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A Nation Derailed

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Just ten days before the second anniversary of the 25 January revolution, Egyptians awoke to another railway tragedy. A train loaded beyond its capacity with security forces recruits heading from Cairo to Sohag derailed in the Badrashin area of Giza leaving nineteen dead and over 120 injured, adding to the toll of deaths on train tracks in Egypt. It was only a month earlier that a rushing train in Asyut obliterated a bus full of children, killing fifty of them.


[The young police recruits were crammed in like sardines, approximately 200 per car, when the train derailed]

In the late night hours of 14 January, Badrashin was awoken by the news of the tragedy. Those who had arose to attend to their morning prayers were called upon to act as rescue workers to save the many who were trapped under the train. In a span of minutes, residents of the nearby areas began to stream out of their homes to help at the site of the incident. Under the cover of darkness, with makeshift lighting, the people of Badrashin performed heroics in the absence of any state intervention. They were picking up the bodies of the deceased, collecting their belongings, attending to the injured, and collectively attempting to lift tons of twisted metal with their bare hands to save those trapped underneath the body of the train. The absence of the state's emergency and transportation service was ominously eery. 


[Due to the delayed response of rescue officials and workers, the people of Badrashin rushed the injured to the hospitals themselves]

In Egypt, like anywhere else, accidents happen. But in Egypt, they happen again, and again, and again, and yet again. The Badrashin incident will likely not be the last of the train tragedies in a country where the national average has become one railroad catastrophe per month. What is even more worrisome than the knowledge of impending disaster is the obliviousness of those who either do not know of it or actively conceal it. A newly-minted Minister of Transportation took a call from a television station on the morning of the Badrashin bloodshed where he mumbled through the answers, said nothing about rescue teams being available on site, and lazily ignored the calls for heavy vehicles to lift the body of the train to rescue survivors relayed to him by the anchor. Lacking in any sympathy, or even tokenistic commiseration, the Minister’s tone spoke to the obliviousness of those in power today in Egypt.

The nearby Hawamdiya Hospital was the recipient of the injured soldiers. Understaffed, underserviced, unsanitary, and woefully ill-equipped to handle such an influx of emergency cases, the hospital staff left the young soldiers strewn throughout the rooms, sometimes two to a bed. The images circulating online and in the news of their pain and misery at the hospital shined some light on a facility that would have otherwise never been given any distinct attention. Not only was the country’s ailing railway system on display, its healthcare institutions, laid to waste by the double-punch of decade of systematic neglect and worsening mismanagement under the Morsi’s government, were in full view.


[Images from Hawamdiya Hospital where the injured had been rushed showcased shocking conditions of healthcare facilities]


[In the absence of even a pillow, this injured soldier had to roll up
items of clothing to rest his head at Hawamdiya Hospital]


[Injured soldier from Badrashin accident receiving treatment and Hawamdiya Hospital]

So cataclysmically destructive was this incident for the government’s public image that they moved swiftly to try and counter the barrage of negative media coverage. President Morsi was rushed to Maadi Military Hospital in Cairo where some of the injured had allegedly been transferred. He posed for photos with the injured in the comparatively advanced, clean, and presentable medical facility so as to showcase the exceptional treatment being doled out to the recruits. The Presidency subsequently distributed these photos to the press corps for wide distribution. Prime Minister Hisham Kandil, also on site, had his photo taken while donating blood. This too was distributed by the PM’s office to the media. The benevolent charity of the state and its leadership was in full gear to counter what was otherwise a public relations disaster for the government. Yet the damage had already been done. The public had heard the cries live from Badrashin on private network ONTV (with some Muslim Brotherhood members suggested had a hand in the accident due to their prompt presence on site before other networks) and seen the photos from Hawamdiya Hospital.


[President Morsi's visit to the Badrashin accident victims who had been transported to the Maadi Military Hospital.
Only state media and press were invited to cover the visit. Photo by Egypt Presidency]

On the second anniversary of the Day of Rage, 28 January 2011, when Egypt’s uprising reached a crescendo that permanently changed the political map of the country, it feels derailment is less of symptom of the railway sector, and more of a condition afflicting the state. As its institutions stubbornly cling to corruption and approximation, its new leaders are setting new standards of negligence, incompetence, and disingenuous political posturing. It seems today’s authorities are more concerned with varnishing their image than developing a systematic plan to change. Attempting, in any way, to deviate attention away from its disastrous mismanagement of both the country and national tragedies, the government’s “mothership,” the Muslim Brotherhood, has often resorted to distraction through divisive identity politics and sectarianism. On the frequent train accidents, various Muslim Brotherhood members and affiliated groups have openly alluded to these tragedies being intentional acts by Christians. More recently, the Brotherhood has also described the Black Bloc, a newcomer to the Egyptian protest scene and fashioned after similar anonymous dissident groups worldwide, as a Christian militia.

However, the Black Bloc are not divorced of Egypt’s railways, not because of the false claim that they share a confessional faith with the train drivers, but rather because their first actions alongside the Ultras and other groups were largely focused on blocking train traffic in the country. On several occasions, two days before the 25 January anniversary, and the three consecutive days leading up to the Day of Rage memorials, the Black Bloc placed their bodies on the train tracks and brought the railroads to a standstill. Similar revolutionary groups closed down several metro lines and blocked traffic on 6 October bridge and other arteries in the country.

As battles rage on in Port Said, Suez, Cairo, Alexandria, and elsewhere for more reasons than can be overviewed here, there is a general sentiment that the country’s revolution is not only outside the offices of power, it has been irreparably derailed. The myriad forms of civil disobedience occurring across the country today, which President Morsi vowed to decisively counter, speak to more than a commemoration of a bygone era of tyranny. In no mood to celebrate, Egyptians are revolting against political monopolization, the continuation of a defunct economic policy, an empty state discourse of embellishment, the radical deprofessionalization of the public service sector, and of course the country’s “trains of death.” Two years have passed since anger swept the country and shook the world. With Morsi in the driver’s seat, the so-called “renaissance train,” what the Muslim Brotherhood often calls its multi-faceted modernization project, is now no more than a sick joke. Little remains of this misnomer besides twisted irony and, in response, depressing satire. In Egypt’s streets today, curfews are being violated, reinstated emergency laws are being ignored, and the state’s overt threats seem to intimidate no one. While the government accuses protesters of derailing the country’s progress and development, it is evident to most that it was Morsi who had driven this train off the tracks.

All photographs from Badrashin taken by Jonathan Rashad


Another Year of Rage

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The date 28 January 2011, also known as the “Friday of Rage,” holds a special place in the hearts of many Egyptians and is widely seen as the turning point at which the “January 25 protests” turned into the “January 25 uprising.” Some associate that day with the image of flames emanating from government buildings and the National Democratic Party headquarters near Tahrir Square, along with the looting and the condition of lawlessness that swept the country shortly thereafter. However, many Egyptians remember the Friday of Rage as the day they were able to defeat Hosni Mubarak’s all-mighty coercive apparatus, as symbolized by the withdrawal of uniformed police forces from the streets. The positive significance attributed to that moment, notwithstanding the security vacuum that it brought about, speaks to a deep-seated animosity between the majority of Egyptians and the policing establishment—one that has survived and continues to animate all aspects of life even after Mubarak’s downfall.

This sentiment is mirrored in popular chants that protesters have often recited at demonstrations and clashes with Egyptian security forces throughout the past two years under the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and currently under the presidency of Mohamed Morsi. It is vividly captured in a variety of popular songs that mock the competence of police forces, and in some cases rejoice at their “defeat” during the 2011 eighteen-day uprisings. Ultras White Knights (Zamalek) soccer fans’ “We Have Not Forgotten about Tahrir” (mosh nasyeen eltahrir) is a case in point:

 We have not forgotten about Tahrir you sons of b*tches.

The revolution for you was a setback.

To whom do we go and tell, “our officers are pimps”

You have taken a beating you have not experienced in years.

Another not-so-subtle expression of popular contempt for Egyptian police is also seen in Ultras Ahlawy’s infamous song “Oh Nesting Crow” (ya ghorab ya ma‘ashesh), in which they ridicule police forces and question their intelligence and educational credentials:

Oh crow nesting at our home,

And who has always been a failure in life,

In high school, he barely scored fifty percent.

And through bribes, his “excellency” got an education,

And received a degree worthy of a hundred colleges.

Oh crow nesting at our home,

Why are you destroying the joy of our lives?

We will not do as you wish,

So please save us your grace.

Go ahead and contrive a case [against me],

Since this is what the Interior [Ministry] usually does.

I was arrested and charged with international terrorism,

When all I did was wave a torch and chant “Ahly.”

The survival of such public expressions of disdain for the policing establishment in popular culture is anything but surprising, given that the abusive practices of security forces have not ceased. As these lines were written, Egyptian security forces were still engaged in employing deadly violence against protesters in nationwide confrontations in the wake of demonstrations organized to mark two years since the outbreak of the January 25 Revolution. For his part, President Morsi declared a state of emergency in three major governorates and vowed further action if calm does not ensue. But even before the outbreak of these confrontations, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) recently reported that police personnel continue to resort unwarrantedly to the use of force against citizens, and have been using torture and violence to target individuals seeking to prove police abuses. The recent violence, moreover, coincides with a reality in which both the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood-controlled presidency have refused to heed revolutionary calls for far-reaching reform of security institutions.

It is too easy to pause at every such incidents of violence, including those most recent, and ask the conventional question: “who started it?” It is too easy to place blame on the provocations of protesters and their failure to comply with police orders. What this analysis misses is that the “vendetta” between the police and Egyptians did not commence at any of these incidents. It speaks rather to deeper conflicts that transcend these battles. The routinization of clashes between protesters and security forces are a testament to the fact that Egyptians are at war, not with the police, but with their state as a whole.

Egyptians revolted on 25 January 2011 against an exclusionary social order that failed to afford them basic social and economic rights. This explains the slogan that spread rapidly in public squares and street marches during the uprising: “bread, freedom, and social justice.” Yet, even with Mubarak’s departure, the end of formal military rule, and the convening of successive elections, people are oppressed in a country in which bread shortages are not an uncommon occurrence, prices are on the rise, and social services are perpetually deteriorating. Morsi, following the footsteps of Gamal Mubarak and Yousef Boutros Ghali, is negotiating the terms of Egypt’s economic development with international financial Institutions behind closed doors. Like his predecessors, he is conducting these negotiations without any meaningful public deliberation or serious engagement with domestic stakeholders. Put simply, instead of negotiating with his own people over the future of the country and the priorities and goals of economic reform, Morsi is negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

By continuing to overlook economic grievances and mounting demands for social and economic rights and by perpetuating the same economic policies of the Mubarak era, Morsi and his Brothers are promoting an environment ripe for social unrest and anti-system mobilization. Such an environment is ready to explode at the slightest skirmishes between the people and security forces. This dynamic has only deepened Morsi’s dependency on security agencies to protect his authority from the large social segments aggrieved by the underlying economic status quo. We must not forget that the Ministry of Interior accumulated influence during Mubarak’s last decade in office in large part as a result of widespread socio-economic discontent that the regime’s unsound economic policies birthed and reinforced. Mubarak gave security agencies a carte blanche in order to keep the Egyptian people at bay. Morsi is following a similar path by shielding security organizations from meaningful reform and condoning their abusive practices.

Morsi is aware that he presides over a state which has not made its peace with the Egyptian people, and which continues to promote an unjust and inequitable economic order. Thus, the president finds himself with no choice but to resort to “security solutions” at every pressing challenge he faces, be it unrest in Sinai or opposition to his constitution. Wael Eskandar sums it up best: “Similar to their predecessors among the Mubarakists, they [the Muslim Brothers] seem to have left their political problems for the police to handle on the streets.” The current impasse is no exception. The best evidence is Morsi’s recent speech: he defiantly scolded protesters, he declared a state of emergency in Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez, and he threatened more stringency if the clashes continue.

The president’s security-heavy speech was silent on any serious commitment to address the political and economic problems that fuel the popular anger and the alienation prevailing in many segments of Egyptian society. He simply called on the opposition for dialogue. Yet he offered no credible signal that this dialogue would not collapse into yet another cosmetic measure that falls short of serious concessions from a Brotherhood, which has refused to cede its monopoly on political power. That politics have taken a back seat to security solutions is not surprising. After all, the Brothers find themselves alone in a corner having alienated their political rivals—perhaps irreversibly—through the unilateralism and heavy-handedness they exercised in passing a constitution that failed to garner any buy-in outside of their own narrow coalition. As noted in a Jadaliyya article last month: “The more the Brotherhood realizes that it stands over a hollow political process that lacks any credibility and that the façade of democracy is no longer holding up, the greater the temptations it will face in steering Egypt closer toward a de facto or de jure state of emergency.

Many observers note that Egypt is deeply divided between those who want an Islamic state and those who are committed to a secular vision for country’s future. Egypt is indeed a deeply divided country, but not only between Islamists and secularists. The deeper divisions lie elsewhere. There is one Egypt where people fight everyday for standing room in packed public buses, wait in line for hours to buy subsidized bread, and sell their furniture to afford the cost of medical treatment. There is another Egypt where people spend on a single dinner over half of what others earn in a year. The less Morsi and the Brotherhood bridge this deep divide, the wider the battle between Egyptian society and security organizations will become, and the more “days of rage” we will witness.

Sisyphus Goes on Demonstration

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 Animation/video installation 2012

Artist statement:

"You are to suffer,

to carry your burden and the weight of your existence on your back forever. And on this rough road you are to travel.

You walk, with blackness round your eyes blocking your entire vision, and a hole in your head preventing you from knowing.

You are not to learn, to see or to understand.

You are to travel the path Sisyphus,

this is your fate and this is how you are destined to exist.

Note 1: We are all Sisyphus.

Note 2: Sisyphus, at this moment, has the face and the tongue of an Arab.

Note 3: Sisyphus can go on a demonstration and cry out loud against his destiny."

Taher Bekri: Epic of the Thyme of Palestine

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Epic of the Thyme of Palestine

By Taher Bekri

In memory of Mahmoud Darwish

Translated by Marilyn Hacker

 

I perfumed the hills and plains

Nourished by brilliant light

Accompanied wanderers’ steps

Through the earth’s ancestral rites

All those domes, bell-towers, temples

Offered up for a thousand prayers

 

That sudden rain which mingled

My scent with the steadfast stones

Alert for gaping rifts

The rocks grasp leaves that I dropped

In the dusk of centuries stretching

Themselves out in history’s pit

 

Neighbor sea, I loved your murmur

That consoled my trembling, joined

By flutes, rocked by solar olive trees

They came by night with reptilian tanks

Razored treads sheared my sprigs

That held a dream built like a stream

 

I still see you, children scorched by phosphorus

Ashes blackened by clouds bleached

Of blood and cowardly dust

Beneath skies gashed by cast lead

Hospitals bled from a hundred shells

Schools that are like graveyards

 

And I don’t forget the path the wind took

To extinguish your genie-less lamps

Who could claim that a rifle was hidden

In flour, or rockets in kitchens

When beds were ripped open on sleeping

Bodies, thresholds smirched with shame

 

How not to see you, batsIn the blindness of the night

Master boots that march on my summers

Scoured of secular lemon-trees

How not to know you, crows

In the brainless drones overhead

 

Winter covered by wailing sirens

Houses like graves without stones

Among the dark cries, among ruins

I consoled the stars brusquely awakened

Terrified by your gunpowder trails

My new leaves your arsonists’ martyr

 

I tell you this, thyme is to flavor

Olive-oil bread kneaded and baked

On my flames, not to light your fires

Neither rosemary, friend of my cypresses

Nor waters wrenched from their source

Will pardon your memory’s gaps

 

I tell you this, thyme is for proud

Old roads, it is not for vultures

Thyme is for birds at rest

Freed from their need and their fear

Not to starve out trees and nests

Not to punish mothers and cradles

 

I defy you, hyenas in helmets

Thyme, even hemmed in by the Wall

Will burst through sea, sky and earth

So many armies for one herb

Still cannot prevent my bestowing

My fragrance on open-armed people 

 

January 27 2009 

[Translated from the French by Marilyn Hacker. Taher Bekri was born in Tunisia in 1951. He writes poetry in Arabic and French. He has lived in Paris since 1976 and has published over twnty books.]      

From Baghdad to New York: Reflections on Painting

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In Daryle Halbert’s 1987 painting “Leon” one encounters multiple things at once, as a history of painting is revealed—but not without being turned on its head. The portrait is deeply humane and complex. It is infused with weight and foreboding. Leon is but nine years old. The angst in his shoulders and body, in his clasped hands, are depicted with a stylization that is sustained throughout. One is reminded of Soutine’s many quarter length portraits. Van Gogh is also very present. Cezanne, as in the painting of his wife at the Detroit Institute of Arts (DIA), is undeniably here. In “Leon”, as in the work of the modernists, the illusionistic and philosophical lie in western painting is done away with. Daryle is wholly aware of the transformation of space, medium, and subject that materialize through Cezanne as a questioning. That such intense observation is at work surprises the viewer when the body shifts, beginning in one place only to end in another.

                                                                                                [Daryle Halbert "Leon" (1987). Image copyright the artist. Collection of Athir Shayota.]

The Center for Creative Studies (CCS), which is located behind the DIA, gave students immediate access to all the giants. At the center of the museum is Diego Rivera’s Detroit Industry fresco cycle, which is based on his studies of the River Rouge Ford plant. No artist in Detroit is able to escape its shadow. The mural’s grandness with its allegorical affronts and simplification of forms amidst the theme of the everyday man with a focus on assembly workers filled us with awe. In the color scheme of “Leon” and the feel of the surface, one thinks of early Renaissance frescoes and paintings, specifically Masaccio and Simone Martini. The world of Masaccio’s Brancacci Chapel frescos begins with Adam and Eve, concluding in the perfect order of Christ as its center. Rivera’s begins with four mothers, goddess figures of the earth; then places the autoworker as its altarpiece. While contrasting in scale, the very intimate “Leon” borrows from (and speaks to) this masterwork. In its psychology, however, “Leon” has more in common with the towering modern muralist figure, Jose Clemente Orozco, who influenced one of the seminal American painters of the twentieth century, Jacob Lawrence. Early on, Daryle acknowledged that Rivera and Lawrence, with Romare Bearden and Charles White, are the four major artists to impact his work.

In 1986, I began my undergraduate studies at CCS where I befriended Richard E. Lewis, whom I had met two years prior at a weekend high school art program at Wayne State University (WSU). Together, at CCS, we encountered “Leon.”

In one of our college courses during this time, Daryle was criticized for not indulging in “universal”  themes in his paintings. His portraits of subjects from his River Rouge community, in addition to still lifes that include objects such as an issue of Ebony magazine, were seen as lacking by a studio seminar professor.

Daryle’s work made us insist on projecting the non-universal; my subject matter became more Iraqi. I painted dolma and mazgoof dishes, humble Iraqi breakfasts (a still life of bread, cheese, tomato, and cucumber), and family members playing cards and tawlee (backgammon).

It was at age twelve, in 1980, that I moved to Detroit from Iraq. Upon arriving, the family stayed a few months with my grandparents, bought a used car, and then rented a house a block away. In the Iraqi northern town of Telkaif we had been told by way of emphasizing the prosperity of the US that at the end of the day when sweeping the floor of one’s business, one swept up money; we are immediately employed by our uncles, who made our transit from Iraq possible.

Not at home in the US, nor with the Chaldean community, I sought kinship and found it in black Detroit. The city had long been a tragic place. Its people, mainly African American, were under constant attack. The mounting effects of local and national policies throughout the whole of the twentieth century, culminating in the 1960s razing of neighborhoods such as Black Bottom and Paradise Valley, were to be calculated blows. Self-sustaining and commercially and artistically active communities were strategically cut apart by freeways and so-called redevelopment, making sure that African Americans, who had mainly come from the south seeking a better life, were to lose all agency while becoming increasingly disconnected and displaced. Although Arabs had also initially gone to Michigan for work—and later to escape wars and authoritarianism that was mainly US sponsored—they were allowed to achieve some autonomy and self-ownership through a corrupt system of banking that gave little to no loans to blacks but made concessions to Arabs with high interest and blatant bribes.

                           [Wafer Shayota "The City, River, and Minarets" (1991). Image copyright the artist. Collection of Athir Shayota]

Outside of a small group of artists that included Daryle and Richard, I painted in isolation with my eldest brother Wafer. As support for the arts in our community was nonexistent, we worked in family businesses, and painted the rest of the time, using the same basement corner of our Detroit family home as studio space. Since our schedules were different, we also came to share a large painter’s palette. Our paintings, employing opposite projections of what are essentially the same sentiments, share resultant colors. The earth tones that Wafer would prepare for a section of his composition would find themselves into a section of my painting of the time, and vice versa. When first immigrating to the US, he continued his Iraqi paintings of fishermen and other folk themes: pan Arab modernist subjects that he was immersed in while training in Baghdad in the mid 1970s. The year that “Leon” was painted, Wafer’s work took on a political tone with the start of the Palestinian Intifada, which intensified over the next three decades in his war series—throughout the monstrous US destruction of Iraq that rages on until this day. This very calm natured man began producing images that deal directly with catastrophes. His paintings exploded in color, becoming larger in scale; forms departed from their Iraqi modernist structuring. One thinks of, by way of paralleling and not associating, the Symbolist and the Surrealist, as in Roberto Matta, and even further, of the Mannerist El Greco. Possessing a different posture than Wafer, I took cue from “Leon.” Simplifying the composition, I eliminate narratives, and attempt to freeze the figure in a non-descript space in order to contain a specific energy.

                                                                                                                 [Athir Shayota "Maymanah" (2012). Image copyright the artist.]

I continue to work in constant dialogue with Richard through an almost thirty-year friendship. In these decades, he has produced some of the most moving figurative works in American art, filling the void that was left behind by Alice Neel. Without verbalizing it, our paintings enter a continous state of visual exchange; together, we consider the motifs of Islamic art, the painterliness of Rembrandt, Velasquez, Chardin, Courbet, and Manet, the aesthetic heroics of Nok and Yoruba cultures, and the temperament of Jazz. Richard creates shattering paintings, including numerous self-portraits.

                                                                                   [Richard E. Lewis "Self-Portrait" (2004). Image copyright the artist.] 

I first discussed moving to New York with Tracey M. Bozeman, a metalsmith, who, with an acute technical eye, produced stunning African-inspired sculptural weavings during the 1980s and 90s. She also challenged and helped direct the resolving of my Detroit paintings. I met Tracey in 1984 in the same WSU program. I visited Richard in New York in 1997, as he had moved earlier while in residence at the Studio Museum of Harlem after receiving his MFA from the Yale School of Art. I did not return to Detroit; not that one is any closer to home in New York. Haitham, an Iraqi artist friend whom I painted in 2003, once observed that, for many of us, exile began inside Iraq.

[The above post is part of Visuals in 1500, a new series that invites a critic, curator, scholar, or artist to utilize a single work of art as the starting point for a larger discussion on aesthetics. In 1500 words or less and with a maximum of five images, these profiles seek to introduce readers to a variety of artists and cultural practitioners and the many concepts and trajectories (creative and otherwise) that they are currently exploring.

Homage to Leonardo

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Leonardo Da Vinci first impressed me when one of my art history professors, while earning my MFA at Indiana University in 1963, described a certain spot in the room of “The Last Supper” as the ideal place for a viewer to stand. He explained that this was Leonardo’s visualization of the Renaissance concept of man as the center. This room at Santa Maria delle Grazie in Milan had not been intended as the monk’s dining hall but was converted to this purpose later, as it was traditional that a painting of the Last Supper would be in a refectory. If you stand in the center of the room and move back and forth until the orthogonal lines of the mural, those diagonal lines that pierce space and vanish in the distance, match those of the room itself then you will have found where Leonardo wanted you to stand. Could that truly be Leonardo’s designing? I traveled to Milan in 1964, found the spot and stood there amazed. Suddenly the space of the painting poured out into the space of the room. Standing at that little spot, like a host of people before me, I could see Renaissance thinking and understand the special significance of perspective to empirical thought and painterly form.

                            [Leonardo Da Vinci, "The Last Supper" (ca. late 15th Century). Image via Wikimedia Commons]

In order to understand how the space of the painting pours into the space of the room, the location of the painting needs to be identified. “The Last Supper” covers nearly two thirds of the upper portion of the end wall, reaching a designated level just below the ceiling, and fills the space between the two sidewalls. When the perspective in the painting becomes one with the perspective of the room we are in, then the sidewalls of the painted illusion become continuous with the sidewalls of the room. The windows in Leonardo’s painting thus become windows in the very room in which we are standing, while the tapestries in his painting seem to hang on the same walls that are to our right and left. Christ and his disciples appear to be dining on a raised platform in the refectory. Leonardo has merged real space with illusionist space—for an instant in time and space the surface of the painting becomes transparent and disappears. It no longer seems to be layers of gesso and tempera. The two accompanying line drawings make this clear. Figure 1 demonstrates the perspective as seen from the side, while figure 2 shows the continuous perspective between painting and room.

                                           [Figure 1. Standing to the side, the orthogonal lines of perspective are discontinous. Diagram copyright the author.]

 

                                                                                                      [Figure 2. Diagram copyright the author.] 

As soon as we realize how Leonardo utilized the one point perspective to seemingly extend the space of the room, we know that he is making a formal comment about the surface of the painting. It is both a wall on which he lays gesso and tempera and also a surface that is transformed into thin air through the working of perspective illusion. No one can accuse Leonardo of being unaware of his forms; his “Last Supper,” which declares his planning with every aspect of its composition, contradicts any such doubt. Not least of these compositional effects is the placing of the single vanishing point right in the face of the central figure, Christ. Thus as we stand in the appointed spot our focus is directed to the central concept of not only the church and the city in which it stands but that of an entire social order.

Since my initial visit to “The Last Supper” at Santa Maria delle Grazie, I have had special respect for my neighbor on the Mediterranean pond. Although he is proclaimed Western and I am Arab, with a massive line drawn between us by Western discourse, I find that Palestine is closer to Milan than either Milan or Palestine to New York or London in the same way that I find myself closer to Leonardo’s scientific attitude than to the contemporary verbal acrobatics of Postmodernism.

After decades of artistic practice, I have realized that I learned a lot from Leonardo’s “Last Supper,” regarding the relationship of the surface of the painting to the illusion behind it; and simultaneously the relationship of its bounding edge to what is seen through it. In composing a painting, the relationship of its content to both the edge of the canvas, the surface of the canvas, and its depth are all to be considered and balanced. The picture’s surface or as we painters call it, the picture plane, is a formal concept of primary importance. This formal concept includes not only the surface but also the normally rectangular edge of the painting. Together, these two components envelope the work of art and define its relationship to reality. The uses of the picture plane are varied and versatile. 

                                             [Samia Halaby, "Homage to Leonardo" (2012). Image copyright the artist.]

Fifty years after having found the spot where Leonardo might have wanted me to stand as a viewer, it was high time that I repay a debt and so I named a painting in his honor, “Homage to Leonardo” (2012). In naming Leonardo in my title I am also pointing to the fact that abstraction was a part of illusionist painting and simultaneously that there is an illusion of depth in abstraction. The difference is that the space we make in abstraction is relative, owing a debt to the thinking that Einstein taught us; while the illusion of space in Renaissance painting and the paintings of Leonardo was a finite measurable space. 

A sketch by Leonardo kept coming to mind as I was working on my painting. It was a pen and ink drawing of a flower on a page with other little sketches that I saw at an exhibition in London in 1966. If I remember correctly, it was a drawing in the British Royal Collection. What is important is that Leonardo shaded it as he normally did by using curved parallel lines indicating the cross-contours of its volume. At the end, he must have felt that he had made it too round and that it had popped out too strongly from the page. Thus he added a diagonal hatch over the entire sketch, thereby applying a flattening effect. I could see his mind working and was startled by his determination to balance the surface flatness of the picture plane with depth even in a small sketch.

In “Homage to Leonardo,” I have made a large painting with many brush marks of varied color and light. Together, they create an abstract space of relative depth, light, and motion. I applied four navy blue vertical lines to assert the surface as Leonardo had done with his diagonal crosshatch. These four lines behave like the edges of glass panels in a large picture window through which we see the depth beyond. They assert a frontal surface, the picture plane, which seems as transparent as glass through which we see a world beyond. 

Subject and content are significant in both illusionist and abstract painting, yet history honors Leonardo not so much for his subject matter, which was available in hundreds of pictures by enumerable artists, but rather for his formal genius, for his scientific attitude, for his knowledge of space and color, and for his use of pictorial abstraction. And of course for his refreshing treatment of a theme that had been and has been repeated thousands of times. It is satisfying to contemplate his work in this present time, where formal qualities are considered backward and the acrobatics of metaphor and verbal content rule the world of visual art, and where discourse on Postmodernist mixed-media is confusedly intermixed with painting. 

[The above post is part of Visuals in 1500, a new series that invites a critic, curator, scholar, or artist to utilize a single work of art as the starting point for a larger discussion on aesthetics. In 1500 words or less and with a maximum of five images, these profiles seek to introduce readers to a variety of artists and cultural practitioners and the many concepts and trajectories (creative and otherwise) that they are currently exploring.]

A Leopard in Winter: An Interview with Syrian Director Nabil Maleh

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In early January, more than 1,500 people packed three nights of screenings in Dubai of Syrian director Nabil Maleh’s film The Road to Damascus (‘A al-Sham ‘A al-Sham, 2006), a filmic journey across Syria that includes stops at its historical ruins and economically strapped towns. The screenings were sponsored by the local Syrian Business Association to raise money for Syrian refugees, and Maleh was on hand to introduce the film. For many in the audience it was their first glimpse into his nearly fifty years of filmmaking. His films are not easy to find in the Middle East or beyond, but since the release of the landmark, The Leopard (Al Fahd, 1972), Maleh has been Syria’s most internationally recognized film director.   

Rocky Horror Picture Show aside, very few films can claim to have had a 30-year theatrical run. But that is the story of The Leopard.  The film is a narrative tale about Abu ‘Ali al-Shahin, a legendary Robin Hood figure of the 1940s and in keeping with Maleh’s own lifestyle, the story of a man fighting the world imposed on him. 

Like many of Maleh’s films, it was made despite and inevitably with the support of one Syrian regime or another. Maleh finished the screenplay in 1969 but a week before shooting was to begin, the government shut down production, saying it made a hero of thug. The next year, Hafez Assad came to power, and as is often the case in regime change, there was a reversal of decisions. The Leopard went into production in 1971 with a budget of $25,000, and when it was released in 1972 went on to play continuously theatrically in Syria for the next thirty years. It won the Locarno International Film Festival’s Special Leopard Prize and was declared in 2005 by South Korea’s Pusan International Film Festival as one of the “immortal masterpieces of Asian cinema.”

None of this would have happened without Assad green lighting the script, which would lead one to think Maleh had an affection for the late dictator. He did not, nor was he a supporter of his predecessor or any person that has ruled his country during his lifetime.

He sees himself as a natural born dissident. “You have to fight for the better always,” he says in his usual mix of joviality and intensity. “I’m always against the regime. I never believed in one party. For example, I consider that I was a Marxist but I hated the Communist Party. I believe in Marx’s justice for the common man, but not in one party rule as that inevitably leads to a Fascist/Nazi system.” 

We are chatting at an outdoor café in the Dubai Mall overlooking the famous dancing fountain and Burj Khalifa, the tallest building in the world. He and his family—his wife and two adult daughters--have been here for over a year now, and it is very far from Syria or the rest of his known world. Maybe too far on some days. He continues to develop narrative and documentary projects and works on his poetry and painting. He’s even writing his first novel about the secret life of a dreamer. But he’s not shy about his restlessness with life in the UAE as he lights one cigarette after another. “Today I have no place to contain me,” he says. 

Born into a prominent upper middle class Damascus family, Maleh began writing political columns for local papers when he was fourteen. At sixteen, he went to Czech Republic to study nuclear physics. Then one day he was asked to be an extra in a film, and he was hooked. “I realized it was the only thing I could be,” he says.  He was accepted into the highly selective Prague Film School (FAMU), whose students then included Milos Foreman and Jiri Menzel.

 [Still image from The Leopard (1972) bu Nabil Maleh.]

While a student, his resonant voice and continuing political passions served him well: he was able to make a living working at the Arab Radio Transmission, an Arabic language Czech station aimed at the Middle East. But it was cultural life of Prague, not politics that captivated him during his studies.  

“In addition to the technical side and high artistic standards, FAMU created and developed a very sophisticated cultural base for the filmmaker. Culture was a part of daily life—a daily event—a new book, play, concert, an engaging debate. And everything was accessible. It is the only place I found where culture was free of charge. I lived for one month in Prague for what a concert with bad seats with would have cost in Paris.”

He found the FAMU sensibility a better approach to film school than his experiences teaching film production in the early 1980s at the University of Texas and UCLA as a Fulbright Scholar. “It’s a totally different way of film education,” he says. “The American schools didn’t expect the students to have a strong foundation in the arts. In Prague, we had to know the works of Joyce, Dostoyevsky, and so on. When I taught at UCLA, the students honestly didn’t know who Arthur Miller and Tennessee Williams were.”

His time in the US was part of continuous pattern in Maleh’s life of being in and out of Syria, mostly because of his disagreements with the government. When he returned home after film school in 1964, he lasted a year before leaving again. Then in 1968, he came back and made Crown of Thorns about Palestine. He says the 45-minute film was the first serious film about Palestine. “It was drama within a documentary,” he explains. “Critics called it the gateway to alternative Arab cinema. One image, one shot, was in color and the rest was in black and white, and this unprecedented artistic choice made quite a sensation in Europe.” 

Since then, Maleh has written, directed and/or produced scores of narrative and documentary films, a mixed filmography of banned and unbanned films, notable among them Fragments (Baqaya Suwar, 1979), based on an autobiographical novel by Hanna Mina, in which a downtrodden man in 1920s Syria tries to reclaim his land from the Turks, and the three-part The Road to Damascus (‘A al-Sham ‘A al-Sham). The road to Damascus was completed in 2006, but immediately banned.

“In early 2012 I put the English subtitles and made an international premier in Malmo FF Sweden - out of the festival,” he says.  “Then it was invited for a seminar about it by Lund University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

Last year, The Road to Damascus made its international premiere at the Malmo Film Festival in Sweden. But today he seems most excited to talk about his 90-second experimental film, made in 1970. Called Napalm, it compares the US interference in the Vietnam War to the Israeli occupation. It played throughout the world and won first prize at the Toulon Film Festival.   

You ask him if you can see it, and he shrugs. “I heard someone in Chicago might have a print.” This is the sad fate of many of his works. Neither he nor the Syrian government adequately preserved his films. “We made seven hundred copies of Napalm from a single negative,” he recalls. “That’s just not heard of. The government through the National Film Organization does have a lot of my films, but they are mostly very badly damaged.”

The Leopard and several of Maleh’s other films are children of Maleh—and the National Film Organization (NFO), a Syrian film collective formed in the 1960s, which was essentially the first managed effort to develop an Arab cinema that broke away from the creative limitations of mainstream movies, mostly made in studios in Egypt.  The NFO invited Maleh, the country’s first graduate of a European film school, to write and direct the film, based on a novel by Haydar Haydar. 

The NFO also brought into production his most controversial film, 1994’s TheExtras (al-Kompars), one of the few Maleh films still easily accessible. The intentionally claustrophobic film, set mostly in a cramped Damascus apartment, is the story of two minor actors trying to have a love affair. The fear and paranoia of Big Brother, and the psychological and literal impotence it leads to, are far from subtle. “Everyone wonders how it got made.” He smiles. “I knew the Syrian government would censor it, so I went to make it in Egypt. When I came home after writing the screenplay, the head of the NFO asked if I had anything that could go into production. I told him I only had this script. They needed me. In the 1980s Syria hadn’t produced much, at least by way of important films.”

His established international reputation led to the script’s approval, but a week before it was to premier at the Damascus Film Festival, it was banned by the censorship committee and taken out of competition. However, the other Arab filmmakers coming to the festival demanded to see it.  

“So the festival played it on Friday morning at 10 a.m., a time they thought no one would come. But the theater was packed-- people were fighting to get in. It was almost like a demonstration,” he said. “It was the first time a film had been so outspoken about life in Syria.”

Maleh recalls the film playing in Damascus for the next four months to nearly sold out theatres. It also went on to win the Cairo International Film Festival. As he is telling this story, we’re interrupted several times by Al Jazeera calling to get his opinion of the decision of this year’s Cairo festival to pull out the film of a Syrian director who has publically stated he supports Bashar Assad and to comment on a film by Hala Abdullah, an anti-regime filmmaker. They persist about Abdullah’s film, and Maleh keeps insisting that there isn’t much he can say about a film he hasn’t actually seen. But he promises them that he’ll talk about what he feels knowledgeable about.

There is no doubt that he’s not happy about what Assad (and some of the opposition) is doing in Syria, but he doesn’t believe in repressing any artist, no matter whose side they are on. He’s not coy about his politics, and he is even less subtle when it comes to Arab cinema.

“What unifies Arab cinema today are the same things that unify Arab politics—the limitation of economics and expression—this doesn’t allow for a personality,” he says. “It is due to the limitations of the capital, not the cultural and artistic limitations. Arab filmmakers have always been the victims of fascist regimes and primitive producers. I feel extremely sad and insulted because I know how many dreams were thrown away.”

He credits Syria’s regionally popular television production with helping provide at least an avenue for creative expression for filmmakers. While he says he doesn’t enjoying watching or working in the TV series mode, he believes that his influence and perhaps that of other NFO pioneers, allowed Syrian TV directors to explore ways to build credible drama, using the moving camera to create a sense of real life, people, places and atmosphere. “I have always avoided the false atmosphere of the studio,” he explains. “When I started filming in real places, that was a novelty for most Arab cinema. And that moved Syrian TV directors to do so also. We know that the actor is part of an environment and he becomes more credible within the story with genuine and real surroundings. This is why the Syrian drama conquered the Egyptian drama across the Middle East.”

Syrian television has been such a domineering force in the Arab satellite universe that is discussed in drama classes at universities in Europe and even the topic of academic research. He nods. “Syrian TV drama has proven to have value--and it can cross many borders without censorship. It can penetrate the walls of censorship and still keep its integrity.”

While not a fan of television, there are stories he has enjoyed bringing to it, most notably penning the script for the 2008 miniseries Asmahan, about the iconic Syrian born Egyptian chanteuse whose complicated life ended in a mysterious car crash when she was 27.

“In Asmahan—her personality, her epic story--I found an inspiration to my ever provocative question about women. Asmahan was for me all women because in the women who I knew, starting from my mother to my love affairs, they have been so rich, like crystals with so many shining sides,” he says. “A woman can be weak, strong, passionate, cruel. I like these multiple faces of a woman. I hate the linear way that conventional traditional films deal with women. I love women as an abstract concept.”

Maleh is happy for Syrian TV directors but mourns the film directors. “How many filmmakers have died without scratching the shape of their artistic dream,” he says. “But that is a pan Arab case.” He agrees there are individuals who have been able to break through the barriers, like Nadine Labaki, but they are phenomena, not daily reality.

In 2006, Maleh was honored by the Dubai International Film Festival, along with Oliver Stone and Shah Rukh Khan, for his filmic achievements. “I thought it was my entrance after all my years of rejecting working with the Gulf states,” he says. “I had the illusion that this could be something. But in my year here I have found so many contradictions that have surprised and disappointed me. There is a huge cultural gap between this place and me. I look around and think what a loss of time, energy and money because of the hidden feeling of inferiority. On one hand, I have 100 percent respect for the monumental achievements regarding the urban life with its complicated infrastructure. Quite admirable. So they have surpassed their inferiority complex by creating highly developed surroundings mostly made of stone, cement and glass. On the other hand, they are catching up with culture (art, intellectual pursuits) by importing it, primarily from the West. I can’t blame them. They are doing what they can but it is schizophrenic on one hand. If I were them, I would subdue the Western culture, especially its false or commercial faces, and think of themselves as incubators for Arab thinking and creativity. Culture is an amalgamation of minds without complexes of inferiority and superiority.”

He gets most worked up about funding. “Americans come here seeking money for their films. They don’t need it. It is a scam,” he says. “An Arab film can be produced for half the money. But the Arab is not carrying the right citizenship.

When Arab organizations support an Arab film, it feels like zakat. Meanwhile, they are begging for Western involvement. This is humiliating and insulting—they do not own the rights to these Western films they give money to, they have no input in them.”

Sometime during our conversation, the Dubai Mall’s fountain begins its dancing for the evening, Arabic pop music blaring across the manmade lake. Maleh joins the rest of the crowd gathering at railing and starts filming the fountain with his iPhone.

“Okay, that’s enough of that for today,” he says with a smile as he sits back down. He too is admittedly schizophrenic about the city, being drawn to what works and repelled by what he feels is missing in the Gulf. 

In a few days, he is traveling to Qatar to work with Enana, a Syrian dance troupe that will perform in Doha. Like for the group’s show, Saladin, in 2010, this will be a combination of stage and screen, “a salute to knowledge,” and Maleh will be creating the filmic background. Later this winter, he will do a residency at the prestigious MacDowell Colony in the US.

“When people ask me how are you, I usually say “I don’t know.” A day is good if I have written a little something or a click of an idea came to me or I discovered a funny story,” he says. “There must be an addition to that day. Otherwise it is not a good day. I think in extracts more than a whole. My screenplays are extracts of the day, my feelings, events that played a role in my life, my friends’ lives or the country. I have to have something to express. Otherwise, I start hating the world. Our lives equal what we express.”

Amir Tag Elsir: Ebola '76

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A Chapter from Amir Tag Elsir’s  Ebola ‘76

Translated from the Arabic by Maia Tabet

 

In times of Tragedy,

Things seem real.

Eyes are real.

The hand that greets a neighbor is real,

And the moon is real, not just a fantasy in the distance.

My sweetheart asks me about the meaning of reality,

I refer her question to Tragedy,

Passers-by ask me about the meaning of real blood.

It is that which is sown by Tragedy, I say. 

Cautionary Note

In August 1976, the deadly Ebola virus struck several areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the border town of Nzara in South Sudan. The virus, which causes a severe haemorraghic fever, is thought to have been carried across the border by a textile factory worker. This novel is not about that textile worker nor any of the other characters that appear in the narrative. It is purely a work of the imagination, without any connection whatsoever to real facts.  Even the events related to the rebellion and the civil war are not real, and they should not be attributed to factual history.

1

At noon on that hot August day of 1976, the killer Ebola stalked Lewis Nawa, consumed with the desire to lodge inside his blood.

Lewis hailed from the borderlands of Nzara, in South Sudan. He was an unskilled worker in a small textile factory that produced cotton clothing and was owned by James Rayyak, formerly a fighter with the rebel army opposed to the central government in Khartoum. Lewis had come to the Congo on unexepected and sorrowful business: he had learnt from a traveller of the death of his sweetheart who, after stealing his heart and titillitating his senses for two years, had appropriated herself of all the love he had ever felt for his wife. 

He didn’t linger in the city center. He was watchful as he walked down the unpaved road between the stop where the Nzara mini-bus had let him off and the bus-stop to the cemetery, where hundreds of people had been buried. There, on the outskirts of the city, lay the piteous harvest of Ebola’s rampage.

The virus was getting really close now, and it lay in wait for the right moment to attack Nawa.  The cemetery’s white stone wall was surrounded with trees, some dead, and others still in leaf, and Ebola was everywhere, inhabiting the body of every person Nawa came across: it was in the blood of the old beggar woman with emaciated cheeks, her hand silently proferred for the half-franc he gave her as he went in; it was in the blood of the security guard leaning on his rifle at the gate, watching visitors going in and out; it was in the blood of all the visitors, whether they caught his eye or not; and it was inside the dead body of the woman on whose account he had made the harrowing journey and on whose tomb he now lay crying, prostrate with grief. She had been alive only two days ago!

The killer Ebola had been terrorizing the people of the country for some time now and couldn’t say why Lewis Nawa caught his fancy, but he was tense with excitement at the idea of migrating to another country in the man’s blood – especially after all the uproar in his native land, where the government had deployed vipers and spiders and every other good and evil thing against him; they had exposed him, they had revealed his identity publicly, and had dispatched vials of his victims’ blood to advanced countries like America, Canada and Australia, where it was scrutinized under fearsome lenses in order to develop a vaccine that would annihilate him.

Truly, Lewis Nawa was not an attractive man, he wasn’t in the least bit handsome; his inordinately thick nose was sometimes covered in white pustules, his shoulders were far too broad,  his lips were cracked with heat and thirst, and smack in the middle of his wide forehead were the sacred markings of his tribe, branded onto his skin.

How old was he? Noone knew exactly, but he appeared to be in his late forties or early fifties. His medical history was pristine:  no diabetes or high blood pressure, no failing vision, no kidney or prostate ailments, nothing really, except for the swamp-fever that occasionally flooded his body, but it was not considered a disease in that part of the world. His romantic life was unremarkable: the first stirrings of love had come early, he had  courted sixteen different girls, some his age, some slightly older or younger, and the only one who ever reciprocated was almost blind and she eventually left him without explanation. Seven years ago, he had married Tina Azacoury, a woman from another tribe who lived with him in Nzara and sold bottles of water on the street with her mother. She was raped six times, and assaulted twice, and while her defilement did not cause Lewis to abandon her, emotional distance had set in between them two years after he had met the woman for whom he now wept bitter tears ... Aline was her name, or Alina as he liked to call her. In any case, it no longer mattered, she was gone forever, the vicious Ebola had seen to it. Nawa couldn’t understand why Ebola had struck Alina and those buried next to her. Mourning relatives were also there, and they too were on the road to perdition thanks to the virus, although they weren’t aware of it, since they dismissed the medical alerts and government warnings against the still unidentified threat and blamed the hundreds of village deaths on the vengefulness of a witch-doctor whose only reality lay in their impoverished imaginations.

Nawa had met the woman while staying in a small hotel on the outskirts of the Congolese capital where he had gone on a pleasure trip. She was an unassuming woman,  one of the maids who cleaned the hotel rooms, and he started to visit her once or twice a month, filled with the longings of lovers everywhere.  Carrying a bag stuffed with good food, enough to last them two days of uninhibited voluptuousness, he cleaved to the demons of adultery and then left to go back to work, his yearning for her so acute that he would be crazed with desire at their next encounter. It was his good fortune to have been absent when the killer virus had wormed its way into her to squeeze every last drop of blood from her body. Another man, whom she saw when Nawa was gone, transmitted the virus to Aline, who never sought to be faithful.

The man destined to be Ebola’s next victim, whose blood would carry the virus to another country where it would carouse with the same madness, now stopped his weeping. As he dried his tears with a corner of the brightly-colored African shift he was wearing, a little flower seller appeared. She was a skinny, barefoot girl who lived in a hamlet nearby and plied mourners with her tokens of comfort. Though she was slight and somewhat unsteady on her feet, the virus had not yet struck her. She brushed Nawa’s shoulder with a purple flower, whose crown veered to black, and he startled and jumped to his feet. He bought the flower and two others like it, pushed them into the still-damp earth of the woman’s grave and went on his way, unable to tear his eyes from the spot – his poor, lost Alina’s final resting-place.

A group of men of varying ages and physiognomies suddenly swarmed around him, speaking quietly but with a garrulousness which exceeded the bounds of propriety. Noone knew whether  they were personal acquaintances of his or merely other mourners wanting to share something with him. What is certain is that most of them carried the virus in their blood and would be succumbing to its effects before long. But Lewis Nawa’s nose was shielded at this point, since he had pulled the shawl up from his shoulder in an attempt to hide traces of his grief, not realizing that by covering his face he was also protecting himself from the tiny droplets of Ebola-carrying saliva in the air.

Wending his way from the cemetery gate to the main road in order to find a vehicle that would take him back into the city-center, he was intercepted by someone whom the virus had failed to fell, the famous blind guitar-player, Ruwadi Monty, otherwise known as The Needle by fans and critics alike. He was a guarded but also handsome man, despite his roaming sightless eyes, and he could smell people exudations a mile away. His outlook was quite Westernized and he claimed to have attended Brussels University which, he said, made much of the fact that he was the first – and last – blind African student to have graduated from its ranks. This was fabrication well beyond the ambit of fiction: the Needle had been living in Kinshasa for sixty years and all the inhabitants and communities of the city knew it.  His degree in music was entirely homespun, an African credential earned from diligent effort inside the walls of his own house. He had visited Brussels, it was true: he had performed at the grand Théatre de la Monnaie with a sensational choir in a benefit concert for the unfortunate Third World and had swung along the Avenue des Arts – one of the city’s busiest and most dazzling thoroughfares – with his guitar.

The guitar-player walked in step with a pretty twenty-year old girl named Darina who served as his guide. The sad man from Nzara meant nothing to the venerable old musician, and the Needle had no reason to accost Nawa but he couldn’t help himself. Ever since he was a little boy, he had intercepted passers-by, and once he had achieved fame he would stop people to ask what they thought of his rising star. He would’ve stopped his mother, had she come out of the house; he would stand in the way of armed men who were known to be dangerous, and whom he knew to be dangerous; he would have intercepted his own shadow had it been in the crowd on the street. There was no reason for him to be at the cemetery that day, he had come there just to obstruct the road.

The Needle had often travelled to Nzara and other places near and far, and he displayed the same idosyncrasies wherever he went.  He organized noisy concerts full of rash and frivolous spectators, including beautiful girls and others that were quite unsightly, not that he could see any of them, of course. The people who attended these events were the organizers and dedicated ‘party-animals’ who went to any show that was being held, no matter how uninteresting. Sometimes, he came across tribal chiefs or local council representatives at whose tables he would dine would earn a bit of money from entertaining a local strongman who had made a fortune in some war.

Rawadi extended a hand that was so virtuosic it deserved its own stage name – but alas, it never came to pass – and he started feeling around the grieving man’s face. He ran his fingers over the disfiguring marks from the ritual bloodletting and figured out what tribe he belonged to as easily as he took a breath. Then, he felt around the Nawa’s shawl and said: “Mister, forgive me for stopping you so unceremoniously and inconveniencing you ... but I wanted to admire your shawl.  Blue is my favorite color.”

How astonishing! Well , of course it was not astonishing at all, since Nawa’s shawl really  was blue, as were Rawadi’s tailored suit and silk shirt.

“Thanks,” replied Nawa, pulling his shawl closer to hide as much of his grief-stricken face as he could. Going on his way, he heard the guitar-player calling after him. “We’ll meet soon, sad man, in your hometown of Nzara, in South Sudan ... I am playing a big show there ... Come to the show! Come, and forget.”

That the blind man had been able by feeling his forehead to tell which tribe and nation he belonged to was unsurprising, but Nawa seemed unfazed by the musician’s correct assessment of the color of his shawl. Was it due simply to  the sorrow gripping his heart? Would it dawn on him later that it was something worthy of surprise? Or had he simply eliminated surprise from his range of emotions?

To Nawa’s ears, the blind man’s words were unremarkable. There was nothing arresting about them, they were just like the words he heard all day at the textile factory where his workmates had never had anything particularly interesting to say in all the years he had worked there; they were like the words he heard at the market, in the meat and vegetable sellers’ stalls, or in the shops of those merchants who carried goods favored by the Arabs; they were just like the words he heard when he went to Manko Nokosho’s, the barber who cut the hair of two-thirds of Nzara’s male population and derived pleasure from his labors. Nawa went over the words in his mind again, but the truth was that they seemed to him just as ordinary as any others, the same old words that his wife Tina used, over and over again, ever since he had stopped loving her. Thinking of Tina reminded him of his deceased sweetheart, and he was overcome by such a fierce longing that he almost turned back to the gravesite, so that he could weep again and push more black-crowned purple flowers into the still-damp earth.

The people who had spoken to him at the cemetery were utterly convinced that an evil witch-doctor had been sowing death througout the villages and cities of the land for no good reason. Nawa empathized with them, not necessarily because he felt that he should, but simply because they were his community, his people, and they all shared the same outlook as well as a the inclination to be empathetic to each other. The country’s inhabitants had all heard of the so-called mystery virus; the literate among them had read the press releases mimeographed on cheap paper by the ministry of health; everyone had heard talk about the fearful killer over the radio-waves, when broadcasts of  beloved traditional songs by the likes of Draydo Lenoah, Suleiman Agho, Ali Farka Toure and Menilik, the Ethiopian, were regularly interrupted. But still,  the idea that it was the work of an evil witch-doctor prevailed. Why the idea had mobilized entire tribes and enchanted emancipators, providing them with the raw materials for their exorcisms as they chased evil out of every burrow it inhabited and fought it to the death.

Nawa shared the same mindset: his brain was just as predisposed to gullibility as theirs were, his palms, like theirs, were sweaty regardless of hot or damp weather, the same hormones ran through his body, he shared the same late onset of greying hair and all the other typical features that characterize Africa’s burden. Thus, on that hot noon, there was no other emotion in his repertoire besides sorrow at the loss of his beloved and stifled rage against the evil witch-doctor that had killed his sweetheart and left him adrift.

Nawa found a ride to Kinshasa in the back of a pick-up truck. The thirty-something driver had stopped for him willingly, winking and bantering as he did so. There was one pair of mules on board, and two passengers, a man and a woman, with whom nothing was exchanged. The man had a hacking cough as a result of a benign complication of the flu that had nothing to do with the Ebola epidemic, and the woman, sitting across from him on a rough metal seat that had been especially installed on the truck bed, seemed in great pain. Although she cradled her bulging belly in both hands, Nawa sadly couldn’t tell that she had reached the end of her pregnancy and was having painful contractions, that the man with a terrible cough was her husband, and that they were on their way to the closest hospital in Kinshasa ...

All he could think of was that she had overeaten and was bloated from indigestion!

Nawa was a thick-headed sort of man. He had taken no notice of the green vistas along the one paved road out of town, and scarcely smelt the hides of the two beasts tied up beside him on the bed of the pick-up truck, when the pregnant woman let out a cry. He watched the bloodied water trickling out from under her, and only then did it strike him that he had lived with two women, from two different countries, neither of whom had borne any children. But before the notion was dispelled, or turned into some kind of self-pity, he found himself squat in the middle of the road on the edge of the city. The driver, who was still furiously winking, had dumped him rom the truck and sped away to get that woman to some place where she could give birth. Nawa didn’t give much thought to the man’s winking, and even had he done so, he wouldn’t have known what to think of it. It was truly not impudence on the part of the cattle-truck driver but a chronic and at the time incurable ailment of the optic nerve.

After being let off the cattle truck, Ebola’s next victim had a nasty way to walk before he was able to find another ride to the center of town, this time aboard a decrepit old truck driven by a one-eyed Congolese.  He had reached one of the smarter streets of the capital – no garish prostitutes here, no clinging beggars, or any other sign of tawdry life. The street belonged in effect, if not literally, to the old magician Jamadi Ahmad who, for years now, could be found there at all times of day on any day of the week. His conventional performances had so inspired a municipal worker with admiration that he removed the sign with the street-name on it, and replaced it with another, improvised one. Instead of Zubi St. the sign read Jamadi Ahmad St. in a hand-written scrawl.

And here was the magician, surrounded by an audience unlike one that a truly clever magician could marshal because Jamadi had lost his special touch years ago. Over the last decade, he had lost the kind of fan-base that a magician would be proud to call his own: no more players from the national soccer team, because they had all found their way to countries more attractive than their own; no more power-hungry politicians, because they had died in streetside executions without judicial process; and he had almost lost a close relative who came to his shows several times a year and give him some financial support when she was claimed by the president of a neighboring country – except for the fact there there was a succession of military coups that failed miserably.

Nawa stopped dead in his tracks and stood mesmerized by the sight of the magician whom he had never seen before, despite numerous visits to Kinshasa.  At that precise moment, Jamadi Ahmad was placing the last fluttering dove inside his cloth bag and pulling out a hare from a hole in the side of the bag, which he then proceeded to return to the bag before pulling out a thickly-feathered white chicken.

Nawa clapped with delight, but his was the only applause to be heard – the  audience had long ago given up the habit of clapping. They were in agreement that no matter how exciting the sleight-of-hand there would be no applause until the magician came up with some new trick. And that had yet to happen ... The magician produced six razor-sharp blades from a coarse-cloth hat he was wearing, he took his time swallowing them and then proceeded to inhale a red cotton thread. Nawa brimmed with tension, his hands trembled, and he reached feverishly into his pocket for a franc to drop into the magician’s almost empty cup. When Jamadi reached his hand into his throat and pulled out the thread, hung at regular intervals with the six blades, Nawa could no longer contain himself. Laughing with relief, he rushed to the magician and threw his arms around him. He had forgotten all about his sorrow over the loss of his sweetheart and forgotten too that a killer was abroad and that by hugging an itinerant street-magician, who ate and drank the Lord alone knows what, he was taking a gigantic risk which one shouldn’t take.

Noone knows why the old magician rejected Nawa’s tempestuous embrace, why he bristled and stamped his feet and abruptly ended the show which would otherwise have run until midnight. He gathered his paraphernalia and locked it away in his big trunk, as murmurs of speculation ran through the crowd: was the magician suffering from indigestion because of the bean stew he ate every day before the show from that filthy restaurant? Or was it simply because he was foolish and didn’t like strangers? Had the stranger’s sudden embrace foiled some new trick he had planned on introducing in order to appease his audience’s demand that he switch up his routine?

For Ebola, the killer-virus, whether the magician smiled or frowned, it was all the same. He had his sights on Nawa and this might in fact be a better opportunity for him to use him as his conduit to go on a killing spree in another country, since the exhausted stranger was now hemmed in by the rest of the crowd.  Ebola had been nervous earlier, fearing that Nawa would cut short his trip and go in search of the bus back to his country – and then, all would be lost, and a new visitor would have to be found.

Shocked by the magician’s sudden fury, Nawa stood riveted to the spot. His eyes recovered their sad cast and looked hesitant.  Even though Jamadi Ahmad knew for certain what that look meant, he ignored it. Pointing to his wooden trunk, he said to Nawa in French, ‘Next time, read this notice before letting your feelings get the better of you!’ (As it turned out, Nawa understood what he said since he had worked for a French family in Nzara years before he had started at the textile factory.) He and the rest of the assembled crowd turned to look at the trunk. DEAR SPECTATORS, it said in red lettering on the lid, PLEASE REFRAIN FROM CLAPPING AND FROM EMBRACING AT ALL TIMES.

The truth is, the sign wasn’t new at all. Although noone had ever noticed it, it had appeared along with the magician all those years ago. But no one had ever been struck with the excitement that Nawa felt and therefore been given cause to heed the warning.  Now, the warning would become infamous, it would make the rounds of the town and gain such common currency in everyday life that a man might write on his pyjamas ‘Dear wife, please refrain from embracing me however intense your desire and passion may be’; or maybe a failing student would modify the idea slightly and write on his exam paper ‘Honorable teachers, please refrain from failing me, however dim-witted I may be’; it was perhaps that very warning that would inspire the authorities clamp down on their citizens and issue new laws, under the following banner headline: ‘By order of the government, please refrain from protest, were the entire citizenry to meet its demise.’

It was a dangerous expression. That’s how it was described by a journalist who happened to be in the crowed, by a community organizer for the rights of women and children, and by an activist who had just been released from jail and had come to enjoy his new found-freedom. He swore that he wouldn’t let anyone embrace or hug him until he had expressed all his pent-up feelings and cursed the government and gone to prison all over again. As for Lewis Nawa, the warning had no effect whatsoever, other than to deepen his uncertainty; and as for the killer Ebola, well, he was extremely restless; the chase had gone on too long and the man from Nzara remained out of reach.

While it is true that Zubi Street, or Jamadi Ahmad Street according to the fawning municipal worker, was a desirable destination, it was only so if the magician were present – as he had been these many years. When he stopped a donkey-cart passing by and lifted on to it the paraphernalia of his ledgermain, some which he used daily, and some enrobed in cobwebs, and left for an unknown destination, the assembled crowd was aghast. They couldn’t believe their eyes and stood rooted to the spot, certain that this was the new trick they had all been waiting for these many years. They looked around, taking in the puddles of stagnant water, the windows of broken-down houses overlooking the street, digging around their pockets for something noone was quite sure about. What they did know for sure, was that they were searching for something and that they would surely find it.

Kanini had been keyed up waiting for the magician to come up with the missing trick, but in the charged and suspenseful moments following his disappearance, all the tension fell away from her. Kanini was a young girl who was born in a horse-stable just outside Kinshasa. She was of unknown parentage and had grown up, abused and violated by the grooms and horse-owners and the young teenagers of neighboring farms until she was eighteen. Looking around the fifty or so stunned spectators, she singled out Nawa. He seemed less bewildered than the others, and it was because of him that her time on Zubi St. was pleasurable, as he had forced a seasoned magician to flee the place. She read the sign on the trunk with difficulty because she was better versed in the levity of the body than in any kind of language or fancy talk. Her vocabulary was quotidian, the lexicon of ordinary talk, aside from the naughty language that  helped her earn a living. She had left the countryside a year ago, roaming the city in search of visitors she could accompany wherever they pleased, sometimes for a pretty penny, but mostly for the price of dirt.

Lewis didn’t appeal to her the way a man might because he was handsome or physically attractive or because his pockets were filled with hidden riches, but he was the only foreigner around. However broken their oars and no matter how empty their pockets, foreigners always had enough to pay for travel and board.

Lying in wait, Ebola observed the young girl pressing herself invitingly against the back of his intended victim, and he smiled. He saw her nudging towards his scartissued face and laughed, almost cackling as he watched the stranger walk away with the young girl whose blood he had contaminated only the day before. He followed them until they turned off the street, swinging along dirty neighborhoods and deserted alleyways until they reached the one-story building. It echoed with cries and knowing laughter and every so often a a drunk would stagger out unsteadily.

The deed was done.

And that is how on a sorrow-filled visit to the Congo,  Lewis Nawa of Nzara became the host for Ebola to cross the border to another country.

[Translated from the Arabic by Maia Tabet. The excerpt is from Amir Tag Elsir, Ebola '76 (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2012).]


January 2013 Culture

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Jadaliyya's first monthly culture bouquet of 2013 has arrived! Painters Samia Halaby and Athir Shayota contribute to Visuals in 1500, a new series of profiles that takes a single work of art as the starting point for larger discussions on aesthetics. Marilyn Hacker translates a poem by Taher Bekri. Maia Tabet translates a chapter from Sudanese novelist Amir Tag Elsir's "Ebola '76." Alia Yunis interviews Syrian director Nabil Maleh. Iraqi artist Sadik Kwaish Alfaraji contemplates the plight of the Arab Sisyphus.

Spread the word and enjoy!

Samia Halaby, "Homage to Leonard"

Athir Shayota, "From Baghdad to New York: Reflections on Painting"

Sadik Kwaish Alfaraji, "Sisyphus Goes on Demonstration"

Taher Bekri, "Epic of the Thyme of Palestine" tr. Marilyn Hacker

Amir Tag Elsir,  "Ebola '76" tr. Maia Tabet

Alia Yunis, "A Leopard in Winter: An Interview with Syrian Director Nabil Maleh."

You can access all previous culture posts here. Tell us what you think and contribute:

culture@jadaliyya.com

Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (January 30)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

Regional and International Relations

Saudi Looks to Lebanon for Regional Boost A news report on the Saudi-Lebanese relations in light of the Lebanese prime minister’s meeting the Saudi crown prince in Riyadh, on Al-Akhbar English.

Qatar Leaks: The Business of Foreign Affairs Radwan Mortada writes on Al-Akhbar Newspaper’s publication of leaked minutes from the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Al-Akhbar English.

Arm Syrian rebels to contain jihadis, says Saudi royal Ian Black reports on Prince Turki al-Faisal’s call for the arming of Syrian rebels to “ensure that 'extremist' groups do not dominate the opposition,” in The Guardian.

Reports and Opinions

Rizana Nafeek: Mother forgives over Saudi beheading A new report on Nafeek’s mother’s assertion that her daughter did not kill the baby in her care and her forgiveness of the Saudi parents who insisted on the execution of her daughter, on BBC.

Sri Lanka curtailing S Arabia maid supply A news report on the Sri Lankan government’s decision to ban women under twenty-five from going to Saudi Arabia after the beheading of Rizana Nafeek, on Al Jazeera English.

Saudi Arabia: Forced into extinction An article on the sarcastic tweets following the religious police's dismantling of an educational exhibition featuring models of dinosaurs in a mall in Dammam, in The Economist.

A Road to Mecca A film by George Misch, tracing the journey of Leopold Weiss, who converted to Islam in 1926 in Saudi Arabia and came to be known as Muhammad Assad, on Al Jazeera English.

A biography of King Faisal: Unexpectedly modern An article on Alexei Vassiliev’s King Faisal of Saudi Arabia: Personality, Faith and Times, in The Economist. 

Qatar poet final verdict expected in February A media report on the upcoming trial of Mohammed al-Ajami, who is facing a life sentence for “incitement against the ruling system,” on Al Jazeera English.

UAE to try 94 over ‘plot to seize power’ A news report on the trial of ninety-four people who are charged with attempts to seize power and establish an Islamist state, and with links to the international Muslim Brotherhood organization, on Al Jazeera English.

Repression in Bahrain

Bahrain government says reconciliation talks set to resume A news report on the latest invitation for a dialogue sent from King Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa to the opposition, on Reuters.

Bahrain Opposition Gives Cautious Nod for Talks A news report on the Bahraini opposition’s reaction to the king’s call for a dialogue, in The New York Times.

Anger in Bahrain following brutal arrest of female protester A news report on the harsh treatment of Zahra al-Shaikh at her arrest during protests, which included the police slapping her and forcibly removing her veil, on France 24.

Bahraini princess facing multiple torture charges A news report on Noura bint Ebrahim al-Khalifa, accused by Bahraini activists of torturing three people while in detention, on BBC.

Crisis in Yemen

US drone strikes publicly criticised by Yemeni cabinet minister A news report on a rare public condemnation of drone strikes in Yemen voiced by the Yemeni human rights minister, in The Guardian.

UN visit to Yemen draws thousands of protesters: “The People want to put the killer on trial” A news report on protesters’ demands to strip the former Yemeni president of immunity, on al-Akhbar English.

11 Yemen Soldiers Killed in Car Bombing A news report on the death of eleven soldiers after a car bomb exploded next to a military checkpoint, in The New York Times.

Human Rights Watch

Letter to the UN Security Council on human rights concerns in Yemen A letter by the executive director of the organization and the United Nations director addressed to the ambassadors of the UN Security Council on the eve of their visit to Yemen.

Culture

Treasure troves of history and diversity Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi examines the narratives of national history presented in national museums in the Gulf states, and their silence on the questions of minorities, tribal feuds and massacres, on Gulfnews.

Arabic

Algeria, an Immense Bazaar: The Politics and Economic Consequences of Infitah

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In the last few months, Algeria has witnessed a frenetic activity of economic and trade delegations visiting the country. In November 2012 alone, Algiers received tens of high-profile delegations succeeding each other from European countries such as Spain, Italy, France, UK, Romania, Finland, and Turkey to Arab countries including Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. With its substantial foreign reserves amounting to more than two hundred billion dollars, it seems that Algeria has become a hot destination for foreign investment at a time when Europe is undergoing a deep economic crisis. Even for the highly-mediatized visit of French President Hollande (that some preferred to interpret through the distorting prism of the traumatizing history of colonialism), economic interests were at the top of the agenda.

Fifty years after its independence, is Algeria in a position to impose itself economically? Is there really a genuine will for the development of a true and balanced economic cooperation, advantageous for both Algeria and Europe? Is Algeria in the path of a full-blown economic development that will benefit the Algerian people, or is it merely an Eldorado for the crisis-ridden foreign economies? To answer these questions, a historical detour is necessary to give us more insights and to help us understand where Algeria stands in the global economic order.

In the first two decades following its independence in 1962, Algeria launched an ambitious development project. The aim was to disconnect itself from an unjust political and economic global order that kept it within the dominated periphery and relegated the country to a status of a proletariat nation; on the one hand as a market for the dominant Western economies, and on the other, as a reservoir of cheap labor and natural resources.

Aspiring for a strong modern economy, Algeria engaged in an inspiring industrialization project and initiated an agrarian revolution to break away from the chains of economic dependency and to achieve food sovereignty. The country was active inside the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development. Moreover, the Algiers’ charter of the 77 in 1967 was a significant step in shifting the fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism from the political sphere to the economic sphere. It was an enterprise initiated with the recovery of lands and different nationalizations that culminated with recovering the hydrocarbon sector in 1971.

Dictatorial and military, the regime of Colonel Houari Boumediene did not represent a right-wing military dictatorship (like that of Augusto Pinochet’s in Chile) that served the interest of an oligarchy linked to imperialism. Boumediene’s economic policies were accompanied by progressive social achievements such as democratization of education, the access of huge segments of the popular masses to health services, guarantees for employment and social upward mobility. In the 60s and 70s, Algeria alongside Egypt, occupied a prominent and leading position during the first wave of the "awakening of the South" in the era of Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement. By 1980, they were the most industrialized states in Africa, aside from South Africa, with a solid experience in industrial management and technological expertise. This autonomous project served a majority of the population and thus achieved a form of social consensus; indeed, denying its significant accomplishments will be nihilistic. However, this attempt of delinking from the imperialist and capitalist global order had its own limitations and internal contradictions--these included the continuing food dependence, reliance on oil revenues, and more importantly, the dictatorial character of the regime, which concentrated powers in the hand of one person, Houari Boumediene.

The political rule of Boumediene suppressed the democratic practice, depoliticized the masses, and reduced them to passive spectators instead of encouraging them to actively participate in public life. Moreover, this project was piloted by a national bourgeoisie in the Fanonian sense of the word, which led to popular discontent in the form of open criticisms during the debates around the National Charter of 1976 and through strikes in the public sector in 1976 and 1977, contesting the development of inequalities, repression, and lack of freedoms. The crux of the matter was how to remedy these serious shortcomings, and how to overcome the contradictions in order to take the nascent project to the second phase of consolidation, and achieve genuine economic independence. After the death of Boumediene in 1978, these considerations were unfortunately not on the agenda of the ruling elite of Algeria’s 80s and 90s.  

With the global neoliberal wave gaining momentum in the 80s, sweeping away the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc, eventually spreading to the whole world from Argentina to Poland and not sparing China in the way, and with the plummeting of oil revenues, the Algerian national development project was abandoned by the Chadli clique. It was dismantled as a process of deindustrialization and carried out to give way to neoliberal policies and the submission to the dictates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its structural adjustment programs (1992-1993, 1994-1999). This had heavy consequences on the population: job losses (more than 500,000 in a few years), decrease of purchasing power, cuts to public spending, increasing precariousness of salaried workers, opening up of foreign trade, and the privatization of public companies. Algeria paid around ninety billion dollars in debt service between 1990 and 2004, and paid its debt several times. . . in fact, seven times. This does not constitute a necessary imperative, but a choice of a regime that abdicated to Western hegemony. Instead of reindustrializing the country and investing in Algerian youths who risk their lives to reach the northern shores of the Mediterranean in order to escape the despair of being marginalized and relegated to being Hittistes,[1] the Algerian authorities offered financial support tothe IMF, a neo-colonial tool of plunder that crippled the economy.

The dignitaries of the new neoliberal religion declared that everything was for sale and opened the way for privatizations. This allowed an explosion of import activity, which pronounced a death sentence on the productive economy. Rachid Tlemçani notes that by 1997, 7100 companies (5500 private) controlled the non-hydrocarbon foreign trade, the majority of which were specialized in import activities resulting in the transformation of the Algerian market into an immense bazaar for foreign goods with its reservoir of corruption.

Under President Bouteflika, from 1999, this neoliberal logic of undermining national production while promoting an import-import economy (imports increased from 9.3 billion dollars in 2000 to 27.6 billion in 2007, and 47.25 billion by 2011) was pushed even further, aiming for a complete integration into the global economy. This is evidenced by the dismantling of all custom barriers, the adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), and the signature of an association agreement with the European Union.

It is in the name of the sacrosanct principles of the neoliberal dogma that industrial investment halted for thirty years. It is because of their profiteering disciples that industrial figures mutated into traders-importers. It is also in their name that the share of industry in GDP went down from twenty six percent in 1985 to about five percent in 2009. The successive governments made all the necessary arrangements for the foreign investors to rush into Algeria.

This policy of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) failed miserably, as Algeria ranked last in terms of FDI per head among the southern Mediterranean countries according to the 2010 report from Anima network. The majority of FDI in the non-hydrocarbon sector was concentrated in the telecommunication sector between 2001 and 2008. Clearly, foreign companies prefer trade rather than direct investment in the country’s development and technology transfer. Moreover, this strategy makes sense given that Algeria is a guaranteed market for their products. As for local investors, the majority prefer easy gains, and therefore engages actively in the informal market.

It is indeed an understatement to say that the FDIs are not flooding the Algerian market. According to international statistics in 2006, two thirds of FDI occur between developed countries, fifty percent of the third remaining go to emergent economies like Brazil, India ,and China, while the African continent gets only a share of three percent. It seems that the difficulty in attracting FDI is a global structural issue and not specific to Algeria only. Nevertheless, successive Algerian governments, especially since 1999, have not renounced their mission of offering the lion’s share of the revenues to multinational companies. As a matter of fact, they have hastened to rescue the crisis-ridden European car industry by importing 200,000 cars a year, perpetuating the logic of an economy based on import, trade, sheer consumption, and shunning local production and industry.

The culmination of such anti-national politics of selling off the economy was reached on 25 March 2005 with the adoption of the Khelil law on hydrocarbons, which called into question the system of production sharing between the national public company Sonatrach and the foreign oil companies. Under the old system, fifty one percent of any field discovered was attributed to the Algerian state while the forty nine percent remaining was negotiated, with a right of twenty five percent to Sonatrach. The foreign companies thus had the right to twenty four percent, on which they had to pay taxes. The Khelil ruling took this system back to pre-hydrocarbon nationalization in 1971, stipulating that any field discovered by a foreign company could own one hundred percent of it. This law was frozen and amended in 2006 to allow the foreign groups to have a guaranteed share of forty nine percent instead.

This process of liberalization and transition to the market economy was accompanied by the destruction of the theoretical and practical know-how, resulting from the liquidation of institutes specialized in strategic sectors such as energy, steel, and textile industries. This was followed by an offensive on technical secondary education by reducing the options of the technical baccalaureate from fourteen to four specializations, which led to the extinction of technical industrial branches that contributed, for decades, to the formation of engineers and superior technicians. This approach only strengthens the belief that it was a conscious, well-thought, and planned eradication project of the Algerian industrial capabilities to transform the country to a simple exporter of oil, gas, cheap qualified and non-qualified labor, and capital in the form of repaying the debt seven times and through the unbridled opening of the economy (infitah).

The 2009 and 2010 complementary finance laws (CFL), which were protectionist in nature and seemingly patriotic, came after the regime frustratingly realized that its politics of seeking FDI had desperately failed. This was especially clear given that foreign companies were getting richer, while Algeria was on the verge of a deficit in the trade balance sheet in 2008 because of excessive levels of imports. This turn of “economic patriotism” is too timid and contradictory to constitute a rupture with the neoliberal policies that tipped the country towards a catastrophe. In no way does it challenge the domination of neo-imperialism that has the upper hand over technology, exclusive access to the natural resources of the planet, control of the global monetary and financial system, control of the means of communication and information, and control over weapons of mass destruction. There is no genuine politics to re-launch the industrialization project and there is no will to break away from the domination of international capital, a sine qua non condition of any strategy of development. Moreover, the 2009 and 2010 CFLs proved to be unsuccessful in curbing the levels of imports that went from 39.1 billion dollars in 2009 to 47.25 billion in 2011. Even worse was the sheer inability of the government to divorce the status of a bazaar economy, only suitable to consume what is produced outside as the country imported more than 300,000 cars in 2011.

This infitah corresponds to a renouncement of the Algerian bourgeoisie's pursuit of an autonomous national development that involved a certain degree of economic and political confrontation with imperialism. As argued by Hocine Bellaloufi in his book Democracy in Algeria: Reform or Revolution, the infitah constitutes a general counter-revolution, which affected the economic, social, political, and ideological spheres. It ended up assigning the country to a status of a dependent on imperialism and an exporter of energy within the neo-colonial framework of the international division of labour. It was far from the objectives of the development dynamic of the 60s and 70s.

In the last thirty years, after Algeria embraced free markets, the picture became bleak. Algerian economist, Abdelatif Rebah, describes the situation very clearly: The public sector that employed 1.4 million in 1990, saw that number plummet to 450,000. The unemployment rate went up from seventeen percent in 1985 to twenty eight percent in 1995, and from forty six percent to fifty eight percent between 1988 and 1995 for the 15-24 year olds. Poverty, which was affecting nearly twenty four percent of the population in 1988, jumped to about forty two percent in 1994/1995. Between 1992 and 2008, the percentage of those permanent salaried fell from fifty seven percent to thirty five percent, while the percentage of the non-permanent salaried workers increased from twelve to thirty one percent.

It is within this context of ultra-liberalization and Algeria’s considerable reserves--around two hundred billion dollars placed in foreign banks--that we need to understand the surge in foreign economic and trade delegations. These parties are seeking a slice of the cake and urgently need to pull their own economies out of the depression. Jean-Pierre Raffarin from the French government, nicknamed Mr. Algeria, visited the country several times in the last few months to prepare for the visit of French president Hollande in December 2012. His visits also sealed lucrative new deals involving multinationals like Renault, Lafarge, Sanofi, and Total. The recent visits of Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci to the UK and Lord Risby, David Cameron’s trade envoy, to Algeria inscribe themselves in this state of “profitable” affairs. The question is: profitable for whom?

In its desperate attempts to attract foreign investments, Algeria finally signed a contract with Renault after years of negotiations. Some observers qualified it as a big fiasco that is dangerous to the economic interests of the nation. Initially, Renault will only create three hundred fifty jobs and manufacture 25,000 cars per year, which is less than five percent of the current market. Moreover, the initial production will consist of assembling kits imported from Romania and Turkey, and engines from France. This is in contrast to the authentic factory in Morocco that is producing 400,000 cars per year and created six thousand jobs with a similar amount of investment. Not content with this dismal picture, the Algerian authorities even dared to offer the French car manufacturer three-year exclusivity. To borrow the eloquent words of the Latin American writer Eduardo Galeano, it seems that the ruling elite has no interest whatsoever in determining whether patriotism might not prove more profitable than treason, and whether begging is really the only formula for international politics. Sovereignty is being mortgaged by the Algerian regime, which has abdicated to its foreign masters.

The other controversial subject of the French president’s recent visit is the accord given to France to explore shale gas, a project with deleterious high environmental impact, rejected by developed societies, including France. Not only is the Algerian regime showing its contempt for the environment and the Algerian people, but it is also perpetuating Algeria’s everlasting dependence on hydrocarbons and condemning the economy to the cyclical rise and fall of oil and gas prices.

Where is Algeria heading if it continues on such a path? Definitely more social explosions and discontent as such policies, wed to endemic corruption and nepotism, cannot achieve social consensus in Algeria and will only lead to more pauperization, unemployment, and inequality. Contrary to the dogmatic affirmations of its advocates, neoliberalism is antinomic with democracy. Instead, it is more compatible with authoritarianism because it mainly serves the interest of a tiny minority at the expense of the majority. It subjects the popular sovereignty to the dictates of the markets--something recently seen in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain in the context of the European economic crisis. If maintained, the neoliberal policies will block the democratization process in Algeria and will end up reinforcing an authoritarian regime with a democratic façade.

Democracy means the sovereignty of the people and cannot be reduced to mere electoralism. It can only be achieved through a vision that has a social and national framework. Genuine democracy can only be constructed opposed to imperialism and its local lackeys in the comprador bourgeoisie, who are subordinated to the international system of exploitation and are not concerned about the population and the future of the country. Suffice it to say that the support and backing offered by the big powers (USA, Europe, Japan, Russia, and China) to the Arab dictatorships and despotic Gulf monarchies is an indication that we cannot separate the democratic, social, and anti-imperialist struggles that will achieve genuine national independence, social justice, and true democracy.



[1] Literally, those who have their backs to the walls, this term is used in reference to the unemployed who ceased to be stakeholders of post-colonial Algeria.

On Algerian Civil Society and the Prohibition of Assembly

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Despite the fact that its laws allow the assembly of people on the streets and squares of Algeria, the public space remains firmly blocked by the Algerian state. This closure is assured in two ways: firstly, through the restrictions placed by law on civil associations, and secondly, by the ways in which the police control crowds. 

The most recent amendment to Algerian law on public assembly details the administrative process required to form a legal public protest. In chapter II, on “public demonstrations,” the law requires the declaration of any public protest. A public crowd that gathers without the declaration and approval by state authorities is considered illegal. The punishment for unlawful assembly is considered “attroupement illegal” and carries one to three months in prison, and/or a fine of two thousand Algerian dinars, about twenty five US dollars (Chapter III Art. 21, 1990 “Dispositions Penales”).

The "declaration" of public crowding is in fact a request since it has to be processed, and accepted, followed by a receipt that must be issued. For the request to be filed, it has to include the time, place, itinerary, reason of the demonstration, and the name and addresses of the organizers. In addition, the request must include the name and headquarters of the association organizing the protest. Herein lies the problem--if the association has not been accredited by the atate, then a request cannot be filed. Many associations in Algeria have been refused accreditation. 

The most significant refusals have been for the associations of a political nature. And specifically, those associations challenging the 2005 Law of National Reconciliation, which in exchange for a cease fire, granted amnesty and impunity to those responsible for killings during the 1990s. It also makes it illegal to demand justice or truth about disappearances during the killings of the 1990s. The law institutes a historical "turning of the page." 

The repression of civil society associations that challenge the 2005 "Law of National Reconciliation" is firm and on going. The law put an end to a decade of violence in Algeria in exchange for amnesty. It also however, ushered in a new era of political repression of discontent and forced amnesia for the victim's families. The suppression of violence was cleverly coupled with a legalized form of social and political forgetting that has also assured the repression of truth.

Two major associations who represent families of those disappeared and which are not accredited by the state are SOS disparus and SUMUD. The thousands of disappeare bodies unaccounted for, perhaps in the range of 25,000 from the period of the 1990s, forms not only the greatest wound in contemporary Algerian society, but also the biggest threat to the highly skilled political authority, which has skillfully prevented a revolution within its borders. In fact, these mass dissappearances, in addition to 250,000 dead, has been a deterrent to a popular uprising. Nonetheless, the suppression of demands for truth regarding these deaths is festering a political problem and represents a potentially powerful catalyst for political discontent. 

SOS disparus is an association of families of those who disappeared during the 1990s. Their headquarters, which is not legally authorized to exist, contains eight thousand dossiers of individuals killed, or disappeared by the Algerian state. In their office, I listened to five women who told me how their brothers, sons, and husbands had been arrested by the state on the suspicion that they were Islamic militants. The women have not seen their family members since their arrests. One woman told me that she knew that her brother was tortured to death; another of her brothers was also arrested, then later released, recounted how he had seen his brother tortured in prison. 

In defiance of the illegality of their association, the women of SOS disparu protest publicly. Late every Wednesday morning, they gather at Addis Ababa Square in Algiers, holding photos of their missing loved ones, demanding the truth about the circumstances of their disappearance. They want to know where the bodies are buried. The police surround them, used to spit on them, beat them, and called them families of terrorists. Today, the police continue to surround them, but no longer touch them as long as they do not move. Much like the women of Benghazi whose family members were killed or disappeared in the Abu Slim prison, these women fearlessly defy the state’s prohibition of public, political protest. 

The need to see the cadaver of their loved ones is shared by the members of SUMUD. SUMUD is an association, also not accredited by the state, of people whose family members were disappeared by Islamists during the 1990s. Because they are not accredited, they are not allowed to have a headquarters, meetings, protests, seminars, conferences, or a bank account to run the association’s budget. SUMUD, like SOS disparus, opposes the laws of impunity for both sides--the state and the armed Islamist groups--who killed and kidnapped during the 1990s.The two associations are allied, work together, and are not political or partisan. Together they seek truth and to see the corpses of their family members.

In September 2012, Navi Pillay, the High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Algiers. The spokesman for SUMUD, Adnane Bouchaib, met with Pillay, but had little faith that her visit or declaration will have any impact on the fate of these families. The women of SOS disparus were eager to make their stories visible and scrambled, despite attempts to prevent them, to make it to their spot at Addis Ababa square. Indeed, they were seen, and Pillay, at the end of her visit, made the following statement: 

While recognizing that the driving force behind this state of affairs is rooted in security concerns, I encourage the Government to review the laws and practices relating to civil society organizations and freedom of assembly, and also to order all security forces to refrain from violating internationally recognized instruments guaranteeing the right to freedom of association, such as Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is a binding treaty that has been ratified by 167 States, including Algeria (19 September 2012).

One could argue that the Algerian state allowed a public gathering. Indeed, there are often crowds of protesters (some put figure at 11,000 protests during the 2010) all around Algeria expressing demands, such as higher wages, better benefits, improvement of a road, highway, hospital, etc. I witnessed such a crowd in front of the Grande Poste in Algiers throughout the week of 8-12 January. During that week, large crowds in the hundreds, of postal workers gathered in front of the grade poste. The police did not disrupt the crowds nor did they inflict any violence, despite the fact that this was not a legal protest. But the crowd made no political demands. This crowd’s demands were limited to an improvement in benefits; they demanded a bonus to be delivered by the end of January. It was a protest with economic grievances, which is clearly tolerated, as opposed to political crowds, who are banned from the public space and whose leaders are repeatedly harassed and punished. On 12 January, the Minister of Communications came to address the leader of the postal workers, and accepted their demands for a bonus. Despite that, however, crowd leaders, as was the case on this day, are watched and controlled so as to assure that they do not speak to, collaborate with, or join with leaders of any other group. The police engage in targeted crowd-leader surveillance. While I was observing this crowd, a young man who is a leader of a youth group for radical political change in Algeria, approached the police and spoke to them during this postal worker protest. He was swiftly and somewhat brutally shoved into a police truck before my eyes. 

In terms of crowd action, the red line in Algeria is politics. This line is drawn in full confidence, during the exhalation of public satisfaction of economic demands and on the back of collective traumatism about the invisible, but very present, crowds of the dead.

New Texts Out Now: John M. Willis, Unmaking North and South: Cartographies of the Yemeni Past, 1857-1934

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John M. Willis, Unmaking North and South: Cartographies of the Yemeni Past, 1857-1934. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

John Willis (JW): The book began as a dissertation written in the departments of history and Middle Eastern and Islamic studies at New York University. While I had been interested in the production and mastery of space as a particular technic of power for some time, what drove me to frame the dissertation and then the book in the way that I did was my experience watching the state celebrations associated with the tenth anniversary of Yemen’s unification (1990) while conducting preliminary research there in May 2000. Listening to the public discourse on Yemen’s recent past, there seemed to be a public consensus, at least at that time, that unification had ended the historical aberration of a divided Yemen that had begun with the division of the country under British colonial rule in the south and Zaydi rule in the north, and continued with the revolutions of 1963 and 1967, with the formation of two independent Yemeni states, themselves divided politically and ideologically. But it seemed to me that this narrative had all too easily erased a contested history, one in which the modern Yemeni nation was the result of a contingent historical process that extended far beyond the borders of southwestern Arabia.

It was my feeling that a critical history, a genealogy, of these spaces had not been written, especially in a way that viewed the problem of space, not as specific to geographical Yemen or the Yemeni nation, but as inextricably linked to forms of discursive and institutional power of global import. That is, the production of the Yemeni north and south as particular kinds of spaces, with assumed ethnographic, moral, political makeups, was the effect of broader processes of empire and anti-empire, which themselves intersected with discourses of religious reform, ethnography, cartography, and so on. To that end, I argue that the spaces of north and south Yemen must be situated in—and, in fact, are the effects of—broader governmental projects generated in India (of which Aden was officially a part until 1937) and the Ottoman Empire, as well as movements of anti-imperialism and Islamic reform (in its Sunni salafi variety) as they developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in opposition to these forms of rule.


[22 May Memorial, Khur Maksar, Aden. Photograph by J. Willis, 2000.]

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does it address?

JW: Drawing on the insights of critical geography and post-colonial historiography, I attempted to write a history of Yemen that was not rooted in universal trajectories of state formation, capitalism, or nationalism, but in what Paul Carter, in his The Road to Botany Bay, called “spatial history.” As I use it, spatial history is a mode of historical analysis that charts the complex interaction between seemingly stable languages and representations and the multitude of daily practices of which these representations were ultimately an effect, in particular the discourses, forms of knowledge, and governing practices deployed by states, colonial or otherwise. Particular spaces emerged from this interaction as objects of governance, resistance, social and moral reform, and, at moments, the apocalyptic imagination.

The book itself consists of two parts. The first three chapters deal with the Indian history of the Yemeni south, by which I mean the incorporation of the tribal polities known as the Aden Protectorate into the larger scheme of native or “princely” states that were critical to British governance in India after the failure of colonial liberalism following the great revolt of 1857. In practice, this meant that the British produced colonial ethnographies, genealogies, and state rituals specific to the Yemeni south, yet rooted in practices developed in India, which would delineate particular “ruling houses” that would govern under British patronage. Upholding the authority of these ruling houses, as members of a trans-regional association of “native princes” allied with the British, became the basis for British policy in the region up until the independence of the south in 1967. I attempt to locate the production of these ruling houses in a diverse assemblage of discourses and practices, including imperial state ritual (such as the Delhi Durbar of 1903), ethnography, cartography, and even the landscape aesthetic.

The remaining three chapters of the book turn to the Yemeni north and the formation of the Hamid al-Din Imamate under Imams al-Mansur Muhammad (d. 1904) and al-Mutawakkil Yahya (d. 1948). In particular, I was interested in Imam Yahya’s post-Ottoman state building project, which drew heavily on a technics of power and space—primarily in terms of military organization—that was clearly derived from the Ottoman Tanzimat order that his father, Imam al-Mansur, had so recently opposed. Recruiting former Ottoman officers and technicians, we see the formation of a new Yemeni state that combined a governmental apparatus rooted in the secular reason of state and a form of temporal/spiritual authority, embodied by Imam Yahya himself, that derived from religious knowledge and noble genealogy. This new order of power was mobilized for the conquest of geographical Yemen in the post-Ottoman period and later intersected with the discourses of Islamic reform (islah) and anti-imperialism that were so critical to politics in the region in the immediate aftermath of the First World War.

The final chapter of the book brings together the sections on the Yemeni north and south through an analysis of the undeclared war between Imam Yahya’s state and the Aden Protectorate (1918-28) and the ways in which the conflict—finally settled by Britain’s use of punitive aerial bombing and signing of an Anglo-Yemeni treaty in 1934—reinforced the divisions between north and south that carried on into the post-colonial period and, in certain ways, to the present day.


[Sir Ahmad b. Fadl, K.C.S.I., Sultan of Lahj. Source: Harold Jacob,
Kings of Arabia
, London: Mills & Boon, ltd., 1923, pg. 141.]

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

JW: It is my hope that this book will reach a broad audience, certainly within the field of Middle Eastern history, but also in the history of colonialism and empire and critical geography. I think it is safe to say that Yemen has occupied a marginal position within the discipline of modern Middle Eastern history, in part because of its seeming isolation from the broader trends of state formation and European domination that characterized the Mashriq and Maghreb. For this reason, I think, Yemen became primarily an object of either orientalist or anthropological inquiry, forever located in a religious/textual past or an ethnographic present. The result was a Yemeni historiography that, until recently, remained aloof from some of the broader concerns of the modern history of the non-West.

For example, Yemen’s place in the Ottoman and British Empires has received little critical treatment, and has been subject primarily to empirically driven, narrative histories. In fact, until recently, much of the more exciting historical work on Yemen was produced by critical anthropologists—people like Paul Dresch, Brinkley Messick, and, more recently, Enseng Ho. It is my hope that my work will join this body of critical literature that uses Yemen’s seeming marginality as a productive site from which one can question some of the predominant narratives about the modern history of the region and even the concept of the region (the “Middle East”) itself by situating it in broader histories of economy, empire, state formation, religious thought, and resistance.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

JW: I have begun working on a new project tentatively titled After the Caliphate: Islam, Mecca, and the Geography of Crisis and Hope. This project will take the post-war abolition of the Ottoman caliphate as a point of departure for a broader investigation of the place of Mecca in inter-war discourses of anti-imperialism and Islamic unity, especially as they were positioned against nationalism, empire, and the notions of race that were particular to them. Drawing primarily on the Arabic and Urdu writings of Muslim activists and intellectuals in the Arab Middle East and India, it is an attempt to draw out of this particular historical moment the ways in which a politics of crisis (related to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and its caliphate, the formation of the League of Nations mandates in the Middle East, the rise of the Indian nationalist movement, etc.) was transformed into a politics of hope, if only for a brief moment, in which Mecca stood metonymically for the collective potentialities of the entire Islamic umma and the absolute antithesis of the European state system and European empire.

The question that motivates me at the moment is: How did Mecca’s otherness, its heterotopic qualities, open up, at least for a period in the 1920s and 1930s, new imaginative spaces that worked to destabilize a series of scalar geographies—the imperial, the national, the regional, and the devotional—and offer alternative visions of world order? 

Excerpts from Unmaking North and South: Cartographies of the Yemeni Past, 1857-1934

From “Authority and Obedience”

Whatever the aim of the Da‘‘an treaty, it did not stifle the imam’s claims to religious and temporal authority. His public proclamations against the Idrisi were less notable for his opposition to the shaykh than the fact that they were with greater frequency directed toward the “the people of Yemen, both Zaydi and Shafi‘i” (sukkan al-qutr al-yamani al-zaydi minhum wa-l-shafi‘i) rather than toward the narrowly defined Zaydi community over which the treaty had given him sovereignty. Imam Yahya’s markedly non-sectarian appeal to Yemeni Muslims indicated that, even though a client of the Ottoman state, he presumed the legitimacy of his own claim to leadership far beyond the Zaydi highlands. But it also intimated the extent to which his reign signaled the transformation of the Yemeni state away from earlier models of the Zaydi imamate, a process that had begun in the late Qasimi dynasty in the eighteenth century.

Bernard Haykel has argued that the accession of a number of Qasimi imams who did not fit the requirements of scholarly probity necessitated by Zaydi law created the conditions for the rise in stature of the scholar and jurist Muhammad ‘Ali al-Shawkani (d. 1835). Although a Zaydi, Shawkani asserted the prominence of the traditions of the Prophet (sunna) as a source of law above the writings of the Zaydi imams. Shawkani’s appointment as the chief judge of the Qasimi state gave him access to the imams as well as the power to appoint his students to positions of influence. Of greater consequence, he reinterpreted the juridical bases of the imamate itself. Drawing on Prophetic hadith, he rejected the summons (da‘wa) as the necessary path to the imamate, arguing that one could be designated as such by the sitting imam or by the oath of loyalty of the ulama. Furthermore, he rejected the conditions that the imam be both a mujtahid and trace his descent to ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, arguing along Sunni lines that he need only belong to the Prophet’s tribe of the Quraysh and appoint knowledgeable scholars to advise him. Finally, and contrary to the Zaydi notion of just rule, he argued that it was impermissible to rebel against the imam unless he had committed a public act of unbelief. The imamate described by Shawkani was, in effect, what the Qasimi dynasty had become: a hereditary monarchy aided by an alliance with sunna-oriented scholars.

The political formation that resulted from the alliance of state power and religious learning was animated by an imagined moral geography that situated its inhabitants in a landscape defined by their knowledge of and adherence to the tenets and practices of Islam. It was a hierarchical view of society that located piety and knowledge in the state and allied members of the ulama. In the face of the Sa‘udi-Wahhabi alliance to the north, for example, Shawkani bemoaned the religious ignorance of the imam’s subjects (ra‘aya), the tribes of the northeast, and the residents of the cities whom he believed made Yemen vulnerable. It was the role of the imam to appoint competent administrators and educated members of the religious establishment to instruct the imam’s reluctant subjects in their religious duties, all of which required the expansion of state authority and obedience to it. In short, it was a view of society that assumed, as Haykel notes, “that only those who have yielded to the authority of the state can be good Muslims” and the political vision it espoused was one in which the boundaries of a moral, religious, and social order were coterminous with those of the state itself.

When the Ottoman administration withdrew from lower Yemen in 1918, Imam Yahya asserted his authority to rule Yemen as the legitimate Imam of the Muslim community and initiated a military campaign to bring the rest of the country under his rule. The history of these campaigns is narrated in a series of biographical (sira) works that were written about Imam Yahya by his supporters among the learned elite in the 1920s and 1930s. These works appealed both to the universal, in their record of the expansion of the domain of the shari‘a under the guidance of the Prophet’s descendant, and the singular in the specificity of the Yemeni social and political context in which they unfolded. But what is important for our purposes is that these works also narrated the production of a new state space which was organized according to hierarchies of religious knowledge, inscribed in geography and united under leadership and guidance of the Imam.

Indeed this new state space as a whole was subsumed under the concept of obedience (ta‘a) and sometimes referred to in the historical literature by the spatialized metaphor of “the domain of obedience” (hazirat al-ta‘a). In these texts, the domain of obedience was synonymous with the rule of the imam, the application of the shari‘a, and the maintenance of a political and social order that preserved the rule of those with religious knowledge. Beyond the limits of obedience was a landscape of corruption (fasad), dissension (fitna) and chaos (fawda). The narrative thrust of these biographical works, then, is the slow but steady extension of the domain of obedience over the whole of the Yemen. If we turn to the chronicle written by Imam Yahya’s chief secretary (katib), Qadi ‘Abd al-Karim al-Mutahhar, the extent to which obedience informed a particular kind of geographical imagination becomes apparent. The author began his chronicle with an account of the year 1337/1918, the year the Ottoman administration began to evacuate Yemen, in which he demarcated the boundaries of obedience:

The imam was residing in al-Rawda. The following lands were obedient to and under the order of our lord the Imam: Sa‘da, and all areas to the edge of Bani Juma‘a and Razih, all of the places in the far north (qibli), and al-Ahnum, Hajur al-Sham, Sharafayn, al-Suda, Kuhlan Taj al-Din, and ‘Affar. All of the middle regions to the edges of Yarim and al-‘Awd were held jointly by him and the Ottoman state.

Thereafter, al-Mutahhar continues to frame the passing of years with the expansion of the domain of obedience under the victorious armies of the Imamate. This space, however, was not like that of the Aden Protectorate as the British envisioned it, embedded in the nature of chiefly authority, the tribe, and the scientific discourse of geography. Rather, the borders of the domain of obedience as represented in the sira literature were ever expanding with the movement of the Imam’s armies, his commanders, who were members of the learned elite, and the extension of his rule. That is, as we shall see below, these histories were chronological accounts which listed the places and peoples conquered, region by region. The narration of these movements is what Michel de Certeau would have called spatial stories. Unlike the map, which he argued “slowly disengaged itself from the itineraries that were the condition of its possibility,” the spatial story is a log of movement, of place enacted through a sequential account of movement through space. Nor was the view that of the perspectiveless map as we saw in Chapter Three; rather it was Imam Yahya’s “piercing gaze” (nazar thaqib) which saw beyond the outer world of appearances and uncovered hidden truths.

While the concept of obedience had a firm foundation in Shawkani’s reinterpretation of the Imamate, the biographical literature suggests the maintenance and protection of a particular symbolic and practical order. As Makdisi has suggested in the context of Ottoman state discourse in Lebanon, the domain of obedience “encompassed politics and religion, public and private—all that contributed to a stable and tranquil social order.” In the biographical literature, opposition to the state was generally framed in a moral language, often indicated by phrases such as “the fires of dissension ignited” (insha‘alat niran al-fitna), which indicated a collapse of just Islamic governance. Words such as dissension (fitna) and chaos (fawda) were more often than not linguistic codes for the disruption of religious and political hierarchies which were necessary for a stable, just, and moral order. This was not due to the behavior of the Imam’s subjects (ra‘aya), who are almost never accused of opposing the state. Rather, it is most always the local notables, shaykhs, and headmen who don the “garb of the state” (ziyy al-dawla) and exploit the socially and politically weak (du‘afa’ wa masakin).

The extension of this domain, then, was concerned with establishing proper hierarchies of authority and knowledge. The return to this state was marked by the arrival of the Imam’s soldiers or “army of truth” (jund al-haqq), led by prominent sayyids, who in turn, acted as embodiments of the Imam himself. The appointment of a governor (‘amil) and shari‘a judge (hakim) indicated the return of just rule, the application of the law, and the reform (islah) or “ordering” (tartib) of the affairs of the land. Obedience was embodied in a very specific set of practices which, in turn, distinguished obedient Muslims from the “people of corruption” (ahl al-fasad). First and foremost the entrance into obedience meant the application of the shari‘a and the abolition of non-Islamic legal practices. What this meant in terms of practice was the performance of unspecified religious duties (ada’ al-wajibat), which itself was a not so veiled reference to the payment of the canonical tithes (zakat). Other practices that had no basis in Islam but had long histories in Yemen were necessary to the enactment of obedience as well. The taking of hostages as a guarantee for submission was recast as the taking of “hostages of obedience” (raha’in al-ta‘a) just as the slaughtering of bulls as a ritual act of appeasement were referred to as offering “bulls of obedience” (‘aqa’ir al-ta‘a). What is important to note here is that obedience as a form of practice was only visible in relation to the state. The state itself, however, was changing dramatically.

[Excerpted from Unmaking North and South: Cartographies of the Yemeni Past, 1857-1934, by John M. Willis, by permission of the author. © 2012 John M. Willis. For more information, or to order this book, click here.]

New Texts Out Now: January 2013 Back to School Edition

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As we kick off the spring 2013 semester, Jadaliyya would like to remind you of some of the most creative and groundbreaking works in Middle East studies that we have featured in our New Texts Out Now (NEWTON) page. Since we launched this page in 2011, we have had the opportunity to share with you unique interviews by authors and excerpts from their new and forthcoming publications.

Here you will find a list divided by topic of some of these texts that you may find particularly useful pedagogically. We encourage you to integrate these into your curricula during this semester and beyond. To stay up to date with ongoing discussions by scholars and instructors in the field, sign up for Jadaliyya’s Pedagogy Section.

We wish you the best in the new semester!

***

Arabs and Muslims in America

Nadine Naber, Arab America: Gender, Cultural Politics, and Activism

Stephen Sheehi, Islamophobia: The Ideological Campaign Against Muslims

Arab Uprisings

Hamid Dabashi, The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism

James Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know

Egypt

Nezar AlSayyad, Cairo: Histories of a City

Ziad Fahmy, Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture

Mervat Hatem, Literature, Gender, and Nation-Building in Nineteenth-Century Egypt

Gender

Noga Efrati, Women in Iraq: Past Meets Present

Nicola Pratt, “The Gender Logics of Resistance to the "War on Terror"

Iraq

Nadje Al-Ali and Deborah Al-Najjar, We Are Iraqis: Aesthetics and Politics in a Time of War

Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime

Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer, and Ziad Abu-Rish, The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order? 

Egypt

Nezar AlSayyad, Cairo: Histories of a City

Ziad Fahmy, Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture

Mervat Hatem, Literature, Gender, and Nation-Building in Nineteenth-Century Egypt

Gender

Noga Efrati, Women in Iraq: Past Meets Present

Nicola Pratt, “The Gender Logics of Resistance to the "War on Terror"

Iran

Farzaneh Milani, Words, Not Swords: Iranian Women Writers and the Freedom of Movement

Shahla Talebi, Ghosts of Revolution: Rekindled Memories of Imprisonment in Iran

Islam

Lila Abu-Lughod and Anupama Rao, Women's Rights, Muslim Family Law, and the Politics of Consent

Hilal Elver, The Headscarf Controversy: Secularism and Freedom of Religion

Maaike Voorhoeve, Family Law in Islam

Palestine/Israel

Rochelle Davis, Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Displaced

Marcy Jane Knopf-Newman, The Politics of Teaching Palestine to Americans

Mark LeVine and Gershon Shafir, Struggle and Survival in Palestine/Israel

Ben White, Palestinians in Israel: Segregation, Discrimination and Democracy

Saudi Arabia

Madawi Al-Rasheed, A Most Masculine State: Gender, Politics, and Religion in Saudi Arabia

Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia

Torture and Detainment

Julie Carlson and Elisabeth Weber, Speaking about Torture

Lisa Hajjar, Torture: A Sociology of Violence and Human Rights

Laleh Khalili, Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies

Yemen

Stephen W. Day, Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union

John M. Willis, Unmaking North and South: Cartographies of the Yemeni Past, 1857-1934

Syria and the United States: Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad on Jazeera's "Empire"

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The Al-Jazeera English show Empire looks at the history of the US relationship with Syria and the current state of the armed uprising. It explores what is - or should be - the Obama policy towards Syria, with guests: Bassam Haddad, the director of the Middle East studies programme at George Mason University, who is also editor of the online magazine Jadaliyya, and author of Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience; David Pollock, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Juan Cole, a professor of Middle East history at the University of Michigan, and author of several books including his most recent Engaging the Muslim World; and Stephen Starr, a journalist and author of Revolt in Syria: Eyewitness to the Uprising. The show was recorded on Wednesday, January 23rd, 2013.

The interviews start at 9:15.

 


New Texts Out Now: January 2013 Back to School Edition

$
0
0

As we kick off the spring 2013 semester, Jadaliyya would like to remind you of some of the most creative and groundbreaking works in Middle East studies that we have featured in our New Texts Out Now (NEWTON) page. Since we launched this page in 2011, we have had the opportunity to share with you unique interviews by authors and excerpts from their new and forthcoming publications.

Here you will find a list divided by topic of some of these texts that you may find particularly useful pedagogically. We encourage you to integrate these into your curricula during this semester and beyond. To stay up to date with ongoing discussions by scholars and instructors in the field, sign up for Jadaliyya’s Pedagogy Section.

We wish you the best in the new semester!

***

Arabs and Muslims in America

Nadine Naber, Arab America: Gender, Cultural Politics, and Activism

Stephen Sheehi, Islamophobia: The Ideological Campaign Against Muslims

Arab Uprisings

Hamid Dabashi, The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism

James Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know

Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer, and Ziad Abu-Rish, The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order?

Egypt

Nezar AlSayyad, Cairo: Histories of a City

Ziad Fahmy, Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture

Mervat Hatem, Literature, Gender, and Nation-Building in Nineteenth-Century Egypt

Gender

Noga Efrati, Women in Iraq: Past Meets Present

Nicola Pratt, “The Gender Logics of Resistance to the "War on Terror"

Iraq

Nadje Al-Ali and Deborah Al-Najjar, We Are Iraqis: Aesthetics and Politics in a Time of War

Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime

Iran

Farzaneh Milani, Words, Not Swords: Iranian Women Writers and the Freedom of Movement

Shahla Talebi, Ghosts of Revolution: Rekindled Memories of Imprisonment in Iran

Islam

Lila Abu-Lughod and Anupama Rao, Women's Rights, Muslim Family Law, and the Politics of Consent

Hilal Elver, The Headscarf Controversy: Secularism and Freedom of Religion

Maaike Voorhoeve, Family Law in Islam

Palestine/Israel

Rochelle Davis, Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Displaced

Marcy Jane Knopf-Newman, The Politics of Teaching Palestine to Americans

Mark LeVine and Gershon Shafir, Struggle and Survival in Palestine/Israel

Ben White, Palestinians in Israel: Segregation, Discrimination and Democracy

Saudi Arabia

Madawi Al-Rasheed, A Most Masculine State: Gender, Politics, and Religion in Saudi Arabia

Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia

Torture and Detainment

Julie Carlson and Elisabeth Weber, Speaking about Torture

Lisa Hajjar, Torture: A Sociology of Violence and Human Rights

Laleh Khalili, Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies

Yemen

Stephen W. Day, Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union

John M. Willis, Unmaking North and South: Cartographies of the Yemeni Past, 1857-1934

The Meaning of Yair Lapid

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The 2013 Israeli elections produced a dramatic nothing. Yair Lapid, television anchor, writer of clichés, son of loudmouth celebrity and one-time politician Tommy Lapid, and famed for his hairstyle, entered the political scene to form a party of handpicked personalities which won nineteen seats in the Knesset, and became the second largest party in Israel. Lapid is now the kingmaker, positioned to determine the shape of the coalition that will form Binyamin Netanyahu’s next government.

What does Yair Lapid represent? Early analysis of voting precincts reveals Lapid voters come from both affluent and middle-class urban, predominantly Ashkenazi neighborhoods, linking directly with the social groups from which came the initiative for the protest wave that swept over Israel eighteen months ago under the #J14 hashtag. Paradoxically, Lapid came to represent the desire of his primarily middle class and white Jewish voters for both radical change and the preservation of current conditions.

No intelligent person expected these elections to produce a less racist or less belligerent Israel, or one that offers any substantial recognition of Palestinian demands. The outcome of the elections is a blow to Israel’s right-wing, and also to Netanyahu. However, the immateriality of the shift is captured nicely by Ha’aretz’spre-elections coverage, which lumped Kadima, Tzipi Livni’s new party–spectacularly named “The Movement”–Labor, Meretz, and Lapid’s party in one broad camp: the so-called “center-left.” One can learn about the nature of this “center-left” from the new leader of Labor, Shelly Yachimovich, who early on took well-deserved credit for the settlement enterprise. She also, quite accurately, rejected the appellation“left” for her party. Given such a barren landscape, if it is at all interesting to “read” the results, it is only in relation to the depth of the long-term political trajectories of Israel’s tectonic plates.  

At least since the #J14 moment, popular disgust with the political class in Israel has been impossible to hide. But in truth, that popular disgust is not new. Even among Jews, the majority of Israelis have always felt alienated from the political class. The rise of Likud in 1977 was, to a large extent, the result of Menachem Begin’s cultivated outsider aura, and his skillful riding on the anger and alienation of Jewish Israelis—particularly Jews from Arab countries: Mizrahim. In turn, Likud, Shas, and Israel Beiteinu, Avigdor Lieberman’s party, have all mastered the modern right-wing art of minting popular support for inequality from resentment. And even in power, they have continually represented themselves as underdogs.  

It is correct to call Israel a settler-colonial society, and to use that paradigm to explain political choices. However, such explanations risk relying on an uneasy functionalism. How, exactly, does the establishment of Israel as a settler society compel present day politicians to invest in settlements and shortchange other constituencies? One mechanism, certainly in combination with others, is that the settlement enterprise provides the Right with a strategy for reconciling anger at the dominant class with the desire for recognition on its terms. “Redeeming the land,” the Zionist slogan for colonization, is both an expropriation and continuation of the settler ethos of the white Ashkenazi ruling class, which expelled the native Palestinians and established the state. For that reason, it is both a claim for recognition within the boundaries of the Zionist hegemonic discourse, and an ideological reversal through which settlements (and the politics that enable them) appear as subversive, outwitting the Ashkenazi elite in the same way that elite once outwitted the “Goy” ruler–the British Empire. This ideological and affective economy, one which inverts the alienation of the popular classes by “alienating” dominant social identities, and which works by representing bourgeois Ashkenazi dominance as alien, not Jewish enough, not patriotic enough, composed of “traitors,” and so forth, has been central to the three decades of Likud rule.

The strategy is not particularly Israeli. The US Right, for example, uses it as well–recall Sarah Palin, or how Republicans portrayed John Kerry as “French.” But in Israel it contributes directly to preserving the centrality of colonization in the national identity. Thus it has made the deepening of colonization the condition of possibility of the neoliberal transformation that has swept Israel towards its current position as the second-most-unequal developed economy.  

Although the #J14 phenomenon was unprecedented in numbers and spread of participation, it was not altogether without precedent. Some noted the similarity with the post-war protest wave that swept Israel in 1974. It is an apt comparison, particularly because it provides no reason to dismiss the 2012 protests as insignificant. Although it was not obvious at the time, the 1974 protest wave marked the beginning of the end of Labor hegemony. Like #J14, those protests emerged from bourgeois, Ashkenazi middle class circles, and were self-consciously “apolitical,” even though the anger captured was much broader and more popular protests have both preceded and exceeded it–most notably, the Black Panthers movement in the early 1970s. Like #J14, they were followed by the overnight success of a new center party, Dash. The new center, however, was short lived. It was Likud that eventually emerged to consolidate the new hegemony.

The social protests, the shrinking of the traditional parties, the widespread sense of revulsion at the political class, the loss of faith in politics, and the very repetition of the seventies’ pattern raise the question: have we entered the twilight of the Great Likud Pact, that combination of neo-liberalism for the upper classes and rampant colonization in the occupied Palestinian Territories for the Israeli-Jewish masses that has defined hegemony in Israel for over thirty years?

Perhaps, but with the provision that we are at the very beginning. The international situation in the 1980s, marked by the exhaustion of post-war social democracy, the emergence of neoliberalism, and the evolution of total US dominance in the Middle East after the defeat of Arab nationalism facilitated the development of Likud hegemony. The global configuration is today markedly different in a way that exerts pressure on both wings of the pact. American power is in slow decline. Neoliberalism is in a global cul-de-sac with profitability unable to recover, anemic growth and financial instability in the core countries, and rebellions and civil wars in the periphery.

In Israel too, it was the end of neoliberalism’s ability to provide upward mobility to the Ashkenazi middle classes that prompted the Rothschild encampment. On top of the persistent civil resistance of Palestinians themselves, the upheavals in Egypt and Syria are also exerting pressure on the occupation: even if, thus far, the risk has remained theoretical, they raise doubts about the long-term viability of Israel’s military strategy, which links the unhindered repression of Palestinians to the security cooperation of autocratic and Western-dominated Arab regimes. Just as ominous is the erosion of Israel’s international status. Whereas in the South support for Palestinians has never wavered, majorities in Europe now consider Israel as much a threat to world peace as North Korea and Iran. The “peace dividends” that Israel received during the long Likud reign, from the US-imposed peace with Egypt and Jordan through the Oslo process, are petering out, returning Israel to the status of an international pariah. At the United Nations, various figures, from Roger Waters to General Assembly secretary Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann openly advocate boycott of the state–and the growing BDS movement has reached the point that it is the thing to attack.

Furthermore, the growing alienation of US Jews from their decidedly illiberal co-religionists – a development which many in Israel consider an “existential” threat – is increasingly noted, and various attempts have recently emerged to capitalize on it, such as J Street, and also Peter Beinart’s call for a “Zionist” boycott. In Israel, Livni sought to build her image as the leader who could restore Israel’s international respect. Indeed, it was the main theme of her 2013 campaign. Nevertheless, for some time Israel has enjoyed a certain grace period, primarily because its location as a Western outpost on the frontier of “asymmetrical” wars and its insecurity industry allow it to cash in on the global difficulties of neoliberalism, and also because its own settler-colonial structures provide a cushion against radical social movements. But global processes will not remain external to Israel for long.

Quite rightly, few have missed an opportunity to criticize the “apolitical” nature of the #J14 phenomenon, especially the refusal to address the occupation and the delusional desire to eschew political choices and the inevitable confrontations and decisions that follow from them–although too facile a dismissal had its own problems, too easily reproducing the perspective of the elite instead of recognizing the social roots of the protests, as well as the real, although not central, participation of Israel’s Palestinian citizens.

But political mistakes are always rooted in concrete experience. While the “apolitical” current which frequently dominated #J14 reflected both the consensual racism that pervades Israel as well as the shallowness of the political consciousness of the majority of the people involved, the rejection of the political was also rooted in a particular experience of politics–that of thirty years of Likud hegemony. During that span, “right” and “left,” instead of being expressions of real political divergences, have operated as two sets of racialized clichés that co-produce the same regime and the same social order–Jewish, white, Ashkenazi, capitalist. In this co-production, the Right, depending on whom you ask, is either “warm and authentically Jewish,” or “stupid and backward,” and the “Left” depending on whom you ask, is either “enlightened and civilized,” or “detached, foreign-funded and rootless.” It was to the extent that #J14 was able to suspend for an hour this political spectacle that it posed an epochal challenge to the hegemonic order.

Ultimately, however, such a suspension must be temporary. Without the articulation of another political matrix, it produces nothing. Put to the test, it produced Yair Lapid–nothingness made flesh.

If a key foundation of Likudism is the identification of “the Left” as an alien threat to Israel’s existence, the 2013 elections were notable by the relative unimportance of the question of security. One can read that–correctly–as another proof of the general, racist banality of the occupation, something which no longer bothers Israelis. But another thing that must be noted about Israel’s recent murder spree in Gaza, undoubtedly also an elections stunt, is that it did not seem to have worked. Appearing “tough” on security neither stopped the bleeding from the ruling coalition nor set the agenda for the public sphere. The “social issues” dominated, although in profoundly centrist formulations.

Lapid’s slogan of “defending the middle classes” set the tone. Even Netanyahu tried to impress the electorate with his social consciousness. Yet the old “left” parties that had expected to capitalize on the prominence of social issues raised by #J14 mostly failed to do so. Labor, despite the leadership of Shelly Yachimovich, who is identified with “social” issues, the inclusion of two of the leaders of #J14, Stav Shafir and Itzik Shmuli, and despite dumping the “peace” issue and making nice with settlers, fell way short of expectations. Hadash, which in contrast really is a left party, gained nothing. Only Meretz grew significantly, but not in a way that changed the broad balance of forces, and probably mostly at the expense of Labor. That the centrality of “social issues” damaged the Right but largely failed to benefit the “Left” reaffirms the critical and so far enduring aspect of #J14’s rejection of politics.

It was Yair Lapid’s new party, promising undefined “change,” that benefited most. Lapid echoed the rhetoric of the summer protests, but his basic frame of mind is neoliberal. Thus his actual political leanings cannot explain his success in benefitting from the agenda set by the protests. Rather, his greatest assets are two that contradict each other: his empty and strongly apolitical record as a brand-name and celebrity–which makes him the personification of the rejection of old politics and the political class as a whole–and his whiteness, which represents the continuity and the stability of the social order and of the same political class. In Israel, the electoral dog whistle of the latter is attacking the alleged “parasitism” or failure “to share the burden” of the orthodox religious parties, and in turn the need to compel religious Jews to work and cease subsidies to them. That rhetoric is also dosed with a good deal of “equal,” and doubly racist, demands that Palestinians “share the burden,” as well as racism towards Mizrahim–some of it quite nakedly obvious.

That ticket is not new. Centrist, un- or under-acknowledged “white power” parties in this vein have periodically emerged on Israeli electoral territory. Other centrist parties, such as Kadima, Labor and Meretz, also occasionally fish in the same waters. No party in that vein, however, has been as successful as Lapid’s, if only because of the weakness of the established parties. It is not his emergence, in and of itself, that is remarkable, but the conjuncture that allows him to capitalize on the growing hollowness of the existing hegemony and simultaneously to express and preserve it.

Beyond the appeal of whiteness and anti-religious bigotry, Lapid is a purveyor of fantasy solutions to all that bothers his voters. His foreign policy is “peace,” based on building walls so that Palestinians stay separate and invisible. His economic policy is to provide social justice and welfare through increasing market “competitiveness,” to close the revolving doors between wealth and political power by recruiting to his party a Shabak head who is also a former bank CEO, and to lower the prices of apartments while strengthening the Israeli banks that speculate in real estate. In short, he stands for the promise that Israel’s deepening crisis can be healed painlessly, and, in particular, without upsetting the structures of class and race domination. As fantasy, the party has nowhere to go except to crush and burn. Unlike the Likud it seeks to replace, it does not yet represent a working hegemonic project. Instead, it represents a denial that the difficulties of Likud’s hegemonic project require new political choices. It speaks to the fears of the white Ashkenazi middle class that it courted, but provides no workable way to bring their interests either into conflict or into collaboration with other social sectors. In that, it is faithful to #J14, both to its yearning for a new common ground, one that ditches the “security” based distinction between “left” and right–a distinction that was not a real political difference but the identitarian underpinning of Likud hegemony—and to its failure to actually offer one, primarily because of the limitations of that movement’s leadership’s whiteness.

As the very emergence of the Likud Pact in the wake of social protests reveals, there is no guarantee that the sunset of Likud’s hegemonic project will lead Israel in a more progressive direction. The inherent weakness of the Left, a legacy of settler-colonialism, points in the opposite direction. On the other hand, the direction of worldwide trends, and the growth of social movements globally and in the region, could be a backwind to any social movement that manages to break the mold. It would therefore be a shame if we let the elections’ results dictate that we only speak of nothingness. So I want to end with two proposals on the margins of Israel’s electoral map, possessing exactly that which #J14 lacked: clear ideas for a real, political common ground, for a real rather than imaginary basis for new political formation and subjectivities. It should not be surprising that both proposals come from the Palestinian sector in Israel, and both find their best articulators in Palestinian women. It should also not be surprising that these proposals have few followers in Israel. But unlike Lapid’s, that negativity is positively charged.

2.

Asma Aghbaria-Zahalka is the Yaffa-born head of a tiny radical-left party, Da’am, with its own trade union. The party drew less than 4,000 votes in the 2013 elections, although she was prominent enough to be featured in Ha’aretz. She started attracting wide attention, however, at least within the small circle of the Left in Israel, when she made an angry impromptu speech after a working class Palestinian speaker was kept off the stage by the organizers of a “social” protest last summer.

Aghbaria-Zahalka proposes a united workers’ struggle against the ruling class. It comes close to sounding simplistic, even naive. It comes even closer to sounding like pandering to Zionism and to her Jewish-Israeli, mostly Ashkenazi, supporters–particularly since she sometimes expresses her criticism of other Palestinians in ways that seem to make light of the critical importance of national and racial identities in the context of Israeli racism and colonialism. Part of this impression can be ascribed to sentences being taken out of context. But another part is undoubtedly an expression of the perils of the strategy itself, which includes within it a voluntaristic élan that rhymes with the ethos of Zionism itself.

Yet in the speech that has come to define her there is none of that. Her argument, directly addressing the organizers of #J14, cuts to the essence: without working-class Palestinians and working-class Jews at its very political center, no protest movement in Israel will amount to much. Palestinians are the key, not only to Palestinian liberty, but to the liberation of Jews in Israel and to their future in the Middle East.

Aghbaria-Zahalka is not “joining” Jewish protests against the cost of living. She asserts the necessity of her leading them and articulating their demands, and in the broadest, most universal way possible precisely because she is a Palestinian woman and not the “universal,” bourgeois subject of the cottage protest. For example, in taking the originally Arab, appropriated in Israel, revolutionary slogans such as “the people want...” and inflecting them with her own Palestinian, female subject of the enunciation, she subsumes a critique of Israeliness–as exclusionary, white, Jewish, and privileged–within a queering of it that posits a new political entity-to-be, a “people” that can emerge from the struggle for equality, instead of being torn apart, manipulated, and ultimately defeated by the inequalities each sector in it wants to preserve. In that she offers the widespread anger brewing in Israel the vision and the political language that it lacks, but also a mirror of its limitations. For the paradox is that to successfully meet the conditions for joint struggle, Israelis who wish to change their society need to overcome the barrier of accepting the leadership of a woman and a Palestinian. And Aghbaria-Zahalka’s undeniable charisma has only got her so far. So far.

In the run-up to the elections Ha’aretz presented Aghbaria-Zahalka as the very opposite of Hanin Zoabi from Balad. There are significant differences between them which I do not wish to minimize. But despite appearances, there are some similarities worth noting in Balad and Zoabi’s strategy in defining their relations to the dominant Israeli identity, and therefore also in the implicit and explicit ways they propose common grounds. One can start with the election clip that got a lot of attention.

In the clip, Israel’s most racist Knesset members are singing and dancing the Zionist national anthem of Israel to a popular Arab tune. Israel’s elections committee censored the clip, describing it as “insulting” the national symbol. It is a reading that has the virtue of pigeonholing Balad in the discursive slot that most serves Israeli politicians, the position of the Arab who is “disloyal,” offensive, hating Jews, whose very outrages serve to define the boundaries of the community. But at least a few Israeli spectators read it differently, as an intervention in an Israeli-Jewish field. And it takes a moment’s reflection to see why. Rather than insulting, the content of the clip can be read as utopian. It can be a proposal for an Israeliness that is at home in the Middle East–no longer colonial, no longer based on the domination of European culture, less pompous, and crucially, no longer illegitimate. And what is more, it is “Hatikva” sung to music that is also the music of a plurality of Israeli Jews. Is there a more visible – or perhaps more audible–way to bridge the gaping disconnect between the symbolic realm of the state and the lived experience of the citizen that #J14 laid bare? Instead of reading it only as biting satire, and without denying its literal and essential meaning as mocking the politics of the Israeli right, I suggest that the image of the Moldovan Lieberman moving to the tune of an Arab dance party is also the stuff of comic denouement. It is, in that respect, akin to the marriage scene at the end of comedy, in which social contradictions are resolved, but here with the original hierarchy subverted.

Let me preempt complaints that this is too strong or willful a reading by quoting from Zoabi’s pre-election profile in Ha’aretz. In it, she makes the point that

Israelis do not know what loving one’s homeland means... To love one’s homeland is to love and respect its history and its native people. Those who love their homeland do not uproot trees and do not construct ugly walls and do not destroy the natural landscape. This isn’t love. This is a project of domination that comes to say, “we are the masters and we want to erase the other entity that is here, and has been here earlier.” I think most Arabs accept and are fine with the fact that Jews live in the country. The problem is the Jews are not fine with the presence of Palestinians. Those who don’t accept Palestinians as part of the place and don’t embrace the fact that here is not Europe, let them go back to Europe.

...In the platform we stress the place of the victim because that is where we are coming from, not because we want to eliminate the other side whose place is safe anyway and does not need to be redefined. We believe in the self-determination of the Jewish collective that was created here, and that has unique cultural attributes, language and identity.

To be more explicit: there is a real but deeply flawed Jewish national collective in Israel, which suffers from a congenital inability to belong to the land it claims as its homeland. The implication is that its only hope to overcome that inability is the mediation of Palestinians. Palestinian nationalism is not the enemy of Jewish-Israeli nationalism, but in fact, through decolonization, the condition of its becoming.

If there is a future for social movements in Israel, it will be on the bass of proposals such as these, coming from Palestinians. The alternative is Yair Lapids all the way down—or worse.

O.I.L. Media Roundup (30 January)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Occupation, Intervention, and Law and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the O.I.L. Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each biweekly roundup to OIL@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every other week]

News

"UN Expert Investigates US Drone Attacks, Targeted Killings that Involve Civilian Casualties," Associated Press
The AP reports on the special investigation by Ben Emmerson, the UN rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights, into the legality of drone warfare and targeted killings as used by the United States.

State Department Defends Commitment to Closing Down Guantanamo Prison,” Julian Pecquet
The State Department has indicated closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility remains a priority for the Obama Administration, despite the recent reassignment of Daniel Fried, the Administration’s special envoy for the closure of the facility, to a position in the State Department related to sanctions policy.

Iraqi Men Sentenced in Kentucky Terrorism Case,” Brett Barrouquere
Mohanad Shareef Hammadi and Waad Ramadan Alwan, two Iraqi men convicted of participating in a plot to send weaponry and funding to Iraqi insurgents, have been sentenced to life and 40 years in prison, respectively. Alwan’s lighter sentence was described by U.S. Attorney David Hale as a result of his cooperation with investigators. Hammadi’s lawyer is reportedly planning an appeal for his client.

Israel Skips U.N. Review on Rights, a New Move,” Nick Cumming-Bruce
The New York Times reports Israel has become the first country to withdraw from cooperating in the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Period Review process, shunning efforts of the United Nations and United States to persuade it to participate.   

"Abbas to Israel: Let in Palestinians Fleeing Syria," Reuters
Reuters reports on the efforts of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to persuade Israel to allow 150,00 Palestinian refugees fleeing Syria to settle in the West Bank--an effort Abbas dropped after the Israeli government requested Palestine relinquish the right of return.

"Former Libyan Spy Chief Could Face Execution Soon, Lawyer Fears," Marlise Simons
The lawyer of Abdullah al-Senussi, Muammar el-Qaddafi's intelligence chief, has contacted the International Criminal Court urging an intervention to prevent the execution of his client over concerns about the fairness of the trial. The ICC has responded by issuing an order for Libya to turn al-Senussi  to the Hague for trial.

"U.S. Expands Aid to French Mission in Mali," Ernesto Londoño
The Washington Post reports on the Pentagon's announcement that it will expand US assistance for the French intervention in Mali by offering aerial refueling and transport planes, as well as reports that the assistance is legal because of France's assertion that the Mali government requested the intervention.

"Britain Lists Israel Next to Iran as Nation with Human Rights Record 'Of Concern,'" Phoebe Greenwood
The United Kingdom has included Israel alongside Afghanistan, Iran, and Zimbabwe as countries the government considers "of concern" with regards to enforcement of human rights, citing Israel's most recent military assault on the Gaza Strip and recent and plans to expand settlements in the West Bank as particularly unsettling violations.

"Gitmo Prosecutor's Rejected Memo Released," Josh Gerstein
Gerstein, of Politico, reports that a memo has leaked in which Brig. Gen. Mark Martins, chief prosecutor for the Guantanamo military commissions, requests the convening authority for the commissions drop the conspiracy charge against detainees charged with plotting the 9/11 attacks.  
 

Blogs

"Why It (Formally) Matters Whether Palestine Ratifies the Rome Statute," Kevin Jon Heller
Heller writes on Opinio Juris that while Palestine has no obligation to ratify the Rome Statute in order for the ICC to investigate Israeli crimes in the West Bank and Gaza, such an investigation will be easier to open the investigation if Palestine has ratified the statute due to the lack of a required Pre-Trial Chamber authorization.

"NATO's Detainee Dilemma in Afghanistan," David Bosco
Bosco reports on his blog for Foreign Policy that NATO's policy of transferring captured Taliban and other combatants to Afghan jails while advocating reform of detention practices in said jails may end soon over concerns about torture and other rights violations. 

"9/11 Defendants Seek to Preserve CIA Sites Where They Were Tortured," Spencer Ackerman
Ackerman, writing for WIRED's "The Danger Room", reports that defense lawyers for the 9/11 conspirators on trial are arguing for CIA "black sites" to remain open and unchanged from their conditions the conspirators were tortured under.  One lawyer describes the counterintuitive move as an attempt to treat the "black sites" as crime scenes, revealing evidence about the treatment of the conspirators while detained there.

"Droning On…" Stephen Walt
Walt responds to a recent NOVA documentary on drone warfare, praising the documentary for delving into the moral concerns of the use of drones.  He also writes that the United States' use of drones with impunity amounts to a "recipe for perpetual war" and argues that, though the program is often described as a success, the United States has ultimately failed to achieve all of its military objectives in recent wars in the Middle East.

"Would It Be Lawful For European (or other) States to Provide Arms to the Syrian Opposition?," Dapo Akande
Akande examines four arguments for the legality of Western states providing Syria's opposition with weapons on the European Journal of International Law Talk! blog, concluding none "provide a very strong basis" for the legality of such an action and that international law is often too underdeveloped to support even the strongest pro-arms arguments.

"Making History in Bab Al Shams," Abbas Sarsour
Sarsour, a Palestinian activist from Ramallah currently living in the United States, provides a first-hand account of the establishment of the Bab Al Shams protest encampment and the Israeli military's subsequent lockdown and encirclement of the area on Electronic Intifada.


Commentary

"Continental Shift," Gordon Adams
Adams argues in Foreign Policy that the United States' military involvement in Mali and Algeria's hostage crisis is endemic of a broader trend in the US focusing on military engagement where it once focused on development, governance, and other humanitarian interests.  Adams holds this shift holds dire consequences for the region, writing: "when security takes the lead, too often, governance and development step aside."

"Report from Beit Lahiya: Israel Continues to Break the Ceasefire in Gaza," Jenny Linnell
Mondoweiss reports that, while not a single rocket has been fired from Gaza since the 21 November 2012 ceasefire with Israel, four Palestinians have been killed and 80 have been injured at the hands of the Israeli military since then.  Jenny Linell warns that even in this context, any possible violence from Palestinians in the future will be viewed "in a vacuum" despite Israel's escalation.

"An Iraqi Massacre, a Light Sentence and a Question of Military Justice," Charlie Savage and Elisabeth Bumiller
Savage and Bumiller detail the collapse of the prosecution of a Marine responsible for a massacre of civilians in Hadith, Iraq, blaming prosecution errors for the surprising acquittal in addition to difficulties inherent in collecting evidence and locating key witnesses, and what Eugene R. Fidell of Yale Law School calls "an unwillingness in some cases of military personnel to convict their fellow soldiers in a battle space".

"Military Tribunals and International War Crimes," Charlie Savage
Savage, writing in The New York Times' Opinion Pages, details Brig. Gen. Mark S. Martins' dispute with the Department of Justice over the charging of 9/11 conspirators on trial with offenses not recognized under international law, namely that of "conspiracy," stressing the potential of the dispute's outcome to set an international legal precedent.

"France in Mali: The Long Durée of Imperial Blowback," Mark LeVine
LeVine writes for Al-Jazeera's Opinion Page that the current Malian crisis is a consequence of blowback from previous European interventions in Africa, and that the present intervention is likely to generate a great deal of its own blowback, prolonging a duration of violence likely to claim the lives of many.
 

Reports

"We Were Too Afraid to Stay on Our Farmlands," PCHR
The Palestinian Center for Human Rights issues a report on the vast economic hardships faced by Palestinian farmers displaced from their lands by fear of attack by Israeli military forces, even following the ceasefire agreement of 21 November 2012.


Conferences

"Embargoes and International Sanctions: Between Legality and Reality"; 1 February 2013; Faculté Libre de Droit, d'Economie et de Gestion de Paris; Contact here for information.

"Minorities: Between Marginality and Participation in the Middle East"; 8 May 2013; Oxford University; Submit proposals here.

"Second Palestine Solidarity Conference"; 10-12 May 2013; Stuttgart, Germany; Contact here for more information.
 

On Jadaliyya

"Mali in Focus, Part Three: A Dangerous Show of Force from a Former Colonial Power," Nicolas Borgeois 

"Parallel Walks in al-Khalil: A Photo Essay," Isis Nusair

"The Human Rights Situation in Egypt: An Interview with Aida Seif El-Dawla," Mark LeVine

"BADIL Proudly Announces the Release of its Report on Palestinian National Identity," Jadaliyya Reports

"Early Perspectives from Algeria on Northern Mali and French Intervention," Kal

"Focus sur le Mali, troisième partie: Une périlleuse démonstration de force de l'ancienne puissance coloniale," Nicolas Bourgeois

"Mali in Focus, Part Two: A War That Threatens the Entire Region," Hakim Addad

"Focus sur le Mali, deuxième partie: Une guerre qui menace toute la région," Hakim Addad

"Personal Status Litigation for Palestinians in Israel: A Controversial Issue (Jadal Issue 16, December 2012)," Jadaliyya Reports

"Infographic: Born at Qalandia Checkpoint," Visualizing Palestin

"Ramallah’s Bubbles," Kareem Rabie

Egypt Media Roundup (January 30)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.] 

“The end game for Port Said: Football case reveals new breadth of politics”
A detailed report from Port Said which reveals what goes beyond a football tragedy court case.

“Egypt: More violent, less political”
Sherine Tadros shares her perception of the volatile situation in Egypt after reporting from Suez.

“Arrests continue in Cairo”
More than forty people are arrested after clashes continue in Cairo a forth day.

“Opposition rejects Morsy’s call for dialogue”
The National Salvation Front refuses to join the dialogue for national consensus called for by the president.

“Suez Canal residents defy President Morsi's curfew”
Port Said, Suez and Ismailia residents stay out on the street after imposed curfew time, while shops and cafes remain open.

“President Morsi declares state of emergency in Suez Canal cities”
President imposes state of emergency on Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez and a curfew from 9pm to 6am.

“Political rift widens as Islamists and opposition forces swap accusations”
The opposition blames the presidency for the violence, while the Muslim Brotherhood says thugs are responsible for the clashes.

“Tahrir Square sexual assaults reported during anniversary clashes”
After three days of clashes on Tahrir Square, horror stories surface of gang sexual assaults on women.

“Health Ministry: Dozens killed, 1,139 injured in nationwide violence”
Port Said leads by the number of deaths after three days of violence across the country.

“Seven killed Sunday in Port Said mass funeral clashes”
Funeral for victims of the Saturday clashes in Port Said is attacked with gunfire.

“Port Said descends into chaos”
After death sentence verdict for twenty-one residents of Port Said in the football tragedy case, their families attack the prison to try to free them.

“21 Port Said football violence defendants sentenced to death”
Cairo court sentences twenty-one out of seventy-five defendants to death; none of the sentenced are police officers.

“Morsy addresses nation on Twitter”
After a day of silence on the second anniversary of the revolution, the president posts on Twitter his condolences to the families of those who died in the clashes between protesters and police.

“Live Updates: Protests, clashes all over the country on revolution's anniversary”
Big demonstrations in Egypt’s major cities mark the second anniversary of the January 25 Revolution.

“Morsi says ‘counter-revolution’ is obstructing Egypt's development”
In his speech marking the Prophet’s birthday, the president denounces forces of the former regime who are sabotaging efforts to pull the country out of the current crisis.

“Brotherhood: We will not be in Tahrir on revolution anniversary”
The Brothers instead will engage in community work.

“Ultras Ahlway’s first day of rage”
Al-Ahly’s Ultras stage a demonstration in Cairo ahead of court decision on Port Said football tragedy case.

“Brotherhood sec-general says Egypt's 'undemocratic' opposition losing street”
Mahmoud Hussein, secretary-general of the Muslim Brotherhood, addresses a variety of topics including the constitution, political opposition, relationship between the Brotherhood and the presidency, etc.

“University students withdraw from Popular Current”
Students leave the Popular Current after leaders refuse to listen to their demands.

“Egypt Two Years On”
Ibrahim Al-Amin says that the ongoing struggle between political groups in Egypt demonstrates that no one force has established a good enough grip on the country to last as long as Hosni Mubarak.

“The Second Anniversary of Tahrir Square Rising”
Richard Falk says that there is hope that the opposition and the government in Egypt will reach a compromise.

“The once and future Egypt”
Omar Kamel talks about how the revolution developed for the past two years and how recently the composition of protest movements has changed.

“Morsy: Elections to take place sometime in three, four months”
The president announces that the elections have been postponed for a few months.

“Emerging Political Alliances on the Second Anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution”
Sinem Adar reflects on how the configuration of alliances between the main players on the political scene in Egypt have changed.

“Alber Saber: Brotherhood will drive the people to secularism”
Atheist blogger who was convicted for contempt of religion says he did not want to leave Egypt. 

“Rights group: Morsy files record number of defamation charges”
The presidency files twenty-four defamation lawsuits for the first seven months of its term.

“FJP predicts winning 55% of parliamentary seats in next elections”
Despite expected stiff competition at the upcoming elections, the Muslim Brotherhood’s party hopes to take majority of seats in the parliament.

“Former interior minister returns LE1 million he took in gifts”
Habib El-Adly returns one-million-worth of gifts he received from Al-Ahram newspaper.

 

In Arabic:

“النائب العام يأمر بضبط وإحضار أعضاء «بلاك بلوك» ومن ينضم إليها”
The Prosecutor General orders the arrest of members of the Black Bloc.

“لماذا يقتل «مرسى» المصريين..؟!”
Alaa Al-Aswany writes that Islamists don’t see the election of Mohamed Morsi a democratic process, but rather victory over the “enemies of Islam.”

“«أبو الفتوح»: على المعارضة أن تتطهر من النظام القديم.. و«الإخوان» عبء على مرسي”
Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh calls on the Suez cities to respect the curfew imposed by the president.

“بعد حضوره الحوار مع الرئيس.. أيمن نور: المطلب الوحيد الذى لم يتم التعقيب عليه هو تشكيل حكومة إنقاذ وطنى”
After attending the national dialogue initiative of the president, Ayman Nour that there was no discussion of a new government of national salvation.

“«الشرعية للحقوق والإصلاح» تشكل «جبهة إسلامية» لمواجهة العنف”
The Organization for Rights and Reform meet to form an Islamic Front to tackle the ongoing violence.

“قرار جمهوري باعتبار ضحايا مذبحة بورسعيد من شهداء الثورة”
President Mohamed Morsi issues a state decree to include the victims of the Port Said football incident in the list of revolutionary martyrs, giving them their families the right to financial compensation.

“"إرشاد الإخوان" يقرر عدم التظاهر بالتحرير فى 25 يناير”
The Muslim Brotherhood decides not to participate on Tahrir Square in the demonstrations commemorating the second anniversary of the revolution.

“مستشار الرئيس: ابتعدنا عن «الإخوان» لاعتراضنا على نهج «الاستحواذ»”
Leader of Salafi Al-Nour Party says meeting with the National Salvation Front was not in connection with the elections.

“النيابة تقرر ضبط وإحضار الضابط المتهم بقتل ضحية شبرا الخيمة”
The prosecution arrests the police officer responsible for killing a resident of Shobra El-Kheima, which resulted in violent protests and more deaths last week.

“«الإخوان»: القوى السياسية رفضت التحالف معنا فى الانتخابات.. ولن نستجدى أحداً”
The Muslim Brotherhood says that they won’t form a coalition with any other party for the elections after negotiations with Ghad Al-Thawra, Al-Wasat, and Al-Hadara Parties fail.

“«برهامي»: التحالف مع «الإخوان» مستحيل.. و«كوتة المرأة» مخالفة للشرع والدستور”
Salafi leader says Al-Nour Party will not form a collation with the Freedom and Justice Party for the elections.

 

Recent Jadaliyya articles on Egypt:

Another Year of Rage
The violence between protesters and security forces since the revolution is not a vendetta battle, but a war between the Egyptians and the state.

A Nation Derailed
Adel Iskandar writes about the significance of the train crash tragedy that happened just eleven days before the second anniversary of the revolution.

The Gendered Body Public: Egypt, Sexual Violence and Revolution
Maya Mikdashi warns of de-gendering the Arab uprisings and ignoring the violence that women face in them.

The Meaning of Revolution: On Samira Ibrahim
Sherene Seikaly tells the story of Samira Ibrahim, a victim of forced virginity tests performed by the army, who fought back defying state and societal pressure.

حالة الإسلاميين في مصر بعد عامين على الثورة
Khalil Al-Anani analyzes the effect of the past two years since the revolution on the Islamists in Egypt.

The Revolution Will Not Be Celebrated
To commemorate the second anniversary of the January 25 Revolution, Jadaliyya presents a number of important pieces that put the past two years in context.

Was There A January 25 Revolution?
Joel Beinin argues that the popular uprising in Egypt of 2011 was outmaneuvered by the army and the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore, a revolution has not yet occurred.

Brothers and Officers: A History of Pacts
Wael Eskandar traces the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood the pre-January 25 state and army.

Meet AbdelRahman Mansour Who Made 25 January A Date to Remember
Linda Herrera tells the story of AbdelRahman Mansour, the co-admin of the We Are All Khalid Said page and the person to choose January 25 as a day for mass anti-Mubarak protest.

التحرير لامركزية الميدان
Mahmoud Salah talks about the significance of the square in bringing together Egyptians.

The Dramaturgy of A Street Corner
Mona Abaza writes about the evolution of street art covering the walls of Mohamed Mahmoud Street.

The Revolution and History
Paul Sedra argues that the January 25 Revolution has made it necessarily to revisit Egyptian history and review with reference to Egypt’s new reality.

مستقبل السلفيين السياسي ماذا بعد الشريعة؟
Islam Mohamed Abdel-Bari gives Pakistan as example of the trajectory of declining popularity of Political Islam and discusses whether this situation would repeat as well in Egypt.

Alexandria Re-Imagined: The Revolution through Art
Amro Ali explores flourishing street art in Alexandria and talks to local artists.

عــامـــان عـلــى 25 يـنــايــــر فــي مصــــر مـكـــــامــــــن الــقــصــــــور فـــي الــثـــــــورة
Reflecting back on the revolution, Aly El Raggal says that it did not manage to change power relations on the lower levels of the power hierarchy.

"Tahrir," My Revolution
Samar Media’s series of videos with Egyptians who share their thoughts on the revolution and what it meant to them.

New Texts Out Now: Paolo Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism
An interview with Paolo Gerbaudo about his new book, coupled with some exclusive excerpts.

The Human Rights Situation in Egypt: An Interview with Aida Seif El-Dawla
An interview with Aida Seif El-Dawla, Executive Director of the al-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence from the end of 2011.

“I Have The Picture!” Egypt’s Photographic Heritage between Neoliberalism and Digital Reproduction (Part II)
The second part of Lucie Ryzova’s essay on Egypt’s photographic heritage, the challenges in preserving it, and the main actors interested in it.

QIZ: Egyptian Jeans Under the Patronage of the Muslim Brotherhood
A translation of Wael Gamal’s piece on the QIZ agreement between Egypt, Israel, and the US.

The Opposition’s Lost Bet on the Economic Crisis

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Egypt faces a severe economic crisis that has not been seen since the late 1980s, when the country was on the verge of bankruptcy.

The budget deficit soared to almost LE100 billion in the first half of the current fiscal year, and is expected to exceed LE 200 billion by its end in July 2013. This means it will hover at about thirteen percent of the gross domestic product.

In the meantime, the already meager foreign reserves keep dwindling at an alarming rate. Doubts are cast on the country’s short-term ability to finance basic imports, such as fuels and foodstuff, while still serving its foreign debt. And it is noteworthy that the country’s credit rating has been recently downgraded, despite the ratification of the Constitution.

This deteriorating economic condition warns of a sweeping wave of social unrest that could deal a blow to the newly elected Islamist ruling elite. Yet this is not to assume that their detractors in the National Salvation Front (NSF) are to benefit from an Islamist showdown, given their inability to formulate a genuine discourse that could handle economic and social grievances.

The only way hitherto envisaged by the ruling party and other technocratic circles has been foreign borrowing. According to the international cooperation minister, Egypt needs US$14 billion to $15 billion in loans to fix its pressing fiscal and economic problems.

However, despite the dire need for foreign finance, the International Monetary Fund loan agreement has been indefinitely suspended following the government’s inability to apply the tax increases and subsidy reductions last December. It seems that the government is not politically capable of effecting the minimal requirements for fiscal restructuring.

Hence, no creditor is willing to pump money to finance an ever-widening deficit, with the exception of Qatar, for clear political purposes.

In such a troubled context, the parliamentary elections approach. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ability to keep things as they are and avoid any painful measures in the few months preceding the elections is doubtful.

Bear in mind that President Mohamed Morsy opted for signing the initial agreement with the IMF as early as November. The government was hoping to reach a final agreement in December so as to disburse the first tranche in January. All are signs that the fiscal situation in Egypt is unsustainable, even in the short term.

Moreover, the very fact that Morsy issued austerity measures amid the crushing political crisis of last December is another clear sign of the government’s dire need to conclude the IMF loan and start receiving foreign funding. Even though Qatar has stepped in, depositing $5 billion in the Central Bank of Egypt, the maintenance of the current fiscal deficit is unsustainable.

Given the economic hardships and the imminent austerity measures, the anti-Islamist opposition has put high hopes on the economic crisis. Many in the opposition camp are counting on the Brotherhood’s loss of popularity and on the final and long-anticipated explosion of the socioeconomic crisis in the face of the ruling Brothers.

How sound is this bet? It appears that the opposition’s betting on securing direct political gains from the economic crisis is ungrounded for many reasons. To start with, the opposition parties and groups have hardly developed any strong organizational links with the burgeoning independent labor movement.

The NSF, the biggest opposition coalition, remains heavily reliant on the support of urban-middle and upper-middle classes. The front’s political platform barely contains genuine social and economic elements.

Rather, the coalition’s main investment has been in an identity-based discourse that is based on some vaguely defined Egyptian essence against the Brothers’ Islamist propaganda. As for the deteriorating economic situation, the front’s stance has been by and large opportunistic and myopic, with very little alternatives given to austerity measures.

The NSF has proved to be no more than an anti-Islamist coalition that lacks any internal harmony. It has no comprehensive idea about the country’s socioeconomic ordeal.

So far, the powers composing the NSF have taken different economic stances. Whereas the Nasserists have shown populist leanings that are hardly sustainable, the liberals preferred to keep silent on austerity measures and the IMF loan.

Given the limitations of the NSF, any socioeconomic explosion is not likely to yield direct political gains to the anti-Brotherhood opposition, despite the fact that the Brothers are in an extremely bad situation. There is a fair chance that Egypt will witness a new wave of sociopolitical violence similar to that of January 1977.

The only difference is that such social rioting will probably take place against a weak and unconsolidated political regime, a police force that is in shambles and an army that is aloof from direct intervention.

But these forms of protest will hardly be of use to the anti-Islamist opposition, which has neither the discourse nor the organizational capacity to benefit from the looming social unrest. The potential riots are likely to be a pure loss for the broadest spectrum of the new political elites, be they ruling Islamists or secular and liberal opponents.

Worse, bread riots and social violence may bring the opposition and the Islamists together with the remnants of the authoritarian state — the police, the military and the judiciary — to establish some type of proto-fascist order in the name of social stability.

[This article originally appeared in Egypt Independent.]

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