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New Texts Out Now: Jens Hanssen, Kafka and Arabs

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Jens Hanssen, “Kafka and Arabs.”Critical Inquiry (Autumn 2012).           

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this article?

Jens Hanssen (JH): I have been carrying a dog-eared photocopy of Kafka’s three-page animal story “Schakale und Araber” in my luggage ever since a friend of mine at the German Institute in Beirut handed it to me to read. This was back in 1998, and I remember that when I read it I knew I would return to it one day. I think for anyone concerned about the tragedy of Palestine, Kafka’s story resonates. It is certainly not straightforward and at the time I did not fully know what it meant, and what it meant for me personally.

Then, in 2009 Atef Botros’s wonderful Kafka: A Jewish Author from an Arab Perspective came out in German. I dug up that dog-eared copy of “Jackals and Arabs” and decided to write a book review of it for the Süddeutsche or Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The German public intellectual Wolf Lepenies had written a shallow review for Die Welt, which argued that some Arabs objected to Kafka and others celebrated his work. What was missing in both accounts was that reading Kafka has the potential to address the question of Palestine and the German taboos around it in new and critical fashions. I felt so strongly about this that I started doing my own research in the German-Jewish newspapers Kafka read at the time. I was struck by just how unabashedly settler colonial most articles were. The papers were full of detailed statistical surveys and calls for maximal colonization of Palestine.

In the end, my review was rejected because the editor opined—rightly, I think—that this was no longer a book review and not yet an academic article. So I abandoned the idea of engaging the German public directly, translated what I had written into English, and broadened the scope of my study to include a host of other Kafka stories. The process since then has been an amazing collective effort of my students, colleagues, friends, and family, who have suggested different approaches and pointed me to new readings.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does your article address?

JH: Since the Egyptian intellectuals Georges Henein and Taha Hussein “discovered” him in the late 1930s, many Arab authors have identified with Kafka’s literature. Joseph K., the tragic protagonist in The Trial, has been particularly popular. Sonallah Ibrahim’s al-Lajna is an obvious example, but as I learnt in the process of writing this article, Jabra Ibrahim Jabra and many other Palestinians, not least Samih al-Qasim and Mahmoud Darwish, have invoked Kafka’s works, too. And I just read that el-Warsha is putting “In the Penal Colony” back on the Egyptian stage. I have traced some of these Arab engagements with this maestro of modernism.

But the article is also about Kafka’s relationship to Palestine and to Zionism, and so I explored the context of fin de siècle Prague and discovered his close ties to the Zionist movement there. It is a complicated relationship, but what I discerned is that Kafka’s rejection of settler colonial Zionism contrasted with his acceptance of Zionist ideals of emancipation in Europe. So I read "Jackals and Arabs” along with other Kafka texts that are set in the non-West, like "In the Penal Colony" and "The Great Wall of China." What I found is that in these writings, European violence in the colonies mirrors the Jewish experience in Europe.

Finally, it was important for me to trace the reception of Kafka in Germany, where the Jewish component of Kafka’s work has been downplayed and the very possibility of critiquing Zionism and Israel from within the German-Jewish tradition is taboo and suppressed, as in the visceral backlash against Judith Butler being awarded the Adorno Prize last month.

J: How does this work connect to and/or depart from your previous research and writing?

JH: I was trained as a nineteenth-century social historian of Ottoman-Arab relations at Oxford. Extended research stays at Aix-en-Provence introduced me to Mediterranean historiography, and almost three years at the American University of Beirut turned me into an urban historian. But since coming to Toronto in 2001, I have been teaching Arab intellectual history in general and the Nahda in particular. I have always felt inadequate to do justice to the Nahda without any training in modern literary studies. I have been hoping for years we would hire someone in modern Arabic Literature who could help me out, but alas, it seems jinxed. So I turned my fascination with "Jackals and Arabs" into an exploration of German and postcolonial literary theories. I have far too much respect for my colleagues in literature to dabble in their field, but I feel more comfortable to speak about Arab intellectual history having done this exercise.

J: Who do you hope will read this article, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

JH: I am actually quite nervous about the reception of this piece. In some sense I have left the familiar moorings of Middle East studies, where I can picture my work’s audience in some vague yet bounded way. I have no idea what my exposure to the Critical Inquiry readership will bring about. I take comfort in the fact that the spirit of Edward Said still permeates the journal. There will likely be objections to my use of the terms “apartheid” and “settler colonialism” in some Israel-right-or-wrong circles, but I am on analytically sound ground here and look forward to pushing the debate further in places like German and Jewish studies. At the same time, there remain ill-conceived traces of a dogmatic rejection of Kafka and other humanists who are wrongly or rightly associated with Zionism in committed scholarship on Palestine. I would like to think that an appreciation of Kafka and like-minded Jewish writers enriches the commitment to justice for the Palestinians. I am most anxious about what Kafka scholars make of the piece. The Kafka shelves [sic] in my university library are intimidating; it is such a dense forest of research!

J: What other projects are you working on now?

JH: This Kafka article is part of a series of essays in a larger project tentatively entitled "German-Jewish Echoes in Arab Political Thought." It is about the traumatic entanglement between German, Jewish, and Arab histories in the twentieth century. This research project uses multiple registers of translation and cultural criticism that connect German-Jewish history to Middle Eastern political developments. I give an account of the unacknowledged traces of the Middle East in Weimar- and post-World War II Germany. I ask, what was the place of the Middle East in critical theory and among writers from Luxemburg and Benjamin to Arendt and Adorno? Conversely, I explore how Arab intellectuals—particularly from Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine/Israel, and Iraq—have translated German-speaking and, in particular, German-Jewish writers. In fact, another essay in this series—on “Reading Hannah Arendt in the Middle East”—has been published online earlier this year. In all of this, I have not forgotten about the Nahda. I am hoping to wrap up an equally long-standing project, my translation of Butrus al-Bustani's soul-searching, anti-sectarian pamphlets "Nafir Suriyya," which he wrote in response to the civil war of 1860, and send it to a publisher by the end of the year.

J: What new directions, do you think, is Middle East Studies taking in the wake of the Arab uprisings?

JH: The money is certainly on Islam and there is still a backlog demand for historically-informed research on the intersection of religion and politics in the region. It is not that there has not been good work since the Iranian revolution caught the field by surprise. But most of the time, Middle East scholars were busy fending off floods of racist and misogynist “expert” discourses on Islam. After 2001, “terrorology” was the gilded discipline, and the general assault on academic freedom intimidated many of us recently-hired faculty. In North America, history departments were the first to respond to the thin coverage of the Middle East at universities. But since then, the study of Islam has attracted considerable amounts of research centers, grants, and funding. The few of us who studied the Nahda and Middle East intellectuals more generally did it on a shoe-string. We found it difficult to convince grant-giving bodies why this research mattered. Then came the spontaneous uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain, and many of us felt that finally reality had vindicated what we had always claimed and conceived but had no contemporary evidence for: people-power exists here, as it does in elsewhere in the world. Secular, liberal, and leftist Arabs rise up against Western-funded authoritarianism and neo-liberal misery, overcome adversity, are passionate about politics, justice, and freedom, and inspire the rest of the world to resist. The current issue of Critical Inquiry has a wonderful slate of articles on the Occupy phenomenon and the Arab spring, including one by Nasser Rabbat.

Right now, there is a sense of disappointment, as better-organized and less progressive forces as well as sectarian divisions have taken over the ideals of the revolutionary moments. But I think Middle East studies is in much better shape to respond to these momentous events than to those in 1979 and 2001; the field is larger, there is a greater variety of scholars in it, including more tenure-stream and tenured faculty with Middle Eastern backgrounds. Jadaliyya is a powerful expression of the field’s readiness to represent the challenges of a new Middle East. And finally, the terrorologist approach has been exposed as the gigantic counter-insurgent spin-operation that it is. For historians who, like myself, are tired of refuting foregone conclusions about rulers and the ruled, the Arab uprisings have validated the search for alternative histories of silenced political ancestries.

The Nahda is one such ancestral problem space that is receiving more attention lately, especially from Arabic literary scholars. Whether you consider the nineteenth-century Arabic revival and reform movement an incomplete project or the source of Arab self-alienation, not to know about the Nahda risks reinventing the wheel or leads to crackpot culture talk. Take for example a recent book, Lost in the Sacred, by Dan Diner, a prominent German historian who (seriously) still argues the old canard that Arabs have failed to secularize and modernize because their language was sacred. Even if Arabic had still been of Koranic quality and Arabs had still considered their language as sacred and unchangeable by the time European armies and commodities flooded the Ottoman empire, the Nahda had so fundamentally transformed the Arabic language that some religious scholars and Arabic classicists started, in vain, to complain. Such an argument was bad enough in German, but then a prominent US university press translated it into English.

Today this approach has the whiff of an era past, and modern intellectual history is making a comeback that seems fuelled by the uprisings. My colleague Max Weiss and I held a conference at Princeton last month to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Albert Hourani’s seminal Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. Once the domain of Orientalists who sought out the permanence and persistence of traditional ideas, intellectual history seems to have experienced a re-enchantment of sorts. A whole host of interesting methodological trends surfaced at the conference; all recognized that we need to move beyond the social law of secularization inherent in Hourani’s liberalism thesis if we want to properly understand the intellectual appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated groups. The other move was to develop recuperative methodologies—approaches that constructively engage with dissident alternatives, especially of Arab leftist intellectual formations in the twentieth century. Here the goal is not to measure social effect, reception processes, or the mass appeal of dominant worldviews. Rather, the point is to participate in the process of transmitting intellectual experiences and counter-currents to posterity that may have been marginal at the time but that may serve—under the right conditions—as a Gramscian inventory of traces to be recovered to inform a more democratic future.

Excerpts from “Kafka and Arabs”

In October 1917 Martin Buber published an animal story by Franz Kafka in his monthly review Der Jude. Kafka’s friend and literary executor, Max Brod, recommended it, assuring Buber that Kafka’s work was among the most Jewish documents of our time. Kafka wrote “Jackals and Arabs” during the war-induced hiatus in Jewish immigration to Palestine, only half a year before the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 committed the British government to support a Jewish national home in Palestine. The polyvalent story and its multilayered context crystallize Kafka’s relationship to Zionism and Palestine as well as his German, Jewish, and Arab scholarly reception. The current revolutionary moment in the Arab world allows us to rethink Kafka and Arabs and, at the same time, the Palestine conflict. As such, this essay contains an intellectual affinity with the revision of Kafka scholarship offered in Critical Inquiry following the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as Achmat Dangor’s haunting postapartheid novel Kafka’s Curse.

[…] 

The correspondence between two of the most important poets of the Palestinian resistance in the mid-1980s is another example. During their widely publicized exchange, Samih al-Qasim invoked Kafka to assuage Mahmud Darwish’s painful sense of the futility of poetry in exile after the Israeli siege of West Beirut, the massacres of Palestinians at Sabra and Shatila, and the hypocrisy of Arab regimes. Al-Qasim reminded Darwish of Kafka’s “ravaging” power as a fellow pariah by way of an allegory in which Kafka gives a “terrifying speech” on the podium of the United Nations. Oblivious to the applause from the General Assembly, Kafka is turned inwards, “contemplating that human beetle helpless on its back.” Al-Qasim explained to Darwish “this beetle is you and me and us and them.” Before the imaginary Kafka leaves the “hypocritical lectern” and returns to his absolute human solitude, he gasped “didn’t I tell you so?” as if to say that for all their professions of support the family of nations considered Palestinians as a burden, long condemned by their deformation during the nakba of 1948. The al-ju`al al-bashri (human beetle) is a direct allusion to Metamorphosis, Kafka’s harrowing tale of the fate of the breadwinning son who wakes up one morning in his bedroom as an ugly beetle and who, nevertheless, is constantly worried about being a burden to his family. But, al-Qasim intoned, “Kafka saw. We saw, and we rebelled; we believed and rebelled, too….And despite everything, we write poetry….This human beetle, turned on its back unjustly, treacherously, and aggressively, will get back up and give birth to a normal human being despite all the civilized beasts turning against us.”

Al-Qasim’s moving plea to Darwish to keep writing also referred to another Kafka work, The Burrow. The story’s narrator is a badger- or molelike creature who exhausts himself in building a maze of underground tunnels and chambers in search of protection from a hostile world above. But the more intricate the tunnel gets the more paranoid the mole becomes that there is a beast outside that audibly pursues him. Al-Qasim appealed to Darwish to break out of this kafkaesque paradox through steadfastness: “This burrow must end—we just have to walk, crawl, believe and say, say and believe, reclaim our strength seed by seed and rise up step by step….We have no choice but to see that distinct flicker of light at the end of the dark tunnel.”

This literary exchange is an evocative instance of the appeal Kafka and his work have for outcasts and victims of history like these two Palestinian poets. Kafka offers an allegorical vocabulary with which to express resistance to one’s plight. It also suggests that the stakes of reading Kafka in the contemporary Arab world are high. Kafka’s work is part of the Arab political lexicon precisely because many Arabs feel they have experienced his fiction as reality.

[Excerpted from Jens Hanssen, “Kafka and Arabs,” Critical Inquiry (Autumn 2012), by permission of the author. © Copyright 2012 Critical Inquiry. For more information, or to subscribe to the full issue, please click here.]


Maghreb Monthly Edition on Jadaliyya (October 2012)

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Chomsky on the Western Sahara and the “Arab Spring” Samia Errazzouki challenges the abstraction of the "Arab Spring," arguing that the term not only de-contextualizes the Western Sahara's protracted struggles for self-representation, but furthermore circumscribes the histories, events, and prospects of contemporary revolts in the Middle East.

Maghreb Media Roundup (October 25) Weekly curation of articles published on the Maghreb from various outlets.

New Texts Out Now: Rikke Hostrup Haugbolle and Francesco Cavatorta, Beyond Ghannouchi: Social Changes and Islamism in Tunisia Jadaliyya editors interview Rikke Hostrup Hougbølle and Francesco Cabatorta regarding the motivations behind their new article, which examines the long term socio-economic changes that contributed to Ennahda victory and attempts to further understanding of democratization in the region.

"Community is Based on Justice" Lilia Weslaty offers an optimistic yet critical analysis of Tunisia's current constitutional status and the overall transitional political climate.

Des trucs, des machins et des choses Salah Elayoubi rebukes Moroccan authorities' brazen intrusion onto journalist Ali Lmbarbet's property. Lmbarbet has been banned from journalistic endeavors for 10 years, following imprisonment and several other encounters with Moroccan officials.

Maghreb Media Roundup (October 18) Weekly curation of articles published on the Maghreb from various outlets.

La Libye un an après Mickael Vogel analyzes challenges to Libya's transitional process, including the implications of Libya's predicted economic growth on centralization and regional contentment.

New Texts Out Now: Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, Libya, Social Origins of Dictatorship, and the Challenge for Democracy Jadaliyya editors interview Ali Abdullatif Ahmida on his newest contribution to the Journal of the Middle East and Africa, which challenges ahistorical and atemporal tribalist portrayals of Libya.

Averting a Moroccan Revolution: The Monarchy's Preemptive Spatial Tactics and the Quest for Stability Report produced by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs expounds Morocco's political status quo beyond the conventional narrative of reform  by examining the regime's control of "spatial practices," and the essential intersections between this spatiality and dissent.  

The Struggle for Security in Eastern Libya New report issued by the Carnegie Endowment asses the obstacles to Libya's weak government, including a budding Salafist militancy, ethnic and regional infighting, and the absence of a substantive, central security force.

The Tunisian Revolution Continues: An Interview with Lina Ben Mhenni Samia Errazzouki interviews Tunisian blogger and activist Lina Ben Mhenni regarding her thoughts on controversial Amendment 28 and other salient issues pertaining to Tunisia's political climate.

Maghreb Media Roundup (October 11) Weekly curation of articles published on the Maghreb from various outlets.

Yes, Morocco is a Regional Model Samia Errazzouki satirically challenges media tropes that aver Morocco's successful evasion of the formulaic "Arab Spring."  

Maghreb Media Roundup (October 4) Weekly curation of articles published on the Maghreb from various outlets.

الترابي في الثمانين

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من أكتوبر إلى يونيو: إفلاس الرؤية وبؤس السيرة

[1]

أكمل الدكتور حسن الترابي، الزعيم الإسلامي، عامه الثمانين هذا العام. وإن قلنا إن شخصاً ما في أي مكان في عالمنا اليوم قد أكمل عامه الكذا فإن مثل هذه الجملة لا تثير في الغالب مشكلة، إلا أنها ربما تثير مشكلة في حالة الترابي. فالترابي عندما سئل مرة عن تاريخ ميلاده وهو ماثل أمام محكمة فإنه أعطى تاريخ ميلاده بالهجري. ولاشك أن الترابي، وهو رجل القانون من ناحية ورجل الحركة الإسلامية من ناحية، قد فكّر في الأمر قبل إعطاء إجابته. لا شك أنه رأى أن صياغة إجابته بتلك الصيغة ينسجم أكثر مع مشروعه الإسلامي الذي يهدف في نهاية الأمر لإخضاع حياة الناس بكل تفاصيلها لأحكام الإسلام وتعاليمه وتقاليده ورموزه وصبغ كل مظاهر سلوكهم به. وهكذا وعندما نقول في حالة الترابي إنه أكمل عامه الثمانين فلابد أن ننتبه أن ذلك بحساب التاريخ الميلادي، أما إن استخدمنا الحساب الذي تبناه الترابي يوما من الأيام عندما وقف أمام تلك المحكمة فإنه يكون في واقع الأمر قد أكمل هذا العام عامه الثالث والثمانين. وأعياد الميلاد عندما تصادف العقود عادةً ما تكتسب وزناً خاصاً وعادة ما تكون فرصة للتوقف ومراجعة النفس. لا أعلم إن توقّف الترابي هذا العام أو قبل ثلاثة أعوام ليراجع نفسه ويراجع ما أنجز في حياته الطويلة وربما ليفكّر في يوم فراقه للعالم وفي إرثه وصورته في كتب التاريخ السوداني في المستقبل (والانشغال بالإرث أمر طبيعي في حالة السياسيين القادة). ربما فعل ذلك وربما لم يفعل، ولكن دعنا نقوم بتلك المراجعة لإنجاز الرجل ونلخّص إرثه.

إن المفارقة الكبرى في سيرة الترابي أن النقطة العليا في رسمها البياني هو بدايتها، إذ أن خطه البياني يبدأ عند نقطة عالية هي لحظة مشاركته الشجاعة والبارزة مع باقي القوى السياسية والنقابية في إلهاب ثورة إكتوبر 1964 من موقعه في كلية القانون بجامعة الخرطوم. وبعد ذلك يبدأ الخط البياني في الانحدار انحداراً متواصلا فيصل في فترة الديمقراطية الثانية (1964-1969) دركه الأسفل عبر دوره (ودور حركته جبهة الميثاق الإسلامي) في توجيه أكبر طعنة للديمقراطية عندما اتخذت الجمعية التأسيسية قرارها بحلّ الحزب الشيوعي في ديسمبر 1965. وعقب انقلاب جعفر نميري اليساري في بداياته في مايو 1969 واعتقال الترابي فإن انحدار خطه البياني يتوقف ليمتد امتداداً أفقياً إلى يوليو 1977 عندما وجّه نميري سفينة نظامه لليمين ودخل في مصالحة مع أحزاب اليمين، وأصبح الترابي (وحركته) عنصراً فاعلاً في نظامه إلى أن انقلب نميري على الإسلاميين قبيل سقوطه عندما اتضح له تآمرهم لإزاحته عن السلطة بانقلاب عسكري. ويتواصل انحدار الخط البياني للترابي (وحركته الجبهة الإسلامية القومية) في فترة الديمقراطية الثالثة (1985-1989) التي لعب الإسلاميون فيها دوراً أساسياً في تأجيج نار الحرب الأهلية وإلهاب هوس الشريعة. وانتهت هذه الفترة بتنفيذ الترابي (وحركته) لانقلابه المؤجل منذ أخريات فترة نميري ووأده للنظام الديمقراطي الذي أتاح لحركته فرصة المشاركة في الحكومة وأتاح للإسلاميين كامل الفرص والحريات الدستورية التي لم تستمتع بها أية حركة إسلامية في أغلب بلاد باقي الشرق الأوسط حينها. ومنذ انقلاب يونيو 1989 فإن انحدار الخط البياني للترابي (وحركته) تواصل تواصلاً متسارعاً ليبلغ بالسودان وضعه المأساوي الحالي.

[2]

وحتى نفهم سر انحدار الترابي المتواصل وسر سقوطه فلابد أن نضع في اعتبارنا أن الترابي إسلامي بالدرجة الأولي ورجل قانون بالدرجة الثانية. وهذا شيء طبيعي في حالة كل إسلامي إذ أن الإيديولوجية تؤكد كل الوقت أن "الإسلام يقود الحياة"، وبذا يكون الاعتبار الإسلامي هو الاعتبار الحاكم الذي يعلو على كل الاعتبارات. صحيح أن دواعي التكتيك ربما تستدعي تنازلات وتراجعات هنا وهناك (لحظات "حديبية" ربما يصفها من هم بمزاج عمر بن الخطاب بأنها لحظات إعطاء "الدنية" في "الدين") ولكن لابد للهدف الاستراتيجي أن يكون منتصبا باستمرار وألا يغيب عن النظر. إن اللحظة العليا في خط بيان الترابي، لحظة إكتوبر 1964، لم تكن لحظة إسلامية وإنما كانت لحظة رجل القانون الذي انحاز لمبدأ الدستور ومثاله الأعلى وهو مبدأ الحرية. أما باقي خطه البياني فهو خط إسلامي فارق فيه الترابي ذاته القانونية وأصبح غارقاً في التآمر على القيم الدستورية حتى وأدها بانقلابه في يوليو 1989.

ولقد مثّل انقلاب يوليو 1989 على المستوى الشخصي للترابي ما يمكن أن نصفه باللحظة العليا لانقلابه على ذاته القانونية إذ أنها كانت اللحظة التي تنكّر فيها للمثال الأعلى للفكرة الدستورية وهو مبدأ الحرية. تنكّر الترابي لمبدأ الحرية السياسية ووأده بانقلابه عندما حَجَر حريات كل السودانيين السياسية، وتنكّر لمبدأ الحرية الفكرية والدينية عندما أحيا قمع الشريعة للآخر وبعث الردّة وعقوبتها من سباتها التاريخي ليصبح الحق الإنساني والطبيعي في تغيير الإنسان لدينه أو رفضه للدين جريمة تسلبه حياته. وكان من الطبيعي في ظل النظام السياسي والإيديلوجي للترابي وحركته، أو ما أطلق عليه اسم "المشروع الحضاري"، أن تتمدّد أشكال القهر لكل مناحي حياة السودانيين، وأن يذيق الترابي وحركته السودانيين ألواناً من الإذلال والعذاب لم تنقضِ  حتى الآن، تفرّغوا لتأسيسها وتجويد وسائلها ولسان حالهم يقول "يعذبهم الله بأيديكم".  

وإن كان انقلاب الترابي على الديمقراطية هو جريمته وجريمة حركته الإسلامية الكبرى فإن هذه الجريمة ما لبثث أن أضحت الجريمة الأم التي وَلَدَت جرائم أخرى لا تقل عنها خطراً. حوّل الترابي بمنطقه الإسلامي طبيعة الحرب الأهلية بين الشمال والجنوب لحرب جهاد إسلامي، ودفع نظامُه ولأول مرة في تاريخ الحرب الأهلية بعشرات الآلاف من المواطنين المدنيين لساحات سفك الدماء والإبادة التي أطلق عليها النظام اسم "ساحات الفداء". ووصل بؤس الحركة الإسلامية وتغييبها للوعي درجة حديث أجهزة إعلامها عن اشتراك الملائكة في حربها الإبادية ضد الجنوبيين ودرجة عقد الحفلات احتفالاً بأعراس موتى النظام وزفافهم للحور العين. وفقد الجنوبي كمواطن غير مسلم حقه في الحياة الكريمة والمعاملة المتساوية في وطنه وأصبح موضوعاً لبطش يد الجهاد التي لا تنفك عن القتل والتشريد. نجح الترابي نجاحاً محزناً في أن يملأ عقول الكثيرين وقلوبهم بما امتلأ به عقله وقلبه من رغبة في الإقصاء والتحكّم والبطش بالخصوم وإذلالهم وتصفيتهم إن لزم الأمر. 

وإن أصبح المواطن الجنوبي في ظل نظام الترابي موضوعاً لشريعة الجهاد وسيفه فإن سائر المواطنين أصبحوا موضوعا لسوط الشريع ، إذ أن رؤية الترابي التي تداخلت فيها إسلاميته وتدريبه القانوني أثمرت القانون الجنائي لسنة 1991. وفي واقع الأمر فإن هذا القانون هو أهم وثيقة للترابي وحركته إذ أنه يجسّد الطموحات العليا للحركة عندما تتحدث عن "تحكيم شرع الله". وهكذا يشمل القانون بالإضافة للعقوبات الموروثة من القوانين غير الدينية السابقة عقوبات الشريعة المألوفة من رجم وإعدام وصلب وقطع للأيدي والأرجل وجلد. وهي عقوبات، كما نرى، تبعث عقوبات القرن السابع في الجزيرة العربية وتتصادم مع الفطرة السليمة وحس الإنصاف والتوازن بين الجريمة والعقوبة (وهو تصادم أحس به الناس حتى في القرن السابع والقرون التي تلته) وتنتهك إجماع الحكمة التشريعية لعصرنا التي لخصتها اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لعام 1984 المتعلقة بمناهضة التعذيب والعقوبات القاسية أو اللإنسانية أو المهينة. إن ما احتواه القانون الجنائي للترابي، رجل القانون المشبع بهويته الإسلامية، يعكس عمق الهوة التي تفصل بينه وبين القيم والمثل التشريعية العليا التي يكافح القانونيون ذوو الضمائر من أجل إرسائها في عالمنا اليوم. 

رغم أن حركة الإخوان المسلمين كان لها تيارها اليساري الذي انفتح على قيم الفكر الاشتراكي وظهر ذلك في كتابات عديدة مثل كتاب (اشتراكية الإسلام) لمصطفي السباعي مؤسس الحركة في سوريا وكتابات سيد قطب مثل (العدالة الاجتماعية في الإسلام) و (معركة الإسلام والرأسمالية)، إلا أن الموقف اليميني المنحاز للملكية الخاصة وعلاقات الانتاج الرأسمالية ظلّ هو الموقف السائد وسط الإخوان المسلمين. ورغم أن التيار الكبير للحركة الإسلامية في السودان برزت فيه اتجاهات يسارية ربطت الإسلام بالاشتراكية كما هو في حالة الحزب الاشتراكي الإسلامي وحالة حركة محمود محمد طه، إلا أن حركة الإخوان المسلمين السودانية ظلّت في الغالب حركة يمينية معادية لفكرة الإشتراكية أو مطمح العدل الاجتماعي. ولقد لعب الترابي دوراً أساسياً في تكريس هذا الاتجاه إذ كان حريصاً كل الوقت على وضع حركته في المسار المعاكس لليسار وخاصة الشيوعيين. وبعد مصالحته لنميري ودخوله أروقة الحكم دفع الترابي بحركته دفعاً حثيثاً في اتجاه التحالف مع رأس المال الإسلامي الذي أصبحت حركته حركة عالمية مرتبطة برأس المال العالمي. ولقد كان نمو هذه النزعة وتسارعها عاملا أساسيا من عوامل حرص الترابي على الانقلاب على الديمقراطية والاستئثار بالسلطة بأسرع فرصة ممكنة إذ أن ذلك سيضع كل إمكانيات السودان وثرواته في يده ويد حركته. وهكذا وفي ظل نظام الإسلاميين شهد السودان تحولاً تاماً في طبيعة الدولة السودانية إذ أصبحت خادمة لمصالحهم الاستثمارية وحارسة لها بالتشريع والسلاح. وممارسة الترابي وحركته انحازت في نهاية المطاف لما يمكن وصفه بالرأسمالية المنفلتة (rampant capitalism) التي تتميّز في حالة السودان بتفكيك القطاع العام وإطلاق يد الخصخصة وإخضاع مجموع العمليات الاقتصادية لاعتبارات توليد الربح السريع والآني من غير اعتبار للنتائج والعواقب الاجتماعية والاقتصادية بعيدة المدى. ولأن الحس الاجتماعي للترابي وحركته ضعيف ولان قيم العدل الاجتماعي غائبة عن أفقهم فقد كان من الطبيعي لسياساتهم أن تفقر الغالبية الساحقة من السودانيين وأن توصل اقتصاد البلاد لطريق مسدود.

[3]

ورغم أن الغالبية الساحقة من السودانيين خسرت في ظل "المشروع الحضاري" للترابي وحركته ، إلا أن أكثر من خسروا وتضرروا هن النساء. خسرت المرأة خسارة كبيرة وفادحة لأن برنامج الإسلاميين يعاملها كمواطن من الدرجة الثانية. صحيح أن المرأة السودانية لم تخسر حقها في الانتخاب والترشيح (كما هو حادث في بلد مثل السعودية) ولم تخسر حقها في نيل التعليم (كما حدث في أفغانستان تحت حكم طالبان) وذلك لأن هذه الحقوق أضحت متجذّرة في السودان وما كان من الممكن للإسلاميين أن يجرأوا على مسّها، إلا أن الإسلاميين وضعوا الأساس القانوني الذي يعرقل المسيرة المستقبلية للمرأة ويسدّ الطريق في وجه استكمال انعتاقها من ربقة التمييز. إن أبرز سمتين تسمان برنامج الإسلاميين أو "مشروعهم الحضاري" هما تطبيق الحدود من ناحية وتطبيق أحكام النساء من الناحية الأخرى. وأحكام النساء كما هو معلوم تنطلق من قاعدة أن المرأة "ناقصة عقل ودين". وهكذا يقع التمييز ضدها على مستويات عديدة من أبرزها مستوى أهليتها لتولي منصب ما أطلق عليه العلماء "الإمامة الكبرى"، وبذا فإن المرأة لا تستطيع أن تصبح رئيسة للدولة، ومستوى قوانين الأحوال الشخصية، ومستوى الشهادة أمام المحاكم، ومستوى الميراث. صحيح أن النظام عيّن وزيرات من باب التكتيك والمسايرة لتقاليد العصر، ولكن ذلك لا يغيّر وضع الدونية النوعية في ظل أحكام الشريعة المفروضة إذ أن جنس الوزيرة كامرأة هو الذي يحدّد وضعيتها القانونية ويجعلها مواطنة من الدرجة الثانية رغم منصبها الوزار . لقد ناضلت النساء السودانيات طويلا ضد كل أشكال التمييز، ورغم التشوهات التي أفرزتها هيمنة الإسلاميين فإن نضال النساء في السودان لم يتوقف ومن المؤكد أنه سيتواصل إلى أن ينلن كامل حقوقهن. ومن الامثلة التي تبعث على التفاؤل وتستحقّ الإشادة ذلك الموقف الشجاع والجريء للصحفية لبنى حسين عندما واجهت تسلّط النظام في يوليو 2009 في قضية البنطلون الشهيرة وأجبرت الإسلاميين على التراجع مُعَرِّيَةً تهافت مشروعهم وعجز أدوات قمعهم.

[4]

ورغم أن الترابي يقف اليوم في المعارضة بعد أن أثبت حواريوه حسن تفقههم بفقههه فانقلبوا عليه وانفردوا بالسلطة، إلا أن ذلك يجب ألا يذهلنا عن حقيقة ما فعل الرجل وعن مسئوليته مهما علا صوته بالمعارضة. يجب أن نرفض ونقاوم كل محاولات الترابي لـ "تطبيع" نفسه وإعادة صناعة دوره السياسي وكأنه جزء من نضال السودانيين من أجل استعادة الحرية والديمقراطية التي سلبهم إياها. إن الترابي هو المسئول الأول عن انقلاب يوليو 1989 وهو بهذه الصفة لا يستطيع أن يتحلّل من المسئولية القانونية والأخلاقية لجرائم النظام. صحيح أن العميد عمر البشير هو الوجه العسكري والتنفيذي للنظام وأنه مجرم حرب، إلا أن الترابي مشارك من الدرجة الأولى في جرم البشير ويجب أن يقف معه في نفس قفص الاتهام، إذ أن انقلابه على الديمقراطية هو الذي مكّن العميد البشير وجعل كل جرائم النظام منذ لحظة الانقلاب إلى أن يسقط ممكنة .

وإرث الترابي يراه السودانيون اليوم في كل ما يحيط بهم، من انكماش في مساحة وطنهم لأن الجنوبيين قرروا بالإجماع الانفصال عنهم والاستقلال بوطنهم، ومن حرب مستمرة في دارفور وجبال النوبة وجنوب النيل الأزرق لا تزال تذهب بحياة السودانيين وتشردهم، ومن فقر مدقع يهصرهم هصراً ، ومن تردٍ في تعليمهم وخدماتهم الصحية، ومن قوانين وأجهزة أمنية مدججة بالسلاح تدوس يوميا على كرامتهم وتنحطّ بإنسانيتهم.        

لقد رفض الترابي أن يعتذر للشعب السوداني عن مسئوليته في الانقلاب على الديمقراطية وعما ترتّب عن انقلابه. وهو كقانوني يعلم أنه حتى لو اعتذر فإن ذلك لن يغيّر واقع الحال ولن يبرّئَه من جرائمه. وكما هو الحال في حالة العميد البشير فإن السودانيين لا يستطيعون الآن إلقاء القبض على الترابي ومحاكمته. إن قصارى ما يستطيعون أن يفعلوه هو أن يعقدوا للترابي وللبشير ولأركان نظامهما محكمة غيابية شبيهة بمحكمة الفيلسوف البريطاني برتراند رسل عام 1966 التي عقدها لمحاكمة أمريكا على جرائم حربها في فيتنام. هذا هو قصارى ما يستطيعون فعله الآن إلى أن تتغير الموازين وتتاح لهم الفرصة لمحاكمتهما ومحاكمة أعوانهما محاكمة حقيقية. ولكن وحتى إن لم يتحقق ذلك فمن الضروري أن يعمل السودانيون على أن يملك التاريخ كل الحقائق لإدانتهما وإدانة نظامهما . إن مثل هذه الإدانة على ما ظل الإسلاميون يقترفونه من انتهاكات وجرائم أمر في غاية الأهمية والحيوية إن أردنا لأبنائنا وبناتنا في المستقبل أن ينشأوا في واقع معافى تسوده قيم الحرية والعدالة واحترام كرامة الإنسان وحقوقه.

ملف من الأرشيف: دلال المغربي

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[”ملف من الأرشيف“ هي سلسة تقوم ”جدلية“ بنشرها بالعربية والإنجليزية بالتعاون مع جريدة ”السفير“ اللبنانية. الملفات ستكون لشخصيات أيقونية تركت أثراً عميقاً في الحقل السياسي والثقافي في العالم العربي.]

 

 

  

الإسم:دلال

الشهرة:المغربي

إسم الأب:سعيد

إسم الأم:أمنة إسماعيل

تاريخ الولادة: 1958

تاريخ الوفاة: 1978

الجنسية:فلسطين

مكان الولادة:بيروت

الفئة: ناشطة سياسية

المهنة:ناشطة سياسية 

  

دلالالمغربي

·فلسطينية.
·إسمها الحركي: جهاد.
·ولدت في حي المزرعة في بيروت سنة 1958.
·والدها فلسطيني من قرية اللد ، والدتها لبنانية.
·تلقت علومها الابتدائية في مدرسة يعبد ودرست الاعدادية في مدرسة حيفا وكلتا المدرستين تابعتين لوكالة غوث اللاجئين الفلسطينين في بيروت.
·التحقت بحركة "فتح" سنة 1972.
·قادت عملية عسكرية في الأراضي المحتلة في 11 آذار 1978 على رأس مجموعة "دير ياسين" وخطط للعملية ونظمها خليل الوزير وسميّت عملية "كمال عدوان" في رسالة واضحة إلي أنها جاءت رداً علي اغتيال كمال عدوان في بيروت عام ١٩٧٣. وقامت باختطاف باص كان متوجهاً من حيفا إلى تل أبيب وقُتلت في تلك العملية.

·تفاصيل العملية:

تمكّنت مع مجموعة من الفدائيين من التسلّل إلى داخل الأراضي الفلسطينية وسيطرت على سيارة إسرائيلية من طراز مرسيدس، واستخدموا هذه السيارة في السيطرة على باص إسرائيلي، واتجهوا به نحو مدينة تل أبيب. وفي الطريق سيطروا على باص آخر ونقلوا ركّابه إلى الباص الأول واستأنفوا طريقهم، واستطاعوا تجاوز أكثر من حاجز عسكري، ما دفع بالجيش الإسرائيلي إلى استقدام عدد أكبر من الجنود وبالقرب من مستعمرة الخضيرة جرت معركة عنيفة مع القوات الإسرائيلية استمرّت لأكثر من ثلاثين ساعة قتل بنتيجتها عدد من الرهائن الإسرائيليين واستشهدت وسقط معها كل من: محمد شرعان (فلسطيني)، عبد الرؤوف علي (يمني)، محمد عبد الرحيم (فلسطيني)، محمدأسعد (فلسطيني)، محمد الشمري (يمني)، علي عامرية (لبناني)، خالد عبد الفتاح (فلسطيني)، يحيى سكاف (لبناني)، وأسر كل من: حسين فياض (فلسطيني)، خالد إبراهيم (فلسطيني). بينما أسفرت العملية عن مقتل 30 اسرائيلياً وجرح ما يزيد عن 80 بين جندي ومستوطن.

كان قائد الجيش آنذاك هو ايهود باراك الذي ما إن علم أن دلال هي قائدة المجموعة، إقترب من جثتها وأمسكها من شعرها وأخذ يشده أمام كاميرات المصورين. 
كانت على قائمة الجثامين التي طالب بها حزب الله اللبناني في اطار صفقة لتبادل الأسرى أُبرمت مع إسرائيل في 17 تموز 2008 ولكن فحوص الحمض النووي DNA أظهرت عدم إعادة الجثمان وأن الجثث المعادة هي لأربعة شهداء مجهولي الهوية...ولا يزال جثمانها غير معروف المكان.   

الأمة المصرية حين تفقد لغتها : لغة الرب أم لغة المستعمر؟

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"اللغة توفر الحرية والقيد، والفهم وسوء الفهم معاً" نيلوفر حائري

يتحكم في استخدام اللغة وتقنينها ثالوث الأمة والدين والدولة. وفي مصر تدرس الباحثة الأمريكية نيلوفر حائري (ذات أصل إيراني) الوضع اللغوي العامي وعلاقته بالأبنية الاجتماعية والثقافية والسياسية خلال فترتين (1987-1988 و1995-1996) في كتابها"لغة مقدسة وناس عاديون: معضلات الثقافة والسياسة في مصر" بترجمة إلهام عيداروس ومراجعة مديحة دوس (المركز القومي للترجمة، 2011).

تركز فصول الكتاب حيال أربعة مواضيع: العلاقة بين اللغة والحداثة(المعاصرة) والتوجه نحو اللغة المحلية (العامية)، والنضال من أجل نفخ الحداثة في العربية الفصحى(لغة القرآن الكريم)، والغموض المستمر في العربية الفصحى المعاصرة، والأزمة في استقلال وتقعيد اللغة العامية لغة تحدث وكتابة. وحين تضع الجهد الأساسي في العلاقة ما بين اللغة العربية الفصحى إزاء اللهجة المصرية العامية فهي غير عابئة بتراكم التنافرات والتناقضات التاريخية، والأبنية الاجتماعية والثقافية، والأنظمة السياسية والدينية.

إذ تنطلق من "الحيرة البحثية" حيال الدرس اللغوي المقارن الذي تستفتح به الكتاب حين تقارن بين لغة "الكاثاريفوسا"( اللغة اليونانية الكلاسيكية الحديثة) التي أبدلت بـ "الديموطيقية" (اللغة اليونانية الشفوية) (الفصل الأول، ص 35) وهي تنعدم بالمقارنة مع اللغة العربية الفصحى (اللغة القرآنية) واللغة المصرية الشفوية التي من الأدعى دراسة تطور الأخيرة عن أكثر من لغة مصرية (الفرعونية والقبطية ولهجاتها) والاندماجات اللغوية بينها وبين اللغات الحامية والسامية والأوروبية.

وتكرس هذه "الحيرة البحثية" حتى حين تعرض لما أقرته الدساتير المصرية في القرن العشرين بتواريخها المعروفة (1923 و1956 و1971 و1980) بأن "الإسلام هو الدين الرسمي للدولة واللغة العربية هي لغتها الرسمية" (الفصل السادس، ص 250) دون أن تحاول قراءة الخريطة اللغوية في أقاليم مصر (العربية السيناوية في شرقها، والأمازيغية في غربها، والنوبية في جنوبها، والقبطية – المصرية في وسطها وشمالها).

وإذا أخذت في حسبانها النضال التحرري العربي والتطلع نحو الوحدة العربية ضد الاستعمار الغربي (الفصل السادس، ص 249) ما دفع إلى الواجهة اعتبار "اللغة العربية الفصحى" هي لغة الوحدة العربية التي أدعت إلى الالتباس الخطير بين اللغة العربية والدين الإسلامي برغم أنها مندهشة من جواب محمود أمين العالم بأنه لم تستطع الوحدة العربية والدين الإسلامي من تطوير "اللغة العربية الفصحى" بل من طورها هم العرب المسيحيون الذين طوعوها عبر الصحافة والأدب في القرن التاسع عشر والعشرين (الفصل الخامس، ص 225).

وقد تفاجأت بفشل "مسألة التعريب اللغوي" حيث فرضت بعض المصطلحات نفسها من لغات أجنبية في مجالات التقنية الاتصالية والأدوات المنزلية ووسائل النقل والمواصلات (الفصل الرابع، ص 183). وغاب عن الباحثة حائري التي اتخذت من إفشال تجربة مجلة "ابن عروس" لمحمد بغدادي ( مارس ومايو ويوليو 1993) في (الفصل الخامس، ص 219)، وجبهة العداء للأدب باللغة المصرية عند شعراء مثل صلاح جاهين وفؤاد حداد وسيد حجاب وعبد الرحمن الأبنودي بسبب الانتماء الإيديولوجي اليساري (الفصل الخامس، ص 223) بأنه هناك قوة فاعلة ثقافية مستمرة وهي متوفرة عبر السينما والإذاعة والتلفزيون التي تكرس من الثقافة المصرية الشفوية أو العامية المصرية – على حد تعبيرها - في الأفلام والمسرحيات والأغاني والكاريكاتير والبرامج التفلزيونية الحوارية والجماهيرية.

وقبل هذا فات الباحثة أنه بين القرن التاسع عشر والقرن العشرين واكب تلك الثقافة المصرية الشفوية التي تعد مرجعياتها حاضرة في الموال الشعبي، والمسرح الشعبي (خيال الظل) وفن الأراجوز، والسيرة الشعبية، والغناء الشعبي (بمختلف تنويعاته الريفية والبدوية والساحلية) صحافة متخصصة.

وقد استطاعت هذه الصحافة – صحافة المجلات المتخصصة في الأدب الشفوي أو العامي - التكريس لهذه الثقافة موسعة من مجالها الإبداعي في الأزجال والمسرحية والمذكرات والنكت نحو مقالات النقد الاجتماعي والسياسي في أكثر من مطبوعة: مجلة أبو نظارة زرقاء (1877 -1884) ليعقوب صنوع حيث منعت وأصدرها بأكثر من اسم لاحقاً في القاهرة وباريس، ومجلة المسامير(1910) للسيد عارف، والسيف (1911) لحسين علي، والكشكول (1921) لسليمان فوزي، وأبو قردان (1924) لمحمود رمزي نظيم، والبغبغان (1924)لمحمود حسني، وألف صنف(1925) لبديع خيري، وأبو شادوف (1926) لمحمد شرف، وابن البلد (1929) للسيد بيومي سلامة.

وفي ذات الفترة ظهرت كتابات من الأدب المصري الشفوي نشرت متوالية مثل: مذكرات فتوة (1927) للمعلم يوسف أبو حجاج، ومذكرات عربجي (1927) للأسطى حنفي، ومذكرات نشال (1927)، ومذكرات وصيفة مصرية (1927) لزينب محمد، ومذكرات خالتي أم سيد (1927) لأحمد عبد الحميد، والحاج درويش وأم إسماعيل (1936) لحسين شفيق المصري.

وأعود لأقول بأنه هناك مرحلة - من مراحل الأدب العربي - وهي مرحلة الآداب الشفوية في الأقاليم العربية حيث ابتكرت الكثير من القوالب الأدبية والأنماط الإبداعية والأشكال التعبيرية (أي: الأجناس الأدبية والفنية) خلال القرون المتتابعة منذ أن دخلت شعوب آسيا الأقاليم العربية، وهي المغول (1258-1260)، والمماليك (1250-1517)، والعثمانية (1566-1916) حيث استخدمت اللغة في مستوياتها الثلاثة(لغة الكتابة واللغة المولدة ولغة العامة على رأي الجاحظ) منقحة عن بعضها في مزيج جديد وضعت فيه الأزجال (الملحون في تونس والحميني في اليمن والنبطي في الجزيرة العربية) والسيرة الشعبية وخيال الظل وفن الأراجوز.

تحولت اللغة هنا إلى وسيلة دفاع ومقاومة بعد أن استحكم باللغة العربية الفصحى الأعاجم حيث أسلموا فكانت خطب الجمع والمراسلات الرسمية بها فتملكوها وهو ما دفع – برأيي - الشعوب العربية إلى أن تستخدم لغاتها المحلية التي تطورت مع ابتكار وسائل وأنماط وقوالب في التعبير والإبداع الأدبي والفني رسخت به من هوياتها المتعددة حيث كل منطقة ترسبت بها مكونات حضارية مختلفة.

والأمر الذي لا يمكنم تجاهله في أي درس لغوي مقارن أن الوضع اللغوي العربي ليس عربياً تاماً، ولا زال قائماً حتى الآن حيث نرى أعراق، غير العربية والمستعربة (المولدة أو الخلاسية)، في العراق (أكراد، تركمان، آشور)، والبحرين (تركمان وفرس وهنود)، والأردن (شركس والشيشان)، واليمن (أحباش ولحوج وأفارقة)، ومصر (أقباط والنوبة واليونان ...)، وسوريا ولبنان (السريان والأرمن)، والجزائر والمغرب (أفارقة وأمازيغ)، وهي تشكل حالات انصهار وإدماج أو انغلاق وتكتل أقلوي.

وحين تضاد الباحثة، وتلمح إلى "الانفصام الثقافي"، في الحياة الاجتماعية بين المصري المسلم وإلزامية تعلم وأداء أركان الإسلام باللغة القرآنية وبين متطلبات الحياة سواء المهنة والحياة العامة التي تجعل من اللغة الفصحى لغة المدارس بينما اللغة الشفوية باعتراف أحد الأشخاص - تحت الدراسة - هي "لغة الحياة" أي أداة التواصل الاجتماعي اليومي في العمل والحياة العامة (الفصل الثاني، ص: 83)، وترى أن مهنة المصحح أو المحرر على أنها مهنة ذكورية حسب مشاهدتها هي عامل رقابي لغوي حيث تتندر بمسمى "الإخوان النحويين" (الفصل الثالث، ص 108) باعتبارهم متنطعين لغويين يشددون على حسن اللغة في تركيبتها وصرفها وإعرابها (الفصل الثاني، ص 89) غير أنها في فصل آخر ترى أن هناك دوراً يلمح إليه المتحدثين والمتحدثات إليها بأن الرقابة اللغوية تخفي رقابة سياسية في الأصل (الفصل الخامس، ص221).

وإذا ما طرحت إمكانية إحلال اللغة المصرية الشفوية لغة تحدث وكتابة (الفصل السادس، 254) باعتبارها تتوازى مع لغات عربية شفوية متعددة في الجزيرة العربية والعراق والشام وشمال أفريقيا فإنها تتناسى عن طرح أسئلة مهمة إزاء أن التناقض بين لغة النص القرآني المتصلة بها اللغة العربية الفصحى المعاصرة، وهي التي تراها غامضة، وبين اللغة المصرية الشفوية أو اللهجة المصرية العامية من حيث: الاختلاف في حقوق الملكية، واعتباطية الرموز، ومسألة الأصل، والقابلية للترجمة (الفصل السادس، 246).

ولكن الأسئلة لا بد أن تعيد النظر في ما يخص هذه اللغة القرآنية الفصحى، وهي لغة دينية بالدرجة الأولى أنتجتها جماعة حجازية – قرشية، فلا تستحق أن تواجه بخطاب "عقدة الصغار" الذي أبداه الأديب عثمان صبري في مقاله المكتوب عام 1967 "العربية الفصحى مش لغتنا علا [هكذا] شان نقدر نتصرف فيها" (الفصل السادس، ص 240)، وهي أسئلة تحمل مشروعيتها عن تاريخ العرب وثقافتهم( لغتهم وكتابتهم)، ومفهوم العروبة كأمة بين عروبات متابينة (العاربة والمستعربة أو اليمنية والحجازية والنجدية)، وجذور معجم النص القرآني الغامضة (السريانية والقبطية والأثيوبية واليمنية)، وهي التي تثيرها مؤلفات جادة كسرت الثابت العلمي بما يتعدى أبواب اللغة العربية في الدخيل والمعرب حين وضع كتاب "التوراة جاءت من جزيرة العرب" (1985) لكمال الصليبي أساساً جغرافياً لهذا النص بأحداثه ومساره التاريخي والاجتماعي والذي توسّع في رد أصل هذا النص إلى واحدة من اللغات العربية المنسية (وهي اليمنية) الباحث فاضل الربيعي في عمله الضخم "فلسطين المتخيلة: أرض التوراة في اليمن القديم" (2008)، وجاء كتاب "قراءة آرامية -سريانية للقرآن" (2002) كريستوف لوكسنبرغ وما تبعه من أبحاث مؤتمر "نحو قراءة جديدة للقرآن؟" (2005) التي اكتشفت مزايا هضم الثقافات السابقة من سريانية وقبطية وأثيوبية حيث صدرت أبحاثه في كتاب" القرآن في محيطه التاريخي" (2008) حرره جبرائيل سعيد رينولدز.

وبرغم أن الباحثة اعتمدت على كتاب "تاريخ الدعوة للعامية وآثارها في مصر"(1964) لنفوسة سعيد، ومن ملاحظتي أنها لم تقرأه كاملاً حين تساءلت ولم تجد، والكتاب أشار وأورد ترجمة نصوص الإنجيل إلى اللغة المصرية الشفوية (الفصل الثاني، 104)، وهي المعروفة بعنوان شهير "الخبر الطيب بتاع السيد المسيح" (1926)التي وضعها ولكوكس لنصوص من العهد القديم والجديد (إنجيل مرقص وإنجيل متى وسفر التكوين وسفر المزامير وأعمال الرسل) وقد طبعت هذه النصوص منفصلة بين عامي(1940-1949) (سعيد، 1964، ص 61)، وهو ما كان يساعدها في حسم تلك الجدليات السطحية التي وضعتها في كتابها من حيث أن اللغة تتحكم فيها بشكل أعمق "التحولات التي تتم في الممارسات الثقافية والهوية الاجتماعية والنظام السياسي" كما يقول شلدون بولوك حين رأى أن اللغات المحلية في الهند تتطور بمعزل عن اللغة السنسكريتية المحتكرة.

إذن، فإن النظام السياسي والبناء الإيديولوجي من يتحكم في تخير مستوى لغوي للكتابة بينما لا يمكن أن يستطيع هذا النظام السياسي والديني من تطوير لغة هو نفسه يحتكرها بل يدفعها إلى قفص في متحف، أو تعد العربية الفصحى "لغة ميتة" كما يعلق الناشر لقمان سليم (الفصل الخامس، 211) فتأتي لغات عربية شفوية، ضمن سياق نظرية النشوء والارتقاء، لتحتل مكانها لغة بديلة متكاملة المقومات والعناصر تستقل وتتميز عن الفصحى بأن لها رموزها وتراكبيها ومرونتها (الفصل الخامس، ص 217) كما قيل في مقالة نشرتها مجلة"ابن عروس" (العدد الثاني، 1993) الموؤودة، وتعيش في اللسان تحت طائلة الاحتمال أن تكون لغة المستقبل !

[الكاتب محمد ربيع]

Syria Media Roundup (November 8)

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 [This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

 
Regional and International Perspectives

The Death of Arab Secularism by Faisal al Yafai

Reactions to the Syrian National Initiative Marina Ottaway on the positions of the opposition with regards to the plan to supplant the SNC for a more inclusive group

 

Election won’t Alter US Course in Syria Sami Moubayed says “Syrians want to believe that the crisis in their country is a high priority for the White House. It is important, no doubt, but by no means is it urgent for the United States.”

 

Hezbollah's role in Syria grows murkysays Nicholas A Heras


The Changing Face of Syria’s Opposition
Al Jazeera’s Inside Syria program with Rim Turkmani, Flynt Leverett and Osama Kadi

Syrians Forced to Teach Themselves in Exile Matthew Cassel visits al-Bushayer school in Turkey.

Syrian Narratives

A Decline into Uprising Jihad Yazigi says the economic and social conditions Syrians lived in contributed to the uprising, an idea that is crucial to understand to come up with an effective economic reconstruction plans.

Syria’s Kurds: Civil Wars with a Civil War Piort Zalewski on the fighting between Kurdish armed groups and the FSA last week in Aleppo.

American Amateurism on Display in Syria Rami Khouri outlines three problems that the United States creates by dealing with the opposition in an indecisive way.

From a distance, Syria 'feels' like Iraq in 2004 Dan Murphy compares and contrasts the two situations.

Women in Revolutionary Syria: Fighting for the Right to have RightsSara writes that “it is entirely unrealistic to deny the gendered nature of space, but accounting for the complexity beyond the public/private binary is absolutely necessary to give justice to revolutionary women in Syria.”

Qui rendra justice à Adnan Qassar, victime de la jalousie de Basel Al Assad ?
On Adnan Qassar, in jail since 1993 for winning an equestrian race against Basel al Assad

Lulu
Razan Ghazzawi’s blogpost on her inspiring revolutionary friend who remains in Syria

Alawite FSA supporter whose father backs Assad tells of a Syrian family ripped apart

Inside Syria

Putting humpty together again: can the FSA ever be unified? Rita from Syria on the potential and challenges of creating a unified armed opposition

In Syria, small-town rebels are stuck in big-city Aleppo Reporter says “the widely divergent backgrounds of fighters and Aleppo residents underscore a continuing tension that probably contributed to the stalling of the rebel advance.”

Execution of Assad troops widens split among rebel fighter factions in Syria Martin Chulov says armed units from Aleppo are angry at the Syrian military council’s inability to unite the armed opposition.

Syria’s Kurds Dare to Dream of Freedom
Loveday Morris attends a class taught in Kurdish.

Art and Social Media

11 Leaders of Syria’s Creative Blogosphere

 

Making Art Around Syria’s RevolutionIndia Stoughton interviews Anas Homsi, Rania Moudaress Silva and Abdalla Omari.

 

Fisks’ Credibility up in Flares Rapahel Telen on a few reactions to the latest Robert Fisk article in which he “discovers” that weapons used in Syria originated from Europe

 

The Case of the Swedish Weapons in Syria Robert Fisk’s article that has now earned him the hashtag of #InspectorFisk on Twitter

 

Jihadists in Syria can be Found on the Internet Aaron Y. Zellin assesses the evolution of the extremist operations and presence over the last 19 months.

Policy and Reports

Month-by-Month Summary of Developments in Syria (Updated) International Crisis Group’s October Update

Arabic

يوم في اللاذقية... هل أصبنا بمرض شراهة الحزن؟!

Haifa Bitar writes about her experience while working at a hospital in Latakia.

 

مشروع كلينتون للحسم في سورية

Abdel Bari Atwan writes about U.S Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's statement about the Syrian National Council.

 

رؤية في واقع الأزمة والثورة

The National Coordination Council for the Forces of Democratic Change in Syria on the implications of the militarization of the revolution.

 

هل من حل بغير رحيل السلطة؟

Salama Kayla questions whether there could be a solution in Syria with the current regime staying in power.

 

صرخة في واد... لإنقاذ سورية!

Erfan Netham Addine writes about the need for a new approach to save Syria.

 

أسباب الانسداد السوري

Fayez Sarrah presents three reasons for the current Syrian impasse.

 

 لا للعفو …. نعم للعدالة

Anwar Al-Bunni calls for the establishment of a free and fair judicial system.

 

حبل السرّ بين السياسي والإنساني!

Ammar Dyoub writes about the line between political and humanitarian in light of the Syrian struggle.

 

قراءة مغايرة في قضية اغتيال وسام الحسن

Bashir Eissa presents a different analysis of the assassination of Wisam Al-Hasan.

 

اقتصاد الحرب الأهلية: سوريا ولبنان نموذجاً

Ward Kasouha writes about the political economy of the civil war.

 

الأغلبية الصامتة والناطقون باسمها

Ghassan Eid writes about the neutral silent majority in Syria.

 

تحليل أنماط التفكير في الانتفاضة السورية

Mohammad Dibo analyses the two types of thought in the context of the Syrian uprising.

 

مجند فار يروي قصة عذابه

Raafat Al-Ghanem tells the story of a fleeing soldier who was brutalized by the Syrian National Army.

 

كارثة قدسيّا

The Damascus Bureau on the atrocities that people face in the Syrian town of Qudsaya. 

Maghreb Media Roundup (November 8)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Wednesday night of every week.]

Algeria

«Nos frontières sont bien gardées, bien contrôlées et bien maîtrisées» Khadija Ahmed Baba interviews the Ministry of Interior and Local Government regarding upcoming elections and a number of salient socio-political issues.  

The Fighter Aboubakr Jamai briefly narrates the experiences of anti-colonialist activist Henry Alleg and reviews his newly-translated "Algerian Memoirs."

Algerian Youth Mark Revolution Day Mouna Sadek reports on celebrations of Algeria's 58th anniversary of Revolution Day.

Libya

Is there such a thing as a Legitimate Armed Militia? Sufyan Maghur discusses militias' escalating conflicts with the GNC and suggests that without immediate integration, these armed groups are positioned to become unaccountable "Guardians of the Revolution," with severe implications for democratization.

UN Security Council: Press Libya on ICC Cooperation, Impunity HRW urges Libya to release Abdullah Sanussi to the ICC as well as to hold anti-Gaddafi militias accountable for past and current human rights abuses.

Insecurity in Libya; Legacy of the Past Hussain Abdulrazzaq Kreiba cites the historical "absence of national security institutions" as a primary factor in the GNC's failure to integrate militias into the national army.

Libyans debate federalism Asmaa Elourfi reports on 2 November demonstrations in eastern Libya and profiles the region's diverse opinions on the prospects of federalism.

Mauritania

A Mauritanian Blogging Week Against Foreign Mining Ahmed Jadu discusses the efforts of Mauritanian bloggers to expose the criminal practices of multinational mining firms.

تدوينات حملة دون ضد شركات التعدين الأجنبية Curation of recent blog pieces regarding exploitive mining practices.

تفجيرات خارج السيطرة تربك عمال MCM وتهدد حياتهم Recent bombings demonstrate the severe occupational hazards to miners face.

Presidential absence sparks controversy in Mauritania Jemel Oumar reports on the opposition's response to the current "constitutional vacuum," and the ruling party's counteractions against calls for a transitional political period.

Morocco

Au Maroc, frontière sanglante pour les migrants subsahariens Lisa Lea Westerhoff shares accounts of migrants tortured by Moroccan security forces.

Morocco orders 19 foreign journalists to leave W.Sahara Morocco insists that journalists researching the 8 November 2010 conflict between Moroccan security forces and Sahrawi dissidents must leave Laayoune for failure to notify the government of their intent.

Morocco Faces Criticism Over Anti-Corruption Efforts Siham Ali discusses the 2010-2011 annual report produced by Morocco's Central Authority for the Prevention of Corruption, which criticizes the government's negligence of anti-corruption measures.

الأمازيغية، أوراش ما بعد الترسيم Ahmed Assid thoroughly discusses the prospects of constitutionalizing Tamazight.  

Tunisia

Enquête : L’assassinant de Abderraouf Khamessi par des agents de la police judiciaire Winston Smith highlights the extrajudicial contraventions of Tunisian security forces and higher level officials in the torture and subsequent death of a man accused of robbery.

شيوخ السلفية: لوم للحكومة والاعلام و نداء تهدئة للانصار Salafist sheikhs meet to discuss media representation and government policies relating to imprisoned young Salafists (vide0).

La bipolarité en Tunisie n’est pas que politique Eymen Gamha argues that the contemporary political climate has scarcely evolved from the Bourguiba era.

Tunisia’s Pressing Issues  Carnegie Endowment reports on the government's contested media appointments and its effect on the burgeoning conflict between Ennahda, opposition parties, and civil society at large.

State feminism in Tunisia: reading between the lines Amira Mhadbi  challenges popular conceptions of female rights in pre-revolutionary Tunisia and asses the current political climate faced by female activists.

Tunisia combats radical speech Houda Trabelsi reports on Ennahda's new investigations into (predominantly Salafist) individuals accused of inciting violence against individuals and the government.  

Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb

Maghreb Monthly Edition on Jadaliyya (October 2012)
Du « péril noir » au Maroc
Tunisian Unionists on Strike in Kasserine Province
Chomsky on the Western Sahara and the “Arab Spring”
New Texts Out Now: Rikke Hostrup Haugbolle and Francesco Cavatorta, Beyond Ghannouchi: Social Changes and Islamism in Tunisia
"Community is Based on Justice"

The Left in Time of Revolution

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[This article was translated from Arabic to English by Mark Marshall and Assaf Kfoury. Read the original article in Arabic here.]

The Arab revolutions are presenting the Left with a mixture of existential challenges and historical opportunities. The decisive factor will be the Left’s ability to learn from the rich lessons of its own past experiences and vast revolutionary legacy, in order to develop its own project and role in the coming period, and to work out a coherent plan for tackling challenges ahead. May that be an occasion for the Left to move away from its penchant for lacerating self-criticism, as if there is no end to paying penance for past sins, and to embrace instead a study of the past that contributes to a better understanding of the Left's current position and role, especially in preparation for the tasks of the coming period. This also presupposes there are elements within the Left who are ready to transcend two currents still active in their midst: a leftist current that continues to support despotic regimes on the pretext of giving priority to the “national question” and a leftist current that is counting on external intervention for paving the way to democracy.

The Left, and especially the young within it, played an influential role in the uprisings notwithstanding its relatively small size. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, the left-wing youth were at the forefront of those who went to the streets and manned the barricades, who occupied city squares and broke down the barriers of fear, and who popularized the slogans calling for the downfall of the rulers and their regimes. They were in the front lines in facing down bullets, tear gas bombs, and orders to disperse. In Morocco, the February 20th Movement unleashed a vast popular wave pressing for reforms. The Syrian situation was somewhat different, due to the role of communist parties allied with the regime, where leftist elements distinguished themselves whenever they split from those   parties and acted as individuals or in small groups and organizations. 

Although leftists won a modest number of votes and seats in the parliamentary elections in Tunisia and Egypt, their struggle continued in the form of mobilizing popular pressure for the dismantling of the despotic regimes and their institutions and for the pursuit of the revolutionary objectives. 

Uprisings against neo-liberalism

The slogan “the people want to topple the regime”, which moved tens of millions of Arabs from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf throughout 2011, and is still moving them to various kinds of sacrifices, is the distinguishing mark of the democratic nature of the uprisings and their most radical objective. The slogan declares that the people are the source of power and elevates popular sovereignty above every other sovereignty, be it individual, dynastic, party-based, military-based, or based on religious authority. It declares that the existing Arab regimes are unable to reform themselves by themselves, and affirms that the only path to the realization of the will of the people is to change them by force – the force of the people.

Alongside the slogan “the people want”, a complementary and no less popular slogan was also raised: “work, freedom, bread”, which put the right to work and social justice at the heart of the democratic process. What was new about this slogan was the demand for “work”. It points to unemployment as one of the primary motivations for the uprisings and as the decisive instigator of the participation of the youth in the uprisings. It is a well-known fact that the Arab world has the largest percentage of youth among the population (15-24 years of age), the largest percentage of unemployed (no less than 30%), and the largest percentage of unemployment among the youth (44% of the unemployed). Youth unemployment points to the increasingly rentierist character of the Arab economies subject to the dictates of neo-liberalism in the globalized capitalist order. Nothing is more indicative of the scandalous nature of these dictates than the fact that the directors of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank hastened to admit -- in the face of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions -- that the growth of local production does not adequately respond to the problem of unemployment, even though that was the measure the two institutions had imposed for a quarter century as the main measure of economic improvement! The scandal grows even more in view of two facts: first, that the two institutions, whose stated mission is to oversee the economic and financial well-being  of the world population, had been promoting Tunisia and Egypt as paragons of economic success in the wake of the “structural reforms” they had enacted; and second, that 51 million more jobs will be needed in the Arab world by 2020, according to estimates of the United Nations Development Agency from 2009.

What economies can produce jobs in such numbers? And what challenge for the Arab revolutions, and for those who will govern in their names, is greater than this challenge?  A challenge that will be all the more insuperable if these revolutions are limited to the political sphere.

The truth of the matter is that the uprisings are a popular collective movement of opposition against neo-liberalism, more than a quarter century after it was directly applied in the region. This is one of the factors that explain their occurrence in so many Arab countries at the same time.

There is no separation here between the social and political motivations. The application of the neo-liberal economic policies was accompanied by growing concentration of power and wealth in the hands of mafia-like groups and families, invariably connected with  security state apparatuses, which extorted special benefits from the financial-real-estate-contracting sectors. This was the case under both the military dictatorial regimes and the dynastic rentier regimes ruling the oil economies. It certainly was no coincidence that this mating of despotism and neo-liberalism led to the predominance of the repressive arm of the state over any other state function as a primary means of social and political control. That is a shared characteristic of the regimes of countries where the dictates of the World Bank and the IMF were applied. The concentration of wealth and the abandoning of any serious developmental effort, coupled with an increase in deprivation and poverty, led to the growth of waste and plunder of public finances. Thus, instead of being invested in regional productive projects, oil and gas revenues were (and continue to be) re-exported to the capitalist centres where they are used to finance the European and American debts, to support their currencies, and promote their investment in various sectors unrelated to regional well-being – that is, when the petrodollars were not being wasted by the billions in the financing of Gulf wars, in contracting billion-dollar weapons sales, and in purchasing obscene luxury goods.

The scandals of the deposed Arab leaders, and the tens and hundreds of billions of dollars that they had accumulated, have exposed the savagery with which they exploited political power to enrich themselves. They plundered public finances, took commissions on economic projects, appropriated large shares of the oil revenues, and controlled the sovereign wealth funds, not to mention the smuggling and laundering of money. All this was done at times when campaigns against “corruption” turned a blind eye on scandals and plunder. Privatization was promoted on the pretext of trimming fat off governmental bureaucracies. “Balanced budgets” were an excuse to give tax breaks to businessmen and rich people, and to increase the burden on the public through indirect taxes, while policies of “austerity” put an end to government subsidies of goods and basic staples and reduced to a minimum the role of the state in social distribution and welfare.

Democracy is the path to socialism

These are some of the repercussions of the Arab world’s encounter with globalization, and these are the challenges of its popular revolutions. The Left, if it is to remain relevant in the eyes of the masses whose basic interests it purports to represent, must completely re-think its social project and recuperate its intellectual independence as a necessary condition for organizational and political independence.

And lest we ignore the traditional question “what does it mean to be a leftist today?” – it can be said that a leftist is someone who tries to conjoin the values of freedom and equality, and who recognizes that under the particular conditions of our countries, the realization of political democracy is an integrated political project that demands the dismantling of the despotic regimes and their replacement by democratic institutions. And a leftist is one who realizes, based on the violent lessons of the history of the Left itself, that the negative aspects of political democracy cannot be overcome by implementing a dictatorship that suppresses freedom without realizing equality, but by strengthening freedom and equality by liberating democracy from the sway of capital and developing it towards economic and social democracy.

Accordingly, the Left in the Arab world can justify its renewed existence by pushing the democratic revolutions towards their coherent ends and grafting social democracy onto political democracy by acting to resolve the contradiction between the political equality of citizens on the one hand and social inequality on the other. Democracy is the path to socialism.

The lowest common denominator shared by socialists worthy of the name is the conviction that the capitalist regime is not the end of history or the pinnacle of human development. Rather history, including the history of the achievements of capitalism itself, has reached a stage that permits the transcending of capitalism. And humanity has reached a level of development that permits the satisfaction of the basic needs of all in terms of employment, wages, housing, education, health and a clean and safe environment. The primary obstacle to the realization of this historical mission is private property and the principle of profit, the two main pillars of the capitalist system. Nothing is more indicative of this fact than the numbers circulated by the United Nations Development Agency that show that only ten percent of the wealth of the richest people in the world would suffice to satisfy those needs.

However, this fact does not excuse socialism and socialists from the biggest challenge raised by the experiences of countries where socialist parties have been in power: how to increase the production of wealth in order to facilitate its more just distribution. There are no ready-made recipes. There have been attempts at a solution that merit study, including the experience of the Brazilian Workers’ Party in power for the past two decades.

A project for the age of globalization

A complete rethinking by the Left of its social project will put to the test its theoretical tools for understanding the current era of globalization, and especially its distinct impact on this region. And the gaping paradox here is the weakness of intellectual and economic efforts regarding the position of the Arab region vis-a-vis globalization in all its economic, social, political, and cultural forms. Perhaps the first points for exploration along this path are the following.

First of all, to identify the general framework of the region’s nexus with globalization through the existence within it of two pillars of modern imperialism: 1) the mechanisms for appropriating natural resources – especially oil and gas – and the re-export of their revenues to European and American centres; and 2) the uniqueness of the region vis-à-vis the other regions of the world due to the presence of a problem left over from the colonial era: the racist colonization of Palestine. Israel is continuing to gnaw off lands all over historical Palestine to this very day, as well as occupying lands in neighbouring countries. [1]

Secondly, exploration of the contradictory nature of globalization as manifested in two new phenomena: the depredations of the financial bubble and the transfer of industry to the countries of the South for proximity to raw materials and cheap labour – a phenomenon that does nothing to end unemployment and poverty in the countries of the South that are hosting the transplanted industries, but has unleashed unprecedented waves of emigration to the countries of the North. One of the controversial contradictions of globalization is its unification of the world in time and place through the amazing revolution in communications and information technology on the one hand, and its atomization of it at the at the same time into sub-state entities and loyalties on the other.

Thirdly, a closer look at the new face of internationalism, which promises new patterns of solidarity and interconnectedness between the countries of the South. It implies an alternative globalization, one based on shared interests between those who have been harmed by modern imperialism and the hegemony of transnational corporations and unequal mechanisms of exchange and development. A globalization that aspires to build a world that has enough room for all the worlds within it, free of racism, hunger, poverty, wars and the danger of nuclear annihilation. A world that will provide a decent minimum standard of living to all who live in it instead of protecting the obscene wealth of the one percent at the expense of the ninety-nine percent.

Secular democracy with a social conscience

There is nothing new about saying that the current revolutions are the focus of conflict on two levels.

The first level is conflict due to external intervention of various types and from various quarters, which is intended to preserve the existing regimes in oil-producing states by force, if necessary. But in other countries the forces of external intervention adapt to the ongoing uprisings in order to co-opt them and remove their sharp edges, by sacrificing the symbols of rule and tolerating a degree of political and media pluralism, while preserving the military pillars of power and the primacy of the executive branch and striving to remove the masses from the spheres of action and pressure. The forces of external intervention do not object to the replacement of the ruling cliques as long as the geo-strategic interests of modern imperialism are protected and the economic policies in effect continue to be implemented. 

The other level of conflict is with the Islamic political forces that see the uprisings and the acquisition of parliamentary majorities as a golden opportunity to roll back what remains of civil and secular legislation in Arab countries. Added to this is their willingness to compromise on the requirements of a minimum level of solidarity with the cause of the Palestinian people in order to acquire legitimacy in Europe and America – not to speak of their neo-liberal bias, their social conservatism and their endeavour to substitute symbolic battles for real solutions to serious social and economic problems.

On the other hand, the Left would do well to hold fast to the most important message of the uprisings: that the democratic transformation must be realized by the people themselves and for the people themselves. That means that the democratic project of the Left must be anchored in the following foundations: 1) Political and legal equality for all citizens, with no discrimination between them on the basis of gender, religion, sect or ethnicity. 2) Executive power must emanate from the legislative branch and be subordinate and accountable to it, and the principle of the separation of powers must reign supreme. 3) Social rights – work, wages, housing, education, health and a clean and safe environment – must be defined as natural human rights, because the failure by a democracy to provide work and bread to its people constitutes an open invitation to the first usurper who comes along to kill it in its cradle. 4) The State must be religiously neutral, so that there is no intervention by the religious institutions in the affairs of the state and no state intervention in the affairs of the religious institutions. That means rejecting the encroachment of the sacred – which is based on the religious principles of proscription and permission and the rights of God as opposed to the duties of man – into the realm of politics, which is based by definition on independent judgement, debate and plurality of options. This view affirms that secularism is an extension of democracy, not the other way round. Legislation must be derived from the institutions of popular sovereignty, be they representational parliaments or popular referendums. And in this transitional stage in particular, the commitment to secularism requires that any concession to religious legislation in the domain of personal status be matched by the enshrinement in law of an optional civil alternative.

A new approach to Arab unity

It is very of great significance that the fall of despotic rule in Libya and Tunisia led to the rapid reactivation of the project of unity among the Arab states of North Africa. The farcical inter-Arab unions of the previous era, which were intended for internal control, were part of a history of failed formulas of the “leading country” and the “merging units” and coerced unification, sometimes through war, as in Yemen, or the legitimization of secession in a deal that preserves the position of the ruler in what remains of the country, as in Sudan. Not to mention the failure to preserve the unification projects or the failure of Syria and Iraq to unify even when they were both governed by the same nationalist party, the Baath.

There must be a new approach to Arab unity that liberates it from despotism and problems of identity. The pan-Arab level is still the only level on which the liberation of the region can be realized, with shared control over its resources, wealth, capabilities and fates. It is the only level for the realization of genuine development for the good of all its residents and a decent position for the region and its people among the nations of the world. In view of the challenges presented by the age of globalization, which are necessitating the construction of regional blocs, these objectives, and the means to realize them, are becoming more necessary. The Arab countries, with their shared language, culture and history, have sufficient vital natural resources – oil, gas, minerals and water – to achieve a level of human development that is based on the value of work and production and which provides a minimum decent standard of living to all citizens.

This approach sees Arab unity as a voluntary project under construction, which will be realized over time through cooperation and integration, based on the shared interests and aspirations of the peoples. It must begin with development of trade between the Arab states, because the rate of commercial integration in the Arab region is lower than in the other regions of the world. And it requires further steps towards economic integration and the establishment of a common market before the process is crowned with various forms of political and institutional integration.

The Arab world is also able to make room for all its human components regardless of differences in ethnicity, nationality, religion and sect. The outlook that indentified national unity with centralized state power, which caused civil conflicts and wars by deepening internal divisions, has come to an end.

The Left has two major contributions to offer in the formulation of a new contract between the different components of the Arab peoples. The first is the recognition that equal citizenship is a necessary but not always sufficient condition for the solution of majority/minority issues. And regardless of the vacillating roles of majorities and minorities in the history of discrimination and domination, sometimes the issue of equal citizenship cannot be resolved without correcting historical injustices by complementing the principle of civil equality with recognition of collective rights to self-determination. 

Secondly, the Left suggests that the tendency to revert to primary identities (family, sect, religious, regional, ethnic etc.) as a last line of self-defence takes place in protest against discrimination in access to power and control over natural resources and the unjust distribution of wealth and state services. This reversion also occurs, and with perhaps more ferocity, when what is being defended are privileges and wealth that were acquired by virtue of those very primary identities. Thus basic social rights, balanced regional development and the just distribution of wealth and allocation of state services are fully complementary to solutions based on equal citizenship and the right to self-determination.

Organization and means

The popular uprisings revealed the inadequacy of social-political representation at two levels: political parties and civil-society organizations. The role of existing “vanguard” parties, based on a rigid internal command hierarchy and a condescending arrogant attitude towards the people, had become frayed even before it was finished off by the uprisings. But those characteristics were made manifest with unprecedented savagery in the bloody practices during the uprisings.

The time has come for mass parties that represent blocs of interests and express popular aspirations through programmes and policies – parties that are means and not ends in themselves. The new parties still need much more imagination and innovation when it comes to internal democracy, and they must discover techniques that are suitable for the struggles and competitions of democratic electoral regimes.

The uprisings have put to the test a quarter-century of non-governmental organization practices that were not subject to serious review. And while most of the human rights organizations played very positive roles, the beginning of the uprisings was a kind of movement of “correction through action”, particularly regarding the democratic transformation.

The formulation “state/civil society”, which had become dominated by the neo-liberal approach, is being challenged by the formulation “people/regime”. The uprisings have had the effect of bringing social issues together and forging ties between them as opposed to their atomization into a dozen separate sectors of thought and practice by non-governmental organizations. Moreover, the activity of the bulk of the NGOs was restricted to pro-democracy advocacy, training and education without regard for the conditions necessary to realize them through political action, and even to the exclusion of the role of popular pressure.

The revolutions enabled the participation of social sectors which neither the frameworks of the parties or the trade-unions – which were based on partisan or occupational affiliation – nor the human-rights organizations could adequately express or represent: the middle classes, youth, women, the unemployed, the poor, marginalized rural residents, slum-dwellers and others. These sectors are gravitating towards new forms of political movements that deserve study. And most importantly, the uprisings inspired valuable contributions to popular action through their innovation of forms of organization at the grassroots level of neighbourhood organizations, youth coalitions, popular committees for municipal activism, organizations for the unemployed and so on. It is very revealing that these novel approaches were accompanied by a rediscovery of all kinds of traditional frameworks for popular solidarity and cooperation, both rural and urban.

Finally, the uprisings overflowed with manifestations of popular ingenuity. Even as the most modern tools and communication devices were being used in the struggle, the most creative, effective, mobilizing and energizing elements of our popular culture were being revived, in the form of various types of chanting, singing, recitation and group dancing.

Popular ingenuity, however, is not the end, but the perpetual inspiration.  


[This article was originally published by
Bidayat Magazine.]


[1] Due to inadequate space here, we will deal with the sensitive subject of the relationship between the Palestinian issue and the democratic Arab uprisings in a future issue of the journal.

 


Syria: When Official Memory is Amnesia

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With those who would kill him waiting at each of the gates of Damascus should he try to escape, Saul of Tarsus, the man who would come to be known as Christianity’s St. Paul, fled nonetheless.  Crouching in a basket, he was lowered over the city’s walls by his supporters, and he fled into the Syrian night.

It was nearly two-thousand years ago that Saul, a soldier, came from Jerusalem to Damascus, dispatched and hell-bent on a mission to arrest followers of Jesus Christ—a man who, among other things, had led an affront to the ruling regime of Rome and the Jewish clergy. But instead, along the road to Damascus, his journey was interrupted by what Christian lore describes as the appearance of Jesus (post-crucifixion) in a light so strong that Saul was blinded.

Crippled, his men had to lead him into the city. He took refuge in a house on the Street Called Straight.  For days, he refused food or water.  His eyes were useless, covered in scales, until a Damascene disciple of Jesus miraculously restored his sight. Saul was re-born as Paul.  He now joined those he had been sent to persecute.

Immediately after his defection, he began preaching of his conversion to the Syrian people.  Having betrayed those whose cause he had previously served, they soon came for him. 

It was a pursuit rooted in a belief—which appears to persist today—that keeping Damascus secure from revolutionary ideas was merely a matter of getting rid of the people that held such thoughts in the first place.

I wonder if those who feared what Paul was preaching breathed a sigh of relief once he was gone—did they think that now they could keep what was brewing under control?

***

Bashar al-Assad surely has heard of Paul.  

If he does not know that Paul, and the movement he joined, Christianity, went on to change Syria and the world, then he surely passed the marked spot in the still-standing wall where the saint made his famous escape.  It is in the heart of Damascus, a celebrated part of Damascus.

The parable of Paul seems tailor-made (made in Syria, after all), and had Bashar heeded its lesson—that an idea can outlast human mortality—it might have saved him some killing, and saved thousands of Syrians from dying. 

But then, perhaps he has been too inculcated in his family’s cult, which has spent the last forty years forcing the notion that Syria—her wealth and her destiny—belongs to them and them alone.  To them, it is as if Syria herself would cease to exist if they were not here to bridle her and rule her.

The omnipresent billboards, posters, murals, mosaics, and statues of Bashar’s dead father (the progenitor), himself (the accidental heir), and his dead brother (the assumed heir)—or what Syrians wryly refer to as “the Father the Son and the Holy Ghost”—vulgarly assert that this ancient place was only born when they forced their way to power. 

Maybe it is only natural that Bashar thinks that stopping the tide of history requires simply re-writing it through lies and omissions, or reshaping it into an impossible choice between him and an intolerant sectarianism that he himself enabled. To Bashar, defeating ideas and ideals is simply a matter of silencing the voices speaking them, and disappearing them into the infamous prison at Tadmor, a town adrift in the remote Syrian desert.

That with the man or the woman goes the revolution.

That the sand makes them mute and the rest of us deaf.

***

Tourists used to flock to that same desert, drawn to Tadmor’s other offering—the Hellenic and Roman ruins of Palmyra, which were abandoned once more, once the world stopped coming here last year.

The prison, notorious for its horrible conditions, torture, and summary executions, had also been abandoned in 2001. Bashar al-Assad closed it shortly after coming to power, in what many hoped was an indication that things might change under his rule—one sleekly branded as young, modern, and reform-bound.

He reopened the prison last June in the wake of the anti-regime protests.

On the remaining grand columns of Palmyra there are still legible inscriptions to the empire’s last leader, the fate of whom Syria herself would warningly whisper in Bashar’s ear.

Her name was Zenobia.  She lived and ruled in the third  century, when Syria was a part of the Roman Empire, the superpower in the region and the world.  But Zenobia had ambitions of creating her own independent empire. For a time, she was tolerated by Rome, which was busy with other conflicts and interventions, until circumstances abroad changed, and she eventually became much more of a liability than an asset. Thus, in 274, the Roman Emperor Aurelian sacked her city of Palmyra. Zenobia retreated, making a last stand in Emesa—the modern day Syrian city of Homs, where earlier this year the Assad regime gambled that its own fates would rise and those of the revolution would fall.

But Zenobia could not win in Emesa and was captured, taken alive by Aurelian’s forces.

History quotes her as saying, in true regional fashion, “I am a queen; and as long as I live, I will reign.”

The Romans, however, forced her from power and from Syria, taking her back to Rome. There, she was paraded through its streets, bound in chains of gold.

I am thinking of her, thinking of how she could not see that it was time to fold.  I want to tell her (or him?) that yes, even if they are all just playing a part, the play can outlast your part.

I am thinking of baskets and golden chains, of defections and UN lassos.

***

At the Syrian National Museum in Damascus, placards in the exhibit on the Palmyra (or Tadmor) Basin say that evidence of “More than a million years of human occupation” has been unearthed there. The text goes on to describe how “More than simply a succession of cultures, analysis reveals a succession of ruptures or breaks.”

Indeed.  Perhaps it has something to do with the fact there is no history of rulers leaving here of their own accord, even before today, before the modern Syrian republic itself was born in 1946. From the Romans, to the Persians, to the Umayyads, to the Ottomans, to the French, and everyone in between, empires have been forced along only to be replaced by other, dramatically different empires, each time with Syrians making the requisite official alterations.  The faces or inscriptions on the currency would be changed, religions would be converted, taxes would be paid to a new capital, a strange language would become lingua franca, another flag would be raised, and everything that came before would officially be forgotten.

Similarly, Syria’s modern history has been one of coups, countercoups, and exiles, with governments changing almost as frequently as the years.  Apparently, Syria just does not do transitions, carryovers, or power-sharing. This cycle of ruptures and breaks, which often dictates amnesia as official memory, has enabled serious avoidance tendencies. (I have always had a suspicion that a survey of these million years of human occupation would reveal in Syria a disproportionately high number of disowned family members, excommunicated faithful, self-exiled or émigrés, and people practicing to ridiculous lengths the principle “he or she is dead to me.”)

As a nation-state, it has meant never having to deal with and, in fact, avoiding the difficulties of negotiating through different visions to reach a point of co-existence where all citizens can realize their fullest potential, and the resulting state can flourish. Thus, the response to the very normal growing pains of creating a dynamic nation-state here has been to simply and absurdly amputate the aching limbs.  Hafez al-Assad refined this tactic, seeing any attempts by the society to grow, evolve, and express itself outside of his control as unforgivable affronts to be broken and then broken some more.

He came to power in 1970 in the final coup and rupture that brought Syria to a grinding halt and brings us to where we are today, with over forty years of one-family rule.

In 1980, however, it was a rupture in my grandmother’s brain that brought our family to a standstill, transforming her into a shell of who she had once been and who she could have yet become.   

***

She was from Hama—a city best known outside of Syria these days primarily for massacres of dissenters.  Inside Syria, it is also known for large churning watermills along the Asi River, fine woven fabrics, fields of wheat, and its tough-as-nails people.

Shortly after the new republic was born, my grandmother left Hama and moved to Damascus as a new bride.  She never hid that she was less than enamored with her husband—he being twelve years her senior—who though intellectual and kind, would never be the debonair womanizer she had fallen in love with but was forbidden to marry.

Her marriage was but one in a series of frustrations rooted in her bad luck to have been born female. Her six brothers married as they pleased, even when their father similarly disapproved of their chosen brides for being too poor, too foreign, or too modern. Perhaps what she envied the most was that her father lavished her brothers with university educations and training—even in Europe and America.  She always knew she would never receive more than a high school diploma.   Once she understood the head starts her father gave the boys would not be hers, she sought to make her own fortunes.  Marriage to a man from Homs and living in Damascus was her way out of Hama.

Throughout her life, she exhibited the entrepreneurial Syrian spirit that of late has better flourished outside of Syria and enriched other countries. After years of The Father stifling it, and then years of Junior stealing it, skimming the profits of other people’s good ideas by forcing them to sell majority stakes to his family.  In her day, my grandmother invested small amounts of money in different businesses, bringing the agricultural yields from the farms near Hama to the people in the capital. Slowly, she bought and sold property, easily supplementing her husband’s salary.

In her house in Damascus, she played host to the spectrum of people that make up Syria: farmers, generals, artists, bureaucrats, housewives, fortune-tellers; Kurds and Armenians; Villagers and urbanites;  Christians, Sunnis, Alawites, Jews, and Shiites.  Many came for her company, while others came for her help. Sect or ethnicity was never the key to entrée. Rather, she welcomed folks whose conversation was entertaining, whose power could be leveraged, or whose talents included the ability to see the future in an overturned cup of Arabic coffee.

But particularly, she opened her door to those who knocked on it in need, often providing an alternative to the ruined systems—political, legal, economical, or societal—that failed them, especially those who were outsiders, because of their gender, their class, or because they were not Damascenes.

Some needed assistance navigating the government bureaucracy, which she helped them bypass by giving them the name of the right bureaucrat to bribe. 

Some asked to borrow money as they stood at her door.  After giving them tea inside her house and hearing their plea, she would retrieve the needed amount from her armoire.  Sometimes she just provided shelter, on mattresses dragged to the living room floor in makeshift accommodations, to those who came from the villages near Hama and who had business in the capital, like the woman who would visit her son monthly in the insane asylum in Damascus.

Others’ needs were more urgent; she once convinced a general she knew socially to imprison a young conscript who had impregnated the girl he loved, but whose parents refused to allow him to marry. The would-be love was—like the Assads—an Alawite.  Like many of her sect, she was of little means and worked as a domestic servant.  He was the son of bourgeois Sunnis, who, like many of the bourgeoisie, believed the Alawites to be of the lowest and untouchable rung of Syrian society.  My grandmother would not have it.  For the young man’s parents, the sight of their son in prison soon caused them to relent.

She always cut quite a figure, tall in her heels from Beirut, a Kent cigarette never far from her lips—from which witty and acerbic commentary was always forthcoming. But though those deep inhales gave her voice its sexy huskiness, they would ultimately render her mute in 1980, perhaps the worst of the paralysis caused by the stroke brought on by all those years of smoking. A vibrant force, she was suddenly crippled, broken, and hovering in a suspension—but not termination—of life.   It is called Locked-in Syndrome. She could no longer move, no longer talk, and only blink her responses and thoughts.  Yet, all those whom she had hosted came to visit her regularly.

A year later, in a message to all Syrians, Hafez al-Assad broke Hama, where resistance to his power had been growing in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, an albeit malformed, grossly imperfect creature, but of course a product of what gave rise to it—much like her responses to the systems that constricted her life and the lives of the others.   

He murdered, by conservative estimates, ten thousand people, forcing the entire city of Hama to collectively pay the price for giving rise to people with the temerity to engage in politics.  He also killed off much of the will of any Syrian to participate politically—making it clear that the cost for exercising such a right would be borne not just by individuals, but by their family, their neighborhood, and their city.  It was a higher price than most people could commit others to pay.

The official memory of Hama was to forget. Syrians never knew exactly how many were killed, and family members still do not know who is dead, when they died, or who is in prison.  Of course the official amnesia precluded any kind of national mourning, and the country remains suspended in the lack of truth, accountability, and reconciliation.

As for my grandmother, for years she languished in a room in her limbo while everyone waited for an end or a beginning; for life to begin moving again.

Then in 1987, after seven years in still and silent stagnation, she left them and this world. She was buried in the cemetery facing the site of the hole in the still-standing wall from which Paul escaped in a basket.

In choosing what to keep of her, we too chose our official memory; even though it had been years since she could sit, stand, or let alone walk, we kept her shoes.

***

Of those that made up my grandmother’s circle of conversation and sisterhood, I was particularly fond of two women—sisters who doted on me as a child.  One of them joined my grandmother daily at lunch, as her flat was nearer to the beauty parlor where she worked than her family’s house. Occasionally in the years of her illness, when the sisters would visit my grandmother, they would telephone me across the world where I was then living and hold the receiver to her ear so she could hear me, but not talk back to me.

As I became aware of religion—which in the 1970s in Syria seemed only relevant for who could eat what when, who got presents on which holiday, and who could marry whom—I learned that these sisters were Jews. 

When I returned, in 1992, after several years away and years after my grandmother had passed, I asked for them.  Only then did I learn that they were gone. Just months before my return, Hafez al-Assad had lifted the ban on Syrian Jewish families traveling together, and the inconvenience of the complexity of being Syrian and Jewish—for both Syria and Israel—was shamefully resolved.  The resulting mass exodus meant the Jewish Quarter, thousands of years old, and nestled along the still-named Street Called Straight, where all those years ago Saul had awaited sight, had suddenly gone dark.

Thus, after nearly twenty years of removing opponents, dissidents, intellectuals, and others who could or would not belong through disappearances, murder, imprisonment, and encouraged exile or emigration, and ten years after removing the Islamists in Hama, the regime amputated yet another limb.

With their departure, Syria began to take leave of the conception of a Syrian identity that rose above our parts to a sum made stronger for its diversity. Further giving in to the utter lack of imagination that would prefer homogeneity—mistaking it for simplicity, both silver-tongued and soothing. 

***

Eight years later, Hafez al-Assad finally died, and we hoped our suspended time and suspended lives were over. But the opportunity for a good Syrian rupture was missed, and passed over as power was passed on to his son.  For eleven years, Bashar al-Assad, the supposedly mild-mannered ophthalmologist, and his pretty wife put a young, fresh face on dictatorship. 

Across the street from the National Museum, arose a glamorous Four Seasons Hotel; new cars were finally legal; foreign tourists poured into the bars and boutique hotels on the Street Called Straight; and one could at last get a Coca Cola instead of having to settle for the domestically produced Master Cola— the only similarity between the two being the red and white packaging and stolen font.  Additionally, a few people, particularly those related to Bashar or from his Alawite sect, got quite rich.  But in some ways, it did feel like Syria had started moving again.

With these supposed markers of progress, plenty of people inside and outside of Syria were willing to overlook the presence of an authoritarian regime in Damascus.  Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie visited the country, chilling with Bashar and his wife.  Not only was it acceptable to be a dictator, it was also A-List cool.  Those gloomy and suspended days of his father seemed so far in the past.

It appeared that kinder, gentler dictatorship would be the way forward for Syria, with Syrians playing no role in determining their political fate, something many seemed willing to accept.  For those who would imagine a democratic and free Syria, such complacency and complicity among their countrywomen appeared as much of an insurmountable barrier to a new future as the countless secret police and security apparatuses that spent much more time keeping Syrians afraid and in line than defending the country against any external threats.

Then, a spark of hope was lit on 25 January 2011, when Egyptians broke through the fear that had held them back and helped keep their dictator in power all those years.  That it was happening in Egypt—in many ways the elder statesman of the Arab world—suggested that what had happened in Tunisia (more of a distant relative) was not just a fluke.  25 January was a declaration—reaffirmed again this year—that Egyptians (cheered on by the Arab world) were embarking on a new path for the future, which by definition had no room for the rulers or ways of the past.

Coincidentally, though perhaps cosmically, 25 January is the day Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus is celebrated.

***

In the wake of the Arab awakenings and the exile of Ben Ali, the trial of Mubarak, the lynching of Khadafi, and the abdication of Saleh, all eyes are on the next teetering domino.

But it remains an unresolved vigil, even as those newly initiated democrats in other Arab countries move on – debating, invalidating, and revalidating God, constitutions, and polls. 

Syria is anew with defections and conversions to a movement that would again shake the nation, splitting once more not only the ranks of today’s soldiers, but also those of relatives, neighbors, colleagues, and friends.

Geopolitical winds—breezes and sandstorms—continue to blow through the country, and in their frenzied shifting, different empires again vie for her.  The vices of each contender, however, have left many a Syrian wary of the future.  And so, many ruptures and breaks, personal and political, have given a new generation of Syrians a taste of blood and bitterness, while seeing to it that older ones never forget.

In the spring of 2011, just as the protests began, and just before Syrian Christians prepared for their Easter celebration of resurrection and rebirth, I began the final stages of renovating my grandmother’s first house, the one she moved to as a bride when she came from Hama, when modern Syria was brand new.   We had finally succeeded in evicting an Army soldier who had been squatting for nearly forty years, even though he had moved in as a tenant after my grandmother had moved her growing family to another house.  Recently, a change to the property law, which for so long had protected such rent-free tenants, gave owners the right to evict such people if the owners paid the squatters to leave—to the tune of forty percent of the house’s value. 

Is the regime seeking a similar deal?

The soldier had sullied the beautiful mosaic floors and had done nothing to update its paint, its plumbing, or its wiring.  But it was otherwise intact and recognizable, enough so that my mother and aunt could guide me through its memories—here they would secretly watch the TV, past their bedtime; there was the spot where the unruly children upstairs dumped water from their balcony to ours, drenching my great grandfather’s head; and this is where, once a month, on a mattress in the middle of the living room, the lady with a son who had gone mad would cry herself to sleep.

Even as chaos swelled that fall, stranding workers in their towns outside central Damascus, the modest renovation continued.  By the end of 2011, all the house’s internal workings had been overhauled and the floors restored where possible and where not, replaced with something new. 

I moved in alone, kept company by the house, my grandmother, and those other ghosts gone by.

But as a long winter approaches Syria, I wonder what fragilities will be felt and seen—if it can remain a home, both intact and welcoming.  Already in the cold and short days of last December, January, February, and March, shortages of diesel and electricity kept us shivering and in the dark, the house’s old wooden windowpanes and shutters shrunken and unable to keep out the bluster.

At night, after I have  turned out the lights and we listen to the sounds of disintegration, I wonder: will we wake to find ourselves disappeared?

We know we are irrelevant for a ruler who would reign as long as he lives, or for empires who would conquer by proxy.

Flesh or stone or limb or wood or country—casualties have been easy to make, and we would all be claimed.  

Nevertheless, it is a lovely house, surrounded by grapevines and citrus trees of every kind.  Light fills it and breezes drift through it, and even though it cannot hide that it is old and once abused, it is clear that it has been re-taken by those who loved it and would love it again.

Butheina H. Kazim on BDS and Defining "Powerful Arab Women"

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[This post is part of an ongoing Profile of a Contemporary Conduit series on Jadaliyya that seeks to highlight distinct voices primarily in and from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia.]

Jadaliyya (J): What do you think are the most gratifying aspects of Tweeting, and Twitter?

Butheina Hamed Kazim (BHK): Immediacy of news distribution, whether you're on the receiving or dispatching end. The timeliness, variety and volume of information on Twitter is unmatched by any other platform in my opinion, for better or for worse. The ease of use is another perk that comes with the platform, along with Facebook and Instagram in the social media arena not too far behind; this makes for a space that is accommodating to more contributors and consumers than most media out there. 

There is certainly a harm statement associated with all that convenience which I have personally become increasingly interested in. 

My days as an early adopter of the platform in 2009 were spent as an optimistic user fascinated with the possibilities of the platform's perceived emancipatory function and utility as a sharing and idea exchange space. Fast forward to 2012, I find myself, like many others, disillusioned with the technological determinism discourse and erring ever more frequently on the side of caution as the dark side of Twitter use in the region has manifested.

J: What are some of the political/social/cultural limits you’ve encountered using the platform?

BHK: The harsh reality that you're not saving any lives by tweeting, no matter how diligently, is a sobering one.

Never before have I encountered the futility of the @ symbol more profoundly than on my recent trip to the Syrian-Turkish border in Hatay and Kilis this summer. Most people afflicted by the conflict don't have access or time to read or spread news via the platform, and while the #Syria hashtag is still topping trending topics lists, much of that comes from outside the "battlefields" so to speak. The death toll has surpassed the 40,000 mark and the Twittersphere is still flooded with support, commentary, opposition and an array of opinions on #Syria, but the bodies are still piling up. As one of the volunteers on the border told me, "when you're sneaking your kids out in the middle of the night, dodging bullets, losing limbs and burying bodies, there's little time to snap photos and tweet". This is not to say that people in those areas are not media savvy; far from it. But the nature of the media exchange is very different and far from existing solely on social media platforms like Twitter. Just in the areas that we visited, while there was a laptop in almost every hospital room you enter, information was being exchanged using CD-ROMS smuggled across the borders, via Bluetooth on the most rudimentary of mobile phones (no smart phones were to be seen) and USB sticks -- and it's working for their purposes.

Not to mention that there are still many barriers to adoption in the MENA region that are at play, including censorship, low broadband penetration rates, intimidation tactics, language barriers (despite efforts like Twitter Translation Center) and literacy rates. This means that its use will be limited to a strata of society with the necessary access, literacy, income bracket and technology, not necessarily all-encompassing or representative of the realities on ground.

J: In your experience and use of Twitter, do you feel it helps mobilize or disorganize? Focus or crowd? Is it manageable or noisy? Can it help persuade and mobilize or does it turn everyone into a voyeur and spectator?

BHK: To use a truism, it is but a medium and certainly a double-edged sword like all other media. 

While I've personally encountered success in being able to reap the aggregating, mobilizing, and organizational benefits of it for some of my projects, including casting for my documentary Letters to Palestine @Ltrs2Palestine, and raising awareness and making announcements for @GreenMapUAE and @NYUSJP and gather material for Artistic Intifada blog, I am far from a zealous advocate of Twitter as a catch-all solution for organization or mobilization.

Hiding behind a hashtag can only get you so far; there is certainly an illusion of effectiveness that can easily take over an avid user's experience with the platform when it comes to using it for sociopolitical mobilization efforts. While a trending topic might make it into a headline or two, there has been little proof over the past few years of the platform's adoption growth that shows a direct correlation with sociopolitcal efforts, especially when it comes to effecting policy.

Although we've seen a rise in Twiplomacy efforts whereby decision-makers, government bodies and other institutions are using Twitter to communicate and reach out, there is in effect very little communication that is happening and therefore very little impact on the realpolitik at play. When was the last time someone tweeted at @StatDept or @UN or @whitehouse or hoards of others and gotten a conversation going? More and more, Twitter is taking the function of a bulletin board or megaphone than a conversation space, and that can be disenchanting. And while there have been exceptions to this, for example in the UAE, like @ABZayed and @Dahi_Khalfan who have personally taken to the platform and directly engaged users, there's still a lot of learning to be done and a long way to go. 

Twitter has also perpetuated the rise to power of a certain breed of cyber-based "native informers" who, due to "access" within the confines of the Twittersphere to the right organizations, people and journalists, particularly English-speaking ones, have become a one-size-fits-all variety of commentators on all things Arab. That is problematic on many levels -- including the ensuing reductionism that results, shoddy journalism in some instances, and the misrepresentation of the street sentiment. 

The dark side of Twitter also houses rumor-spreading capability, fear-mongering potential and libel-breeding grounds of epic proportions. We also have seen in our time people who have tweeted to the death, tweeted their way into incarceration, deportation or even denaturalization. Examples of such cases are countless – Hamza Al Khashghari, Ahmed Abdelkhaleq, Ala’a AbdelFattah to name a few. Whether you agree with the actions taken by or against them, the reality is this: the limits are certainly ever-present. 

On the flip side, there are many advantages, including immediacy of information dispersion (bearing in mind fact-checking challenges), mobilization within certain groups and echelons, and the broader "voicebox" function that the platform serves, that make it a very important player to be reckoned with. If you have enough social media clout, social cache and the right following, your voice in all its 140 characters can definitely raise awareness and make sound waves in the social media ether.  We just have to be aware of the challenges before we can wholeheartedly champion the tool as a harbinger of progress and freedom.


[Image of Butheina Hamed Kazim in the Syrian-Turkish border town Kilis, Southeast Turkey with the children of Syrian refugees. Image provided by author.]

J: In one of your blog posts, you gave a "subjective list of 100 powerful Arab women," and, in response to a separate list prepared by Arabian Business, you asked "How do we define power?...What makes a powerful Arab woman." What factors do you consider in defining power, and what makes a powerful Arab woman to you?

BHK: The list is just that: subjective. It was as much an exercise in challenging conventional definitions of power as it was a desire to have the criteria, decision-makers and process by which such lists are generated made transparent. I also hoped that it would encourage people out there to make their own lists so that we have a broader scope of women being recognized that mainstream media do not necessarily have access to. I would love to see hundreds of lists with names we've never heard of before that the curator and list creator considers powerful from his/her own subjective viewpoint - she could be his/her teacher, employer, neighborhood seamstress, grandmother and so on.

Some of the problematics I'd hoped to address were not only the definition of "power," but also the definition of "Arab". I had noticed that in the referenced list, women from certain Arab countries were not included for some reason; those countries included Libya, Iraq and Djibouti. Arab women outside the Arab world were also excluded, and I wanted to address that oversight as well. The other aspect is the delineation between power and good power which I felt that most lists out there do not address. Foucault has much to say about that matter, but I just wanted to address it by including women from all different walks of life, industries, ideologies and geographic locations. Powerful Arab women can include those that engage in promoting thought and debate; they challenge conventions or not, they may be powerful solely in their decision-making capacities, in their "access" to decision makers, in their innovations, in their contributions to work, life, powerful in their bodily strength, in their engagement to intellectual discourse, or even pop culture. But then again, it's all subjective. 

J: In your Gulf News op-ed, "The Pavilion of Apathy," you describe the importance of boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) on Israel in the context of a summit in Dubai. What, to you, makes BDS especially effective?

BHK: The summit was actually a satellite event that was live-streaming a New York-based event, the Creative Time Summit (which listed an Israeli-government backed organization as one of its partners) at a venue in Dubai with its own set of talks and discussions.

BDS as a civil society call for boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel until it complies with international law is effective in that it empowers individuals to take action no matter where they are or what field they're involved in. It puts the onus on every person and empowers them to do something and take a stance rather than wait for governments or international bodies to do the work; it builds from the bottom up. As a grassroots movement with a clear message, it streamlines calls from all over the world across individuals, organizations and movements and unites them under one voice and one call: the call to end international law violation and the call for Palestinian rights. BDS as a strategy also has a proven track record of effectiveness as a means of non-violent action which we have seen most clearly in its role in ending South African apartheid.

J: You've suggested that Palestinian media transcends conventional norms, existing "through a series of windows." Do you think this aspect of Palestinian media has an impact on the Palestinian struggle for liberation? What is the political effect of the unique case of Palestinian media?

BHK: Such a unique position in existing always "through windows" comes with its own set of opportunities and challenges. The opportunity in this case lies in the fact that Palestinian media has a place and a voice in every media outlet in existence - whether through traditional media such as newspapers based outside of Palestine like Al Quds Al Arabi, or Al Safeer's Palestine-dedicated supplement, in pop-cultural vignettes such as music videos or operettas like The Arab Dream, in caricatures showcased on virtually every Arab publication, in dedicated programing on Pan-Arab television channels, or even through the decision-making power of the Palestinian media moguls and talents (editorial and on-screen) that run many Pan-Arab media platforms. Palestinian "media through windows" has the unique position of carving out a space as a global Palestine, rendering it irreplaceable from the hearts and minds of the onlookers rather than an exclusively national narrative told on state-run screens. The challenging political effect of such a position means that "Palestinian media,” when existing under the auspices or in the context of non-Palestinian institutions, can be exploited, limited, or tailored to serve the given host platforms' own agenda. We have seen this play out especially on pan-Arab state-run television networks

[Butheina Hamed Kazim tweets at @butheina and blogs at Butheina.]

Putting Palestine on the Map

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They want their homeland? They should fight for it.
-- Ali Khaled, father of Leila Khaled, 1950s

With the US embroiled in Afghanistan’s endless theater, the debate around insurgencies has once more taken hold. In 2007, Jeffery Record’s Beating Goliath detailed the story of how some insurgencies end up defeating their much more powerful adversaries. Three years later, the RAND Corporation published Ben Connable and Martin Libicki’s How Insurgencies End, which showed that such struggles last for ten years, giving the stubborn Goliath the best odds if they are able to quell public opinion in their own country and break the support networks for their David. The US War College’s Thomas Mockaitis’ 2011 study Resolving Insurgencies found that most rebellions degenerate into criminal organizations or small terrorist networks, both unable to sustain the political goals that initiated them. All this is salutary reading for tone-deaf policy makers, who would like to see the Afghan story follow this script: let it become a drug infeudated oligarchy and lose popular support. It is simply not what has happened.

None of these studies take seriously the Palestinian story, which has not followed the ten-year cut-off, nor degenerated into criminality and futility. It has in fact retained its political goals despite the prolonged occupation of its rump territories since 1967, and every attempt to shatter any hope of union of the many Palestinian political groups. The Israeli garrison state’s suffocation of Gaza and the neo-liberal and increasingly comprador leadership in the West Bank have not dented the remarkably coherent will of the Palestinian people. The brave hunger strikes that ran from December 2011 to May 2012 testify to this. The “war of empty stomachs” brought over two thousand Palestinians, held in Israeli prisons under “administrative detention,” to open the frontline inside the prisons with dignity; they were joined by non-violent mass struggles whose goals, according to the first striker, Khader Adnan, exceed the prisons: “The mass hunger strike is a signal to all oppressed and vulnerable people everywhere, not just Palestinians. It’s a message to everyone suffering from injustice, under the boot of oppression.”

How is it that such a small part of the world population has been able to take its considerable political message to the world stage, and to remain optimistic these sixty years despite Israel’s military control over it and despite the US vetoes against any attempt to bring justice to the Palestinians? The total population of Palestine is eleven million, with just about four million in the Occupied Territories, one million inside Israel and the remainder in the Diaspora (with three million of them in Jordan alone). The entire population of Palestine is less than that of the city of my birth, Calcutta, India (fourteen million). In 1972, the US vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that condemned Israeli air strikes on Lebanon and Syria (the vote was thirteen to one). It was the first time the US exercised a lone veto in the chamber, and it would not be the last. The US has been the most frequent user of the veto, mainly to defend Israel (following what is known as the Negroponte Doctrine, the view that Israel must be shielded from international criticism). Israel, meanwhile, has justified its military posture towards the Palestinians with the view that they do not exist as a political project—from Israeli premier Golda Meir’s 1969 statement (“There is no such thing as Palestinians”) to Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan’s 1973 statement (“There is no more Palestine. Finished”). US institutional and arms backing combined with Israel’s military force has done little to break the will of the Palestinian resistance, or to tarnish the sympathy it evokes across the world. How has this been so?

The answer is provided in a new book by the historian Paul Thomas Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order (Oxford, 2012). Chamberlin roots his story in the emergence of the Palestinians as political actors after 1967, drawing from the failure of the Arab states to push for a diplomatic (and military) solution to the injustice meted out to the Palestinians. Groups such as al-Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) revitalized the prone Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by linking their local struggle to the “new political geography” of Third World Liberation that ran from Vietnam to Cuba, from Algeria to Guinea Bissau. The 1969 cover of the Fatah paper, Hisad al-‘Asifa indicated the shift: Refugees [al-‘aja’un] in 1948, but Revolutionaries [thuwar] in 1965. This shift was highlighted by Rosemary Sayigh in her 1979 book The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries. Drawing from the more militant nationalism of the Arab National Movement, from the vital currents of Marxism and Maoism, and from the experience of the Algerian FLN, the new Palestinian groups sought to link themselves to the new currents of radicalism and to produce fedayeen units to conduct attacks against Israeli military and security targets. They sought an “Arab Hanoi” either in Amman (Jordan) or Beirut (Lebanon), and sought to create a new radical imagination through the work of their poets (such as Mahmoud Darwish) and their writers (such as Ghassan Kanafani).

New leaders such as Yasser Arafat and George Habash, both in their early forties, emerged as the figures of the new revolutionary spirit. They broke the yoke that tied them to the neighboring Arab states, notably Nasser’s Egypt. In November 1967 Arafat met Nasser, who mentioned that the Palestinian leader did not want to surrender his gun to Egyptian security. “Mr. President,” Arafat said as he removed his pistol, “your intelligence people are wrong. I offer you my freedom fighter’s gun as proof of that fact.” Nasser smiled, “No. You keep it. You need it, and more.” Armed incursions into the Occupied Territories raised the profile of the fedayeen and cemented the Palestinians as a political force—moving them from their status as refugees who need UN services to revolutionaries who want to end their colonial subjection and to create their own nation-state.

Chamberlin turns his attention to the emerging alliance between Israel and the US, with the Nixon administration throwing its full support for an increasingly irrational Israeli military policy. Any peep from the Palestinians would be met with disproportionate force by the Israelis, armed and backed by the US. “We shall hit the enemy where and how we choose,” said the euphemistically named Israeli Defense Force (IDF), “even if the objective does not exactly match the enemy’s crime.” Israel’s arsenal of counter-insurgency was fairly straightforward: armored divisions and aircraft would bombard Palestinian camps (including civilians) and positions of neighboring Arab states which housed the Palestinians (Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria); the UN General Assembly would be neutered, and the US would exercise its Security Council veto to immunize Israel from criticism; an ideological campaign conducted by the Western media, helped along by the Israeli hasbara agency, would paint the Palestinians as equal parts illegitimate and terroristic and conscript the idea of anti-Semitism, and the blindness to Israeli state violence, in order to do so.

Boxed in by Israel-US and the paralysis of the Arab states, the PLO’s more militant factions decided to take the attack to the enemy at its weakest point. This is why the fedayeen began terrorist acts of commercial aircraft hijacking and armed attacks at Israeli sites (airports and embassies) and Israeli representatives (including athletes, as at Munich in 1972). The PFLP conducted the most spectacular hijackings, landing commercial aircrafts in Libya and Jordan, trying to barter hostages for Palestinian political prisoners, and in some cases, blowing up the empty aircraft to demonstrate the existence of the Palestinian political project. The most famous of all these hijackers was Leila Khaled, a PFLP cadre whose life has been wonderfully reconstructed by Sarah Irving in a new, short book, Leila Khaled: Icon of Palestinian Liberation (Pluto, 2012). Khaled was not the first or only woman among the fedayeen: the example of Rashida Obeida inspired her, as did Shadiah Abu Ghazaleh, and alongside her fought women such as Amina Dhahbour. In 1969, Khaled was part of the PFLP team that hijacked TWA Flight 840 to Damascus, flying first over her birth city of Haifa. Khaled recounted a few years later that from the sky she saw her city and “my father’s image appeared before my eyes and I could hear his voice saying, when shall we return home? My whole world came together.”

Part of Israeli state ideology has been to claim that the Palestinian attacks are remorseless and indiscriminate, a cognate of the imputed Oriental disregard for human life. This is negated by Irving’s carefully wrought portrait of the conflicts that plagued Khaled, who measured the scale the violence of her own hijackings against that of the enormity of Israeli state violence against her family and nation; the addresses of what Darwish called the “surplus value of the slaughter” can be found in the naqba of 1948, the invasion and occupation of 1967, and then the harsh bombardments of Jordan and Lebanon, the cries of the villagers of Hasabaya (21 June 1972) and the residents of Beirut (April 1973 to 1982). The Palestinian attacks were designed to bring visibility to the suffering, to break through the silence; they were politically motivated and not blood-thirsty, as far as Khaled intimates to Irving. This subjective interpretation is clarified by Chamberlin’s search through the Beirut archives, which show the debates in the PLO around the “external operations,” with the more moderate elements worried that the hijackings and the acts of terror would alienate international opinion from its emergent consideration of the Palestinian point of view. That is why General Vo Nguyen Giap told Arafat in the late 1960s to “turn your terror war into a struggle for human rights. Then you will have the American people eating out of your hand.” This is what drove a wedge first between Arafat’s Fatah and Habash’s PFLP, and then when the latter also decided against hijackings, between Habash’s PFLP and Wadi Haddad’s PFLP-EO and Sabri al-Banna’s Abu Nidal Organization.

The divides in the Palestinian freedom struggle moved Arafat to offer concessions to the Israeli regime. It was Arafat who came to the UN in November 1974 to say, “do not let the olive branch fall from my hand,” as he hinted toward a two-state solution as long as any deal did not invalidate the rights of the Palestinians as a nation. Backed to the hilt by the US, it was Israel that refused to meet Arafat’s outstretched hand. As the US Ambassador to Lebanon William Buffum wrote in a confidential cable in 1973, “Israel does not seem disposed to make minimal concessions essential for this plan [ending the guerrilla violence] to be implemented, despite its professed concern over fedayeen terrorism abroad and within [the] occupied territories.” US State Department officials such as Joseph Zurhellen and ambassadors such as William Stoltzfus (Kuwait) cautioned against the Israeli view that the Palestinians do not have a political project, with Zurhellen pointing out that the US needs to understand the use of terror for political ends, and Stolzfus pointing out that the Palestinians are “lost souls” whose fedayeen has broken the isolation to which their nation had been condemned. None of these views would influence US policy, which was tethered to the rightward drift of Tel Aviv. It is now a cliché that the Israelis have been willing to make peace, and it is the Palestinians who have been stubborn—forgetting that the terms of the discussion from Tel Aviv essentially call for the liquidation of the Palestinian national project.

The “global offensive” of the Palestinian national movement pushed its issues to the forefront from 1967. The dynamism of that wave crested by the time of Oslo, losing its steam when the PLO went into partnership with the Israeli government toward the pacification of its people, and when it adopted neoliberal policies in the West Bank to stem the broadest aspirations of the population. The furrows of the global offensive opened up after 1967 remain, now seeded by similar social forces that have an utterly different strategic understanding. For every Kōzō Okamoto and Lod Massacre (1972), there is a Rachel Corrie and the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) human shield. It is non-violent resistance against Israeli tanks and bulldozers that is the framework of action, not the use of firepower to sow terror. The new global offensive emerged in the wake of the second intifada of 2000, when on the Palestinian ground grew new social forms of their own, the Popular Resistance Committees and the prisoner activism, taking up the cudgels as the PLO factions and Hamas saw their own ability to strike effectively against Israel whittled down. The ISM, founded in 2001, brought a generation of young North Atlantic activists to bear witness to the Israeli colonial project, and to take this message home. Alongside ISM grew various Palestine solidarity formations for students and others in the North Atlantic states, whose growth in the 2000s was premised on events such as the murder of Rachel Corrie, the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon in 2006 and of Gaza in 2009, and then the harsh reaction of the Israeli state to the attempts by international activists to break the blockade of Gaza through several flotilla campaigns.

It helped Israel’s public relations campaign naught to have a stream of conscious activists make their own kind of transit to the Holy Land, now not to see the ancient sights of oppression, but the modern ones. Reports by delegations of activists have flooded the Internet, as shelf-loads of books have poured into the hands of those who cannot themselves make the journey. Most recently, the US playwright Sarah Schulman’s Israel/Palestine and the Queer International (Duke, 2012) undermines the idea that Israel is the bastion of social freedom in the region. Her careful, analytical memoir of her 2010 visit to Palestine and Israel, and of the tour she organized for queer Palestinians around the US in 2011, bristles with the possibilities of genuine solidarity if patience allows various political agendas committed to freedom to find the common space for their differences and unities to find each other. Taking refuge in “homonationalism” does nothing to immunize the Israeli queer community from its participation in the Brand Israel mythology, as silence across the Wall on issues of sexual freedom does nothing to forward the Palestinian political project. The British writer Bidisha’s new memoir of her tour to Palestine, Beyond the Wall: Writing a Path Through Palestine (Seagull, 2012) reveals the suffocation of the Occupation. Both Schulman and Bidisha introduce us to the vibrancy of Palestinian cultural life, the world of activists such as Haneen Maikay of al Qaws: For Sexual and Gender Diversity in Palestinian Society and of writers such as Suad Amiry (author of Sharon and My Mother in Law). Angela Davis and Yasser Arafat met at the World Festival of Youth in East Berlin in 1973, and now Noam Chomsky goes to the Islamic University in Gaza in 2012 for a conference on applied linguistic and literature and delivers a major address alongside leading Gazan politicians (such as Jamal Khudari of the People’s Committee Against the Siege) calling for an end to the blockade.

The spear of this new global offensive is the Boycott-Divestment-Sanctions (BDS) movement and the concomitant attempt to break the blockade of Gaza, the former wishing to put on notice the world’s complicity in the occupation of the Palestinians and the latter wishing to oxygenate the world’s largest open-air prison. BDS and the various flotillas remain controversial approaches, but the arguments for them (such as assembled by Audrea Lim in the new volume from Verso, The Case for Sanctions Against Israel) seem on balance to be far better than those against. BDS is part of an array of non-violent techniques developed to put moral and material pressure on the Israeli state and on its citizenry to reject their colonial domination of the Palestinians.

The Indian arm of the BDS campaign, the Indian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (InCACBI), has revived itself on a terrain that had slipped to the advantage of Israel—with arms sales and counterterrorism relations as the glue (as I documented in Namaste Sharon, 2003). Writings from the group have now entered the Indian media with a confidence little seen over the past decade, with most of the more energetic participants to contribute to a volume edited by the novelist Githa Hariharan, From India to Palestine: Essays in Solidarity (LeftWord, 2013). In New Delhi, on November 4, a small group gathered to protest the performance of The Cameri Theatre, whose director, Noam Semel, rather cagily said that InCACBI can “protest against politicians and soldiers. We are not the right people,” but then gingerly admitted that his Tel Aviv based group has performed in the Occupied Territories “as per directions of our government.” InCACBI members wore t-shirts that said “No to Israeli Apartheid,” and stood as silent sentinels near the entrance of the theater, handing out leaflets. “One woman said she supported us but did want to see the play,” reports the editor and actor Sudhanva Deshpande, “We gave her the t-shirt, which she wore inside. But then she came out again, saying she couldn’t possibly stay inside after having read the leaflet. Another couple refused to go in after reading the leaflet.” In the 1960s and 1970s, Israel’s fear was the international terror networks, from Japan to the US, that had given themselves over to the “external operations” of the PLO. Today, Israel’s “worst nightmare,” as the Palestinian intellectual Omar Barghouti put it, is the BDS campaign. It is today’s form of the global offensive, from New Delhi to Hampshire College, from Amman to Pink Floyd’s Roger Walters.

***

On November 29, Vijay Prashad will join Sarah Schulman at New York City’s McNally Jackson Bookstore (7pm) to help release her book, Israel-Palestine and the Queer International, and on December 8, he will moderate a discussion in Boston between Angela Davis and Noam Chomsky, where the question of Palestine will certainly be part of the global offensive.

Egypt Monthly Edition on Jadaliyya (October 2012)

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This is a monthly archive of pieces written by Jadaliyya contributors and editors on Egypt. It also includes material published on other platforms that editors deemed pertinent to post as they provide diverse depictions of Egypt-related topics. The pieces reflect the level of critical analysis and diversity that Jadaliyya strives for, but the views are solely the ones of their authors. If you are interested in contributing to Jadaliyya, send us your post with your bio and a release form to post@jadaliyya.com [click “Submissions” on the main page for more information].

Statement by Comrades from Cairo: We Refuse Economic Bondage -- Stop the Loans
A statement released by Comrades from Cairo rejecting the IMF loan which the Egyptian government is currently negotiating.

Studying Social Streams: Cultural Analytics in Arabic
VJ Um Amel uses examples of Egyptian digital media to discuss methods of academic study.

Civil Society in Revolt: From the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street
Chiara Bottici and Benoit Challand discuss whether the protests of the past year signal a new wave of popular mobilization.

نظرة داخل البيت السلفي
Islam Mohamed Abdel-Bari writes about the internal tensions between two ideological groups in the Salafi Al-Nour Party.

Egypt’s Constituent Assembly: Contempt and Counterrevolution
Paul Sedra criticizes the constitution writing process and a recent allotment of state money to promote the draft constitution among the Egyptians.

مقطع من رواية التماسيح
An excerpt of Youssef Rakha’s recent novel Crocodiles.

Currency Crisis in Iran; Copts in Egypt
Paul Sedra speaks on the difficulties the Christian Coptic minority in post-Mubarak Egypt.

Hossam El-Hamalawy on Social Media and Protests in Egypt
An interview with labor activist Hossam El-Hamalawy discussing social media and the revolution.

الهامش الاحتجاجي يسقط المركز التسلطي: العملية الثورية لا تنتصر إلا بالتضامن العالمي
An review of the recently published book Marginalization and the marginalized in Egypt and the Middle East.

الربيع العربي: الصحة والرعاية في المرحلة الانتقالية
Adam Coutts, Sharif Ismail, and Mark Dempsey point out a number of steps that transitioning Arab states should take in order to secure effective healthcare reforms.

October Culture
Jadaliyya’s translations and culture commentaries for the month of October.

Huda Lutfi: The Artist and the Historical Moment
Mai Serhan presents an overview of Huda Lutfi’s artistic life since 1992.

Power, Rebirth, and Scandal: A Decade of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina
Amro Ali recounts the history of the Alexandrian library from its inception in the 1970s as an idea to the humiliating forced resignation of its corrupt former president.

An Overview of the Egyptian Legal System and Legal Research
A short overview of Dr. Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab’s new book on Egypt’s legal system.

New Texts Out Now: Myriam Ababsa, Baudouin Dupret, and Eric Denis, Popular Housing and Urban Land Tenure in the Middle East
An interview with the authors of a new book on urban development.

Text of Manal El-Tibi's Resignation Letter to Egypt's Constituent Assembly
Human rights activist Manal El-Tibi justifies her resignation with the incapacity of the constitution to provide freedom and equality for all citizens, but favoring one particular interest group.

Martyrdom at Maspero: Searching for meaning
Paul Sedra tries to explain what happened on October 9-10, 2011, arguing that it was not simply a pogrom.

Justice Denied: Egypt's Maspero Massacre One Year On
Ekram Ibrahim writes that justice still eludes the families of the killed during the Maspero Massacre; so far only three soldiers and no officers have been sentenced to short-term prison terms.

A Firsthand Account: Marching From Shubra to Deaths at Maspero
Sarah Carr’s witness account of the events of October 9, 2011.

Egypt’s Withering Paternalism and the Future of Its Political Economy
Amr Adly says the ruling party has three options to cope with social conflict which the collapsed paternalistic authoritarian system set up by Gamal Abd El-Nasser can no longer mange.

“عن أزمة حزب النور وتحديات الحركة السلفية في مصر”
Ashraf El-Sherif writes about the recent divisions within the Salafi movement and the future challenges they face in Egypt.

تحديات تنتظر "مدن الملح"

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أهم عنصر للحياة هو الماء، وعند تأسيس المدن الكبيرة تاريخيّاً كانت دائماً ما تبنى بالقرب من مصادر المياه. إما على ضفاف الأنهار، أو على شواطئ البحار. لا توجد في أي من دول الخليج مصادر مياه نهرية، ولذلك فقد تكوّنت غالبية المدن على ضفاف شواطئ الخليج. 

اكتشاف النفط وتصديره غير المورد الأهم لبناء هذه المدن، فتحوّل أهم مقومات الحياة من الماء إلى النفط. تعتمد غالبية مدن الخليج بشكل شبه مطلق على تحلية مياه البحر كمصدرها الرئيس للمياه، وغنيٌّ عن القول؛ إن هذا المصدر يحتاج إلى جرعات مكثفة من الطاقة لتحليتها، ما يجعلها مكلفةً جدّاً، ولولا التكنولوجيا الحديثة وموارد الطاقة من نفط وغاز لما كان بالإمكان القيام بهذه العملية.

بعض المدن، كالرياض، تقع على بعد مئات الكيلومترات من سواحل البحر ومن أي مصدر مياه رئيسي، وهذا يحتاج إلى تغذية المدينة يوميّاً عبر نقل المياه المحلاة مئات الكيلومترات من سواحل الخليج إلى قلب شبه الجزيرة العربية الصحراوي.

 

تاريخيّاً، طالما كان الوضع المائي والبيئي والغذائي في دول مجلس التعاون هشّاً، فالبيئة في هذه المنطقة قاحلة وتفتقر إلى مقومات الماء والزراعة، وهي بذلك غير مهيأة بطبيعتها لتوفير مقومات المعيشة الأساسية لكتلة ضخمة من البشر، ولذلك دائماً ما كانت هذه المنطقة ذات كثافة سكانية ضئيلة نسبيّاً في عصر ما قبل النفط. وفي الماضي القريب كان الجفاف والقحط مخاطر تهدّد الحياة بشكل دوري في أقطار شبه الجزيرة العربية، وكانت الكتل البشرية تضطر إلى الترحال والنزوح فيما بين ضفاف الخليج وأقطار شبه الجزيرة العربية بشكل دوري (كما حصل مؤخراً في عشرينات القرن الماضي).

 

قلما نفكر في هذه الأمور، لأن جيلنا تعود أنه عندما يفتح الحنفية؛ فالمياه ستتدفق، وعندما نضغط على زر صغير في الحائط سينبلج النور، وإن أحسسنا بالجوع نذهب إلى أقرب دكان ونتبضع ما أردنا من أنواع الفواكه والخضراوات واللحوم المستوردة من كل بقاع العالم. وننسى أن وراء هذه الخطوات الصغيرة جهودٌ جبارةٌ ومكلفةٌ لتزويد الطاقة واستيراد الغذاء ولتحلية مياه البحر وجعلها صالحة للاستهلاك. وننسى أيضاً أن العنصر الأساسي الذي جعل كل هذا ممكناً هو النفط والغاز، فالطاقة الصادرة منهما هي التي مكّنت من تحلية المياه وإنتاج الكهرباء، وإيراداته هي التي مكّنتنا من استيراد المواد الغذائية التي نعيش عليها.

تكفي نظرة خاطفة على وضعية المياه في دول الخليج لنبين هشاشة الوضع المعيشي فيها. ارتفعت كمية استهلاك المياه منذ اكتشاف النفط بشكل جنوني، حيث تضاعفت عشرات المرات (في الكويت كمثال، زاد استهلاك المياه أكثر من 150 ضعفاً في ثلاثين سنة بحسب المصادر الرسمية). وأصبحت دول الخليج تسجّل بشكل دوري اليوم أعلى معدلات استهلاك للمياه في العالم (يستهلك الشخص في الكويت حوالي 500 لتر يوميّاً، بينما في انجلترا، كمثال، يستهلك الشخص 150 لتراً يوميّاً). تنتج غالبية هذه المياه (حوالي الثلثين) بواسطة محطات تحلية مياه البحر، وهي عملية صعبة ومكلفة ليست فقط في إنتاجها بل أيضاً في تخزينها.

 

في الإمارات، وقد تكون أكثر دول الخليج تقدماً في هذا المجال، يكفي المخزون الاستراتيجي للمياه لحوالي ثلاثين يوماً، بينما في البحرين؛ فإن المخزون الاستراتيجي بالكاد يكفي يوماً واحداً.هذه الأرقام في بيئة هي في الأساس صحراوية قاحلة، وتفتقر إلى مصادر المياه المتجددة كالأنهار؛ تدعو إلى الحيطة والتفكير الجدي في استراتيجية النمو الاقتصادي والسكاني المتصاعد في دول مجلس التعاون. فلو، لا قدّر الله، حصلت كارثة أو حرب أدت إلى إيقاف إحدى محطات إنتاج الطاقة أو تحلية المياه؛ فمن الصعب تخيّل تبعاتها.

 

عاشت البحرين ما يسمى بـ «الاثنين الأسود» في أغسطس/آب 2004، حين انقطعت الكهرباء لمدة يوم واحد في عز الصيف. أدى هذا اليوم إلى شبه كارثة في البحرين، فأخذت الناس تدور في سياراتها وتهرع إلى أقرب «سوبرماركت» لديه مولد طاقة خاص، حتى يتسنى للناس الوقوف أمام ثلاجات الأكل والتبرد. وقد يكون الأخطر من هذا كله أن انقطاع الكهرباء أدى إلى توقف إنتاج المياه المحلاة التي تعتمد بشكل كبير على الطاقة، ما أدى إلى استهلاك المخزون الاستراتيجي للمياه بشكل شبه كامل في غضون يوم!

 

كل هذا يجعلنا نتساءل: بما أن بيئة البنية التحتية للحياة من مياه وغذاء وكهرباء تقف على كف عفريت في دول الخليج، وتعتمد بشكل كبير إما على الطاقة أو الإيرادات النفطية الناضبة؛ فلماذا تواصل دولها في بناء مدن ضخمة جديدة، واستقطاب سكان جدد لسكن هذه المدن، ما يقود إلى زيادة مطردة في متطلبات المياه والطاقة والغذاء؟ كل هذا في بيئة هي أصلاً غير مهيأة بشكل ملائم لكل هذه الأمور، وتعتمد بشكل رئيسي على مورد ناضب لتمويلها؟


عندما سُئل عبدالرحمن منيف عن سبب تسمية روايته الشهيرة «مدن الملح» قال: «قصدت بمدن الملح، المدن التي نشأت في برهةٍ من الزمن بشكل غير طبيعي واستثنائي. بمعنى ليست نتيجة تراكم تاريخي طويل أدى إلى قيامها ونموها واتساعها، إنما هي عبارةٌ عن نوع من الانفجارات نتيجة الثروة الطارئة. هذه الثروة (النفط) أدت إلى قيام مدن متضخمة أصبحت مثل بالونات يمكن أن تنفجر، أن تنتهي، بمجرد أن يلمسها شيء حاد. الشيء ذاته ينطبق على الملح. فعلى رغم أنه ضروري للحياة والإنسان والطبيعة وكل المخلوقات؛ فإن أية زيادة في كميته، أي عندما تزيد الملوحة، سواء في الأرض أو في المياه، تصبح الحياة غير قابلة للاستمرار. هذا ما هو متوقع لمدن الملح التي أصبحت مدناً استثنائية بحجومها، بطبيعة علاقاتها، بتكوينها الداخلي الذي لا يتلاءم وكأنها مدن اصطناعية مستعارة من أماكن أخرى. وكما قلت مراراً، عندما يأتيها الماء، عندما تنقطع منها الكهرباء أو تواجه مصاعب حقيقية من نوع أو آخر؛ سنكتشف أنّ هذه المدن هشة وغير قادرة على الاحتمال، وليست مكاناً طبيعيّاً لقيام حاضرات أو حواضن حديثة تستطيع أن تستوعب البشر وأن تغيّر طبيعة الحياة نحو الأفضل».

 

التحدي الجوهري لمدن الخليج هو: هل بإمكانها أن تتفادى السيناريو المتوقع، سيناريو «مدن الملح»؟

Inhale Reality, Exhale the Truth

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Scattered are the lunatics, like rats, scurrying across the floor in panic when the lights are turned on.

For forty years they have assumed that the cultural world of the United States is to their advantage. Hatred of the outsider and of women distinguished their social view. Theirs is the rhetoric of freedom and liberty papering over, lightly, a politics of suffocation. The main word was No: no to this, not to that, no to a woman’s right to dignity, no to the unfurling of the full personality of the outsider; no to the social wage: public transport, public schools, public health care, public welfare, and of course no to getting high. This election revealed that beneath the votes for this or that political party lies a social landscape that seeks real freedom: the votes for gay marriage and for medical (and recreational) marijuana tell us that the days of the Preachers’ aura in the polling booth are soon to be over.

The lunatics are in disarray.

To quote, of all people, Alec Baldwin, it is a bad thing for a political party when you ask, “did the rape guy lose?” and the answer is “which one?”

Buntings of blue have emerged in the southern districts of Texas, leaking into the bastion of Republicanism. By 2034, the US will be a majority minority country. The lunatics are unprepared for this transformation. They are addicted to racism and misogyny. There is no twelve-step program for their recovery. They are too far gone, undone by their habits of fear, hatred and arrogance – the fraternity running the campus. Society as Animal House.

* * *

What of the “winners”? Certainly they are not social cretins. They do not flinch when talking of sex and women, or of race and the outsider; they do not look at every woman and assume that she is a vessel for their contentment or at every outsider and think that they are either to be deported or jailed. That is their temperamental advantage.

They win by default, by the habits of a two-party system. It used to be said that the Democrats are the “lesser evil.” If the political world can be seen as a kaleidoscope with three bits of glass inside, one of those bits that reflects in the mirror confirms the Democrat’s progressive advantage: that is the glass that says on it, Women and Outsiders. But the two other pieces of glass, on Finance and War, are interchangeable between the two parties. There is no “lesser evil” here, only, as the Black Agenda Report’s Glen Ford put it, the more “effective evil.” Because the party of Lunacy makes gestures that turn off the majority of the country, it is harder for them to actually disembowel the entitlement programs, to drain the tank of Social Security and Medicare, to break the back of union power. If the Democrats do it, liberalism sniffs and moans, but then acknowledges that this is perhaps inevitable, that the times require responsibility. The shadow of Bill Clinton’s evisceration of liberalism hangs heavy on the Obama presidency: Grand Bargains, balanced budget amendments, deep cuts to the tune of $2.50 for every dollar in spending. This is the economics of Finance, and says nothing of the global jobs crisis. Any recovery that comes in will not improve the jobs situation. The parties of Wall Street, both of them, say nothing to the millions of disposable people who will never be able to find meaningful employment in this dispensation. A society dominated by Finance Capital suffers from acute joblessness. Money is made through mathematical manipulation, not through trade in goods and services between real, living people – all of whom have irritating things like desires and wants, encumbrances to the world of Finance.

No cuts to the military; no let up on war. A few hours after the election, drones struck in Yemen, near Sanaa, killing at least three. A finger in the eye of the United Nations, whose bureaucrats have slowly begun another investigation into drone attacks. The habits of belligerence are so ingrained that at the third presidential debate neither candidate inhaled Reality and exhaled the Truth. Obama said that Romney was speaking as if in the 1980s, with Russia as the main threat. The fact is that both seemed stuck in that fateful decade, shrouded by the fog of American Supremacy. More ships, with bayonets or not, more troops, more bombings. Even when they say more diplomacy, what they mean is the strangulation of countries, embargoes of Cuba and Iran, harsh economic warfare that does not build the confidence between nations. China and Iran are set to change their leaders, but neither candidate reached out to the new governments, eager for a new relationship. Theirs was the framework of pro-Israel, anti-Iran, pro-machismo, anti-negotiation, pro-1980s, anti-21st century.

* * *

So where does this leave us? Some confidence in the fact that the social landscape favors the politics of the Future. Great tasks manifest ahead to move that landscape away from the Parties of War and Wall Street. Base building organizations across the country, some housed in places like encuentro 5, are alive to the possibility of more systematic assertion in the political domain. What fails us consistently is a widened historical imagination. We fear the lunatics and run for shelter – inconsistent with our own self-awareness that their roof is rickety. The tasks of an expanded political imagination are already available –  (a), the Little Things: passage of the Employee Free Choice Act, which would build up the enclaves of organized labor, an increase in the minimum wage, an allowance for bankruptcy judges to write down mortgage debt, so an end to the foreclosure epidemic; (b) the Big Things: revitalization of the public sphere, an increase in public goods (transport, schools, housing) not only for their usefulness but because these would allow a serialized, privatized population to get a sniff of social solidarity, to give us a cultural preview of a socialist, communitarian world. If we relied upon each other and saw each other more, we’d build trust in our capacity to shape this world. That was the lesson of Occupy: and it endures.

But not this, not social democracy, nor that, planetary humility. The IMF forecasts that by 2016 China will be the world’s most powerful economy. That date is within reach. But the US political class has denied its importance to the population. When Empires collapse they prefer to go to war rather than to allow a peaceful transition. World War 2 heralded the collapse of the British Raj just as the Napoleonic wars led to the usurpation of Holland’s preeminent position. Empires stubbornly try to hold on, unwilling to read the tea-leaves. The finance capitalists are the canaries, hastening from the old center of empire to the new – fleeing Amsterdam for London in the 18th century, and then London for New York in the last one, and now from New York draining investment capital into the Pacific Rim and other emergent centers. In the 1920s, the old war dog Winston Churchill bemoaned, “I would rather see Finance less proud and Industry more content.” Too late. Money had already fled, and the deindustrialization of Britain left Manchester and Sheffield as heritage towns and not the powerhouses that they once were. The anatomy of old imperial decline contains the anatomy of the decline of the American Empire and of the American Dream. Detroit (Michigan), Gary (Indiana), Solvay (New York) – shadows of what they once were, ghosts of industrial might.

Belligerent talk backed up by the menace of aerial bombardment threatens a planet that does not seem to have the appetite for another superpower. The Chinese are content with multi-polarity, since their entire foreign policy seems driven by the Treaty of Westphalia – you do your thing, we’ll do ours. This is a historical opening for the planet, with regionalism allowing for the emergence of new kinds of solution, whether in Latin America (with their own trading agreements and political platforms) or in South-West Asia (with India-Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan creating a new Southern Silk Road). The Southern Silk Road is an important development in the creation of regionalism, linking South Asia to Central Asia, and West Asia to China. No longer will these regions need to go through the US and European-dominated routes to conduct their trade. The hub (US-Europe) and spokes (the rest) approach to world affairs is being rendered anachronistic by these developments. As a result of the growth of regionalism, US primacy and its unipolar approach is being set aside. The deepening links with Iran are a testament to the lack of US domination in the region, and of its political failure to isolate Iran. Americanism is a false utopia; regionalism is today’s reality.

* * *

Capitalism’s general tendency is toward dehumanization: to let loose the Four Horsemen of the Modern Apocalypse – Poverty, War, Social Despair and Climate Change. It is clear that this system is not capable of a humane future. It will drift inexorably to fascism from above (to encage disposable people in prisons and highly policed ghettoes) and to fascism from below (with the increase of socially dangerous political tendencies, whose imprints will be racist, misogynist, xenophobic). The Rich, and their political minions, will fail the world. It is our task to save it.

[This article was orginally published onCounterPunch.]

City, Space, Power: Lahore’s Architecture of In/Security

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Casualties of War

Lahore today looks like a city at war. One of the greatest unacknowledged casualties of the United States’ “war on terror” has been the cities—and citizenry—of Pakistan. The US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to oust the Taliban from power in response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.[1] In 1985, sixteen years prior, President Ronald Reagan equated the Taliban mujahideen who had defeated the Soviet’s in Afghanistan as “the moral equivalent of America’s founding fathers.”[2] This presidential stance has obviously changed since. In 2008 the US committed another surge of troops to Afghanistan due to the continued presence of the Taliban in the region. Pakistani military operations were waged in parallel in the northwest regions of the country bordering Afghanistan. Since then, Pakistan has seen a particularly stark backlash within its borders as a response to its continued collaboration with its close ally.[3] Militants within Pakistan have retaliated by targeting police and security sites in cities throughout the country. Lahore is just one unsung casualty of this war that links Lahore and New York City across disparate geographies through the legacy of US policy and Pakistani collaboration during the Cold War.[4] As Eqbal Ahmed presciently said: “These are the chickens of the Afghanistan war coming home to roost.”[5]

Lahore is renown for its food and its inhabitants’ penchant for pomp. It has been described as “the city of people who love unconditionally, without reserve, the ‘heart of the Punjab.’”[6] Unlike Karachi, its more populous southern rival, it is neither regarded as particularly violent nor cosmopolitan in the popular imaginary.[7] The writer Mohammad Hanif describes: “Half a dozen people are killed on an average day: for political reasons, for resisting an armed robbery, for not paying protection money, and sometimes for just being in the wrong spot when two groups are having a go at each other. If the victims don’t belong to your family or your neighborhood, or if you are not carrying out the killings, you are not likely to hear the gunshots. On television, you’ll catch a glimpse of ambulances…and you’ll thank God that it was a relatively peaceful day.”[8] Lahore has not historically experienced such incidences of daily violence and was instead wearier of attacks on its religious minorities that intermittently punctuated its past.

Beginning in 2008 Lahore experienced a wave of retaliatory attacks that were both unprecedented in scale and frequency.[9] The attacks were in response to Pakistani military operations that were perceived as occurring at the behest of the United States. The seemingly incessant bomb blasts that escalated form 2008 through 2010 gave rise to a public discourse of fear, anxiety, and paranoia, with a sense of incomprehensibility as to the reasons for the chosen sites of violence and dismay at their human toll. The repercussions of these blasts are now so interwoven into the daily experiences of the city’s inhabitants that youth, particularly, cannot remember—nor imagine—the city otherwise. The attacks have given rise to what I describe as Lahore’s architecture of in/security, which is reshaping the contours of the city as well as the way its inhabitants thread through it. This has continued despite the fact that since 2010 these attacks have abated. Bomb blasts today are no longer perpetual, and yet in effect they persist in the urban psyche and endure through the markers of securitization that populate this considerably altered city. It is increasingly difficult to gauge safety in Lahore, to situate the reality of lived experience against the symbols proliferating in the city that continue to mark it as unsafe.[10] The Lahore High Court in February of this past year even ordered the provincial government to remove security barriers and apparatuses that are obstructing the flow of traffic in front of administration and police headquarters throughout the city. The police and senior officials have refused this request and barriers remain in place.[11] Residential areas are another issue altogether.


[Entrance to Karbala Gamme Shah with security barriers and police. Photograph by Julius John.]

Lahore’s Architecture of In/Security

I am interested in the emergence of Lahore’s securitized zones and the way power inscribes itself in urban space through architecture. Parallel with this is my interest in using cartography as an analytic tool to interrogate processes of securitization. By architecture here I mean conceptual approaches to space, following Eyal Weizman’s definition of it in his work on Israel’s architecture in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: “On the one hand, the book deals with the architecture of the structures that sustain the occupation and the complicity of architects in designing them…On the other hand, architecture is employed as a conceptual way of understanding political issues as constructed realities…[where] the occupation is seen to have architectural properties, in that its territories are understood as an architectural ‘construction’, which outline the ways in which it is conceived, understood, organized and operated.”[12] Normative discourse responding to the bomb blasts in Lahore attributes the rise in securitization as an effective response to the attacks and also considers the city as a whole under siege. My focus in this essay is two-fold: one is investigating the process of securitization and its architectural effects, while the other is creating new representations of the city that allow us to queer our understanding of it.[13] By queer here I mean to see the city otherwise, to defamiliarize and consider it against its popular semantic registers within Lahori public discourse.

I treat the city of Lahore as an “elastic geography,” a dynamic entity that is both a physical site and imaginary construct.[14] I am particularly interested in the relationship between visual representations and our image of the city, and in using cartography as a tool to understand the way in which the securitization of Lahore manifests itself spatially.[15] New means of representation can create alternative images of the city, and my hope is that this provokes and challenges us to reconsider and ultimately transform the relationship that we have to space and power, from Henri Lefebvre’s writing on the “right to the city” to David Harvey’s insistence that “The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights.”[16] It is a markedly different thing to say that the attacks post-2008 in Lahore were primarily targeted at police and security services than to say that Lahore is being indiscriminately bombed. It is even more striking if this is supported by visual representations that aid in our analysis of security issues.

In Lahore securitization has become a primary method through which certain regimes of control are legitimized, which is what I refer to as Lahore’s architecture of in/security. This most visible manifestation of a regime of control is legible in the preponderance of security measures distributed throughout the city—walls, barriers, gates, and checkpoints. These objects and apparatuses—some cropping up overnight, others calcifying over time into permanent structures—are found throughout the city in residential areas, religious spaces, governmental and police zones. They delineate boundaries, block vehicular and pedestrian access, restrict entry, and alter the city’s urban fabric. In civic spaces barriers and checkpoints effectively shrink civic space and encroach upon the rights of citizens. In residential blocks they indicate a family or larger community that is fortifying its boundaries. Parts of Lahore look like the city is at war because spaces are dominated by the presence of these objects and concomitant processes, which are the artifacts and performances of its in/security. This is further legitimized through a discourse of in/security by its multiple agents, state and non-state alike.[17]


[Datta Darbar (Datta Ganj Bahksh) fortified by concrete barriers and barbed
wire and heavily staffed by police. Photograph by Julius John.]

Let us begin with Lahore’s walls. Walls are interesting because they, at the most basic level, block you from accessing spaces physically but also deal with vision: they keep your eye from seeing through spaces. After the 2008 bombings the city issued an ordinance to public institutions recommending that they increase the height of their walls from six to eight feet. Residential quarters took note and did the same. It is inconceivable that two additional feet of brick, sheet metal, concrete block, or barbed wire are increasing anyone’s safety, but the symbolic gesture of securitizing space is the more valuable one. If you look closely at the city’s walls, the brick and mortar betray their age and you can read the line at which the additional increment begins. This horizon line is legible throughout the city—a horizon denoting fear. The result of higher walls and the placement of boards to cover what was visually permeable before (the perimeter gates bounding Punjab University or National College of Arts) has been that if you are driving or walking along Mall Road, space has become flattened. It has no perspectival depth. This obliteration of transparency is a newer strategy of control that is moving from the physicality of the body to that of the gaze. Citizens are effectively cordoned off from using and even claiming these civic spaces now that they are no longer visible. Mall Road has become a purely symbolic space of power, evident during the spectacularized displays of fervor exhibited by “political” protestors who crowd the street, much to the chagrin of drivers, since all other spaces are barricaded.

The counterpoint to the fixity of walls in Lahore is the movable barrier—the checkpoint. Checkpoints have a ghostly quality in the city and can appear and disappear, expand and contract through the day and night. They exploit this architecture of impermanence and are perceived as temporary objects, which, if they are present in excess of years, they are not. Checkpoints, unlike walls, barriers, and the like, engage the social realm instead of simply blocking access to space or delineating boundaries. Checkpoints exclude, produce hierarchy, and restrict access. They also empower security services who monitor social behavior and control flows of circulation. Security details at checkpoints in Lahore routinely harass and demand bribes from drivers, discriminating based on class, likeliness of alcohol consumption, and perceived occupation of the driver. The public discourse on safety considers the bomb blasts as the result of actions of people from outside the city, non-Lahori’s, but through the infrastructure of checkpoints this is collapsed onto tensions regarding class that arise from within Lahori society.


[Concrete barriers and new concrete wall outside the FIA headquarters on Temple Road. Photograph by Sadia Shirazi.]

In the residential area of Cantonment, for example, checkpoints are now veritable tollbooths, with automated service lanes for residents. What was a temporary structure put in place after the spate of bombings is now concretized into a fixed entity. Defence Housing Authority (DHA) is another case in point. This residential development is owned and managed by the military and has checkpoints, guards, and barriers placed at points of entry between it and Charrar Pind, a village that predates the construction of Defence that is now strangulated by the constructions encircling it. Charrar’s inhabitants are now monitored as potential threats. The arrangement of concrete barriers forces people and vehicles to navigate around them at a clipped pace; the checkpoints here are slow spaces of compression that filter movement in one direction only. The residents of Charrar are de facto criminalized and scrutinized, since any departure from their settlement necessitates that they travel through Defence, which surrounds them and in which many of its residents are employed as domestic labor. In these sites of securitization the threat is perceived from within and elsewhere. Charrar is elsewhere in a sense, but within and outside of Defence. These checkpoints are only visible to Lahoris who live or travel within this residential development and are targeting class difference exclusively, which distinguishes them from the temporary checkpoints that surface on Mall Road leading towards its civic spaces in colonial Lahore. The checkpoints in Defence and Cantonment are not part of public discourse on the rise of securitization after the pervasive bomb blasts. The larger discourse on securitization elides this internal friction between class and caste, village and military developers. The response from a perceived threat from inside is justified by focusing on threats from outside.


[Map by Sadia Shirazi.]
 

Cartography and the Spectacle of Security

It was in response to heated arguments with my mother regarding whether and how safe Lahore actually was that I began a research and cartographic project about the bomb blasts.[18] I wanted to make sense of the paradigm of in/security and began to consider ways to visualize information regarding the blasts. First I combed through publicly available information on bomb blast sites, casualties, and perpetrators; I assembled the data into a table from 1997 onwards. In the span of ten years, from 1997 through 2007, I saw that there were only two bomb blasts in Lahore, both targeting the minority Shia community. These attacks occurred in 1998 and 2004 respectively. There were no attacks from 2004 through 2007. Beginning in 2008, Lahore experienced a series of high intensity bomb blasts concentrated in the colonial city at targets such as the High Court, Police Headquarters, and Federal Investigative Authority headquarters. None of the 2008 attacks targeted minorities. It was clear to me after completing the table that in 2008 the character, location, and intensity of the blasts altered considerably, which corresponded with the US surge in Afghanistan that same year and military operations conducted in coordination by Pakistan. Each subsequent year has resulted in an escalation of those attacks, from five in 2008 to ten in 2009 to fifteen in 2010, after which attacks subsided, with three most recently in 2012.[19] Most high-impact blasts were claimed—by militant groups ranging from the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan to Lashkar-i-Jhangvi—while others, such as the horrific attack on Datta Ganj-Baksh, also known as Data Darbar, a shrine revered by Sunni and Shia alike, are still unaccounted for.[20] A series of low intensity copycat bombs, usually targeting cultural sites such as music halls and theaters, have also occurred that are usually unclaimed.[21] Visualizing the information made many things legible that were otherwise obscured.


Last Week on Jadaliyya (Nov 5-11)

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This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes a list of the most read articles and videos.  Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series. 

 

Conditions on Aid and the Politics of Development

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It is mid-August and the heat in the eastern occupied West Bank is oppressive. The air is dry, wind whips up dust, and sand makes its way into the crevices of shoes, pores, and hair. The landscape is covered with settlement agricultural plantations, military outposts, and winding stretches of asphalt. In between this matrix of settlements and outposts are the stretches of makeshift Palestinian encampments – tin shacks and tents that look as though they would fly away with the slightest gust. Goats, camels, and sheep graze nearby while shepherds sit on rocks and sweat in the heat of the afternoon. Next to them are layer upon layer of cement block homes, some painted bright pastel colors, others grey or white. All are separated by narrow dirt paths or broken roads. And in this bleak landscape are children walking along the sides of the highway, next to speeding cars, going home from work or school. 

The West Bank is split between these built-up areas of housing and stretches of encampments. This is a result of the Oslo Accords (1993 and 1995), the interim negotiated agreements premised on the goal of a two-state solution. Many Israeli and Palestinian academics and policy analysts consider the Oslo Accords completely ineffectual means to that end. 

The Oslo Accords remain in force in the occupied Palestinians territories, however, and divide the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C.  Area A is made up of the West Bank’s major population centers, and falls under the Palestinian Authority’s civil and security jurisdiction. In Area B, Palestinians have control over civil affairs only. In both Area A and B, Palestinians are permitted to create permanent infrastructure without Israeli building permits. These Area A and B pockets are separated by large expanses of Area C land. 

Area C is maintained under full Israeli control. In these regions, Palestinians are forbidden from creating permanent structures without a permit from the Israeli Civil Administration. It is here where Palestinians are forced to reside in informal, non-permanent encampments. Area C makes up 62 percent of the entire West Bank. 

From January to July 2012, Israeli occupation forces destroyed 213 Palestinian-owned structures in Area C of the West Bank. These structures include homes, schools, businesses, water cisterns, animal cisterns, solar panels, and even cesspits for sewage. This year alone, 682 Palestinians have been displaced due to infrastructure demolition. In the past ten years, Israeli authorities have demolished more than 2,200 Palestinian residential units, leaving more than 13,000 Palestinians homeless. Sixty percent of demolitions in 2011 alone were in areas close to Jewish settlements.

Demolition orders issued by the Israeli authorities are largely based on the fact that affected structures are built without permits. A September 2012 World Bank report on “The Imperative for Economic Cohesion” in the occupied Palestinian territories states: “[I]n the majority of Palestinian villages in Area C, building permits are almost unattainable and the application for building permits has been characterized by ambiguity, complexity and cost.” With the ability to obtain Israeli Civil Administration permits beyond reach for the majority of Palestinians, many are left with no other choice but to build illegally in order to provide shelter for their families. 

As the same World Bank report on economic cohesion in the occupied territories states, “the entire Palestinian economy is affected by what happens in Area C.” This may seem rather obvious, given that Area C makes up such a large portion of the West Bank and contains some of the most viable agricultural land in Palestine as well as other resources. However, what remains striking in the World Bank report and many other reports on the occupied territories is the gap between analysis and development planning. There is a blatant lack of political will to secure the future of this economically and geographically strategic area of the purported future Palestinian state.

In response to Israeli authorities’ systematic demolition of Palestinian infrastructure and donor fears that deepening colonization is overtaking their proclaimed agenda of a two-state settlement, Area C of the West Bank has become a recent focus of international development efforts. Yet, international donors’ current approach to aid does not provide sustainable solutions to the development crisis in Palestine.

Looking forward, reforms to aid policies must be part of a larger political agenda to support Palestinian rights and an end to the Israeli occupation. This implies an international commitment to Palestinian rights as the only means to lay the foundations of sustainable socio-economic development in Palestine. This framework simply does not yet exist.  

This approach to donor aid, especially in regards to extremely conflicted regions such as Area C, is complex and multi-layered. For some large international donors such as USAID, a strict policy of aid conditionality requires building permits from Israeli authorities to construct any infrastructure for Palestinians in Area C. Requiring Israeli permits effectively weakens Palestinian ownership rights over land by normalizing Israel’s authority over planning and building. Most organizations avoid the question of building permits altogether, instead opting for humanitarian aid or emergency-aid projects that do not require building permits at all. This type of aid includes the distribution of food, school supplies, or first aid kits; it can also provide portable sanitation units and agricultural supplies for farmers or shallow water ponds for irrigation. None, however, provide the type of permanent infrastructure development needed to assert Palestinian ownership of land or livelihoods. Palestinians remain fundamentally unable to control the future of local development in this region.  

The problems run deeper. For those organizations that build in Area C without permits, close to none choose to directly confront Israeli authorities if that infrastructure is demolished. Although 25 percent of demolished Palestinian structures in 2011 were created through donor-funded projects, organizations will not demand accountability on part of the Israeli Civil Administration through reparations or any other forms of compensation. 

There are, however, organizations attempting to change international donors’ complacency in regards to systematic demolitions. Oxfam is an organization that does consistently call for reparations for destroyed infrastructure. There are also other individual cases in which international NGOs have called for compensation. For example, Poland’s foreign ministry recently summoned the Israeli ambassador in order to demand reparations on behalf of Polish Humanitarian Aid for a destroyed water cistern. The majority of donors working in Area C, however, remain silent on this issue. 

Ultimately, both approaches do very little to ensure sustainable development in Area C because of donors’ unwillingness to hold the Israeli Civil Administration, and ultimately the government of Israel, responsible for its flagrant disregard of international law and the rights of the Palestinian people. 

For example, the European Commission (EC) took note of Area C as a region of strategic development for Palestine. The EC recently detailed plans for a new seven million Euro grant to “support Palestinian presence in and development of Area C with the view to accomplish the creation of a viable contiguous Palestinian state.” The EC pledges to “help the relevant PA ministries to plan and build new infrastructure and enable people to reclaim and rebuild their land there.” The project gives a good impression: building infrastructure, and reclaiming and rebuilding land. 

Here is the catch: the EC states that it must undertake a financial risk of 10-20 percent for demolition orders from Israeli authorities. Therefore, it will “ensure coordination and information vis-à-vis the Israeli authorities” and “extend the implementation period of all infrastructure projects after provisional acceptance from the Israeli authorities has been obtained.” Ultimately, to account for the risk of building in Area C, coordination and approval of Israeli authorities will be needed to continue projects. 

Whether the EC intends for these statements to imply informal communication and coordination, or if it literally means the need for official Israeli permits, the EC still capitulates to Israel’s occupation. 

Recognizing, formally or informally, Israel’s authority over planning and building in Area C delegitimizes Palestinian rights over this land.  More importantly, Palestinians in Area C do not simply need isolated, individual projects to secure their future. Socioeconomic development can only take place when Palestinian authorities and Palestinian communities have credible control and power over planning and building. This includes large-scale infrastructure work such as the establishment of power grids, roads, agricultural roads, sewage networks, and formal water lines. Despite the millions of Euros poured into the region, the Israeli Civil Administration remains in control of development.  

Even in the Council of the European Union’s (EU) May 2012 report regarding the “Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process,” the report’s first clause articulates the unequivocal “commitment to a two-state solution.” Yet, on the issue of Area C infrastructure development, the EU insists that it must “engage with the Government of Israel to work out improved mechanisms for the implementation of the donor funded projects.” Although the EU does state that it will continue funding projects in Area C and expects these projects to be “protected for future use,” it remains complicit in the perpetuation of a status-quo system of authority; Israel’s decision-making power in this region remains legitimate and as a consequence, the need to assert Palestinian rights remains a secondary priority.  

Such conditions apply in sixty-two percent of the West Bank – sixty-two percent of the supposed future Palestinian state. Therefore, without a clear donor policy change that deliberately circumvents Israel’s system of building permits and decision-making power, Palestinian rights over property and resources will continue to suffer and the de-development of Palestinian communities will continue unabated. 

In an article written in the context of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the second Palestinian uprising against Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Edward Said wrote, “Now the international community must lay upon Israel the obligation to accept the principle of real, as opposed to fictional, partition, and to accept the principle of limiting Israel's untenable extra-territorial claims…” These words penned in April 2002 are as prescient today as they were then. 

Current approaches to aid in Palestine, such as those that require Israeli building permits in Area C or even informal coordination with Israeli authorities, legitimize and normalize Israel’s “untenable extra-territorial claims,” and undermine the “obligation” of the international community under Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention to “respect and ensure respect” of the rights and protections afforded to civilian populations in occupied territory. Such conditions reflect larger policies, which remove any and all accountability on the part of the Israeli government and the international community to uphold their responsibility to respect Palestinian rights and self-determination. 

Donors, including the European Commission, are well aware of the negative consequences of their aid policies in Palestine. Facts on the ground are hard to ignore, especially as illegal outposts, settlements, and checkpoints riddle the region’s landscape with stark reminders that both Israel and Palestine could not be further away from a lasting peace. 

The donor community is in a similarly distant position – to be more precise, “a million miles” away, according to Nadia Hijab, director of Al-Shabaka, The Palestinian Policy Network.  While critical voices in the field certainly exist, they remain marginal. 

Current leadership, unwilling to change its policies despite Israeli intransigence, is shielded and distanced from the social, economic, and political repercussions of the occupation that are felt each day by Palestinian communities.  In the higher echelons of international politics, there are no diplomatic consequences for simply paying lip service to Palestinian human rights. 

The European Union is just one of many international actors that continue to pour money into an aid-dependent Palestine while also enacting policies such as the “EU-Israeli Action Plan,” a document outlining future EU-Israeli economic and political coordination, with, of course, no explicit mention of the occupation. 

Hijab concludes that facts on the ground can only shift in favor of a just and lasting peace when the heavyweights of the international community, including the United States, decide to “take Israel on politically.”

Hijab’s comments echo Edward Said’s conclusions ten years ago:  “There can be no conceivable peace, in my opinion, that does not tackle the real issue: Israel's utter refusal to accept the sovereign existence of a Palestinian people…What boggles the mind is that no official—US, Palestinian, Arab, UN, European, or anyone else—has challenged Israel on this point...”

Five Texts by Zakaria Tamer

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Five Texts by Zakaria Tamer

Translated by Marilyn Hacker


Who are you?

Who is the Syrian?
The Syrian is an unknown citizen, he did not become famous for having chosen death, prison, and endurance over suffering and self-abasement as the path to freedom. The Syrian is a citizen living outside Syria and a citizen living within its borders readying himself to leave as soon as he is able, and what unites Syrians inside and outside Syria is a loathing of tyrants and their regimes from A to Z.

The little one is eaten and the big one is eaten

The great thief devoured many little thieves , and the people exchanged satisfied glances, and they whispered in hushed voices: Justice always comes late, and the big thief will be swallowed up by an even bigger thief, and the biggest thief will be swallowed by the blood of the martyrs.

The blind

Sheikh Mahmoud told his young pupils to go to the window and to look at the sky from there, so the pupils rushed to the window, and Sheikh Mahmoud asked them:
“What do you see in the sky?”
The pupils said “An airplane flying.”
Sheikh Mahmoud said “Look harder! What else do you see?”
The pupils said “We see some clouds, and a sun.”
Then Sheikh Mahmoud questioned them insistently: “What else do you see besides the sun, the clouds, and the airplane?”
So the pupils stared at the sky, and then they said, sure of themselves, “Nothing, besides the sun and the clouds, because the airplane has disappeared.”
Then Sheikh Mahmoud said to them, his voice full of anger: “You are worthless! It is as if I were teaching blind men, who perceive nothing!”
And when the little pupils left the school, they walked along the street imagining they were blind beggars knocking on all the doors for alms, but no door opened for them, and they looked up at the sky, but they saw nothing but the clouds and the sun.

What is left

Each writer is what he writes, and that’s all, neither more nor less, and any other noise he makes has no more value than grains of sand piled onto other grains of sand. Today there are writers who fill the public forums of Syria sighing and moaning about their support for the revolutions, but all that they wrote before the revolution was no more than whispers and insinuations in locked bedrooms where women are preparing to undress, and they are no more than what they had written, not what they claim now.

Don’t be timid!

The writer: I’m going to write about the growing number of beggars, and I will give the reasons for that with an in-depth analysis.
The pen: Why don’t you write about those men whose timidity keeps them from joining forces with the beggars?

[These texts were published in Arabic on the author's Facebook page al-Mihmaz (The Spur) and translated by Marilyn Hacker]

[Zakaria Tamer (b. 1931, Damascus) is one of the pioneers of the Arab short story. He has published eleven short story collections, two books of satire, and dozens of chidlren's books. He lives in London]

بعد ما بعد الحداثة: مقالات في الأدائية وتطبيقات في السرد والسينما والفن

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[“كتب” هي سلسلة جديدة على صفحات “جدلية” نستضيف فيها المؤلفين والمؤلفات في حوار حول أعمالهم الجديدة ونرفقه بفصل من الكتاب.]

"بعد ما بعد الحداثة: مقالات في الأدائية وتطبيقات في السرد والسينما والفن" تأليف: راؤول ايشلمان. ترجمة: أماني أبو رحمة. عن دار أروقة.

 

جدلية: كيف تبلورت فكرة الكتاب وما الذي قادك نحو الموضوع؟ 

أماني أبو رحمة: بدأت فكرة الكتاب منذ عامين تقريباً وأثناء بحثي عن موضوعات كتاب “ما وراء القص: دراسات في رواية ما بعد الحداثة”، كنت أقرأ وأبحث كثيراً لاختيار الموضوعات المناسبة. ولفت انتباهي أثناء البحث حديث منظري ما بعد الحداثة البارزين من أمثال ليندا هتشيون وإيهاب حسن ووليم غاس عن نهاية ما بعد الحداثة ـ وأن تطبيقاتها الفنية والأدبية والمعمارية قد أخذت بالتلاشي لتحل محلها تطبيقات جديدة تستند إلى نماذج فكرية إنسانية مغايرة. شغلت القضية فكري حتى أنهيت كتاب ما وراء القص. وبدأت البحث عن “نهاية ما بعد الحداثة” أو “موت ما بعد الحداثة” أو “بعد ما بعد الحداثة”. وأذهلني الكم الهائل من التنظير المتعلق بالموضوع وعدد الكتب والدراسات التي طرحت منذ ما يزيد عن عقدين تتحدث عن احتضار ما بعد الحداثة وتحول النموذج الفكري الإنساني بعيداً عنها على أصعدة مختلفة. وشرعت في تقصي التنظيرات والبحث عن الكتب التي تعالج القضية معالجة جادة. فعثرت على ما يقارب أثني عشر مصطلحاً يمكن أن أصفها بالجدية والتميز وشمولية الطرح والمعالجة. أذكر على سبيل المثال مصطلح ما بعد الألفية لإريك غانس ومصطلح الحداثة الزائفة لآلان كيربي والحداثة الآلية لروبرت صاموئيل والحداثة المغايرة لنيكولاس بيريو والأدائية أو نهاية ما بعد الحداثة لراؤول ايشلمان. جمعت هذه المصطلحات وما كتب عنها وضمنتها في كتابي “الفضاءات القادمة: الطريق إلى بعد ما بعد الحداثة”. كان مصطلح الأدائية ذي تأثير شخصي عميق بالنسبة لي لعدة أسباب اذكر منها أن المصطلح يتضمن نظرية نقدية أو لنقل أدوات للنقد الأدبي تعد جديدة ومغايرة ولكنها تتناول الوسائط الأدبية التقليدية كالرواية والسينما والفن وترتكز أيضاً على نظرية أنثروبولوجية بعد ما بعد حداثية تغاير نظرية “العنف المقدس” وأن كانت تتقاطع معها في جوانب عدة ولب هذه النظرية التي أطلق عليها واضعها ايرك غانس “الانثروبولوجيا التوليدية” هو إرجاء العنف باللغة.

كما أنها تنطوي على مفهوم فلسفي أعمق يعود بالجماليات إلى كانط وبالفلسفة إلى الواحدية مقابل الاثنينية ما بعد الحداثية . شمولية المصطلح وغرابة النظرية هما ما دفعاني إلى التعمق فيها. وبدأت على هامش اشتغالي في كتاب “الفضاءات القادمة: الطريق إلى بعد ما بعد الحداثة” و تقصي النظريات بعد ما بعد الحداثية، أجمع ما كتبه ايشلمان بخصوص ادائيته؛ هذا المصطلح القديم الجديد. وهكذا عثرت على مادة مميزة كتبها ايشلمان منها فصل من كتابه “الأدائية أو نهاية ما بعد الحداثة: الجمال الأمريكي” والصادر عن مجموعة ديفيس 2008. وتطبيقات نقدية تتناول روايات وأفلام صدرت بعد العام 2000 وأسست لمغايرة نقدية تلامس جوهر المصطلح كما أراده ايشلمان أذكر منها: “قصص بسيطة” لإنغو شولز (رواية عرضية حول إعادة توحيد المانيا مع تضمينات أميركية بامتياز)، و“إله الأشياء الصغيرة ) لأرونداتي روي (أدب ما بعد الاستعمار)، و”القارئ” لبرنهارد شيلينك (معالجة تشوبها الإثارة لصراعات الأجيال في مرحلة ما بعد الهولوكوست في ألمانيا)، و”خزانة الملابس” لأولغا توكارتشوك ( قصة قصيرة تصويرية للكاتبة البولندية الأكثر شعبية في مرحلة ما بعد الشيوعية) و”فندق العالم” لآلي سميث و “حياة باي” ليان مارتيل. ومن الأفلام أذكر “البلهاء” للارس فون ترير (1997)؛ و “الاحتفال” لتوماس فينتربيرغ (1998)؛ و “الكلب الشبح” لجيم جارموش (1999)؛ و”اركضي لولا اركضي” لتوم تاكوير (1999). وفي السينما السائدة نجد الفيلم الحائز على جائزة الأوسكار “الجمال الأمريكي” (1999) ، فضلاً عن فصول تتناول الفن والعمارة والشخصية في حقبة بعد ما بعد الحداثة.

أنهيت الإعداد والترجمة ثم راسلت المؤلف راؤول ايشلمان الذي أبدى إعجابه الشديد بفكرة ترجمة المادة إلى العربية ووافق على كتابة مقدمة الكتاب وهكذا أنهيت العمل ودفعته لناشر كتابي “فضاءات”: أروقة للدراسات والترجمة والنشر. أما فصول الكتاب فهي : 

•الأدائية أو نهاية ما بعد الحداثة (الجمال الأمريكي)
•بعد ما بعد الحداثية: الأدائية في الأدب
•التحقق من الفترة التاريخية: الأدائية في “فندق الكابيتال” لأولغا توكارتشوك وما بعد الحداثة المتأخرة في “فندق العالم” لألي سميث (مع ملاحظات حول رواية “إله الأشياء الصغيرة” لروي أرونداتي ، و”كنيسة السبعة” لميلو أربان.
•الأدائية في السينما
•الشخصية الأدائية
•الأدائية في الفن  

 - ما هي الأفكار والأطروحات الرئيسية التي يتضمنها الكتاب ؟ 

 أ.أ: ربما أن الفكرة الأساسية في الكتاب هي إعلان المؤلف عن موت ما بعد الحداثة ومحاولته صياغة مصطلح يناسب المرحلة القادمة أي بعد ما بعد الحداثة فكان مصطلح الأدائية.

 لاحظ ايشلمان أن جملة من الكتابات التي تراكمت منذ بداية الألفية الثانية تحيد عن قواعد ما بعد الحداثة غير المكتوبة بأمرين: الأول، هو أنها تحكي قصصاً يصل فيها الأبطال إلى مرحلة التجاوز والتعالي على العالم المادي. وثانياً، وربما الأهم، هو أنها تخدع القارئ بجعله يتخذ مواقف بوذية نحو العالم سواء أراد ذلك أم لم يرد. وبسبب هذه الحيل فإن القارئ يعتقد أن الكتاب يسخرون منه على غرار التهكم الساخر أو المفارقة ما بعد الحداثية. فالإستراتيجية السردية هي حيلة أو مصيدة تقترح أننا لا يمكن أن نصل إلى المعرفة أو الحقيقة إلا من خلال التعالي، عكس الطريقة النقدية الموظفة في ما بعد الحداثة.

 ويمكن تحديد الأدائية ببساطة بوصفها الحقبة التي ابتدأ فيها التنافس المباشر ـ أو الإزاحة ـ بين المفهوم الموحد للعلامة واستراتيجيات الغلق من ناحية، والمفهوم المتشظي للعلامة واستراتيجيات انتهاك الحدود المميز لما بعد الحداثة من ناحية أخرى. ويبقى السؤال الأهم الذي حاول المؤلف الإجابة عليه هو كيف يمكن للاشتغالات الأدائية أن تذهب باتجاه تأسيس واحدية oneness جديدة دون السقوط في فخاخ الميتافيزيقيات القديمة؟ يكمن الجواب من وجهة نظر الكتاب في التمكين الراديكالي الجديد للإطار والذي يكون بتوظيف مزيج من الجماليات والأدوات الإلزامية القديمة.

 تُركب الأعمال الأدائية بطريقة لا تترك للقارئ أو المشاهد ـ في البداية ـ خياراً سوى الانحياز لحل وحيد ملزم لكل المشكلات التي يثيرها العمل قيد التناول . وبكلمات أُخرى فإن المؤلف يفرض علينا حلاً معيناً من خلال توظيف وسائل دوغمائية، طقوسية، أو أي وسائل قسرية أخرى، الأمر الذي يقود إلى تأثرين مباشرين. فمن ناحية، يفصلنا هذا الإطار القسري ـ مؤقتاً على الأقل ـ عن السياق المحيط به من حوله، ويدفعنا دفعاً داخل حدود العمل، حتى إذا ما أصبحنا في الداخل، فلا مفر لنا حينها من التماهي مع شخص أو فعل أو موقف ما بطريقة لا يمكن أن تكون معقولة إلا ضمن حدود العمل ككل. وهكذا فإن الأدائية تسعى لامتلاك كعكة ما بعد الميتافيزيقية وأكلها أيضاً. فمن ناحية أنت مرغم على التماهي مع شيء غير معقول أو غير قابل للتصديق ضمن الإطار ـ ويمكن تلخيص ما أعتبره السمات الأربع الأساسية للأدائية فيما يلي:

1. الصيغة السيميائية الأساسية للأدائية هي الواحدية monist. وهي تتطلب تكامل الأشياء things أو الواقعية thingness ضمن مفهوم العلامة. وقد وجدت المفهوم الواحدي للعلامة الأكثر فائدة حتى الآن هو فكرة ايريك غانس عن الإشاري. والإشارية تعني أن شخصين على الأقل، رغبة منهما في إرجاء العنف في موقف صراع محاكاتي، اتفقا حدسياً على علامة حاضرة أشارت إلى، وألهت، وزينت أداءها الارجائي للعنف. وهذا المشهد الاشاري البدئي، الذي كان فيه الإنسان واللغة والدين والجماليات جميعهم حاضرين وللمرة الأولى مشهد افتراضي بطبيعة لحال. وتجسد الإشارية في تفسيري التاريخي الشخصي، الآلية السيمائية المتولدة في الحقبة الجديدة أكثر من أي مفهوم أحادي منافس. وبكلمات أخرى فإن الاشارية تشير إلى الوعي المتزايد بالحقبة الجديدة. و ستكون وظيفة الجماليات الأدائية، تبعاً لذلك، هي وصف التجليات المختلفة للاشارية في الأعمال الفنية وإظهار كيف أنها تجعل هذه الأعمال ذات جاذبية بمصطلحات الواحدية وليس بعقلية ما بعد الحداثة. وقد خصص الكتاب لتحقيق هذا المشروع .

2. أما الأداة الجمالية الخاصة بالأدائية فهي التأطير المزدوج. ويرتكز الإطار المزدوج على التوافق بين الإطار الخارجي (بناء العمل نفسه) والإطار الداخلي (المشهد الاشاري من أي نوع كان). ويبنى العمل بطريقة تضمن تنقل فرضيته الجدلية الرئيسية ذهاباً وإياباً بين هذين الموقعين: بحيث يقوي منطق الأول الثاني بطريقة دائرية مغلقة. والنتيجة هي حشو أدائي يسمح بتداول لانهائي لرموز ميتافيزيقية مشكوك فيها معرفياً، ولكن لا يمكن دحضها شكلياً ضمن حدوده. وبدورها فإن هذه الرموز الميتافيزيقية صالحة فقط ضمن إطار عمل محدد وتعزز بنائيتها الواضحة عزل العمل أو الاعتراف به بوصفه مسلمات غير قابلة للطعن كما أنها تؤسس قسراً حالته الجمالية ـ بوصفه عالماً من الخبرة الايجابية الموضوعية والمتميزة. ولأنه من السهل تحدديها وفضحها، فإن هذه الرموز الميتافيزيقية تجبر القارئ أو المشاهد على الاختيار بين الجمال غير الحقيقي للعمل المغلق أو الحقيقة المفتوحة المبتذلة في سيقنتها التي لانهاية لها. وتحاول الإعمال الفنية الأدائية أن تجعل المشاهد أو القارئ يعتقد بدلاً من أن يقتنع بالمجالات المعرفية. وهذا بدوره قد يمكنه من افتراض مواقف أخلاقية وإيديولوجية ما كان لهم أن يأخذوها بغير هذه الطريقة. وبمصطلحات تلقي القارئ، فإن الأدائية تكون ناجحة عندما تتمكن من تغير نموذج اعتقاد القارئ بطريقة خاصة، و عندما يبدأ القارئ في إسقاط هذا النموذج الاعتقادي الجديد على الواقع.

3. والمركز الإنساني في الأدائية هو الشخص الكثيف المبهم لأن المتطلب الشكلي الأبسط للتحول مرة أخرى إلى شخص كلاني هو شخصيات أدائية مكررة أو محشوة ـ حتى يتكون شخصاً فإن الشخص لا بد أن يفصل نفسه عن سياقه بطريقة أو بأخرى ـ توطد موقفها عن طريق الظهور مبهمة وكثيفة بالنسبة للعالم من حولها. هذه القتامة المبهمة ليست مرغوبة بحد ذاتها، ولكنها تشكل نقطة البداية لتطور ممكن آخر. وأفضل طريقة لتقيم هذا التطور هو قياس ما إذا كان الشخص (أو إلى أي درجة ) قد تجاوز الإطار المزدوج الذي حدث أن وجد نفسه فيه. وفي الأنواع السردية، فإن قدرة الإنسان على تجاوز الإطار هي مؤشر معياري على الأدائية الناجحة أما في السرد النفسي فإن التجاوز جزئي بالضرورة، في حين أنّه يمكن تحقيقه كلياً في السرد الفانتازي. في الأنواع المعمارية المصورة، التي هي بطبيعتها ثابتة، فإننا نواجه حالات مفارقة من التشبع أو التهديد بالخطر impendency التي تفرض علينا ظروف واشتراطات التجاوز دون إظهار كيف أن التجاوز هو في نهاية المطاف كامل ومنجز.

4. تبرز الإحداثيات المكانية والزمانية في الأدائية في الصيغة المؤمنة. وهذا يعني أن تأطير الزمان والمكان بطريقة تمنح الأشخاص فرصة حقيقية لتوجيه أنفسهم ضمن تلك الأُطر ثم تجاوزها بطريقة أو بأخرى. بسبب تركيبيتها وتصنيعها الواضح، فإن التأطير يجعلنا نفترض وجود كاتب ضمن فرض إرادته علينا بوصفها (الإرادة ) نوعا من التناقض أو الأحجية التي لها معنى حقيقي لكنه خارج نطاق معرفتنا. و فيما يتعلق بالحبكة ، فإننا نجد صراعاً أساسياً بين قهرية الإطار المؤمن المكانية والزمانية ونضال الأشخاص (بشراً أو رموزاً) للتغلب عليه. وبالنسبة للتمثيل المكاني (في الهندسة المعمارية)، نجد توتراً أساسياً بين محاولة المهندس المعماري إحداث تأثير التجاوز والتفوق وبين والقيود المادية التي تفرضها المادة التي يستخدمها: بمعنى أن الفتة المؤمنة الموسعة دائماً ما ترافق مع لفتة بشرية محدودة. 

- ما هي التحديات التي جابهتك أثناء البحث والكتابة؟ 

 أ. أ.: كانت المشكلة الأساسية هي أنني لم أقرأ الأعمال الأدبية التي حللها ايشلمان ولم أشاهد أيضاً معظم الأعمال السينمائية، فاستغرق الأمر أياماً طويلة على هامش البحث والترجمة حتى أشاهد الأفلام واقرأ ما تحصلت عليه من روايات لأتمكن من عرض أفكاره بالطريقة اللائقة. أضفت إلى الكتاب أحياناً تعريفاً بالأفلام والروايات كما بحثت عن اللوحات الفنية على الإنترنت ووضعتها بين يدي القارئ ليتمكن أيضاً من متابعة الخطوط المغايرة في تحليل ايشلمان. أذكر أنني بحثت عن الفيلم الروسي Kukushka (الوقواق)، ويتحدث الفيلم عن ثلاثة أشخاص لا يفهمون لغة بعضهم البعض تقذف بهم ظروف الحرب الروسية الفنلندية في عام 1944 إلى مكان واحد: امرأة ألمانية شابة فقدت زوجها في الحرب، و ضابط روسي (وشى به مساعد موثوق به للشرطة السرية)، و قناص فنلندي يقاتل لصالح الألمان (الذين خانوه ووشو به). ولأنهم غير قادرين على شرح ظلال محنتهم السياسية والشخصية لبعضهم البعض، فقد اضطروا إلى التعامل مع وسائل اتصال إشارية بحتة (مدبلجة شفوياً بحيث تتيح لنا أن نفهم ما تقوله الشخصيتان الفنلندية والألمانية في الواقع). المفارقة أيضاً أن الفيلم غير مترجم إلى الانجليزية وشاهدته كاملاً بالروسية لأكون الشخص الرابع بعد أبطال الفيلم الذي يحاول التعامل مع وسائل اتصال إشارية بحتة. والإشارية بالمناسبة هي أحد مصطلحات الأدائية التي باتت كالأدائية نفسها تحمل مدلولات خاصة يطرحها المؤلف. هذا فضلاً عن وجود مصطلحات خاصة بالمفهوم لم يسبق ترجمتها أو حتى توظيفها بالطريقة التي يريدها المؤلف، وتطلبت مني لذلك جهداً إضافياً في الترجمة لانتقاء المفردة الأقرب والأكثر دلالة.

- كيف يتموضع هذا الكتاب في الحقل الفكري/الجنس الكتابي الخاص به وكيف سيتفاعل معه؟

أ. أ.: الكتاب كتاب في النقد الأدبي. ويحاول صياغة أدوات نقدية مغايرة يمكن تطبيقها على الاعمال الفنية التي غادرت ما بعد الحداثة. يتناول الكتاب الوسائط الفنية التقليدية (غير الدجيتالية إن جاز التعبير) . أما أهميته من وجهة نظري فهو تقصيه الواسع النطاق لمظاهر مغادرة ما بعد الحداثة في الثقافة الغربية على مدى عقدين من الزمن. إذ بقطع النظر عمّا إذا كان مصطلح الادائية يصلح لتوصيف مرحلة بعد ما بعد الحداثة أم لا، إلا أن المتابعة العريضة التي قدمها المؤلف تثبت بشكل قاطع انحراف النموذج الثقافي الغربي والعالمي ربما عن ما بعد الحداثة.

- ما هو موقع هذا الكتاب في مسيرتك الفكرية؟ 

 أ. أ.: يأتي هذا الكتاب رابعاً بعد كتابي “علم السرد: مدخل الى نظرية السرد ” الذي ترجمته ليان مانفريد، وكتاب “ما وراء القص: دراسات في رواية ما بعد الحداثة” الذي جمعت مادته وترجمتها أيضا، ثم كتاب “الفضاءات القادمة: الطريق الى بعد ما بعد الحداثة” الذي عرضت فيه ما يزيد عن إثني عشر مصطلحاً كلها تنظر لمرحلة بعد ما بعد الحداثة في الثقافة الغربية ومن ضمنها أيضاً مصطلح الأدائية. 

 - من هو الجمهور المفترض للكتاب وما الذي تأملين أن يصل إليه القراء؟

أ. أ.: الكتاب معرفي بالدرجة الأولى وأتمنى وصوله لكل مهتم بالأدب والثقافة. ولكنني وكما ذكرت سابقاً أرى أنه يهم النقاد و المشتغلين بالسرد والسينما والفن .

- ما هي مشاريعك الأخرى/المستقبلية؟. 

أ. أ.: أعمل على إعداد كتاب جديد يتعلق بالعلاقة الجدلية الشائكة بين الرواية والتاريخ مع التركيز على اقتحام الذاكرة أو الذكريات لشبكة العلاقة تلك منذ مطلع الألفية الثالثة أو قبلها بقليل. أتمنى أن أوفق في عرض العلاقة نظرياً وتطبيقياً.

السيرة الذاتية :

أماني أبو رحمة: باحثة ومترجمة فلسطينية صدر لها:
• “علم السرد: مدخل إلى نظرية السرد” تأليف يان مانفريد وترجمة: أماني أبو رحمة. دار نينوى للنشر والتوزيع .دمشق. 2011
• “ما وراء القص: دراسات في رواية ما بعد الحداثة” مجموعة مؤلفين . ترجمة: أماني أبو رحمة. دار نينوى للنشر والتوزيع . دمشق 2010.
• “الفضاءات القادمة: الطريق إلى بعد ما بعد الحداثة” أماني أبو رحمة ومعن الطائي . دار أروقة للدراسات والترجمة والنشر. القاهرة 2012. 

راؤول ايشلمان: فيلسوف وناقد أدبي ومنظر ثقافي ألماني ـ أمريكي من أصل سلافي , يُدرس ايشلمان حاليا الأدب المقارن في جامعة لودفيغ ماكسيميليان في ميونيخ. وقد حصل على شهادة البكالوريوس عام 1978 من جامعة روتجرز الأمريكية والدكتوراه في الأدب السلافي من جامعة كونستانز عام 1988، وألف أيضاً أطروحة في الموضوع ذاته وقدمها إلى جامعة هامبورغ في عام 1995. وضع ايشلمان ثلاثة كتب هي “غوملف والحداثة الكلاسيكية الجديدة”، فرانكفورت . 1993، و”ما بعد الحداثة السوفيتية المبكرة” فرانكفورت.1997. و“الأدائية أو نهاية ما بعد الحداثة: الجمال الأمريكي” والصادر عن مجموعة ديفيز الأمريكية عام 2008. فضلاً عن مقالاته المتعددة الاهتمامات بالألمانية والسلافية. يعد ايشلمان من أوائل الذين أشاروا إلى نهاية ما بعد الحداثة وبادروا إلى دراسة سمات وملامح المرحلة القادمة. ولأيشلمان اهتمامات انثروبولوجية واضحة في مقالاته ومساهماته في المؤتمرات والندوات التي يعقدها للترويج لمفهومة (الأدائية) التي يرى أنها ستحل محل ما بعد الحداثة التي آذنت بالأفول.

مقطع من الكتاب 

 

“تعرض ما بعد الحداثة فخاً محكماً استثنائياً لا مفر منه في ما يتعلق بالمعنى. وأي محاولة يبذلها المرء في رحلة البحث عن المعنى تذهب أدراج الرياح لأن كل علامة تعد بنوع من المعرفة الأصيلة تكون متضمنة في سياقات يتطلب شرحها تحديد علامات أكثر. وفي محاولته تحديد نفسه من خلال المعنى، فإن الشخص في ما بعد الحداثة يغرق في طوفان المرجعيات المتقاطعة التي تتزايد في الاتساع أكثر من أي وقت مضى. ومع ذلك فإنه حتى لو تشبث بالشكل فلن تكون النتيجة أفضل بحال من الأحوال، لأن ما بعد الحداثة لا ترى في الشكل ترياقا للمعنى، بل انه أثر يقودنا إلى الوراء نحو سياقات موجودة بالفعل ومثقلة سيميائياً. كما أن أي محاولة لتثبيت المعنى تتبعثر على أشكال متداخلة وكل توظيف لشكل يرتبط بمعان موجودة بالفعل وكل مقاربة للأصالة تعود بنا إلى علامة مغايرة. تنتهي رحلة الشخص الباحث عن المعنى من حيث بدأت: فضاء ما بعد الحداثة الذي يتوسع إلى ما لا نهاية.

أن الخروج من ما بعد الحداثة لن يحدث بوساطة تكثيف البحث عن المعنى من خلال إدراج أشكال جديدة مدهشة أو من خلال العودة إلى منبع الأصالة، و لابد ـ بدلا من ذلك ـ أن نسلك آلية منيعة تماماً ومستعصية على نموذج التشظي والتفكيك والتضخم ما بعد الحداثي. هذه الآلية التي بدأنا نشعر بها مع القوة المتزايدة للأحداث الثقافية في السنوات القليلة الماضية، يمكن أن تُفهم على نحو أفضل بتوظيف فكرة الأداء أو الإنجاز performance.

الأداء بحد ذاته ليس ظاهرة جديدة أو غير معروفة. ففي نظرية الحديث- الفعل لأوستن يشير الأداء إلى فعل اللغة الذي يحقق ما يعد به. أما بخصوص الحدث الفني في ما يسمى بـ "القصص الكبرى "في مرحلة الحداثة فإن الأداء يبرز أو يُغَرِّب الحد الفاصل بين الفن والحياة، أما في ما بعد الحداثة فإن الأداء يدمج جسد الإنسان أو الإنسان نفسه ضمن سياق فني في ما يطلق عليه الفن الأدائي أو الحدوثي أي الفن الحدث. غير أن مفهوم الأداء الذي أقترحه هنا مختلف. لا توظف فكرة الأدائية لإبراز أو لسيقنة الشخص ولكنها توظف للحفاظ عليه: يُقدم الشخص أو (يقدم نفسه) بوصفه وحدة كلية غير قابلة للاختزال مما يعطى القارئ أو المراقب انطباعا بالإلزام. هذا التجسيد الكلي للشخص غير ممكن إلا عندما لا يمنح الشخص سطحاً متمايزاً سيميائياً يمكن استيعابه وبعثرته على السياقات المحيطة. لهذا السبب فإن الشخص الجديد يظهر للمراقب مختزلاً ومتواصلاً بوصفه مفرداً وحيداً أو بسيط الفكر ومتطابق إلى حد ما مع الأشياء التي يمثلها. هذه الكليَّة المغلقة البسيطة تتطلب فاعلية لا يمكن تحديدها إلا بمصطلحات ثيولوجية. لهذا فإنه يخلق ملاذاً تلتجئ إليه تلك الأشياء التي اعتقدت ما بعد الحداثة أو ما بعد البنيوية أنها قد انحلت نهائياً: الغايات، والمؤلف، واليقين، والحب، والعقيدة، وأكثر من هذا بكثير.

لم تكن صياغة نموذج الشخص المختزل والكلي على يد الكتاب والفنانين هذه المرة وإنما جاءت من النقاد الذين وقفوا بالضد من (النظرية) أو توافقوا مع ما بعد البنيوية بالحد الأدنى. ففي مقالتهما الموسومة (ضد النظرية) والتي نشرت في منتصف الثمانينيات من القرن الماضي دعا الناقدان ستيفن ناب و ولتر بن مايكلز إلى وحدة أو عدم انفصال جوهريfundamental inseparability بين الحالات الأساسية الثلاث: التأويل بمعنى نية المؤلف، والنص، والقارئ. وبهذه الدعوة إلى الوحدة يعارض الناقدان (النظرية). وتمنح النظرية ،حسب ناب ومايكلز امتيازاً لهذا الجزء أو ذاك من عملية التأويل الكلية بينما تًهْمِل أو تقوض الأجزاء الأخرى (النقد التأويلي يعلي من قيمة نية أو قصد المؤلف، أما التفكيكي فإنه يميز العلامة فيما يهتم النقد النسبي بالقارئ)، كما أنها لم تنتق أو تحسن التطبيق التأويلي ولكنها مثلت، بدلاً من ذلك، محاولة غير مقبولة لأخذ موضعاً خارج التأويل.

إن (النظرية) " هي مسمى لكل طريقة يحاول الناس من خلالها الوقوف خارج ممارسة ما من أجل التحكم فيها والسيطرة عليها دون ممارستها. لا يمكن لأحد الوصول إلى مكان خارج الممارسة وأن على المنظرين أن يوقفوا محاولاتهم وتبعاً لذلك فإن المشاريع النظرية قد وصلت إلى نهايتها ".

هذا الإصرار على الوحدة المطلقة بين المؤلف والعلامة والقارئ له تأثير غير مباشر وإن كان بعيد المدى على إعادة خلق الشخص. لن يحدث التأويل بعد الآن بوساطة الأحداث السيميائية المتضخمة الزائفة التي لا تتصل بالقص والتي تواصل التملص من سابقاتها، ولكنه سيحدث هذه المرة من خلال التنافس بين البيانات الفردية الكلية التي يصنعها أشخاص متفرقون.

وسيعبر الشخص عن نفسه بوساطة الإنجاز الكلي بمعنى تحقيق ما يؤمن به ، في حين يستجوب أشخاص منافسون أفعال الأيمان هذه. إن الأشخاص المضادين للنظرية مبهمون (ليس لديهم مجموعة صفات وخصائص مميزة) ولكنهم حاضرين دائماً ويمتلك القارئ سبيلاً عملياً يوصله إليهم على قاعدة الأداء التأويلي المنفصل والمتماسك.

في سياق مختلف يقارب هذا المعنى ، يجادل والتر بن مايكلز في كتاب صدر عام 1995 بعنوان (الأهلانية، الحداثة، والتعددية الأمريكية ) معارضا البحث عن الهوية الثقافية في الماضي، أو في العرق أو في جذور أجنبية، حيث يقول :"الهوية الثقافية هي الطريقة التي يعيش بها الناس حياتهم في وقت معين، أنها غير مُنْتَجة، بل أنه من مستحيل في الواقع، تأسيس هوية خارج هذا الإطار التجريبي. تعمل النظرية وإيديولوجية التعددية الثقافية على حد سواء بوساطة فصل جزء عن الكل( الدال عن العمل التأويلي , العرق عن الثقافة) وجعل هذا الجزء المفصول ضمن آخر متقلص لا يمكن تحقيقه".

وفي الوقت ذاته الذي وضع فيه ناب ومايكلز مفهومهما (ضد النظرية) وضع الامريكي الروماني ايرك غانس نظريته عن (الأنثروبولوجيا التوليدية ) والتي ترتكز أيضاً على علامة كلية مدركة أدائياً a holistic, performatively conceived sign وعلى شخص مختزل a reduced subject . ويمكن وصف الانثروبولوجيا التوليدية بأنها نظرية معتدلة في أصل اللغة مستوحاة من نظرية الأُضحوية لرينيه جيرار. وفي قلب نظرية الانثروبولوجيا التوليدية نجد موقفاً بدئياً ـ "أزمة المحاكاة" ـ حيث يتنافس أعضاء مجموعة صغيرة لا تعرف اللغة وتوظف لأول مرة علامة لغوية أشارية linguistic ("ostensive") sign لتعيين الكائن موضع الاختلاف أمامهم . ويحدث أن توظيف العلامة الاشارية قد نزع فتيل الصراع المحتمل أو أرجأه: وهكذا تحول النظام الاجتماعي الحيواني الموجود إلى نظام انساني على نحو خاص يرتكز على تمثيل سيميائي بدلا من المحاكاة المادية ("mimesis").وبطريقة مماثلة للقتل التأسيسي founding murder لضحية بريئة في نظرية رينيه جيرار، فإن أول توظيف للعلامة يكتسب فعالية مقدسة هامة: الخبرات الجمعية لفعل التهدية الحادث بوساطة سيميائية بوصفه شيئاً مقدساً. هذه التهدئة، مع ذلك، هي مجرد إرجاء للصراع البدئي المتعلق بالكائن موضع الرغبة: وعلى الرغم من أن العلامة الاشارية تمثل كائناً إلا أنّه لا يمكن طرحها للتوظيف المباشر. ولذلك فإن التمثيل دائما يثير الاستياء resentment، الأمر الذي يهدد باستمرار بحدوث العنف، ولكن التوظيف المجدد للعلامة فقط هو الذي يمكنه أن يؤجل هذا التهديد مرة أخرى. يضفي غانس ـ وبوعي تام ـ على الاختلاف المرجأ الدريدي قدسية ووجودية. فالصيرورة ( السيموزيس: Semiosis) هي تأجيل تهكمي، ولكن هذا الإرجاء لا يوظف في تقصي الأثر والمفارقات اللغوية ، ولكنه يخدم هدفاً مقدساً هو الحفاظ على الشخص في المجموعة السيميائية semiotic collective. وتحتوي العلامة الإشارية دائماً على عنصر المفارقة، لأن العلامة تتظاهر بأنها شيء لا يمكن أن تكونه (شيء عادي). وتحقق العلامة المصالحة من ناحية والاستياء من ناحية أخرى لانها تمثل الاشياء دون أن تضعها تحت تصرف الشخص بالكامل. إن لهذه المفارقة أثار مباشرة على بحث الشخص عن هوية. فبدلا من فشله المستمر في أن يعثر على نفسه في كومة الآثار السيميائية، يشكل الشخص ذاته من خلال جدلية "الحب والكراهية" المتجذرة في العلامة الكلية المرتبطة بالكائن ، وتؤكد هذه الجدلية باستمرار نفسها من جديد في الحياة الثقافية. وإذا ما وضعنا ذلك بعين الاعتبار هذا في الاعتبار، يمكننا أن نقول إن غانس قد بدأ تحولا في اهتماماته من النقد النظري إلى الوصف بعيد المدى للثقافة المعاصرة. فسجلاته “الحب والاستياء المر” والتي تظهر بانتظام على موقعه على الإنترنت، تتناول مؤخراً ما أطلق عليه غانس ما بعد الألفية أو ثقافة بعد ما بعد الحداثة. ومع كل ذلك لم تجد أطروحات ضد النظرية لناب ومايكلز والأنثروبولوجيا التوليدية لغانس قاعدة واسعة في الأوساط الأكاديمية الأمريكية: فأطروحاتهم الاختزالية و المضادة للنظرية لم تحظ بقبول ليس عند البنيويين فحسب ولكن أيضاً لدى جماعات النقد الأدبي التقليدي والتأويلي.

ويمكننا العثور على نسخ أخرى من الأدائية أقل تطرفاً وربما أكثر تأثيراً في ما يطلق عليه اليوم التاريخانية الجديدة New Historicism والتي يمثلها اليوم ستيفن غرينبلانت. ذلك أنه يمكن النظر إليها بوصفها فعلاً شبه متعال يهدف إلى إحياء أداءات الشخص –الإبداع المبكرة. وما على المرء إلا أن يفكر بالسطر الافتتاحي الملغز في “مفاوضات شكسبيرية”: " لقد بدأت بالرغبة في الحديث إلى الموتى". إن دراسة تأثير الممارسات الأدائية على النقد والأبحاث منذ الثمانينيات أمر لا يمكن تناوله هنا بالتفصيل ولكنني سأتطرق إلى مقالتين حديثتين اتسمتا بالأدائية العميقة وهما : “للأشياء المشتركة” لجيديدا بيردي (1999) و”الاشتباه” للناقد الروسي الألماني بوريس غرويس(2000).

 

Counting Calories and Making Lemonade in Gaza

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The calorie is a crucial measurement in our self-imposed scrutiny of the body. As a recently released Israeli government document shows, it is also an instrument of rule.

After a two-year legal battle, the Israeli human rights organization Gisha has secured the release of “Food Consumption in the Gaza Strip — Red Lines.”
 

Measurement obsession

In September 2007, after Hamas took control of Gaza, the Israeli cabinet restricted the passage of goods, fuel and people to and from the strip. Prepared in January 2008, “Red Lines” prescribes the “humanitarian minimum” of this policy.

In implementing the siege on Gaza, Israeli officials sought to allow “for subsistence without the development of malnutrition.” “Red Lines” is a poignant reminder of how that measurement, the calorie, works as a tool of exclusion and political containment.

In 1896, in a Wesleyan University basement, Wilbur Atwater invented the calorimeter. He provided the budding science of nutrition with a powerful technology that rendered food “politically legible.”

The early 20th century witnessed the rise of an obsession with making economy visible and measurable. Similar to indices such as the cost of living and the gross domestic product, the calorie was a crucial mechanism in this effort to calculate production, consumption and productivity.

The calorie enabled the calculation of the minimum needs required for maximum productivity. Scientists and economists presented the calorie, like other measurements, as an objective universal standard that would ultimately facilitate development and overall benefit.

But the historical origins of the calorie, as well as its ongoing role as an instrument of governance, reveal how the “universal” functions to exclude and categorize people. When the League of Nations’ technical commission set the “optimum standard” for nutrition in 1938, they adjusted the levels of proteins, fats and carbohydrates down from higher Western standards due to the “dietary habits” of people in the Middle and Far East, who were deemed “less active.”

The history of the calorie also reveals a less obvious imperative of measurement: political containment. Economists and nutritionists in the US first configured the “cost of living” index in the late 19th century, when labor organizing was at its height.

It was not the promise of economic amelioration that drove these efforts. The determination of basic subsistence was crucial to ending labor unrest and maintaining social hierarchy.
 

Economic warfare

It is this volatile mix of bodily surveillance and political containment that explains the Israeli policy laid out in “Red Lines.”

By measuring calories, alongside the weight of food, and factoring in age and gender differences, the Israeli security establishment and health ministry together translated Gazans’ “daily humanitarian portion” into numbers of trucks delivering food to the strip. Israeli officials instituted “economic warfare” to contain Gazans and incite them against Hamas.

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, which monitored and approved every kind of food that entered Gaza, argues that “Red Lines” was merely a draft; it was never the basis for policy.

Such a contention is hard to stomach when the quotas on goods coming into Gaza matched the document’s calculations.

In fact, the quantities that were eventually cleared to enter were smaller than the “daily humanitarian portion” of the “Red Lines.” The aim, in the words of one COGAT official, was: “No prosperity, no development, no humanitarian crisis.”

As a result of the blockade, Gazans suffered shortages in basic products such as flour and sugar. This coincided with an alarming rise of unemployment from 26.4 percent in 2007 to 45.4 percent in 2008, and an increased dependence on aid, from 63 percent in 2006 to 80 percent in 2007.

A brief perusal of the historical record, most notably in Iraq and most recently in Iran, teaches us that economic sanctions consistently work to starve and kill civilians, particularly those without access to ruling elites. They are a brutal form of collective punishment. They impoverish most and enrich a few. They enable profiteering and unlikely alliances.

They give birth to new kinds of economic practices. And they reveal an important paradox of the last century’s fixation on measurement: it relies on what remains unmeasured. The so-called “informal” economy makes the formal one possible.
 

Bitter lemonade

Served Israel’s bitter lemons, Hamas made lemonade. Beginning with the blockade in 2007, the Hamas government turned the small tunnel trade into a “major commercial enterprise.” As Middle East analyst Nicholas Pelham shows, on the eve of Operation Cast Lead in December 2008, “tunnel trade revenue increased from an average of [US]$30 million/year in 2005 to $36 million/month.”

Rafah’s underground markets carry everything from basic goods to weapons. Weapons are a realm of commerce that both Egypt and Israel have paid close attention to. This August, Egypt destroyed numerous tunnels in response to a militant attack on Egyptian soldiers near Rafah.

Hamas’ vision of turning the tunnel trade into a formal free trade zone has found enthusiasm among Egyptian businesses, while the new Egyptian president, under US pressure, seems less receptive. Meanwhile, the Israelis have provided yet another performance of a long, if not so precise, arm, with the recent bombing of the Yarmouk military manufacturing facility in Khartoum.

Initially, the Rafah tunnels defied the logic of the calorie. Imports and supplies escaped measurement. In the narrow spaces between being subjects of Israeli occupation and objects of humanitarian aid, Hamas turned to free market capitalism.

As political economist Sara Roy pointed out during a lecture at The Palestine Center in Washington, DC, last month, local businesses are unable to compete with the underground trade. Gaza’s commercial class is marginalized and people are increasingly dependent on the Hamas government.

It is not coincidental, then, that once Hamas took control of the commercial tunnels in 2007, it began regulating, taxing and monitoring the underground markets. The government was quick to grasp that measurement is key to maintaining economic and political control.

Since the Mavi Marmara flotilla action in 2010, Israel has partially lifted its restrictions on the entrance of food to Gaza. But the use of indiscriminate pressure on the entire population continues to be the basis for the current policy.

Israel can and has turned the lights out on Hamas’ entrepreneurial innovations and Gaza’s 1.5 million residents with the flick of a switch. Given Israel’s complete control of airspace, territorial waters, infrastructure and the population registry, Gaza remains the world’s most overcrowded open-air penitentiary. And the lemonade is just too bitter.

[This piece was originally published in Egypt Independent’s weekly print edition. It has also been posted on Egypt Independent's online edition.]

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