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Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (January 22)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.] 

Regional and International Relations 

Egypt lawyer Gizawi to get jail and lashes in Saudi Arabia A news report on the sentencing of the Egyptian human rights lawyer on charges of “drug trafficking,” on BBC.

Obama meets new Saudi interior minister at White House A news report on the meeting between Barack Obama and Prince Mohammed bin Nayef at the White House, on Reuters.

Readout of the President’s Meeting with Saudi Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayef A statement posted on the website of the White House on the meeting between Obama and Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in the Oval Office.

Behind UAE Detentions, Fears of a Transnational Brotherhood Plot Rori Donaghy writes on the treatment of seventy-seven Emirati men arrested in July and the intimidation of their wives, and argues that this treatment reflects the authorities’ fear of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, on Al-Akhbar English.

Saudi Arabia to grant $100m to Palestinians A news report on the financial grant made by Saudi Arabia to the Palestinian government, which is struggling financially after Israel decided to withhold Palestinian tax revenues, on Al Jazeera English.

Reports and Opinions

Executed Sri Lankan maid’s mother refuses Saudi money A news report on the refusal of Rizana Nafeek’s mother to take money from Saudi well-wishers, in The Daily Star. 

Brookings’ Bruce Riedel urges intensified US support for Saudi despots Glenn Greenwald analyzes a memorandum to President Obama written by Bruce Riedel, a thirty-year veteran of the CIA and currently a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, urging the support of “the world’s last absolute monarchy,” in The Guardian. 

Repression in the Gulf: A mirage of rights An article on the political scenes in Gulf states, in The Economist.

Saudi women on Shura Council Rashid Abul-Samh analyzes King Abdullah’s decree to appoint thirty women to the Shura Council, in Al-Ahram Weekly.

Crisis in Yemen

At least 13 militants killed in Yemen in blast and drone attack A news report on the death of ten suspected al-Qaida bomb makers in a house, and of three “militants” in drone strikes, on Reuters.

End of assassinations in Yemen? Nasser Arrabyee speculates whether the arrest of a terrorist cell and the trial of ten al-Qaeda suspects, who are thought to be responsible for the wave of assassinations of soldiers and officers last year in Yemen, will put an end to assassinations, in Al-Ahram Weekly. 

Arabic


Focus sur le Mali, troisième partie: Une périlleuse démonstration de force de l'ancienne puissance coloniale

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[Cet article est le troisième d'une série de trois, avec des perspectives différentes sur les développements au Mali. Les articles précédents - « Mali in Focus, Part One: The Jihadist Offensive Revisited » et « Focus sur le Mali, deuxième partie: Une guerre qui menace toute la région » ]

Large consensus politique sur la scène politique intérieure, soutien de la communauté internationale, urgence de la situation face à l'avancée rapide des milices islamistes, tout à première vue concourt à justifier l'intervention militaire française au Mali. Derrière la prétendue légitimité de « l'opération Serval », se dévoilent cependant des zones d'ombre et des contradictions inhérentes à la responsabilité de la France dans cette situation de crise, à l'inconsistance des objectifs défendus et aux conséquences potentiellement désastreuses pour l'ensemble de la zone sahélienne d'un tel engagement militaire.

La « demande d'intervention » malienne

Premier élément de justification de l'intervention militaire française au Mali déclenchée le 11 janvier, la demande expresse lancée la veille par les autorités maliennes d'une aide militaire face à l'offensive du groupe islamiste Ansar Eddine dirigé par Iyad Ag Ghaly, avec l'appui d'éléments Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) et du Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), sur la localité de Konna en direction du sud du pays. 

Il est indéniable que la France ne peut être accusée d'avoir agi uniquement sur sa propre initiative, puisqu'elle a répondu directement à la sollicitation du président malien par intérim Dioncoundra Traoré, formulée dans une lettre adressée au secrétaire général des Nations unies Ban Ki-moon et au président français François Hollande. 

Cet argument, qui part du postulat de la légitimité de Dioncoundra Traoré, élude cependant tout questionnement sur la représentativité et le poids politique réels du président par intérim, dans un contexte de transition démocratique troublé. Une frange importante de la société civile et de la classe politique malienne considère en effet que Dioncoundra Traoré est illégitime dans la mesure où il demeure « otage » des militaires.

Dans les jours précédant, les premières frappes aériennes françaises, Bamako était en ébullition et les institutions maliennes au bord d'un nouveau renversement. Les groupes politiques qui soutiennent l'ancienne junte du capitaine Sanogo avaient lancé une série de manifestations fortement suivies, en faveur de l'organisation d'une concertation nationale dont le but était de remettre en question le pouvoir intérimaire. Ils affirmaient en outre leur hostilité à une intervention militaire extérieure, appelant à la reprise du Nord par la seule armée malienne. 

Comme l'a noté l'envoyé spécial du journal Le Monde à Bamako, le pouvoir officiel paraissait alors sur le point de chuter. « Le renversement des fragiles autorités locales que dirige Dioncounda Traoré semblait “pratiquement programmé”, selon un proche du président. Selon la même source, des militaires auraient même envisagé d'arrêter ce dernier dans la nuit du 9 au 10 janvier, la veille de la prise de Konna par la coalition islamiste », écrit Jean-Philippe Rémy du Monde. Ces éléments, s'ils sont confirmés, favoriseraient l'interprétation de l'intervention française comme un moyen de préserver in extremis un régime contesté mais néanmoins favorable à une action militaire extérieure. 

Les partisans de la guerre menée par la France ont également tendance à occulter que malgré les résistances et les manifestations d'hostilité contre les « bandits armés » et les « terroristes », il se pourrait comme l'ont suggéré plusieurs chercheurs, que dans le nord du Mali, « le soutien populaire aux islamistes soit plus profond qu'on ne l'imagine ». Les relations entre les populations et les différentes groupes islamistes sont généralement considérés sous le seul aspect de l'oppression religieuse, des exactions, tortures et autres violations des droits de l'Homme dont sont responsables les militants radicaux. Il n'en demeure pas moins que les modes d'organisation politique et religieuse introduits par les groupes djihadistes, ainsi que la redistribution économique des ressources issues de la contrebande et des trafics, a pu être perçu par les populations du Nord comme un élément d'ordre, de justice et de stabilité dans des zones totalement laissées en déshérence par le pouvoir central malien.

Une interprétation discutable de la résolution du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies

Sur le plan du droit international, la justification de l'intervention française découle d'une interprétation de la résolution 2085 des Nations unies adoptée 22 décembre 2012, autorisant le déploiement d'une force militaire multilatérale, la Mission internationale de soutien au Mali (Misma) mobilisée sous l'égide de la Communauté économique des Etats d'Afrique de l'Ouest (Cédéao). 

Malgré le soutien officiel affiché par la communauté internationale et les membres du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, deux éléments de divergence entre l'action entreprise par la France et l'esprit originel de cette résolution onusienne peuvent être constatés. D'une part, la résolution 2085 stipulait initialement, selon le ministère français des Affaires étrangères, que l'opération « sera conduite avec des troupes combattantes exclusivement africaines et une forte mobilisation de l'Union européenne sur les plans financier et logistique ». Or, le déclenchement prématuré de l'opération par la France implique que ce sont actuellement les seules troupes françaises qui participent aux combats, venues en renfort d'une armée malienne mise en déroute à plusieurs reprises par les combattants islamistes. Les modalités de l'intervention française continueront donc à sortir du strict cadre de la résolution 2085, tant que la force multilatérale de la Cédéao n'aura pas été déployée sur le terrain.

D'autre part, il est important de rappeler que la résolution 2085 était axée en priorité vers la progression des négociations politiques et la mise en place d'un processus de dialogue et de réconciliation, parallèlement au déploiement militaire. Il est clair que l'opération française, justifiée sur le coup par « l'urgence de la situation », impose de facto la priorité à la gestion de la crise par la force, et relègue à l'arrière-plan la perspective d'une solution politiquement négociée. La complexité de la situation dans le Nord-Mali et l'imbrication des enjeux liés aux différentes revendications des groupes islamistes et touaregs se trouve ainsi caricaturalement réduite dans le discours officiel à une opposition frontale entre la France et « les terroristes », avec lesquels aucune négociation n'est envisagée. 

Quelle légitimité politique ? 

Dès le déclenchement par l'armée française de « l'opération Serval », un consensus s'est dessiné sur la scène politique intérieure française. Les représentants des partis de la majorité de gauche (PS) et de l'opposition de droite (UMP), ainsi que le centre (MoDem) et l'extrême droite (FN) ont majoritairement soutenu l'initiative de François Hollande. La plupart des médias français ont également pris position en faveur de l'intervention française, qualifiée notamment de « choix du moindre mal » par le quotidien Le Monde.

Seules quelques voix discordantes, au sein du Parti de Gauche et des Verts, sont allés à l'encontre de la décision du chef de l'Etat, en condamnant le déclenchement d'un engagement militaire de la France au Mali sans que François Hollande n'ait préalablement saisi le gouvernement et le Parlement. Dans une tribune publiée le 13 janvier, l'ancien Premier ministre Dominique de Villepin a lui aussi exprimé ses réserves sur la « précipitation apparente » de l'opération et ses inquiétudes sur la réutilisation  d'une rhétorique de la « guerre contre le terrorisme ».

Au-delà des critiques portant sur le mécanisme décisionnel ayant conduit à l'engagement militaire français et sur la légitimité contestable d'une intervention menée au nom de la guerre contre le terrorisme, des contradictions apparaissent également entre la volonté de rupture avec la politique néocoloniale revendiquée par François Hollande pendant sa campagne électorale, et la réalité de son action.

François Hollande avait notamment affirmé ne plus vouloir se comporter en « gendarme de l’Afrique », abandonner les relations troubles liées à la « Françafrique »[1], privilégier l'action multilatérale sous l'égide des Nations unies, et laisser les pays africains prendre en charge leur propre sécurité. Le chef de l'Etat, en faisant intervenir la France de manière solitaire au Mali contredit ses engagements et se retrouve inévitablement dans une posture interventionniste. Cette attitude, assimilable à une forme de néocolonialisme, a notamment été fustigée par la presse algérienne. 

Par exemple, l'éditorial de l'édition du 13 janvier du quotidien algérien Liberté dénonce cette France qui a « décidé de faire l'impasse sur les résolutions onusiennes pour partir en guerre contre le terrorisme au Sahel. Toute seule, comme le serval, elle n'a pas résisté à la tentation épidermique de revenir dans son ancien précarré pour montrer à tout le monde qu'elle est la seule qui connaît le mieux les intérêts des Maliens. Leurs anciens colonisés. » 

Bien sûr, le Président Hollande nie ces accusations. « La France, elle libère. La France, elle n'a aucun intérêt au Mali, elle ne défend aucun intérêt économique au Mali, elle est au service de la paix. » a-t-il annoncé le 16 janvier lors de ses vœux à la presse. Si effectivement la France n'a pas au Mali d'intérêt économique majeur, on compte à travers le pays près de 50 filiales et sociétés à capitaux français majoritairement basées à Bamako et employant environ 2 000 salariés. Les liens démographiques entre la France et son ancienne colonie demeurent très développés. Le Mali compte environ 5 000 ressortissants français, tandis que 100 000 Maliens sont établis sur le sol hexagonal. Mais surtout, le Nord-Mali est frontalier du Niger et de la Mauritanie, deux anciennes colonies françaises avec lesquelles les relations économiques sont plus étroites, et qui sont elles aussi vulnérables face à l'action des mouvements djihadistes. 

Des objectifs et des moyens à géométrie variable

Dès le lancement des opérations, les buts de guerre de la France sont apparus fluctuants et confus. Après avoir évoqué la nécessité d'assurer la sécurité des ressortissants français établis au Mali, le gouvernement s'est orienté vers un discours guerrier, invoquant la réponse à une « agression caractérisée », et la nécessité d'arrêter la progression des groupes islamistes armés soupçonnés de vouloir se diriger vers Bamako. Puis, François Hollande a annoncé à propos des groupes djihadistes qu'il s'agissait de « les détruire, les faire prisonniers si possible et faire en sorte qu'ils ne puissent plus nuire », tout en mettant en avant le principe du rétablissement de la souveraineté du Mali « sur l'ensemble de son territoire ».

De même, aucune définition précise des cibles et objectifs militaires n'a été évoquée. Les colonnes de combattants islamistes ayant franchi la ligne de démarcation entre le Nord et le Sud ont d'abord été visés. Les raids aériens français se sont ensuite étendus aux bases-arrières des djihadistes et à des zones urbaines, situées à plusieurs centaines de kilomètres de la région de Konna où avait été lancée leur première offensive. C'est maintenant un déploiement massif de troupes au sol auquel nous assistons. 

Les modalités de l'intervention française ont ainsi débordé de toutes les limites et de tous les cadres initialement fixés. Alors que le ministre de la Défense Jean-Yves Le Drian annonçait le 24 décembre que la France n'irait pas au combat et qu'un « contingent européen de 400 hommes » formerait l'armée malienne, tandis que la Cédéao se chargerait des opérations militaires, c'est exactement l'inverse qui s'est produit. Aux frappes aériennes ont succédé le déploiement de troupes françaises, dont les effectifs n'ont cessé d'être renforcés et devraient finalement atteindre 2 500 hommes.

La création d'un « Sahélistan » ou le risque d'une prophétie auto-réalisatrice

La France se retrouve ainsi lourdement engagée dans une opération militaire aux contours flous, « qui durera le temps nécessaire » selon le Président Hollande. Cela rappelle inévitablement l'intervention en Afghanistan, dont la France vient de retirer ses forces armées, avec un bilan pour le moins mitigé.

« Nous avons eu l'Afghanistan, il ne faut pas qu'il y ait de Sahélistan », déclarait en juin 2012 le ministre des Affaires étrangères Laurent Fabius. Ironie du sort, la France en s'installant dans une guerre asymétrique de longue durée, risque de renforcer l'instabilité des pays de la zone sahélienne et d'attiser le militantisme djihadiste et anti-impérialiste. L'expérience a déjà montré que les expéditions militaires menées depuis 2001 au nom d'une guerre sans fin contre le terrorisme ont eu pour effet de renforcer le mal qu'elles cherchaient à combattre plutôt que de l'éradiquer.

La récente multiplication de témoignages, en partie confirmés par la Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme (FIDH), sur les exactions commises dans le Nord-Mali par les soldats de l'armée régulière malienne – soutenue par la France – contre des personnes soupçonnées d'appartenir ou de collaborer avec les groupes islamistes armés, pourrait favoriser une adhésion des populations à la cause djihadiste et attiser les suspicions et les tensions inter-ethniques déjà prégnantes.

Rappelons également que la situation de crise qui prévaut actuellement au Mali représente une des conséquences directes de l'intervention française en Libye en 2011. Le retour au Mali après la chute du régime libyen de plusieurs milliers de combattants touaregs recrutés comme mercenaires dans l'armée de Kadhafi, le pillage et la mise en circulation des stocks d'arme accumulés à travers le Sahel sont autant de facteurs de déstabilisation et de renforcement des milices. 

Bien que mettant en garde contre le risque de création d'un « Sahélistan », avec des conséquences désastreuses pour l'ensemble de la région, la France s'est paradoxalement engagée dans une opération qui, faute d'un profond changement d'orientation stratégique, provoquera un nouvel enlisement militaire, lequel viendra renforcer l'ampleur du militantisme djihadiste attisé par les agissements de l'ex-puissance coloniale.



[1]   Ce terme désigne les relations économiques, militaires et politiques entre la France et ses anciennes colonies d'Afrique, par l'intermédiaire de réseaux d'influence locaux. La notion renvoie à la collusion entre les élites politiques françaises et africaines, à des affaires de corruption et de rétro-commissions, mais aussi à un interventionnisme plus direct par le biais de soutien à des coups d'Etat ou d'opérations de « maintien de la paix ». 

Tipping Towards Iraq's Squares: An Interview with Falah Alwan

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The Iraqi state releasing 335 detainees this past week? Prime Minster Nouri al-Maliki bussing in a few hundred paid “supporters” to rally? What gives? Signs point to the wave of mass anti-government protests mostly centered around the provinces al-Anbar, Niniweh, and Salah al-Deen, shaking Iraq since 21 December 2012. These evolving mobilizations have sometimes brought out numbers approaching hundreds of thousands (as in Mosul’s Ahrar Square) and led to the blocking of a major Iraq-Jordan-Syria Highway. Some have also claimed the recent mobilizations as an “Iraqi Spring.” By 7 January 2013, Iraqi security and pro-government thugs began physical attacks against protesters. The demands—ever a contentious issue given the many layers of influence in Iraq—have focused on releasing Iraq’s detained—namely women— the casual use of the death penalty, and the closely related issue of “combating sectarianism,” which lies at the heart of Iraq’s many social and political crises. In a complex interplay, much of civil society and the (sectarian) political elite have struggled over the meaning of these protests. Even interpreting the word “equality” very differently—especially as these calls have come from areas of Iraq traditionally associated with Sunni populations. Though garnering more media than the mass protests of say early-to-mid-2011, according to blogger Reider Visser, “International media are attracted to these protests precisely because they fit in a sectarian narrative about a simplistic Sunni-Shi’a battle over Iraq.” How “sectarian” are these protests exactly, and what might be their potential beyond that narrow frame? To get a firmer understanding of the moment’s dynamics, Ali Issa talked to Baghdad-based Falah Alwan, President of the Federation of Workers Councils and Unions in Iraq (FWCUI), about what brought this about and where it all may be going. The interview was originally conducted in Arabic.
 

Ali Issa (AI): What happened recently in Iraq to trigger mass mobilizations seeing as how the street has been very quiet the past several months?

Falah Alwan (FA): The protests that many Iraqi cities are witnessing now are not actually in reaction to a passing event. That is to say they are not the direct result of some government action. The street that your question describes as “quiet” is actually silent only as a result of repression, especially after the protests of February 2011 when the authorities revealed their violence openly—using the army to clamp down on nonviolent protests and firing live ammunition at peaceful protestors. It may be that a particular event triggered what is happening now, but the content of the protests now goes well beyond the Prime Minister vs. the Finance Minister. You have [surely] noticed the development of the slogans people are raising. So while the “event” was the arrest of the finance minister’s security guards, the protestors demanded the end of “Article 4: Terrorism”, which is a law that authorities have used as an instrument to repress any dissent. They have also used it against all strikes and nonviolent sit-ins that workers demanding their rights have organized for years—especially the protests of the Basra oil workers in 2006-2007. Protesters are also now demanding the end of sectarianism or sectarian discrimination, while others ask for work opportunities and a remedy to unemployment.

AI: What is the situation of prisoners in Iraq now, especially women prisoners? Are there reliable numbers?

FA: With regards to women prisoners we [at FWCUI] used to receive field reports from a team at the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq that visited women’s prisons, and they would report numbers of rape cases and other violations. The consolidation of government control post-2009, and especially in the aftermath the 2011 protests, have made these visits extremely difficult. Also, political, civil society, and feminist groups are absolutely banned from visiting the prisons that hold people for political reasons, under accusations of “terrorism.” As for numbers, according to government institutions, there are one thousand women detained, with four thousand arrested and under interrogation. Other media, however, put the numbers at the tens of thousands.

AI: If elite political and sectarian forces inside and around the regime have played a role in the recent protests, how has the street gone beyond those designs? In your opinion what is the biggest challenge to the movement spreading to the rest of Iraq?

FA: It is possible for any individual to project their judgments and understandings on any phenomenon, but this does not change the core of the issue. In addition, a situation may remain “quiet” for decades but continue to hold within it the elements of an explosion that can be triggered by any event. Looking at the objective basis, it is these elements that shifted the scenario. Tunisia remained under Ben Ali’s repressive regime for decades without us seeing the “elements” of a revolution. The suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi sparked events that led to the revolution that overtook all of Tunisia, then Egypt, then the Middle East and even beyond.

Not looking at Iraq as a chain of events, but rather seeking the roots, they lie in a political system and the division of a society based on what they call Shi’a, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkmen, and Christian “component parts.” The government then says that it does not discriminate between one part or another, and that “Iraq is one.” Then politicians wrestle over dividing the ministries between political blocs based on ethnicity, each in a team that hates the other, uniting only in their animosity towards Iraqi society. The centralization of power in Shi’a Islamic parties, the spread of corruption in the government institutions were set up, and the inability of the authorities to create a broad political frame that can contain the whole society has all lead to a general societal disgust, which the people have expressed through a series of protests and sit-ins across Iraq, that preceded the moment we are living now.    

All this led to discrimination against large sections of Iraq in the form of policies and actions like arrests, accusing any opposition group of having affiliation with al-Qaeda or the Ba’ath, etc. These then are the bases that today’s movement launched from. On one hand, this movement is expressing in a direct and practical way that the sectarian regime cannot lead society under any circumstance. On the other, the areas or provinces that were accused [by the authorities] of sectarianism or [links with] al-Qaeda and the like are now raising slogans that directly threaten the sectarian structure. This is because the regime actually relies on sectarian claims so it may then reproduce itself by “counteracting” a sectarian or Saddamist banner.

These regions have broadcast their opposition to sectarianism and put forward broad slogans—some of which are democratic and civil. As this grows it will seriously strike the ethnic discourse of the central government—which I believe will begin to identify itself on another basis in order to sustain its efforts.

The Maliki government victory over the people in February 2011, and then settling scores with its political opponents resulted in a narrow, top-down regime that only became more and more insular. The present wave may put an end to this tyranny if social forces can develop through it.

AI: How do the protesting forces attempt to go beyond sectarianism?

FA: From the first days, slogans were demanding unity and a rejection of sectarianism and division. Coming about instinctually and organically—calling for brotherhood between Shi’a and Sunni, Arabs and Kurds . . . [but that is] as if “unity” were a coming together of Shi’a and Sunni. “Unity” is a positive slogan, no doubt, but raising it in this way, I believe, will again reproduce sectarian political tendencies. I feel that putting out a societal understanding of “unity” based on an objective class analysis is a serious political goal that falls on the shoulders of political groups that have a clear understanding of Iraqi society.   

AI: What is the relationship between these protests and the labor movement or the political formations that emerged after 25 February 2011—what some call Iraq’s forgotten uprising?

FA: I already talked about the relationship to 25 February. Now labor, across Iraq—while acknowledging the lack of deep-rooted institutions—has tools of struggle at its disposal. We are talking about a social class that is at the center of events, even if they are not participating clearly and directly as the working class, since the political situation and sectarian divisions deeply paralyze the organizing abilities of workers. In the end the strengthening of any mass democratic movement will improve the climate for direct workers’ struggle. 

AI: In your opinion, what could truly make this a turning point in Iraqi political life?

FA: This moment could be a crossroads for more than one possibility—all is open now. First, it is possible that these protests could transform into a broad social revolution that changes the political system and builds another. And a new socio-political model could develop, one that opposes the model imposed on, and advertised for, in the region. The development of the present movement could refresh the revolution in the region as a whole and will not be apart from it—especially if it spreads through progressive forces to the Southern and Kurdish regions.

Another possibility is the continuing stubbornness of the government, its success in strengthening sectarianism, and the eventual deterioration to armed struggle and widespread unrest. This may be similar to what took place in Syria as well as in Iraq during 2006 and 2007, now with the lack of a US presence. The regressive forces that risk losing their seats—should this movement grow—could push society in that direction. They could even attempt to divide the whole of Iraq officially.

The third possibility is that the protests remain concentrated in the West and North while the regime’s forces remain elsewhere. Then there might be a truce between some of the forces involved in the protests and the authorities, with a gradual shrinking of the movement.

All of these are possible. Though what has been realized now is that the regime is facing a broad mass of people that publicly reject its policies and boldly raise banners stating so. In other words, the people have intervened in a sphere that the authorities want to monopolize. 

Advocacy, Uprising, and Authoritarianism in Bahrain: An Interview With Ahmed Al-Haddad

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Almost two years after the beginning of the February 14 uprising, the Bahraini regime is still struggling to crush the ongoing political and civil rights movement, all the while working to rehabilitate Bahrain’s “tainted” image. Media blackouts, relentless surveillance and scare tactics, arbitrary detentions, anti-protester violence, and expensive Public Relations campaigns have become daily occurrences. Yet on 20 January 2013, Bahraini authorities met with Amnesty International in order to showcase alleged human rights “strides” in Bahrain, and to show the regime’s (alleged) continuous efforts “to consolidate a legislative framework for human rights and promote its culture in the Bahraini society.” Having jailed the majority of Bahrain’s prominent political opposition leaders and outspoken human rights advocates, the Bahraini king then called for the resumption of "national dialogue" with the country’s political community. How does the Bahraini community of political and human rights advocates sustain their struggle amidst this reality of state oppression, well-funded pro-regime propaganda, and international complacency? In this interview, International Relations Officer at the European-Bahraini Organization for Human Rights (EBOHR) as well as the Bahrain Center For Human Rights (BCHR) Ahmed al-Haddad speaks about the local and global challenges of advocating for the Bahraini uprising, as well as exposing the political and humanitarian violations of the Bahraini regime. Al-Haddad also stresses the importance of the political and civil rights aspects of the uprising, and the ways in which the Bahraini regime and the international community have undermined them.
 

Rosie Bsheer (RB):What is unique about the work that the European-Bahraini Organization for Human Rights (EBOHR) does and what are its main accomplishments so far?

Ahmed Al-Haddad (AAH): We advocate within the European Union (EU) governments, the EU parliament and the European Union itself. What we try to do is distribute information to these governments that work in affiliation with the EU, to push the EU to, for example, place an embargo on teargas—as you know the UK sends teargas to Bahrain—or to implement a ban on granting visas to officials accused of torture and to hold them accountable. So basically, we do the same work that the BCHR does but we are more concentrated within Europe itself, and we work closely with the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH). In terms of what we have done so far, we established EBOHR only seven months ago, so we focused on building up a good database and good connections with people within the EU. We had several good meetings with EU officials and the EU team that was going to Bahrain and they did a really good job there. We had some meetings with two officials who were working with EU Foreign Affairs and they issued a report regarding Bahrain, human rights violations there, and the EU policies towards it. I think these are our main accomplishments so far, in addition to several reports that we released after the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report. 

RB:Are there major differences in the ways that European countries and the United States have dealt with the Bahraini uprising and the regime’s violent response toit—keeping in mind their ongoing, lucrative arms deals with Bahrain?

AAH: I think the European Union is more inclined to act with respect to the humanitarian cause in Bahrain. They want to push for some sort of solution in Bahrain. Officials there are trying really hard to do something, to find a solution, in terms of political and human rights violations in Bahrain. As you know the Danish minister of foreign affairs and the Danish ambassador to Bahrain have [both] been working closely with the Bahraini regime in regards to Abdulhadi al-Khawaja’s case. They have been visiting Bahrain regularly and observing the trials there. They have also sent several ambassadors to monitor and observe the trial of Nabil Rajab and Sayyed Youssef al-Muhafdha [who was released on bail on 17 January 2013.] So I think the European Union is seriously trying to do something, but it is complicated by the fact that such decisions have to go through the different EU member states, governments, and officials. Approval of individual governments must be secured because as you know EU member states all have to agree and decide on the course of action. It is not like in the Unites States where you have one government with its state officials and human rights observers, and foreign policy directives…

In regards to the European Union, since we started working with them, they have pushed for more solutions, and the services of the EU’s External Relations Section are becoming part and parcel of the EU system. Now that there is a human rights department within the European Union, they have been monitoring very closely the Bahraini uprising and the regime response to it. Regarding the timeline, the European Union has been more active and influential, especially compared to the actions of the United States in the last two years. Most recently, the European Parliament called for EU sanctions against Bahrain and released a third resolution calling on the Bahraini regime to respect human rights and implement the BICI recommendations. The US government claims to support human rights around the world, but then they have this double standard towards Bahrain, especially when compared to their role in places like Syria for example. So in the end, it is all about US interests and as such the United States has not acted, symbolically or materially, when it comes to Bahrain, one of its strongest allies in the region. While we understand that the continued presence of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is the US government’s top priority, we deplore their complete disregard for the ongoing human rights and political violations in Bahrain. This is why we are trying to lobby and advocate, in order to get them to act.

As to the latest arms deal between the United States and Bahrain, US officials say that the deal does not include teargas or other weapons that can be used against protestors. But according to Al Jazeera, the arms deal includes anti-riot weapons that are of course going to be used against protesters. The US government still has a long way to go in terms of its policy vis-à-vis Bahrain, as does the UK government. There is so much they can and should do about political and humanitarian violations in Bahrain. For example, a ban on teargas would be tremendously helpful. One of the things were are trying to do at the moment within our advocacy efforts in the European Union, United States, and United Kingdom is to push for a UN monitoring team inside Bahrain to observe the implementation of the BICI and the UPR [Universal Periodic Review] recommendations. This UN team can then issue a serious report about whether the Bahraini regime implemented the recommendations or not. It makes no sense that the Bahraini regime established the BICI commission for human rights recommendations and then they established another monitoring team led by the Minister of Justice [Khaled bin Ali al-Khalifa] who is himself identified by the BICI report to be violating human rights violations—I do not think he is going to arrest himself at the end of the day. The monitoring team would be a really good thing. We are also trying to advocate for Bahrain to be considered “a country of concern” under Article 10 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights at the meeting of the UN Human Rights Committee this coming March. We hope to convince the United Nations to act in the case of Bahrain’s grave human rights violations, unless we do not get the [necessary] votes of UN member states. Things are going well so far, but we still have to work very closely with the United States, where colleagues are working hard and doing a great job.

RB:Have you had any success in preventing the sales of teargas to Bahrain, at least within the European Union?

AAH: UK officials say they have stopped the sale of teargas to Bahrain, but we still need them to issue an official statement. It is not enough to claim that they do. We need them to issue a statement clearly declaring that the United Kingdom has stopped the sale of teargas to Bahrain. We still have a major issue now with shotgun pellets. We have documentation and material evidence indicating that Cyprus' G&L Calbers Ltd. has been selling Victory Starlight cartridges—the animal hunting ammunition—to the Bahraini regime. Bahraini security forces regularly use these against protestors. Bill Marczack from Bahrain Watch was also able to identify that Italy has been selling pellets and the pellet gun Benelli M4 to the Bahraini regime. We are currently trying to find out if other guns that are being used against protesters actually originated from the United States. We are also working on forcing the government of Cyprus to prohibit its companies from selling animal hunting pellets and guns to the Bahraini regime. If we get confirmation that the Bahraini regime is using other “crowd-control” weapons as lethal weapons, we are going to push source countries to stop selling them to Bahrain. While more research needs to be done, we believe the pellet shotgun should be considered a prohibited weapon as per the Protocol of Non-Detectable Fragments. Not only are these being used from close range against peaceful protesters in Bahrain, but we were also able to document, in several cases, that pellets cannot be detected by X-rays, contrary to claims by the Bahraini regime, and as such, should fall under this convention.

RB:Given the failure of implementation of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry’s recommendations and the increasing culture of impunity in Bahrain today, coupled with continued threats to and imprisonment of the Bahraini regime’s fiercest critics, how does the community of activists in Bahrain plan to move forward to address these great challenges?

AAH: The culture of impunity is a serious issue. Indeed one of the biggest problems we face today in Bahrain is international impunity. Foreign governments are not holding Bahraini officials accused of political and humanitarian violations responsible for their actions. On the contrary, they are actually welcoming them into their countries, like Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, the King’s son, who has been accused of torturing regime critics and yet was welcomed as a VIP at the 2012 Olympic Games in London. We are now in the process of filing a lawsuit against these officials in various courts, including in Germany, with the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), a German NGO. We are working on filing official complaints on the torture of two Bahraini European citizens—Abdulhadi al-Khawaja and Mohammed Habib Almuqdad—at the European Court of Human Rights.

We are also trying to do something about spyware that the United Kingdom and the European Union are selling to the Bahraini regime to monitor and track down human rights and political activists. In that regard, I do not think the culture of impunity in Bahrain is going to end, unless these recommendations and reforms are implemented, especially since the whole judicial system in Bahrain is a mess. According to the Bahraini constitution, the king is the person who is in charge of the judiciary, so if the king cannot be held accountable, the international community should hold these accused officials who are proven to have committed political and human rights violations and prevented fair trials accountable for their crimes. The International Criminal Court (ICC) should be intervening as well, and we have been advocating for that, but it has been very difficult to get any results there. In the case of Germany, the ECCHR has been doing a really great job.

RB:How do Bahraini activists continue to build solidarity networks within Bahrain and with the rest of the world under this atmosphere of state surveillance, censorship, and repression?

AAH: As human rights defenders, a large number of Bahrainis, including myself and my colleagues, have gone on many IT trainings, so the good thing is that Bahrainis on the ground and abroad are very competitive when it comes to computer technology and we know how to navigate the digital world in a way that the Bahraini regime cannot monitor and track everybody down. This is how we get in touch with activists on the ground but of course there’s always the possibility that the regime knows who is working with whom. The good thing is that the Bahraini youth have built great solidarity networks with international youth organizations who have supported their two-year peaceful uprising and speak out against the many violations that the Bahraini regime commits. A lot of countries and youth around the world have been influenced by the Bahraini revolution too. At the same time we have a lot of people working on international advocacy in the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union. Over the last two years we have worked hard to build this connection among the international community and people on the ground.

RB:Have you tried to build solidarity networks with people and activists in other Gulf states?

AAH: As you know, Nabeel Rajab, Abdulhadi al-Khawaja and Maryam al-Khawaja established the Gulf Center for Human Rights (GCHR) because they were concerned about human rights violations in the GCC states. We have good connections with human rights defenders in GCC countries. However, maintaining these networks is really hard because, even if you have a safe Internet connection whereby GCC regimes cannot track you down, we cannot do much with our communication right now beyond building these networks. It is not like we can publish online or on social media. What little we have published so far has been through anonymous sources; but yes, we have good networks within the United Arab Emirates, the bedoon activists in Kuwait, in Oman, and also now in Saudi Arabia. We also have close ties with the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR) that publishes a lot of statements in regards to these human rights activists.

We have tried to co-organize actions and plan events with activists throughout the GCC states. But this has been made more difficult with the latest GCC security amendment, which allows all GCC states to track down any human rights defenders. Say you are blacklisted in Bahrain and you are at the border of any GCC state: that is it, you are in the system, they have the right to detain you. It is really hard to form a strong solidarity network because within the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, there are very few human rights defenders. So if these handful of activists take to the street or try to organize an event, they might get arrested. It is also for their own safety: it is not good to act in a visible way at this moment in time, but we are planning a lot of things for the future. Building solidarity networks is a great idea and we have been trying to do this for a long time. We started forming a coalition of human rights defenders inside the GCC, to start something within their own governments as well. So it is not only about Bahrain. We are in solidarity with the Saudi people, we have strong ties with Saudi women activists. So this is definitely one of our goals but it needs a lot of planning, a lot of time, and it is really hard to publish the results of these efforts anywhere.

RB:Despite local and regional efforts to silence the Bahraini uprising, the activist community managed to keep Bahrain in the limelight for short periods of time. This is no longer the case. What has changed and why?

AAH: I would not say that the media has covered Bahrain since the 2011 uprising. They have halfheartedly tried to cover Bahrain. They claim they want to cover it, but they do not. The media is extremely politicized. As soon as the uprising began in Syria, the media shifted their exclusive attention there almost immediately and forgot about Bahrain. I am in no way undermining the importance of the Syrian uprising and the Syrian regime’s brutal response to it. But the media should cover state oppression everywhere and expose human rights violations in both Syria and Bahrain to the world. This is clearly part of the political game taking place today.

Generally though, Bahrain simply does not interest the media, because the media these days simply work within the constraints of their governments, they parallel their own governments’ foreign policies. US channels, for example, do not usually go against or challenge US foreign policy in the end. What the Bahrainis try to do is take advantage of YouTube. Social media is the only source for Bahrainis to make their voices heard, for the Bahraini youths to publish videos, statements, and anything that is taking place on the ground. They try of course to push mainstream media channels to publish these videos, articles, and human rights violations in Bahrain, but it is also the fact that the Bahraini regime has blocked a lot of media journalists from entering Bahrain. Bahrain Watch documented more than two hundred journalists and personnel who were not allowed to enter Bahrain for media reasons, to prevent them from seeing and covering what’s going on in Bahrain. This really is one of the main things that is happening in Bahrain. But I think the Bahraini revolutionaries and the activists in general have broken the PR system, the state’s PR machines that try to send the wrong message about the Bahrain revolution. We continue to fight against this media blackout on Bahrain, and the protests of course are also ongoing.

RB: Maryam al-Khawaja arrived in Bahrain on 11 January 2013. How was she received?  

AAH: When Maryam arrived in Manama there was a huge security alert in the airport. As soon as she left the plane, she saw a lot of female officers standing by. She entered with her Danish passport, went to passport control, and filled out the visa forms and waited in line. She entered on a two-week visa because she asked for a two-week visa. She went to Bahrain not only to visit her family, but also to observe and document human rights violations as part of her job as well. But now she is with her family and everything is fine. She is very happy to be there. We still have to wait and see what happens in the remaining part of her trip, what the Bahraini regime intends to do. Are they going to hold her and ban her from traveling or something of the sort? We wish her the best, but we are also prepared for the worst-case scenario and BCHR and EBOHR will continue its work regardless. As they always say, even if they arrest us all, they cannot arrest the idea, they cannot arrest the revolution, they cannot arrest the uprising. They arrested Nabil, they arrested her father Abdulhadi, they arrested her sister Zainab, they arrested thirteen activists, but more activists keep popping up to take their place to fight such oppressive regimes.

RB:Is Maryam al-Khawaja’s return to Bahrain an attempt to bring worldwide attention back to Bahrain and the ongoing struggles that people continue to face on a daily basis under the Al Khalifa regime?

AAH: Maryam refuses to make this about her. She does not want to have the media focus on her personally. Her risky trip was her attempt to assert her right to return to her country, to see her family, especially her father who is in prison, and to express her freedom to go out whenever and wherever she wanted. This is not the key issue that she wants the media to focus on. She issued a statement just for safety reasons, in case something did happen to her while she was there, to show the world how human rights defenders are being treated in Bahrain. She wants the media to pay more attention to the ongoing human rights violations in Bahrain. People are being tear-gassed everyday, people are being shot on a daily basis. So she does not want it to be about her, but rather about the cause itself, about Bahrain, human rights violations there, about what the Bahraini people are facing at the moment.  

I have taken over Maryam’s duties at the Bahrain Center for Human Rights as International Relations Officer until she returns from Bahrain. I will be in charge of international advocacy, which is what I do with EBOHR, so there are a lot of similarities between the two jobs. We will focus on pushing the international community to put real pressure on the Bahraini regime. We do not want to hear any more simple condemnations; we have heard too many statements of “concern” and “condemnations,” with government officials making these empty statements over and over again. We will try to push Bahrain’s close allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union to put more pressure on the regime and to start taking action against violations in Bahrain because their statements alone are useless. The Bahrain regime is not even respecting the UN UPR human rights recommendations, why would they respect these statements? And when Maryam returns, we will continue to work together and we will divide the work between the two of us so we can be more efficient and influential.

RB:Does EBOHR have any direct contacts with the Bahraini regime in its attempts to advocate for the release of political prisoners or do you work solely through advocacy groups?

AAH: EBOHR has a monitoring team inside Bahrain and we have Bahrainis who work with us on the ground actually. As human right organizations, we do not negotiate directly with regimes because we are not a political society or institution that should engage the regime. We think that the regime should respect and implement the recommendations that were issued. That is our main goal. We leave negotiating to Bahraini political societies in Bahrain. At EBOHR we have the chairman of the organization whose father Mohammad Jawad Barweez has also been imprisoned, he is one of the thirteen Bahraini activists who were recently sentenced. What EBOHR tries to focus on is call for the release of prisoners in Bahrain, support the peaceful civil resistance movement, to implement various human rights recommendations and stop violations inside Bahrain, but we are certainly not into negotiating with the regime. And actually the regime does not even want to see us.

RB:What are the Bahraini regime’s biggest fears today, and what would you say are the biggest successes accomplished during this ongoing uprising?

The Bahraini regime fears anyone who speaks out against it in public and reaches out to the media. It fears anyone who has a nationalist background or any national agenda. The regime plays on the sectarian issue, saying that the Bahraini uprising and conflict is one between Sunnis and Shiis, which is not the case. We have a lot of people in the movement who are not religious. I myself am not religious, and I come from a mixed religious background. So religion and sectarianism have nothing to do with that. The regime especially fears those who speak out and say that their main concern is the country, its future, and its people, and that they are Sunnis and they want serious reforms. The regime fears human rights defenders.

What took place in Bahrain was a political and civil rights movements—the Bahraini people took to the streets and called for their political and civil rights. Then it escalated more into a human rights violations uprising, so to speak, because of the level of killing and ongoing human rights violations. So the regime really fears human rights defenders because they are especially plugged into the international community—they fear Maryam al-Khawaja, which is why we suspect they may not let her leave the country. They fear that she is professional and outspoken, that she is representing the uprising in the international community, and that she is providing foreign governments with tangible evidence of Bahrain’s human rights violations and the lack of implementation of any political or other reforms. This is why they do not want human rights defenders, Bahrainis and others, to enter the country or even leave it. So the regime’s solution is to impose a media blackout and arrest human rights defenders. They want the Bahrain Center for Human Rights to vanish and they do not want all this “fuss” about the Bahraini uprising. Simply put, the regime fears us all. They fear every individual who does not fear them.

Since 1920, Bahrain has experienced uprisings in almost every decade. But past uprisings were quickly crushed or cooled down within a year or so. What has been happening now since February 2011 is different. People are extremely fed up with the situation and they want change. They are done with the regime’s empty promises, so the activist movements, and the youth specifically, have made several strides despite the massive media blackout and the arrest of human rights defenders, the ongoing attacks against protesters, and the continuous silencing of human rights defenders by the regime and the mainstream media. We are able to continue this revolution and it is not going to stop unless concrete change takes place. This is one of our biggest successes. A small percentage of the already few Bahraini citizens living outside of Bahrain try to turn to their advantage international concern towards Bahrain. Many Bahrainis may not be aware of these international advocacy attempts and their encouraging results given that most of our meetings are off the record. But they certainly make a huge difference and influence change. Many individual governmental officials have invested much of their personal time and effort to help the Bahraini cause. We think there is still much more that needs to be done.

The international community and foreign governments should stand with the Bahraini people and take action against regime oppression. We are fed up with the double standard towards Bahrain and people in other countries facing the same kind of oppression. In the end, we are human beings and it is really sad that we start measuring deaths simply in numbers. It is really sad to reduce human life to numbers: we should have regard for the inherent value of human life. They are people, they have families, and they should not simply be counted as statistics in the so-called reform process. If we were to do that, to play into this reduction, then comparing the ratio of the Egyptian population to that in Bahrain, more Bahrainis today are in prison than in Egypt, not to mention how many of the only one million Bahraini population have been killed. Human life should not be measured by statistics.

Now, even if the Bahraini regime implements the human rights recommendations, we still have a civil and political rights issue. Human rights defenders work within this framework of civil and political rights, despite the fact that many of us do not highlight that. According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, we have the right to govern ourselves. The UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders clearly states that it is the duty of such individuals to promote and educate others about their political and civil rights. We are simply reiterating what the United Nations calls for and the very conventions of civil and political rights that the Bahraini regime has signed on to. We think it is all connected. We tell the international community that ours is not simply a human rights issue, it is a civil and political rights conflict. We have Nabil Rajab and other human rights defenders who use the language of political and civil rights and who should be protected as human rights defenders. We also have Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, who has made it his life mission to fight for political and civil rights, not just for human rights. This is a major task we have taken upon ourselves: to remind everyone that this is a political conflict and not simply a human rights-based one.

RB:Is there anything else you would like to add?

AAH: I want to stress the importance of the political and civil rights aspects of the ongoing uprising. It is part of the missions of both the BCHR and the EOBHR that regardless of the outcome of the human rights cause—assuming the Bahraini regime stops its war against activists, allows Bahrainis to practice their “human rights,” and implements freedom of press, none of which are likely to happen—there remains the political struggle itself. It is very important to address the political and civil rights aspects of the current conflict and uprising within the international community, who has ignored the political aspect lately because of the grave human rights violations. We obviously have to address human rights violations, but we also need to push foreign governments to call on the Bahraini regime to respect the demands for political and civil rights of Bahraini citizens. 

مالي الحرب الماحقة

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بدأت فرنسا حملتها في مالي ودس أنفها في شؤون مستعمرتها السابقة متعذرة بمحاربة "القوى الإسلامية المتطرفة" وضرورة وضع حد لسطوتها في مالي. خططت وأرست القواعد والجنود وقررت القصف ومطاردة هذه الجماعات، قتلت إلى حد الآن العشرات من عناصر" أنصار الدين" وقصفت بعض خزانات وقودها، وقال الجيش المالي إنه استعاد السيطرة على بعض المدن. أعلنت فرنسا أنها لن تتعدى الجنوب المالي، وإنه ليس من ضمن مخططاتها التوجه إلى الشمال، إنما ستمهد للقوات الأفريقية للقيام بتلك المهمة وتحرير الشمال من قبضة "الجماعات الإسلامية" المتطرفة. وفعلاً بدأت بعض الدول الإفريقية بإرسال قوات إلى مالي، لكن يبقى إعلان فرنسا مجرد وعد وتظل هناك حقيقة أنها دخلت من دون غطاء دولي شرعي.

من ناحيتها  قامت عناصر ”أنصارالدين“ بقتل طيار فرنسي وعشرات الجنود الماليين وإسقاط طائرات لفرنسا وقالت إنها سيطرت على مدن جديدة. وقالت منظمة " هيومن رايتس ووتش" إنه قتل عشرات المدنيين، خلال اليومين الأولين من هذه الحرب. هي الحرب إذاً حيث الكر والفر. حرب بين العصابات والجيوش. حرب  يرى أحد أطرافها أن مصيره الجنة. معركة بين قوى أجنبية استعمرت تلك الأرض في السابق وبعض السكان المحليين المتطرفين. صراع قوض مشروع وحلم شعب ينتظر الاستقلال. أزمة قد تمتد تأثيراتها إلى دول الجوار .

خلفية عن المعركة وساحتها

الهجمات الفرنسية التي بدأت هذه الأيام، ماهي إلا مقدمة لحرب ”تحرير شمال مالي“ أي أزواد وأهم مدن هذا الإقليم هي:

العاصمة قاوو، والعاصمة الثقافية تمبكتو، وكيدال. وتبلغ مساحة  الإقليم 822 ألف كيلومتر مربع، أي ما يعادل مساحة فرنسا وبلجيكا. أما سكانها فأغلبهم من الطوارق مع وجود للمكون العربي والزنجي. أرض أزواد قامت فيها عدة ثورات من أجل الاستقلال، ورفض التهميش، وقمع الجيش المالي. بدأت بثورة 1963 التي واجهها  الرئيس المالي آنذاك مديبو كيتا بالقمع الشديد والتنكيل وعمليات الإبادة. كذالك ضربت هذه الأرض موجة جفاف عام 1973 تسببت في نزوح جماعي منها. قامت فيها ثورة عام 1990، قادها إياد أغ غالي،  بذل فيها شعب أزواد الغالي والنفيس وضحى فيها تضحيات جسام وانتهت بإتفاق سلام، يتم بموجبه حكم أزواد بمركزية أقل وتنمية المنطقة. لكن ذلك بقي مجرد وعد. وفي سنة 2006، تحرك الأزواديون مرة أخرى، وفشلوا في تحقيق  حلمهم. أما بداية الأزمة الحالية فبدأت مع تهاوي نظام القذافي، حيث خرج بعض المقاتلين الأزواديين، الذين  قاتلوا في صفوف قوات جيش القذافي، من ليبيا حاملين معهم سلاحهم وعتادهم وتوجهوا إلى مالي. وخططوا مع أطراف أزوادية أخرى، من أجل السيطرة على الشمال المالي، وإسقاط سلطة بامكو. وانضمت لهم بعض العناصر من الأزواديين المنضويين تحت لواء الجيش المالي ونجحوا في مسعاهم.

لكن هذه القوى اختلفت فيما بعد. فحركة تحرير أزواد أعلنت الاستقلال وأنصار الدين أعلنوا تطبيق الشريعة.  كما تلقت هذه القوى الأزوادية الدعم من قبل بعض القوى المتطرفة مثل ”التوحيد والجهاد“ التي قامت هي الأخرى بإعلان إمارتها الإسلامية خارج نطاق حكم الدولة الأزوادية، التي أعلنت حركة تحرير أزواد استقلالها وبدأت تطبيق ”الشريعة الإسلامية“من وجهة نظرها التي تتضمن تقطيع الأيادي وتحريم التلفزيون وكل أمور الحداثة. وانقلبت على حلم الشعب الأزاودي في دولة مستقلة والذي بدأت أولى تجلياته مع إعلان حركة تحرير أزواد. يرى الكثيرون أن السبب وراء انتشارها في الشمال المالي هو عدم وجود تنمية حقيقية فيه وتركه مكاناً خارج نطاق الزمن. وكذلك الوقوف ضد قيام دولة مستقلة لشعب أزواد في أرضه. فمالي لم تستطع يوماً السيطرة على الشمال، ولم تقم بتنميته، بل تركته مكاناً للمجرمين وتجار المخدرات الذين يرتبطون بعلاقات وطيدة مع حكامها والمتطرفين. وكان هدفها الأسمى هو قمع انتفاضات شعب أزاود.

لا رابح في الحرب

يمكن القول إن فرنسا قد أدخلت نفسها في مأزق ووحل شديد الصعوبة وذلك بقرارها التدخل في دولة لا جيش لها ولا حكومة. دولة مؤسساتها منهارة تحكمها عناصر عسكرية انقلابية. بدأت حرباً في منطقة يحلم شعبها بالاستقلال. صحيح أن حركة أنصار الدين متطرفة، إلا أنها تختلف عن القاعدة فهم أصحاب أرض وأبناء بيئة وليسوا مقاتلين قادمين من بلاد أخرى. و يقودهم أحد أهم الشخصيات النافذة في منطقة أزواد وهو إياد أغ غالي، ابن المنطقة، وواحدة من أكبر قبائل أزواد، والذي يرتبط بتحالفات قوية مع بقية القبائل الطارقية والعربية الموجودة في أزواد. طبعاً هناك تواجد للقاعدة في المنطقة ولها قوتها، لكن ليس بحجم جناح أنصار الدين.

ستظل فرنسا  تقصف وتدمر وتقتل ويقتل من جنودها ويسقط من طائراتها دون جدوى. قد تساعد الجيش المالي في استعادة مدن أكثر. ذلك الجيش الذي يكن له سكان منطقة أزواد كره شديد، لما أذاقهم طوال سنين من مر العذاب وعمليات الإبادة والتطهير العرقي. لكن فرنسا لن تستطيع حسم المعركة لأن المقاتلين يعرفون المنطقة. ويعتبر أبناؤها أن حربهم مقدسة، لأن مصير الميت فيها حسب اعتقادهم هو“الجنة“. ومن جهة أخرى يعرفون أن الهزيمة تعني نهايتهم. ففرنسا لن ترحمهم. وسيبدأ توافد المقاتلين من كل بقاع الأرض للوقوف في وجه التدخل ”الصليبي الفرنسي“ في مالي والترويج بأن مالي أصبحت ”منطقة جهاد“.

ستتحول المنطقة إلى أفغانستان جديدة وقد تمتد المعركة إلى بقية دول الجوار وحدوث الكارثة الكبرى، وهي تحول منطقة إفريقيا جنوب الصحراء، إلى منطقة نزاع دائم، مثلما حدث في الأزمة الأفغانية التي لم تستطع فيها الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية الحسم إلى الآن. 

نحن  وحرب مالي

سيكون لحرب مالي بالتأكيد تأثير قوي على موريتانيا. وذلك لكونها إحدى دول الجوار التي ترتبط بحدود برية شاسعة مترامية الأطراف مع مالي خاصة منطقة الشمال. فالشمال المالي هو العمق الشرقي لموريتانيا. كذالك يرتبط الشعبان  بعلاقات وثيقة علاقات تجارية وعرقية. فالعربي في أزواد، له قريب في موريتانيا. كذالك الزنجي في باماكو. الحرب تعني تشرد الآلاف والهجرات الجماعية وموريتانيا ستكون هي الوجهة الأولى للمتضررين من الحرب. خاصة أن ليبيا تشهد الآن فترة انتقالية بعد سقوط الطاغية القذافي، يتهم الفاعلون فيها بعض الأزواديين بالقتال بجانب القذافي. وليبيا كانت أهم وجهات النازحين من شعب الطوارق أيام قمع الجيش المالي لهم. نزوح شعب أزواد إلى موريتانيا فعلاً بدأ في الأيام الأولى من تحركات  العام الماضي  التي قامت بها حركة تحرير أزواد والقوى المتطرفة، من أجل إسقاط سيطرة الجيش المالي على الشمال.

فقد جاء إلى موريتانيا ألاف الأزواديين ونصبت لهم مخيمات في الشرق الموريتاني. ومع بداية التدخل الفرنسي ستتزايد الأعداد النازحة إلى موريتانيا. سيؤدي هذا النزوح إلى ضغط كبير على موريتانيا التي يعاني شعبها  الفقر وسوء التسيير. فهموم الشعب الأزوادي ستنتقل إلى شعب رغم غنى دولته يرزح تحت نير العوز. فعلى سبيل المثال قام بعض سكان مدينة باسكنو الموريتانية، حيث يوجد  مخيم للنازحين الأزوادين، بالتسجيل في مخيمات الإيواء الأزوادية من أجل أخذ المساعدات التي تعطيها هيئات الإغاثة الدولية، وذالك لفقرهم ولتضررهم من الحرب. فاللاجئون الازواديون لن يجدوا أمامهم نظاماً جاهزاً لاستيعاب أزمتهم، خاصة إن تضاعف عددهم. وسيتقاسمون مع الشعب الموريتاني المعاناة والذل إلا إذا قامت هيئات الإغاثة الدولية بدور جبار لعدم حدوث كارثة إنسانية في مخيمات اللاجئين الأزوادين. كذلك ستحتاج فرنسا جهود موريتانيا في معركتها ضد ”أنصار الدين“ ستحتاج جيشها وأرضها، لأن تكلفة الصراع مع العصابات المسلحة ستكون باهظة وفرنسا تنظر لموريتانيا كما تنظر أمريكا لباكستان في حربها مع طالبان. وحين يذعن الرئيس الموريتاني لإرادة فرنسا ولو بمجرد تقديم دعم لوجسيتي بسيط، ستكون موريتانيا هدفاً لهجمات انتقامية من أنصار الدين والقاعدة. كذالك السكان المحليون الرافضون  للتدخل الفرنسي في مالي. وقد تكلف الرئيس كرسيه بفقدانه ولاء جنرالات الجيش، لكون الجيش الموريتاني غير قادر على الحرب هذه الأيام، فهو في حالة من الضعف تجعله عاجزاً عن خوض أي حرب خاصة إن كانت خارج الحدود.

مشاركة موريتانيا في الحرب ستحدث حالة من الغضب الشعبي وذلك لكون فرنسا هي من يقود هذه الحرب وتتدخل بجنودها وافتقادها للشرعية الدولية. وهذا ما يعتبره الكثيرون غزواً أجنبياً وطمعاً فرنسياً في السيطرة على المنطقة. كذلك يعتبر أغلب الموريتانيين هذه الحرب ”حرب بين كافرين“ ولا تخصهم. يمكن أن نستشف من خلال المعطيات السابقة أن هذه الحرب لن تؤدي إلى الاستقرار المنشود في المنطقة ولن تقضي على التطرف وسطوة الجماعات المتطرفة، بل ستحول المنطقة إلى ساحة حرب مستمرة. وأن المنطقة تكتوي بنار عدم السماح للشعب الأزوادي بتقرير مصيره وتأسيس دولة في أرضه، التي عاش فيها طوال قرون. وطن  تصان فيها كرامته ويحفظ فيها هويته فلعنة الوقوف في وجه إرادته ستظل تطارد المنطقة. كذلك غياب التنمية في تلك المنطقة وجعلها ملجأ مناسباً لكل فار من العدالة ومتاجر بالمخدرات، كما مقراً للجهاديين المتطرفين. ويمكن الجزم أنه لن يخرج أي من الأطراف منتصراً في هذه الحرب.

“I Have The Picture!” Egypt’s Photographic Heritage between Neoliberalism and Digital Reproduction (Part II)

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The Arab Image Foundation (AIF)—a private archiving initiative founded by a group of artists and collectors in 1997, and run through foreign and local grants—appears on the surface like the very antithesis of the Library of Alexandria in Egypt (discussed in Part I of this article). While based in Beirut, the AIF holds a substantial collection of photographs from Egypt and represents an important model of archive and heritage-making in the region.

The AIF’s approach to preserving and curating its extensive photographic collection is highly professional. Its online database is well presented, described, and sourced. The author and source (provenance) of every image is acknowledged on the main website. Additional information about the technique and size of each photograph appears through the advanced search option once the viewer has registered on the website (registration is free). However, this online database is not entirely immune from criticism, most notably in how its search categories are constructed. Many of the categories are poorly chosen and seem to reflect the database-maker’s own research interests: categories such as “old woman,” “smiling,” or “frowning” are subjective. While information about photographic technique and artifact size is given, there is no indication of medium (e.g., carte postale, carte de visite, part of an album, loose mounted or unmounted print). Such information remains crucial to the social and cultural historian in order to understand the circulation and usage of any given photographic object. Photographs should, ideally, also be scanned with their edges visible. Cropping the edges of a photographic object strengthens its reading as a dematerialised “image,” as it denies a key feature of its “objectness.” In this particular context, cropping the photograph’s edges is one way the AIF translates a three-dimensional social object into a two-dimensional aesthetic text. Compared to the Library of Alexandria, however, and compared to the very poor archiving record of the region in general, the AIF database appears as a breath of fresh air. Despite its shortcomings, it was clearly conceived by archivists (or by artists and photographers who share the archivist and historian’s respect for the artifact) as well as for researchers.


[The Arab Image Foundation website's front page.]


[The Arab Image Foundation's archive search page.]

Given the AIF’s origin among artists, much attention is given to the aesthetic qualities of individual photographs. Their collecting policies, exhibition activities, and publications are structured around artistic projects initiated by its founders and members. Like other regional custodians (e.g., the Library of Alexandria and the collectors discussed below), the AIF also emphasizes “production,” which in this case includes art exhibitions, books, films, postcards, and mixed-media art forms. The AIF’s bias for presenting their photographs as primarily art objects takes precedence at the expense of its historical or research potential. Although it is a non-profit organization supported by international cultural grants, it operates as a private estate mediated through artistic projects. This aesthetic bias does not in and of itself preclude the simultaneous use of the collections by researchers interested in other aspects of the material. If only researchers could access them, that is. The original photographs, numbering around 500,000, are officially unavailable for viewing. About ten thousand scanned photographs are available to the general public to view on the website. Another ten thousand scanned copies are available for select researchers to view in the Beirut office. For those researchers personally unknown to the AIF, access to the vast majority of the collection is very difficult.

The AIF also runs a program called MEPPI, the Middle East Photograph Preservation Initiative. This initiative has a double aim: to “map and survey” significant collections in the region, and to train local personnel in archiving and preservation skills. A similar “mapping” initiative was recently carried out by the Archive Map, a project that evolved from the Speak, Memory Symposium of 2010 organized by the Townhouse Gallery of Contemporary Art in Cairo. Both ventures—by the AIF and the Townhouse Gallery—represent the production of heritage in the age of neoliberalism. Neither institution is an archive in the sense of a depository whose main purpose is to serve the public and researchers. Rather, both originate within private artistic ventures that understand culture as a privilege for those in certain, well-known, elite circles.


[The MEPPI website.]

Given the fact that the funding and participating institutions are also powerful global collecting institutions (i.e., The Getty and The Metropolitan Museum of Art in the case of MEPPI), the act of “mapping Middle East archives” can also be read as a strategy for opening up new markets. The markets currently being opened are those for knowledge and expertise flowing into the region. But they carry the potential of becoming markets of objects flowing in the opposite direction. This is not illegal, and whether it is desirable or not is a very contentious issue. But we should not be naïve towards the many possible repercussions of our actions. I am myself part of this process. The emergence of a market is often the function of discovery. By discovering, we—historians, curators, or collectors, united by our search for new and previously unseen objects or sources—create value, and we create, feed, or encourage a market.

Collectors and Custodians

A third set of actors in the heritage drama is the individual custodians. They include collectors proper (i.e., those who acquired collections mostly by buying) and custodians of family collections (i.e., those who inherited family collections). The bulk of photographic heritage—the “real stuff”—is located with them.

Collectors are a socially diverse crowd, and their attitudes towards photographs differ. Some are well aware of the uniqueness of the material object, while others believe that an “image” is all there is to be had, and trade digital copies on the market. But collectors also share many similarities. They are very conscious of the historical time in which they live: that there is now something that needs to be “saved,” sold, or—for that matter—something to be guarded against the acquisitiveness of archives looking to expand their collections. “My things are mine only, I am the one who will look at them and who will speak about them,” says one long-term collector of photographs and popular culture ephemera. He explains: “I collected this myself, it’s my life’s work. I am free to do with it as I want. I picked it up from the trash. It was trash. Now they want to come and take it?” This was over ten years ago, just before the public fashion for nostalgic value and ensuing narratives of conservation began to take the shape they have today, and before the prices of old photographs on the market skyrocketed accordingly.

The attitudes of private collectors and collection custodians have historical roots, as well as reflect the recent attitudes of the two major institutional players, the Library of Alexandria and the AIF. All of these actors share a negatively defined ownership: as having photographs “against” other parties: the state (who forcibly takes away), society (who destroys or does not understand), other private collecting institutions (who outsmart you and do not pay the fair price), or even researchers (who, holding unspecified esoteric knowledge, might deflower your virgin photographs). Common to these attitudes is the perception that photographs somehow contain “truth,” or that they contain “value.” Therefore, they have to be either controlled or marketed.

In the extreme version of this story, some collectors refuse to show their collections to researchers. One collector justified his refusal in the following terms: “If you write your history [of photography] after seeing my photographs, then what will be left for us, owners of these photographs, to do?” While, luckily, his complete refusal is uncommon (if not entirely unique), the logic informing his suspicion and possessiveness is not. Because of the confusion of object and image, original and copy, as well as the excessive demand placed on images as repositories of “truth,” many feel that their images have a virgin quality that can only be taken once.

Suspicions towards researchers were only part of the many anxieties that Egyptian collection owners shared with me. After all, researchers might be a nuisance, but not a threat to collection owners as such. For many, the worst enemy has historically been the state. The state stands for the one who takes things away, and who imposes its own version of history. This is the case with one custodian of a large family archive, a descendant from a notable Ottoman-Egyptian family whose members—since the nineteenth century up until the 1952 revolution occupied high state offices and were close to the palace. The post-1952 history of this family, as with many similar elite families, was shaped by real or perceived threats of dispossession. When the collection custodian spoke to me, there was little difference from his perspective between the nationalizing socialist state of the 1960s and the neoliberal Mubarak state from the 1980s onwards. Functioning as a web of interconnected mafias, powerful actors within the Mubarak state could mobilize Egyptian national heritage laws to lay its hands on people’s property, which then ended up as de facto theirs.

The other problem this particular collector (and he is not the only one) has with the state’s legacy in culture and heritage is about the interpretation of history. Like others of his social milieu, he feels strongly that his family was excluded from the writing of post-1952 history, or even vilified. He sees his role not just as a custodian of family property, but also as having a duty to write his family “back into Egyptian history,” so to speak. “There has been too much history written by the state,” he explains, “too much history as politics.” While this specific person might not see it this way, this mistrust can be productively extended back towards colonial history, as a history that is always written by someone else. In the Egyptian context, the feeling of mistrust towards history equally applies to post-colonialism and it does to post-socialism.

This collector, like every other of the dozens of collectors I have encountered, plans to set up his own archive. Others dream of having their own museums, research institutions, or cultural centers. Yet others use their material to produce coffee-table books or films. And some sell scans of their images to big banks, businesses, or publishers producing calendars or other marketing tools capitalizing on the nostalgia for the Old Regime. This cultural ethos of nostalgia for pre-1952 Egypt, much in evidence during the last decade of the Mubarak Era and currently carried over by a host of websites and Facebook pages, should be understood within the context of the full retreat from the economic and social models of the 1950s and 60s.While this is not always evident to most of those who indulge in the consumption of such nostalgia, much of what appears to be purely commercial exploitation has an important ideological element: it is, again, “history as politics.” The implicit message these nostalgic items convey is that colonial Egypt was clean, modern, and beautiful, thus laying blame on the post-colonial era for taking Egypt “backwards” to chaos and dirt.

As a result of all these genealogies, there is hardly a collector of old photographs (or documents or other vintage objects) in Egypt who would collect for the sake of having a unique object. Furthermore, there is no private institution that would be happy to act as “only” a depository. There hardly is a collection owner in Egypt who would not at least dream of being also a knowledge producer or using his collection to produce some commercial, artistic, or intellectual “product.” 

In the new understanding of culture, being “only” a depository almost sounds like a dirty word. All the actors discussed above, individual or institutional (all of them being private, something that is often blurred by the highly problematic term of “independent”) shy away from being “only” a custodian of valuable material—whether this value is defined as aesthetic, historical, or other.

But is this attitude actually new? All of these attitudes are implicitly defined against the failure of the state’s custodianship of cultural heritage. What the new private actors discussed here do amounts to the same: they perceive their collections as their ‘ezba (estate) alone: as assets to be guarded from others, and exploited for their own exclusive benefit. Because they “have” the material—they “have the picture”—many of them believe they also have the “truth” that resides in it.

All of these attitudes are defined in opposition to what “the state” does. But the state, the villain, has already died. He died a slow and painful death under torture over the past thirty years. He was a controversial fellow: some might mourn him, others do not. Some mourn him in some respects and not in others. He failed miserably to care for Egypt’s heritage, but he also achieved much, especially from the perspective of somebody of my generation, brought up on twentieth-century (and increasingly outmoded) ideas about “equality,” the “public,” and “research.” Egypt is still arguably better off with bad and often abused national heritage protection laws and its badly run public museum collections than without them. (See Pahwa and Winegar, Middle East Report, Issue 263, 2012) To me at least, the one who killed him—the neoliberal ethos of culture as privilege, and heritage as the domain of a select few—seems much worse.

The situation now appears as follows. Cultural products—such as photographs—are valorized, both culturally and materially. They start to be considered “antiques” and “collectibles,” and they beg to be considered for the prize of “national” (or conversely, “universal human”) heritage. In the deep sea of everyday social reality, precious fish are swimming. Two kinds of globally articulate fishermen compete to catch them. One kind catches the fish to take a picture of it, and puts a digital picture of it on his website. Then he kills the fish to make sure that nobody else has the same picture of this same fish on their own website. The other kind of fisherman catches the fish and places it in a first-class aquarium. He makes a big fuss of having it, and shows it, sometimes, to some people. What often happens, however, is that the first fisherman (he is an ibn al-balad after all) catches the fish, takes a picture that he puts on his website, and then sells the fish to the other kind of fisherman for exhibition. Both think that they have won, and both are happy. Seeing this game, some fish owners hide the fish they have and wait to see who will pay more. In either of these cases, we, whether as the general public or as academic researchers, lose.

في مديح دار للسينما في بغداد

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في مديح دار للسينما ببغداد: شاشة الأحلام حين تصبح مرآة لتحولات مدينة 

في العام 1960 كانت سنتي الأولى في مدرسة، سأحتاج سنوات كي أعرف معنى اسمها: "التهذيب". ثم خمس سنوات لاحقاً في "مدرسة المثنى الإبتدائية" ببنائها الهندسي الجميل، وصفوف الطابق الأرضي منها، المطلة على حديقة كنت أراها جنة حقيقية، لاسيما أنني مبكراً كنت أربط بين البيت الجميل واحتوائه على حديقة، بساحة الرياضة وملعب كرة السلة الذي سيشهد أكثر مباريات سخونة بين مدارس قضاء المسيب الغافي على الفرات الندي المتدفق دائماً. 

حين نقلت مع عدد من التلاميذ إلى "مدرسة المثنى" كنت على درجة من السعادة. فذلك يعني أنني سأخترق " شارع لويس باكوس"، وهو أكبر شوارع المسيب وأحدثها، ويخترق عدداً من البساتين، كما أن الطريق إلى المدرسة الجديدة كان يعني خروجاً يومياً من أجواء " محلة أم الصخول" الخانقة، حيث البيوت العتيقة والأزقة الضيقة، ومروراً ببناية السينما حين كنت أمر بدهشة تتجدد، كلما تم تجديد إعلانات الأفلام. لكنها دهشة كانت ممزوجة بمخاوف تنطلق من تحذيرات أهلي من السينما وأخلاق روادها، لكنني وحين كنت في الصف الخامس امتلكت الجرأة في خرق المحظور، ودخلت القاعة العجيبة التي كانت تعرض فيلم" سبارتكوس"، وكانت دهشتي بلغت بي حد أنني لم أشعر بيد والدي وهي ترفعني من مقعدي بغضب، حين أوصل قاطع التذاكر خبراً لعائلتي، فهرع أبي إلى السينما ليخرجني منها. ولم تنفع ضربات عقاله القوي في أن تنتشلني من حالة السحر التي كنت غرقت فيها ونمت ليلتها وأنا أعيش نوعين من المشاعر: لذة اكتشاف ضوء السينما وحكايات أبطالها الساحرة، والألم الذي كانت ضربات عقال أبي تركته على ظهري وعنقي، فيما كانت والدتي تحتضنني ودموعها تنسكب على عنقي الملتهب بصفعات أبي.

في العام 1966 سكنت عائلتي في بغداد، وفيها كانت دور العرض السينمائية قد خلقت تقاليد اجتماعية وثقافية، بل كانت منذ أربعينيات القرن الماضي واحداً من المصادرالغنية للعراقي في معرفة الآخر، ونادراً ما تجد مواطناً متعلماً ممن بلغ في أواخر القرن العشرين، العقد الرابع من عمره، لم تكن السينما شكلاً من اشكال التسلية الراقية عنده. ودور العرض في بغداد تتعدد لا بحسب الأمكنة فحسب، بل بحسب الأذواق وبحسب الشكل السينمائي. فلا يمكن أن تذكر " سينما النهضة" في منطقة الباب الشرقي، الا وتستعيد ذاكرة جمهور السينما في العراق مئات الافلام الأجنبية.

وكيف لي أن انسى درسه التربوي حين أخذني العام 1968 إلى الفيلم الذي أحدث ضجة في العالم "إلى أستاذي مع التحية". فمع سحر الممثل سدني بواتييه، الأستاذ الذي قرر التصدي لتحسين سلوك طلبة مشاغبين بالتوازي مع إغناء قيم المعرفة والإيثار والصداقة وحب الآخر، ومع غناء لولو التي صارت واحدة من المغنيات البريطانيات الشهيرات، أمكنني أن اخرج من صالة السينما مكتظاً بمشاعر أصيلة عن قدرة السلوك التربوي على تغيير البشر وأفكارهم نحو إتجاه إيجابي يركز على قيم الخير والسلام والتعاون.

وفيما كنت قد تحصلت على قدرة شخصية في مواصلة المعرفة والثقافة بعدما رسّخ فيّ أخي أسساً قوية وثابتة، ظلت "سينما غرناطة" محطة لخطاي منفردة تارة، ومصحوبة باصدقاء وصديقات تارة أخرى، وفيها شاهدت أفلاماً فرنسية بارزة، لا سيما مع موجة أفلام السينما الفرنسية التي غزت بغداد في سبعينيات القرن الماضي، كما في فيلمي "الموت حباً" و"الإغتيال" والأخير كان معالجة سينمائية مؤثرة عن إغتيال السياسي المغربي المهدي بن بركة، في باريس العام 1965.

وإذا كانت "سينما غرناطة" تخصصت بالافلام الاجنبية وتقاليد خاصة، من بينها، عرض فيلم خاص لمرة واحدة في الساعة الواحدة بعد الظهر، لاعلاقة له بالفيلم المعروض طوال اليوم، فان من نافسها على جودة عروض السينما العالمية كانت "سينما سميراميس" في عروض ما كان يعرف حينها تحت اسم "السينما التقدمية" بحسب تعبيرات عقد السبعينيات وتحديداً في أفلام" زد"، "ساكو وفانزيتي" و"حالة حصار"، ومع افكارها "الثورية" كانت تتحول تلك العروض إلى منتديات ثقافية واجتماعية متحركة، فبامكانك مشاركة أي من الجمهور في نقاش حول الأبعاد الفكرية والفنية للعروض، حيث الكثيرون كانوا جاءوا وهم يعرفون إلى أين هم ذاهبون، في تطلع هادر إلى المعرفة والحرص على الإتصال مع كل ما كانت تلك العروض تثيره من ايحاءات ودلالات.

في العام 1970 كنت قد تعرفت لأول مرة على الصالة الانيقة لسينما سميراميس، وكانت تعرض فيلماً وثائقياً عن  مباريات كأس العالم لكرة القدم، التي أقيمت في العام ذاته بالمكسيك، وظفرت بها البرازيل، وظلت اثيرة لديّ حتى العام 1990، حين غزا العراق جاره الجنوبي ليبدأ منها مرحلة انحداره الثقافي والمدني، حين جاءت العقوبات الدولية الأقسى في التاريخ المعاصر، لتنقض على كل ما هو حيوي ثقافياً واجتماعياً واقتصادياً، لتكون الأفلام السينمائية من قائمة المحظورات، وليتسرب الغبار والظلام شيئاً فشيئاً على صالة جديرة بأن تكون منذورة للأحلام والجمال المحلق.

أقل ما يمكن وصف جمهور تلك العروض، هو القول بأنه جمهور مثقف، جمهور متذوق. وعلى الرغم من تغير المزاج الثقافي والسياسي العراقي في ثمانينيات القرن الماضي، إلا أن " سميراميس" حاولت البقاء ما أمكنها حارسة لذوق رفيع في الفن السابع حين وفرت للمشاهدين فرصاً نادرة لمتابعة أفلام بارزة حينها.

خذ مثلاً " نادي القطن" أو "كوتون كلوب" لفرانسيس فورد كوبولا، بأداء لافت لمن سيصبح اليوم أحد نجوم السينما الاميركية الأبرز: ريتشارد غير. حضرت الفيلم وأنا عائد من جولة قتال شرس أخرى، خلال الحرب مع ايران، وتحديداً أوائل العام 1985 واستغرقت عميقاً في جمال مشاهد البارع كوبولا المحلقة بفضل من غنى موسيقى الجاز وعمقها، لا سيما أن الفيلم، كان صورة عن حياة مدينة نيويورك في عشرينيات القرن الماضي، عبر صراعات الناس واضطراب مساراتهم العاطفية والاقتصادية والسلوكية وقد عكسها مكان هو النادي الكائب في حي هارلم، وفي زمن سيصبح تحت رحمة "الكساد العظيم" مما عنى الكثير من الدم والعنف وقد غطى الآلات الموسيقيين وإن كانوا يعزفون لمؤلفين من نوع ديوك الينيغتون.

و"سميراميس" تبدو وكأنها على علاقة بالمخرج اليوناني الأصل، كوستا غافراس، فقد عرضت في العام 1984 فيلما مثيراً للجدل، عراقياً على الأقل. فهو يتعاطى مع قصة محامية إسرائيلية تتولى الدفاع عن معتقل فلسطيني حتى تثبت براءته من تهمة القيام بـ"عملية ارهابية"، وفيه أمكن لعراقيين كثر أن يتلمسوا صورة ما للحياة الإنسانية.

في فيلم" هانا. ك" لكوستا غافراس، أمكن أيضا تلمس الضوء المقدس ما بين أسواق القدس القديمة ومسجد الاقصى وكنائسها، حد أن رعشة قدسية تملكتني وأنا أتابع خطوات الفلسطيني المتهم (أدى دوره الممثل محمد بكري) في تنقله ما بين باحة مسجد قبة الصخرة، وأسواق القدس التي ارتبطت شعوراً عميقاً بأغنية الرحابنة الخالدة "شوارع القدس القديمة". وجاء ذلك الضوء القدسي محمولاً على أجنحة من الرقة، وفرتها موسيقى المؤلف اللبناني الأصل جبريال يارد الذي سيعرفه محبو السينما الرفيعة في بغداد عبر فيلم " وداعاً بونابرت" للمخرج يوسف شاهين.

سينما سميراميس، الكائنة في شارع فرعي بين شارعين هما الأشهر في بغداد: السعدون وأبو نؤاس، كانت شهدت واحدة من حفلات موسيقى البوب النادرة، ففي ليلة رأس السنة 1979- 1980 أحيى فريق موسيقى الديسكو الشهير جداً حينها "ايربشن" حفلة صاخبة تقدمتها بالطبع أغنية "وان واي تيكيت".

ويكاد يكون فيلم "شاعر العنف" المخرج برايان دي بالما " آنتشبيلز" أو"المحصنون"، أحد أخر العروض الرصينة التي عرفتها سمير اميس، قبيل غزو الكويت، ويبدو أن فرط الرصاص الذي شهد الفيلم الذي يصور صراع الشرطة في شيكاغو مع عصابات المافيا، كان متطابقاً مع رصاص حي وحقيقي هذه المرة، انهال ليس على مدينة دار السينما تلك، بل على عموم البلاد حتى انتزع منها، أو كاد، جوانبها الثقافية الحية، ومنها "سميراميس" التي ظلت مؤشراً على مسار جميل لمدينة سيأخذها حكامها والغزاة بإصرار و"بسالة" إلى حياة يحاصرها الغبار والظلام، مثلما كانت دار السينما في العام 2004، حين وجدتها مقبرة لأحلام ومصائر انتقلت من الشاشة إلى الحياة ذاتها.

Early Perspectives from Algeria on Northern Mali and French Intervention

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Thus far, Algerian press coverage and reactions are divided on France’s military intervention in northern Mali, Operation SERVAL, as well as the additional thrusts in the south by Mali’s jihadist coalition. Skepticism that has been prevalent in Algerian media coverage of calls for the internationalization of the Malian crisis remains a strong thread in opinion and editorial writing nonetheless. While significant strands of elite opinionespecially at the political levelappear to have somewhat rallied to support military intervention in northern Mali. At the same time, the Algerian government’s longstanding position in favor of "dialogue" and a "political solution" to the crisis remains evident in press reports, government statements, and skepticism over the prospects that the intervention will successfully resolve Mali’s troubles persists. Comments from Algerian intellectuals depicting the campaign as a "proxy war" of the United States or as destined for failure, and highlights given to the opinions of certain French voices suggest some level of discomfort over France’s intentions and the Algerian government’s role in the crisis; this is to be expected to some extent given the background of distrust between Paris and Algiers over Mali, as well as the nature of Franco-Algerian relations in general. Outside of the major dailies, some confusion does appear to exist over Algiers’ position in the ongoing struggle. This post only reviews French-language media and looks at perspectives through the beginning of the week of 13 January.

Tut Sur Algerie (TSA) has carried several articles looking at Algeria’s response and its evolving role in the crisis. The focus in many of these articles is explaining why Algeria is no longer opposed to the "military option" and why it remains "concerned" over the intervention in general. Algeria’s diplomatic efforts are either described as failures or its differences of opinion with France over intervention is described as part of a long game aimed at eradicating AQIM. These pieces rely heavily or entirely on anonymous Algerian military or security sources. TSA’s coverage is broadly representative of Algerian news coverage of the intervention, laying out a number of different theories and opinions about why the French decided to intervene and why Algeria has decided to cooperate. One piece also argues the objective is to "scuttle" Algerian efforts to promote political dialogue. 

One piece describes Algeria as having put "one foot into the war waged by France in Mali’" by opening its airspace to French over flights and mobilizing forces in southern Algeria. The article quotes a "security source" as stating that the Algerian Air Force "stands ready to intervene if necessary" and "[they] are even ready to participate alongside French forces." The article frames the current situation as a failure for Algiers:

How did Algeria, which has long advocated the option of dialogue before war, find itself involved in this conflict? In recent months, Algerian diplomats have made many statements on the need to focus on a political solution and to avoid a military option. They toured several regional neighbours to rally them to Algeria’s position. It conducted dialogue with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine. [. . .] In fact, long convinced that France would intervene militarily in northern Mali, Algeria sought to gain time to better prepare itself for this war, significantly strengthening southern border security. The French and the Americans wanted the Algeria-Mali border closed to prevent the terrorists from fleeing from a military intervention. once the border was secured, and Algiers agreed to the use of its territory, France could launch military action to regain northern Mali. Algeria is especially brought on this account because it sees the prospect of getting rid of AQIM on its southern border.

Another article argues that Algiers "rallied to the military solution" because "the Tuareg Islamist group," referring to Ansar Ed-Dine, reneged on standing away from the terrorists of AQIM and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). It quotes "a senior Algerian official" as stating that Ansar Ed-Dine "broke their commitment to cease hostilities in accordance with the Algiers Agreements" by joining the AQIM and MUJWA assaults on Konna last week. According to the official, "this gave formal proof that they did not separate from the terrorist groups." The article further quotes this official as describing Algerian efforts to negotiate with Ansar Ed-Dine for a political solution as having gone on "in vain." Still, the anonymous Algerian official argues that "the northern Mali question will not be solved solely by military means. There will be no final and lasting solution beyond political dialogue with representatives from the peoples of the north – the Tuareg, Arabs, and Songhai. After the military phase and once the terrorists are eliminated, the solution will come with political authorities at the heart of the problem."

Still another piece puzzles over Algiers’ "strange silence‘ in response to the strikes in Mali. It argues that in cooperating with Operation SEVAL, Algeria has flipped its position on foreign military intervention – long a fundamental staple in its foreign policy. Of particular concern for the author is that the news that Algeria provided authorization for "unconditional" French over flights came "not from the Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci, or Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, or the Minister of National Defense Abdelmalek Guenaizia," but from the French Foreign Ministry. The author asks why Algeria, "which is usually so attached to its national sovereignty," not inform Algerians of its decision regarding France’s strikes in Mali? It reviews Algeria’s opposition to NATO’s intervention in Libya, which came from its "doctrinaire" opposition to foreign intervention in states’ internal affairs. It then reviews Algeria’s long insistence on a "political solution" to the Mali crisis. It describes the government’s failure to "communicate this strategic information to the public" as "total contempt" for the Algerian body politic. It charges the government with betraying Algeria’s long standing commitment to non-intervention:

Allowing these over flights of military aircraft to bomb another country means that Algeria has completely abandoned its basic doctrine and now endorses foreign military intervention in Mali or elsewhere. This sudden and significant change in position is curiously surrounded by a heavy silence of the Algerian political class. The parties like the FLN, RND, and PT, while they warned against ‘the presence of foreign troops on our southern border,’ have fallen into a deep silence. Treatment of the Malian crisis by the imposition of the French military, the former colonial power, a NATO member state, is at this point the consensus within the country? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which called France a ‘friendly power,’ has merely a single statement.

It urges the Algerian government to adopt a "permanent presence in the field of communication to at least explain official positions to the people and to try and convince the Algerians." It accuses the government of "making the same mistakes" as the former regimes in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt and despairs that the Algerian parliament cannot be counted on to "initiate a national debate on the issue of the mismanagement of Algeria’s Mali diplomacy."

Another TSA story looks at reactions on Algerian social media. It summarizes the responses as mounting to bitter, sarcastic surprise--a common refrain being "isn’t Algeria a sovereign country?" It describes Algerian social media users as criticizing Algeria’s decision to support the intervention – citing historic markers, such as the Congress of Soummam, where Algeria’s independence era leaders pledged against interventionism and interference in other countries’ internal affairs. Facebook users are quoted as referring to French over flights as"shameful."

Yet another critical article is entitled: "Mali: How Algeria has Shot itself in the Foot." The piece reviews Algeria’s diplomatic efforts in Kidal and promotion of "dialogue" as the solution to the crisis, noting that "all channels of Algerian diplomacy were mobilized to defend this fairly respectable position" and drawing a comparison between the take over of Afghanistan by the Taliban and the US "intervention" there after 9/11, which was intended to dislodge the movement but has not succeeded in eradicating it. It decries Bouteflika’s "silence" on the current situation, asking "what is the true position of Bouteflika on the Mali case," quoting the official Algerian news wire service of only days previous, having reviewed the president’s position in favor of a negotiated settlement in Mali. The piece reviews the statements of Foreign Ministry spokesman Amar Belani, as the Islamist coalition moved south attracting French intervention. It also questions how Algeria has publicly supported the "territorial integrity of Mali," and Algeria’s background of public opposition to military intervention in the Sahel, while describing France as a "friendly power" and allowing it to launch military action in Mali. Now, the author writes, "we do not know how the Algerian head of state regards the crisis." This runs along a common, frustrated theme in a significant portion of Algerian writing on the government’s public stance on the situation in Mali. It ridicules Algeria’s diplomatic leadership:

The capacity of Algerian diplomacy to shoot itself in the foot is amazing. What point did all these negotiations with the MNLA and Ansar Dine serve? There is the perfume of treason in the air. Algiers has not only failed to release its diplomats held hostage by MUJWA in the Gao region, but it is also poised to lose Ansar Dine as an interlocutor. Worse, the credibility of Algerian foreign policy has also been dealt a serious blow. Who is to blame?

The author accuses Bouteflika of blindly seeking a fourth term in office, "throwing down the sacred principles of the nation." It surmises that Paris informed Algiers of its plans to intervene in Mali and that "Algiers did not find fault because of secret agreements established during François Hollande’s visit in Algeria." It accuses Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal of providing public cover for "the reversal." It also casts skepticism on the legal premise of France’s intervention and argues "it is too easy to say that Bamako’s decision to call in the army of the former colonial power is sovereign, as the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims." Scathingly, it asserts "if Algeria’s diplomacy was persuasive and convincing, there would be no need for Mali to call on the 'help' of Paris to 'save' it from 'savages' in the north. Is not Mali part of the 'core countries' supposed to coordinate around Algeria for operation action against terrorism in the Sahel?" It continues arguing that the Comité d'état-major opérationnel conjoint (CEMOC) – which includes Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Algeria, "should have been able to set up a joint force to counter act the actions of terrorist groups in the Sahel. What of the military staff members in Tamanrasset: Nothing!" The conclusion mocks Bouteflika’s 1999 campaign promise to "rehabilitate Algeria’s international image" —"La réussite, comme on le constate aujourd’hui, est éclatante!"

El Watan, Algeria’s premier French-language paper, carried narratives similar to those above. Early articles have noted the Foreign Ministry’s "silence" about the decision to allow French over flights, while also highlighting measures taken by the Algerian security forces in southern Algeria over the last year, including the deployment of 35,000 men to the southern border with Mali. El Watan highlighted meetings between top Algerian officials and other regional leaders — notably PM Abdelmalek Sellal’s attendance at the Ghadames Summit in Libya and his meetings with Malian PM Diango Cissoko. It highlights Sellal’s change in tone, comparing it that of a "warrior," since France launched its raids in Mali:

We supported dialogue to the maximum and continue to do so, but in the case of infringements of security and the use of other means, we stand firm [. . .] The crisis in Mali will have a direct impact on the region. It is not a simple case of terrorism, organized crime that uses drugs and launders money.

It describes Algeria as initially reluctant to accept a military option but "now embedded in a war international in operational scope." It reiterates concerns among Algerian elites that the country could become like Pakistan, a rear base for Western wars and a client state whose territorial and political sovereignty is ambiguous. "Public opinion is outrageously cynical when a war comes to our borders and three Algerian diplomats are in the hands of jihadist groups." 

El Watan still describes the much talked about "political solution" favored by Algiers as being on decision-makers’ minds. An article entitled "War Causes More Problems Than it Solves" features comments from Ahmed Idebir, the amenokal of the Algerian Tuaregs in the Ahaggar. Idebir, who is also a senator, has previously told the media about his opposition to military intervention in northern Mali. Idebir argues that war will complicate the situation in Mali and the wider region, accusing France of holding a destabilizing "hegemonic policy in the Sahara" with "other interests aside from fighting terrorism." The article goes on to quote the senator as arguing that the Libyan crisis has created a "new context," weakening the region, and predicting that "this war will push thousands of people in exile along the border regions, already heavily affected by successive outflows related to the various rebellions. We have an increasingly large refugee community to take charge of and secure." The article states that "about forty-five nationalities" are now represented in Tamanrasset and that "the economic situation in the region is very difficult with tourist season due to be catastrophic due to events in northern Mali." Additionally, Idebir states that "thousands of Tuareg" in Mali, Niger, and Mauritania have Algerian papers, which are circulating around. He states that while in the past, it was fine to give papers to people who passed through frequently. He argues for greater vigilance for fraudulent papers or people using papers illegally, explaining "harm comes from those who have decided to give this heavy responsibility, under the sovereignty of the nation, to unauthorized persons." 

Media comments suggest Algerian public opinion is intensely divided over the intervention. These divisions are expressed in the local press, with the El Watan editor Omar Belhouchet expressing "absolute" support for the intervention and Kamel Daoud offering scathing criticism. More than one paper gave space and attention to comments by French defense analysts such as Eric Denécé and from former French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin regarding the wisdom of Operation SERVAL. There has been plenty of open criticism of France as well. Much of this coverage reflects the still adversarial perceptions many Algerians – those in the elite and the masses – have of French foreign policy. 

Le Temps, which often carries hardline pieces on terrorism, published an interview with Algerian professor, Menas Mesbah, which accused the United States of running a "proxy war" in northern Mali. He argues that the war in Mali illustrates "a new game in the world where the US entrusts wars with other countries to its allies." Mesbah predicts a "quagmire" in Mali if the war is long and that the conflict "will have an impact on Algeria. Mesbah also predicts an "exodus" of Malians into southern Algeria as the war continues. Still, according to Mesbah, "Algeria will not participate in the war in Mali."

Le Temps also ran a summary of a commentary by Laid Seraghni. Seraghni argues that France’s intervention come under "the false pretext of restoring the constitutional order that is, in reality, the colonial order established to protect its interests." The author argues that the intervention will "affect and destablize all the countries in the Sahel region, including Algeria, whose borders are so great that the state can not counter the infiltration of terrorist groups." "According to him," Le Temps writes, "this intervention ‘would force Algeria to consider the military option to protect its borders and the Algerian population in the region of Kidal (Mali). The Algerian army will face the rebels of Ansar Eddine, AQIM, and MUJAO.'" Additionally, the intervention will leave Algeria "surrounded by the French army operating Libya, Ivory Coast, Niger, Mauritania, Chad and Mali." The article argues that Algeria is being "targeted by France," using Seraghni’s piece as backup:

Since colonization, Algeria has always claimed its independence and sovereignty. The Algerian revolution of 1957, derailed the plan to create an independent Tuareg state controlled by the colonial power. Algeria refuses to admit French bases on its territory, whose primary mission is to monitor and pressure the Algerian state.

Seraghni argues that "anyone who follows relations between Algeria and France knows that it is not Mali which raises the attention of French power, but Algeria." The author accuses French elites of having "never forgiven the independence of Algeria, which paved the way for the decolonization of Africa" concluding by reminding readers to recall "the phrase of Charles de Gaulle who declared that "France has no friends, she has only interests.’"

On the eve of the intervention, Le Temps also published a series of articles based on interviews with French analyst Eric Denécé. The headlines for these, mostly short articles, highlighted points of distrust between Algeria and France – "The French have prejudices against Algerians" for example – or praise for Algeria’s efforts in Mali  — "The Algerian strategy for the crisis in Mali will bear fruit."

In an interview with the French-language daily, Le Soir d’Algerie, political science professor Ahmed Adimi described the intervention as an attempt to "undermine Algeria" and a "step in a plan for the installation of foreign forces in the Sahel region." Adimi’s thesis is that France has worked for years to destabilize the Sahel as a means of strengthening its geopolitical stance. Asked whether the French operation in Mali was consistent with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2085, Adimi states the following:

Western powers have used it to intervene and adopt resolutions to justify their military operations. This has already happened in Iraq. In fact, the French operation may seem legal since it comes at the request of the acting president of Mali. However, it is important to remember that the current government came to power in a coup.

Adimi argues that Algerians have "been sounding the alarm about the situation in the Sahel in general." He goes on to argue:

Ahmed Barkouk and myself have organized several seminars on this topic. We discussed the role of France and its commitment to the region. It was France that was behind the creation of the movement for the Azawad and I speak of course of the political organization and not of the people of Azawad who have rights as a community. The French knew that their intervention in Libya would lead to a return of the pro-Gaddafi military Tuareg to Mali. They also planned the release of Libyan arms stockpiles across the Sahel band. The project is to transform the region into a new Afghanistan, the result of long term planning.

While Adimi argues that "the war will surely last for a long time," he does not believe the French have the capacity to erode the armed groups in Mali, since leaders from these organizations can count on "jihadists from all over the world" to "flock to participate in this new crusade." He predicts, at the suggestion of the interviewer, that the French will find themselves in a situation similar to that of the Americans in Somalia, producing a "catastrophic situation" resulting from entering the conflict "in haste." Adimi then argues that Algeria faces a "dilemma":

On the one hand it acknowledges that it is the Malian government that has appealed to the French, so this in not an occupation. But on the other hand, Algeria is very concerned about the events occurring along its border in Mali. A strong and powerful state should not allow this to happen along its borders. But we must recognize that it is the absence of Algerian diplomacy in Africa that has allowed this. We totally lost the influence we previously had on this continent and we are paying the price for absence. The consequences could be difficult to bear. Honestly, I think the next step will be the sharing of southern Algeria. Foreign intervention in Mali aims to weaken the Algerian state, this is a reality. I tend to see danger everywhere, but the risks are real."

Adimi suggests Algiers increase its diplomatic profile in Africa; he compares Algeria to Morocco, which he says has a presence "everywhere in Africa." Secondly, he recommends that the government invest more in development in southern Algeria. Accusing the government of failing to formulate an adequate policy in the region, Adimi concludes by stating that the army should be the last resort and that "national defense is not only the duty of the army, but also the policymakers."

Kamel Daoud, a prominent Algerian columnist, ponders the possibility of Algeria becoming "Pakistanized" – "a country reduced to the status of a nursery of explosive barracks, drones, services, cells, coups, and collaborators. A country that finds its legitimacy in its 'international' usefulness, and its geostrategic rent." Daoud recalls comments from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her visit to Algiers late last year about what "Algeria must" do in cooperation with international anti-terrorism efforts. Daoud fears that Algeria’s growing ties to the US and other Western powers puts Algeria at risk of becoming less stable, less independent. Daoud predicts that France’s attack on the armed groups in Mali will grow into "an open war" that sucks in Algeria. He imagines North-West Africa as South Asia:

Obliged to play false neutrality or cooperate for the sake of internal balances against its own population and emergency external support. It will emerge from general restlessness and agitation and the Talibanization of the periphery, in the worst scenarios. Will Tunisia be Sri Lanka, and Morocco India, with a smaller and more devious SADR [Polisario-controlled Western Sahara] as Kashmir? Libya? A black hole. Mali? Karzai’s Afghanistan with the French in Bamako.

Daoud describes Algeria as it is now as too centralized and too post-colonial to handle the evolving crises in the region, arguing that the state must "reform or collapse."

Finally, another Algerian columnist, Brahim Younnessi, criticized the Algerian government for not informing the government or public about its decision to allow French over flights. "Algeria is at war. How can we think otherwise when French military aircrafts are permitted to fly over the sky to hit Algerian armed groups in northern Mali?" Younnessi argues that southern Algeria has been an area of strategic depth for groups like Ansar Ed-Dine, AQIM and MUJWA; fighters fleeing the bombing will probably move north, attempting to enter Algeria. The mobilization of Algerian troops along the border in the sixth military region means that Algerians will "be forced to engage in ground combat" with these armed groups, under "French air cover." He overviews intelligence and other support reportedly given by Americans to the French; he then states: "There is no doubt that Algeria, which wants to prevent any incursion on its territory enjoys all the information gleaned by the French military services." Although Algiers says it does not want to act against armed groups 'outside of its territory,’ they may need to go beyond the border since the MNLA (the non-Islamist Tuareg group that helped initiate the rebellion in the north, only to be outgunned and smarted by the Islamists) "cannot face them alone."

Overall, the Algerian government’s decision to allow over flight rights to the French Air Force, along with troop and helicopter movements in southern Algeria, suggest Algiers will likely play an enabling role by opening airspace, attempting to block off escape routes, and sharing intelligence. The Algerians may also seek to assist in negotiating post-war planning, despite the failure of its diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Ansar Ed-Dine and Bamako. The timing of Malian Prime Minister Diango Cissoko’s two-day visit to Algiers speaks to Algiers’s continuing desire to impact political conditions in Mali. France’s aggressive (speaking descriptively, not legally) moves in Mali appear to have given momentum to international and regional efforts to push forward an intervention in Mali and may be bringing along Algeria at the same time. There is one main message coming out in certain Algerian press accounts, namely in Francophone press via anonymous security officials. The message is that Algeria decided to abandon dialogue with Ansar Ed-Dine and others in northern Mali in favor of an immediate armed campaign when its leaders renounced non-aggression pacts they signed at Algiers’s egging and participated in attacks in Konna and elsewhere with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

[A version of this article was originally published on The Moor Next Door.]


The Human Rights Situation in Egypt: An Interview with Aida Seif El-Dawla

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Aida Seif El-Dawla is a psychiatrist, long time Egyptian human rights activist, and Executive Director of the al-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence. Since 1993 the Nadeem Center has worked both to rehabilitate victims of state torture while also helping to mobilize different societal sectors in Egypt against the state practice.  This interview was conducted with El-Dawla by email and in person at the Nadeem Center office in Cairo in November and December 2011. The interview discusses the current human rights situation in Egypt as well as some of the structural issues that Egyptian human rights advocates continue to confront as they attempt to build a stronger institutional and cultural culture of human rights in Egypt.

Mark Levine (ML): In a recently released report on the human rights situation in Egypt, you point out that President Mors’s first one-hundred days coincided with the anniversary of the Maspero Massacre in October 2011. It seems that this coincidence is about more than just a date. As you argue, "[o]ur [research] shows that the regime did not change, that torture remains systematic, the police continues to enjoy impunity, justice has not been enforced." Is this continuation of systematic abuses a result of the entrenched power of the old system, especially in the police, which Morsi has little power to change, or has he in fact become a part of the machine/system that he swore to replace?

Aida Seif Al-Dawla (ASD): I think that Morsi is still ruling with the old regime machinery. I have doubts that he wants to change it as long as it performs its function in protecting the regime, protecting him and his party. I understand that purging the Ministry of Interior and state security apparatus from corruption and abusive officers takes time, but there is no political will to do that, even after the passage of the draft constitution in December.

For example, had he been serious, Morsi could have ordered the Minister of Interior to remove torture equipment from police stations, to order him to tell his staff to pull themselves together, and to push for prosecution of officers accused of torture. In November it was reported that the President's office ordered the prosecution of a sergeant who is said to have verbally abused Morsi's son. He did not issue a similar order in response to the various reports that were issued by human rights groups after his first one-hundred days of rule. He claimed that he had ordered the Ministry of Interior to investigate allegations and to prepare a report on the state of human rights abuses within a maximum period of fifteen days. Those fifteen days ended on the eighteenth of October. And until now there is no reply, not even a denial of a problem in this regard. Sadly, eradicating state torture is not among Morsi's priorities. In fact, it has not been a priority for any of the presidential candidates in 2012. Even those who mentioned it were talking about torture during the Mubarak rule. Atrocities committed by the army and the police since Mubarak's removal from power have not been an issue. 

ML: Do you think that the average Egyptian has more awareness of  the content and the significance of human rights now than she or he might have had before the revolution?

ASD: I think that the average Egyptian is more aware of his right to dignity. Whether or not these are translated into human rights principles, i.e. whether or not people are aware of the conventions and the provisions is not important. One thing that has survived the counter-revolution in Egypt is people's sense of being capable of change, and their refusal to tolerate humiliation. They have not forgotten how they stood up to the police and the military. The images of the martyrs remain very alive in people's minds. The one thing that the revolution succeeded in reclaiming is the dignity of Egyptian people and their sense of entitlement to a better life.

ML: Based on what you have seen of the emerging constitutional proposals, is there the possibility that the new constitution will have enough provisions to protecthuman rights thus making it harder for governments to violate them with impunity?

ASD: The constitution is filled with ambiguity that lends itself well to manipulaton. A flagrant example of this ambiguity is reflected in a statement made by the Prime Minister. He said that labor strikes are allowed provided they do not take place within working hours, which of course renders strikes useless in practice even if they are not technically outlawed. More broadly, so many draft articles include language stating that something is considered legal “according to the law.” But of course a law can be so restrictive so as to make the right meaningless in practice.

In contrast, there are some issues that are not mentioned at all. Look at torture. The term itself does not appear anywhere in the constitution. Furthermore most of the torture that happens in police stations takes place during and immediately after arrest, to draw confessions or whatever before a case is completed or fabricated. The constitution permits the detention of someone for something like twelve hours, if I remember correctly, during which time the detainee is not entitled to know the reason for his arrest, nor can he contact anybody. Those first hours in police custody carry all the risk of all forms of torture and maltreatment. Indeed, just the other day a person apparently died a couple of hours after entering a police station.

As we see, laws can be drafted in a way that can make a constitutional provision meaningless. There is no acknowledgment of an absolute right and human rights did not seem to be a major concern of the Constitutional Committee. Instead, what appeared to be important to them was how to maintain control within the boundaries of the interests of the ruling party and its ability to retain political and economic control over society, as well as the boundaries of the Sharia. And even there they do not seem to be in agreement.

On a positive note, this process did not unfold without resistance at the grassroots level. That protest which led Morsi and the government to be too afraid to present even a draft of the constitution for public debate until a final draft was rushed through the Committee.

ML: One of the main institutions, if not the only institution, in Mubarak-era Egypt to act as a brake against Government abuses was the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC). But in the last decade, Mubarak managed to change the make-up and the rules of the Court in order to weaken its ability to push back against policies and actions that violated the constitution. How is the SCC functioning now and are you hopeful that, with the new constitution, it will regain its role as protector of core human and political rights for Egyptians, regardless of the goals and policies of the government? 

ASD: Again, this mostly happened during the Mubarak regime to the extent that it allowed such pushback to occur. And Court rulings, however positive [from a human rights perspective], were not always implemented. For example, we have several court rulings ordering privatized companies to be returned to the state, as well as a ruling for a minimum wage, none of which have been implemented. The Supreme Constitutional court became and remains politicized. Today, some of its most senior judges also hold high political posts in their judicial capacity, which harms their impartiality. There is nothing in the new Constitution that will address this problem.

ML: During Mubarak’s rule, at times there was real dialogue and even coordination between human rights  activists, political forces, and even sympathetic members of the judiciary. Are you seeing political activists, parliamentarians, or those who served in the Assembly before it was suspended, and even government officials interacting more regularly with human rights groups and activists in the emerging political system? Or are human rights groups being marginalized as new centers of power are created?  

ASD: The Mubarak era saw such coordination at moments of strong confrontation against the regime, e.g. the rise of the Kefaya movement, the movement for the independence of the judiciary, torture of renowned democracy activists, and the like. Those moments had specific objectives and were short lived; an overall picture and vision for the future was thus never shared. I dare say it was never even there. Not then, and not now. Thus, when everybody in Tahrir chanted "The people want to topple the regime" it was a unified slogan but did not mean the same thing for everybody. Some saw the change mainly in the change of Mubarak and his narrow clique, others were more serious in what they demanded.

This discrepancy revealed itself in later positions by core activists of the Tahrir uprising through 11 February 2012: leave or stay in Tahrir after the 11th, meet or not meet with Omar Soliman, or Sharaf, join or not join the Constitutional Committee and even now, meet or not meet with the president and share in the consultation meetings. The political landscape is rife with internal conflict. Nonetheless, the political picture appears to be split between the Islamists and the Liberals, given the complexity amongst all civil society actors, this is not accurate. Indeed, it falls into the trap that the Islamists intended, namely to project the conflict as one between those calling for a religious state and those calling for a secular one.  

Perhaps the most important consequence of this framing of the political debate is that it completely excludes the drive and struggle for socioeconomic rights. Here it is important to understand that too many analyses, both inside and outside Egypt, want to simplify the debates for broader consumption. So, if it becomes too complex they reduce it. Even within the human rights movements, civil and political rights are overshadowing the social and economic rights. Egyptian liberals joined the Mubarak-era leftovers as well as the Brotherhood in describing workers strikes as actions with narrow demands that should wait until the nation has been rebuilt. And when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued its first legislative bill against strikes and sit-ins, the legislation was welcomed by all political elite including those who describe themselves as liberals. What is new is that human rights issues, both political/civil and social/economic are taken up by youth groups who are not limited by their organizations, organizational demands, or political interests. This gives the whole human rights struggle a popular dimension that it lacked over the previous decades.

ML: Since the beginning of the uprisings across the region there have been conservative voices/figures who have appropriated the term "human rights defender" and similar terms in order to pursue an agenda that in fact seeks to curtail and restrict human rights and other freedoms, especially if they are perceived to violate sharia or supposed cultural norms. Is this also happening in Egypt? Or is the idea of human rights understood well enough by the public today to make it hard for conservatives or the government appropriate it to violated human rights? Do you see a new generation of activists who are more willing to support a full human rights agenda even when it might challenge their particular beliefs or interests? 

ASD: I do no't know about a full human rights agenda. I dare say that only a few human rights organizations support a full human rights agenda. But people understand what is in their interest or what is not. I think there are many people who would defend the implementation of Sharia while meaning something different from what the Brotherhood means, and these in turn mean something different from what the Salafis mean. Sharia is a very broad term with varying substance depending on who is interpreting it. But what is felt on the street is that the Islam Egypt knew for so long is different from the one proposed now by the Islamist groups, who also differ among themselves.

Every statement or proposal of a restrictive law suggested by a Salafi or Islamic authority, especially those suggesting weird things such as early marriage of girls, as young as nine years old, are met with excessive ridicule among social media groups and users. What is new is the fact that those fatwas are no longer terrifying to people, but are ridiculed. This holiness of what Islamists say is no longer there. Rights activists, both in organizations and in pressure groups on the street, have an opportunity to make use of this, provided they do not alienate themselves from the majority of the Egyptian people, amongst whom a head cover has almost become a national dress for both Copts and Muslims, where the majority of girls are still being circumcised, again both Copts and Muslims, and where the right to drink alcohol and wear a bikini is not on the agenda of a people the majority of whom have probably never been to the sea. 

Until now, I think, this opportunity has not been effectively used. Until now, I think, we are being drawn to react to an agenda set by the very forces and groups we are opposing. 

ML: But will the calculus change now that the constitution has been approved, however faulty the process? 

ASD: The strong opposition to the draft constitution and the low turn-out for the referendum show that people are not accepting it without protest. Morsi in many ways has become like Obama, who depends on the military and security apparatuses to rule. He had two choices at the start of his Presidency to protect his rule: the people or the army. But because of his economic policies he can not use the people to defend his authority because the people want bread and a real minimum wage. So he had to rely on the army and existing political-economic-security elite. It will take time, but this will doom him in the end as his policies are shown clearly to serve their interests and not the majority of supporters of the FJP who voted for him. 

Moreover, with the most recent violence, at the Ittihediyya Palace, the fact that forty-three people were held captive by Muslim Brotherhood members, and that there are testimonies now on YouTube by the captives describing torture, letting the world know that there was literally a chamber in the Presidential Palace used to torture people [during the protests]. He has lost an incredible amount of legitimacy with average people. The problem is that the opposition has so much work to do to offer a credible alternative. Look at the labor movement. Not only did it not manage to bring large numbers of workers, as workers, into the streets in response to the attacks on protesters at Ittihediyya or Tahrir, but it's clear that the long-term issue of trade union activists fearing to be too directly political has not been overcome yet.

ML: What is the most important thing that can be done to put activists and scholars working on human rights into more productive dialogue? 

ASD: Well, if you look at some of the books that discuss issues related to human rights, they are written with such jargon, so technical and impossible for those outside a narrow group of philosophers or critics or specialists to understand, that they're just not useful for activists on the ground. You gave me some books last time we met from a famous philosopher who works on the issue we've discussed. I tried to read them but I could get past a few pages and then closed the book. What good is that? How does that help me? We need scholars to give more attention to thinking and writing in an accessible language and with concepts that are useful to activists working on the ground to fight against these practices, not have a language that adds to the burden. Otherwise, what good is all this scholarship to activists on the ground? 

New Texts Out Now: Madawi Al-Rasheed, A Most Masculine State: Gender, Politics, and Religion in Saudi Arabia

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Madawi Al-Rasheed,A Most Masculine State: Gender, Politics, and Religion in Saudi Arabia.Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Madawi Al-Rasheed (MAR): First, the banality of superficial opinions on Saudi women that is so pervasive. In the public sphere, especially in the West, Saudi women are either superstars or victims of their own society and religion. I felt it was time to contribute to this debate from an academic perspective. I do not want to write a book that celebrates the achievement of Saudi women, seeks pity, or even condemns them to the duality of victim/survivor. As a woman with a Saudi background, I feel that we share with other women a certain degree of discrimination and have our own grievances as Saudis. I also feel uncomfortable with the category of “women” as a homogeneous undifferentiated mass. Class, ethnicity, and religious affiliations cut across this category that is varied, stratified, and experiences discrimination in different ways. So the book reflects my own personal journey first, and second, my academic interests.

My previous work always had an awareness of the construction of gender, and the role of women in politics, society, and religion. Since my PhD research in the 1980s, I allowed women their place in my political and historical narratives about the Saudi past and present. More recently, in A History of Saudi Arabia (2002 and 2010), I demonstrated how women feature in the legitimacy narratives of the state and its quest to merge with society as a result of marriage. In A Most Masculine State, I gave this awareness the attention it deserves by situating gender at the center of debates about politics and religion. I have thought about this book for years. It became an urgent project as the Saudi “woman question” has ceased to be merely a local issue and has become a truly global concern. This was an outcome of Saudi internal challenges and external pressure, especially after 9/11, when Saudi Arabia came to the forefront, not simply as an oil producing territory, but as a contested country.

J: What particular topics, issues and literatures does it address?

MAR: The book tries to resolve the debate about whether society, culture, and religion are responsible for the extreme marginalization of Saudi women in the public sphere. I argue that neither Wahhabi Islam nor a tribal ethos is alone sufficient a variable for explaining inequality in Saudi Arabia. Instead, my argument situates this discrimination in the evolution of the state from one relying on religious revival to one anchored in religious nationalism. Under the state, Wahhabiyya became a religious nationalist movement, playing a similar role to that of secular nationalism in Arab countries where secular Arab nationalism was promoted. Nationalism in both situations tends to appropriate women, turn them into symbols, objectify them, and make them the criteria for measuring sometimes contradictory outcomes. Women are central to political and religious projects. In the process of serving the nation, they lose control over their destiny and become subject to other people’s projects.

I also problematize the role of oil in the book. It is true that the oil surplus allowed women education and welfare services, but it has also contributed to their further marginalization and exclusion from the labour force, and has even contributed to increasing state control through the use of surveillance technology and expansion of institutions such as the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prohibition of Vice. Without oil, the Saudi state would not have been able to maintain sex segregation, control, and surveillance in public spaces. Oil is therefore a mixed blessing.

At another level, as Saudi women’s organizations and civil society are still curtailed, I found myself using the abundant women’s literature, for example novels, in which women have found a niche to express dissent, resistance, and subversion of the status quo. I examined these novels from an anthropological rather than literary criticism perspective. Saudi women’s novels blur the boundaries between fiction and non-fiction. This became clear when I started interviewing novelists and discussing issues wider than literature.

The book engages with academic work in gender studies, feminist theory, and politics. It also has a diachronic dimension to allow tracing change and continuity, especially in a country that has undergone dramatic social change over a short period. 

J: How does this work connect to and/or depart from your previous research and writing?

MAR: I consider the book as illustrating an approach I have adopted in my previous work. I always combine history and anthropology to understand the present. Yet the book differs from my earlier work in two ways: first, its subject matter (the centrality of gender relations); and second, its wide range of sources, such as textual documents, interviews, and even internet sources. The latter became important as women’s mobilization migrated or was forced to migrate to the virtual world. The internet has become a refuge for dissenting voices through Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube; all are incorporated in my analysis. These new sources represent a challenge to research, but together with other sources, they actually illuminate new areas, especially youth mobilization, resistance, and subversion.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MAR: As the book is written in English, its prime audiences are English speakers. Academics and students would obviously be the first to read it, but I hope that its topic and style will encourage policy makers, journalists, activists, and other interested civil society organizations to read it too. The book offers an interpretive approach to understanding the complexity of Saudi society. I hope the book will be translated into Arabic, as my other books have been, so that it can reach Arabic speakers in general and Saudis in particular. They will find reflections on developments that they live in their everyday life, but written from afar. In particular, Saudi women of all political and ideological persuasions, from liberals to Islamists to undecided ones, will hear their voices in this book.

J: What methodologies did you use to gather information from Saudi women on questions of equality and recognition in the current public sphere?

MAR: My textual sources include government publications, novels, media interviews, and statistics from NGOs and international organizations.

I complemented those with interviews. I have travelled in the Middle East to meet Saudi women and interview them. When this was not possible, we talked on Skype and exchanged emails and tweets. Sometimes, women themselves contacted me, seeking to inset their stories in the book as soon as I published short articles while still researching the topic. They sent me documents in which evidence of their plight was documented. Some women wrote their own life histories and sent them to me. I even met women royals and wives of princes who wanted to talk about certain issues. Of course, I could not have used all this material, as it can be confidential, but the stories informed my understanding of gender relations in my own country.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MAR: At the moment, I am recovering from writing a Most Masculine State and enjoying the company of my students after two years of absence under the Leverhulme Research Fellowship.

I have plans to start a new research project on topics that have become urgent with the Arab uprisings: for example, the body and political dissent. The body as a weapon, consent, and dissent appeal to me as ways to trace historical shifts and contemporary transformations.

Excerpt fromA Most Masculine State: Gender, Politics and Religion in Saudi Arabia

Authoritarian States and Women: Low Cost, High Profit

Weaving the story of Saudi women’s exclusion together with religion and politics opens new avenues for contextualizing and interpreting why authoritarian states such as Saudi Arabia champion women’s causes. While in the past Saudi religious nationalism dictated the position of women and insisted on their seclusion, today the state promotes women’s empowerment. The cost of this about-face remains low compared with the high cost of losing international legitimacy, internal political dissent, and, eventually, revolution. Women’s empowerment under King Abdullah coincided with the advent of many new challenges, both internal and external, to the Saudi state. Terrorism, strained relations with the United States—the guarantor of the security of the regime—rising unemployment, an agitated youth bulge, and more recently a changed Arab world where friendly dictators may appear a thing of the past are but a few of the real threats facing the ageing Saudi leadership. And, through both real and virtual mobilization, women themselves are challenging the state to act on their many grievances. International human rights reports continue to embarrass Saudi Arabia in the global community, not to mention sensational stories about women flogged for driving or victims of rape stoned while their attackers go unpunished. The state can no longer hide behind the rhetoric of Islamic specificity, as many women themselves are aware that Islam alone does not explain their persistent marginalization.

In this changed context, the king has shifted the legitimacy of the ruling family to a new level, seeking to feminize the masculine state. From the point of view of the state, women are needed as a group in order to fight political dissent (by men) and appease the West. The state is playing on women’s aspirations and co-opting their mobilization to achieve new local and external legitimacy. Faced with new mobilization around several campaigns, from driving to employment rights, as discussed above, it has pre-empted the outcome by patronizing women and channelling their activism towards state-controlled objectives. This culminated in promising women the right to vote in the future and to be appointed to state institutions, all announced during the Arab Spring.

Moreover, women’s causes do not directly challenge authoritarian rule. When the state decided that its religious nationalism had become a burden on state security and survival, it immediately championed women’s causes as a means to defeat those Islamists who challenge it using both peaceful and violent means. It reached out to new liberal and democratic political constituencies, consisting of both men and women, that have emerged in the country over the last decade. In this respect, the authoritarian state kills two birds with one woman. It contrasts itself with the radical backward and conservative elements in society while appealing to dissenting liberal voices. As such, the Saudi state has been compelled to champion women’s causes to achieve its local and international objectives. Since 2005 King Abdullah has joined past rulers in the Arab and Muslim world to become a gender reformer, seeking new legitimacy through the women’s question. The king’s old age and marginality within the royal circles of power also prompted him to seek new loyal subjects, who had been marginalized in the past. Women have proved to be receptive. 

If the authoritarian state benefits from championing women’s causes, why do women ally themselves with authoritarian patriarchal structures to achieve more rights and visibility while others invite the state to maintain the status quo? Saudi women have not been able to gain the consensus of their society behind their emancipation. In fact, some women resist the idea, and seek greater restrictions on what they consider to be threatening their own interest as women. Given such a lack of unity, weak groups such as liberal women seek state intervention and protection to avoid reprisals from society. This is compounded by the fact that women are denied the right to organize themselves into an autonomous pressure group. In fact, Saudi Arabia remains one of the countries where civil society is curtailed by a legal system that does not leave great space for non-governmental organizations to operate outside state control. Even women’s charities are heavily controlled by the state through extensive princely patronage networks. Saudi women of all persuasions look for the state to increase its policing of men, restrain their excesses, and force them to fulfil their obligations and responsibilities towards women. In such a political context, Saudi women are left with limited choices. An authoritarian state proved to be willing to endorse some of their demands, increase their visibility, and free them from the many restrictions that they are subjected to. The power of the state and its wealth have proved too good to resist. 

This book showed that a most masculine state is today, at critical moments of historical crisis, compelled to espouse its own feminization. It is not possible to maintain a purely masculine state, continuing to ignore feminine voices. By championing women’s causes the authoritarian Saudi state may in the short term have succeeded in containing women’s mobilisation. But in the long term no doubt Saudi women like other women in the world will try to move beyond state-sponsored feminism and achieve their dream of becoming full citizens. The journey may be long and arduous, but it has certainly started. The voices of the many Saudi women discussed in this book represent light at the end of the tunnel. This book was an attempt to capture this light.

[Excerpted from A Most Masculine State: Gender, Politics and Religion in Saudi Arabia, by Madawi Al-Rasheed, by permission of the author. © 2013 Madawi Al-Rasheed. For more information, or to order the book, click here.]

New Texts Out Now: Paolo Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism

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Paolo Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism. London and New York: Pluto Books, 2012.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Paolo Gerbaudo (PG): I have been involved in progressive social movements in Italy and the UK for the last twelve years, some times as a participant, other times as a journalist for il manifesto a newspaper of the Italian New Left, other times as a social movement researcher, and still other times as an organizer. Thus, the first reason for writing this book for me was a strong sense of commitment to, and solidarity with, the movements I studied, and an enthusiasm about the sense of possibility they sparked. Naturally, the position of an activist/researcher is much more problematic than this. I think it should involve some degree of detachment from the social movements one studies, and the capacity to be critical of their doings, to look not only at victories but also at defeats of these movements and at their reasons. This is what I try to do in the book, delving into the contradictions between discourses and practices, and in particular the contradiction between the emphasis on participation in activist culture, on the one hand, and the continuing presence of a diffuse charismatic leadership in contemporary movements, on the other hand.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does it address?

PG: There is one key debate my book is trying to address. It is the academic and pundit debate about the so-called Facebook or social media revolutions: the question of the impact of social media in contemporary movements. This debate is marked by a stark division between techno-optimists like Clay Shirky, who think social media automatically provide movements with formidable mobilizing weapons, and techno-pessimists like Malcom Gladwell and Evgeniy Morozov, who see social media as ineffective at best, dangerous at worst. My book tries to escape the narrow confines of this debate, which has gone on quite fruitlessly for some years now. This is also because my main question is not: are social media good/bad? but rather, what do activists actually do with social media? What is the content they channel through them? Pursuing these questions allows me to open up my analysis to questions of radiclal politics and collective identity, and to the insights of authors like Ernesto Laclau, Alberto Melucci, and Zygmunt Bauman.

J: How does this work connect to and/or depart from your previous research and writing?

PG: My previous research focused on the anti-globalization movement; its theorizing reflected the culture of that cycle of protest, with its emphasis on difference, on autonomy, and on small-group organizing. This previous work, conducted during my PhD studies at Goldsmiths College in London, has been retrospectively useful for identifying the specificity of contemporary movements vis-a-vis the anti-globalization movement, and in particular the popular and majoritarian character of contemporary movements. While changing the object of my research, I have also come to be increasingly skeptical of a series of ideas which animated my previous research, in particular the cult of spontaneity, horizontality, and networks, which became so dogmatic in the anti-globalization movement and is still reflected in contemporary movements.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

PG: The idea of the book is to be an academic book, but an academic book that can speak to publics beyond academia, in particular to the activist community to which it is ideally addressed. My intention was to make the book not only a scholarly inquiry, but also a platform of self-reflection for activists. By discussing issues activists are constantly dealing with in their day-by-day ground operations, the book hopes to inspire and contribute to an organizational rethinking. It invites us to get to grips with some of the most burning failures of contemporary social movements, and in particular their tendency towards evanescence, which reflects the embrace of highly liquid media, such as social media.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

PG: Social movements' communications is and will remain my main area of interest. Critical social media studies is tentatively the type of investigation I want to conduct in the future. However, I am also becoming increasingly interested in the role of social media beyond activism, and its influence on the creation of new urban subcultures, from the artificial love relationships facilitated by dating sites like Badoo, to the new forms of gendered community developing around sites like Pinterest. Studying social media indeed bears much promise for those interested in the transformation of contemporary society, if only we are capable of going beyond the fetishism with objects and technologies that has so far dominated the stage.

J: How does your book expand upon or diverge from recent scholarship on social media and popular protests across the globe?

PG: The thesis of my book goes against much of the grain of theorizing about social media, but also more general theoretical work about the information society, cognitive capitalism, etc. Authors like Manuel Castells, in his work on networks, and of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in their discussion of multitude and swarms, have depicted the contemporary digital society as one marked by irreducible multiplicity, flexibility, and horizontality; individuals do not have to be fused into collective subjects in order to act together. In my book, counter to this strand of theorizing, I emphasize the continuing importance of questions of unity in collective action. I show how social media are used by activists as emotional conduits to facilitate the coming together of an individualized constituencies around common identities, common places, common names, and formats of action. Moreover, I highlight how counter to claims about leaderlessness, social media use is not characterized by absolute horizontality, but is rather accompanied by the rise of new forms of soft leadership. Contrasting interviews, observations, and analysis of social media material I highlight the contradition betweenactivist claims to absolute spontaneity andthe actual practices of social media campaigning. Participation is always framed in a way or another, and in the case of contemporary movements it is chiefly structured by  relatively small group of highly dedicated activists, reluctant leaders, or "movement choreographers." There is no such thing as "unrestrained participation," even in the era of social media.

J: Choreographic leadership and choreography of assembly are two recurring terms in the book. But what do these notions actually mean?

PG:
The term “choreography” is a metaphor to render the idea that at the time of social media protest activity is not as spontaneous and disorganised as it might appear at first sight.  Rather, by using social media, acting as Facebook admins or popular movement tweeps, contemporary digital activists come to act as choregraphers or soft leaders of sorts. Through the messages, suggestions, and instructions they disseminate, they  shape the way in which movements assemble in public space. Yet animated by a libertarian critique of hierarchy shared by many contemporary movements, these leaders do not want to be recognised as such. are never visible on the stage—jJust like a choreographer whose scripts structure the movement of dancers. Secondly, the metaphor serves to express the fact that social media are not about creating "cyberspace" opposed to physical reality. To the contrary, they are about shaping our collective action in physical space, the way in which we come together and act together on the streets of Cairo, Madrid, and New York.

Excerpts from Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism

FROM THE INTRODUCTION

An Emotional Choreography

In this book I argue that social media, as utilized in contemporary social movements, have been chiefly involved in the creation of an emotional choreography of assembly, understood as the mediated “scene-setting” and “scripting” (Alexander et al., 2006: 36) of the participants’ physical assembling in public space. Contrary to those authors who see social media and new media generally as creating an alternative virtual- or cyber-space (for example McCaughey and Ayers, 2003), I adopt the term “choreography of assembly” in order to stress how social media have been used to sustain new forms of physical gathering in public space, providing participants with a common sense of unity, place, and direction in the unfolding of collective action. Countering the spatial dispersion of contemporary societies, Facebook messages and activist tweets have constructed a new sense of social centrality, focused around “occupied squares,” which are thereby transformed into trending places, or venues of magnetic gatherings, with a great power of emotional attraction.

Despite the scepticism of techno-pessimists like Gladwell and Morozov, it is undeniable that social media have had a major impact on the unfolding of collective action, although not at all in the disembodied manner celebrated by techno-optimists like Shirky. At the same time, it is also important to highlight the risk of seclusion that the use of social media can create, when their use is not accompanied by street-work and interaction with those on the other side of the digital divide, who, for instance, “do not have a Facebook account.”

The adoption of the term “choreography” also serves to indicate that the process of the symbolic construction of public space, for all the participatory character and techno-libertarian claims of protest culture, has not been entirely “spontaneous” or “leaderless”—as many pundits, journalists, activists and academics alike have suggested.[1] In a theoretical frame, my main target throughout the book is the discourse of “horizontalism” (Juris, 2008) informed by notions like “networks” (Castells, 1996, 2009) and “swarms” (Negri, Hardt, 2000, 2005), which will be discussed and criticized in the following chapter. I argue that far from inaugurating a situation of absolute “leaderlessness,” social media have in fact facilitated the rise of complex and “liquid” (Bauman, 2000) forms of leadership which exploit the interactive and participatory character of the new communication technologies. Influential Facebook admins and activist tweeps have played a crucial role in setting the scene for the movements’ gatherings in public space, by constructing common identifications and accumulating or triggering an emotional impulse towards public assembly. Just like conventional choreographers in the field of dance, these core organizers are for the most invisible on the stage itself. They are reluctant leaders or “anti-leaders”: leaders who, subscribing to the ideology of horizontalism, do not want to be seen as leaders in the first place but whose scene-setting and scripting work has been decisive in bringing a degree of coherence to people’s spontaneous and creative participation in the protest movements.

[…]

FROM CHAPTER TWO: “We Are Not People of Comment and Like: The Revolutionary Coalescence of Shabab-al-Facebook”

In the words of Ahmed Sabry, a forty-eight-year-old architect involved in the revolution, Facebook was for many young Egyptians a sort of “training ground,” which prepared the shabab-al-Facebook psychologically for the tough challenges that awaited them in the streets.[2] It allowed them to build up a confidence in their own abilities from the relatively safe cover of a computer screen. Nora Shalaby observes that the [Kullena Khaled Said] Facebook page “showed that there were many people thinking the same, and wanted the torture to stop and wanted to see a regime change.[3] The mere existence of opposition Facebook pages was for many politically inexperienced young people proof of the fact that Mubarak’s regime was less powerful than it pretended to be. Mustafa Shamaa recounts how “the first time I watched the Khaled Saeed’s page I got a bit scared. But then I saw that they didn’t arrest the admin. And I realized that there was some safety and that we could write whatever we wanted to.”[4]

If the figure of Khaled Said allowed this largely unpoliticized Egyptian middle-class youth to identify with one hero, it also allowed them to identify against a common enemy—not just the regime as a whole but more specifically the police. “Ours was first and foremost a hate for police,” explains Sally Zohney. “The police represented everything that was wrong with Egyptian society.”[5] Different categories of people had different reasons for harbouring this anger. Football “ultras”—fans of popular clubs like Zamalek and el-Ahly—hated the police because of the frequent clashes after matches.[6] Microbus drivers hated them for being constantly targeted with arbitrary road fines, with which officers were topping up their miserly salaries. Young people resented them because of random searches and harassment.

[…]

The Kullena Khaled Said Facebook page progressively came to function as a sort of megaphone through which, from its safe base in Dubai, Ghonim would relay to a broad and diffuse public the decisions taken by activists on the ground in Cairo and Alexandria. The Facebook page became a platform from which to share and streamline information, but more importantly to create a sense of anticipation about the upcoming event. A Facebook event was created titled “January 25: Revolution against Torture, Poverty, Corruption, and Unemployement.” On Friday the 21st, four days before the protest, the page counted 100,000 confirmed attendees and many others would join in the following days.

But would all those appearing under the “attending” list actually turn out? Or would the Facebook youth remain just a Facebook youth? These were the questions many people asked themselves on the eve of the demonstration, in a testament to the difficulty of constructing a sense of trust online (Tarrow, 1998). Previous protest events had already acquainted participants with the gulf between a Facebook count of attendees and the actual street count. Scepticism was thus unsurprisingly rife: “I saw that people were saying they would take part in the protests but I didn’t believe they would,” recounts Reda a photographer and member of the ultras of el-Ahly who took to the streets on the 25th.[7] Sally Zohney came to realise that many of her friends who had confirmed their attendance were not actually intending to participate:

Before the 25th OK we had the event on Facebook of the 25th of January revolution, and you have many people saying attending, attending, attending and you say: “alright, whatever.” And you see how many of those you know and you ask them are you guys really going? And they would say: no! Then why are you saying that you are going to attend on Facebook? Because we are supportive! And then you start realizing that only one or two are actually going out of twenty people who said yes![8]

Fear of police of repression, and mutual distrust among Facebook users, constituted two formidable obstacles on the way to achieving a huge turnout on the day. Ghonim was aware of the risk. During the final days before the demonstration he put much effort into updating his status messages in an effort to counter the defeatism of many users, well exemplified in a comment posted by one user: “no one will do anything and you’ll see. All we do is post on Facebook. We are the Facebook generation. Period” (Ghonim, 2012: 135).

To counter this impression, Ghonim focused on positive messages emphasizing the people’s determination to take to the streets, exemplified by the statement: “we won’t stand and watch other people on Facebook.” The motivational work done by Ghonim in preparation for the protests was summed up in a message published on the 24th, which appealed to people’s sense of pride:

A person decided not to participate tomorrow, he is sitting in front of his computer and writes comments on Facebook saying: the people are cowards and nobody is really going to participate...like I said before there is a phenomenon in psychology called projection...you have a certain problem, in order to avoid pangs of your conscience you are saying to yourself that all the people are cowards...Unfortunately my friend...I am not a coward, I am demonstrating on the 25th Jan.

The same urge to dispel people’s fear and uncertainty underscored the action of young activist Asmaa Mafhouz, who in anticipation of the protest posted a now-famous YouTube video in which she incited people to join the protests: 

If you think yourself a man, come with me on 25 January. Whoever says women shouldn’t go to protests because they will get beaten, let him have some honor and manhood and come with me on 25 January. Whoever says it is not worth it because there will only be a handful of people, I want to tell him, “You are the reason behind this, and you are a traitor, just like the president or any security cop who beats us in the streets.”[9]

This call to heroism cleverly used the machismo prevalent in large sectors of Egyptian society as a channel through which to mobilize young men, who would fear being ridiculed for having been surpassed in bravery by a young girl. On the eve of the protest similar videos and status messages confirmed the impression that “it was going to be big”—as Ahmed Sharqaui, an Egyptian activist from the town of Zagazig, reflects.[10] The last status message published on the Kullena Khaled Said page on the morning of the 25th, a few hours before the time set for the public gathering, took the tone of a generational challenge: “today we are going to prove that we are not guys of ‘Comment and like’ as they claim. We are REALITY on Earth we are demanding our rights and we are all participating.”

NOTES

[1] Expressions like “spontaneous” and “leaderless” to describe the popular movements of 2011 abound in many media articles and reports across the different countries considered in this study. See for example H. Gautney, “What is Occupy Wall Street? Story of a Leaderless Movement,”Washington Post, 10 October 2011.

[2] Interview with Ahmed Sabry—Cairo

[3] Interview with Nora Shalaby—Cairo

[4] Interview with Mustafa Shamaa—Cairo

[5] Interview with Sally Zohney—Cairo

[6] The “ultras”—fans of the Cairo football teams el-Ahly and Zamalek—played a crucial role in the revolution against Mubarak. See for example J. Montague, “Egypt’s Revolutionary Soccer Ultras: How Football Fans Toppled Mubarak,”CNN, 29 June 2011.

[7] Interview with Reda—Cairo

[8] Interview with Sally Zohney—Cairo

[9] A. Mafhouz, “Asmaa Mahfouz and the YouTube Video that Helped Spark the Egyptian Uprising,”Democracy Now!, 19 January 2012.

[10] Ahmed Sharqaui—Cairo

[Excerpted from Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism, by Paolo Gerbaudo, by permission of the author. © 2012 Paolo Gerbaudo. For more information, or to order the book, click here or here.]

اليمن ودورة جديدة للصراع بالوكالة

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لا يمكن وصف ما أثير ضد السفير الإيراني بسبب تصريحاته يوم السادس من يناير الجاري بأقل من زوبعة. في لقائه مع مجموعة من الصحفيين اليمنيين احتج السفير على الاتهامات الموجهة ضد بلاده من الرئيس اليمني عبد ربه بحجة اكتشاف شبكات تجسس إيرانية، قال فيها السفير “لا شيء في اليمن يستحق التجسس عليه والرئيس عبد ربه يستمد معلوماته من تقارير غربية.” تصريحات السفير الإيراني البعيدة عن الدبلوماسية واللياقة والقريبة جداً من واقع اليمن أثارت جزء من الرأي العام اليمني بجانبه المتحفز ضد إيران وتدخلاتها الحديثة العهد في اليمن.

هذه التصريحات كانت جافة وليست مجافية لواقع الحال في اليمن بحكم أنه بلد مكشوف تقوم بهيكلة جيشه بعض الدول مثل الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وتتعرض أراضيه لضربات شبه يومية من الطائرات الأمريكية بدون طيار والتي كشفت مؤخراً النيويورك تايمز إن المملكة العربية السعودية أيضاً قامت بالمشاركة في هذه الضربات، في اختراق ليس الأول من الجارة السعودية للأجواء اليمنية حيث تعرضت من قبل محافظة صعدة الشمالية لضرب كثيف من الطيران السعودي ضد جماعة الحوثيين في عام 2010. بالإضافة إلى ذلك فقد أثيرت ضد تصريحات السفير الإيراني زوبعة لم تلقها شحنة أسلحة محملة على متن سفن تركية رست على ميناء الحديدة دون معرفة لمن تتوجه هذه الأسلحة وماهي انواعها؟ وهو خبر تسرب بشواهد قوية لم تدع مجالاً للانكار لكن سرعان ما تمت تغطيته بالحديث عن شحنة أسلحة إيرانية وصلت دون أية شواهد. بما يكشف سريعاً طبيعة المناكفة والمزايدة الرخيصة لأدعياء الغيرة الوطنية من وكلاء اليمن للأطراف الإقليمية المتصارعة.

ربما لا يعادل غباء تصريحات السفير الإيراني في توقيتها ومفرداتها سوى فجاجة تصريحات السفير الأمريكي الذي سبق وحرض على مسيرة الحياة السلمية الراجلة من مدينة تعز لصنعاء وكانت تهدف للاعتصام أمام دار الرئاسة. حينها اعتبر السفير الأمريكي التوجه لقصر الرئاسة عملاً غير سلمي وللأمن حقه في مجابهته. هذا التصريأ اثار زوبعة مشابهة لما نراه آلان ضد السفير الإيراني وإن اختلفت الأطراف التي تدير هذه الزوبعة وفي اتجاه من تستثمر. وإذا كان حرص السفير الأمريكي على المبادرة الخليجية التي بالكاد نجح في توقيعها بين طرفي التسوية هو الدافع وراء تصريحاته المستفزة، فالأمر مختلف لدى السفير الإيراني الذي استفزه التعامل الحكومي اليمني مع دولته دون أسانيد واضحة بخفة ظاهرة لا تبدي فيها الدولة اليمنية أي حرص على علاقتها مع الدولة الإيرانية. فالرئيس اليمني المقل في ظهوره الإعلامي لم يتردد طويلاً في إلقاء خطاب غاضب حول التدخل الإيراني وشبكة تجسس إيرانية لا نعلم عنها شيئاً ً حتى آلان، وبعد مرور قرابة ستة شهور من هذا الخطاب المعنف.

ظهرت قصة شبكة التجسس الإيرانية بعد فترة وجيزة من نشر قوائم باسماء اليمنيين الذين يتلقون رواتبهم من السعودية في صحيفة الشارع اليمنية مما نتج عنه ردود فعل واسعة حول طبيعة الشخصيات وحجم المبالغ التي تتلقاها. ومع أن القائمة غير موثقة لكنها لاقت قبولاً بحكم إنها تضمنت شخصيات، خاصة القبلية منها، معروفة بتلقيها أموال من السعودية وبعضها يجاهر بذلك. لكن الأمر يختلف عندما يتعلق بالأموال الإيرانية فرغم ما صار معلوماً بوجودها لكن حتى آلان حجم تدخلها لايزال محل لغط ونقاش حول حقيقته وإن كان لايزال أقل تشعباً من النفوذ السعودي في اليمن الذي تنافسه في مناطق اشتباك حساسة وسط الفراغ السياسي الهائل. وهو ما عبر عنه أحد الصحفيين الحاضرين لدى السفير الإيراني بالتعليق: نعم ليس هناك ما يستحق التجسس لكن في اليمن يوجد من الفراغ ما يستحق بسط النفوذ فيه، مما يلخص اسباب اشتداد المنافسة بين البلدين مؤخراً وهو حالة الفراغ الذي تتسيد الوضع السياسي في البلاد بعد انسحاب الدولة الكلي جراء ما شهدته الدولة اليمنية من احداث عام 2011 انتهت بإسقاط الرئيس علي صالح ليحل محله نائبه وتشكيل حكومة وفاق وطني تبدو عاجزة عن إدارة الملفات العاجلة اقتصادياً وأمنياً، ليستمر تآكل الدولة اليمنية.

هذا الفراغ السياسي في بلد موقعه الجوسياسي حساس مثل اليمن يغري بالكثير. فاليمن دولة بسواحل طويلة على البحر الأحمر وبحر العرب وتتحكم بمضيق مائي هام وهو باب المندب الذي يتحكم بالمدخل الجنوبي للبحر الأحمر. وعادة تحرص القوى السياسية التي تسيطر على قناة السويس  على السيطرة على باب المندب كما فعلت بريطانيا باحتلال مدينة عدن المطلة على مضيق باب المندب عام 1839، حيث يعتبر التحكم بباب المندب شرطاً أساسياً للوصول والسيطرة على قناة السويس، وبالتالي التحكم في خط دولي بحري شديد الحيوية. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، فإيران التي هددت بغلق مضيق بباب هرمز أحيت للسعودية آمالها وتطلعاتها القديمة حيث طالبت اليمن سابقاً أثناء مفاوضاتها الحدودية التي انطلقت عام 1996  بالسيطرة على ممر بري يصلها لبحر العرب حيث البحار المفتوحة لبترولها بعيداً عن اختناق الخليج العربي المهدد أمنيا وعسكرياً. ورغم أن الحكومة اليمنية أبدت مرونة تجاه الطلب السعودي لكنه توقف عند الأمور السيادية عندما اشترطت اليمن أن يكون تحت سيادتها وهذا ما رفضته السعودية. يزيد من أهمية اليمن لدى السعودية طول الشريط الحدودي بين البلدين الذي يتجاوز 1400 كم مربع وهو شريط يصعب السيطرة عليه بسبب صعوبة جغرافيته المتنوعة بين جبال وصحارى. إضافة للتشابك الاجتماعي بين البلدين ليس فقط بين قبائل الحدود بل أيضاً تمتد أصول الكثير من السعوديين لليمن بعضهم – تحديداً اليمنيون من حضرموت- يسيطرون على مفاصل الاقتصاد السعودي – غير البترولي- هذا غير الجالية اليمنية في السعودية والتي يصل تعدادها لقرابة مليوني نسمة.

إذاً اجتمعت حساسية الموقع مع ديناميكية المجتمع بالقرب من دولة محافظة مثل السعودية بكل ثقلها الإقتصادي والديني تتحول بالتأكيد هذه الدولة لبؤرة مثيرة للقلق بكل تأكيد، بداية كان أول خلاف سعودي يمني نشأ حول وراثة التركة العثمانية حيث اختلفتا على حدود دولتيهما حتى وصل الأمر إلى نشوب حرب عام 1934 انتهت بسيطرة السعودية على الساحل اليمني الشمالي الغربي. ثم وقع الطرفان معاهدة الطائف التي استولت بموجبها السعودية على عسير وملحقاتها وهو ما يعرف بالمنطقة الجنوبية في السعودية لمدة 70 عاماً قابلة للتجديد مقابل انسحاب قواتها من الساحل. ورغم هذا الصدام المبكر بين النظام السعودي ونظام الإمامة في اليمن، فإن السعودية وقفت عائقاً أمام أي عملية تغيير لهذا النظام اليمني حيث منعت الدعم العربي لثورة 1948 وما عرف بالثورة الدستورية ضد الإمام يحيى مما أدى لفشلها. تلتها ثورة 1962 التي سعت لإسقاط الإمامة وإقامة نظام جمهوري مما استدعى الصف الثوري لطلب التدخل المصري، لتصبح اليمن مسرحاً لصراع اقليمي بين مصر والسعودية لم تهدأ إلا بعد هزيمة 1967.  مما أبعد مصر عن الساحة اليمنية ونتج عنه التوصل لإتفاق بين طرفي الصراع في اليمن لينتهي الصراع المسلح عام 1970  وتصبح اليمن الشمالي جمهورية في ظل جوارها الملكي والسلطني من دول الخليج لكن بعد صراع طويل انهك الدولة الناشئة لصالح القوى الإجتماعية التقليدية المسلحة مثل القبائل التي استعانت بها السعودية للتسلل لعمق هذه الدولة لتحجيم مخاطر نشوء جمهورية بجوارها، هكذا كان نشوء أول جمهورية في المحيط الإقليمي لتليها جمهورية اليمن الجنوبي.

لم يكن شمال اليمن لوحده مصدر تهديد، بل جنوبه الذي كان محتلاً من البريطانيين وكان يضج بالحركات النقابية والعمالية في مستعمرة عدن. وبعد ثورة سبتمبر انطلقت حركة المقاومة الجنوبية المسلحة ضد البريطانيين التي استمرت منذ عام 1964 حتى الجلاء عام 1967.  وبهذا تعد اليمن الجنوبي الدولة الوحيدة في محيطها التي انتهجت المقاومة المسلحة ضد الاستعمار، وهنا لم تكن السعودية بعيدة أيضاً عن المشهد حيث حاولت دعم بعض الفصائل المعتدلة لإخراج البريطانيين مع بعض الإمتيازات لهم في عدن ولم تنجح محاولاتها. وكأي دولة خرجت من الاستعمار بعد حركة مقاومة طويلة تأسست عليها شرعية النظام القادم اتجه الجنوب نحو التحالف مع الإتحاد السوفيتي وبدأت التوجه اليساري – الماركسي. مما زاد من متاعب السعودية في اليمن التي كانت تتصور اليسار خطراً داهماً وبذا رأت ضرورة تدعيم وجودها في الدولة المجاورة جغرافياً لها وهي اليمن الشمالي واوحت لشيوخ القبائل بتحالف مع قيادات الجيش للانقلاب على الرئيس الإرياني بسبب تمسكه باستقلالية القرار الوطني، ليخلفه الرئيس إبراهيم الحمدي الذي سرعان ما انقلب على حلفائه المشايخ واتجه للتقارب مع الجنوب وتحول بذلك لخطر اكثر راديكالية من سابقه، وبسبب كاريزميته المفرطه وشعبيته الواسعة سرعان ما اغتيل بعد صعوده للسلطة بما يزيد عن ثلاث سنوات قليلاً في اكتوبر 1977 مع خيوط تآمر سعودي واضحة ضده. هكذا صعد للسلطة حسين الغشمي لعدة اشهر. والذي اغتيل واتهم الرئيس الجنوبي سالمين بإنه وراء عملية اغتياله وهي وراية يشكك فيها الكثيرون لكن على اثرها تم إعدام هذا الرئيس من قبل رفاقه ليأتي من بعده رئيس سرعان ما ينقلب عليه ويرسل للمنفي في غضون عام. وبذا تكون اليمن الشمالي قد شهدت اغتيالين في عام واليمن الجنوبي اعدام رئيس ونفي آخر في ما يزيد عن عام بقليل. وشهدت كذلك بعض الصراعات الدموية وحربين واسعتين بين الشمال والجنوب على الحدود وحربين بين الجنوبيين أنفسهم. هذه كلها صراعات دموية انخرطت فيها قوى خارجية عديدة بعد ما صار اليمن بشطريه جزء من صراع الحرب الباردة آنذاك.

صعود علي عبدالله صالح للحكم في يونيو عام 1978 بتدخل سعودي صريح يتجلى باستدعائها شيخ واحدة من  أكبر قبائل اليمن وأكثرها تنظيماً وهو الشيخ عبدالله بن حسين الأحمر لتآمره بدعم علي عبدالله صالح رئيساً رغم تململه من فكرة تولي السلطة عسكري مجدداً، لكنه استجاب لما دعته السعودية وهكذا كان حسب مذكراته. هكذا جاء صالح على خلفية صراعات دموية واضطراب حقيقي وبتحالف مع الإسلاميين كغريم طبيعي ضد اليسار في الجنوب بإمتدادات التوجه اليساري شمالاً.

مع الدعم السعودي الاقتصادي والسياسي لنظام الحكم شمالاً استقرت الاوضاع هناك بينما شهد الشطر الجنوبي حرباً دموية عام 1986 ومع انهيار المنظومة الاشتراكية توجهت انظار النخبة الجنوبية نحو إحياء مشروع الوحدة مع الشمال وهذا ما تم في مايو عام 1990. لم تكن السعودية راضية على الوحدة ومرت علاقتها مع حليفها السابق شمالاً باضطراب تجلى في وقوف اليمن في صف العراق أثناء حرب الخليج. وهذا ما دفع ثمنه اليمن غالياً بطرد عمالته من الخليج مما زاد من الأعباء الاقتصادية للدولة الوليدة والتي كانت من أوائل الدول العربية التي ركبت موجة الديمقراطية في التسعينيات وشهدت انتخابات برلمانية حرة عام 1993. لكن سرعان ما تفاقمت الأزمات السياسية في اليمن بين طرفي الوحدة انتهت بحرب 1994 التي دعمت فيها السعودية انفصال اليمن لكن سرعان ما حسمت قوات حكومة صنعاء الوضع عسكرياً لصالحها واستمرت الوحدة اليمنية لكن تضررت العلاقة بشدة بين البلدين حتى وصلت لمرحلة اشتباكات حدودية في ديسمبر عام 1995 ولم تنكسر حدة التوتر إلا بعد وساطة سورية انتهت باطلاق عملية التفاوض على الحدود عام 1996 لتنته بترسيم الحدود نهائياً عام 2000 وتتنازل فيها اليمن بشكل نهائي عن مطالبها بإقليم عسير وملحقاته.

هكذا كانت السعودية المستقرة والمحافظة التي لم تتأثر إلا قليلاً بأي من الموجات الإقليمية مثل موجات التحرر الوطني والمد القومي- اليساري بالستينيات أو الموجات العالمية مثل الديمقراطية على عكس جارتها التي تأثرت سريعاً بكل هذه الموجات ولحقت بها مبكراً، وانتقلت من ساحة صراع إقليمي للصد إلى ساحة صراع عالمي لصد تأثيرها مجدداً على الجارة السعودية. ومع العقد الأول من الألفية الثانية بدت اليمن دولة تحت السيطرة السعودية باستثناء منغصات الحرب على الارهاب، التي تعاونت فيها اليمن مع بعض التلاعب من قبل الرئيس صالح لتمرير مشروع التوريث والابتزاز المادي.

بعد الغزو الأمريكي لبغداد عام 2003 بدأت في الظهور جماعة زيدية يمنية – أحد تفرعات الشيعة- بشكل أكثر وضوحاً رافعة شعار الثورة الإيرانية "الله اكبر.. الموت لأمريكا .. الموت لإسرائيل.. النصر للإسلام "، مما استفز الحكومة اليمنية وأحرجها أمام حلفائها السعوديين والأمريكيين لتقوم بضربة جوية على منزل قائد الجماعة وتشتغل حرب صعده بفصولها الستة  في يونيو 2004. ورغم صغر جماعة الحوثيين لكن الحرب كانت تنتهي ثم تشتعل مجدداً حيث رآها الرئيس السابق صالح فرصة للتخلص من بعض خصومه العسكريين، تحديداً الجنرال علي محسن بزجهم في هذه الحرب وحرقهم في آتونها ليمهد طريق 
الثوريث لابنه. كما كانت ورقة ابتزاز ضد جارته السعودية والتي استشعرت ذلك سريعاً وقامت بالتدخل عسكرياً في الحرب السادسة عام 2010 بحجة استيلاء الحوثيين على أراض حدودية تابعة للسعودية. كان الحوثيون نقطة تحول حيث صارت اليمن إحدى بؤر التوتر الإقليمي الجديد بين إيران والسعودية وكانت أول نقطة نفوذ إيرانية في اليمن.

اندلعت الثورة اليمنية أو الانتفاضة الشعبية العارمة في فبراير عام 2011 ليدخل للمعادلة السياسية اليمنية مكون جديد وهو الشباب المستقل، وتتخذ بعض الحركات المسلحة مثل الحوثين نهجاً جديداً في العمل السياسي وهو العمل السلمي، لم تكن السعودية متمسكة كثيراً بحليفها المتقلب المزاج علي عبدالله صالح لكن كان يعنيها الحفاظ على النظام الموالي لها في صنعاء دون تغيير ثوري حقيقي فيه حتى لا تنجح الثورة وتستطيع احتواء هذا المتغير الجديد في الساحة والتي تفاعلت معه اليمن سريعاً، كالعادة بينما تحاول السعودية تجاوز هذه الموجة بسلام كما هي عادتها من خلال احتوائه أولاً في المناطق المجاورة على الأقل، وهذا ما كان. ويمكن النظر لانضمام حليف السعودية وشريك علي صالح السابق، علي محسن، للثورة من هذا المنطلق. فرغم معارضة انضمامه من البعض مثل الحوثيين والمستقلين لكن تحالفه مع الإسلاميين، خاصة الاخوان، فرض وجوده. وبوجوده سرعان ما تحول الجو الثوري الشعبي لأزمة سياسية خانقة مصحوبة بصراعات مسلحة زعزعت يقين الشعب اليمني من نجاح الثورة بانضمام أحد اكبر رؤوس النظام والحراك الجنوبي الذي تعاطف مع الثورة والتحرك الشعبي الجنوبي المصاحب  للثورة اصيب بفتور وابتعد عن المشهد الثوري، هذا كله مهد للقبول الشعبي بالمبادرة الخليجية التي كانت مرفوضة سابقاً.

المبادرة الخليجية بالمعايير الثورية تعتبر التفافاً عليها، لكنها تسوية سياسية بين الاطراف السياسية للمشهد السياسي اليمني قبل الثورة وهما حزب المؤتمر ممثلاً بالرئيس السابق صالح واحزاب اللقاء المشترك وهي تحالف حزبي على رأسه حزب الاصلاح الاخواني والحزب الاشتراكي والحزب الناصري وغيرها من أحزاب صغيرة، لكن ما جرى في اليمن يعد أكبر من مجرد أزمة بين احزاب البلاد وتوجد فيه أطراف لم تدخل ضمن إطار المبادرة، وهي الفئة المستقلة من الثوار والحوثيين والحراك الجنوبي. وهذه الفئات هي التي استطاعت إيران النفاذ من خلالها لتوسيع نفوذها داخل اليمن. وفوق ذلك كله فإن كوادر بعض الاحزاب الغير منتظمة مثل حزب الاصلاح الاخواني انضوت ضمن بعض التحالفات السياسية المدعومة من إيران التي استثمرت بنجاح السخط اليمني المتراكم من التدخل السعودي السلبي ومشاعر الثوار التي استفزت من المبادرة التي اعتبروها مؤامرة سعودية ضد ثورتهم.

لم تكن المرة الأولى التي تستغل فيها دولة إقليمية المشاعر اليمنية المعادية لتاريخ التدخل السلبي للسعودية في اليمن لتأليب أطراف داخل اليمن ضد السعودية باعتبار اليمن قاعدة خلفية للسعودية التي يثير قلقها أي وجود معاد داخلها. وكانت ليبيا القذافي مثالاً صارخاً خاصة في علاقتها الوقتية مع الحوثيين وتمويلها لبعض القبائل. هكذا أكدت إيران حضورها في مناطق الفراغ الواسعة التي خلفها غياب قوة الرئيس السابق بتحالفاته القبلية في مناطق شمال صنعاء والتي خلفها الحوثيون. واستفادت من حالة الغضب الثوري التي لم تهدأ في مناطق الوسط مثل تعز. كما استفادت من انقسامات الحراك الجنوبي وبالتحديد انقسامه لتيارين، تيار يدعو للانفصال أو ما يسمى فك الإرتباط وتيار الفدرالية. وبينما يدعم العالم التوجه الفيدرالي متجاهلاً التيار الأكثر راديكالية الذي يدعو لفك الارتباط بقيادة نائب الرئيس السابق أثناء الوحدة، علي سالم البيض، الذي اتجه فيما بعد للتحالف مع إيران مجاهراً بذلك. هكذا يتيح التدخل الإيراني وتغلغل نفوذها في اليمن لمزيد من الاشتعال داخل الساحة اليمنية لتتحول لأحدى ساحات الصراع الإقليمي والعالمي الدائر آلان في المنطقة والذي لن ينته إلا بكسر شوكة إحدى  القوتين المتصارعتين أو تقاسم مناطق النفوذ بينهما.

تزييفُ الوعي وتطييفُ التاريخ في سياقات الثورة السوريّة

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(إلى الصديق الأستاذ جورج طرابيشي مفكرًا فوق الطوائف، وإلى ضحايا الطوائف)
رغم الاختلافات الهائلة (ديمقراطيًّا) بين حقبةِ ما بعد الاستقلال وحقبةِ البعث، فإنّ الفترتين تتقاطعان من حيث الغياب شبه التامّ لأيّة دراساتٍ علميّةٍ للمسألة الطائفيّة في سوريا. فقد بقيتْ هذه المسألة من المحرَّمات طوال فترة حكم البعث، ومن المهمَلات طوال الفترة التي تلت الاستقلال، رغم أنّ حكومات الاستقلال المتعاقبة عاشت الطائفيّة من خلال الدويْلات الطائفيّة المجزّأة التي أنشأها الانتدابُ الفرنسيّ.

في تطييف الطيف السوريّ


منذ انطلاقة الثورة السوريّة سعى النظامُ إلى حشر الثورة، التي احتضنتْ ألوانَ الطيف السوريّ، في ساحة الصراع الطائفيّ التي يتقن اللعبَ فيها، مستفيدًا من خبرته في الحرب الأهليّة اللبنانيّة، ومستغلًّا حساسيّةَ موقع سوريا الإستراتيجيّ وتحالفاتها الخارجيّة، الأمرُ الذي سيمنحه (حسب اعتقاده) وقتًا كافيًا للحسم الأمنيّ. وفي المقابل أدّى طولُ الأزمة، المترافقُ مع تزايد العنف، إلى ردِّ فعل غريزيّ متمثّلٍ في الحاجة إلى الدفاع عن النفس، فتوجّه المنتفضون إلى السلاح، الذي سهّل النظامُ عمليّاتِ تهريبه في البداية بعد أن كان يرفضه.
لكنْ كان لأحد الأحداث دورٌ حاسمٌ في خلخلة النهج السلميّ، وتكريسِ الانقسام بين السوريّين: إنه مجزرةُ جسر الشغور (6/6/2011). فقد هاجمتْ جماعاتٌ مسلّحةٌ من المعارضة مفرزةَ الأمن السياسيّ، وأبادت عناصرَها (حوالى 120)، ومثّلتْ بجثثهم. ثم قُتل نحو أربعين آخرين في كمين.(1) تلا ذلك قتلُ عسكريّين في حماة، ورميُ جثثهم في نهر العاصي، من دون أن نقرأ تصريحَ إدانةٍ من قبل الهيئات السياسيّة التي ادّعت تمثيلَ الشعب السوريّ.


لقد كانت لدى النظام ثقةٌ تامّةٌ، على ما يبدو، بأنّ مخطّطاته ستلقى استجابةً لدى غريمٍ سابقٍ، هو الإخوانُ المسلمون وفلولُ الطليعة المقاتلة المقيمون في المنفى منذ انتهاء "الجولة الأولى" من النزال الذي أودى، في بدايات ثمانينيّات القرن الماضي، بعشرات آلاف المدنيّين في حماة على أيدي قوّات سرايا الدفاع، مثلما أودى بمئات ضحايا الاغتيال الطائفيِّ الذي مارسه الإخوانُ ولم يعتذروا عنه قطّ. كما دخلتْ على خطِّ المواجهة والشحن الطائفيّ وسائلُ إعلامٍ خليجيّةٌ (الجزيرة، العربيّة) ومبتذلةٌ (الصفا، وصال..)، مستغلّةً الفراغَ الثقيلَ الذي يرافق وسائلَ الإعلام الحكوميّةِ العديمةَ الصدقيّة، لتزجّ بالصراعين الخليجيِّ ــ الإيرانيّ والإيرانيّ ــ الغربيّ في خضمِّ الثورة. كما أدّت صفحةُ "الثورة السوريّة ضدّ بشار الأسد" دورًا كبيرًا في تصدير تسمياتٍ لأيّام الجمعة أثارت حساسيّاتٍ طائفيّةً. وتعاظم الاحتقانُ مع خضوع العديد من كتائب "الجيش السوريّ الحرّ" لابتزاز المال السياسيّ، وللحاجة الماسّة إلى السلاح لمواجهة نظامٍ بات منذ اغتيال "خليّة الأزمة" (18 يوليو الماضي) يستخدم كلَّ أنواع الأسلحة الثقيلة. وتحوّلت الثورةُ في وسائل الإعلام إلى صراعٍ عربيّ ــ مجوسيّ، أو عربيّ ــ كرديّ، أو شيعيّ ــ سنّيّ، أو علويّ ــ سنّيّ، أو روسيّ/ صينيّ ــ غربيّ/أمريكيّ. أمّا على الأرض فقد وصل النظامُ والثورةُ إلى دوّامةٍ يوميّةٍ عبثيّةٍ من العنف، وأضحت الأزمةُ السوريّة ملفًّا للمساومات الدوليّة على مستقبلٍ شرق أوسطيّ جديد.


رؤى عمياء... وغير عمياء


في خضمِّ هذا الصراع والتجييش الإعلاميّ، اضطُرّ الناشطون والمثقفون إلى التصدّي لأخطار المسألة الطائفيّة التي بدأتْ تلْقي بظلالها على النسيج الاجتماعيّ السوريّ. لكنّ الرؤى التي قُدِّمتْ لم تكن على مستوى كارثيّة حضور هذه المسألة في الثورة السوريّة. ويمكن إيجازُ هذه الرؤى بثلاث:

1) إنكارُ الطائفيّة، وتكرارُ عباراتٍ من قبيل "الثقة بالشعب السوريّ،" و"التعايش المشترك،" و"التاريخ السوريّ يعكس الوحدة الوطنيّة قبل آل الأسد." وتمّ الاستشهادُ برموزٍ وطنيّةٍ ثابتةٍ، كشكري القوتلي وسعد الله الجابري وفارس بك الخوري، في استغراقٍ نوستالجيٍّ انتقائيٍّ للأحداث والشخصيّات. ومن الطبيعيّ أن يكون أصحابُ هذه الشعارات شديدي التفاؤل باختفاء الطائفيّة مباشرةً بعد سقوط نظام الأسد!

2) القول بأنّ الطائفيّة حدثٌ طارئٌ من خارج البنية. هكذا فُسّرت الحوادثُ الطائفيّةُ التي شهدتْها سوريا عبر تاريخها (كمذبحةِ مسيحيّي باب توما في 9/7/1860، التي سقط خلالها نحو 8500 مسيحيّ وأُحرق 3800 منزل)(2) على أنّها نتيجةٌ للاحتلال الأجنبيّ والاستعمار والمصالح التي تهدف إلى تحريض الشعب الواحد على الاقتتال. وهذا التيّار عمومًا يعكس ذهنيّةً قائمةً على التوجّس الدائم من "المؤامرات،" وإلقاءِ كلِّ أسباب التخلّف والفشل والهزيمة على "الآخرين" و"الغرباء" و"ضعاف النفوس" و"المغرّر بهم." وهي لازمةٌ ضروريّةٌ لتفسيرٍ لا يبحثُ عن الأسباب الحقيقيّة، وإنّما يتهرّب من مواجهة المسؤوليّة. ولا يخرج عن هذا السياق تفسيرُ خسارة فلسطين عام 1948 و"نكسة حزيران" عام 1967.

3) الاعتراف بالحضور الكبير للعامل الطائفيّ في تصعيد الحدث السوريّ، واعتباره نتاجًا طبيعيًّا لغياب السياسة من المجتمع طوال أربعة عقود، والاقتناع بأنّ الأمور ستنحو بعد سقوط "النظام الطائفيّ" في أحد اتجاهين: أ) القبول المضمر بالطائفيّة محدِّدًا لسوريا المستقبل، يفرز عنها نظامُ المحاصصة في الحكم، الأمرُ الذي نرى تجلّياته في مشاريع المجالس والمراحل الانتقاليّة. ب) نشوء ثورة مضادّة سيكون هدفُها مطابقًا للشعارات الأولى للثورة السوريّة: "الحريّة" والديمقراطيّة" و"الشعب السوري واحد."

تطييف التاريخ ــ وثيقة "انفصال العلويّين" نموذجًا

خلال سيطرة البعث على السلطة في سوريا منذ العام 1963 شهدت البلادُ تغييبًا تامًّا وممنهجًا للحياة السياسيّة، التي اقتصرتْ على فكر البعث ومؤسّساته، وتمّت "إعادةُ تخيّل" الشعب عبر تسطيح الثقافة الوطنيّة. وقد نتج من ذلك ثلاثةُ أجيالٍ تكاد لا تعرف شيئًا عن حقبةِ ما قبل الأسد الأب. ثم جاءت الثورةُ السوريّةُ لتبثّ الحياة في عروق التاريخ المحنّط، ونشطتْ حركةُ البحث والكتابة في تاريخ سورية المعاصر. لكنْ، على الرغم من أهميّة هذه "الحمّى المعرفيّة" التي انفجرتْ بعد نصفِ قرنٍ تقريبًا من الكبت، فإنّ لها محاذيرها حين تتبنّى أفكارًا مشوّهة ومزيّفة وتقدّمُها "حقائقَ تاريخيّةً" و"بداهاتٍ" لا مجالَ لنقاشها. ويأتي ذلك بعد "شيطنة" حقبة البعث الاستبداديّة، و"الأقليّات" عمومًا و"العلويّين" خصوصًا،(3) وبعد تجاهل كلّ الأسباب التي أدّت إلى صعود طبقةِ "الريفيّين" الفلّاحيّة وسقوطِ طبقة "الأعيان" الإقطاعيّة التي أدّت دورًا بارزًا في صناعة السياسة السوريّة منذ نهاية العصر العثمانيّ مرورًا بالانتداب وحتى الوحدة مع مصر.(4)
ضمن هذا السياق من الثورة، وفي فترةٍ تشهد احتقانًا طائفيًّا، دخلت الوثائقُ المتبادلةُ على خطِّ المعركة الإعلاميّة. وظهرتْ مثلًا الوثيقة رقم 3547 تاريخ 15/6/1936،(5) التي يتمُّ تداولها على أنها "وثيقةُ العلويّين الانفصاليّين" التي رُفعتْ إلى رئيس الحكومة الفرنسيّ آنذاك، ليون بلوم. فخلال جلسةٍ لمجلس الأمن ردَّ سفير فرنسا لدى الأمم المتّحدة (جيرار آرو)(6) على مندوب سوريا الدائم لدى الأمم المتحدة (بشّار الجعفري)، فقال: "بما أنّك تحدّثتَ عن فترة الاحتلال الفرنسيّ [لسوريا]، فمن واجبي أن أذكّرك بأنّ جدَّ رئيسكم الأسد طالبَ فرنسا بعدم الرحيل عن سوريا وعدم منحها الاستقلال، وذلك بموجب وثيقةٍ رسميّةٍ وقّع عليها محفوظةٍ في وزارة الخارجيّة الفرنسيّة. وإنْ أحببتَ أعطيكَ نسخةً عنها."(7) وسرعان ما احتفتْ مواقعُ المعارضة وعمومُ المدوّنات والمواقع العربيّة بالوثيقة "الدامغة" التي تثبت توارثَ "الخيانة" جينيًّا والعمالة "الفطريّة" لدى آل الأسد خصوصًا، والعلويّين عمومًا. وبذلتْ قناةُ العربيّة جهدًا أكبر للبحث عن الوثيقةِ حتى وجدتْها، فنشرتْ صورةً لما زعمتْ أنّه "صورة الوثيقة الأصليّة."(8) كما كرّس الشيخُ المثير للجدل، عدنان العرعور، حلقةً للاحتفاء بـ "الوثيقة" بندًا بندًا، ختمها بالقول: "أتمنّى من كلِّ علويٍّ شريفٍ أن يتبرّأَ من هذه الوثيقة. وأتمنّى من كلِّ ضابطٍ علويٍّ شريفٍ أن ينحاز إلى هذا الشعب، إلّا إذا كان يؤمن بهذه الوثيقة."(9) وهذه مفارقةٌ مضحكةٌ لكنّها تعكس طريقةَ القراءة الطائفيّة للتاريخ: فالعرعور يوجّه خطابَه إلى طائفةٍ كاملةٍ يفترض "بداهةً" أنّ المنتمين إليها لم يموتوا منذ العام 1936 لأنّها الكيان والجوهر ذاته جينيًّا ونفسيًّا وفكريًّا، سابقًا ولاحقًا، ولا تهمّه صحّةُ الوثيقة أو زيفُها، وما إذا كانت الشخصيّات الست(10) الواردة أسماؤهم صحيحةً، ولماذا ورد اسمُ سليمان المرشد بدلاً من سلمان، ولماذا لم تحمل الوثيقةُ سوى أسماءٍ مغفلةِ التواقيع أو البصمات.

الوثيقة ليست جديدةً. فقد كتب عنها الصحفيُّ اللبنانيُّ أنطوان غطاس صعب في النهار (23/10/2011) ونشر نصّها الكامل خلال حمّى الكتابة عن مشروع "الدولة العلويّة" في تلك الفترة.(23) كما نُشرتْ عام 1980 في كتاب العلويّون النصيريّونلأبي موسى الحريري،(12) ضمن مشروع "الحقيقة الصعبة" الذي يمكنُ اعتبارُه أحدَ أسوأ الأمثلة على القراءات الطائفيّة للتاريخ والأديان المقارنة أثناء الحرب الأهليّة اللبنانيّة. وفي 23/5/1989، نشرتْ صحفٌ لبنانيّةٌ وثيقةً وجّهها حزبُ الوطنيّين الأحرار إلى القمّة العربيّة الاستثنائيّة التي عُقدتْ، في اليوم نفسه، في الدار البيضاء، وضمّنها الوثيقة المذكورة.(13) كما نُشرتْ في كتاب دانييل لوغاك، سوريا الجنرال الأسد، المنقول إلى العربيّة عن دار مدبولي.(14) والسؤال الأهمّ هو: لماذا لم تُربط الروايةُ في سياقها؟

يصف أحدُ معاصري تلك الفترة، المناضل أكرم الحوراني، أنّ الحكم الفرنسيّ في دولة العلويّين ودولة جبل الدروز كان شديدَ الوطأة، وأنّه استغلَّ التخلّفَ الاجتماعيّ والوضعَ الإقطاعيَّ والعشائريّ فشكّل فيهما مجلسًا تمثيليًّا لزعماء العشائر والإقطاع، بينما كان الأمرُ مختلفًا في الدولة السوريّة، حيث لم يكن للفرنسيّين فيها هذا النفوذ.(15) ومع تشكّل حكومة الكتلة الوطنيّة تجدّدت النزعاتُ الانفصاليّة في جبل الدروز واللاذقيّة، لكنّها كانت أكثر تعقيدًا في اللاذقيّة نظرًا إلى عظم عدم التجانس السكانيّ فيها. وعلى الرغم من أنّ العلويّين كانوا منقسمين داخليًّا فقد استجابوا كـ "طائفة ــ طبقة،" حسب تعبير حنّا بطاطو،(16) عندما شعروا بأنّهم مهدّدون من هيمنة طبقةٍ مدينيّةٍ أكثر قوةً تمثّلتْ في الإقطاعيّين "السنّة،" مُلّاكِ الأراضي الذين دعموا الوحدةَ مع دمشق. كما أنّ معظمَ الأراضي التي كان يزرعها "العلويّون" كانت يملكلها إقطاعيّون "سُنّة" من اللاذقية وحماة، وكانوا شديدي الظلم والاستغلال لفقر العلويّين، فأسهم هذا التفاوتُ الطبقيُّ الحادُّ في مفاقمة حدّة الانقسامات الدينيّة. أمّا في جبل الدروز فكان الإقطاعيّون والفلّاحون من الطائفة نفسها (دروز)، لذا لم تكن الانقسامات بتلك الحدّة. ومع وصول الوفد المفاوض إلى باريس كان ملفُّ مصير جبل الدروز وجبال العلويّين حاضرًا بقوّة، فأطلق "علويّون انفصاليّون" حملةً دعائيّةً ذاتَ مضامين طائفيّةٍ يُعتقد أنّها من تنظيم حاكم المحافظة الفرنسيّ، شوفليه، المعارض للوحدة مع دمشق.(17) وخلال وجود الوفد في باريس عام 1936 أسفرتْ جهودُ الضبّاط الفرنسيّين عن مذكّرةٍ من بعض أعضاء المجلس التمثيليّ العلويّ (مذكّرة إيراهيم الكنج) يؤيّدون فيها انفصالَ جبل العلويّين عن الوطن السوريِّ وبقاءَه تحت الحكم الفرنسيّ، بينما امتنع بعضُهم الآخر عن التوقيع.(18) إذن، لم يتمكّن الفرنسيّون من توحيد آراء "العلويّين" تجاه الوحدة، وقام عددٌ من المثقفين والحِرفيّين بتشكيل "رابطة الشباب المسلم العلويّ" لمحاربة النزعة الانفصاليّة والدفع باتجاه الوحدة السوريّة. وبعد نحو شهرٍ أصدر رجالُ الدين العلويّون بيانًا أكّدوا فيه التزامَ الطائفة بالوحدة الوطنيّة السوريّة، وأنّ "كلّ علويٍّ هو مسلمٌ يعتقد بالشهادتين ويقيم أركانَ الإسلام الخمسة،" وأنّ أيّ علويٍّ لا يعترف بإسلاميّته ولا يذكر أنّ القرآن الكريم كتابُه وأنّ محمّدًا نبيُّه لا يُعدّ بنظر الشرع علويًّا ولا يصحّ انتسابه إلى المسلمين العلويّين. كما عقد وجهاء ورجالُ دينٍ علويّون اجتماعًا في قرية القرداحة في الشهر نفسه، وأرسلوا بيانًا إلى وزارة الخارجيّة الفرنسيّة يفيد أنّ كلمة "العلويّين" لا تعني ديانةً منفصلةً عن الإسلام، وأنّهم ليسوا سوى أنصارِ الإمام عليّ، ابنِ عمِّ رسول الله (ص) وصهرِه وأوّلِ من آمن بالإسلام؛ "فليس الكاثوليك والأرثوذكس والبروتستانت سوى مسيحيّين، وليس العلويّون والسنّة سوى مسلمين." ونتيجةً لنشاط رجال الدين العلويّين ودعمهم للوحدة، أصدر الشيخ أمين الحسيني، مفتي فلسطين، فتوى تصادق على أنّ "أولئك" العلويّين مسلمون، وعلى كلِّ مسلمٍ تقبّلهم بكلِّ إخلاص. وكان يَقصد باقتصار الفتوى على "أولئك،" العلويّين الذين يُعرّفون أنفسَهم سياسيًّا بأنّهم مع الاتجاه "السنّيّ" السوريِّ السائد. وبعد ستةِ أشهرٍ من المفاوضات الماراثونيّة وقّع الجانبان السوريُّ والفرنسيُّ مشروعَ معاهدةٍ في 9/9/1936 اعترفتْ باستقلال سوريا، وأسقطتْ اسمَ "حكومة اللاذقية" لتصبحَ "محافظة اللاذقية في دولة سوريا الموحّدة."(19)

الجدير ذكرُه أنّ الكتلة الوطنيّة عيّنتْ، بعد عودة الوفد السوريّ، عزيز الهواش محافظًا على مدينة دمشق، وهو ابنُ إسماعيل الهواش، زعيمِ عشيرةِ المتاورة، إحدى كبريات عشائر العلويّين، وأحدِ قادة ثورة الشيخ صالح العلي. وقد ظلَّ إسماعيل الهواش طوالَ حياته مناهضًا للانفصال وداعيةً للاستقلال، فتعرّض لغضب الفرنسيّين واضطهادهم. الجدير ذكرُه أيضًا أنّ الشباب الوطنيّ من أبناء منطقة الجبل، من علويّين ومسيحيّين، ساهموا في النضال مع إخوانهم، أبناءِ مدينة اللاذقية والمدن الساحليّةِ الأخرى، من أجل تحقيق الاستقلال والوحدة السوريّة، وكان من بينهم شبابٌ مرموقون أمثال: منير العباس، والمحامي عبد الله العبد الله، والمحامي بولص ديبة، والشاعر الكبير نديم محمد، وغيرهم من الشباب الذين كانوا يؤلّفون مع عبد الواحد هارون (زعيم مدينة اللاذقية) الكتلةَ الوطنيّة في هذه المحافظة.(20) ويورد الحوراني أنّه، عقب إقرار المفوّض السامي دستورَ تجزئة الأراضي السوريّة عام 1930، كان على "سلطات دولة العلويّين أن تجابهَ الوفودَ من سكّان منطقة اللاذقيّة الذين أعلنوا أنهم يريدون تغييرَ هويّاتهم التي تنسبهم إلى دولة العلويّين. وكان مكتبُ الكتلة الوطنيّة في حماه يستقبل العديدَ من وفود أبناء مصياف المطالبين بالوحدة، والرافضين لأن تكونَ المذاهب الدينيّة سببًا في تمزيق وحدة سورية."(21) فأيّ الوثائق تُعبّر عن "طائفة العلويّين" الذين انضمّوا عمليًّا إلى الوحدة السوريّة؟!

أعتقد أنّ تقاذفَ الوثائق، أصحيحةً كانت أمْ مزيّفةً وخارج سياقها التاريخيّ الكامل، واعتبارَها تمثّل فئةً كاملةً منذ الأزل إلى الأبد، ليست إلا ذرائعَ كراهيةٍ تعكس سذاجةً في القراءة التاريخيّة، وضحالةً فكريّةً. والحقّ أنّ أهميّة دراسة الوثائق تنحصر في أنّها تعكس مصالحَ "طبقةٍ" محدّدةٍ في "فترةٍ" محدّدةٍ و"ظروفٍ" محدّدةٍ ضمن "منطقةٍ" محدّدةٍ. ولكنْ فقط في حال دراستها ضمن سياقاتها، وربطِها ببقيّةِ المناطق والشرائح والطبقات، فذلك ما سيتيح لنا فهمًا أفضلَ لصيرورة تطوّر المجتمع وتشخيص أمراضه. وأيًّا يكن الأمر، فإنّ تاريخ سوريا ولبنان يمتلئ بالعرائض والوثائق التي تعكس حدّةَ الانقسامات التي سادت بين الطوائف، وضمن الطائفةِ نفسها، تجاه الفرنسيّين والإنكليز والروس والألمان والعثمانيّين وغيرهم، في زمنٍ لم تكن فيه أفكارُ القوميّة والوطنيّة منتشرةً بعد. ولا يمكن أبدًا الركونُ إلى تفسيرات الشارع أو وسائل الإعلام للصراعات وترديدُها من دون تدقيقٍ أو نقدٍ، بغضّ النظر عن موقف المثقف من السلطة، وسواء لامس هذا النقد أو التحليل شعارات الشارع أو لم يناسبها. وهذا أمر لم يسلمْ من الوقوع فيه حتى ثقاةُ المنافحين عن العلمانيّة قبل الثورة السورية. حتى إنّ كاتبًا علمانيًّا ولا يتساهل مع المسألة الطائفيّة، كياسين الحاجّ صالح، كتب على صفحته في الفيس بوك تعليقًا أثار استنكاراتٍ شديدة: "ليس احتمالًا أن تقود سياسةُ تحالف الأقليّات إلى التحالف مع إسرائيل. هذا محتّم، وهو مدوَّنٌ في جيناتها" ـــ وهو المثقف العارف بأنّ هذه البداهات التي تفسّر السياسة جينيًّا" أقربُ إلى التفسير الأنثروبولوجيّ العنصريّ من أيّ تفسير آخر. وبدلًا من التراجع عن هذه الفكرة، أصرّ على أنّه كتب ما يكفي من "الملْحقات" لتوضيح سوء الفهم، ولحلّ "الالتباس" الذي حملتْه العبارة! ورغم "الالتباس،" يبقى تعليقُ ياسين عاجزًا تمامًا عن تفسير أنّ جميع معاهدات الاستسلام مع إسرائيل وقّعتْها "أكثريات" (وفق مصطلحات ياسين): من الملك عبد الله، جدّ الملك حسين، إلى جميع سلالته، مرورًا بأنور السادات، وحتى اتفاقيّة أوسلو التي وقّعها ياسر عرفات.

ولا تختلف "زلّةُ" ياسين كثيرًا في الجوهر عن فكرة "الحتميّة" و"عقدة الأقلويّة" التي يسوقها أنطوان غطاس صعب، في تعقيبه على نشر "الوثيقة التاريخيّة" الآنفة الذكر. فهو يقول إنّ "مشروع إقامة الدولة العلويّة يعود إلى عشرات السنين، ولم يُطرح في ساعته، وذلك على خلفيّة الخوف من ذوبانِ الأقليّات، ومنها الطائفةُ العلويّة، واضمحلالِها. ذلك أنّ العلويين أكّدوا تاريخيًّا، كما يظهر في الوثيقة، استعدادَهم للتحالف مع اليهود على الانغماس في مجتمعاتهم العربية." ننوّه هنا إلى أنّ الدولة العلويّة كانت قائمة فعليًّا، وليست مشروعًا كما يزعم صعب، ودامت أكثر من خمسة عشر عامًا!

على عكس ما سبق، يرى أسامة المقدسي، الذي حلّل المسألة الطائفيّة في القرن التاسع عشر في لبنان، أنّ الطائفيّة "ليست غريزةً، أو حتميّةً، بل تعبّر عن ترجمةٍ وتحويرٍ لفكرةٍ جديدةٍ للمساواة ظهرتْ في منتصف القرن التاسع عشر في مجتمعٍ متعدّد الطوائف وخاضعٍ لضغوطٍ خارجيّةٍ، ويفتقر على جميع المستويات إلى رؤيةٍ قادرةٍ على تخيّل مستقبلٍ أفضل."(22)

الخلاصة

تعكس محاولاتُ فسير "المسألة الطائفية" في سياق الثورة السوريّة مدى تعقيدات المسألة وتخبُّط الأدوات المعرفيّة وصعوبة الفصل أحيانًا، في خضمّ الثورة، بين الموضوع (النظام) والمفهوم (الطائفة). فهذه الأخيرة لا يمكن تفسيرُها "ككيان، بل كعلاقةٍ سياسيّةٍ محدّدةٍ، يفسّر وجودَها شكلٌ من الصراع الطبقيّ، ويفسِّر إلغاءَها شكلٌ آخرُ من الصراع الطبقيّ،" كما وصفها شهيدُ الطائفيّة مهدي عامل.(23)
ثمّ إنه لا يمكن الركونُ إلى المعلومات التاريخيّة خارج سياقها. فمفاهيمُ "الوطنيّة" و"القوميّة" لم تكن موجودةً مجتمعيًّا قبل القرن العشرين. وحتى بعد انسحاب القوّات العثمانيّة بقي بعضُ الأعيان والمفكّرين السوريّين يتحسّرون على سقوط الخلافة.

وأخيرًا، فإنّه من الخطورة بمكانٍ الانزلاقُ إلى الأهواء التي تستحدثها الانقساماتُ السياسيّة، وتوريةُ الأحداث بالتسطيح، وتفسيرُ الآنيّ بالمطلق. ولا يكفي وصمُ الآخرين بالطائفيّة لتفسيرها. إنَّ إحياء ثقافة الطائفيّة، على حدّ تعبير المقدسي، يُحوّل الطوائفَ الدينيّة إلى طوائفَ سياسيّةٍ تخرج من الحيّز الخاصِّ إلى الحيّز العامّ لتنافس "هويّة" الدولة؛ فتشكّل بذلك تربةً خصبةً لوعيٍ مزيّفٍ، قائمٍ على مجريات الحاضر، ويؤسّس لمستقبلٍ انفجاريٍّ تكون الطائفة فيه كيانًا سياسيًّا داخل الجسم السياسيِّ للدولة وتعرّف نفسها انطلاقًا من توازن الهيمنة على البلاد.

[عن مجلة "الأداب" اللبنانية]

هوامش:

(1) محمد جمال باروت، العقد الأخير في تاريخ سورية، جدليّة الجمود والإصلاح (بيروت: المركز العربيّ للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات، مارس 2012)، ص 269.
(2) Francois Lenormant, Histoire des Massacres de Syrie en 1860 (Paris, 1861), p 123.
(3) نظرة سريعة إلى مقاطع الفيديو على اليوتيوب، والكتب الإلكترونيّة المنتشرة حاليًّا، توضح أخطار هذا الأدوات التحريضيّة الموجّهة واللاعلميّة. ويمكن الاطّلاع مثلًا على هذه الصفحة في الفيس بوك، ولديها 6000 معجب حتى الآن، وهي متخصّصة "بفضح" أسرار العقيدة النصيريّة:
[https://www.facebook.com/alawayeen.secrets?fref=ts [1
(4) قد لا يُعجب البعض أنّ البعث حقّق انتصارًا ساحقًا في الانتخابات الديمقراطيّة عام 1954، وخصوصًا في مدينة حماة، الخاضعة للعائلات الإقطاعيّة التي هزمتْها قوةُ الفلاحين المنتظمة تحت قيادة أكرم الحوراني، وذلك قبل انقلاب الثامن من آذار على حكومة الانفصال. ويمكن التوسّع بالعودة إلى مذكرات الحوراني، أو الاطّلاع على: باتريك سيل، الصراع على سورية ــ دراسة للسياسة العربيّة بعد الحرب 1945-1958، ترجمة سمير عبده ومحمود فلاحة (دمشق: دار طلاس، ط 8، 2010)، ص235، 241-245.
(5) يورد باتريك سيل في كتابه الشهير، الأسد، وثيقة أخرى على ما يبدو، وهي ذات تاريخ ورقم مختلفين، ولا يتطرّق إلى محتواها بل يكتفي بالإشارة إليها لكونها تحمل اسم علي سليمان الأسد (تاريخ الوثيقة 11/يونيو/1936، وثائق الخارجيّة الفرنسيّة ــ المشرق 1918 ــ 1930 ــ سوريا ولبنان ــ الوثيقة 492 ــ الملف 195) انظر: باتريك سيل، الأسد ــ الصراع على الشرق الأوسط (بيروت: شركة المطبوعات للتوزيع والنشر، ط 10،2007)، ص 28، والهامش رقم 14، ص 30.
(6) خلطت "العربيّة" بين لوران فابيوس، وزيرِ الخارجيّة الفرنسيّ الذي كان حاضرًا في اليوم نفسه، وجيرار ارو، سفيرِ فرنسا لدى الأمم المتحدة. فالأخير هو من ردّ على الجعفري، في حين نسبت الردّ إلى فابيوس. وقد نقل عنها العديدُ من المواقع والجرائد الخطأ ذاتَه. ويمكن العودة إلى النصّ الأصليّ لموجز مداولات الجلسة على موقع الأمم المتحدة، والتي تختلف ترجمتها على نحوٍ طفيف:
[http://www.un.org/News/fr-press/docs/2012/CS10752.doc.htm [2
(7) ردّ أرو على الجعفري الذي عُرض خلال بثِّ قناة الجزيرة لجلسة مجلس الأمن المنعقدة بتاريخ في (30) من أغسطس 2012
: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cby6nC1xfoA&feature=related
(8) صورة "الوثيقة الأصليّة" التي نشرتها قناة العربية:
[http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/08/31/235337.html [3
(9) رد العرعور على الوثيقة
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI8EWZVPa58 [4
(10) الشخصيّات الستّ المزعومة كما وردت أسماؤها في الوثيقة هي: عزيز آغا الهواش، محمود آغا جديد، محمد بك جنيد، سليمان أسد، سليمان مرشد، محمد سليمان الأحمد.
(11) أنطوان غطّاس صعب، "وثيقة تاريخيّة عن مشروع "الدولة العلوية" في سوريا:
http://www.centerlcrc.com/index.php?s=3&ss=4&id=3930&skw=الدولة%20العلوية
(12) أبو موسى الحريري، العلويون النصيريون، سلسلة الحقيقة الصعبة 5 (بيروت، 1980)، ص 229 ــ231.
(13) تلت مقالة أنطوان صعب عدة مقالات حول الموضوع نفسه، ويمكن الاستئناس بمقالة جوزيف إلياس، "وثيقة العلويين: مزيد من النقاش،" النهار، 18/3/2012، والتي ردّ فيها على صعب. وكلاهما قبل نشر الوثيقة في مجلس الأمن!
(14) Daniel Le Gac, La Syrie du général Assad, Editions Complexe, 1991, p 69-71.
(15) أكرم الحوراني، مذكرات أكرم الحوراني (القاهرة: دار مدبولي، ط 1، 2000)، الجزء الأول، ص 159.
(16) Hanna Batatu, “Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for Its Dominance,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Summer, 1981), p. 331.
(17) Philip S Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945 (London: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1987), p 520-22.
(18) مذكرات أكرم الحوراني، الجزء الأول، ص 159.
(19) كمال ديب، تاريخ سوريا المعاصر من الانتداب الفرنسيّ إلى صيف 2011 (بيروت: دار النهار)، ط1، تشرين الأول 2011، ص 64 ــ65.
(20) Gitta Yaffe-Schatzmann, “Alawi Separatists and Unionists: The Events of 25 February 1936,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), p 36-37.
(21) مذكرات أكرم الحوراني، الجزء الأول، ص 159.
(22) أسامة المقدسي، "من الطائفيّة إلى الوطنيّة اللبنانيّة،" مجلة الآداب، بيروت،2001 / 12 / 11، ص53.
(23) مهدي عامل، في الدولة الطائفيّة (بيروت: دار الفارابي، ط 3، 2003)، ص327.

 

Habits of French Colonialism

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“In other days France was the name of a country. We should take care that in 1961 it does not become the name of a nervous disease.” -- Jean Paul Sartre, preface to Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth

In an early French film on the colonies, Enfants annamites ramassant des sépèques devant la Pagode des dames (Lumière Brothers, 1897), two French women smile condescendingly as they scatter coins to a group of Vietnamese children, who scramble to gather them. Little has changed in the French attitude to its former colonies in more than a century. The “Socialist” president François Hollande’s deceitful claim that France is in Mali to protect the country from Islamism is shallow: there are other motivations that linger so close to the surface, such as France’s desire to project itself into an increasingly restive Francophone Africa since its 2011 intervention into Cote d’Ivoire as well as France’s need for nearby Niger’s uranium for its nuclear energy and for Mali’s gold. Like the two women in 1897, Hollande stands at the Élysée Palace, dripping with hypocrisy. 

The French “socialists” have always been keen colonizers, and strikingly, they have found willing collaborators in the wider French Left. In 1956, at the height of the Algerian struggle for national self-determination, the French communist delegates voted in favour of the Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet’s government to grant “special powers” to its colonial security services in Algeria. Mollet was committed to anti-colonialism before he became the head of the government, with his volte-face treated to tomatoes during a visit to Algiers (la journée des tomates, it is called). French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre wrote a stinging attack on the Left’s position on Algeria in 1957. “They talk of Algeria,” he wrote, “but in moderate terms.” No protests against the war, no days of action. “Its activists are grumbling,” he wrote, and “as for the working-class, the result, and perhaps the aim, of this policy is that it is entirely demobilized…..The [Left] is reaping what it has sown: when it needs the masses, it will no longer find them.”

Sartre was right. Eighteen months later, when the Fourth Republic collapsed, the Left could not seize the situation. It lost a million and a half votes in the elections, ushering Charles de Gaulle back to power and inaugurating the Fifth Republic.

The French Left has learned no lessons.

On 16 January, Deputy François Asensi of the Gauche démocrate et républicaine parliamentary bloc (and former Communist member) gave a speech at the National Assembly. Non-intervention would have been cowardice, he notes (La non-intervention aurait été la pire des lâchetés). The position of the Left Front, the Communists and the Republicans, he continued, is clear: “to abandon the people of Mali to the barbarism of fanatics would be a political error and a moral failing” (La position des députés du Front de gauche, communistes et républicains, est claire: abandonner le peuple malien à la barbarie des fanatiques aurait été une erreur politique et une faute morale). The jihadists of Northern Mali had to be stopped, said Deputy Asensi, or else they would create a despotic, blood thirsty and medieval state (des régimes despotiques, sanguinaires et moyenâgeux). Echoing George W. Bush and his amanuensis on the war on Iraq Christopher Hitchens, Deputy Asensi notes, that fundamentalism is a new form of fascism (Leur fondamentalisme constitue une forme nouvelle du fascism). There is no mention here of the Tuareg fight for self-determination that goes back to the 1960s which had been suppressed by the French themselves, nor anything about the French-led Libyan war of 2011 that sent radical Islamist fighters across the border into Azwad (northern Mali) to tip the balance against the Tuareg nationalists. What we get from Deputy Asensi is the bland defence of French neo-colonialism couched in the language of humanitarian internationalism, “International military action was necessary to avoid the installation of a terrorist state” (Une action militaire internationale était nécessaire pour éviter l’installation d’un EtatTerroriste).

The Communists partly differentiated themselves from their erstwhile member. Four days before, their statement echoed the French worry about the jihadist groups moving to the South. There was no mention of the resource wars. A small mention of the French neo-colonial agenda (Françafrique) was brushed aside by saying that this intervention “can be seen” in colonial terms (and not is a colonial assault). But then, as with Deputy Asensi, it tried to shift the burden of the military operation from France to Bamako and to the United Nations (Le PCF rappelle que la réponse à la demande d'aide du Président du Mali aurait du s'inscrire dans le cadre d'une mission de l'ONU et de l'Union africaine, réalisée sous drapeau de l'ONU, par des forces maliennes et africaines, dans le strict respect de la Charte des Nations-Unies, dans les limites imposées par l'exigence de la souveraineté malienne).

It is the case that the Malian “government” did request assistance. But bear in mind that this “government” came to power as a result of a coup led by the military, whose coup leadership (especially Captain Amadou Sanogo) was trained by the US; and that the actual Malian democracy of the 1990s was consistently undermined by the West and the IMF, who inserted their own man to the prime minister’s office in the early 2000s. Mali did not call for the intervention; the undemocratic, and Western backed, coup regime’s antecedents did. The current President, Dioncounda Traoré is only the Acting President, whose installation to his current office in April 2012 was sealed with a promise to fight a “total and relentless war” on the Tuareg, giving in, therefore, to the Malian military’s main grouse that led to the March 2012 coup in the first place. Traoré’s first Acting Prime Minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra was removed by the coup leaders in mid-December 2012 and replaced by Django Sissoko, who presided over a regime dominated by the coup leaders. This is the government that invited the French into Mali. Sanogo’s own political leanings can be gauged by the fact that he opposed the entry of an UN-authorized African force (staffed by ECOWAS) but he welcomed the French bombardment.

The African Union’s head, Yayi Boni, but not the African Union itself, hastily blessed the French intervention. Benin’s President Boni, a former banker who has become paranoid about his own safety, said he was aux anges or thrilled with the French intervention. Niger’s Mahamadou Issoufou backed the intervention and a military solution, but more it seems out of nervousness about Niger’s precarious position. When Issoufou came to power in 2011, he appointed a Tuareg social democrat, Brigi Rafini to be his Prime Minister, seeking to unite all of Niger, including the restive Tuareg. Pressure on the Francophone African heads has been immense – but even here there are signs of stress, as it is disagreement amongst them that has prevented a clear line from the African Union in Addis Ababa.

The UN support for the intervention is, despite Deputy Asensi’s claims, also shaky. UN Security Council resolution 2085, negotiated in December, was to provide safeguards against an extension of any intervention. It is not clear that the French provided any safeguards to the UN before its 11 January bombardment of Konna. Paragraph eleven of the UN Resolution is fairly clear,

Emphasizes that the military planning will need to be further refined before the commencement of the offensive operation and requests that the Secretary-General, in close coordination with Mali, ECOWAS, the African Union, the neighbouring countries of Mali, other countries in the region and all other interested bilateral partners and international organizations, continue to support the planning and the preparations for the deployment of AFISMA [African Led Support Mission to Mali], regularly inform the Council of the progress of the process, and requests that the Secretary-General also confirm in advance the Council's satisfaction with the planned military offensive operation.

The UN has been caught a bit wrong-footed, once more opening the door to an intervention with safeguards in place, but then watching one of its permanent members disregard the caution and its provisions as it bombs and kills civilians in the name of the UN. For the French Left to hide behind the UN, when it is exactly what the French military assault is doing, is to ridicule both the UN Charter and the entire tradition of anti-colonialism and human rights. France’s UN Ambassador Gerard Araud will brief the UN Security Council on Tuesday, 22 January. It is expected that he will reinforce the tired narrative: jihadis have to be stopped, France is only assisting the Malian government, and so on.

The French operation is called Serval, the African wild cat, whose figure is the symbol of the Italian island of Lampedusa – the gateway between Europe and Africa. During the Libyan war, Lampedusa became the contentious stopping point for Africans fleeing the crisis for Italy. Now, the herald of Lampedusa, the serval, blesses the jet fighters as they go in the other direction, bombing Africa as if by habit, throwing dust in the eyes of the world’s peoples.

[This article was originally published on News Click]

Parallel Walks in al-Khalil: A Photo Essay

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I last visited al-Khalil (Hebron) with my family when I was a child in the mid 1970s. I only have vague recollections of that visit, except for the place where Ibrahim (Abraham) was to sacrifice his son. For some reason, and maybe because as a child I was unable to comprehend why a father would be asked to sacrifice his son, that visit remained ingrained in my memory for years to come.

While studying in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, I always visited Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Birzeit, especially for solidarity student visits during the first Palestinian Intifada. I have been living in the United States since 1993, yet despite my repeated visits back home for research and to see my family in Nazareth, al-Khalil was never on my agenda. It was not until I agreed to be a discussant for the film This is My Country Hebron—which at the time was to be screened in January 2012 as part of the annual Human Rights Film Festival at Denison University—that I went back to al-Khalil to see with my own eyes what was happening on the ground. I went again for another visit in early May of that year, and by now it seems that al-Khalil will be part of every future visit I make.


[Map of al-Khalil, showing Israeli settlements and restrictions on Palestinians. Image by B'Tselem.]

Arriving at the Checkpoint

Before arriving at al-Khalil, I had to get a ride early in the morning from a friend who is originally from ‘Arabeh and currently lives in Beit-Safafa. We drove through the Israeli checkpoint in Bethlehem. He told me how he makes a point of shopping in Bethlehem to benefit the Palestinian economy. He described how, at times, the Israeli soldiers give him a hard time as he tries to re-enter Israel, and how they restrict the quantity of grape leaves and other agricultural goods that he is allowed to bring back with him.

My friend also shared the story of how he was stopped a year ago at the Qalandiya checkpoint while he was driving to East Jerusalem with his wife and her sister. The Israeli soldier told him that he could only have his wife go through with him, as they were related, but not her sister. His wife immediately asked to switch to the driver’s seat, so the Israeli soldier had to let them through since then, as the driver, both her husband and her sister were related to her.


[The Wall in Bethlehem, close to the checkpoint from Jerusalem. Image by Diego Segatto]

As we approached Bethlehem, we were confronted with giant concrete walls and barriers. This was an ugly reminder of how the Israeli Separation Wall has engulfed Bethlehem, and symbolically marked the start of my trip to al-Khalil. I quickly found a place in an old mini-bus that drove me and other students to al-Khalil.

An Encounter with al-Khalil

On reaching al-Khalil, I had no plan of where to go or what to do. I asked for directions to get to the old part of the city and started walking through the market. Speaking to a woman running a store that sells Palestinian embroidery, I explained the aim of my visit and she immediately put me in touch with the son of a family whose neighbors are Jewish Israeli settlers.

I went to the roof of the family’s house, and could see Israeli soldiers on guard on adjacent rooftops. The mother described how they had to put up nets to prevent their settler neighbors from throwing trash on their house. She also described the vast amount of money they were offered to sell their house to the settlers.


[Old city rooftops. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Old market in al-Khalil. Image by Isis Nusair.]

I had the chance to meet with representatives of the Christian Peacemakers Team (CPT), and they introduced me to a woman activist who invited me into her house to see her balcony overlooking al-Shuhada (Martyrs) Street. Representatives of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) had placed metal barriers on her windows to protect her house from the stones of the settlers. Needless to say, she could no longer enjoy her balcony!


[Overlooking al-Shuhada Street. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Overlooking al-Shuhada Street. Image by Isis Nusair.]

I continued walking in the old market until I reached another barrier where I could see more Israeli soldiers. I realized then that I must have arrived at the Ibrahimi Mosque. There was a triangle of Israeli barriers and checkpoints. I exited through one, went through another to get into the mosque, and then passed by a third as I started walking towards the area in the heart of the city where Israeli settlers live.

Entering the Enclave

The emptiness of the settlers’ area in comparison to the buzzing activity in the old city was eerie.


[Israeli security checkpoint by the Ibrahimi Mosque. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Walking in the Israeli Settler controlled area in al-Khalil. Image by Isis Nusair.]

I continued walking until I arrived at an intersection and did not know where to go. I asked an Israeli soldier on-guard on how to get to Beit-Hadassah. He pointed in the direction.


[Israeli security tower at the entrance to al-Shuhada Street. Image by Isis Nusair.]

I felt terrified, as anything could happen in this seemingly forgotten and empty place. There was hardly anyone around except for a few settlers who were waiting for the bus and a lone Israeli soldier on guard.


[al-Shuhada Street. Image by Isis Nusair.]

All Palestinian stores were closed and I passed by what was once a vibrant vegetable market that had become completely lifeless except for a few cats.


[The old vegetable market. Image by Isis Nusair.]

Before arriving at Beit-Hadassah/al-Dabbuya, the heart of the settler enclave in al-Khalil, I wanted to take a picture of a concrete barrier that I had been on the other side of (that is the Palestinian side) less than an hour before.


[The Israeli security barrier from the Palestinian side. The Hebrew graffiti on the wall
reads "Neighborhood of the heroes of Hebron." Image by Isis Nusair.]

At that moment, my camera refused to cooperate. I am not sure if it was my fear that affected its function or a mere coincidence. I passed by Beit-Hadassah/al-Dabbuya and continued walking until I arrived at another Israeli checkpoint. I wanted to go through but was prevented by the soldiers “for my protection” as I am a (Palestinian, second-class) citizen of Israel. I told them that I wanted to go through, back to the Palestinian section of town as it made no sense to return the way I came when the Palestinian section was less than a minute walk away. After I insisted that I wanted to go through, the soldier asked whether I was Arab, and when I answered in the affirmative, he allowed me to go through, but threatened: “Hope they don’t do anything to you” (shelo ya’asou lach mashehu).

I would have liked to think that by leaving the settler area, my trip to al-Khalil was over, but I was yet to exit the whole city back to Jerusalem, rather than just the Israeli Jewish enclave within an enclave.

Returning to Jerusalem

When looking for public transportation, I was faced with two options: either take a cab via the Israeli tunnel straight to Jerusalem, or take the bus via Bethlehem back to Jerusalem. I ended up taking the bus, and had to go through one last Israeli checkpoint before arriving into Jerusalem. The bus was stopped. A young Israeli female soldier got on board and asked very arrogantly in Hebrew (with a strong Russian accent) that we get off the bus. She rudely asked the driver: “What is this, a summer camp?” (ma zeh kaytana?), as there were many children on board the bus, and—according to Israeli regulations—women with children were exempt from getting off the bus.

Although I traveled on my own, I refused to get off and was bluntly told by the same soldier that if I did not get off, I would not be able to enter into Jerusalem. Before I exited the backdoor, I told her in Hebrew: “Enjoy your fake power” (tehani mehakoah hamezouyaf shelach). She was not happy with my comment, and was waiting for me outside when the time came to check my bag before letting me back on the bus. By then, she had decided to call her superior to complain that I had cursed at her.

The word “fake” in Hebrew is mezouyaf, and the word for “fucked” (and in certain contexts “armed”) is mezouyan. I insisted that I did not curse her and that all I had said was “enjoy your fake power.” Her superior let me through, perhaps due to the “easing of regulations” in Bethlehem a day before Christmas Eve for Greek Orthodox Palestinians. At that moment, I took a deep breath, feeling suffocated by my face-to-face encounter with this brutal politics of control, discrimination, and segregation.

Returning to al-Khalil

I returned to al-Khalil with my Palestinian friend in early May 2012. This time, we drove together through Beit-Jala and were able to witness another unsightly extension of the Separation Wall. As my friend had her two young children with her, she decided that it was not safe to come with me to the area controlled by Israeli settlers. I walked there on my own to continue taking pictures from the point where my camera had stopped functioning a few months earlier.


[Walking into the Israeli settler controlled area. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[The other side of the barrier. Hebrew graffiti reads “So that the temple shall be
built quickly in our time.” Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Mural of Israeli rabbis Dov Lior and Mordechai Eliyahu next to the deserted vegetable market. . Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Walking on al-Shuhada Street. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Walking on al-Shuhada Street. Image by Isis Nusair.]

A Jewish Israeli child was happily driving his small motorcar on the road, and there were tour buses as well as Israeli soldiers on patrol on al-Shuhada Street. Nobody said anything to me, and I was on a mission, still afraid, yet not as much as I had been during the first trip since I at least knew where to go. I did not dare enter into Beit-Hadassah/al-Dabbuya, still feeling suffocated by the eerie atmosphere of the enforced closure of that major part of the city to accommodate just a few hundred Jewish settlers.


[Beit Hadassah/al-Dabbuya. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[A child playing next to Beit Hadassah/al-Dabbuya.]


[Barrier separating the Palestinian and Jewish parts of the city. Image by Isis Nusair.]

As I was going back to the Palestinian area, this time walking back the way I came in order to meet my friend by the mosque, I passed by closed shops and signs detailing where the taxi stop, hammam, cinema, barbershop, and grocery store used to be.


[Deserted taxi stop. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Deserted taxi stop. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Deserted grocery store. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Hammam Al-Naim. Image by Isis Nusair.]

I kept imagining how buzzing and vibrant this area must have been before 1979. I passed by a small mosque that was open with hardly anyone inside. I also passed a group of Palestinian kids who were playing by a concrete Separation Wall that reminds me every time I see it of similar barriers at the Lvov and Warsaw Ghettos, etched in my mind through films such as ThePianist and In Darkness.


[Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Settler controlled area in al-Khalil. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Settler controlled area in al-Khalil. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Settler controlled area in al-Khalil. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Palestinian kids playing by a concrete barrier. Image by Isis Nusair.]


[Returning to the Palestinian section of town. Image by Isis Nusair.]


 [This article is a co-publication, also appearing on arenaofspeculation.org]


Rhetoric or Critical Action? The Role of Human Rights in EU-UAE Relations

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An EU resolution passed in October 2012, which condemned human rights abuses in the United Arab Emirates, caused outrage among defenders of the Emirati regime and gave hope that human rights may play a greater role in EU foreign policy. Several months on, has this resolution proved to be anything more than empty rhetoric?

The resolution criticized repression of political activists in the United Arab Emirates, where seventy-seven individuals have been detained without charge in the past year. It also called for authorities to conduct impartial inquiries into alleged physical attacks on prominent Emirati activist Ahmed Mansoor. Politicians and Emirati commentators responded angrily to the resolution, with UAE Foreign Minister Anwar Gargash labeling it "biased and prejudiced." Prior to the resolution passing, the UAE regime lobbied hard to oppose it, sending a letter to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) threatening that it would “needlessly damage EU-UAE relations." At the center of these relations is the 20.25 billion dollars of bilateral trade between the two in the first six months of 2012. 

The fear of reputational damage alone may have prompted the threatening UAE lobbying efforts, given that the resolution carried no further action on behalf of the European Union. Although human rights organizations received it with hope, questions have arisen about the degree to which the resolution was simply empty rhetoric aimed at convincing domestic populations that the European Union cares about human rights. Indeed, these concerns have deepened with news on 18 January that the European Union had announced the opening of a diplomatic mission in the United Arab Emirates.

It is not so much the opening of a mission in the United Arab Emirates that is of concern. Rather, it was the press release that heralded it, which stated that the announcement "highlights the importance of our geo-strategic interests in and our political and economic ties with this country [UAE]." It is disquieting that Cathy Ashton, EU Representative for Foreign Affairs, has not mentioned the human rights abuses taking place in the Emirates publicly and this highlights the lack of coherence between the various bodies of the European Union.

The hope that this resolution marked the initial stages of integrating human rights into EU foreign policy stemmed from a new strategic framework released in June 2012. The EU Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy pledged to place human rights at the heart of all internal and external policies of the union. Whilst this document sets out laudable intentions, it must be backed up with tangible action and consistent language from all of its bodies.

In the case of the Emirates, Cathy Ashton and the new diplomatic mission must publicly pressure the regime into ceasing its crackdown against political dissidents. Authorities there have been accused of torturing prisoners and freezing bank accounts of detainees’ families, as well as passing legislation criminalizing all forms of dissent. In terms of specific action, the answer may lie within EU member states.

Snooping software is readily used by the state to spy on dissidents, and European and US companies have been implicated in the sale of such items to Gulf rulers. The EU resolution mentions the attacks on Ahmed Mansoor, who was the subject of a report by Bloomberg in October 2012 detailing the use of spyware on his computer. Citizen Lab exposed the spyware as being an Italian-made surveillance tool and comes on the back of Bahraini activists receiving emails containing spyware made by the UK-based Gamma Group.

At the very least, the EU should be working to stop the support of state repression by companies operating within member states. Of course, the culpability of Western governments and companies in this repression goes beyond the sale of software, as numerous lucrative arms deals attest. The United Kingdom and France appear to be vying with each other over the sale of fighter jets to the Emirates, after recent visits by both Cameron and Hollande. These deals seem sure to expand the military power of a ruling family exposed by the New York Times as having already established a private mercenary army to take charge of "civil uprisings."

In the past, human rights have been a negotiable issue for the European Union and of secondary importance to wider trade and geo-strategic interests. The October resolution was the first public comment on the rights record of the United Arab Emirates. Along with the strategic framework released in June, it raised hopes that human rights would play a greater role in external relations. Sadly, Cathy Ashton’s announcement of a diplomatic mission opening in the Emirates was notable for its silence on the issue of human rights in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), appearing to confirm that words from the European Parliament are simply empty rhetoric.

The Presidency of the Council of the European Union passed to Ireland in January with a statement of "deep commitment to peace, democracy and human rights" and intent to "promote implementation of the EU’s human rights strategy." As a means by which to realize that commitment, resolutions from the European Parliament should include measurable outcomes that can be pursued by MEPs in pressuring the EU Council and Cathy Ashton to act. The Parliament may have the ability to pass resolutions, but the Council and High Representative must take them seriously if they are to have practical impact. If the resolution includes specific action points, then MEPs would have the ability to seek updates on progress and the President of the European Parliament could place pressure during his or her address to the EU Council.

The ideas within the European Union’s Strategic Framework on Human Rights suggest that steps are being made in the right direction. For the framework to be anything more than a box ticking exercise, all bodies of the European Union must act together to ensure that human rights shape policy and is not simply a propagandistic tool of legitimation. In the case of the United Arab Emirates, the new diplomatic mission should act to stop software companies based in EU member states from selling spyware to a repressive regime. That would be a significant step towards integrating human rights into policy and advancing impressive words beyond rhetoric.

Maath Musleh on Social Media and Palestine

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[This post is part of an ongoing Profile of a Contemporary Conduit series on Jadaliyya that seeks to highlight distinct voices primarily in and from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia.] 

Jadaliyya (J): What do you think is the most gratifying aspects of Tweeting, and Twitter?

Maath Musleh (MM): Twitter is a platform of expression; that by itself is very gratifying. Being able to speak your mind at any time is relieving. What makes Twitter different from other similar platforms is its simplicity. You do not have much functionality. Twitter is simple: tweet, follow, DM. This simplicity puts all the focus on the idea itself. The simplicity of tweeting has also made this platform the primary platform used to report from the field. Thus, many of the people active on Twitter are also active on ground. And noticeably, the number of your followers is directly related to the level of your activism on ground.

J: What are some of the political/social/cultural limits you’ve encountered using the platform?

MM: The limits and obstacles can be found everywhere. The key point here whether these manage to restrain you or not. If I allow anything to limit my freedom of expression on Twitter, then Twitter will not be my place any longer. Nonetheless, there are many annoying and challenging political and cultural trends amongst Arab tweeps specifically.

The main negative trend on twitter is the tendency to tweet sectarian comments, specifically when discussing several Arab uprisings. The level of sectarianism on Twitter has reached a sickening level. Nonetheless, I refuse to even discuss a sectarian or racist idea with anyone. If we discuss them, we give these ideas legitimacy. Freedom of expression does not include sectarian and racist speech. Thus, I came with a personal rule: “Anyone [who] tweets a sectarian tweet is directly blocked and reported”. This makes life easier and my timeline cleaner. 

J:  In your experience and use of Twitter, do you feel it helps mobilize or disorganize? Focus or crowd? Is it manageable or noisy? Can it help persuade and mobilize or does it turn everyone into a voyeur and spectator?

MM: It can go either way. It is important not to forget that Twitter plays a big role in shedding light on what happens on ground. This was clear during the prisoners’ hunger strike early 2012.  Speaking about tweeps in Palestine (excluding Gaza), I have witnessed the creation of Twitter accounts of many tweeps, including top ones. The main reason behind opening their accounts was to tweet from actions they take part in. So in essence, many of the most followed tweeps are already active on ground in one way or another. But as followers of Palestinian tweeps increase, the coherence between Palestinian tweeps falls. Many amateur tweeps become too independent too early.

Twitter is like a flock. You have birds leading, and others instinctively trusting them. But at the end, the flock works together in coherence and harmony. On Twitter, this works when tweeps network together not only on Twitter, but also outside Twitter. You have an idea that leads the flock. More or less, this has been the case amongst Palestinian tweeps until recently.

Recently, there has been a move to form independent flocks that would eventually split us on Twitter. The move remains marginal to some extent. Nonetheless, I will be prepared to move away from Twitter when it stops becoming a useful tool for advocacy. And to be a useful tool, we need coherence and harmony amongst ourselves on Twitter. Otherwise, it will backfire on us.

It is perfectly healthy to have different ideologies. Nonetheless, we need to agree on principles, and we need to trust each other. If trust and shared principles fall, Twitter will become just another “Facebook”. 


[Image of Maath Musleh.]

J: What initially made you decide to start using Twitter as a platform? Were you a Journalist, writer, scholar, student, before you opened your account?

MM: I opened my personal Twitter account in December, 2009. Nonetheless, I had started using Twitter way before that, maybe around 2008, because I used to work as a social media specialist.

In December 2009, I started my blog, and so I also started a personal Twitter account to gain more exposure for it. But because of my job, I could not tweet or blog with my real name. I was not that active on Twitter.

I became more active on twitter during the March 15 demonstrations in 2011. And because, at the time, Facebook was spammed, I started to become more active on Twitter instead. I started using my real name on Twitter in September, 2011. 

J: In what ways has Twitter helped you as a source of information? How do you sift through that information and determine its credibility?

MM: Verifying the credibility of information on Twitter is not an easy task. For the past two years, a network of Palestinian tweeps has been building. Trust has also been built amongst one another. To a certain level, we know which tweeps we have to follow for credible information. 

There are several trust levels for everyone. I adopt three levels of trust on Twitter. Level 3 of trust is the general level. It includes tweeps who I have noticed have a consistency in accuracy. The Level 2 of trust is more specific. It includes tweeps who I came to know well on Twitter through discussion and conversations. I have come to understand their points of strengths and points of weakness in reporting. 

Level 1 is the close circle. It includes Tweeps who I know personally in real life. This filters the spam of information on twitter.

Nonetheless, Twitter remains only an initial source of information. This information, even if from trusted sources, needs to be verified by sources on ground. It needs to be verified by several sources. It is important to remember that when someone imparts inaccurate information, most of the time they do not do it on purpose. There are many factors that play a role. So when someone verifies your information with other sources, it is not at all an insult to you. 

Twitter can also be a great source for whistle-blowers. It is important to keep an open mind when reading news on Twitter. – and even more important not to participate in spreading rumors. Sometimes, hastiness to tweet news to guarantee more retweets and more followers could make you fall into the dump of rumors. 

It is better to tweet late and accurately than to tweet first and inaccurately. At some point, everyone tweets inaccurate information. I tweeted a lot of inaccurate information in the past. Sometimes you fail in verifying news. It is okay as long as you correct it and apologize. 

J: Does Twitter turn activists into slacktivists?

MM: Twitter is important.  When there is an action on the ground, it is extremely important that people are on Twitter tweeting about it and spreading the word. The problem is that the majority decide to take that role. The balance is not quite as everyone hopes. We need more people on ground. Nonetheless, as I said before, a lot of the tweeps are active on ground. And when they tweet, they tweet from the field.

It is human nature to have a tendency to slack off. But at the end of the day, I cannot judge the level of activity of anyone by how active they are on Twitter. And let us remember, the acts of struggle and resistance are not only the ones we see.

Sometimes actions could be so sensitive that they remain covered in secrecy during planning and after execution. Many Palestinians are in Israeli prisons now just because of this unhealthy phenomenon. Many people have full time jobs of just pointing fingers at people and deciding who is an activist and who is not, or who is patriotic and who is not. In a way, they help the occupation in trying to make actions planned in secrecy surface, and thus fail.

We never know what everyone does. And we do not need to know. Everyone should just focus on what they do.

[Maath Musleh tweets at @MaathMusleh and blogs at Palestine Youth Voice.]

A Loss in the Battle for Free Access to Information

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[The following article was originally published on Tadween Publishing's blog. For more information on the publishing world as it relates to pedagogy and knowledge production, follow Tadween Publishing on Facebook and Twitter.]  

Aaron Swartz, a passionate defender for the freedom of information, committed suicide on 11 January, ending his life of twenty-six years. Swartz’s death comes after months of legal conflict following his downloading of millions of JSTOR-hosted journal articles with the intention to make the material accessible to the public.

“Information is power,” wrote Swartz in his Guerilla Open Access Manifesto in July 2008. “But like all power, there are those who want to keep it for themselves.” Throughout his life, Swartz sought to protest this idea and the act of withholding knowledge and information from the public or putting a price tag on it.

Swartz’s life as a technological genius began at an early age. At fourteen, he helped develop RSS software, and, shortly thereafter, cofounded Reddit. While Swartz’s ability as a creator remains remarkable, his role as a defender of free access to information and knowledge is what he will be remembered for and what lead to his untimely death. Glenn Greenwald writes in the Guardian that Swartz “committed himself to the causes in which he so passionately believed: internet freedom, civil liberties, making information and knowledge as available as possible.”

In June 2011, Swartz was arrested and accused of gaining illegal access to millions of JSTOR articles with a restricted MIT computer. According to the New York Times, Swartz faced charges related to “wire fraud, computer fraud and unlawfully obtaining information from a protected computer.” He was scheduled to go on trial in April 2013 and could have faced over thirty-five years in prison and millions of dollars in fines if convicted. (Ars Technica has a detailed description of Swartz’s actions leading up to his indictment, which can be read here.)

Swartz was a vocal critic of restrictions to freedom of information online and the founder of Demand Progress, a progressive civil liberties organization known for its successfulcampaign against internet censorship bills SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) and PIPA (Protect IP Act). Reflecting on the against-the-odds defeat of SOPA and PIPA in a passionate speech delivered at the May 2012 Freedom to Connect conference in Washington, DC, Swartz warned, “The enemies of the freedom to connect have not disappeared.”

The activist’s suicide has already prompted a petition to the White House for the removal of US Attorney Carmen Ortiz, who, even though JSTOR refused to press charges, pursued a superseded indictment, raising the number of felony charges against Swartz from four to thirteen. “Stealing is stealing,” Ortiz had previously stated, “whether you use a computer command or a crowbar, and whether you take documents, data or dollars.” On 14 January, the US Department of Justice formally dismissed all pending charges against Swartz.

Swartz’s death is a devastating loss for his family and friends, but also for those who have fought alongside him in the battle for open access and freedom of information.

With an unfortunate irony, Swartz’s suicide comes two days after an announcement by JSTOR that it will make the archives of more than 1,200 journals available to the public for free, giving those who sign up “read-online access” to three articles for every two weeks. Although JSTOR’s decision to move closer to open and free access is a step in the right direction, Swartz’s death overwhelms this welcome news. If anything can be gained from this tragedy, it is that Swartz’s death has brought the barriers and tactics governments and companies use to prevent and control access to information under heightened scrutiny.

In Tadween Publishing’s next blog post we will further investigate JSTOR’s pricing and regulations so as to delve deeper into the issue of open access.

Mali in Focus, Part Three: A Dangerous Show of Force from a Former Colonial Power

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[This article is the final of a three-part series featuring different perspectives on the recent developments in Mali. Previously published: "Mali in Focus, Part One: The Jihadist Offensive Revisited" and "Mali in Focus, Part Two: A War That Threatens the Entire Region"]

Broad political consensus in the domestic political sphere, support from the international community, and the urgency of the situation due to the rapid advance of Islamist militias—together, at first glance, these factors seem to justify French military intervention in Mali. Behind the alleged legitimacy of "Operation Serval,” however, France’s role is ridden with gray areas and contradictions due to the inconsistency of objectives and the potentially disastrous consequences for the entire Sahel zone as a result of such military engagement.

The Malian “Demand for Intervention”

The first justification for French military intervention in Mali, launched on 11 January, was the request for military aid against the onslaught of the Islamist group Ansar Eddine led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, with elements of support from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). The attack was launched against the town of Konna in the southern half of the country.

Undoubtedly, it is impossible to accuse France of having acted solely on its own initiative, as it responded directly to a request from the acting President of Mali, Dioncounda Traoré. The request was formulated ​​in a letter addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, and French President, François Hollande. 

This argument, however, assumes Traoré’s legitimacy and evades any questioning of the representativeness and actual political weight of the interim president in the context of troubled democratic transition. A significant portion of the Malian civil society and political class considers Traoré illegitimate, insofar as he remains a "hostage" of the military. 

During the days leading up to the first French air strikes, Bamako was at a boiling point and Malian institutions were on the brink of another upheaval. Political groups supporting the former junta of Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo had launched a series of demonstrations with a strong following that were in favor of organizing a national dialogue aiming to challenge the interim authority. They also reaffirmed their opposition to foreign military intervention, calling for the recovery of the North exclusively by the Malian army. 

As noted in French newspaper, Le Monde’s, special envoy in Bamako, official power seemed on the verge of falling. "The toppling of the fragile local authorities who where led by Dioncounda Traoré seemed “practically inevitable” (pratiquement programmé) said a close associate of the President. According to the same source, the military would have even considered stopping it on the night of January 9 to 10, the eve of the Islamist coalition’s taking of Konna,” writes Jean-Philippe Rémy in Le Monde. These elements, if confirmed, would support the interpretation of the French intervention as a means of preserving a contested regime in extremis, yet nevertheless, favorable to an external military force.

Supporters of France’s war also tend to elide the fact that despite the resistance and hostility against "bandits" and "terrorists," it could be, as suggested by several researchers in northern Mali, that "popular support for Islamists is deeper than we imagine." Relationships between people and the different Islamist groups are generally viewed through the lens of religious oppression, atrocities, torture, and other human rights violations. Nevertheless, the political and religious forms of organization introduced by the jihadist groups, as well as the economic redistribution of resources coming from contraband and trafficking, could be perceived by the populations of the North as an element of order, justice, and stability in areas neglected by the central government of Mali. 

A Questionable Interpretation of the United Nation Security Council’s Resolution 

In terms of international law, the justification of French intervention stems from an interpretation of United Nations resolution 2085, adopted on 22 December 2012. The resolution authorizes the deployment of a multilateral military force, the International Support Mission to Mali (MISMA), mobilized under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 

Despite the support of the international community and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), two discrepancies can be observed between France’s actions and the original spirit of the UN resolution. On the one hand, resolution 2085 initially stipulated, according to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that the operation "will be conducted exclusively with African combat troops and strong mobilization of the European Union with regard to finances and logistics." However, France’s premature initiation of the operation implies that currently, only French troops are involved in the fighting, arriving to support the Malian army who had faced repeated advances from Islamist fighters. The terms of the French intervention continue to depart from the strict framework of resolution 2085, as the multilateral ECOWAS force has not been deployed on the ground. 

On the other hand, it is important to remember that resolution 2085 focused primarily on advancing political negotiations and establishing a process of dialogue and reconciliation, in addition to military deployment. It is clear that the French operation, justified as an "emergency situation," gives de facto priority to the management of the crisis by force, and relegates the prospects of a politically negotiated solution to the background. The complexity of the situation in northern Mali, and the imbrication of various interests tied to claims of Tuareg and Islamist groups have been reduced to a simple opposition between France and the "terrorists," with whom no negotiation is possible.

What Political Legitimacy?

During the French Army's launch of "Serval Operation," a consensus emerged on the French domestic political stage. The representatives of the left-wing majority party (PS) and the right-wing opposition (UMP), as well as the center (MoDem) and the far right (FN), have mostly supported François Hollande’s initiative. Most French media have also taken a position in favour of the intervention, which was notably qualified as a "choice of the lesser evil" by the daily Le Monde

Only a few dissenting voices within the Left and the Green parties have gone against the decision of the Head of State, condemning the launching of a military engagement of France in Mali, which François Hollande had not brought before the Government or Parliament for discussion. In an op-ed published on 13 January, the former Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, also expressed his reservations about the "apparent haste" of the operation and his concerns about the re-use of the "war against terror” rhetoric.

Beyond the criticism of the decision-making process that led to the French military engagement and the questionable legitimacy of an intervention conducted in the name of the “war against terror,” there are also contradictions between Hollande’s alleged desire to break from the neo-colonial politics, as claimed during his election campaign, and the reality of his recent actions.

More specifically, François Hollande had declared: that he did not want to behave as "Africa’s policeman,” that he sought to abandon troubled relations related to "Françafrique,"[1] and that he would privilege multilateral action under the aegis of the United Nations, letting African countries take responsibility for their own security.  For the Head of State to commit an isolated France to an intervention in Mali directly contradicts his previous commitments, and inevitably forces him to adopt an interventionist posture. The Algerian press particularly denounced this attitude, which many voices in Algeria have argued can be likened to a form of neo-colonialism.

For example, the editorial in the 13 January edition of the Algerian daily Liberté denounces this France that has "decided to ignore UN resolutions to go to war against terrorism in the Sahel. It did not resist the epidermal temptation to return to its former domain to show everyone that it is the only one who knows what is best for Malians, their former colonized peoples.” 

Of course, President Hollande denies these charges. "France liberates. France has not a single interest in Mali, it has no economic interest in Mali to defend, it serves for peace," he vowed to the press on 16 January. There are nearly fifty subsidiaries and majority-owned French companies, mostly based in Bamako, employing approximately two thousand employees. The demographic links between France and its former colony also remain significant. Mali has about five thousand French nationals, while one hundred thousand Malians live in France. But more importantly, northern Mali borders Niger and Mauritania, two former French colonies who have closer economic relations with France, and are also vulnerable in the face of the jihadists’ actions.

Objectives and Means 

Since the operation’s launch, France’s goals for the war have seemed uncertain.  After proclaiming the need to ensure the security of French citizens residing in Mali, the government turned towards a hawkish discourse, invoking its response to “aggression,” and the need to halt the progression of armed Islamist groups suspected of proceeding towards Bamako.  Then, in reference to the jihadist groups, François Hollande announced that it was a question of “destroying them, imprisoning them if possible, and making sure that they could cause no more harm.” At the same time, he underscored the principle of re-establishing Malian sovereignty “over the entirety of its territory.” 

Similarly, no precise definition of the military targets and objectives has been suggested. The columns of Islamist combatants who had crossed the line of demarcation between the North and South were initially targeted. The French air raids were then extended to the jihadists’ lower bases and to urban zones, situated several hundred kilometers from the Konna region, where they launched their first offensive.  Now, we are witnessing a massive deployment of ground troops.

The terms of the French intervention have surpassed all the initial limits and frames that had been set. Although Minister of Defense, Jean-Yves Le Drian, announced on 24 December that France would not go into combat and that a “European contingent of four hundred men” would compose the Malian army, whereas ECOWAS would lead the military combat, exactly the opposite has happened. The airstrikes were followed by the deployment of French troops, which have been continuously reinforced and expected to reach 2,500 men.

The Creation of a “Sahelistan,” or the Risk of a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 

France finds itself heavily engaged in a military operation of unclear dimensions, “which will last as long as necessary,” according to President Hollande. This inevitably calls to mind the intervention in Afghanistan, where France has only just withdrawn its armed forces, and where the results were mixed, to say the least.

“We have had Afghanistan, there should not be a Sahelistan,” Minister of Foreign, Affairs Laurent Fabius declared in June 2012. Ironically enough, by getting involved in a long asymmetric war, France risks adding to the instability of the countries in the Sahel and of inciting jihadist militancy, as well as anti-imperial sentiment. Experience has already shown that since 2001, military operations in the name of a “war against terror” have actually worsened the problems they were fighting against, as opposed to eradicating them.   

The recent increase in testimonies, in part confirmed by the International Federation on Human Rights (FIDH,) expose the violent acts committed in northern Mali by soldiers in Mali’s regular army – supported by France. These acts, committed against people suspected of collaborating with the armed Islamist groups, could lead to increased support for jihadist groups and exacerbate existing ethnic tensions.

We should also remember that the current crisis in Mali is one of the direct consequences of French intervention in Libya in 2011. Several thousand Tuareg militants recruited as mercenaries in Gaddafi’s army returned to Mali after the fall of the Libyan regime, looting and circulating stocks of arms across the Sahel. They are now one of the factors destabilizing the region and contributing to the strength of the militias. 

While cautioning against the risk of the creation of a “Sahelistan” and the disastrous consequences for the entire region, France is paradoxically engaged in an operation in the Sahel.  Without a profound reorientation in strategy, this will likely provoke a new military mobilization and strengthen the force of a militant jihadism that is fueled by the actions of the ex-colonial power.

[This article was originally published in French and translated to English by Allison McManus and Mickael Vogel.]


[1] This term refers to the economic, military, and political relations between France and its former African colonies, through local networks of influence. The concept refers to the collusion between French and African political elites, to corruption, and retro-commission scandals, but also through more direct interventionism, such as support for coups or “peacekeeping operations”.

Syria Media Roundup (January 24)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

Regional and International Perspectives

 

Syria: The Analogies of History Daniel Neep explores “the ways in which the challenges faced by today’s rebels relate to those faced by the rebels of the 1920s, positing that historical solutions may well help the Syrian people in their struggle against the Assad regime nearly ninety years later.”

Bleeding from a Triple Hemorrhage Vijay Prashad provides a summary of developments in Syria’s crisis and concludes that “a fragile hope rests on the revitalization of Arab nationalism as a cord that binds the people across the widening sectarian divides.”


Should Obama Have Intervened in Syria?
Marc Lynch says a US intervention would have made things worse.


Fund Syria’s Moderates
Responding to Lynch, Robin Yassin-Kassab idealistically says there remain ways for the US to help alleviate Syrian suffering which consists in helping the “moderate” and “secular” elements of the armed opposition.

 

Syria’s Reconciliation Minister: Turkish Role in Syria ‘Very Bad’ Antoun Issa’s interview with Ali Haidar

 

Iran Shoots Itself in the Foot Robin Yassin-Kassab says “Iran’s backing for al-Assad is ironic because at a certain point the Syrian revolution was the one that most resembled 1979 in Iran”

 

Will Reversing Roles Help Turkey Avoid War in Syria? Emad Abdullah Ayasrah says there is a case of ‘reversed polarized roles’ with regards to Turkey’s official stance on Syria.

 

Whispers of Change in Turkey’s Syria Policy Tulin Daloglu supports that idea, suggesting that Turkey might be considering to ask the opposition to be more conciliatory with Damascus.

 

Turkey Angered by Petition on White House Website that asked Turkey to open its border with Armenia to allow the passage of Syrian refugees.

 

Au Liban Les Camps de Refugies Syriens Sont Payants The privately-owned makeshift camps at the Lebanese border are allegedly charging refugees for their accommodation.


Avant la Reunion de Paris, la Coallition Nationale Presse le Pas
Ignace Leverrier provides an overview of the recent structural developments within the National Coalition.


Syrian Narratives

 

The Syrian Dialogue Project A group of Syrians inside and outside Syria aims to create a platform to give a voice to “the silent majority” in Syria.

Moaz al-Khatib: Letter to the Christians of SyriaIt is no secret that some political regimes, in their cleverness, turn sects against each other. This is usually accompanied by the enacting of special laws and the suppression of institutions. In many countries, only remnants of tired regimes and individuals who call themselves rulers remain. Hypocritical secularism dominates these regimes, which employ false piety and artificial tolerance devoid of spirit and life.” 

 

Secret Syria Chemical Weapons Cable RevealedThe cable confirms several aspects of our original report, but also shows that the cable was less conclusive than our previous item suggested.”


Syrian Banks Face Gangs and Robbery as They Transport Cash to Damascus
Hadeel Al Sayegh says the numbers of banks across the country are dwindling and Syrians have limited access to them as a result of the violence.


Radical Elements are the True Winners in Syria’s Stalemate
Hassan Hassan says “this threat of radicalism is slightly exaggerated by western countries, but at the same time largely underestimated by the Syrian opposition, giving way to misunderstanding of an issue that is complicating the process of finding a way out of this crisis.


My University and my Dreams Were Destroyed in Aleppo
Amal Hanano, on last week’s explosions in Aleppo : “Two explosions took hundreds of lives, ending the plans and dreams of future architects, engineers, teachers, citizens.”

 

Syria and the Risk of Somalisation Haian Dukhan explores the statement made by envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi

War Rape: the Forgotten Pandemic Sweeping Syria


Inside Syria


“Suryaat”
BBC program on Syrian women in the Syria crisis.


The Pickings of War
A report from Sarmada on the emerging car selling business

 

The Battle for Lattakia Part 1 Karen Leigh meets with opposition fighters “waging a bloody guerilla war in the mountains that border the city”


The Battle for Lattakia Part 2

 

Conversations: The Architecture Student From Alepporecounts four “traumatic scenes” he saw on his way to the school


Syrian Town Takes Strife in Stride
Basma Atassi reports on the “deceptive” normality in Salkeen

 

The Lionesses of Syria: Assad Recruits Army of Women as He Starts to Run out of Men

 

Evolution of a Dissident Part 1&2Racan Alhoch’s personal struggle growing up with what he then understood as conflicting allegiances

 

Al-Qaeda Fighters Revealing Their True Colors, Rebels SayMartin Chulov in Aleppo reports that a schism developed between al-Qaeda and the FSA


Arts and Social Media

Social Media Buzz: The Attack on Aleppo University
 Mohammed Sergie on the latest Syria-related events and debates that went viral on social media platforms.


Policy and Reports

 

Attacks on Religious Sites Raise Tensions Human Rights Watch researchers document the looting and vandalizing of three religious sites in the hands of the armed opposition, one Shi’a place of worship and two churches.

 

Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle International Crisis Group’s report.

 

Interviews

 

"Business Networks in Syria": Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad on C-Span Book TV

 

Conferences

 

Keynote Panel on Syria for Conference at the University of Denver


Arabic

 

دمشق مطمئنة: الرياح السياسية والعسكرية تتبدّل

Sami Kleib writes about how geopolitical interests are playing into the current Syrian struggle and leading to a reassured Assad regime in Syria.

 

وثائقيات بي بي سي عن قرب : سوريات

Recently published documentary on BBC in which six Syrian women talk about their different roles in the current Syrian struggles. 


حين قالت لي معلّمتي: "حافظ الأسد كما الله لا يموت"

Farah Assayyed writes about the indoctrination of the Syrian youth under the Baathist regime.

 

السؤال السوري الكبير

Elyas Khouri writes about the need for constructive criticism of the opposition in Syria.

 

نعم، الأمم التحدة لا تعترف بنا!

Samir Shishakli writes about the role of the UN in the dire situation inside Syria.

 

!أميركا والنفط العربي

Michel Kilo presents his views on the recent news about the U.S being self-reliant in terms of the supply of energy and oil.

 

عروسة سورية لبنى زاعور تروي قصة اعتقالها

Loubna Zaour recounts her experience while being incarcerated in a Syrian prison.

 

لوران فابيوس الحضاري الناقص

 Osama Attawil writes about France's diplomatic relations and strategies in terms of Syrian politics.

 

من وحي الحالة السورية

Majed Habou writes about the story of Abu Jum'a, a prison officer in the 80s in Aleppo Central Prison, and his family's political positions in terms of the current struggle.

 

المأزق السوري بين استنقاع العسكرة وتهافت السياسة

Tarek Azizeh writes about the current Syrian impasse.

 

استهداف «هيئة التنسيق الوطنية» في سوريا

Mohammad Sayyed Rasas writes about the Syrian opposition's criticism and targeting of the National

Coordination Committee.

 

معركة سوريا والجيوبوليتيكا الدولية

George Haddad writes about the international geopolitics around the Syrian struggle.

 

!دير الزور: الخراب يعم... والمسلّحون يتقاسمون الغنائم

Tarek AlAbed writes about the current situation in Deir Azzor.

 

لماذا يجوع السوريون؟

Fayez Sarrah writes about hunger and food shortages in Syria.

 

باقة ورد للأحياء

Sahar Abdulla writes poems for Syria.


تزييفُ الوعي وتطييفُ التاريخ في سياقات الثورة السوريّة
Basileus Zino writes about political sectarianism in the context of the Syrian revolution. 

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