To write this commentary, I draw on my knowledge as historian of twentieth-century Palestinian painting as well as my own experiences with some of these artists when I co-curated Al Jisser Group’s exhibition in New York, “Williamsburg Bridges Palestine.” Additionally, I have a little experience visiting Gaza and communicating with artists there. On one of my visits acting as consultant, I brought the director of the Station Museum in Houston to Gaza as part of the development of the “Made in Palestine” exhibition. This essay will be limited to discussion of static images – painting and photography; but the show is a mix of static pictorial arts, film and video, as well as music.

My first impression of the show and of these artists is their moral good health. It may seem strange that a historian of art would talk about moral health within the parameters of aesthetics. The fact is that art cannot be seen in geographic or disciplinary isolation. And thus as I compare this body of artwork from Gaza to the general aesthetic and moral relevance of much of international production, the sincerity and honesty of Gazan artists appears unusual.

I am moved by their heroism. They continue working and producing art in the midst of destruction and pain imposed by Israeli incursions and encirclement. They overcome depression and adversity and continue to be honest. Several of these artists experienced the anguish of losing not only their homes but also the content of their studios to Israeli bombing. Yet they stand up again and again and continue working. The exhibition titled “Rescue” by Shareef Sarhan, Majed Shala, and Basel El-Maqousi in the wreckage of the Red Crescent Hospital speaks of this more eloquently than words. Is this not the essence of sumoud, that determination to persist that inspired and motivated the previous generation of Liberation artists during the 70s, 80s, and 90s?

The majority of the Gaza artists in this show are educated in the Arab world. A substantial number, perhaps a majority, are educated in Palestinian institutions of art, mostly in Gaza. Some received their art education in Russia. Rare is the individual among them who studied in the West. Some were self-educated. Most of them live and work in Gaza but there are those who live either in the West Bank or in exile. Many are born in refugee camps and say so openly thus taking ownership of the valuable cultural efflorescence in Palestinian camps. But regardless of where they live, Gaza left a strong imprint on their aesthetic consciousness.

One of the marvelous attributes of the show is that it is inclusive. It is refreshingly curated with a very light hand. It does not have that look of the pristine dictatorial museum and gallery exhibition. What it does possess is variety and energy. One sees the accomplished works of artists such as Mohammed Al Hawajri and Tayseer Barakat hanging with works by painters newly graduated from art school. The viewer is given the dignity of deciding for themselves what is important. According to Jasmine Melvin-Kouski, Assistant Curator of the show, Alhoush House of Arab Art and Design uses the technology of the web to “showcase the exciting natural diversity that exists within Arab art.” Moreover, to artists in Gaza, the web has become a precious doorway to the world, an intellectual tunnel through the Israeli cordon.

Gazan artists have taken up the traditions of artistic self-reliance. They have organized exhibitions, galleries, study centers, web pages, and artistic clubs and groups. The studios at the Red Crescent Hospital accompanied by the workshops program and Iltiqa Gallery are examples. They continue the traditions established by the previous generation. It was not an academic historian but rather the wonderful artist, Ismail Shammout, who wrote the first precious book on contemporary Palestinian art during the years of the uprising in Beirut in 1989. It was artists in Beirut and the West Bank and Gaza who organized the Union of Palestinian Artists and the numerous exhibitions of Palestinian art throughout the world and placed it firmly on the international map. Their hard work forms the base for the rich variety of today’s Palestinian arts scene.

The artists of Gaza though living very difficult conditions are nevertheless aware of the world. The currents of art history and of the contemporary art scene are visible in both the form and content of their work. The representation of eyes in the Liberation art of Palestine was used as a symbol to convey that we are aware, we know what is happening to us and we see the world clearly. Interestingly, there are many eyes in the paintings of artists from Gaza. I take note of individual painting with such focus on eyes in pictures by Nariman Farajallah, Dina Matar, May Murad, Majed Shala, Shafiq Radwan, and others. Even in the sad children’s faces in the paintings of Abdelraouf Alajouri the eyes tell of premature awareness. Among the eclectic photographs of the young artist Mahmoud Abu Hamda there is a close up of an eye reflecting the world outside and it seems to share, intentionally or not, the ideas of the liberation artists. Additionally, it presents a principle of internal/external that can apply to situations other than Gaza.

Nowhere, however, are eyes more obviously indicative of knowledge of the world than in the project GAZAWOOD POSTERS, the series of posters by Ahmad Abu Nasser (aka Tarzan), and Mohammad Abu Nasser (aka Arab). These posters indicate awareness of the detailed variances of meaning in international mainstream media’s propagandistic news and of the West’s cultural practices both in film and in postmodernist art.

But there is a difference between the postmodernist works of the Nasser brothers and the exhibition of Gaza paintings. That difference reflects the two trends in Palestinian visual production in our current era. While Palestine remains the primary subject in both trends, they differ in form. One trend, contemporary Palestinian painting, is visual and pictorial relying for its message on visual symbol; the other, Palestinian postmodernist art,participates formally in contemporary international postmodernist trends utilizing interdisciplinary mixed-media and relying primarily on the verbal language. Postmodernist art is not painting; it is a completely different discipline.

The first trend, contemporary Palestinian painting, though comprehensible by the entire world and partly directed towards it, remains inherently aimed at Palestinians and the Arab world. Visible in this work is its descent from the art of the Liberation movement. It relies on it in its formal language even while it differs slightly in content and the use of symbolism. In contrast, the Palestinian postmodernist trend is directed at an international English speaking audient. It utilizes the formal language of postmodernism but subverts its content. It combines static and moving image, and a variety of interdisciplinary media including photography, video, installation, performance, and the spoken and printed word. Like international postmodernism, it relies on communication in the verbal language rather than the visual one. That is not to say that it does not use images; but the images need to be translated to words in order to make sense. Its message does not use the Arabic language native to its practitioners but rather the English language, which has now become internationalized.

However, and what is of primary importance is that the Palestinian postmodernist trend differs inherently from international postmodernism. Its subject matter is sincerely committed to Palestinian aspirations. It does not maintain the elitism and arrogance of subject typical of international postmodernism. In that respect it is a subversive art, an art that borrows contemporary international forms and fills them with Palestinian political aspirations, it takes the forms of oppression and fills them with the content of the oppressed. The Nasser brothers do this with unmatched bravado as though to say we understand how you imprison us so take a look at how well we understand your prison. Thus in GAZAWOOD the prominent eyes are indicative of intelligence, humor, and international awareness. 

Not included in this show but notable as another Gazan postmodernist work is the “Gaza Metro” by Mohammed Abusal. Abusal photographs a metro sign in various parts of Gaza, thereby fulfilling a wish while making a poignant comment about the abnormality of life in Gaza. It tells an international audience, that look your life is not like ours; while being sarcastic and painfully humorous.

Contemporary Palestinian painting practiced by a majority of the Gazan artists is a continuation of earlier traditions. Visible are not only the formal influences of the previous Palestinian generation of painters but also that of historic Arabic art as well as the ancient arts of the region. The remainder of this essay deals with contemporary Palestinian painting and photography as static single images first as to its form and lastly as to its content. 

Unlike the Liberation artists, the painters of Gaza tend to be more expressionist than symbolist. The influence of expressionism in their work came directly through the agency of Darat al Funun in Amman where for a time German-based Syrian artist Marwan Kassab Bachi would teach in their summer program and where its good director, Suha Shoman, made certain that many artists from Gaza came to study. In Marwan’s paintings, faces form a major subject and are distinguished by marvelous brushing. After the first wave of students returned to Gaza, faces as well as free brushing began to dramatically appear in their paintings. They are used to good effect in the paintings of Shafiq Radwan, where faces of various scale fit next to one another or inside each other all looking out at us in their various attitudes. The wonderful brushing of Marwan affects Abdel Nasser Amer, Ruqaia Al Lulu, and Mohammed Harb (who uses broad brushing to paintexpressively distorted faces and figures in bright colors).

Another formal tendency which appeared in the art of liberation artists and which has its origins of medieval Arabic (Islamic) geometric abstraction is the tendency to fit shapes tightly together so as to fill the flat space of the picture’s plane. The clearest use of this is to be found in the work of Rima Al Mozayyen, who fills the picture with flattened shapes so fitted as to fill the picture’s surface. The photographs of Majed Shala also reveal the innate aesthetics of medieval Arabic (Islamic) art in the way the parts relate to one another though the subject is contemporary. Shala focuses his lens on small intimate sections of camp architecture where surfaces reveal that they are old, used, and disparate. They reveal the camp builders by expressing the poverty and artistry of their hands. Furthermore, bits of graffiti reveal the disenfranchisement of the residents as they have only their own walls to express their political and religious ideologies. Some of the photographs of Khalil Al Mozayen might also be included in this discussion where the texture of Gaza architecture is a central subject revealing the effects of destruction and use. Mozayen is a highly trained and experienced photographer. Salman Nawati, Shadi Alassar, Basel El-Maqousi, and Omar Shala all present very capable photographs.

                                                                                                                                [Majed Shala. Image copyright the artist.]

The influence of the ancient arts of the region are visible in the work of Tayseer Barakat, where rows of images are knowledgeably influenced by ancient Egyptian, Assyrian, and Sumerian arts. In Barakat’s work, images in rows and compartments tell about the small compartments of life in refugee camps. The paintings of Raed Issa present figures that appear to be youths struggling against attacking Israeli soldiers. While this painting represents life in Gaza, it is formally aware of the relationship of negative to positive space so clearly visible in the work of Mustafa Hallaj and in Arabic geometric abstraction as well as Arabic calligraphy and the ancient arts of the region.

Whereas the formal attributes of contemporary Palestinian painting owe much to the past, as they should, its subject matter reflectscontemporary life in Gaza. The untitled painting in the show by Nariman Farajallah presents rows of figures, bandaged, wrapped, swirling, bent, hung, or buried by debris. The paintings of Abdelraouf Alajouri bring us the children of Gaza and the frightened child in every adult. We can read the psychological weight forced on to the hearts of the people of Gaza in these children, naked and fragile. The figures in the paintings of Iyad Sabbah combine the contradictory sensations of refuge and torture. The painfulness of life in Gaza is also clear in the figures painted by Mohammed Joha, which are made to look like damaged mannequins. There is not blood, yet we are affected by figures that are crucified, upside-down, and bandaged. The photographs of Nidaa Badwan belong in this group of works that express the anguish of life in Gaza. Nidaa uses a combination of facial expression with a black plastic bag tied around the head implying suffocation and garbage. These artists have all found ways to express their observations of anguish in Gaza making the visual expression far more powerful than words.

                                                                                                                              [Nidaa Badwan, untitled. Image copyright the artist.] 

In subject matter, the work of Dina Mattar brings the paintings of Ahmad Nawash to mind. Like Nawash, Mattar’s pictorial organization is superb. Kites, birds, figures, and other objects in her paintings posses a certain humor and delight; but they also posses a clearly compelling structure that is neither informal nor carelessly invented. The viewer begins to decipher what seems an intentional story and begins to question what is happening between the personages in the paintings. That is the precise attribute that brings Ahmad Nawash to mind. It could very well be a similarity of life and experience or a direct influence, it makes no difference as visual culture has a way of permeating our consciousness in ways that we are hardly aware of. What I find of interest is that her paintings also bring the Spanish painter Joan Miro to mind, but though the resemblance to Miro is outwardly close it is far weaker than the compelling similarity of attitude to the work of the old master, Ahmad Nawash.

                                                                                                                            [Dina Mattar, untitled (2009). Image copyright the artist.]

The visual work presented by this exhibition deserves very careful consideration and respect. It carves out a space in the world of Art that is unique. Though the artists of Gaza live in a painful prison, they are surrounded by subject matter fit for epic poetry, and they manage to find the sincerity and the willpower to standup and to use it. They manage to stand up not only against the painful odds of a difficult life but they also stand up in spite of the overwhelming propaganda of oppression designed to make them feel inferior. This contrasts starkly to comfortable societies where artists are unable to withstand the temptations of elitist propaganda designed to make them feel superior and produce visual works that are vacuous. The artists of Gaza are indeed heroic. 

This essay first appeared in the THIS IS also GAZA exhibition catalogue that was published on the occassion of Alhoush House of Arab Art and Design's inaugural event and is reprinted with permission of the author. 

[Mohamed El Marouani est l'auteur de l'oraison funèbre de Abdessalam Yassine. Condamné à une peine de vingt-cinq ans de prison, pour complot contre la sureté de l'état, il est libéré dans le sillage du mouvement du 20 février. Il est le fondateur de l'association Al Oumma qu'il aimerait transformer en parti politique, mais pour lequel il a essuyé un refus.]

Ahmed Benseddik et Salah Elayoubi (AB et SE): On se souvient de l’oraison funèbre que vous avez prononcée aux funérailles du Cheikh Yassine. Ceux qui vous ne vous connaissaient pas ont pu apprécier vos talents oratoires, alors que vous meniez une violente charge contre ceux que vous qualifiez de « normalisateurs et collaborationnistes de la tyrannie et de la corruption. » Qui êtes-vous  Mohamed El Marouani ?

Mohamed El Marouani (MM): Licencié en Sciences Economiques, option économétrie et titulaire d’un diplôme d’études supérieures (DES) en gestion, je suis chercheur sur les questions de la pensée politique islamique et prépare actuellement  une thèse doctorale sur « la Théorie de la légitimité du pouvoir politique en Islam ».

Marié et père de trois enfants,  je suis administrateur principal et responsable d’études  à Maroc Telecom et  ex-vacataire à l’Institut National des Postes et Télécommunications, Cycle des Gestionnaires.

Président fondateur du Mouvement pour la Oumma de 1998 à 2011, je suis l’actuel coordinateur national du parti du même nom. Ex-militant et responsable syndical, j’ai également fondé nombre d’associations et de coordinations civiles, participé aux actions de défense des droits de l’Homme  (débats ou manifestions de protestations ou de solidarité avec les prisonniers politiques et pour délit d’opinions).

Ex-détenu politique, j’ai été condamné à une peine de vingt cinq, ans ramenée à dix ans en appel, avant d’être libéré, le 14 avril 2011, dans le sillage des manifestations du mouvement du  20 Février.

Je suis l’auteur de plusieurs publications sur différents thèmes (constitution et démocratie, enseignement, économie etc), dont notamment un ouvrage sur le pouvoir politique dans la pensée politique islamique historique et contemporaine (publié sous forme d’articles).

AB et SE: Quelles étaient vos relations avec Cheikh Yassine et al Adl wal Ihsane ?

MM: Cheikh Yassine fut l’un des rares leaders de ce pays à avoir continuellement et sans répit fait la démonstration d’un courage à nul autre pareil, contre le despotisme et la corruption. Ses interpellations et ses adresses aux uns et aux autres témoignent de la grandeur du personnage. Malgré l’incarcération, l’assignation à domicile, les persécutions et l’enfermement psychiatrique, il n’a jamais fléchi.

Par ailleurs, l’homme était un intellectuel, porteur d’un projet de société et doué de qualités incontestables, nécessaires au leadership, et le charisme qui va avec. Il en fallait pour accompagner et faire évoluer Al Adl wal Ihssane vers la place importante qu’elle occupe aujourd’hui, dans le champ politique marocain.

Les relations que nous avions tissées, tant avec lui qu’avec son organisation, étaient bâties sur le respect mutuel, la coopération et la solidarité.

AB et SE: Vous avez été condamné à vingt cinq ans de prison, avant d’être gracié par le roi. Quelles ont été les circonstances de votre arrestation et de votre condamnation ?

MM: Dès 2006, le Makhzen avait mis en place un plan politico-sécuritaire visant la restructuration ou plutôt le reformatage de la scène politique marocaine dont les grandes lignes sont :

• Démantèlement forcé ou consenti des partis administratifs pour la refondation d’un contexte politique en adéquation avec les besoins du Makhzen ;
• Répression des médias indépendants;
• Affaiblissement de la mission électorale du Parti Justice et Développement (sur le plan politique, il ne représente plus aucune menace pour le  régime politique makhzénien) ;
• Poursuite de l’opération de fichage sécuritaire, à l’encontre d’al Adl wal Ihssane, en vue de les contenir, comme l’a si bien signalé P. Vermeren, dans son ouvrage «  Le Maroc de Mohamed VI. La transition inachevée » (ed. La Découverte).

C’est dans ce contexte politique que s’est déroulée notre arrestation et notre condamnation. Le Makhzen a pris le pli d’autoriser les partis qui se rangeaient à sa vision  politique. Il ne pouvait décemment pas autoriser un parti politique qui revendiquait sa liberté et son autonomie et était donc aux antipodes de  sa nature despotique. A défaut de soumettre le parti, et convaincre ses responsables, ils ont choisi de nous museler en nous intentant un procès inéquitable au cours duquel la présomption d’innocence a été sciemment violée par le ministre de l’Intérieur de l’époque, Chakib Benmoussa.  Le jugement fut à l’avenant, et d’une médiocrité inégalée.

AB et SE: Comment peut-on être condamné aussi lourdement un jour et être purement et simplement libéré un peu plus tard ? N’est ce pas là une preuve que les mêmes méthodes de manipulation et de dissuasion sont appliquées par le Makhzen ? Et n’est ce pas là un aveu de votre innocence, et peut-être aussi de celle d’autres condamnés ?

MM: Aucun doute à ce propos ! Le Makhzen était persuadé que les conditions étaient réunies pour asseoir son hégémonie sur le champ politique. Il n’aura pas dérogé à cette approche keynésienne qu’ont tous les régimes despotiques de la vie politique. Ils sont génétiquement obnubilés par une vision à court-terme. Mais comme Keynes le signalait, à long-terme, nous serons tous morts. Le projet est toujours le même : tuer dans l’œuf toute contestation ou tentative de lutte contre le despotisme et la corruption.

Mais c’était compter sans le « Mouvement du 20 Février » qui, dans le sillage de ce que l’on a appelé « le Printemps arabe », a contrecarré ces plans et à qui nous devons, pour l’essentiel, notre libération. Un juste retour de bâton pour ceux qui nourrissaient l’ambition de porter atteinte à nos droits les plus élémentaires, et entacher notre réputation pour nous couper de notre base et nous aliéner l’opinion publique.

Mais si notre libération fut un  revers manifeste pour l’administration du Makhzen qui a toujours privilégié les choix sécuritaires au détriment d’une stratégie de développement, je dois toutefois déplorer un bémol à cette victoire. D’autres détenus islamistes continuent de croupir dans les prisons. Une sorte de monnaie d’échange pour nous contraindre à un changement dans nos choix politiques. En pure perte, car notre détermination de lutter pacifiquement pour l’instauration d’un véritable État de droit où les Marocains pourront jouir d’une vie décente et où les richesses seront réparties de façon équitable, reste intacte.

AB et SE: La cour d’appel a refusé la constitution du parti politique « Al Oumma » dont vous projetiez la création. C’est sans doute un signe qu’on vous tient encore à l’œil, malgré la grâce dont vous avez bénéficié. A-t-on justifié ce refus ?

MM: Pour notre plus grand malheur, le pouvoir judiciaire n’est pas indépendant et souffre de problèmes structurels profonds. Un exemple : le tribunal administratif s’est prononcé contre la constitution du parti Al Oumma, alors même que le délégué  royal pour la défense du droit et de la loi, partie neutre, avait émis un avis favorable. Un verdict scandaleux, quand on sait que le jugement a été fondé sur des questions de délai de prescription des attestations d’inscription dans les listes électorales, sur une décision ministérielle et ce, en dépassement flagrant de la loi et de son décret d’application. Un argument qui équivaut à rejeter toutes les attestations fournies par les députés à l’occasion des élections du 25 novembre.

En réalité, le refus d’autoriser la constitution du parti est une décision purement politique qui ne peut être dissociée du contexte général, fait de répression des libertés, de procès fabriqués contre les militants du 20 Février, et d’emprisonnements politiques dans des conditions contraires à la dignité humaine

AB et SE: Beaucoup parmi les membres du 20 Février semblent convaincus qu’un accord à tout le moins informel, sinon tacite, aurait été passé entre le PJD et Al Adl wal Ihssane, ainsi que d’autres mouvances islamistes, afin de donner à Benkirane et son gouvernement une chance d’expérimenter leur programme politique. Certains n’hésitent pas à suspecter un accord sous les auspices ou à l’instigation du Makhzen, et évoquent une trahison. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

MM: Je ne me permettrais pas de répondre à leur place. Vous pourrez toujours leur poser la question. En ce qui nous concerne, nos positions resteront inchangées tant que le contexte actuel demeurera le même. Nous serons toujours aux côtés des opprimés, opposés au despotisme, à la tyrannie et la corruption. Le retrait d’al Adl wal Ihssane, avec qui nous partageons bon nombre de points de vues, est une décision politique interne à l’association. Nous devons la respecter. Au demeurant, s’ils ont quitté les manifestations, ils n’ont pas quitté la scène mais affirment leur propre ligne politique. Enfin, faut-il le souligner, nul ne pourra jamais  soupçonner al Adl wal Ihssane d’avoir eu des affinités avec le pouvoir.

AB et SE: En Tunisie et en Égypte, le premier réflexe des islamistes au lendemain de la révolution semble vouloir être celui d’en découdre avec les mouvements laïcs, de chercher à s’incruster constitutionnellement, tout en agitant la Charia comme une menace, sans jamais apporter de solution démocratique. Quelle est la place du concept de la démocratie dans votre esprit ?

MM: Tout d’abord, il nous faudrait nuancer le propos. Ce qui se passe en Tunisie et en Égypte n’a rien à voir avec l’adoption ou non de  la démocratie. L’Égypte et la Tunisie vivent une période de transition démocratique que l’on peut assimiler à une « zone de turbulence ». Dans un tel contexte, on relève deux types d’évènements :

• Des évènements que l’on peut qualifier de normaux ou naturels, liés au débat politique qui agite la société civile et met aux prises des projets politiques divers: nationalistes, libéraux, gauchistes et islamistes. Cette diversité est à mettre au bénéfice d’une bonne santé de la démocratie et d’une richesse dans les échanges, tant que le dernier mot revient au peuple, via des élections transparentes et dans un contexte de liberté. C’est, somme toute, la voie empruntée par toute démocratie;
• Des évènements liés aux soubresauts du régime renversé et qui visent à déstabiliser le processus démocratique.

Toute transition démocratique, connaît des moments de tensions qui sont dépassés aussitôt qu’est mis en place un cadre politique et constitutionnel.

Quant à la démocratie en elle-même, elle demeure, à ce jour, le meilleur système jamais expérimenté par l’humanité, pour s’organiser en société civile et gérer ses choix stratégiques. Y-a-t-il lieu de rappeler que l’État, dans la pensée islamique, est un État civil qui peut prendre toute forme possible suite un consentement des composantes de la société ? Notre projet politique s’articule autour de deux axes: le peuple source du pouvoir, et la souveraineté de la loi. Cependant il faut distinguer entre source du pouvoir et source du droit. La Charia peut être l’une des sources du droit et peut être la source principale du droit. En Égypte, par exemple, peu ou prou sont, y compris parmi les coptes, opposés au principe de la Charia comme source du droit. On peut en tirer la conclusion que tout est fonction de la volonté populaire, et c’est là la principale règle de la démocratie : le respect de la majorité sans compromettre les droits des minorités et de l’opposition politique.

AB et SE: Vous n’avez pas manqué d’adresser des messages politiques au pouvoir marocain, au PJD… quel bilan faites-vous d’une année après l’arrivée de ce gouvernement ?

MM: Je considère que le gouvernement est le produit du contexte politique et ne peut agir au-delà de ses compétences et possibilités politiques et constitutionnelles.  C’est la raison pour laquelle nous n’avons perçu aucun changement fondamental dans les choix stratégiques du gouvernement Benkirane qui nous inciterait à changer de position politique. Un simple exemple : le régime continue à s’opposer à notre droit à l’expression et à l’organisation.

Trois conditions doivent être réunies pour que l’on puisse juger ou non de l’efficacité et de  l’efficience de la formation gouvernementale : un large soutien populaire, un contexte  politique sain et ouvert et un cadre  constitutionnel démocratique.

• Côté soutien populaire, les sondages ne dépassent pas le chiffre de 27% ;
• Le climat politique est marqué par les emprisonnements politiques, la répression du droit d’expression et d’organisation (le cas du parti Al Oumma, répression de la presse et des manifestations pacifiques…).
• Le cadre constitutionnel est marqué par l’hégémonie de l’institution royale jusque sur l’application du programme gouvernemental.

Un état des lieux qui n’est pas étranger à la péjoration d’un certain nombre d’indicateurs :

• Indice de la démocratie: le Maroc est passé de 116 en 2010 et 119 en 2011 ancrant le Maroc dans la sphère des pays totalitaires, alors que la Tunisie est passée du rang 144 à 94 pour la même période, lui permettant de quitter cette sphère et de regagner les pays à régime hybride, en cours d’instauration de la démocratie ;
• Indice de la corruption: le Maroc passe de la position 80 en 2011 à 88 en 2012 selon le rapport de Transparency International ;
• En matière des libertés, le Maroc enregistre une chute des libertés de la presse en passant de la 135^e place, en 2010 à 138^e en 2011, selon le fameux rapport des libertés de la  presse de 2012, édité par Reporters sans frontières.

La constitution ne laisse de liberté à aucune formation politique d’exercer le pouvoir et d’appliquer ses programmes, assimilant tout gouvernement travaillant avec cette monarchie dite exécutive à un serviteur du pouvoir, en dépit de tout bon sens démocratique.

Il n’est donc pas exagéré de dire que le gouvernement actuel a réussi à jouer son rôle dévolu de faire-valoir du régime. En redorant ainsi le blason au Makhzen, il nous renvoie  à une ère de plomb relookée. Alors que la vie politique est à l’agonie, on constate que le camp du despotisme reprend l’initiative.

AB et SE: Aussi bien Wikileaks que le livre « Le roi prédateur. Main basse sur le Maroc » (Catherince Graciet et Eric Laurent ; ed. Seuil) évoquent l’implication du roi et de son entourage dans des agissements d’abus de pouvoir, de haute corruption et de multiples scandales et actes de prédation économiques. Le palais n’a jamais démenti ces deux sources. Pourquoi à votre avis ?

MM: L’institution royale a son porte-parole dont la responsabilité est de répliquer à ces accusations. Son silence assourdissant a valeur d’assentiment.

AB et SE: Comment appréhendez-vous la situation politique du Maroc et son avenir ?

MM: Le Makhzen persiste dans son ignorance coupable du mécontentement populaire exprimé dans la rue. Il refuse d’honorer ses propres engagements pour une transition démocratique et ses promesses économiques et sociales. Le Droit et les libertés fondamentales continuent à être bafoués, dans un champ politique éteint. Autant de constatations qui me font penser que les ingrédients d’une nouvelle vague de révolte sont désormais réunis.

[Cet interview a été publié sur le blog de Salah Elayoubi.]

[This article is the first of a three-part series featuring different perspectives on the recent developments in Mali.]

Although the jihadists in northern Mali share the same radical Islamist substrate, we were expecting to see Iyad Ag Ghaly’s Ansar Eddine (AD) movement cloak itself in a more moderate attitude in return for having obtained a respectable status in the Azawad conflict. This was the wish expressed by several international mediators—namely Algeria and Burkina Faso—given the different meetings held in Algiers and Ouagadougou. But some visible signs demonstrate an accord among the different jihadist groups that is too broad to avoid a collision with the international community.

In the start of the negotiation process, Iyad Ag Ghaly appeared to be the right interlocutor—someone who only had local demands, had never taken part in international terrorism, and promised to fight against drug traffickers and organized crime. There was, until now, a thin line that separated him from terrorists like Abu Zeid, the head of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM), Katiba Ibn Ziad, or veteran Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a recent AQIM dissident who founded a new katiba named "Signatories by Blood.”

We are dealing with a three-faced jihadism: one that provides essential public services to dominated populations (the main one being the safety of people and property), one that is the face of brutality—including the terror of summary justice and violence  in the name of sharia. The third and final face is that of collusion with organized crime and drug trafficking.

While some countries did not want to launch a foreign military offensive without exhausting all possibilities for peaceful resolution (see: “Goodbye Afghanistan, Hello Mali!”), large portions of the international community insisted that the two Malian adversaries first explore all paths of discussion. But neither Bamako, AD, nor the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) seem to have been sincere in their efforts to make compromises.

With the situation being dynamic and volatile, the events of the previous weeks also paint a new configuration where the chances of peace are dwindling. This is a situation where the two protagonists—Bamako and AD—seem to have applied Carl von Clausewitz’ saying, "War is a continuation of politics by other means."

Summary of Recent Events

For the next round of talks in Ouagadougou, originally scheduled for 10 January 2013, the transitional government in Bamako, as well as the AD movement, have publicly demonstrated firm and distant positions. On 31 December 2012, in an interview with Jeune Afrique magazine, the Malian government’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tieman Coulibaly, used language that can hardly be considered diplomatic. He prioritized a military intervention in the near future. Elections were postponed until after forces regained the North. He also held a radical position toward the rebels with whom he was about to enter into discussion:

Kidal is a region of Mali and it will be governed according to the laws and principles of the Malian constitution. Ansar Eddine does not represent the population of Kidal. It cannot enact Sharia or other laws that are inconsistent with the Malian Law. As long as Kidal remains in Mali, this will be the case.

In short, Bamako says there is nothing to discuss except the surrender of the armed Islamist groups. Is the Malian army reinvigorated to the point of launching a campaign of re-conquest immediately? Contrary to articles emanating from a blindly chauvinistic press and the exacerbated speeches from southern Mali, nothing seems less certain.

The immediate reaction of AD was to suspend the agreement to cease all hostility with Bamako, an agreement the MNLA co-signed on 21 December in Algiers. As a result, jihadists are mobilizing their troops. From its part, the diplomatic delegation of AD sent a "political platform" on 1 January to the Burkinabé President, Blaise Compaore. This seventeen page document calls for the end of secularism in Mali and a new constitution proclaiming the "Islamic character" of Mali. It asks primarily for "broad autonomy" of Northern Mali with the "strict" application of sharia.

But unlike the static posture of Malian army units, jihadist troops and militants have previously made ​​a number of military and political maneuvers, leading to a restructuring and strengthening of their forces on the ground. In mid-November, the jihadists of Gao, (those of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa with elements of the katiba“Signatories by the Blood” of Mokhtar Belmokhtar (MUJAO-SPS)) entered Menaka, East of Gao, after heavy fighting. To the West of Timbuktu, units of MNLA integrated with AD and others took refuge in Mauritania after giving their vehicles and weapons at the border to the Mauritanian authorities. On the Algerian border, jihadists disarmed and confiscated the vehicles of an Arab tribal militia, the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA).

On 31 December, the MUJAO-SPS took control of Al-Khalil, a few kilometers from the location of Bordj Badji Mokhtar in Algeria and a very short distance from an important Algerian military base. On one hand, this suggests the  influx of Malian refugees into Algeria and other neighboring countries. On the other hand, this recent situation risks disrupting contraband circuits, which could be felt through the lack of necessary products in Azawad (see: Algeria and the Malian Borderline Disorder). The MNLA now control only the region of Tinzaoutine on the Algerian border. Without the help of the Algerian authorities, Tinzaoutine would not not be able to resist a jihadist assault for very long. With a sense of urgency, the MNLA organized a three-day congress there, starting 7 January. The MNLA is gradually sliding from an active player in the Azawad conflict to the role of a spectator with no influence on the ground. Moreover, Ansar Eddine sent a delegation to Tinzaoutine to demand that the last military units of the MNLA either integrate into Iyad Ag Ghaly’s movement or give up combat and abandon their armaments. Additionally, during a tour in the west of Azawad, Iyad Ag Ghaly received the support and allegiance of several tribes. This tour was preceded by similar tours in the east and north.

Thus, the jihadi movements, Ansar Eddine, MUJAO-SPS, and AQIM seem to have collaborated to control the territory of Azawad through different military and political approaches. The alternative forces of MNLA, MAA, and probably National Liberation Front of Azawad (FNLA) are now marginalized. At the same time, the jihadists have created new katibas oriented along ethnic lines, such as the Songhais, Moors (Ansar Sharia), and others.

An Offensive Geared Towards Mopti to Influence Negotiations

During the last few days, dozens of vehicles and around three hundred of Ansar Eddine’s combatants have been spotted moving towards the south. They have entered into a village called Boré, on the national route RN 15. This strategic route, with multiple villages, may be at stake during combats these next days; whoever holds the route effectively controls this territory.

Heavily armed combats and exchanges with the Malian army have taken place on 7 January in Konna as well as Sévaré. In this last location, the objective was to disrupt the Mopti airport’s function as a strategic base for reinforcements, arms, munitions and rations. The strategy of the jihadists may be to harass the Malian military on a broadened front and to exhaust the Malian forces by cutting their access routes and by interrupting the commercial flow on the Niger River. This way, they could hold a partial siege of the city of Mopti. It must also be noted that if the jihadists know how to utilize guerrilla tactics, the Malian army has not yet been able to prove its efficiency in using mobile armed units in pursuit of rebels.

It is hardly likely that jihadists will attack the city of Mopti head on, given its population of 120,000 and the several military quarters. The primary purpose is to allow for the movement, led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, to come to the negotiating table in a strong position. The head of their delegation at Ouagadougou, Alghabass Ag Intallah, just demanded the postponement of discussion until 18 January--enough time to obtain a political success (a rally of the last forces of MNLA at Tinzaoutine) or a military success (the fall of a location like Konna).

As Carl von Clausewitz said, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means,” yet it would be necessary for Bamako to have the means to implement this policy. It is the moment of truth for the new Malian army. Is it capable of reacting and recapturing the area around Mopti? Any static or defensive attitude would amount to nothing less than defeat at the level of diplomacy. 

[A version of this article was originally published in French on Un regard averti sur l'Algérie et le Monde. It was translated to English by Allison L. McManus and Mickael Vogel.]

منذ شهور انطلقت على الفايسبوك نداءات تدعو للتظاهر في المدن والقرى المغربية، بل وفي العواصم الأجنبية من أجل المطالبة بالتغيير الجذري للنظام السياسي في المغرب. فبعدما كانت حركة 20 فبراير تطالب بالملكية البرلمانية كحل للأزمة التي تمر فيها البلاد وفاء لشعار اليسار القديم تحت حكم الراحل الحسن الثاني، تحول المطلب اليوم، في ظل حكم ابنه محمد السادس، إلى "إسقاط النظام" في تحول نوعي وغير مسبوق. وقد شق هذا الشعار طريقه إلى الشارع المغربي حيث دُوِّن على جدران بعض الأحياء الشعبية، كما أورد أكثر من مصدر إعلامي. كيف يمكن قراءة هذا التحول في خطاب الشارع المغربي؟ وما هي الأسباب التي أدت إليه؟ وما هو أثر هذا النداء الجديد على مستقبل المغرب السياسي؟

من يعرف الساحة السياسية في المغرب يدرك أنها تنقسم إلى ثلاث فئات: فئة مستفردة بالحكم والقرار وتتمثل في المؤسسة الملكية. وفئة تؤمن بالعمل داخل مؤسسات الدولة مقتنعة بالهامش المُوَفَّرُ لها عبر الآليات التنفيذية التي تمتلكها الحكومة، وأخص بالذكر جميع الأحزاب السياسية التي تشارك أو سبق لها أن شاركت في العمل الحكومي. وفئة ثالثة تطالب بتغيير عميق من أجل إرساء القواعد الحقيقية لممارسة الحكم بعيداً عن وصاية المؤسسة الملكية. ترى هذه الفئة أن التغيير الحقيقي لا يأتي إلا بإقرار دستور ديمقراطي بعيد عن منطق الدستور الممنوح في صورته الحالية، وإرفاق المسؤولية بالمحاسبة الفعلية.

 وقد ضمت حركة 20 فبراير في صفوفها كل هذه الفئات حيث أدت التجاذبات بين مختلف هذه الأطراف إلى إنهاك الحركة لصالح الفئة القوية التي يمثلها تحالف الملكية والأحزاب السياسية. فمع فشل الحراك الفبرايري، اضطر الطرف الثالث للانسحاب ومراجعة حساباته ليدرك سوء تقديره في التحالف مع الأحزاب.

وطوال مدة أُفول حركة 20 فبراير، ازدادت الأوضاع تأزماً في المغرب، رغم وصول حزب العدالة والتنمية إلى تدبير شؤون الدولة وتراجعت المؤشرات التنموية والاقتصادية  والاجتماعية، حيث تمت الزيادة في الأسعار وتفشت البطالة والفقر وارتفعت وتيرة الإحتجاجات في مختلف ربوع البلاد، والتي تُواجَهُ بقمع شديد في غياب أي حلول إجرائية عملية لتفادي تفاقم الأزمة. وقد وصل الحد بالفريق الحكومي الحالي إلى نوع من الشلل المذهل في إتخاذ القرارات الجريئة للقطع مع الفساد والاستبداد، بل تمكن "العفاريت و"التماسيح" من لي أيدي الحكومة، لتمرير قرارات تكرس استمرارية حالة الاختناق الاقتصادي والاجتماعي، التي أدت إلى إفلاس خزينة الدولة على حساب توزيع عادل لمقدرات الأمة بين أفرادها.

كل هذه الأسباب ساعدت في المغرب، على تشكيل كتلة إحتجاجية شعبية موضوعية، وعلى إدراك تام بفشل تجارب التغيير السابقة، والتي تميزت بالخداع والنضال المزيف والإلتفاف على مطالب المغاربة، المتعلقة ببناء دولة مؤسسات حقيقية تكفل الكرامة والعدالة الاجتماعية المفقودتين بالنظر إلى خلاصات الدراسات والتحاليل ذات الصلة. و يأتي نداء 13 يناير في هذا السياق، حيث يمكن اعتباره صرخة شعب ظل منذ عقود يعاني من مختلف أصناف القمع والتهميش وضحية مساومات و متاجرات سياسية. وهو ما يمكن استخلاصه من خلال الرسائل الدعائية لهذا النداء عبر مختلف المواقع الاجتماعية.

وقد لقي هذا النداء مقاومات شديدة. بدءاً من أنصار المؤسسة الملكية ووصولاً إلى نشطاء سابقين في حركة 20 فبراير. وبالمقابل حظي باستجابة منضوين تحت تنظيمات معينة. كحركة الجمهوريين المغاربة ومستقلون نشطاء سابقون في الحراك الفبرايري ونقابات وبعض التجمعات اليسارية الراديكالية.  فهل سيؤرخ هذا النداء لمرحلة سياسية جديدة في المغرب، يتم من خلالها التطبيع، من جهة النظام السياسي، مع إمكانية معارضة شكل هذا النظام نفسه؟ بعبارة أخرى، هل سيستوعب النظام السياسي هذا الطرح دون اللجوء إلى أساليب القمع المعهودة، لتجنيب البلاد الدخول في فوضى عارمة لا تعلم عواقبها؟ أم أن قمع هذا النداء سيكسبه شرعية إضافية لتلتحق به الأصوات الصامتة في أفق ثورة على شكل الثورة التونسية؟

وحده المستقبل جدير بالإجابة على هذه التساؤلات لكن يمكن القول إن هذا النقاش السياسي الجديد استطاع أن يفرز واقعاً سياسياً جديداً بقطبين متنافسين، عوضاً عن الأقطاب الثلاثة المذكورة آنفا، وذلك خارج منطق الدستور الممنوح والقوانين المنظمة للعمل السياسي. قطب ملكي يجمع كل الفعاليات السياسية المنضوية تحت شرعيته والضامنة لاستمراريته. وقطب ثان معارض، لم يعد يعتبرالملكية حكماً فوقياً، بل طرفاً مباشراً في الحكم يستحق المساءلة والمحاسبة، بالنظر إلى حجم تدخله وتحكمه في الشأن السياسي بل وحتى الاقتصادي. لكن هذا التقاطب لم يأت من فراغ، وإنما جاء كنتيجة لتراكمات تاريخية جعلته ينتقل من جانب التدافع الخفي بين النخب السياسية إلى إدراك شعبي جماهري، تجلت إحدى تطبيقاته في نداء 13 يناير. فهل بفعل جماهرية هذا المطلب سيستطيع هذا التقاطب الجديد فرز واقع سياسي يتلائم مع الوعي الجماعي الحاصل اليوم؟ وهل ستستطيع المعارضة أن تضمن الحفاظ على مقومات الدولة دون الوقوع في تفتيت كيانها وخدمة قضايا الأمة المغربية في إمتداداتها الإسلامية والعربية والإفريقية حالة تفوقها؟ وهل ستساعد الظروف الإقليمية والدولية على قلب موازين القوى في المغرب؟

من المؤكد أن المرحلة لصالح الشعوب حيث انتقل الخوف من معترك إلى آخر. ولم تعد رغبة التغيير حبيسة النخب الفكرية المدركة لمزايا الحرية والعدل في تنظيم المجتمعات، بل صار مطمحاً لجميع من ظلوا لعقود خارج السياسات الحكومية بفعل الاضطرابات التي خلفها الاستبداد ومنطق التحكم ومصادرة حق الجماهير في إختيار الحكام ومحاسبتهم.

سادية جديدة باسم المصلحة العليا: "الدولة الذكورية" تدفن حق المرأة بمنح جنسيتها لأولادها نهائياً

"لا حق للمرأة اللبنانية بمنح جنسيتها لا لأولادها ولا لزوجها، فمن شأن ذلك الإضرار بالتوازن الطائفيالديموغرافي في البلاد، وبالمصلحة العليا للوطن".. هذا هو فحوى القرار والتوصية التي رفعتها اللجنة الوزارية التي كلفها مجلس الوزراء دراسة القضية إثر طرح مشروع مرسوم حق اللبنانية بمنح جنسيتها لأولادها في 21 اذار الماضي، في ما روج له يومها على أنه "عيدية" الحكومة للمرأة اللبنانية في عيد الأم.
وجاءت "الهدية" المرّة والمحبطة للنساء في لبنان بعد طول انتظار عبر التوصية بالرفض التي رفعتها اللجنة الوزارية إلى رئيس الحكومة نجيب ميقاتي إثر إجتماعها بتاريخ 14 كانون الأول المنصرم، لتقضي على أي بذرة أمل ولدت لدى المرأة اللبنانية بالتمتع بالمساواة.

والمضحك المبكي في محضر التوصية السري، الذي حصلت المفكرة القانونية على نسخة منه، أن اللجنة الوزارية عادت إلى تفسير سابق للمجلس الدستوري يقول بإمكانية تجاوز مبدأ المساواة المكرس في الدستور اللبناني إذا كان تطبيقه يمس بالمصلحة العليا للبلاد، مع العلم أن هذا المجلس اعتمد التفسير المذكور في سياق الطعن بالقانون الذي حرم الفلسطينيين من حق التملك العقاري.

واللافت أنه باستثناء وزير الشؤون الإجتماعية وائل ابو فاعور، يحمل محضر التوصية تواقيع جميع أعضاء اللجنة وهم نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء سمير مقبل رئيساً وعضوية وزراء العدل شكيب قرطباوي والداخلية مروان شربل والخارجية عدنان منصور ووزير العمل سليم جريصاتي ووزير الإعلام وليد الداعوق. ولدى اتصال "المفكرة" بالوزير فاعور، أكد عدم علمه بالقرار والتوصية، مؤكداً أنه لم يدع إلى الإجتماع المذكور. وأشار أبو فاعور أنه سيبحث الموضوع مع رئيس الحكومة الذي سيلتقيه اليوم. مع العلم أن اللجنة أشارت في محضرها أنها وصلت إلى قرارها بـ "الإجماع"، فعن أي اجماع نتحدث؟

واستندت اللجنة في توصيتها التي تكرس التمييز السلبي بحق النساء في لبنان، وتؤكد ذكورية الدولة تجاه نصف المجتمع، إلى جملة من المعطيات التي تخالف في جوهرها حقوق الإنسان وتتناقض مع مجمل الإتفاقيات الدولية التي وقعها لبنان. وفي بعض ما استندت إليه، لا تخالف اللجنة الوزارية بنود الإتفاقية الدولية للقضاء على كافة اشكال التمييز ضد المرأة (سيداو) فقط، حيث ذكرت بتحفظ مجلس النواب اللبناني على البند الثاني من المادة التاسعة من الإتفاقية، والذي يتعلق بمنح المرأة حقاً متساوياً مع حق الرجل في ما يتعلق بجنسية أولادها، بل أنها ذهبت أبعد من ذلك في إتجاه السعي إلى إعطاء أسس دستورية لقرارها. فـ "مواءمة مقتضيات العيش المشترك والمناصفة والتساوي والفعالية في معرض التمثيل النيابي (المكرسة دستورياً) تصبح أكثر تعذراً وتعقيداً في ظل تفاقم الخلل الديموغرافي بين أبناء الشعب اللبناني من المسيحيين والمسلمين قبل التحرر المأمول من القيد الطائفي"، مما يسمح اذا بالشذوذ عن مبدأ المساواة بين الجنسين. ولتدعيم وجهة نظرها، استندت اللجنة صراحة إلى قرار سابق للمجلس الدستوري إثر الطعن بالقانون الذي حرم الفلسطينيين من التملك العقاري. وتضمنت التوصية فقرة تفيد "بما أنه سبق للمجلس الدستوري أن أورد أن مبدأ المساواة الذي يتمتع بالقوة الدستورية لا يعمل به عند وجود أوضاع قانونية مختلفة لا يصح معها إعمال المساواة، أو عندما تقضي بذلك مصلحة عليا..."..وبذلك أصبح بإمكان أعضاء اللجنة والحكومة من خلفهم، لا بل سمحوا لأنفسهم، وبكل ضمير مرتاح، بتغليب المصلحة الطائفية على المصلحة الحقوقية لمواطنين يشكلون نصف المجتمع اللبناني.

واثباتاً للإخلال بالتوازن الطائفي، وفي محاولة لتبرير فعلتها بطريقة تتناغم مع الحساسية الطائفية التي تعوم عليها البلاد، أشارت اللجنة إلى "أن وزارة الداخلية زودتها بأرقام عن عدد المستفيدين من منح الأم اللبنانية الحق بمنح جنسيتها لأولادها والجنسيات والطوائف التي ينتمون إليها، وهي أرقام تخل بالتوازن الديموغرافي الطوائفي إخلالاً كبيراً، فضلاً عن شمولها عدداً لا يستهان به من الفلسطينيين". وتظهر الأرقام التي حصلت عليها اللجنة من وزارة الداخلية أن الأجانب الذين سينالون الجنسية من خلال أمهاتهم اللبنانيات يصل إلى نحو 380 ألف شخص والأهم توزع جنسياتهم وطوائفهم. وتوقفت اللجنة في توصيتها أمام عديد الفلسطينيين الذين سينالون الجنسية من أمهاتهم، لتحذر من الموضوع وتأثيره على التوازنات اللبنانية. إذ يبلغ عدد النساء اللبنانيات المتزوجات من فلسطينيين أربعة آلاف وخمسمائة إمرأة من أصل 76 ألف إمرأة لبنانية متزوجات من أجانب، وهي نسبة ليست كبيرة مقارنة مع التهويل الذي يلوح به معارضو منح المرأة اللبنانية جنسيتها لأسرتها. مع العلم أن اللجنة نفسها أشارت إلى حصول 15 ألف إمرأة فلسطينية على الجنسية اللبنانية نتيجة زواجهن من لبنانيين، ولكن ذلك لا يعتبر مشكلة طالما أن مانح الجنسية هنا هو رجل، بالمفهوم الذكوري للمسؤولين في لبنان وفلسفتهم الحقوقية التمييزية السلبية تجاه المرأة. 

وانتهت اللجنة إلى الإعتبار، وبناء على كل ما تقدم "أنه من حق الدولة اللبنانية، وفي ضوء مصلحتها العليا، أن تقرر وضع القيود التي تحدد مداها لإكتساب غير اللبنانيين الجنسية اللبنانية، إذ تمارس في ذلك حقاً سيادياً محفوظاً لها دون سواها على الأرض اللبنانية، لا سيما إذا كان اكتساب الجنسية يتعارض مع مبدأ رفض التوطين (زواج اللبنانية من فلسطيني) أو يخل بصورة فاضحة بالتوازن الديموغرافي أو يزيده تفاقماً، على ما حصل في مرسوم التجنيس في العام 1994". يذكر أن المرسوم المذكور شهد الكثير من المحسوبيات الطائفية والمذهبية والرشاوى التي مررها زعماء السياسة والطوائف يومها.

وخلصت اللجنة "بالإجماع" كما ورد إلى اقتراح "عدم الموافقة على مشروع القانون المذكور والإستعاضة بإجراءات من شأنها منح كل الحقوق لأولاد اللبنانية المتزوجة من أجنبي مع استثناء الحقوق السياسية. وتبعاً لذلك، اقترحت منح إقامة دائمة من دون بدل عوضاً عن سمة المجاملة، والحق بالتعليم والانتساب إلى المدارس والمعاهد والجامعات كافة والحق في العمل في القطاعات الخاصة والحق في الطبابة والاستشفاء في القطاع الصحي العام والخاص والاستفادة من تقدمات وزارة الصحة ووزارة الشؤون الاجتماعية والصندوق الوطني الاجتماعي. الا أن ذلك لم يمنعها في حمأة تعداد الحقوق التي تقترح منحها عن استثناء حقوق أخرى تحفظها فقط للمولودين من ذكر لبناني وهي حق العمل في المهن الحرة والقطاع العام أو القطاعات التي تنص القوانين والأنظمة والقرارات المتعلقة بها على توافر شرط الجنسية اللبنانية صراحة وهي قطاعات واسعة جداً. كما تجدر الإشارة إلى أن اللجنة لم تذكر الأزواج البتة وما إذا كانوا يستفيدون من الإجراءات التحسينية أم سيقتصر إقتراحها على أولاد اللبنانيات وحدهم.

وتعليقاً على توصية اللجنة، أكدت منسقة حملة "جنسيتي حق لي ولأسرتي"لينا بوحبيب شعور القيمين على الحملة "بالإمتعاض جداً والغضب من هذه النتيجة"، ورفضها "جملة وتفصيلاً وبالمطلق". وأشارت بوحبيب إلى إجتماع عقدته الحملة مع اللجنة في الثالث من كانون الأول الماضي، حيث أكد لهم أعضاؤها أنهم سيدرسون الموضوع بمناخ إيجابي. وقام ممثلو الحملة بتبليغ نتائج اجتماعاتهم مع اللجنة للسيدات المعنيات بالقضية والمناصرين لها خلال اجتماع الهيئة العامة للحملة قبل نحو عشرة أيام وتركت أجواء إيجابية وآملة بين النساء. وبذلك لم يكن نساء الحملة يدركون ما تعد اللجنة لهم. وتشير بو حبيب إلى أن الحملة إتصلت بمكتب رئيس اللجنة سمير مقبل يوم الجمعة الماضي وسألت عما وصلت إليه الأمور، فأكدوا لهم أنهم لم يجتمعوا بعد، في حين أن توصيتهم وقرارهم مؤرخ في 14 كانون الماضي، "ليفاجأونا بتوصيتهم الظالمة والمتناقضة مع حقوق الإنسان والمرأة، والتي تحمّل النساء وزر الطائفية البغيضة في لبنان بحيث تشكل النساء بنظرهم خطراً على المصلحة العليا للدولة".

وبعدما عبرت عن استياء القيمين على الحملة مما حصل، أكدت بو حبيب نية الحملة بالتصعيد "لأن ما حصل غير مقبول ومرفوض"، مؤكدة أنه "سيتم الإعلان عن الخطوات اللاحقة بعد التشاور مع السيدات المعنيات". وعليه، قضت اللجنة الوزارية على أمل اللبنانيات وحقهن بالتمتع بالمواطنة الكاملة والمساواة، وليس حملهم لجنسية من الدرجة الثانية لا تخولهن منح جنسيتهن لأولادهن الذين ولدوا وترعرعوا في لبنان ولا يعرفون وطناً سواه. والمؤسف في الموضوع أن هذه الحكومة نفسها أقرت مشروع قانون يخول اللبنانيين المتحدرين من أصل لبناني منذ العام 1921 إستعادة جنسيتهم اللبنانية، برغم أن غالبية هؤلاء لا يعرفون موقع لبنان على الخارطة الدولية، ولا يتحدثون لغته ولا يشعرون بأدنى الإنتماء إليه.

وحاولت اللجنة الوزارية تغطية جريمتها بالتوصية بسلة من الحقوق لأبناء المرأة اللبنانية المقيمين في لبنان، من إقامة مجانية وحق العمل (ولكن هناك استثناء لبعض المهن) وبالتطبب في المستشفيات الحكومية وبالإنتساب إلى الضمان الاجتماعي  وغيرها من التقديمات التي كان بإمكانهم الحصول عليها وعلى العديد من الحقوق الأخرى، لو تم اقرار حقهم بالجنسية من دون منة من أحد. الدولة اليوم دولة ذكورية بإمتياز.. بل هي دولة سادية قبل كل شيء.

[يعاد نشر المقالة بالإتفاق مع المفكرة القانونية.]

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

 
Regional and International Perspectives

Iran-Brotherhood Ties: Rooted in History with Eye on Future Hassan Hassan says “a closer look at the historical links and ideological similarities between Tehran's mullahs and Arab Islamists shows that not only could Iran build ties with the emerging political forces in the region, but that it could develop a sustainable special relationship.”

As the Appeal of Islamism Fades, Arab Secularism can Soar Jasmine Roman writes: “the death of Arab secularism has been exaggerated. The mantra of secularism in the Arab countries is far more complex than a clear segregation between political and religious institutions, and the future of secularism in the region is more complicated than just the rise of Islamism.”

Jabhat al-Nusra’s Goals Extend Beyond SyriaHussein Jemmo says “they see Syria as merely a single step in a journey taking them from Aleppo and Idlib to the Alawite mountains in Latakia, and eventually extending to regions beyond Syria.”

Jordan’s Syria Problem Nicolas Pelham on the activities of the Syrian rebels within Jordanian borders.

Syrian Narratives

Syria’s Rebel Rivalry Between Jihadists and FSA Jamie Dettmer says the assassination of a rebel commander by jihadists at the Turkish border highlights the growing tensions and instances of infighting within the armed opposition.

Making Heads of Tails of Bashar al Assad Al Jazeera’s Inside Syria program with guests Fawaz Gerges, James Jatras and Shashank Joshi

Syria: Is it Too Late?Frederic Hof claims that “the last vestige of peaceful protest has long since been killed by regime terror mandating armed resistance”

Foundation of the Deraa Section of the Revolutionary Left CurrentSyrian Freedom Forever outlines a list of tasks that the “left revolutionaries” have set out for themselves, which unlike the above article gives hope for a peaceful resistance.

Syrian Silent Majority Demands ‘Transition to Rationality’Goeffrey Aronson on the creation of Syrian Dialogue Project, which seeks to answer the following question: “What do Syrians believe is important to Syrians today, and how can they best shape their future?”

Preparing for the New SyriaAshraf Ghani and Claire Lockhart present their “roadmap” for peaceful power transition in Syria.

At Once Professional and Prescient Marlin Dick writes a profile of the late Adib Khair, a prominent Syrian television producer.

Assad’s Speech and the Syrian Political Solutionan analysis by Sami Moubayed

Syria’s Battle for the AirportsTareq al-Abd provides an overview of the battles fought across the country for the control of various airports.

Website Identifies 7 Revolutionary Guard Commanders Among Freed Captives in Syria

Syria Dropped Hallucinogen Weapons on Syrian Rebels, Secret Cable Says

Don’t Wait for Assad’s Fall to Prepare for Transition Bradley Bosserman says the conversation on chemical stockpile is distracting policymakers from another important conversation a post-Assad transition.

Rami Jarrahqualified this report on chemical weapons as a “hoax.”

Inside Syria

Navigating a New Damascus: Cement Barriers and Checkpointsa new reality as experienced by Marah Mashi

A New Method for Syria’s Security Services?Marah Mashi says “nowadays, at the very least, it has become important for the security services to appear professional, even if it’s just another manifestation of the same foul tactics.”

Syria Forces Attack Rebel Aleppo Martin Chulov on the explosions that killed  87 students at Aleppo University.

MSF: Syria’s Hospitals are now a War ZoneFabrice Weissman’s translated Le Monde interview

Conversations: A Pharmacist in Qamishlisays “the other day there was a women’s march, but I no longer go out because our protests have been corrupted and are now distant from the spirit of the revolution.”

For Those Still in Syria, A Daily StruggleNPR’s Kelly McEvers meets internal refugees in an Aleppo school.

Syrian Purgatory Steven Sotloff reports from Atmeh refugee camp.

Syrian Rebels Take Control of Key Assad Airbase Martin Chulov, Luke Harding and Matthew Weaver on the recent victory of rebels who captured the Taftanaz military base near Idlib

 
Art and Social Media

A Revolution Within the Revolution The “Syria First: We are an Ethical Alternative Campaign” was launched by activists last November to reiterate the need for non-violent resistance as opposed to “distractions,” including militarization, growing sectarianism etc.

The Steady Drumbeat of Civilian Activism Marlin Dick on the various citizen initiatives left out of the media’s depictions of the uprising in Syria.

Kafranbel Activists distribute one-page leaflets criticizing some elements of the opposition

Social Media Buzz: Iranian Prisoner Exchange, Cross-Dressing Soldiers  Mohammed Sergie on the latest Syria-related events and debates that went viral on social media platforms.

There’s no App for SyriaMichael Peck opposes Apple’s decision not to market the new computer game app on the Syrian civil war.

Lara Setrakian: Single Story Sites Like Syria Deeply Have Lessons to Offer to the Rest of the News Business

Syria Deeply’s Interview (Google+ Hangout) with Bambuser’s Executive Chairman Hans Erikson

Policy and Reports

Preparing for a Syrian Transition A report by Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart for the Legatum Institute

Conferences

Resolving the Syria Crisis Conference on January 10-11, at the University of Denver, Colorado

Arabic

كيف تنجو سورية من داء الطائفية؟

Syrian Director Haytham Haqqi writes, according to his views, about the "Sectarian Disease" in the politics of Al-Assad.

اللاجئون السوريون ونكران الجميل العربي

Al-Quds Al-Arabi writes about the dire situation of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries, and the apparent reluctance of the Arab governments in the Arab league to relieve their humanitarian crisis.

الحرب على الاخوان تشق الخليج

Abdel Bari Atwan writes about the sudden change in the Gulf Countries' long and strong relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood.

منطقـة الجزيـرة السـوريـة: الجبهـة المنسـيّـة

Tarek Al-Abed writes about the events in the cities of the Al Jazirah region, which has been largely marginalized in terms of media coverage.

!ماذا يعرفون عن سوريا ؟

Michel Kilo writes about Western analysis and coverage of events in Syria.

كابوس الاعتقال السياسي مستمر

Marah Mashi provides accounts of situation of political prisoners in Syrian prisons.

!حدائق حلب... مقابر

Al-Akhbar reports on the transformation of public parks in Aleppo into cemeteries.

تفجير الجامعة: هستيريا الروايات

Basel Dyoub writes about the Tuesday raid on the University of Aleppo.

في هجاء الحالة السورية

Ward Kasouha criticizes the Syrian revolution.

اليرموك: ما بين القصف والحصار

Damascus bureau provides an insider's account about the situation in the Yarmuk Refugee Camp in Syria.

نشطاء الثورة السورية في اسطنبول

Damascus Bureau on the Syrian activists in Istanbul.

من داخل مخيمات البؤس السورية: قصة مروعة من نار وجليد

Amal Hanano writes about the situation in the Olive Tree Refugee Camp in Atmeh.
 
باقة ورد للأحياءby Sahar Abdullah

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Wednesday night of every week.]  

Algeria

L'opération de l'armée se poursuit, "quelques morts et blessés" affirme le gouvernement algérien Radio France gives a chronological account of the hostage situation in Algeria.

L'armée algérienne s'attaque aux islamistes armés Video news update on Algerian army attacks on armed faction holding hostages.

Mali, Algeria discuss intervention fallout Walid Ramzi reports on Malian president’s visit to Algeria and Mali-Algeria relations

Libya

Hundreds in limbo at camp on the Tunisian-Libyan border Humanitarian news site IRIN reports on the situation of refugees stuck on the Libyan border.

The New Old Libya: Photo series George Steinmetz’s photo series for Natioal Geographic showcases Libya’s rich history and trajectory into the future. (Accompanying feature article by Robert Draper.)

Huge concert in Tripoli brings in Amazigh New Year Ayman Akelky reports on Amazigh New Year’s celebrations in Tripoli.

Breaking the hold of politics on Libyan society Osama Matri critiques the narrative of political weakness holding back development of robust Libyan civil society.

Mauritania

Operation Serval: The View from Mauritania Nasser Wedaddy describes Mauritanian political and societal perspectives on the conflict in Mali.

A Mauritania Outlook The Moor Next Door comments on Abdel Aziz’s government, its opposition and international perspectives.

“المشاهد” تنفرد بنشر الوثيقة السرية لـ”لحراطين” Blogger Arabliss presents documents exposing systematic oppression and enslavement of “Hratin” people.

المنسقية : نرفض مشاركة موريتانيا في الحرب وبقاء عزيز في السلطة Protesters hold large demonstrations against Mauritanian involvement in Mali

Morocco

لجامعي يرد على أطروحة أن النظام المغربي ينوي الدمقرطة Academics respond to discussions of the recent Moroccan constitution and assertions of its contributions to democracy.

Finances publiques: Alerte rouge Omar Radi highlights the atrocious state of Moroccan indebtedness and its effects on the market.

Les Mia du moyen atlas Sheryn Ziani describes the plight of young women in the rural Middle Atlas region.

Morocco to boost growth through youth jobs Hassan Benmehdi reports on Moroccan Economic, Social, and Environmental Council’s focus on combatting youth unemployment as a development strategy.

Review: Byad ou k7al The Mixtape est la Yasser Rougui reviews Moroccan producer Don Bigg’s latest project (with audio clips.)

Tunisia

حوار مع وزير الشؤون الاجتماعية خليل الزاوية Tunisian blog Nawaat interviews Minister of Social Affairs Khalil Zaouia

Sheratongate: Blogger's allegations against Foreign Minister land her in court Reporters Without Borders follows the public prosecutor’s investigation of blogger Olfa Riahi, who accused Foreign Minister Rafik Abdessalam of abusing public funds.

Two years since the uprising, justice must be done  Amnesty International implores Tunisian authorities to address demands of families of those killed and injured during uprisings.

Prime Minister, major unions sign social pact on revolution's anniversary Roua Seghaier describes the social pact signed in Tunisia, which cause controversy amongst labor syndicates.

Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb

قراءة هادئة في نداء 13 يناير

Mali in Focus, Part One: The Jihadist Offensive Revisited

Mohamed El Marouani: « Les ingrédients d’une nouvelle vague de révolte, sont désormais réunis »

Penser le changement de l'éducation au Maroc : Interview de Nabil Belkabir, membre de l'UECSE

La somme de tous les rêves brisés d'Anfgou et d'ailleurs

Repossessing the Dispossessed

Maghreb Monthly Edition on Jadaliyya (December 2012)

Jadaliyya's Maghreb Page Echoes in France

Recently there has been a proliferation of talk about Ramallah’s “bubble.” Based on the seeming contradiction between the quality of life there versus elsewhere in the occupied West Bank, popular accounts are rife with descriptions of bubbles emerging and bursting.

The bubble language is pervasive but is not coherent. Some argue that the bubble is economic, poised to pop and thereby destroy Ramallah’s boomtown economy. Others contend that the bubble is an artificial force that encourages inorganic businesses that can’t survive the occupation. And others maintain that the bubble is based in government debt, or that the bubble is a “problem” that the private sector will need to solve, or that the bubble might be made of consumer debt.

And some argue that the bubble is a sphere of representation, a cultural fact that is productive of a different kind of public space, which marks Ramallah as a place somehow not of Palestine, where foreign visitors are isolated from Palestinians in villages.

Yet others argue that Ramallah itself is a bubble and thereby insulated from Israeli apartheid. And that now, post-intifada, it enables widespread exhaustion to give rise to individual aspiration, and provides Palestinians relief from the political situation.

Even if some accounts of the bubble are based on certain assumptions of what Palestinianness, resistance, or forms of wealth should look like, it is clear that for some, the economic situation, and the idea of the bubble, is reconfiguring resistance. For others, it is “truly a bubble” that prevents resistance altogether, or it could be close to bursting, a “recipe for revolution” that results from unsustainable growth and the widening gap between a “new, highly educated, English-speaking class in Ramallah” and those classes most harmed by austerity measures.

The question is: what binds these accounts together?

First of all, like bubbles, they’re based on future expectations, and they produce norms about economics and social life. For authors writing about occupied Palestine, hearing about daily Israeli incursions, or being among a population decimated by the violence of occupation, prisons, and immiseration – or in exile and diaspora – it’s difficult to see the situation as anything but unstable. The relative comfort and wealth, the new Audis, the new hotel, and the cappuccinos that some can enjoy seem jarringly dissonant with preexisting ideas of Palestine and life under occupation.

However, this discursive field conflates a lot of categories that are bound and linked, but intertwining, and the promiscuity of bubble talk does little to illuminate the forms of economic, political, social, and structural stability or instability that exist in the West Bank today.

By and large, the recent move towards political economy in Palestine studies is very productive, but accounts which focus narrowly on Ramallah separate it from the West Bank, the West Bank from Palestine, the West Bank from Israel, and Palestine from the world. My intention here is to parse some of these categories, and to approach the idea of social, economic, and political stability at a different scale. Consider a couple of different correctives to these accounts:

Take Sam Bahour, who is a Palestinian-American businessman and activist widely quoted in the above accounts, and very vocal in opposition to the occupation, in his critique of the PA, and in his support of the private sector. Bahour writes:

Economic development and growth which is worthy of building toward an economy of a future state is nowhere to be found. How could it be? All key aspects of a true economy are squarely in the hands of Israel, our occupier. Israel, alone, holds the levers to our water, movement, access, all borders, airspace, electricity, electromagnetic spectrum, just to name a few. A new building in Ramallah, or 100 for that matter, make for good ribbon-cutting ceremonies, but are as far from economic state building as is wrong is from right. 

More concretely, he describes the difference he sees between sustainable, politically viable economic growth and growth in GDP:

Now, we are forced to circumvent Jerusalem, around cement walls and through multiple Israeli checkpoints. Today it takes us over 60 minutes, at best. For GDP growth, this is great news. During those extra 40 or more minutes we burn more gasoline, require more lighting on the longer roads, eat more sandwiches on the way, spend more time driving, hit more potholes, which causes more work for the road engineers in the morning, and so on. All of this extra spending is great for a higher GDP but catastrophic for our livelihood and state-building exercise. 

For Bahour, the solution to those political and economic problems that emerge in the context where the open market is an ideological illusion is only going to come from a political process that serves the people and economy broadly conceived, as well as through a functioning, non-constricted open market that can only emerge with the end of the occupation and the many types of barriers Israel imposes (to economic growth and otherwise). 

The point here—that the ways that accumulation and growth happen is a consequence of the occupation rather than a contradiction to it—is necessary for an adequate understanding of whether there may, or may not, be a bubble in Ramallah. 

Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour take a different approach, arguing that the so-called state-building project enables several unwelcome political realities. It encourages (1) an artificial, or ideological, separation between economics and politics, (2) acquiescence to the occupation, and (3) the integration of neoliberal discourse into Palestinian political language. 

They write,

Simply stated, because it has no evident strategy for tackling the real ‘external’ obstacles, the PA’s attention has shifted to a range of perceived ‘internal’ obstacles to statehood, and its program is consequently aimed at rooting them out. Seen from this angle, then, the PA statehood program must embed the discourse and practice of neoliberalism in Palestinian society. It is here where the concept of the rule of law, so central in neoliberal rhetoric, proves its instrumental value. Underlying its technical, neutral vocabulary is the desire to escape politics and, indeed, the very political nature of the question of Palestine. The statehood program encourages the perverse idea that citizens may have to acquiesce in occupation but will not be denied the benefits of smoother running traffic, a liberal education curriculum, investor-friendly institutions, efficient public service delivery, and, for the middle class, access to luxury hotel chains and touring theatre performances.

 

For them, the interaction of cultural and social changes with economic and political facts is crucial to understanding the breadth and scope of the ideological and material changes that are occurring in Palestine.

But bubbles imply instability – so where are the instabilities in this situation?

For Bahour, in the West Bank the barriers to growth that the occupation presents limit the current pattern of “artificial” growth, and could potentially collapse a market which only appears free. For Khalidi and Samour, there is a contradiction at the center of the state building project: it seeks not to build a state, but to normalize the occupation through the imposition upon, and replacement of, resistance by a mix of free market ideology, limited “free market” practice, and the new forms of social life that come with them. Clearly, if these factors are intertwined, they’re going to allow different people different kinds of opportunities, and engender different cultural forms, and different attitudes about politics and resistance. 

Furthermore, if we take seriously the PA efforts at economy building and state building, and if we understand that neoliberalism isn’t a point in time, isn’t about utterly open markets, and isn’t complete, we arrive at different conclusions and, indeed, different questions. We see that neoliberalism is a piecemeal class project that functions in part by organizing markets in certain ways, using the state as a scale at which capital accumulation is organized, and establishing forms of openness, and the ideological practice of openness, as strategies to do so.

And so a slightly different question emerges: in what ways is this situation stable or unstable?

As a student trained in anthropology and human geography, I’m mostly interested in the social, cultural, political, and structural aspects of the economy, and less in statistical or strictly economic accounts. In my dissertation project on new town development in the West Bank I explore the current push towards privatization and state building, and the ways that politics is being inscribed into social space in the West Bank in a dialectical relationship with the changes in physical space that are brought about by new capital and investment, and to ideas about space and life within it. 

More narrowly here, I want to understand what the ideas of instability which are being mobilized by bubble talk obscure, and what economic and social norms are being produced within the sphere of bubble talk, as well as in the bubble itself.

The accounts at the beginning of the piece mostly fall short of the target. Social life, economics, and politics are all inextricably linked, and one can’t be understood in isolation from the others. And even though there is a lot of West Bank immigration to Ramallah, the bubble is better understood not by comparison to other West Bank towns or to ideas of resistance, but to the structural relationships of the whole West Bank to Israel and Israeli ambitions, and to Israeli settler colonial imperatives to control the West Bank with as little effort as possible.

It is clear that new forms of lending and debt in Palestine are enabling consumer spending on all the so-called luxury goods—homes, goods, cars—that these accounts, for various reasons, understand as not Palestinian enough, or perhaps as too expensive, or too unlikely for Palestine. However, here, as elsewhere, the accumulation of debt in one place is consistent with the accumulation of wealth another, and the market itself is productive of ideas of individual need. 

The increase in personal debt, and reference to the 2008 crisis in the US, is one of the main reasons for the bubble talk. The debt market in the West Bank, however, differs from that in the US—new forms of mortgage lending are insured against collapse and political risk by NGOs and international aid organizations, and banks allegedly have recently released salaries to PA employees only after receiving loan payments. So even if the West Bank were to see a wave of defaults, which may happen in the future, Palestinian lenders enjoy various forms of insulation.

Consumer spending is enabled by this debt and the peculiarities of the West Bank labor market. Should a mass bankruptcy occur, we would almost certainly see West Bank labor mobilized to generate wages. The West Bank is both a captive market and the container of a labor force that can be activated or disabled through permits and other mechanisms, and a consumer debt bubble could be remedied by increasing the number of work permits to Israel, or, perhaps, by another move to seriously attempt dormant proposals for truck-to-truck trade and industrial zones, and by PA wages and direct disbursements. 

New mortgages are based on a reorientation and simplification of the land regime in Palestine. Through large-scale development on land purchased by developers and registered, or, in at least one well-known case, reparcelized by the PA, there are more clearly-titled apartments that can be used as collateral, and because land ownership rights are effectively vested in developers rather than individual buyers, these mortgages are further insulated from the market. Finally, under the current situation, it’s hard to imagine that land prices will fall in Palestine, given the actual scarcity of land in the urban centers, and the artificial scarcity of land produced by Israeli blue-line plans, the Oslo regime of Areas A, B, C, Israeli home demolitions, and so on.

The question of a government debt bubble is more complicated, and I won’t really deal with it here, except to say that many have argued that the PA is backed and propped up by the Israeli government and international aid and thus debt is a condition of its existence. While the PA regularly fails to meet its salary requirements, Israel just as regularly steps in to help by disbursing money it has withheld illegally or under the terms of the Paris Protocol. Given the vested interests of Israel and the international community in the PA, collapse seems unlikely.

In turn, all this bubble talk, and the narrow focus on Ramallah, tends to obscure the ways that the West Bank, and the West Bank economy, is being held in suspension by political and social processes taking place beyond it, by making it “open” in a broader context of closure, and by obscuring this fact with “bubble” language that focuses on the former rather than the latter.

The first is that states have a big role in preventing or enabling crises—many of the problems of the 2008 collapse could have been avoided if the American government had bought up crummy mortgages and served as a guarantor in order to insulate people from market forces. But in this period, states are more likely to create the conditions for these collapses by disabling regulation, forcing open markets, and so forth. And while the PA state building project is doing something similar, it is backed, and held in suspension, by the geopolitical and geoeconomic scaffold that has emerged to structure Israel’s relationship to Palestine since 1948.

Viewed from a different perspective, the newness of the Ramallah market does not index instability, but instead points towards a set of practices that attempt to bound instabilities into possibilities. In various ways, debt, falling wages, and PA wage instability control the dynamics of consumption and manage the market; and the political relationship of the PA to Israel keeps the West Bank market subordinate to Israel’s.

It’s true that there are fissures, and that there opportunities for resistance that emerge in different places—for example, if the economy of the occupation moves through the PA, the PA might now be in a position to make credible threats to those who profit from the occupation. Or, Ramallah class culture might begin to clash with the national movement, and this may lead to increased political consciousness among those who don’t benefit from new economic practices. Here, I simply want to propose a wider view of these forces, and suggest the situation in Ramallah may not consist of short-term bubbles, but instead long-term, if piecemeal, attempts to establish certainty, and to solidify certain economic, political, and cultural forms in the West Bank.

"'Born at Qalandia Checkpoint' focuses on the impact of Israeli movement restrictions on the everyday lives of Palestinians. The phenomenon of Palestinian women forced to give birth at military checkpoints peaked during the Second Intifada (2000-05). Since then, Palestinian women in remote areas have increasingly resorted to coping strategies, such as relocation in the weeks prior to delivery or giving birth at home. 

Rather than challenge Israel’s military occupation and its associated checkpoints to address these conditions, the United Nations and other agencies have opted for a 'humanitarian' response in choosing to support the training of midwives. While this is a necessary measure, it should not supplant the legal and/or diplomatic challenges necessary to curtail Israeli abuses. By addressing the symptoms rather than the root cause of the problem, these agencies contribute to the normalization of Israel's ongoing military occupation."

[Download full-size image here.]

[Image originally published by Visualizing Palestine.]

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Occupation, Intervention, and Law and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the O.I.L. Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each biweekly roundup to OIL@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every other week]

News

"Clearing Palestinian Protestors from West Bank Site, Netanyahu Pledges to Build Settlement," Joel Greenberg
The Washington Post reports both on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's plans to construct further settlements in the West Bank and his government's forced eviction of Bab al-Shams, a Palestinian vlllage formed in protest of the new settlements.

"Palestinian Premier Urges Arabs to Pay Pledged Aid," Sarah El Deeb
The Associated Press surveys the efforts of Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to respond to a "cash crunch" faced by his government. Fayyad has met with the Arab League, who pledged $100 million in aid to the Palestinian Authority last year, regarding raising funds to meet his government's obligations, while the Arab League has called on Israel to resume monthly transfers of $100 million in tax funds--transfers it stopped releasing late last year as part of a punitive response to Palestine's successful efforts seeking an upgraded status at the United Nations. 

"Secret No-Fly Evidence Rejected by Judge," Bob Egelko
U.S. District Judge William Alsup has blocked an Obama administration attempt to use "secret evidence" to halt Rahinah Ibrahim, a Stanford doctoral student from Malaysia, from challenging her inclusion on a "no-fly list". As part of her inclusion on the list, Ibrahim was barred from entering the United States.

"French Troops Target Terrorists in Mali as Newest Shadow War Begins," Spencer Ackerman
Wired's Danger Room blog reports on France's deployment of an undisclosed number of troops in Mali, an operation aimed at targeting Islamist militias in the northern part of the country. Also discussed is the United States' history of involvement in training counterterrorist efforts in the region, France's recent history of military interventions in North Africa, and the possibility of future US involvement in the operation.

"Obama to Speed Troop Exit," Carol E. Lee, Adam Entous
Following recent meetings with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, President Obama has indicated an intent to speed up the schedule of withdrawing US forces from Afghanistan, though providing few details as to how such a withdrawal might occur. 

"U.N. Expresses Dismay Over Saudi Execution of Sri Lankan Maid," Nick Cumming-Bruce
The New York Times reports on the United Nations' objections to Saudi Arabia's recent execution of Rizana Nafeek, a Sri Lankan woman accused of committing a murder in 2005. Among the objections to the conviction and sentence was that Nafeek was seventeen years old at the time of the murder, an age that international law stipulates the death sentence cannot apply to.

Blogs

"Are Israel and Turkey's Settlements Comparable?," Kevin Jon Heller
Heller responds on Opinio Juris to Eugene Kontorovich's recent argument that Israel could evade an ICC prosecution for illegal transfer by "working up a Cypriot case against Turkey", agreeing with Kontorovich that the Court is unlikely to ever prosecute Israel but pointing out Israel's occupation is larger in number and that Israel has "much more actively" engaged in illegally transferring its citizens into its settlements in the West Bank. A case against Turkey's settlements in Cyprus, Heller argues, would highlight "how much stronger the case against Israel really is."

"The Screenshots Prove It: New York Times Altered Headline to Remove Words 'Israel-Occupied,'" Ali Abunimah
A set of screenshots obtained by Electronica Intifada reveals The New York Times editing a story on the Bab al-Shams encampment so as to no longer describe the West Bank as "Israeli-occupied". The elimination of such language, Abunimah writes, is a "key goal of Israeli propaganda," aimed at granting false legitimacy to Palestinian land claimed by Israel.

"Iraq: US 'Troop Surge' Magic Bullet Myth Lives On," Jim Lobe
Lobe responds to criticisms of Chuck Hagel's refusal to back the 2007 "troop surge" in Iraq, writing that such criticism is steeped in a wrongheaded "myth" that the surge alone, and not a partnership struck between Coalition forces and up to 100,000 Sunni Arab insurgents around the same time, changed the the fortunes of US forces in post-invasion Iraq.

"Fact-checking the Iranian DDoS Attacks Against US Banks," Jeffrey Carr
Carr examines claims made about recent DDoS attacks against JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and other US banks, attacks the group Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters claims responsibility for. Carr finds both CNN and Bloomberg overstate the extent of the planning required to initiate and damage inflicted by the attacks, and criticizes Senator Joe Lieberman's belief that Iran launched the attacks.

"Failures of Palestinian Reconciliation," Rajab Abu-Sariyyah 
Abu-Sarriyah criticizes a recent meeting between Palestinian Authority President Mahmood Abbas and Hamas Political Bureau Chief Khaled Meshaal on Al-Monitor, writing that such talks "provoke false hope," removed from the aspirations of the Palestinian people. Sariyyah wonders if political unity between the sides represented by each man is impossible.

Commentary

"Don't Close Guantánamo," Jennifer Daskin
Daskin, a lawyer who has served as senior counsel for Human Rights Watch and in the Department of Justice's National Security Division under the Obama Administration, argues against closure of the detention facility at Guantámo Bay for the short term. Closing the prison, Daskin writes, would not amount to release or prosecution for most of the detainees, and could roll back a number of recent improvements in conditions. Daskin holds that defining a legal framework for ending the conflict against al-Qaeda would erode the legal justification for holding the detainees in the facility, and is the only "realistic hope for meaningful closure" for the facility. Benjamin Wittes of Lawfare and Kenneth Anderson of Opinio Juris respond to Daskin's argument.

"The Growth of International Law Scholarship," Roger Alford
Writing for Opinio Juris, Alford provides a case study of the use of the term "international law" in academic scholarship, using WestLaw's JLR library to chart instances of the term's use from 1987 to 2011. Alford argues the statistics show the field has shown "sustained growth across the decades" relative to a number of other fields of legal scholarship.

"The Most Hated Woman in Israel," Larry Derfner
Derfner sits down with Haneen Zoabi, an Arab member of the Israeli Knesset, discussing her history as an advocate for Arab citizens of Israel, her participation in the Mavi Marmara flotilla, the Israeli government's attempt to strip her privileges in the Knesset, and her successful appeal to Israel's Supreme Court to have said privileges reinstated.

"Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes," Cora Currier
ProPublica provides an overview of the United States' use of drone warfare in Pakistan and Yemen, detailing what is known about the process of choosing targets, who conducts the strikes, how many have been killed in strikes, and the debate regarding the legal rationale for such attacks.

"Death of a Prisoner," Laura Poitras
The New York Times' "Op-Docs" page features Poitras' short documentary on Adnan Farhan Abdul Latif, a Guantánamo detainee who recently died in solitary confinement, and the return of his remains to his native Yemen. Poitras questions the circumstances of Latif's detainment, in which he was held for eleven years without being formally charged with a crime, and of his death, the US government's account of which Poitras describes as "hard to take at face value." 

Reports

"Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies (pdf)," Micah Zenko
In a report for the Council of Foreign Relations, Zenko argues against the legality and net benefits of using drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen and lays out a "substantive agenda" whereby the United States could end targeted killings of unidentified militants and contribute to an international legal framework regarding the use of drones.


Conferences

"European and Transnational Rulemaking," University of Amsterdam, 15 January, 2013; submit proposals here and here (emails).

On Jadaliyya

"European Footballers Declare Support for Palestine," Jadaliyya Reports

,   Lila Abu Lughod and Maya Mikdashi",التقاليدوالآلةالمناهضةللسياسة: "جرائمالشرف" تغويفرقةالدام"

   (Tamer Nafar, Suhell Nafar, Mahmood Jrery (DAM ",ردفرقةالدامعلىمقالالتقاليدوالآلةالمناهضةللسياسة"

"Don't Play Apartheid Israel: Summary of 2012 Cultural Boycott," Jadaliyya Reports

"Settler Colonialism: Then and Now (Video)," Jadaliyya Reports

"Imagining Justice Beyond the ICC," Samar Al-Bulushi

Sherene Seikaly ",عدّالكالورياتوصناعةالليمونادافيغزة"

"Good Taliban, Bad Taliban: Pakistan’s Double Game and the US War on Terror," Waqas Mirza

[Mohamed El Marouani is the author of Abdessalam Yassine's funeral oration, who died on 13 December 2012. Sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for "conspiring against state security," El Marouani was released during the wake of the February 20 Movement. He is the founder of the Al Umma, which he hopes to transform into a political party, however, he has been barred from doing so. The following interview was orginally published in French on Salah Elayoubi's blog and translated to English by Allison L. McManus.]

Ahmed Benseddik and Salah Elayaoubi (AB and SE): We remember the eulogy that you gave at the funeral of Sheikh Yassine.  Those of us who did not know you could appreciate your talents as an orator given the severe charges you delivered against those whom you described as “normalizers and collaborators in tyranny and corruption.” Who are you, Mohamed El Marouani?

Mohamed El Marouani (ME): Licensed in economic science, with a focus in econometrics, and with a diploma in superior studies (Études Supérieures DES) in management, I am a researcher of questions regarding political Islamic thought. I am actually preparing a doctoral dissertation on “The theory of the legitimacy of political power in Islam.”

Married and the father of three children, I am the senior manager and director of studies at Maroc Telecom and previously held a position at the National Institute of Post and Telecommunications' management cycle.

President and founder of the Movement for the Oumma from 1998 to 2011, I am the national coordinator for the party of the same name. Ex-activist and union official, I have also founded numerous civic associations, coordinated, and participated in actions in the defense of human rights (debates or demonstrations in protest or in solidarity with political prisoners or prisoners of conscience.)

Ex-political detainee, I was condemned to twenty five years in prison, reduced to ten years on appeal, before being liberated on 14 April 2011 in the wake of the protests of the February 20 movement.

I am the author of several publications that address different themes including constitution and democracy, teaching, economy, and others, more notably a work on the political power of Islamic political thought--historically and contemporaneously.

AB and SE: What is your relationship with Sheikh Yassine and al Adl wal Ihsane?

ME: Sheikh Yassine was one of the few leaders in this country who continuously and relentlessly demonstrated an unrivaled courage against despotism and corruption. His inquiries and addresses are both testaments to the grandeur of his personage. Despite incarceration, house arrest, persecution, and psychiatric confinement, he never wavered.

Moreover, the man was an intellectual; he carried a project of society, was gifted with the incontestable qualities that are necessary for leadership, as well as the charisma that goes with it. These were necessary to accompany and to advance al Adl Wal Ihsane to the important place it occupies today in the field of Moroccan politics.

The relationship that was woven, with him as much as with his organization, was based on mutual respect, cooperation and solidarity.

AB and SE: You were condemned to twenty five years in prison before having been pardoned by the king? What were the circumstances of your arrest and condemnation?

ME: Since 2006, the makhzen (network of Morocco's political and business elite) has been putting into place a political security plan to restructure, or rather reformat, the political scene in Morocco, of which the major guidelines are:

• Dismantling (forcible or consensual) of the administrative parties to rework a political context that is adequate to the needs of the makhzen.
• Repression of independent media.
• Weakening of the electoral mission of the PJD (according to the political plan, the PJD no longer represents any threat to the makhzeni political regime).
• Undertaking of a security surveillance operation against al Adl Wal Ihsane in an attempt to contain them, as was well indicated by P. Vermeren in his work The Unfinished Transition.

It is in this political context that our arrest and condemnation unfolded. The makhzen has developed the habit of authorizing only the parties that conformed to its political vision. They were not able to civically authorize a political party that would retain its liberty and autonomy, illustrating the makhzen’s despotic nature. Having failed to subjugate the party and to convince its leaders, they decided to muzzle us and began an inequitable court process where the presumption of innocence was knowingly violated by the Minister of the Interior at the time, Chakib Benmoussa. The judgment fit--unequalled mediocrity.

AB and SE: How were you so severely condemned one day, and just a little while later, purely and simply liberated? Was this not another proof of the same methods of manipulation and dissuasion that are applied by the makhzen? And is that not a confession of your innocence, and maybe that of others who have been condemned as well?

ME: No doubt about this! The makhzen was persuaded that conditions were ripe to install its hegemony in the political field. It would not depart from the same Keynesian approach that all despotic regimes have: “In the long run, we are all dead.” The project, always the same, is to break down all contestation of, or the tentative struggle against, despotism, and corruption.

But it did not count on the February 20 movement, which, in the wake of what has been called “the Arab Spring,” to counteract its plans and essentially become our liberation. It was a justified response for those who attempted to undermine our most basic rights and tarnish our reputation, and to cut us at the base and alienate us from the public.

But if our liberation was a reversal for the makhzen that had always privileged the option of security over development strategy, I must say, there is a damper on this victory: other Islamist detainees continue to languish in prison-- a sort of currency exchange to contain the ongoing change in our political decisions. This is completely wasted, for our determination to fight peacefully for the establishment of a true rule of law where Moroccans might enjoy a decent life and where wealth is distributed in an equitable fashion rests intact.

AB and SE: The court of appeals has refused the constitution of the political party “Al Oumma” that you have put forth since its creation. It is without a doubt a sign that you are still under watch, despite the grace that you have received. Is the refusal justified?

ME: To our great misfortune, the judicial branch is not independent and suffers profound structural problems. An example: the Administrative Tribunal declared it was opposed to the constitution of the Al Oumma party, even though the royal delegate for the Defense of Rights and Law, a neutral party, had handed down a favorable judgment. It was a scandalous verdict, especially knowing that the judgment had been based on issues regarding the registration of electoral rolls, a ministerial decision, and in flagrant violation of the law. 

In reality, the refusal to authorize the party’s constitution was purely political and cannot be disassociated with the general context--that context involving the repression of liberties, fabricated processes against the activists of the February 20 movement, and political imprisonment under inhumane conditions.

AB and SE: Many amongst the February 20 protesters seemed convinced that a deal – by all means informal – had been tacitly agreed to between the PJD and Al Adl Wal Ihsane, as well as other Islamist movements, to give Benkirane and his government a chance to experiment with their political program. Some of them suspect that this was an accord under the auspices of makhzeni instigation. They are suggesting treason. What do you think of this?

ME: I can not permit myself to respond in their place. You could always ask them this question. As for what concerns us, our positions remain unchanged as long as the actual context remains the same. We are still on the side of the oppressed, opposed to despotism, tyranny, and corruption. The retreat of al Adl Wal Ihsane, with whom we share a good number of viewpoints, was an internal political decision on their part. We must respect it. Moreover, if they have left the demonstrations, they have not left the scene, but rather affirmed their own political line. Finally, it is necessary to underline that nobody ever suspects al Adl Wal Ihsane of having pursued power.

AB and SE: In Tunisia and Egypt, the Islamists’ first reaction in the aftermath of the revolution seemed to be one of doing battle with the secular movements, of searching for their own constitutional installation, while using sharia as a menace without ever putting forth democratic solutions. Where is the place for democracy in your mind?

ME: First of all, it is necessary for us to add some nuance to this topic. What is happening in Tunisia and Egypt does not have anything to do with adopting democracy or not. Egypt and Tunisia are living through a period of democratic transition that we can liken to a “turbulence zone.” In such a context, we can expect two types of events; events that we can qualify as normal or natural, tied to political debate that mobilize civil society and put in place diverse political projects: nationalist, liberal, leftist, and Islamist. This diversity is taken to be a sign of the good health of a democracy and of the richness of exchanges, as the last word belongs to the people via transparent elections in the context of freedom. It is the path borrowed from every democracy. The other kinds of events are linked to remnants from the ousted regime that wish to destabilize the democratic process.

Every democratic transition has known moments of tension that have passed as soon as a political and constitutional framework has been put in place.

As for democracy, it remains the best system humanity has ever attempted in order to organize civil society and to manage strategic decision making. Recall that the state in Islamic thought is a civil state that can take any form possible in accordance with the consent of members of society. Our political project is articulated around two axes: the people as the source of power, and the sovereignty of the law. Nevertheless, it is necessary to distinguish between the source of power and the source of law. We can draw the conclusion that everything depends on the will of the people and this is the principal rule of democracy: the respect of the majority without compromising the rights of minorities and the political opposition.

AB and SE: You have not failed to address the political messages of the PJD. What assessment can you make following this government's first year in power?

ME: I believe the government is the product of the political context and cannot act beyond its political and constitutional limits. It is the reason why we have not witnessed a fundamental change in the strategic choices of Benkirane’s government. A simple example: the regime continues to oppose our right to expression and organization.

Three conditions need to be met to be able judge whether or not the government is efficient: broad popular support, a sound and open political context and a democratic constitutional framework. On the side of political support, polls do not pass the figure of twenty-seven percent. The political climate is marked by political imprisonments, the repression of the right to expression and organization. The constitutional framework is marked by the hegemony of the royal institution. Moreover, the following figures illustrate the worsening state of affairs:

• Democray Index: Morocco went from number 116 in 2010 and 119 in 2011, anchoring Morocco in the sphere of totalitarian countries, while Tunisia went from 144 to 94 in the same period, permitting it to leave this sphere and to earn a place as a hybrid regime in the course of installing democracy.
• Corruption Index: Morocco went from number 80 in 2011 to 88 in 2012 according to a report by Transparency International.
• Concerning freedoms, Morocco experienced a fall in freedom of the press from the 135 place in 2010 to the 138 in 2011, according to the Reporters Without Borders' report on freedom of the press in 2012.

The constitution leaves no freedom for political development in exercising power or applying programs. With the monarchy as executive, they are servants of power despite their good democratic spirit.

It is thus not an exaggeration to say that the government has actually succeeded in playing the role of the regime’s devoted stooge. In running into the arms of the makhzen, they have returned us to the era of lead. We can see that the camp of despotism is dominating.

AB and SE: Wikileaks, as well as the book The Predator King evoke the implication that the king and his entourage are party to abuses of power, extreme corruption, and multiple scandals, including acts of economic predation. The palace has never denied these two sources. Why in your opinion?

ME: The royal institution has a spokesperson whose responsibility is to reply to these accusations. His deafening silence signifies assent.

AB and SE: How do you grapple with the political situation in Morocco and its future?

ME: The makhzen persists in its guilty ignorance of the popular discontent expressed in the street. It refuses to honor its own assurances for a democratic transition and its social and economic promises. The law and fundamental liberties continue to be trampled in a political field that has been extinguished. Many conditions make me think that the ingredients for a new wave of revolt are now coming together.

Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad discussed his book, Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience, with C-Span's Book TV and talked about the current conflict in that country. This interview was recorded on the campus of George Mason University on 27 September 2012 and aired recently on C-Span. 

The themes addressed include:

• The gradual transformation of the Syrian economy after 1970 
• State-business networks and cronyism in Syria prior to the uprising
• The existence of economic networks elsewhere, including in the United States
• Tailored economic policies that benefited the upper business echelons
• The economic background of the uprising and the distinction between rural and urban areas
• On the significance of the Syrian military in comparative perspective
• The security services as the locus of coercive power in Syria
• The dilution of the uprising by the tactics and behavior of rebel groups
• The illegitimacy of US, Turkey, and GCC countries's call for democracy in Syria
• The regional and international context of the Syrian uprising
   

[Cet article est le deuxième d'une série de trois, avec des perspectives différentes sur les développements au Mali. Le premier article - « Mali in Focus, Part One: The Jihadist Offensive Revisited » ]

« …Ce conflit est légitime et vital pour la sécurité des Français. Nous ne pouvons pas espérer conserver nos modes de vie et notre prospérité si nous n'allons pas à l'extérieur du territoire national participer à la stabilisation et au règlement des crises, à l'éradication des menaces qui finiraient immanquablement par venir nous menacer à l'intérieur du territoire national. »

Ces mots ont été prononcés par le général de division deuxième section et ancien directeur du Collège Interarmées de Défense (CID),Vincent Desportes, qui répondait aux questions des internautes pour le journal Le Monde. M. Hollande, président « socialiste » de la République française élu depuis moins d’un an, vient de faire entrer son pays dans une guerre qui menace toute la région. Il soutient que cette guerre a comme objectif d’aider le Mali, « pays ami ». Si la justice et l'amitié avaient été l’objectif de M. Hollande, il aurait dû commencer par octroyer le droit de vote aux résidents étrangers non communautaires comme il l’avait promis lors de sa campagne électorale. 

Nul ne peut être dupe des véritables intentions et visées des « va-t-en guerre » du moment. La France, comme beaucoup d’autres pays du Nord, savait ce qui se passait au Sahel, en particulier depuis l’aide (désintéressée nous avait-on dit) apportée au peuple Libyen « ami ».  C'est à la suite de l’intervention française en Libye que l’arsenal militaire amassé par Kadhafi s’est retrouvé entre les mains de groupes divers, avec en tête ceux se revendiquant de l’islamisme. Il était plutôt facile de saisir ce qui était en train de se préparer.  L’entreprise AREVA, d'une importance vitale pour le « mode de vie et la prospérité » des gens du Nord, a de plus en plus de mal à retenir ses employés français dans la région du Sahel.

Cette guerre n’a rien d’une action désintéressée et gratuite, pas plus que ne l’a été la « libération » de la Libye et l'élimination de son tyran. La France, soutenue par ses alliés européens et américains, ne cherche qu’à défendre son « protectorat » et à le renforcer. Les richesses que recèle la région du Sahel sont immenses. Elles sont surtout nécessaires tant pour le présent que pour l’avenir des continents européen, américain et aussi asiatique, car elles préservent et améliorent le mode de vie des gens qui y vivent, si envié par les Africains. Il faut s'assurer que le pétrole, le gaz, l’uranium, l’or et, depuis peu, le gaz de schiste demeurent entre de « bonnes » mains, avec l’aide -la complicité- des sous-traitants aux commandes des pays de la région. Pour les dirigeants du Sud et du Nord c’est du gagnant-gagnant.

On ne peut cependant pas en dire autant de leurs peuples, tout particulièrement ceux du Sud. On estime déjà que des dizaines de milliers de sinistrés s’entassent dans des camps de réfugiés, des chiffres qui n’incluent pas ceux qui souffrent sur les lieux des combats. Du point de vue économique, il faut rappeler qu'un très grand nombre de familles au Niger, en Algérie, en Mauritanie et au Burkina Faso, subsistaient quasi exclusivement du tourisme et de ses dérivés. Pour elles, cette guerre ne sera que malheur. Elle ne fera qu’enlever des ressources à ceux qui en ont déjà moins pour les donner à ceux qui en possèdent déjà plus. 

Ne prônant pas l’inaction, je dis qu'une autre voie était possible, si peu utilisée jusque-là : la fermeté à travers le dialogue politique. Une multitude de groupes se font face dans ces régions, certains d’entre eux, tels les Touarègues, ont des revendications légitimes qu’ils brandissent depuis des lustres de manière souvent pacifique. Il était tout à fait possible de trouver les accords nécessaires avec certains et d’isoler de fait les plus extrémistes. De toute façon, cette guerre, comme tant d’autres, se finira autour d’une table de négociation. D’ici là, le sang, les larmes ainsi que la détresse économique et sociale en pousseront plusieurs vers l’extrémisme dans les pays de la région sahélienne. 

Bien sûr, il ne s’agit aucunement de dédouaner les dirigeants des pays du Sud. Ils sont les premiers responsables de la situation catastrophique que vivent leurs peuples. Leur gestion autoritaire et antisociale, leur corruption, leur accaparement des richesses de leurs pays comme si cela était une propriété privée, ont été le meilleur terreau pour que croissent les frustrations nourrissant les extrémismes de tous bords. A force de mener ce genre de politique foncièrement antipopulaire, ils ont fini par perdre toute légitimité. Dénués de crédibilité à l’intérieur de leurs propres frontières, ils sont devenus de plus en plus vulnérables aux injonctions et autres « conseils » émis par les dirigeants du Nord. 

A voir l’accolade de M. Hollande avec M. Bouteflika lors de la visite du président français en Algérie, il est clair que la « nouvelle » relation entre les deux pays ne va pas déroger à la règle : les affaires d’abord, la démocratie, les libertés et les droits humains plus tard.« Et voilà que je te t’offre une usine de montage Renault pour ta belle ville d’Oran »,  « et voici qu’à mon tour je t’ouvre mon ciel aérien pour que tu fasses joujou avec tes avions de combat »… Voici la substance des relations Nord-Sud. Et tant pis pour ceux qui pensaient que ça se passerait autrement. En effet, qui aurait cru possible que l’Algérie, si prompte à utiliser le passé pour se maintenir au présent, puisse ouvrir ses portes à une intervention étrangère, de surcroît une intervention de l’armée française en Afrique sahélienne ? 

Facile est la tâche qui incombe à l’habituelle presse liée aux Palais : montrer et faire parler les « pauvres » Maliens tout sourire remerciant la France de Hollande venue les secourir. Il aurait été moins coûteux en vies humaines et en souffrances d’aider l’Etat malien à subvenir au désarroi économique et social dans lequel il se débat depuis si longtemps. Cela est encore possible, mais ne rêvons pas. Certes, il est heureux de voir les coupeurs de mains et de têtes prendre la poudre d’escampette (mais vers où au fait ?!). Il aurait été plus judicieux encore de ne pas les laisser s’installer aussi facilement qu’ils l’ont fait. C'est à croire que les dés étaient depuis longtemps jetés pour qu’on en arrive là, avant d’aller encore plus loin, probablement. 

« Il est clair que cette guerre va durer et que l'engagement français est un engagement de long terme. Les troupes africaines ne pourront repartir vers le Nord que dans plusieurs mois et on ne sait pas combien de temps prendra l'opération elle-même ». 

Là encore, ce sont les propos du général Vincent Desportes dans le même quotidien vespéral français. C'est un fait, il n'y a plus grand monde pour croire que la guerre sera du genre « éclair » comme expliqué lors des premières heures de l’attaque. Ils sont venus, ils ont vus mais ils ne repartiront pas de sitôt. 

Pour faire en sorte que cette guerre soit rapidement stoppée, il ne reste donc que la mobilisation citoyenne, laquelle est bizarrement restée muette jusque-là, particulièrement en France. Que les mouvements anti-guerre, de gauche et progressistes s’expriment et s’organisent contre cette guerre, y compris au parti socialiste Français ! J’ai du mal, beaucoup de mal, à penser qu’il n'y a que Messieurs de Villeppin, Mélanchon ou Mamère qui soient contre cette intervention. En Algérie également il y a urgence à voir se constituer un tel mouvement. L’enjeu y est encore plus important, car plus cette guerre va durer, plus grands seront les enjeux, entre autres et non des moindres, celui de sauvegarder l’intégrité du territoire et l’unité du pays.

Ce qui est en cours en ce moment au Mali aura sans aucun doute des répercussions très larges au Nord, tant à Algers qu’à Paris. Cela a déjà commencé. Gageons qu’elles seront le moins coûteuses possible.

Various local, regional, and international parties concerned with Bahraini affairs have failed to translate the November 2011 report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI, also known as the Bassiouni report) into a political program similar to Yemen’s GCC Initiative. The United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council states had devised the Initiative in 2011 to quell the Yemeni uprising. Although the Gulf Initiative distorted and marginalized the results of the revolution in Yemen, some argue that it also saved the country from turning into another bloodbath scenario like that in Syria. Nothing of the sort has happened in Bahrain, where the stakes simply are not as high for these same powers that have since condoned the violence that the Bahraini regime has meted out against the peaceful protesters. While the results of the BICI report were far from shocking for most Bahrainis, that the Bahraini regime-initiated inquiry actually documented horrific human rights violations in the small Gulf country raised expectations of implementing accountability measures and political reform.

The BICI report established that Bahrain is facing huge and real challenges. Its findings revealed that gross human rights violations were systematic and based on a particular training pattern received by those responsible for the implementation of the law. The report also found that senior members of the Bahraini regime had ordered these transgressions. Essentially, the inquiry disclosed that the violations were carried out:

1. With similar methods at different interrogation centers. Torture—at times leading to fatalities—arbitrary arrests, beatings, verbal abuse, and looting of property were common practices;
2. During a lengthy time period spanning February to June 2011; and,
3. Against a wide range of targets, as it affected thousands of people and most of the areas inhabited by the opposition and the Shia majority. The violations also included arbitrary dismissal of workers, the demolition of mosques, and incitement and spread of terror by the local official media.

All this confirmed that Bahrain was facing unusual challenges. Yet for the last thirteen months, the debate has remained centered on determining “the nature” of these challenges as opposed to actively addressing the source of the problem: the complex political system itself. Framing the violations of the last two years solely within a human rights lens de-politicizes the concerted anti-revolution strategies of the regime and its allies while reinforcing the view that reform and dialogue are the way forward. The regime can thus easily address the human rights perspective through adequate police training, improving the conditions of detention, and punishing discrimination against Shia citizens. Tackling the “political crisis” in Bahrain, however, would require a complete restructuring of the entire ruling infrastructure based on ideals of the 14 February Revolution, namely: equality, social justice, and democratic political participation, all of which the regime has and will continue to fight tooth and nail.

These institutional transformations necessarily extend to the furthest reaches of the executive bodies in the state. Indeed, for the full implementation of the Bassiouni recommendations, this restructuring must include:

1. Nationalizing the security apparatus by eliminating its dependency on foreign mercenaries and opening it up to all Bahraini nationals regardless of sect, gender, political affiliation, etc. and in the process forging a more unitary notion of citizenship;
2. Reforming the intelligence bodies and implementing safeguards to guarantee their operation within the provisions of the Constitution;
3. Developing an impartial and functional judiciary system;
4. Eliminating the control of the royal family over the national media; and,
5. Most importantly, working to remove the army from politics and reorient its mission toward the defense of the country and not the rule of the Khalifa family.

This restructuring would directly undermine the very pillars upon which the power and legitimacy of the Bahraini authoritarian state rests. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Khalifa regime will countenance a true institutional reform program, given that it would essentially cause the loss of every tool the regime has used to suppress and curb the opposition’s aspirations of a governing partnership.

The Yemeni GCC Initiative did not merely propose surface changes promoting limited protections of human right, but set forth a program for the institutional reform of the army, the police, the judiciary, and other state bodies. However, the process of political restructuring put in place by the GCC Initiative was limited by two significant constraints imposed by national and international geopolitical configurations. First, it maintained regional (and by extension, international) power arrangements, with Sana’a continuing to work within the framework of the Saudi-dominated system. Second, those social and political institutions of support for the former Saleh regime retained considerable influence in the newly emerging political structure. Thus, the GCC Initiative makes certain concessions to the revolution, imposing limited reform, but sustains much of the structural arrangements of power through which the former regime operated.

With the Bahraini case, it is obvious that the ruling authority is working systematically with its regional and international allies to establish an even more limited debate over the Bahraini uprising. In doing so, they are ignoring the core problem of the Bahraini political crisis: the political infrastructure of the Khalifa ruling family.
Britain has taken the lead in adopting a strategy of “dwarfing” these structural problems by framing them as human rights "concerns," as remarks by the Foreign Office Minister for the Middle East Alistair Burt indicate. Charging Michael Posner, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, with the responsibility of overseeing the Bahraini case signifies that the United States is pursuing this path, too. It is naive to think that this strategy reflects a lack of recognition of the real problem. Rather, it exposes the hypocrisy of their approach. US, British, and other government officials make public expressions of concern for human rights abuses, while the pillars of excessive power that maintain the authoritarian rule of the Khalifa family are upheld through Saudi and Anglo-American support.

The issuing of the Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report gave some initial hope of reinforcing a program of national reconciliation and democratization. However, what has happened has been quite the opposite. The regime has continued its repressive and violent practices to preserve its authoritarian rule and it has made any progress towards stability and prosperity even less likely. If any real change for the good of the country as a whole is to happen, we must insist on substantive structural transformations within the institutions of power, rather than limited demands for human rights protections.

This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes a list of the most read articles.  Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series. 

• Who Failed Rizana Nafeek?
• "من المآسي المضاعفة للنزوح:فتيات سوريات للزواج "بثمن بخس
• Ordering the Disorderly? Street Vendors and the Developmentalist State
• Raped, Without Justice, and Without Hope
• Mali in Focus, Part One: The Jihadist Offensive Revisited
• Ramallah’s Bubbles
• Human Rights Watch Statement on Zero Dark Thirty
• The Naked Bodies of Alia
• Torture, Drones, and Detention: A Conversation Between Laleh Khalili and Lisa Hajjar
• عن الإسلام والأسلمة حسب الطلب وأنواع الدين

• Reports Roundup (January 19)
• Maghreb Media Roundup (January 17)
• Syria Media Roundup (January 17)
• On the Margins Media Roundup (January)
• Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (January 15)
• Last Week on Jadaliyya (Jan 7- 13) 
• Egypt Media Roundup (January 14)

• Depoliticizing Bahrain's Uprising: The Rhetoric of Human Rights
• Reports Roundup (January 19)
• Focus sur le Mali, deuxième partie: Une guerre qui menace toute la région
• "Business Networks in Syria": Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad on C-Span Book TV
• A New Revolt in Morocco?: An Interview with Mohamed El Marouani
• O.I.L. Media Roundup (18 January)
• Infographic: Born at Qalandia Checkpoint
• Ramallah’s Bubbles
• Maghreb Media Roundup (January 17)
• Syria Media Roundup (January 17)
• سادية جديدة باسم المصلحة العليا
• قراءة هادئة في نداء 13 يناير
• Mali in Focus, Part One: The Jihadist Offensive Revisited
• Mohamed El Marouani: « Les ingrédients d’une nouvelle vague de révolte, sont désormais réunis »
• Torture, Drones, and Detention: A Conversation Between Laleh Khalili and Lisa Hajjar
• On the Exhibition THIS IS also GAZA
• Raped, Without Justice, and Without Hope
• New Texts Out Now: Noga Efrati, Women in Iraq: Past Meets Present
• US Department of Homeland Security's Media Monitoring Manual
• New Texts Out Now: Nicola Pratt, The Gender Logics of Resistance to the "War on Terror"
• ملف من الأرشيف: نزيهة الدليمي
• On the Margins Media Roundup (January)
• سراويل الكويز برعاية الإخوان
• باقة ورد للأحياء
• Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (January 15)
• قصيدة برتولد بريشت كجزء من بيوغرافيا الطموح
• الكويز وصندوق النقد ومصالح واشنطن
• Last Week on Jadaliyya (Jan 7- 13)
• Egypt Media Roundup (January 14)
• Penser le changement de l'éducation au Maroc : Interview de Nabil Belkabir, membre de l'UECSE
• Ordering the Disorderly? Street Vendors and the Developmentalist State
  
  

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.] 

“Protesters and security clash at Alexandria court”
Families of martyrs and activists clash with security forces after they are prevented from demonstrating in front of the court which was expected to pronounce a verdict on a killing protesters case.

“Egypt Opposition Faces New Challenges”
The National Salvation Front is shaken by internal disputes, as Popular Current youth refuses to accept the membership of Al-Wafd and Conference Parties in the front.

“Muslim Brotherhood figures seek Egypt diplomatic posts"
The president can use his right to appoint ten heads of missions to appoint people close to the Muslim Brotherhood to important to Egypt countries.

“Congress' non-condition conditions to Egypt”
Issandr el Amrani reports on the press conference of the delegation of US senators who recently visited Egypt.

“#Jan25 : The big conspiracy of #McCain , #NSF and Homeland security again #MB and #Egypt !!”
Zenobia exposes a recent post on Muslim Brotherhood’s webpage talking about a conspiracy involving Senator John McCain and the National Salvation Front.

“The Mubarak Retrial: A Principled Quest for Justice”
Basil El Dabh comments on the Court of Cassation to return the Mubarak case to a lower court for retrial.

“Cairo Criminal Court orders Mohamed Mahmoud suspects released”
More than three hundred detainees are released based on the amnesty decree issued by the presidency last year.

“Brotherly No More?”
Ashraf El-Sherif writes that after gradually losing wider public support, the Muslim Brotherhood will only be able to garner electoral support through sectarian rhetoric in the next elections.

“Thousands of Ultras rally in Tahrir demanding justice for Port Said victims”
Ahly football team friends organize a protest ahead of Port Said case verdict next week.

“Angry residents block tracks in Giza after train kills four”
Giza residents go out on another protest, after lack of transportation safety control takes more victims within a week of a major train crash.

“Prosecutors investigate sudden death of man in police custody”
Investigation starts in connection with a textile merchant’s death while in custody at a police station in Giza.

“Block of flats collapses in Alexandria, Egypt”
At least twenty-five are dead after a building collapses, as the streak of civilian-death incidents continues in Egypt.

“Nubians protest marginalization”
The main demand of the Nubian community is return to their native lands.

“Protesters demand Al-Gizawy’s release”
A protest in front of the Saudi embassy demand the release of Egyptian lawyer sentenced to five years in prison and three hundred lashes for drug smuggling in Saudi Arabia.

“Morsi’s Slurs Against Jews Stir Concern”
In a 2010, Mohamed Morsi made anti-Israeli comments which come back to haunt him during his presidency.

“Update: Charges dropped against former PM accused of squandering public funds”
Former PM Ahmed Nazif will pay back illegally acquired funds worth LE1.75 million in exchange for the charges against him being dropped.

“Egypt govt to 'reconcile' with Mubarak-era officials charged with financial impropriety”
Former ministers of finance and trade might be among the former regime officials seeking settlements with the current government.

“FJP flips position, decides to ally with Abu Ismail in elections”
The Freedom and Justice Party to contest elections in coalition with Hazem Abou Ismail’s Umma Party and the Salafist splinter Al-Watan Party.

“Who let the street kids down?”
Nelly Ali tells the story of one of the many street children she has met and asks important questions about societal responsibility.

In Arabic:

“عاجل.. محكمة جنايات الإسكندرية تتنحى عن نظر قضية قتل متظاهري 25 يناير”
A court in Alexandria resigns and passes on the trial of killing protesters to a higher court after violent clashes in front of the court building.

“النور: الإصرار على وضع المرأة في النصف الأول من القوائم «مزايدة سياسية»”
Salafist Al-Nour Party rejects the proposals for mandatory inclusion of women in the first half of the electoral lists.

“الإخوان ترفض «لم الشمل»”
Khairat Al-Shater, the deputy supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, refuses the requests of the opposition for changes to the government and the electoral law.

“وماذا لو قاد محمد مرسي القطار بنفسه؟!”
Mohamed El-Khazandar uses the recent train crash tragedy as an analogy of the way the country is being run.

“صباحي يُعلن شروط جبهة الإنقاذ لخوض الانتخابات البرلمانية”
Hamdeen Sabahi announces the conditions upon which the National Salvation Front will contest elections.

“ردا على الوسطي المؤدب المحايد الرصين معتز عبد الفتاح”
Alaa Abd El-Fattah responds to Moataz Abd El-Fattah who attempted to justify the provisions for military trials against civilians in the constitution.

Recent Jadaliyya articles on Egypt:

EIPR Analysis: Overturning of Mubarak and Adli Conviction Expected Outcome of a Flawed Trial
The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights’ report on the decision of the Cassation Court to return the Mubarak case for retrial.

New Texts Out Now: Nicola Pratt, The Gender Logics of Resistance to the "War on Terror"
Jadaliyya’s interview with Nicola Pratt about his latest article on civil resistance.

سراويل الكويز برعاية الإخوان
Wael Gamal criticizes the Qandil government for renewing the QIZ agreement with Israel and the USA.

الكويز وصندوق النقد ومصالح واشنطن
Mohamed El-Menshawi talks about the US pressure on Egypt to accept the IMF loan and a new QIZ agreement.

Ordering the Disorderly? Street Vendors and the Developmentalist State
Maha Abdelrahman comments on the new law extending punishment against street vendors and the dynamics of regulating public space in the recent Egyptian history.

The unfolding debate about the Palestinian hip hop group DAM’s new music video “If I Could Go Back in Time,” and Lila Abu-Lughod and Maya Mikdashi’s critique of it, has generated an intense visceral reaction on the part of many readers on Jadaliyya and in the blogosphere. DAM produced this music video in collaboration with the director Jackie Salloum and the renowned singer and activist Amal Murkos, to tackle the heinous crime of honor killing in Palestine. Abu-Lughod and Mikdashi took the video to task for treating the horrible phenomenon of honor killing as a social rather than a political problem. Many readers as well the members of DAM, however, mistook their piece as an attempt to exonerate Arab patriarchal structures of culpability. Admittedly, Abu-Lughod and Mikdashi do not go far enough in condemning these sexist cultural traditions. But as Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Suha Daher-Nashif cogently demonstrate, the oppressive patriarchal structures in Palestine have worked in cahoots with the Israeli apartheid policies to perpetrate gender inequality.

It is interesting to note that the bellicose comments on the Abu-Lughod and Mikdashi piece have been constructed around various binary oppositions that pitted activists against academics (theory), gender against nation, rooted nationals against diasporic critics, and arts against politics. In her critique of Abu-Lughod and Mikdashi, for example, the Bethlehem Blogger states:

Women can’t describe their experiences without two Diaspora academics telling them (in English) what sort of language to use when they talk. This for me is the most disturbing aspect of Abu Lughod and Mikdashi’s writing: their (ab)use of feminist and anti-colonialist language to make an argument that is very damaging to women.”

Unpacking the binary oppositions that underpin this kind of rhetoric is beyond the scope of this essay. But suffice it to say, these oppositions actually depend on and inform, rather than negate, each other for their coherence.

I am definitely sympathetic to Abu Lughod and Mikdashi’s critique of the culturalization of honor killing in relation to current histories of colonialism and patriarchy. However, I would like to suggest here that (intra-family) femicide, to be more precise, must be understood at the level of the formal constitution of the structural source of the problem itself: namely, global capitalism. Since the capitalist mode of production constitutes the totality of social relations today, the critique of the culturalization of political problems should, therefore, be radicalized. After all, global capitalism ultimately generates the contradictions and conditions within which these heinous crimes are perpetrated. As the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek argues, “the problem with global capitalism . . . is not reduced to imperialist expansion and colonialist oppression but it involves its own logic of exclusion.” Israeli colonial policies may not explain violence against women in Arab countries or the world, as DAM members correctly note in their rejoinder to the original critique. However, reframing femicide and gender inequality in relation to global capitalism reveals a common thread that has remained invisible in the DAM controversy. Making global capitalism visible locates intra-family femicide within the material realities of economic globalization. It can also reveal the extent to which global capitalism uses colonialism and patriarchy to reproduce, and at the same time conceal, the hegemony of the global economic order.

Situating intra-family femicide within the global economy and the feminization of poverty in the new world order makes it possible to interrogate the ubiquity of misogynistic violence in patriarchal cultures not only in Arab countries but also around the world. In its global expansion to the remote corners of the world in search for new markets and cheaper sources of labor, the neoliberal ideology of economic globalization recodes women’s labor and redefines the parameters of their mobility. Consequently, traditional gender formations themselves get disrupted as Western notions of freedom and the division of labor are negotiated and appropriated. This cultural disruption happens in complete disproportion to the deteriorating economic conditions among Palestinians. More than ever, the Palestinians are excluded from Israel’s capitalist economy, which is now increasingly outsourced to migrant workers from around the world. And the crisis of tradition and gender, in turn, is violently acted out on women’s bodies.

Read in this context, the connections among the many shapes that misogynistic violence takes around the world can be discerned, be it “intra-family (honor killings), infanticide, multicidal femicide (serial killers)[,] and systemic femicide (in war zones).” These diverse forms of misogynistic violence—whether it is the one hundred million missing girls in South East Asia and East Asia that Amrtya Sen talked about over two decades ago, the commerce in refugee Syrian women in the Jordanian matrimonial market, or the hundreds of young women who are killed in the maquiladorasin the US-Mexico trans-border towns—are all connected to the hegemony of the capitalist mode of production.

In the context of the expansion of neoliberal economics in Palestine, it becomes apparent that Palestinian femicide victims like Asia’s missing women, the maquiladora workers, the Syrian refugees, or the victims of sex and labor trafficking, are rendered as a disposable property and defenseless sexual commodities. They inhabit the lowest rung of the capitalist market and about whom no one cares. This explains, as Kevorkian-Shalhoub and Daher-Nashif correctly point out, why local configurations of patriarchal authority work in cahoots with the oppressive Israeli state apparatuses and colonialist structures to regulate women’s sexuality. It also explains why the authorities do not bother to investigate these crimes or crack down on the culprits. According to the capitalist logic of surplus value, covering up these heinous crimes is more profitable than investigating them. Hence, it becomes generally acceptable that these women are exploited as workers and as women, before they are marked for disposal.

In particular, this relational (not relativist) materialist analysis allows us to examine the connections between femicide in Palestine and other forms of misogynistic violence in the region. This is especially true for gender oppression in the context of the increasing polarization of wealth between the haves and have-nots in the Israeli colonial state. These forms of violence have been directly and indirectly correlated to the militarization of Israeli society and the intensification of its colonial and apartheid policies. At the same time, the increasing privatization of Israel’s welfare structures and the expansion of neoliberal economics should also be brought to the fore. For example, in 2005 Ha’artz reported that the “sharp increase in the rate of deadly domestic violence against women within Israeli households must also be seen as an indirect result of the military conflict” (emphasis added). What this report leaves out is the question of the direct cause of this violence against women in Israel. Global capitalism and its contradictions remain thus comfortably invisible.

Since the fundamental antagonism of the class struggle is the constitutive split which forms society in the capitalist mode of production, the dominant ideology will do all it can to cover up this hole in the fabric of social relations. In the name of national (Jewish) identity, hegemonic Zionist ideology in Israel will obfuscate the extent to which women in Israel—whether they are secular or Haredi Jews, migrant workers, forced laborers, or African refugees—bear the burden of these socio-economic and political policies on their bodies. As the neoliberal economic policies demand the integration of Palestinian labor force in the Israeli market, violence against women in Israel takes different forms to maintain state control over women’s bodies. This can explain the recent emergence of anti-assimilationist Zionist fundamentalist groups such as Lehava, which began organizing vigilante-style patrols to save and redeem Jewish women who are romantically involved with non-Jews, “minorities,” and foreign laborers. No wonder then that inter-ethnic dating is deemed an act of “national treason” by more than half of Israeli Jews, who frame public discourse on this issue in typical colonialist tropes that represent the Jewish woman as an innocent victim of the exploitation of the hyper-sexualized Arab man. It is in this context, moreover, that we should also comprehend not only the violence against women, and men, from different countries around the world who are trafficked in Israel for commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor, but also the violence against Israeli women who are themselves trafficked abroad to Europe and North America.

When it comes to femicide and other forms of misogynistic violence, therefore, a relational materialist analysis reveals how deeply implicated so-called “civilized and modern” countries are in the business of misogynistic violence. Even the world’s foremost superpower still refuses to ratify CEDAW (The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women). This relational perspective renders the racist, Orientalist basis of the culturalization of femicide moot. If the critics are concerned about the manipulation of gender violence in Orientalist discourses and racist representations to further demonize Palestinians and Arabs in the court of public opinion, it becomes imperative then that we critically examine systemic forms of inequalities in women’s lives within a materialist framework that connects violence against women to the same power structures that operate globally to exploit women and their labor.

In raising questions about the UN funding of DAM’s song, Abu-Lughod and Mikdashi have accurately touched upon the fundamental antagonism that is inherent to the capitalist mode of production. Like it or not, institutionalized forms of cosmopolitan law and the human rights regime are embedded within the ideological universe of global capitalism. To justify its expansionist policies, the latter demands the fabrication of certain images of victims of patriarchal traditions. In turn, these images are used to transform these victims into eligible candidates of international aid and humanitarian intervention. Needless to mention, humanitarian interventions have been legitimately criticized for their expansionist (neo-colonialist) agenda that is believed to usher Western democratic principles, but that in fact only facilitates the exploitation of the other as she is integrated into the global economy.

Linking honor killing to global capitalism allows for formulating an alternative politics of liberation that can align people around the fundamental antagonism of class struggle, which cuts across all genders, races, and nations. This requires not only interrogating the investment of cosmopolitan law in local social problems, but also articulating the work of progressive activists and anti-sexism cultural workers like DAM beyond the “conscious raising” strategy. Lest my point here be misunderstood, let me make it clear that it is important for men’s activism in combating misogynistic violence to be recognized. After all, violence is clearly gendered masculine, in that men inhabit a structural position of power in patriarchal societies that allow them to commit, often with impunity, the majority of gender violence in the world.

In the context of the silence about all forms of misogynistic violence in the Arab world, in particular, to have a group of men speak up against gender violence sends a powerful statement about men’s unwillingness to remain silent and complicit. Men should, and can, do a lot socially and culturally to bring an end to misogynistic violence. It is vitally important, however, to establish a direct correlation between gender violence and the crisis of masculinity that has resulted from the latest economic recession and conditions of precarity. Needless to mention, such a crisis is exacerbated under conditions of colonial occupation and apartheid such as the one we witness in Palestine. The performance of masculinities, in short, is always mediated through gender and colonial social divisions. However, class remains the most fundamental antagonism that can more cogently explain the implications of the reconfiguration of gender politics and women’s mobility and freedom in relation to the traditional gender structures and the declining powers of the male breadwinner.

To clarify, the critique of colonialism and patriarchal oppression is an important part of the global struggle for emancipation and freedom, but it must always be drawn back to the class struggle. The singular and concrete experiences of the have-nots, those who are excluded from the system, the “part of no part,” to use the French philosopher Jaques Rancière’s phrase, stand for the radical gesture of universality that is opposed to the empty principles of constitutional equality. It is through their oppression and exploitation that we can discern a glimpse of the urgency of reimagining a truly just world order.

While groups oppressed by sexist, racist, homophobic, and colonialist power structures should strive to assert their concrete universality based on their specific experiences, it is important that they also analyze these specific forms of struggle at the level of the formal constitution or fundamental antagonism of the global capitalist system. Otherwise, we will endlessly continue to add on a new dimension of oppression after another without addressing the real issue that seemingly remains impossible to symbolize. This is the only way that we can address the problem of honor-killing and the legitimacy of the struggle for gender justice, without displacing, compromising, or de-politicizing the need to formulate the universality of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli settler-colonialism and apartheid politics.

[The author would like to thank Sherene Seikaly for her valuable comments on various drafts of this essay.]

Two weeks ago, an official Egyptian delegation visited Washington to negotiate expanding the Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) agreement with Israel and the US, which sees designated geographic areas in Egypt given duty free status in collaboration with Israel.

They also met to discuss reducing the Israeli component in Egyptian exports to the US, which is part of the QIZ deal.

Meanwhile, Palestinians were finalizing plans to build the first Palestinian village on land that Israel will confiscate to build settlements.

They erected it a and called it Bab Al-Shams 'Gate of the Sun': a new and unique form of resistance during such difficult times.

News of the QIZ meetings, a scoop by Mohamed El-Menshawi the Washington correspondent of Egyptian daily Shorouk, came as no surprise.

It was preceded by a US visit to Cairo in September.

The agreement has been a key item on the agenda of Hisham Qandil’s government since it was appointed by President Mohamed Morsi.

On 9 September 2012, in an interview with economic news agency Bloomberg, Qandil said that Egypt will meet its commitment to the agreement which opens up the US market for Egyptian products if they have a 10.5 percent Israeli component of added value (which Morsi’s Egypt wants to reduce to eight percent).

Qandil also said that “a lot of people are making good business out of that: We want to make sure we do the right thing for them to flourish.”

The Muslim Brotherhood and QIZ Pre-Revolution

On 9 December, 2004, a report that was published on the Muslim Brotherhood's website Ikhwan Online titled: “Muslim Brotherhood MPs: QIZ threatens Egypt’s security", said the Brotherhood parliament bloc warned against the risks of the QIZ agreement that was then due to be signed within days.

The site reported that according to MP questionings and interpellations, "the agreement is a serious threat to national security because it is the first economic and industrial agreement with the Zionist enemy."

At the time, Brotherhood parliamentarian Hamdi Hassan, said in an interpellation, that the agreement "achieved all that the enemy has sought for decades: controlling the region economically through interfering in the Egyptian economy after it controlled it politically in the wake of the Camp David agreement." Hassan concluded by saying “you cannot make peace, promises or QIZ with Zionists”.

The Islamist MP ended by strongly rejecting “ attempts to normalize relations with “our usurper enemy” and described it as “a mark of shame that will burden future generations”.

But the Brotherhood's rejection of QIZ was not only for political reasons. The Islamist group also refuted the argument put forward by the Mubarak regime and the then minister of trade and Industry Rachid Mohamed Rachid that the agreement would rescue the textile industry and create 150,000 new jobs.

Morsi, who at the time was an MP and spokesman of the Brotherhood bloc in parliament, mocked these justifications in a statement he made inside parliament and demanded that the government clarify how 150,000 jobs will be created. He also rejected Egypt “signing an agreement with a Zionist minister”.

Meanwhile, another Muslim Brotherhood MP Hassanein El-Shura speculated about the pressure put on the government by the business lobby to sign the agreement.

Today, eight years later, Morsi's government wants to expand QIZ while the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and its parent organisation the Brotherhood are completely silent. What has changed in their reasoning?

From Ahmed Nazif’s QIZ to Qandil’s QIZ: Who Benefits?

As we know, none of the economic promises of Rachid and the government of former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, materialized.

The QIZ did not save Egypt’s textile industry nor did Egypt’s exports witness the anticipated landmark boom. For eight years and three months, since the activation of the agreement in 2005 until the first quarter of 2012, Egypt exported goods worth $5.1 billion to the US as part of the agreement, or $618 million annually.

The top product we export is jeans trousers which accounted for nearly half of QIZ exports in 2011, mostly to Gap and Levi’s, according to the latest figures of the QIZ division at the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Meanwhile, Egypt imported goods worth $560 million from Israel during that period.

What a meagre harvest in comparison to Egypt’s exports that reached $29 billion in 2007/2008 and $27 billion in 2011/2012.

Since 2011's January 25 Revolution, the volume of QIZ exports increased, reaching $931.6 million in 2011, in comparison to $858.2 million in 2010. In the first quarter of 2012 Egypt’s imports from Israel were $94 million, $48 million of which were in March alone, which is four times as much as the same quarter in 2011. This is the main goal of QIZ and the gas deal: to increase commerce between Egypt and Israel.

But what happened in terms of job creation and expanding industry, and did it bring in the promised foreign investment to bolster export opportunities?

Out of 536 companies that registered for QIZ, 382 did not export a penny’s worth; only 154 have exported goods over the eight and a quarter years. This means that seven out of every ten businesses that registered did not benefit from the agreement until the first quarter of 2012.

Textiles and readymade garments account for eighty-nine percent of these exports, followed by plastic goods at two per cent and chemical products at two per cent, which means that the primary beneficiary has been readymade garment exports.

A study issued in April 2010 by leading regional research institution Economic Research Forum headed by Egyptian economist Ahmed Galal, states: “QIZ’s contribution was very small in resolving the structural problems threatening Egypt’s textiles sector.”

The study, written by two researchers, Jeffrey Nugent and Abla Abdel-Latif, added that of the seventeen industrial zones housing QIZ factories, eighty percent of exports come from only six of them and eighty-eighty percent of exports are concentrated in companies with more than 500 workers.

"Among major companies, there is a bias towards bigger and bigger enterprises; half of QIZ exports come from companies with a workforce of more than 2,000," it revealed. This means there are very few benefits for small and medium companies that were promised permanent prosperity.

Egyptian companies still mainly rely on imported fabric from China, India and Israel, "which diminishes the benefits of the agreement” and means that the overall benefits to the spinning and weaving industry are minor.

Meanwhile, QIZ attracted some Turkish investment in the sector but the study found, however, that the anticipated benefit, which was meant to see the strengthening of companies that supply the readymade garment industry, “did not happen."

Political Gains and the US

Then why is Qandil’s government once again boosting this unfruitful agreement?

The answer lies in politics: This agreement was a cornerstone of the relationship between the US and Mubarak regime as it prepared to hand over power to his son.

Even after Mubarak has been ousted, it remains a US prerequisite for supporting the regime in Egypt.

As MP El-Shura pointed out in 2004, there is also the alliance with the small lobby that benefits from QIZ, headed up by Galal El-Zorba, chairman of the Union of Industries before and after the revolution. Speaking to Ikhwan Online website, El-Zorba welcomed the formation of "Ibdaa" (Begin) business society led by Brotherhood businessman Hassan Malek.

Day after day, the economic policies of Brotherhood rule reveal the depth and breadth of a socio-political alliance with Mubarak’s businessmen, even if this contradicts their positions in the past.

While official and non-official calls are being made in the West to boycott products made in Israeli settlements because of Israel’s fierce settlement policies, our government – which was appointed by a Brotherhood president – wants to expand economic and commercial normalization with Israel, in order to defend and support exports of jeans trousers that are essentially manufactured by five businessmen.

On 26 April 2006, more than one year after QIZ was implemented, the Brotherhood website reviewed a book by Ashraf Dwaba (the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) website regularly publishes his economic articles) titled “QIZ from an economic and Sharia perspective”.

Dwaba refuted "claims that QIZ enabled Egypt’s exports, especially textiles, to avoid fierce competition in the US market." 

His books states: “One cannot ignore the threat of QIZ to efforts to raise the quality of Egypt’s industry, because Egyptian industry would depend on exclusive advantages in the agreement that could be retracted at any time for any reason”.

He adds that “There are many countries – most notably China, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and others – that managed to increase their exports to the US, especially textiles and readymade garments, without signing such agreements by relying on increasing production efficiency and quality, and cutting prices.”

Dwaba went further by saying: “There is no truth to claims about the economic benefit in defending the agreement," adding, “exports do not forgive a crime and do not reverse something forbidden into something permissible."

Glory to the messengers of freedom from Palestine, the builders of 'Gate of the Sun' and shame on those who normalize relations with Israel at the expense of the cause and morality, at the expense of righteousness and interests of the people.

[Developed in partnership with Ahram Online.] 

[This article is the second of a three-part series featuring different perspectives on the recent developments in Mali. Previously published: "Mali in Focus, Part One: The Jihadist Offensive Revisited"]

"...This conflict is legitimate and vital to the security of the French. We can not expect to maintain our lifestyles and our prosperity if we do not go outside our country to participate in the stabilization and resolution of crises, eradicating threats that could inevitably threaten us from within our national territory.”

French General and former director of the College of Defense (CID), Vincent Desportes, spoke these words while answering questions from readers on the website of Le Monde newspaper. Francois Hollande, the “socialist” President of the French Republic elected less than a year, has just dragged his country into a war that threatens the entire region. He argues that this war has as its objective to help Mali, "a friendly country." If justice and friendship had been Holland’s target, he should have began by granting the right to vote for non-EU residents, as he had promised during his election campaign.

No one is fooled by the true intentions and aims of "going to war.” France, like many other countries of the North, knew what was happening in the Sahel, especially after giving a helping hand (a selfless act, as we were told) to the “friendly” Libyan people. It is the result of French intervention in Libya that the military arsenal amassed by Gaddafi found itself in the hands of various groups, led by those touting Islamism. It was easy to grasp what was in the making. Additionally, the company AREVA, vital for the "lifestyle and prosperity" of the people of the North, was having more and more difficulty retaining its French employees in the Sahel region.

This war is not a selfless and free act, and neither was the "liberation" of Libya and the removal of its tyrant. France, supported by its allies in Europe and the U.S., seeks only to defend and strengthen its "protectorate.” The wealth contained in the Sahel region is immense. It is also especially necessary for both the present and future of Europe, America, and Asia because it contributes to the preservation and amelioration of the lifestyle of people who live there, as so envied by Africans. It is imperative to ensure that the oil, gas, uranium, gold, and recently, shale gas, remain  in "good" hands, with the help and complicity of subcontractors under the command of the governments in the region. For the leaders of North and South, it is a win-win.

However, the same cannot be said of their people, especially those in the South. Already, there it is estimated that tens of thousands of people are crowded in refugee camps, numbers that do not include those who have suffered in areas of heavy fighting. From an economic point of view, it must be remembered that a very large number of families in Niger, Algeria, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso, remain almost exclusively dependent on tourism. For them, this war will only bring misfortune. It will do nothing more than remove resources from those who barely have anything, to give to those who already have a lot.

Without advocating inaction, I say that another way was possible, even if it has been seldom contemplated: firmness through political dialogue. A multitude of groups are in these areas, some of them, such as the Tuareg, have legitimate claims that they have peacefully brandished for ages. It was quite possible to strike the necessary agreements with certain groups, while isolating extremists. Regardless, this war, like so many others, will end around a negotiating table. In the meantime, the blood, the tears, and the economic and social distress will push many towards extremism in these countries of the Sahel region.

Of course, this does not mean we should excuse the leaders of the countries in the South.  They are the first to be responsible for the catastrophic situation that is being inflicted on their people. Their authoritarian and anti-social rule, their corruption, and their monopoly on the wealth of their countries as if it was private property, were the best breeding-ground for feeding the frustration of extremists of all persuasions. By following this kind of fundamentally unpopular policy, they have lost all legitimacy. Stripped of credibility within their own borders and consequently weakened abroad, they have become more and more vulnerable to the injunctions and other pieces of “advice” given by leaders from the North.

When one looks at the embrace of President Hollande with President Bouteflika during the recent visit of the French President in Algeria, it is clear that the “new” relationship between the two countries will not break with the precedent: business interests will have first priority, then on to democracy, and the question of liberty and human rights will come later.  “And now I give you a Renault assembly factory for your beautiful city of Oran.” “And now, in return, I will open my airspace for you to play games with your warplanes.” This is, essentially, the substance of North-South relations. And too bad for those who thought that things would transpire differently.  In fact, who would have believed it is possible that Algerian officials, so quick to use the past to maintain their rule in the present, would open their doors to a foreign invasion - an intervention of the French army in the Sahel, no less?

The task facing the usual press tied to the official powers is easy: make people speak of the “poor” Malians while smiling to thank France and Hollande who have come to their rescue. It would have been less costly in terms of human life and suffering to have helped the Malian state to improve the socieoeconomic conditions that the country has long been facing. This strategy is still possible, but we hardly consider it. Certainly it is good to see those who decapitate hands and heads scampering away (but heading where to, exactly)? It would have been even more pleasing and opportune to have not let them settle as easily as they have. It seems that the die had been cast long ago so that we would arrive at this situation,--probably before going any further.

It is clear that this war will last and that the French engagement is a long-term engagement. The African troops will not be able to leave for the North for several months and we do not know how much time the operation itself will take.

These were the comments of General Vincent Desportes in the same French paper, Le Monde. It is a fact that there are not many people who still believe that the war will be “clear,” as it was explained in the first few hours of the attack.  They have come, they have seen, but they will not leave so soon.

To end this war quickly there is nothing left to do except hope for a popular mobilization -  a phenomenon that has remained bizarrely quiet until now, especially in France. The progressive, leftist anti-war movements should express themselves and organize against this war, including the French Socialist Party.  I find it difficult - very difficult - to believe that there is only de Villepin, Mélanchon, or Mamère who are against this intervention.

In Algeria, as well, it is imperative to see such a movement take form.  The longer this war lasts, the higher the stakes will become, not the least of which is protecting the territorial integrity and the unity of the country.

That which is occurring in Mali will undoubtedly have serious repercussions for the North – as much for Algiers as for Paris. This has already begun. One would like to hope that the effects will be as least costly as possible. 

[This article was originally published in French and translated to English by Muriam Haleh Davis and Samia Errazzouki.]

Light from the Middle East: New Photography
Exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum, London, UK
13 November 2012 – 7 April 2013

The photographer Abbas’s images of the Iranian revolution have been described as “the memory of the event.”[1] I certainly remember them. Or I remember the event. I remember anyway my parents deciding that we had seen enough of these images on the streets, so they folded up their newspapers and unplugged our television at home.

Abbas's images are the first ones you see upon entering the rather dark space of Light from the Middle East. There is the photograph of handprints, dipped in the blood of martyrs; the photograph of protestors, burning a portrait of the Shah; the photograph of chadori women, receiving military training. If you are my height, the first visible image is the photograph of the bodies of four executed generals laid out on the shelves of a morgue. These are the first images you see if you follow the exhibition in the direction of the English language, starting in the room on the left, as the exhibition intends you to do, and walking your way around the semi-circular space to exit on the right. If you travel in this direction, then the exhibition invites you to reflect on the work under three headings, in this order: Recording, Reframing, Resisting. There are other ways to “read” the exhibition of course. You could, for example, go from right to left, the direction of Farsi and Arabic. This would give you a very different sense of what is on view here, a point to which I will return.

There is a lot of interest in the contemporary Middle East art market right now. All the photographs in this exhibition belong either to the British Museum or to the Victoria and Albert Museum collections, or to their recently formed joint collection of contemporary Middle Eastern photography (funded by the Art Fund). Moreover, Light from the Middle East is one of at least eight shows in major international galleries and museums that, since 2004, have either featured or focused on Middle Eastern photography. This is timely. Given how much information about the region is mediated through photographic images–whether they are produced by governments, embedded reporters, the global press, or by citizen journalists–it seems important to be paying attention to photography today.

Odd then, and frustrating, that the lively and exigent work in Light from the Middle East should be constrained by a structure and sequence–recording, reframing, resisting–that reflects the very conception of photography that the exhibition seeks to interrogate. The artists in the show have more confidence than this. For most, the photographic project does not begin from the premise that there is a moment of “pure” recording that can subsequently be reframed or resisted. Instead, the works generate vigorous debate about process, perspective (position, scale), practice and belief. In an interview in the exhibition catalogue, for instance, the artists Joana Hadjithomas and Khalil Joreige do not ask whether the images of “our wars” (in Lebanon) record the truth or manipulate reality. They ask: “How could we believe in them? This question is still valid today. It deals not only with how much we still believe in images, but also how can we believe in this world and the images it produces.”[2] Some of the most compelling pieces in this exhibition–like Hadjithomas and Joreige’s Wonder Beirut: The Story of a Pyromaniac Photographer (1997-2006), Walid Raad’s Notebook Volume 38: Already Been on a Lake of Fire (2003), and Nermine Hamman’s Upekkha (2011) series–build entire worlds that we both believe and disbelieve, that are both fact and fiction, true and imagined. These pieces have already stepped quite some way away from recording, reframing, and resisting.

There are thirty artists on display here, and they come from a generously defined “Middle East” that stretches from North Africa to Central Asia. In keeping with geo-political circuits of visibility, artistic legitimacy and networks, however, note that a substantial proportion of these artists/photographers are also based outside the region, mostly in New York, London or Paris. In order to impose some coherence on this extensive range of material, each individual piece is obliged by the exhibition to demonstrate how–usually on account of a political prompt–it illustrates and/or disrupts an established way of understanding or doing photography. The problem with this approach is that it diminishes both politics and photography. Insofar as these images are said to be about politics–where politics is a topic to be recorded, reframed, or resisted–the exhibition has the curious effect of reproducing dominant, recognisable representations of “the Middle East.” It is all “about” revolution, war, religion, gender, censorship. Insofar as these images are said to be about photography–where photography is a range of techniques for recording, reframing or resisting–the exhibition can offer only a limited account, within a conventional framework, of why these pieces are provocative. In its weaker moments, the organization of the exhibition tends to confuse and conflate political and photographic strategies. These problems manifest themselves differently across the exhibition, but two examples will suffice here.

Ahmad Mater’s Magnetism I and II (2012) appear in the section entitled “recording” because, according to the exhibition catalogue, the works record a sculptural installation–iron filings spiralling around a central, black, magnetic cube. They also however (again, according to the catalogue) exploit the limitations of the camera’s recording capacity because, at first glance, they (the iron filings, magnetic cube) do not look like what they are but rather appear to be aerial photographs of pilgrims circling the Ka‘ba. In this way, the work “playfully calls into question the reliability of the photographic image.”[3] True, but Magnetism only does this insofar as the notion of “reliability” is anchored to a particular conception of photographic recording, in which the camera represents, without interference, something that once passed before its lens (something that has/had a physical reality). Consider alternatively the artist’s own account of his work, in which he suggests that his photography “records experiments and experiences.”[4] With this simple claim, Mater opens up recording to an entirely different referent–for him, what passes before the lens is “experiences.” And he offers a reliable representation of it: Magnetism faithfully portrays the pull, the force, “the feeling of being at the centre of the Islamic world.”[5] The “recording, reframing, resisting” triad also creates its own exclusions. The catalogue is noticeably silent, for example, on Mater’s use of the photogravure printing process, presumably because it is not perceived to interfere with the recording of the iron filings and magnetic cube which takes place, roughly speaking, in a single moment and at a specific location. This, in the context of the exhibition, would seem to be the only way the technique could secure any relevance. The space and time of experience however, which is Mater’s alternative referent for recording, is far more expansive. Experience roams around history and folds in different people and places. It is under the sign of experience therefore, and not of physical reality, that photogravure, the technique that ‘Abd al-Ghaffar deployed in the first printed photographs of Mecca during the 1880s, acquires its real significance.[6]

The main problem with the organization of the exhibition is this: if we already know in advance what politics and photography are, then how is it possible to find something new, and something newly challenging, in these images? A second example–the images from Amirali Ghasemi’s series Party (2005), which are included in the section“resisting” –illustrates this point, which is arguably broader than the exhibition itself.

Ghasemi’s Party portrays people at parties in Tehran with their flesh and faces whited-out in order to protect their identities from the media and the Iranian authorities. As Ghasemi himself notes, these images are inevitably understood to be about “censorship, women’s rights, the hijab, and Islam.”[7] In Light from the Middle East, Ghasemi is described as “[rebelling] against photography … while depicting acts of social rebelliousness.”[8] It is “very tricky” however, Ghasemi says, “to glorify young people’s desire for having a good time as a rebellious act against the authorities.”[9] And even trickier to imply, as the catalogue does, that Ghasemi’s work is an act of rebellion because his whiting-out reminds us “of how easily photographs can be manipulated” and “is suggestive of the unsubtle techniques employed by the Iranian censors of imported magazines”.[10] It is tricky because, whether these photographs are or are not about censorship, they arethemselves censored. The assumption that these images engage with censorship at the levels of both content and technique gives rise to an uneasy tension: for even if the topic of the photographs, censorship, is political–and it is worth noting that the artist himself is deeply ambivalent about this interpretation[11]–should a pre-emptive act of censorship, in effect, of self-censorship, necessarily be considered an act of resistance?

“Artistic images don’t bring weapons in the struggle,” Jacques Rancière has written. Instead, “they help frame new configurations of the visible and the thinkable, which also means a new landscape of the possible.”[12] A more productive way to think about the political intervention commanded by the use of photography in this exhibition might be to consider how the images create what Rancière calls “dissensus” around consensual “ways of seeing.” For Rancière, a dissensus challenges what has already been decided in advance; it is a “dispute on what is given, on the name that can be given of it and the sense that can be made of it.”[13] Importantly, a dissensus does this not by denouncing a given reality or by reduplicating it (only “better”) but by building “other ‘realities’ or other forms of 'commonsense,' which means other settings of time and space, other communities of words and things, of perceptions and meanings.”[14] It means building other worlds, as Hadjithomas and Joreige might put it. This, Rancière says, is where “[a]rt and politics begin.”[15] Exploring how the works in Light from the Middle East create dissensus would prevent any single piece from being reduced to being “about politics” and, at the same time, would open up photography to a more intensely charged notion of the political. Consider, in this regard, one of the images in Newsha Tavakolian’s Mothers of Martyrs (2006) series, which appears in the section “recording.” The image shows a mother, sitting on a chair, holding a portrait of her martyred son in front of a black banner on which is written the word Moharram. According to the logic of the exhibition, the poignancy of this image must be explained either in terms of “the photographic” (the catalogue discusses Tavakolian’s ability to show, in a photograph, how a photograph can capture the likeness of an absent person) or in terms of “the political and cultural” (here it refers to her allusions to Shi’i martyrdom). But the power of Tavakolian’s work arguably lies in how it brings these elements (and more) together, without collapsing them into each other. Tavakolian’s image creates new connections, in Rancière’s terms, between word forms and visual forms, between different spaces and times, a here and an elsewhere, a now and a then: between the portrait of the boy and the word on the banner, between the martyrs of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and the Shi‘i martyrs of 680-683, between the individual martyr in the hands of his mother and the “myth of martyrdom” that Abbas decries in his book Allah O Akbar.[16]

Why do Abbas’s images start the exhibition? They do so for two troubling reasons: because photojournalism is framed as the originary technique in a narrative of photography that begins with a particular conception of recording; and because the Iranian revolution is framed as the originary event in a narrative of the contemporary Middle East that is too often unwilling to tear its eyes away from political Islam. But what if you reversed the direction, and read the exhibition from the right to the left? Beginning from “resistance” allows you to immediately recognize that the force of the work in Light from the Middle East derives not solely from its engagement with politics (understood as a topic) or with photography (understood as a set of techniques) but from its challenge to organized, historical, given ways of looking at the world, of making sense of it, of “common senses.” The sequence “recording, reframing, resisting” is one such common sense, as are the oppositions that sustain it: real/illusion, reliable/unreliable, censorship/rebellion, past/present. Reversing the direction transforms Abbas’s IranDiary from the definitive starting point of the exhibition (the point from which to measure how far politics and photography have travelled) into the exhibition’s conclusion. This concluding position is not so much a final summary as it is a final question, a question, in keeping with dissensus, as to what fresh senses can be made of IranDiary, as it joins the other worlds and novel connections created by the work in the exhibition.