Quantcast
Channel: Jadaliyya Ezine
Viewing all 6235 articles
Browse latest View live

عن الفن الإسلامي

$
0
0

قبل عامين، نظم معهد العالم العربي في باريس، معرض الفن الاسلامي، كسابقة احتضنت لأول مرة في العاصمة الفرنسية، من قبل إدراة المعهد التي ترى بوجوب تعريف الناس على هذا الفن، الذي اشتهر كإرث قائم بحد ذاته، وليس كحركات مستقلة أو متتابعة. 471 عملا بأحجام، وتكاوين وتشكيلات مختلفة تراوحت بين الخزف والزجاج والرسم والتصاوير والنحت والنجارة والنسيج والسجاد والخط العربي والأسلحة كالسيوف والخناجر، والمجوهرات وأدوات الزينة المختلفة، وحتى صناعة الحيوانات المعدنية. 

ربما لا يعرف العالم "الغربي" الكثير عن الفن الاسلامي، لكن السؤال يبقى، هل يعرف العالم العربي بهذا الفن. المسؤولة عن هذا المعرض، السيدة أوريليرويز، قالت في معرض سؤالنا: "بعد جمعنا القطع المعروضة كلها من المليونير ناصر ديفيد الخليلي، عمدنا إلى تعريف القارئ الغربي، على ماهية الحضارة الاسلامية من خلال الفن، ولذلك أهمية كبرى في تقديم الإسلام كإيديولوجيا لا تتأسس على العنف، بل على الجمال، ونأمل من خلاله أن نحدث تغييراً في الستيريوتايب المعمم في أوروبا بشأن الاسلام". وللحقيقة، فإن لناصر ديفيد الخليلي الفضل الأكبر في وضعنا وجها لوجه مع هذه الخصوصية التي تمتع بها الفنانون. فهو الجامع الأبرز لقطع الفن الاسلامي، وهو الذي يسعى وراءها في المزادات العلنية العالمية. يقول في إحدى المقابلات، بأنه مهتم بالتعرف على حضارة جيرانه الاسلام، الأمر الذي سيمكنه في الحال من فهم ديانته. فناصر يهودي، وعمله في جمع التراث الفني الاسلامي، والمحافظة عليه، فإنما ينم عن وعي عميق بالحضارات وشغف بالفن عموماً. وقد قام بطباعة كتيبات عن الفن الاسلامي وزعت في جميع أنحاء أوروبا ووصلت فلسطين.

وعلى كل حال، فإن الفن الاسلامي لم يتأسس على شكل تيارات، أو مدارس ولم تبرز أسماء بالطريقة التي هي عليه حاليًا. إلا أنه ارتبط بحقبات، وبجغرافيا. ولذلك فإن الإيديولوجيا الشيعية حضرت بكثافة في أعمال فناني بلاد فارس، وبالتالي طغت عاشوراء، وواقعة مقتل الإمامين الحسن والحسين، والمهدي المنتظر وعيسى المسيح، على الكثير من التصاوير، والرسومات المنجزة على ورق البردى او القماش بدرجات فخامته المختلفة. نجد الكثير من الأعمال التي تصور مباشرة معادلة الخير- الشر، وبالتالي انتصار الأول النهائي على الأخير. عدو كالأعور الدجال، يحضر بكثافة مثلا، يتم ذلك بإحالته إلى عنصر الشر عبر تصويره بملامح غير "بريئة"،  ومن ثم غلى العنصر الأضعف في اللوحة، بعد تواجهه مع السيد المسيح، الذي يقتله تحت مرأى حليفه الإمام المهدي المنتظر. تحضر أيضا الجنة والنار كطرفين نهائيين، يتم فرز البشر حسب أعمالهم، وتبدو الملائكة مشغولة بتنظيم هذا الامر. يحق القول بأن هذه الأعمال ولما فيها من جرأة، فإنها تبعث على الدهشة اولاً قبل أن تحرضنا على الانهماك في دراستها عن قرب، لرصد أدنى التفاصيل في الخط واللون والظل والبعد الثالث في اللوحة، والذي يبدو فقير الحضور. من هنا، يبدو الفن الاسلامي، خاضعًا تمامًا لإرادة الفكر الديني. فليس ثمة متنفس أمام الفنان لتكريس الإنسان في اللوحة، أو العامل البشري، وهو يستمد إلهامه بشكل مباشر من النصوص الدينية الجاهزة. من هنا، يغيب حضور العامل البشري، لمصلحة بروز الفكر الإسلامي، الذي يخضع أيضا الفنان، فلا يوقع هذا الأخير إسمه، ويترك لوحته أو عمله للتاريخ متنكراً أحياناً لأي إحساس وجودي ممكن أن يجتاحه ولو للحظة.

وبشكل عام، فإن الفنانين المسلمين لم يكونوا ليوقعوا أسماءهم على الأعمال المنجزة، بل كانوا يحيلون هذه الأعمال إلى غرض وظيفي، يقف في ظهر الدين، أو لغرض عملي منزلي أو شخصي. لم تحتل اللوحة أو العمل عموماً مساحة في الذاكرة الشخصية، بعيداً عن المساحة المتعلقة مباشرة بالنص الديني، والتي غايتها الاحتفاء بالعمل الصالح وارتجاء الثواب وتجنب العقاب. أعمال بدورها، لم تكن لتستقل بذاتها في تلك الفترة، كقيمة فنية، بل كانت خاضعة بالكامل للقيمة الإيديولوجية ااتي تشكل مظلتها. وهي أعمال تظهر بوضوح تأثر العرب والإسلاميين بالفن الصيني، والزخارف في الإمبراطورية القديمة، كما وتطال أيضا في بعض أوجهها تأثراً أو تشبها بالفن البيزنطي. وعلى كل حال، فإن هذه الأعمال، ونتيجة لتغيرات في ميزان القوى ما بين الشرق الغرب تحديداً، وبروز العالم الغربي بعد الثورة الصناعية، ليحكم الكوكب، قدر لها بعد عشرات أو مئات السنين، أن تصحو كأعمال ذات كينونة خاصة، لها أبعادها التي لا تتقاطع بالمرة مع أي من المدارس التي كانت ناشئة في العالم الغربي. وفي حين كان الفن في أوروبا خاضعاً لمقاييس طالت أولاً إيديولوجيا الكنيسة وتمردت عليها (موناليزا ليوناردو دافنشي) في القرن السادس عشر، قبل أن تطال الكادر الإنساني وتتلاعب في الظل واللون والضوء، ومن ثم الطبيعة الصامتة والتلاعب بملامح الأشياء وتكسيرها ضمن سجالات حادة بين أتباع الفن، ومشتغليه ومن ثم تجريد اللوحة قبل مزج الأشكال الفنية العديدة والعناصر وامتداد الفن ليطال كل شيء، ومن ثم الانقلاب على الفن باعتبار أن كل شيء هو عمل جاهز، أو يختصر قيمة فنية جاهزة..إلخ، كل هذا السجال الذي امتد لحوالي ستة قرون، في أوروبا، لم يكن ليطال باي شكل من الأشكال الخصوصية الاسلامية، نظراً للتحصينات المفروضة عليه باسم إيديولوجيا الإسلام. 

ولذلك، فقد شهد هذا الفن من ناحية، عزلة عن الجمهور العام، العالمي، كما لم يتسنى للعالم الحديث، التعمق فيه بالشكل الذي يستحق. وبالطبع لا ننسى كذلك، أن هذه النص الاسلامي، لم يمنع بعض السلاطين والملوك، من أن يسخروا الفن احياناً لتكريس وجودهم، لكن، وبما أنهم حكموا بإسم الإسلام، وبما أن طغيان الحضارة الإسلامية، هو ما طبع بلاد العرب وفارس وبعض الجوار، فإن تلك الأعمال اعتبرت كافة، أعمالاً إسلامية جوهراً ومضمونا. فالحاكم هو حاكم بأمر الله وهو الخليفة وولي المسلمين والناظر الأرضي الأول بشأنهم. ومن هنا، خلت البيوت من اعتبارات الزينة، إلا من بعض الأعمال كالرسم الذي يصور مثلا الطواف حول الكعبة أو يوم الحساب، أو علامات الآخرة (نزول السيد المسيح من السماء الثانية، ظهور المهدي المنتظر، الأعور الدجال،..). ليس الفن إذن ترفيهياً، وهو يحمل أقصى معاني الجدية، لكنه أيضاً يحمل الراحة للإنسان والتصالح مع ذاته (الفردية) وفهمها للتصالح مع التعاليم الإسلامية والدفاع عنها (الجماعية). لكن هذه الذات تتقاسمها نزعة سلفية أو نزعة صوفية، فالفرد هنا ممنوع أن ينأى بذاته المستقلة، وهو على علاقة مع الله، سواء بشكل مباشر أو غير مباشر، والقيمة الإنسانية ضحلة وقصيرة الملامح. وهذا ما كان السبب الرئيس في بناء القصور والعمارات، ذات الأبواب الضخمة والشديدة الجمال. إضافة إلى الاهتمام بالتصميم الداخلي للغرف وصناعة السجاد والأسرّة، والسيوف والخناجر والخوذ والدروع، وهو كله لتحصين الذات ورفع معنوياتها وحمايتها نفسياً وفيزيولوجياً وتهييئها للدفاع عن المقدس الإسلامي. ولهذا برز فن النجارة (الأرابسك، المعشقات، والمفروكة) بأساليب رفيعة ومنجزات بالغة الجمالية ومتناهية الدقة في تفاصيلها، كما وفن الحدادة والعمل بالمعادن الذي أنتج تصاميم للمجوهرات والمصوغات والحلي والاواني، وتفنن في دمج الجمالية الدينية (الخط، اللون)، بالجمالية المادية (المعدن: الذهب والفضة تحديدا). 

لكن الفن الاسلامي، لم يعنى بالأبعاد الثلاثة، ولم يهتم فنانوه بداية إلا بتصوير بعدين، واختزال البعد الثالث. ولم يقدموا اتجاهاً واضحاً في لوحتهم.  كما انهم لم يعنوا بالأحجام الكبيرة لأعمالهم الهندسية او التصويرية (باللون). ربما لم يعنيهم الأمر، إلا أن النقص الذي تركوه في أعمالهم، هو بمثابة اكتساب لصفة غير متوقعة إلى حد ما. فعندما نقف في وجه لوحة تحمل بعدينن فإن اللعبة تكون بصرية صادمة ومدوخة في بعض الأحيان، فالأشكال المرسومة (الأشخاص، الوجوه، الأحصنة، الأمكنة،..)، تفترض البعد الثالث، لكنه بعداً مفقوداً ما يداعب مخيلتنا ويدغدغ حاسة البصر، حتى لنكاد نتوهم بأنه ما يعرف أحيانا بالـ (conceptual art). تقول بعض المصادر إن الفنانين لم يقربوا بتاتاً رسم النبي محمد، نظراً لتحريم تصوير الأنبياء. ما جعلهم يلجئون إلى الخط للتفنن فيه، وإيداع طاقاتهم في عالمه بابتكارهم أشكال وانواع غير معروفة من قبل. وقد تمازج الخط ببساطته، وفقر مادته (الكثير من الأعمال اقتصرت على الحبر)، مع براعة التشكيل والتأليف بين مطارح هذا الخط، الذي سيعتمد من قبل لخط القرءان بأحجام ومقاييس مادية مختلفة (إختلاف المادة من الورق إلى الزجاج والفخار والعاج والجلود والعظام والخزف والأحجار الكريمة..إلخ). إلا أن مجموعة الخليلي المعروضة في المعهد العربي في باريس، تنافي هذه المقولة إذ إن بعض الأعمال تصور النبي محمد دون أن تظهر ملامح وجهه. تصور قامته كاملة، لكن مع مسحة بيضاء على الوجه. في معظم هذه الرسوم تستخدم الالوان الترابية وتدرجات الازرق (لون سماوي)، إضافة إلى الذهبي (كدلالة تفخيم، اعتمدت بكثرة في القرن التاسع عشر). أما الخلفية فهي متروكة للون مادة الورق الأصلي، وفي الكثير من اللوحات، لم يعن الفنانون بتأليف الخلفية اللونية لأعمالهم. كانت الرسالة واضحة ومباشرة، وخاضعة بشكل توتالي للنص الإلهي. لكن هذه الأبعاد ستشهد تطويراً اوتوماتيكياً، خصوصاً في التصاوير البارونامية للكعبة والطواف حولها، إذ لن يعود الخط محصوراً ببعدين دون الثلاثة، بل سيحاول اقتحام العين والبعد الثالث دون أن ينجح، لكن ذلك سيضفي جمالية غير ملحوظة من قبل. وبأي حال فإن الفن الاسلامي جنح نحو ابتكار أساليب تعبيرية جديدة منذ القرن التاسع. دون أن يكون لذلك علاقة بقومية معينة أو عرق. 

المعرض (شتاء وربيع عام 2010)، شمل إضافة إلى ما حاولنا الإشارة إليه، قماشة كانت تغطي الكعبة المشرفة قديماً، إضافة إلى مصحف هائل ملفوف على بعضه، وكان بطول ستة أمتار. والأعمال كافة يمكن ان تقدم لنا ثلاث دلالات أولها ما يدل على العلاقة القائمة والوثيقة ما بين ما هو فن وما هو مقدس، وثانيها ما كان لأصحاب القرار في المناطق الخاضعة للحكم الإسلامي، من نفوذ حتى استطاعوا التأثير لابتكار أساليب جديدة، أما ثالثها فهو التحرر من الحواس، ومن مقاييد الإنسان وأعضائه والنفاذ إلى عناصر العالم المحيط بنا.


Syria Media Roundup (December 27)

$
0
0

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

 

International and Regional Perspectives

 

Will Brahimi Get a Breakthrough?Vijay Prashad on the dangerous developments and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria

 

For Whom the Syrian Bell Tolls Pepe Escobar writes:“the top geopolitical tragedy in 2012 is bound to remain the top geopolitical tragedy in 2013: the rape of Syria.”

 

Senior Syrian Official in US and co-Operating with Intelligence Agencies Martin Chulov says that the details of Makdissi’s whereabouts remain nebulous

 

A Word of Advice About The Middle East-We’ve Reached the ‘Tipping Point’ With Cliches Robert Fisk says “you’ve got to be careful when Syria’s rebels are perpetually ‘closing in’”

 

Winter’s Edge for Syrian Refugees in ErsalAfif Diab talks to refugees at the Syria-Lebanon border.

 

Syria’s War Leaves its Scars on the Children Deborah Amos meets with Syrian schoolteachers in the Turkish city of Gaziantep

 

Syrian Narratives

 

Navigating the Syrian Opposition Darth Nader outlines three main types of opposition activists: the pacifist crowd, the FSA-are-always-right-and-can-do-no-harm crowd, and everyone else.

 

La Syrie au Jour le Jour 3. Quelle Barbarie Pour Quel Etat?Inspired by the writings of late sociologist Michel Seurat, Aurelien Pialou delves into the Syrian regime’s consolidation of power.

 

Assad’s War on the Red Crescent David Kenner reveals the entanglement behind the politics of humanitarian aid in Syria.

After all This Misery How Can Syrians Live Together Again? Hassan Hassan says “vengeance does not build a nation, it simply damages it further.”

All (Syrian) Politics is Local Hassan Hassan says tribal leaders have the power to ensure that the country does not become a breeding ground for extremism

 

Syrian Lenders Hit by Board Resignations Amid ‘Political Exposure’

 

The Most Dangerous Beat on Earth Four journalists share their experiences in covering the situation in Syria.

 

Inside Syria

 

From Bread to Front Lines Steven Sotloff meets with Aleppines who are divided over a war that shows not end in sight.

 

Under Siege Damascus Gets Desperate for Food and Fuel Mikel Ayestaran on how Damascus deals with the skyrocketing prices, the power shortages and the internal refugee crisis.

Homs After the Battle: Quiet, But No PeaceMarah Mashi discovers new “unintentional landmarks of Homs”: The Thieves Markets, the Zahraa Labyrinth and Bab al-Dreib.

 

The Forgotten Mental Patients on Syria’s FrontlinesDar al-Ajaza hospital in Aleppo is struggling to find staff and medication for its patients.

 

Conversation: Life in Homs, Struggling Schools A Homs schoolteacher writes about the current political and social rifts in Homs.

 

Syria Crisis: Low-Key Christmas for Christians Lina Sinjab meets with Damascenes who, for the second consecutive Christmas, are in “no mood to celebrate.”

 

Art and Social Media

 

How the Face of the Syrian Regime Betrayed Assad Over Twitter David Kenner attempts to contextualize Makdissi’s defection using the latter’s July conversations with activist Rami Jarrah.

 

Dear Syria, Save Damascus’ Old City Graeme Wood worries about the capital’s Old City, which could be the next battleground.

 

Aleppo’s History under Threat A brief visual overview of the damages on the cultural and historical landmarks in Aleppo

 

Policy and Reports

 

Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (1 January-30 June 2013) Report from the United Nations (modified for a third time this year)

 

Syria Regional Response Plan (1 January-30 June 2013) Report from the United Nations (modified for a fourth time this year)

 

UN Periodic Update on developments in Syria

 

Arabic

تقسيم سوريا: دروس الماضي وشواهد الحاضر

Mostafa Allabbad provides his historical analysis of partition as a solution for Syria.

 

الحرب الأهلية في سوريا: انفراط المشرق العربي

Amer Hasan writes about the civil war in Syria and the effects of Jihadist Salafist armed groups such as the Al-Nusra Front on the country.

 

الانكسار العربي ومستقبل سورية

Abdel Bari Atwan writes about the future of Syria.

 

حماه.. مدينة في حسابات حرب ومخاوف

Tarek Al-Abed writes about the recent escalation of events in Hama.

 

الأطراف الخارجية ومستقبل سوريا

Fayez Sarrah writes on the international implications of the struggle in Syria.

 

٢٤ ساعة سورية

Raed Wahsh recounts the stories of street vendors and everyday actors in the suburbs and villages of Syria.

 

تقرير مصور حول اوضاع اللاجئين السوريين في مخيم الزعتري في الاردن .. حمودة مكاوي

Hamouda Makkawi provides a report with pictures on the situation of Syrian refugees in the Zaatari camp in Jordan.

 

صندوق الألم: جولان حاجي

Some of Syrian poet Jolan Haji's poems.

 

فهم الأزمة السورية: موقف وحلّ

Kamal Deeb writes a reflection of his own views on the situation in Syria and calls for a more well-

rounded analysis of the future of the struggle.

 

مواد البناء تعبر بكثافة من تركيا إلى شمالي سوريا

Rasha Rami writes about the smuggling of construction material through the Turkish border. 

قطر والفلسطينيون

$
0
0

سواء من حيث التوقيت أو من حيث الجوهر، فإنه من الصعب تفسير زيارة أمير قطر الشيخ حمد بن خليفة آل ثاني إلى غزة في تشرين أول/أكتوبر 2012 بشكل مبسط. وكما هو الحال عادة عندما يتعلق الأمر بالسياسة في فلسطين، فقد تبلورت بشكل سريع العديد من التفسيرات والتأويلات. وبالتالي، فإما أن قطر كانت تسعى لضمان دعم قادة حماس لإعادة انتخاب خالد مشعل لقيادة المكتب السياسي للحركة الإسلامية، وذلك عن طريق استخدام نفوذها الكبير على الإخوان المسلمين للمساعدة في تحويل رفح إلى معبر حدودي اعتيادي ومنتظم بين مصر وفلسطين؛ متذرعة بذلك للمطالبة بحصتها من غاز البحر الأبيض المتوسط، بالاعتماد على التفاهمات غير الرسمية بين حماس وإسرائيل؛ ومروجة لتطوير قطاع غزة المعدم بـ 400 مليون دولار لكي تزيد، وبشكل كبير، فاتورة النضال؛ وموسعة بذلك المخطط الأمريكي الإسرائيلي لجعل الشقاق الفلسطيني مؤسساتياً عن طريق وضع الدعائم الدبلوماسية لكيان فلسطيني يقتصر على قطاع غزة؛ ومتحدية السيطرة المصرية على المفاوضات والجهد الذي يبذل للمصالحة الوطنية.

إن كل ما ذكر أعلاه يحتوي على درجة ما من الصحة. ولكن في هذه اللحظة بالذات فإن فلسطين ليست مركز الكون، أو على الأقل ليست المركز الوحيد. على الأغلب، فقد ذهب الشيخ حمد، وهو الراعي الرئيسي لتغيير النظام في سوريا، إلى غزة لكي يزيد من عزلة الأسد عن طريق الاستهزاء بادعائه بأنه الراعي المتبقي الوحيد لاستمرارية المقاومة الفلسطينية في أوضح صورة ممكنة. ففي المحصلة، فإن حمد الوهابي وليس بشار البعثي هو أول قائد عربي يقود موكباً من رفح إلى غزة. وبفعلته هذه، جعل القطيعة بين حماس ودمشق حاسمة ونهائية. 

إن كثرة النظريات حول الزيارة القطرية تعكس النفوذ الاستثنائي في فلسطين للإمارة بالغة الصغر. لم يأت هذا النفوذ فجأة، فقد جرى تعزيزه على مدى سنوات عديدة. حتى منتصف التسعينيات، كانت مكانة قطر في الوعي السياسي لمعظم الفلسطينيين تعكس حجمها وتعدادها السكاني الضئيلين. كانت سياستها تحدد عن طريق السعودية وأولياء نعمتها الأجانب. كما كانت المكان الذي أقام معه أحد قادة فتح غير البارزين، وهو محمود عباس، علاقات مع العائلة الحاكمة عن طريق إقامته هناك منذ الخمسينيات ودوره في الخدمة المدنية.

كما هو الأمر بالنسبة للعديد من الأشياء المتعلقة بقطر، فقد بدأ هذا الوضع بالتغير بعدما خلع الشيخ حمد والده عام 1995، وخاصة عندما رعت السعودية ومصر محاولة فاشلة لإعادة آل ثاني الأب، وتم البدء ببذل جهد للخروج من كنف الرياض وتحدي السعودية ومصر في رياديتهما للشؤون العربية. وكان المحرك الرئيسي لهذه الحملة قناة الجزيرة والإخوان المسلمون، واللذين كانا منذ مطلع الأمر ظاهرتين متلازمتين.

على الرغم من أن الإعلام العربي كان يتمتع درجة أكبر من الحرية في انتقاد القادة الفلسطينيين من باقي نظرائهم العرب، فقد قامت الجزيرة، بوضع ضوابط جديدة، مهنية وكذلك سياسية. ففي الوقت الذي اندلعت فيه انتفاضة الأقصى على أطلال أوسلو في أواخر عام 2000، كانت الجزيرة قد أصبحت أشهر قناة في فلسطين وفي المنطقة فيما يتعلق بالشؤون الفلسطينية. إن تغطيتها الشاملة والمعمقة والجريئة والمباشرة في كثير من الأحيان لجميع جوانب الانتفاضة ومحاولات إسرائيل المهتاجة لإعادة الأمور إلى وضعها الراهن أضافت لرأسمال الدوحة السياسي بين الفلسطينيين. 

في نفس تلك الفترة، وبعد أن استغلت بشكل ماكر تحول مصر في عهد حسني مبارك إلى جمهورية موز وتآكل ريادية القاهرة في السياسة العربية، بزغت قطر كمصلح بارز لمشاكل المنطقة. في عام 1999، زودت قيادة حماس في المنفى بملاذ مؤقت بعد طردها من الأردن، ولكنها لم تتردد في وضعها على طائرة متجهة إلى عمان بعد أن قام الأخير بنكث عهده باستعادتها بعد فاصل زمني طويل إلى حد ما. ولعب رئيس الوزراء ووزير الخارجية القطري الشيخ حمد بن جاسم آل ثاني دوراً مهما خلف الكواليس في حل حصار الزعيم الفلسطيني ياسر عرفات في مقره في رام الله أثناء عملية الدرع الواقي في ربيع 2002. بدا قادة قطر كأنهم أبطال الانتفاضة الفلسطينية ضد إسرائيل، ولكن وفي نفس الوقت كانوا لا يجدون أي حرج  في مقابلة نظرائهم الإسرائيليين والسماح لمكتب الاتصال الإسرائيلي في الدوحة بالاستمرار في عمله بعد أن تم إغلاقه رسمياً مرتين. 

ولو أن الدوحة نأت بنفسها عن قيادة السلطة الفلسطينية واقتربت من حماس أكثر من معظم العواصم العربية، فإن الأزمات خلال حقبة عرفات نادراً ما تطورت إلى ما هو أكثر من معاقبة بعض المصالح التجارية المتعلقة بقطر. كما حصل عند سجن عيسى أبو عيسى في غزة، وهو شقيق رئيس مجلس إدارة المصرف الدولي الفلسطيني وينحدر من واحدة من أعرق العائلات الفلسطينية في قطر. تم اعتقاله بسرعة من قبل السلطة الفلسطينية عندما كان برفقة وفد قطري رسمي إلى غزة عام 2000. كان الوفد يسعى لحل الخلاف بين السلطة الفلسطينية، التي استحوذت على المصرف الدولي الفلسطيني بعد أن اتهمته بمخالفات عديدة، وبين عصام أبو عيسى الذي رد بأن جرمه الوحيد هو رفضه وضع المصرف تحت تصرف السلطة الفلسطينية. لم يتم السماح للأخوين عيسى بمغادرة مدينة غزة باتجاه الدوحة إلا بعد أن هددت قطر بقطع التمويل والعلاقات مع السلطة الفلسطينية. في تلك السنوات، كانت الجزيرة في مقدمة العلاقات الفلسطينية القطرية، سواء كان ذلك من خلال كشف سياسات السلطة الفلسطينية وأعمالها المحظورة أو من خلال إجراءات عقابية ضدها – بما في ذلك هجوم اللجان المحلية على أفرادها ومقارها. 

إن خلافة عباس في أواخر عام 2004 بالإضافة إلى انتصار حماس في انتخابات عام 2006 حوّل العلاقة المتوترة أصلاً إلى علاقة تسودها العداوة المتبادلة والعلنية. 

في واجهة الأمور لم تكن التطورات التي حصلت بعد عام 2005 تبدو ذات مغزى .فقد أنشأ قادة فتح علاقات مميزة مع دول عربية محددة بشكل فردي إلى درجة أنه أصبح ينظر إليهم بأنهم يمثلون مصالح تلك الدول ضمن الحركة الوطنية الفلسطينية، وفي هذا السياق كان يعتبر عباس بأنه رجل الدوحة. في الواقع، فقد نجح عباس بالمحافظة على علاقات شخصية حميمة مع القيادة القطرية طوال هذه الفترة على الرغم من الاختلافات السياسية الحادة، كما هو الحال مع لاعبي كرة الركبي الذين يصارعون بعضهم البعض للموت تقريباً على الملعب ثم يذهبون لتناول المشروب سوياً فيما بعد. 

بالنسبة لقطر، فإن الأمر كان يتعلق بانضمام حماس إلى النظام السياسي الفلسطيني وتأسيس نفسها لتكون النصير السياسي دون أي منازع للحركة الإسلامية الفلسطينية وذلك من أجل زيادة نفوذ الدوحة ولمنع الحركة الإسلامية من الانضمام إلى المعسكر الإيراني المنافس، وفي أثناء هذا دفعها باتجاه التكيف.أما بالنسبة لعباس، فكان الأمر يتعلق بعدم فقد سيطرته على فتح وإخضاع حماس لبرنامجه الخاص. 

وبسبب ضخامة المصالح، فإن دبلوماسية قطر في هذه الفترة عجزت عن تحقيق أي شيء يفوق حجمها. استمرت الجزيرة في هذه الأثناء بنشر السياسة الرسمية بشكل حذق محافظة بالوقت نفسه على معايير مهنية لم تكن موجودة بشكل واضح عند الآخرين، سواء كان ذلك على مستوى المنطقة أو أبعد من ذلك.  لم يستطع حكام هذا البلد أن ينافسوا بشكل فعال السعودية ومصر في مفاوضات التفاهم بين فتح وحماس قبل أن يستولي الإسلاميون على السلطة في حزيران/يونيو من عام 2007، أو اتفاقات المصالحة التي تلت ذلك. الاتفاقية الوحيدة بين عباس ومشعل التي استطاعت قطر أن تديرها في عام 2012 ولدت ميتة. 

ومع ذلك، استطاعت قطر في السنوات التي تلت ذلك من رفع الرمزية الضخمة والراسخة للقضية الفلسطينية وذلك لتحسين مظهرها ومصداقيتها، ولتمتين رعايتها لحماس. في وقت كانت العلاقات القطرية السورية أكثر تقارباً من أية علاقة بين دمشق وأي من دول الخليج الأخرى، نجحت الدوحة خلال العدوان الإسرائيلي (2008 – 2009) على قطاع غزة بتحدي معظم العالم العربي (بما في ذلك الجامعة العربية) والغرب باستضافة قمة عاجلة لإظهار تراخي العرب. وبعد ذلك بعام، استطاعت الجزيرة عن طريق نشر "الأوراق الفلسطينية" بإلزام السلطة الفلسطينية باتفاقية يتم التفاوض عليها مع إسرائيل ضمن إطار عمل أوسلو وذلك في أسوأ وضع ممكن. لم يكن هناك الحاجة للكثير من للتسويق والاثارة، ولكن مع ذلك تم تضمين ذلك في هذا الخليط.

ومن الجدير بالذكر أن سياسة وأهداف قطر في هذا المجال كانت مختلفة عن سياسات وأهداف سوريا وإيران. حيث أن الأخيرة سعت لإضعاف السلطة الفلسطينية لكي تقوي النضال الفلسطيني ضمن سياق صراع بالوكالة مع إسرائيل، بينما لم تسع قطر للصراع بل من أجل حصة من السلام، سواء كان بشكل مباشر أو غير ذلك، ومقعد بارز على الطاولة. إن ما ميز الدوحة عن بقية العواصم العربية هو حذقها ومقدرتها الانتهازية التي تبدو كأنها بلا حدود. فعلى خلاف السعودية، لم تهتم قطر بالألفة الإيديولوجية لمن رعتهم طالما أن هذه المنظمات والهيئات والأفراد، اللذين تدرجوا على كامل طيف الفكر والنشاط السياسي العربي، استطاعوا أن يوسعوا من طموحها وبرنامجها. وبالتالي، وعلى خلاف مصر في عهد مبارك، كانت قطر تقبل وبشكل مستمر على المناورة بين المعسكرات المتنافسة، والمشاركة في الخلافات العامة مع الحلفاء والرعاة المقربين، لكي توسع من سياساتها.

يبدو أن الانتفاضات التي اندلعت في المنطقة في أواخر عام 2010 قد أتمت الدائرة التي رسمتها السياسة القطرية. فبصفتها الراعي الرئيسي للإخوان المسلمين، وهي بالطبع لديها القدرة الكبيرة على الرعاية، أصبحت قطر الآن المهيمن بلا منازع، ولكن كالجزيرة ربما لفترة أقل مما يفترضه العديد من الناس. وبتقربها بشكل كبير من حلفائها التقليديين في مجلس التعاون الخليجي في خضم انتشار هذه الثورات، وبالأخص البحرين، وبازدياد المنافسة الحادة مع إيران، فقد رمت بثقلها وراء المعارضة السورية ضد حليفها السابق بشار الأسد. فبالإضافة إلى دعمها المباشر للجيش السوري الحر، كانت مساهمة قطر الرئيسية هي نجاحها في أن تفطم حماس عن دمشق. لم يعد خالد مشعل يقيم في دمشق، ولكن في الدوحة. وانتقل نائب رئيس المكتب السياسي موسى أبو مرزوق إلى القاهرة، وغادر بعضت القيادات الإسلامية سوريا قبل أن تبدأ دمشق الهجوم على حليفها الإسلامي السابق.

وبالتالي وعند وصوله إلى غزة، جرى استقبال الشيخ حمد على أساس أنه بطل فاتح وليس على أساس أنه ألعوبة صهيونية وخائن. إن الفعالية التي استطاعت أن تحصل قطر من خلالها على التأييد ممن رعتهم تشهد على حذق استثماراتها السياسية على مدار العقدين الماضيين. سيكون من الممتع مشاهدة ما سيلي هذا: دفعة متجددة للمصالحة الفلسطينية، أو بدلاً من ذلك مزيد من الدعم لحماس لضمان صعودها المستمر ضمن النظام السياسي الفلسطيني، ولكن مع برنامج سياسي سيصعب في نهاية المطاف تمييزه عن البرامج التي تسعى لاستبدالها. 

[نشرت المقالة للمرة الأولى باللغة الإنجليزية  وترجمها إلى العربية مازن حكيم]

Maghreb Media Roundup (December 27)

$
0
0

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Wednesday night of every week.]

Algeria

Algeria Prepares For ‘Guerrilla’ Warfare Walid Ramzi reports on Algeria's current military training.

Can Algeria and France forget the past? Nabila Ramadani discusses Hollande's unapologetic recognition of French colonial rule (video).

POMEPS Conversations 12 with Michael Willis Michael WIllis compares the rise of Islamist parties in 1988 Algeria with post-Arab Spring political climates.

French president says Algeria suffered under 'brutal' colonialism Emily Albert examines reactions to Hollande's statements on colonialism.

Will the Arab Spring ever reach Algeria? Jacques Hubert-Rodier argues that factors relating to rentierism,  social fragmentation, and the state's security apparatus have impeded "Spring-like" rebellion.

«La corruption est l’institution la plus stable en Algérie» El Watan's interview with University of Algiers III Professor Rachid Tlemcani on recent evaluations Algeria's growing corruption.

Libya

GNC approves legislation for “isolation law” targeting Qaddafi officials Tom Little details new legislation intended to prevent Qadaffai-era figures form serving in top governments positions.

Libya Marks 61st Anniversary of Independence Day Curation of photos from Libya's celebrations. 

!النداء الأخير من بنغازي
Wisam Salam covers Benghazi's response to enduring militia violence.

! هذه ليست ثورتي
Enas Saddoh condemns human rights abuses executed in the name of the revolution.  

Mauritania

Mauritania: Arresting Teachers Who Have Been On Strike and the Detention of TV Channel Team Arabic Network For Human Rights Information report condemning the harassment and detention of high school teachers protesting in front of the ministry of education.  

Mauritanian journalists discuss Mali coverage challenges
Jemal Oumar reports on the security obstacles, "threats of exploitation," and difficulties of neutrality facing Mauritanian journalists.  

موريتانيا: خريطة طريق لمستقبل …
Discussion of the options Aziz faces: dialogue and reform, or inevitable deposition.

Morocco

Morocco: Restore Accreditation to Al Jazeera HRW urges Morocco to reinstate accreditation of several foreign media correspondents covering the Western Sahara conflict.

Migrants In Morocco Stuck At A Dead End Doctor's Without Borders reports on government violence again sub-Saharan African migrant workers.

Enseignements d'une élection Abubakr Jamai asses the election of Diss Lachgar to head of Morocco's Socialist Union of Popular Forces as well as the leftist party's alliances with the PJD.

خديجة غامري : يوجد في النقابات العديد ممن يستغلون الطبقة العاملة ويسخرونها لأجل مصالحهم الخاصة
Discussion of the varied effects of labor unions, some of which promote workers rights but also facilitate wealthy union leaders' exploitation of workers.

الأقلية الأولى والأقلية الثانية
Activist Hisham Driaz reflects on the evolution of the Feb20 movement.

Tunisia

Political peddlers: Vending Tunisia
Larbi Sadiki on disillusionment with the transitional process and its politicians.

L’identité nationale et le devenir tunisien Mohamed Arbi Nsiri explores the existential struggle of national identity in post-revolutionary Tunisia.

The Language of the Political Crowd in Tunisia Andrea Khalil posits that Tunisian crowds wielded a language of unity against Ben Ali's divisive social constructions.

Tunisia: Stop Undermining Judicial Decision HRW urges Tunisia to release Sami Fehri, director of Attounissia T.V, charged for embezzling funds following the broadcast of episodes imitating leading political figures.

La Polit-Revue : A qui profite la razzia de Djerba? Seif Soudani reviews this weeks's political stories.

حوار مع أحد قادة الحركة الإحتجاجية بالرديّف سنة 2008
Winston Smith explores the impact of the 2008 mining uprisings on the 2010 general uprising.

Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb

Memory Wars and the Messiness of History: An Interview with Jim House on the Commemoration of 17 October 1961
Year Three
Politics after Abdessalam Yassine
Art, Politics, and Critical Citizenry in Morocco: An Interview with Driss Ksikes
من أجل مدنية الحكم في موريتانيا
L’an I de la Révolution tunisienne ou les résurgences d’un passé qui divise
Neither Regret Nor Remorse: Colonial Nostalgia Among French Far Right
From Opposition to Puppet: Morocco’s Party of Justice and Development

أربع قصائد

$
0
0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ثلاث زنابق

ثلاث زنابق،

أم ثلاث أمّهات؟

. . .

ثلاث زنابق:

الأولى تفتّحت

كأن بتلاتها البيضاء تتضرّعُ

تسألُ إلهاً ما

عن أولادها

الثانية انحنتْ

يكاد ظهرها ينكسرُ

إذ تبحثُ في الأرض

عن ميسمها


الثالثة مازالت

تخبّئ وجهها

تحت وجهها

وتبكي

أتراها تعرفُ؟


ثلاث زنابق

مقطوعة السيقان

والماء نزر

في أصيص زجاجي

ووراء زجاج الشاشة

ثلاث أمّهات 

سوريّات

زهرة الرازقي

زهرة الرازقي تتثائبُ

لا تخافُ من أصابعي

ولا من فراشة صفراء

تحوم حولها

وتهرب بعيداً

حين أمد يدي


الريح خجلى

والصباح طفلٌ، 

مثلي،

سيرحل 

مثل كل الصباحات

ولن يستوعب معناه

حتى بعد أن يصبح ذكرى 

صباحٍ

يُستعادُ في قارةٍ أخرى

حين أمد يدي

إلى ذاكرة الحديقة

التي تجثم الآن 

تحت جبل من الطابوق

لأقطف 

زهرة الرازقي


في حياة قادمة


في حياتي القادمة

لن أكون “أنا”

سأكون زهرة بريّة

تستلقي على سفح تل بعيد

تستريح عليها الفراشات

وقد يقطفها طفل

لا يعرف الحروب

يأخذها إلى أمه

يضعها بين نهديها

تقبّله

تشمّني

وأشمّها

. . .

في حياتي القادمة

لن أكون

 

فراشة

 

كم عدوت وراءها

في حديقتنا ببغداد

لكنها كانت دائماً تهرب

واليوم

بعد ثلاثة عقود

وفي قارة أخرى

تحط على كتفي

. . .

زرقاء 

كأفكار البحر

أو دموع ملاك 

يحتضر

جناحاها ورقتان من شجرة 

الجنة

لماذا الآن؟

أتراها تعرف 

بأني لا أعدو 

وراء الفراشات

بل أراقبها بصمت

و بأني أعيش

كغصن مقطوع؟

* * *

Behind the Bahraini Revolution: An Interview with Maryam Al-Khawaja

$
0
0

[The following is an interview conducted with Maryam Al-Khawaja, the acting president of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and the deputy director of the Gulf Center for Human Rights. She is currently in self-imposed exile in Denmark due to safety and security reasons, but remains closely connected to events on the ground in Bahrain. She posts regular updates on her Twitter, @MARYAMALKHAWAJA.] 

Samia Errazzouki (SE): Can you give us a general overview of the current situation in Bahrain?

Maryam Al-Khawaja (MA): Whenever you want to know the human rights situation of any country, ask where their human rights defenders are. In Bahrain, all of the most prominent human rights defenders sit in prison cells today. The human rights situation has been deteriorating continuously since the beginning of the Bahraini Revolution on 14 February 2011. There are currently up to one hundred extrajudicial killings, and approximately one thousand eight hundred political prisoners, a significant amount of which are children under eighteen. At the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), we continue to document cases of excessive force against protesters, arbitrary arrests, lethal use of tear gas, kidnappings, and systematic torture (physical, psychological, and sexual). The protests have continued on a daily basis since 14 February 2011.

One of the main problems for why the country has not moved forward in regards to stopping human rights violations is the culture of impunity, which exists within the country, in addition to the existence of international immunity for Bahrain. The culture of impunity enforced by the regime and the king is the reason why nothing has changed. As Bahraini activists we were hoping that the regime would take the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) as an opportunity to take a step in the right direction and implement real reforms. Instead, the regime used this five hundred-page report as a tool to buy itself time while it continues to commit the same violations. In some cases, the violations got worse. Additionally, during this period, Western countries continued to sell arms to the Bahraini government and business continued as usual. The people who were responsible for the massive widespread human rights violations in high positions were kept in their position or even promoted.

SE: What is the background for the political and civil rights movement in Bahrain?

MA: The 1990 Intifada was only one of many uprisings in Bahrain. To understand what led to the 1990s Intifada and the current revolution of 14 February 2011, one must understand the history of uprisings in Bahrain and the role of the civil rights movement. Since the 1920s Bahrain has witnessed some sort of uprising almost every ten years. For example, in the 1950s, Intifadat al-Haya’a, which was led by the religious leaders of both the Sunni and Shia communities started. At the time, Bahrain was still a British protectorate, so with the help of the British, the regime arrested all of the leading figures of that movement. The Sunnis among them were sent to Saint Helena Island and those who were Shia were exiled to Iran and Iraq.

In 1971, the British withdrew from Bahrain and one of the only good things they did for Bahrain was leave a constitution that gave people a real parliament. The constitution was passed in 1973. The parliament was elected, but in 1975, when Emir Isa tried to pass a decision to enforce a state of emergency, the parliament refused. In response, he dissolved the parliament. When people took to the streets in the 1990s, they were demanding a return to the 1973 constitution. There was systematic torture, arbitrary arrests, and people were killed. The general perception was that Isa’s brother, Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, who was appointed prime minister in 1971, was the person actually ruling the country. During the 1990s, there was an uprising demanding a return to the 1973 constitution and an elected parliament. People were arbitrarily arrested, a number died under torture, and the crackdown continued for years. The main person known for setting up the systematic torture in Bahrain was Ian Henderson, who was nicknamed the “Butcher of Bahrain.”

In 1999, Emir Isa died and his son Hamad took over. Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa changed the ongoing political and popular scene in Bahrain. He promised Bahrainis that if they sign his referendum, he will release all political prisoners, that Bahrain would be a constitutional monarchy, and people in exile would be able to return. He called it the “Days We Have Yet To Live.” He held his promises in the beginning: political prisoners were released, those exiled were allowed to return, and torture ceased. In 2002, after his referendum passed and despite making a videotaped promise to not change the constitution of 1973, he unilaterally changed the constitution to make himself king and announced the “Kingdom of Bahrain,” when it was previously the “State of Bahrain.” He gave himself absolute and unchecked powers. He also passed royal decree 56 in 2002, which is a big part of the reason for why Bahrain is where it is today. It granted amnesty and instilled a culture of impunity for all those who had been involved in grave human rights violations, such as torture and extrajudicial killings. 

SE: Why did the 2011 Bahraini Uprising take place? 

MA: Since Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa took power, he reappointed his uncle, Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, as the prime minister, making him the longest standing unelected prime minister in history. After 2002, the human rights and political situation started to decline again but not to levels seen in the 1990s. The constitution of 2002 created a bogus parliament made up of an upper and lower house. The upper house has forty members who are all appointed by the king himself. The lower house is the elected chamber, which also holds forty seats. Due to astounding gerrymandering, it is impossible for the opposition to get more than eighteen seats out of the forty, even if they get majority votes. All that aside, the parliament has no legislative or monitoring powers. Recurring protests demanding accountability for criminals who were still in government, as well as better housing, jobs, and against discrimination were violently attacked. The popular perception was that the Ministry of Interior, the security forces, and riot police were connected to the prime minister. When people got arrested, Bahrainis blamed the prime minister, and the king who was seen as “more progressive” would then pardon and release prisoners. It was the good cop, bad cop scenario.

During this time, corruption increased, the crown prince was heavily involved in the land reclamation that was taking place, and the Bahraini royal family moved towards gaining more economic power at the expense of the population. They brought in cheap labor from Southeast Asia, who were then treated like modern day slaves, while Bahrainis remain unemployed. Bahrain is essentially run like a family business, and citizens are treated like subjects. If they are not profitable for the family business, they are sidelined. 

In 2007, as per Human Rights Watch’s report, Torture Redux, systematic torture reemerged in Bahrain but mostly against convicts. On 13 August 2010, a crackdown started and the regime arrested many prominent activists. Local human rights groups started documenting the return of physical, psychological, and sexual torture against political prisoners. Because it was Ramadan and the Eid festivities were coming up, many expected that the same ongoing scenario would reoccur and the king would come out and pardon the political prisoners. What happened instead was that the king and the crown prince condoned the crackdown for the very first time. That is when it was clear something had shifted. This crackdown continued, around five hundred people were imprisoned, twenty one percent of all political prisoners were children. There were also repeated cases of kidnappings. People would disappear for several hours to a few days, then found half naked dumped on the streets. Most of the underage boys who were kidnapped had their pictures taken completely naked and then blackmailed into working as informants for the intelligence services. This situation continued until the beginning of the mass uprising in February 2011. On the day that Mubarak stepped down in Cairo (11 February 2011), the Bahraini king announced on national television that every Bahraini family would receive one thousand dinars. The announcement drew negative reactions from people who responded by saying, “Is our freedom only worth a thousand dinars to this king?” Later, during the Pearl Roundabout protests, the protesters launched a campaign to use the one thousand dinars per family towards the protest movement. 

SE: What are some of the tactics that the Bahraini regime uses that have been used in previous uprisings to stifle dissent?

MA: Other than the arbitrary arrests, torture, killing and other violations; one of the things the Bahraini regime does best is playing the labeling game. Early on, the Bahraini regime labeled the entire opposition as being Nasser socialist. The regime then labeled them as being communists, then Iranian agents, and terrorists. And now, they are both terrorists and Iranian agents. The reason for this is that the Bahraini regime tries to understand what the threat du jour is in the international stage, and then applies that label to the opposition. 

The other similarity is the use of trumped up charges and fabricated cases against dissidents. For example, if you take a picture out of a newspaper from the 1950s, the headlines and images are almost entirely the same today, except in color.

SE: What are the conditions of the political prisoners currently held in Bahrain and in what ways have the prisoners remained active, such as in the Dry Dock Prison? 

MA: The political prisoners formed a coalition in the prison and they wrote a statement saying, in sum, if you are going to lock up all the revolutionaries, then you will get a revolution from within your prisons. They were attacked inside their prison cells, beaten, and some of them were taken into solitary confinement on the basis that they were suspected of leading this coalition.

Systematic torture still exists (physical, psychological, and sexual). After the release of the BICI report, torture moved from official torture centers to unofficial centers. For example, a few days ago, security forces took a young man to a youth hostel where he was beaten severely, had his money and mobile stolen, and was then dumped on the streets in Jidhafs. 

The judicial system in Bahrain is neither independent nor fair. It is used as a tool to go after and punish dissidents. Within the last two years, Bahrain has witnessed thousands of political cases based on trumped up charges. During the summer, political prisoners were denied air conditioning despite the unbearable heat of Bahrain. At some points, they were not allowed to shower. Sometimes they were not allowed to pray or even use the bathroom. Many of the political prisoners still suffer due to severe torture and are prevented from adequate medical care. We continue to have cases of minors under eighteen who are imprisoned and at times, tried under the internationally condemned terrorism law. 

SE: How do you respond to the claims that the uprising is rooted in a sectarian struggle between Sunnis and Shia’s? 

MA: For several decades, the Bahraini regime has implemented systematic marginalization and discrimination of the Shia majority in Bahrain. There are certain areas in Bahrain where Shia are not allowed to live. There are jobs that Shia Bahrainis are not allowed to work in. There is a mandatory religion class from the elementary to university level, where students are taught that anyone who is Shia is going to hell. 

In 2006, the Al Bander Report revealed the sustenance of sectarian division and the regime’s penetration of NGOS in an effort to dismantle them. This report revealed demographic engineering in Bahrain and mechanisms of exclusion. The Bahraini regime was actively working on creating a system that excluded the majority of the Bahraini population, which is Shia. One of the ways this is done is by the ongoing political naturalization of non-Bahrainis. Tens of thousands of Pakistanis, Yemenis, Syrians, and Jordanians have been politically naturalized for two reasons. First, for them to serve in the security forces, intelligence services, and the army, while most Bahraini citizens, both Shias and Sunnis, are not allowed to work there. Second, to demographically change Bahrain from a Shia majority to a Sunni majority, since all those who were being politically naturalized are Sunnis.

Despite all this, when people took to the streets on 14 February 2011, their demands were not related to the systematic marginalization and discrimination against the Shia majority in Bahrain. The demands were rooted in political and civil rights activists calling on the king to implement the promises that he made ten years ago. It was only after the use of excessive force and the killing of peaceful protesters that people started demanding the fall of the regime. The regime initiated a very sectarian crackdown. They knew that if they were able to label the movement in Bahrain as being a “Shia Uprising,” it would be easier to connect them to Iran. This would also make the uprising seem as if it were not rooted in grassroots grievances, and also to justify the violent crackdown. They did this by targeting people for merely being Shia. They demolished more than thirty mosques belonging to the Shia sect, some with very important historical importance. During arrests, house raids, interrogations, and torture, security forces and intelligence services would also use derogatory sectarian language. This was all documented in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry.

Looking at the demands of the protest movement, and looking at the makeup of the protest movement it is obvious that this is a simple case of an oppressive regime versus an oppressed population. At the end of the day, what really matters in Bahrain is not whether you are Sunni or Shia, it is whether you are a loyalist or not. Today in Bahrain, there are Shias who are ministers and who are the biggest supporters of the regime, like Samira Rajab. You also have Sunnis like Ebrahim Sharif, who is sitting in a jail cell today after being tortured and sentenced by military court because he criticized the regime. This is the reality.

SE: How has Bahrain Center Human Rights (BCHR) continued working despite being banned from Bahrain? 

MA: The majority of the people who work with BCHR do so on a volunteer basis. They are people who believe in pushing Bahrain forward toward a better country for all, even if it comes with consequences—and the consequences have been very real. Board members and members of the BCHR have been subjected to harassment, defamation campaigns, arrests, imprisonment, severe torture, unfair trials, travel bans, and the list goes on. What these oppressive regimes do not understand is that the culture of human rights has been embedded, and every time they arrest a prominent human rights activist, they are creating the pathway for hundreds of new activists to emerge. The BCHR continues to run and will continue to run despite all the tools and mechanisms used by the regime to put a stop to the work. 

The BCHR has two main teams. We have a documentation unit in Bahrain, run by Sayed Yousif AlMuhafdhah, who is currently imprisoned, and an international team. The people on the ground are responsible for documenting and following up on cases and human rights violations; afterwards, they send it abroad to the international team, who help write the statements and reports. These statements and reports are sent to international human rights organizations, institutions, and governments. They are then used as a tool to try and advocate for a better international response towards the human rights situation in Bahrain. Twitter is also one of the main tools used to document violations, to communicate amongst us, and to make sure people outside of Bahrain know what is happening on the ground.

Sons of Beaches: How Alexandria's Ideological Battles Shape Egypt

$
0
0

A Salafist Muslim intellectual, overlooking an Alexandrian beach last summer, tells me over coffee: “The cosmopolitanism of our city [Alexandria] may look like it has died, but the skeletal structure of cosmopolitanism is still there. It is this structure that underpins the spread and acceptance of ideas, including Salafist ones, that makes this city a formidable force.”

This “force” also makes Alexandria the vanguard city of Egypt's socio-political developments. A glimpse of it was caught in the fogginess of the sheer ferocity that unfolded in the in the two Fridays’ immediately preceding the December constitutional referendum that has set off alarm bells as to where it is steering the direction of Egypt. The murky “battle-lines” appear to be drawn in what Lina Attalah, editor of Egypt Independent, describes as “a polarization between Islamist forces who are after a highly defined identity-based project to see a more Islamized Egypt…The other camp is a revolutionary camp that wants to see a democratic Egypt that allows multiple identities to exist.”

On 14 December, following a sermon by ultra-conservative Sheikh Ahmed Mehalawy who accused opponents of the divisive draft constitution as being “followers of heretics” and told worshippers to vote “Yes” in the referendum, violent confrontations ensued outside the courtyard of the Qaed Ibrahim mosque (or as many call it, “Alexandria’s Tahrir Square”) between Islamists and opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored constitution. Violence also broke out the following Friday, despite the deployment of Central Security Forces, resulting in the burning of buses and cars, and leaving almost sixty injured. Clearly, they do not call it “Revolutionary Alexandria” for nothing.


[Anti-constitutional protestors burn vehicles that reportedly belong to Islamists. Photo from Alex Eyes Facebook Group]

The reinvigoration of the revolutionary camp and the rise of new Islamist currents have left the subtext of the chaos unanswered: How exactly does the city, defined as “Egypt’s subconscious” in Sarah El Deeb’s recent piece, influence the country’s developments? There are several factors that shed light on why and how Alexandria commands the trajectory of Egyptian politics.

The Bastion of Refuge

Alexandria fashioned itself over the decades as the only viable and structural oppositional city to Cairo. It could do this not only because it was relatively out of the central government’s sights, but it also did not have to suffer from the same constraints that Cairo-centered opposition initiatives constantly confronted. The closer a political group moved toward the centers of power in Egypt’s capital, the more likely they were to be compromised and co-opted by the vested interests inherent in a proximity to political power. Alexandria provided an ideal locality for Islamists to establish new movements, build social capital with the poor, and fill in the gaps where the state failed. Whereas Cairo represented the state, Alexandria represented the mantle of opposition, dominated by Islamists for years.

The deepening of the Egyptian state’s centralization over the past sixty years also meant the heavy concentration of the security and intelligence sector in Cairo. Consequently, Alexandria was not subject to the same degree of hawkish surveillance and brutal crackdowns as was the case in the capital, and therefore was given some leeway to maneuver.

The late Samer Soliman argues in his brilliant work The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak (p 87) that centralization also meant a shifting of resources to Cairo, which contributed to a dispirited Alexandrian public psyche that their city, which had relatively prospered in the monarchical era, was now relegated to a shadow of its former self. This was apparent in the self-styled culture wars of Alexandria’s elites to wrestle away from Cairo the reins of the country’s cultural leadership. Their significant achievement was the unveiling of the reincarnated Library of Alexandria in 2002. 

An Illusionary Seduction

Alexandria's ability to sway political dynamics throughout Egypt has much also to do with the socio-cultural relationship the coastal city establishes with population centers.

Power is relational and the Alexandrian diffusion of ideas and trends beyond city boundaries works, not so much because Alexandrians are effective in projecting their “pre-eminence”—underscored by cliché titles such as “Bride of the Mediterranean” and “Champion people”—to the rest of Egypt, but rather because Egyptians are predisposed to associate the coastal city with romance, escapism, summer holidays, and various positive connotations—connotations that are culturally reinforced by the popular arts. An idea or political actor coming out of Alexandria, the conventional story goes, can only be “good” for their equivalents in other cities, towns and villages. Therefore, Alexandria’s revolutionary actors, for example, embolden other revolutionary actors in areas of Egypt. This ideational soft power relationship operates effectively because influencer and recipient have an unspoken pact that is disproportionally favorable to Egypt’s second largest city. It partly explains why Khaled Saeed, the young Alexandrian beaten to death (some fifty meters away from the beach) who would be the spark of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, was elevated to chief martyr of the nation. This would have arguably been unlikely had Khaled died in Sohag or Aswan.


[Films set in Alexandria. The popular arts shaped multiple generational perceptions of the coastal city. Design by Amro Ali]

The other powerful effect of Alexandria has over the country’s imagination works effectively because most Egyptians have not been to Alexandria, and, therefore, it remains just part of their imagination. Islam Asem, a second generation Alexandrian, tells me “when I go back to my father’s village in upper Egypt, I am treated with such adoration as if living in Alexandria was like living in Germany.” Upon their excited first arrival in Alexandria, visitors often complain to me of the high rates of sexual harassment (arguably worse than Cairo), anti-Cairene merchants and taxi drivers, suspicions, snobbery, and a general in your face conservatism. It is not that these factors are alien anywhere in the country else, but Alexandria is held up to a higher standard and is expected to fill the shoes of its forebear that shaped generations of Egyptians in the twentieth century of how they relate to the city.

Cairo-based Ahmed Bahgat, Representative of the Lotus Revolution Coalition, spoke in July 2011 in downtown Alexandria to crowds of activists and protesters: “It is a great honor to be here in Alexandria, from which came the first martyr, Khaled Saeed...Your sit-in here gives us protesters in Cairo the motivation to continue our sit-in as you lend us emotional support. If you disperse, we cannot continue, as we draw our strength from you.”

Such an outlook is characteristic of Tahrir and revolutionary activists. Alexandria helped lay the mythical foundations of the revolution, particularly with the death of Khaled Saeed, but more so, it gave way to the title “Revolutionary Alexandria” following the victory of secular-Nasserist Hamdeen Sabahi who vanquished his opponents in the city by a large margin in the first round of the last presidential election (thirty-four percent as opposed to the fifteen percent that would be-President Morsi received that same round).


[Activists and Soccer Ultras from Cairo descend on Alexandria's corniche on second anniversary of Khaled Saeed’s death to “inaugurate” their new revolutionary base on 6 June 2012. Photo by Amro Ali.]

Also for Salafists, Alexandria remains the home and metaphysical origin of their movements and for the Muslim Brotherhood, the incubator of their plans and base of their business networks. Importantly, the city’s utmost role for Coptic Egyptians, it is the official seat of the Pope and hence the title – Pope of Alexandria.

A Referendum’s Fracturing of a City, a Nation

Many observers were surprised at the recent referendum results in which Alexandrians voted to approve the constitution by a ratio of fifty-six percent. This figure, however, does not necessarily reflect the Islamists’ strength in Alexandria for a variety of reasons: The overall national turnout on the first stage of voting was low, thirty percent, compared to the presidential election of over fifty percent. Alexandria correlates with this trend. Out of a total of 3,347,770 Alexandrians registered to vote, only 35.76 percent turned out to vote. 


[Breakdown of Alexandria's district-level results of recent constitutional referendum. Diagram by Amro Ali]

Each election that took place in Alexandria since the outbreak of the January 25 Revolution operated under different circumstances and dynamic external factors, making it quite complex to compare them. However, the purpose of the above patterns is not to attribute causality based on correlations, but rather to emphasize that they are indicative of broader patterns that would need to be examined more closely by systematic research. Thus, it is clear that there is a tentative pattern that emerges, whereby voting behavior seems to be correlated with socio-geographic factors, and, perhaps relatedly, the degree of penetration by the Islamists’ social services and welfare network.

The largest anti-constitution camp came from heartland Alexandria, apart from the working class districts of Moharram Bey and Karmus. The areas constituting the heartland have historically been the base of the public and private sector, coupled with a general societal harboring of suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood. They also represent largely the Alexandria that existed prior to the 1952 revolution before mass urbanization over the successive decades would force the city to expand outwards—described sometimes as the “Alexandria Emigration”—with the state unable or unwilling to extend basic services to the new areas.

The heartland, which roughly stretches from El-Labban (Old Alexandria) eastward along the coast toward Sidi Gaber,[1] has more sway by the revolutionaries due to the progressive politics that permeates urbanization and relative social mobility. This was quite telling in my middle class suburb of Cleopatra Hamamat (also Khaled Saeed’s residence where his middle class stature connected with street activism), which falls under the Sidi Gaber jurisdiction, where the ‘No’ vote triumphed significantly, specifically 56746 to 32540.

Radwa El-Barouni, assistant lecturer at Alexandria University, points out that Alexandria’s “Yes” vote came primarily from severely impoverished districts and Greater Alexandria’s outskirts that are mainly made up of immigrant communities from the surrounding villages and the Nile Delta. The overlapping factor in places like East Alexandria’s Montazah and Raml Thani are overpopulation, extreme poverty levels, and, therefore, these are places where Islamists have been able to make inroads – through social welfare services, medical care, religious education – over the years at the expense of the failure of the state.  

The grinding poverty in certain districts underpins a double advantage for Islamists. For example, Borg El-Arab and El-Amreya have conservative Bedouin roots, and Mina El-Basal is strongly connected to its Upper Egyptian roots. In other words, Islamists who provide social services to their home of origins are not unfamiliar to such migrant communities who form part of the forgotten Alexandrians.

Overall, Islamist groups have been able to capitalize on their entrenched social services and welfare networks with two primary modes of attack. Voters would choose an Islamist position at elections and referendums out of a gratitude factor, as one lady told a BBC reporter that I viewed during the parliamentary elections “The Brotherhood helped me when my husband died.” But also the Islamist framing of the “Yes” vote as a religious duty connected to afterlife ramifications or even the play on identity politics sheds some light on poorer districts voting patterns.

To a considerable extent, the real strength of Islamists tends to be overestimated and poverty does not necessarily hold a causal relationship with conservative voting patterns. There are other factors that seem to contribute to Alexandria’s voter preferences, and which I observed during my volunteer work for Shayfeenkom (the voter fraud watchdog) in May. For example, grassroots support fostered by socialist Abul Ezz El-Hariri in Moharram Bey was prevalent during the presidential elections, as well as Sabahi’s neo-Nasserism, which resonated with the working class district and saw voters abandon conservative candidates. This makes sense when one considers that during the 1950s and 1960s Moharram Bey saw established families move out and rural migrants move in to undertake work in factories set up during Nasser’s reign. Since then, they have been a die-hard Nasserist constituency.

Moreover, the low turnout in the referendum may have been a sign of voter fatigue, “their rationale being we have voted five times in less than a year and a half and nothing seems to be working,” says El-Barouni. Apart from the pro-stability card, voting took place in a climate of extreme polarization and shortage of time for the public to undertake proper discussions over the proposed constitution. Moreover, the reported irregularities have been of great concern (and, thus, if anything, the diagram should be used as a rough indicator of trends rather than actual results).

The Ecosystem of Street Politics

An accident of geography and urban planning determined how Alexandria’s protests would unfold and communicate with the rest of Egypt—in ways that, in my view, recent events aside, are better coordinated compared to the chaos in Tahrir. The city’s street politics were long hindered by the absence a large public space like Tahrir Square to accommodate the masses. Qaed Ibrahim was chosen during the 2011 uprising because Sheikh Mehalawy’s anti-Hosni Mubarak sermons were seen as the natural gravitational center—that is, at a time when he was less divisive. Distant public spaces such as Mahatet Masr and Mansheya were gradually abandoned in favor of the new frontline.

Yet the vicinity of Qaed Ibrahim could hardly be considered large enough, and this frustrated protest organizers that they, alternatively, pioneered various styles of protest marches across the city, projecting a heightened political exposure to crucial communities. Eleven suburbs, which incidentally voted “No” in the referendum, are crossed by the time such marches would reach the endpoint of Sidi Gaber. Alexandria’s urban politics is advantaged due to it being closely tied to the crisscrossing of people and ideas, which is arguably more rapid, unlike the capital, in the coastal city due to its linear grid-like structure and low transportation cost. This means street mobilization is more feasible than it is in other cities—a feature that works well for revolutionaries and Islamists alike.

What strengthens Alexandria’s revolutionary modus operandi is its close proximity to key, intertwined battlegrounds. The Bibliotheca Alexandrina, with its debates, seminars, exhibitions on the revolution and how to move Egypt forward, was transformed into the soul of the revolutionary youth community and civil society. More significantly, the revolutionary movement also benefited from the Bibliotheca’s physical grounds which are often used for protests. This is reinforced by the adjacent Alexandria University’s colleges of arts, law and commerce, which provide the vigor of student politics – while weak in organization but deliver the numbers to their respective causes – to the extended revolution. Thousands of disaffected students, who gravitate from apolitical spectators to hardened activists, enhance the creativity and momentum of the erratic doorstep away street politics that maneuver between the grounds of the campus, library and mosque.

Such dynamics fuse youth politics, religious politics, with an intellectual-creative drive that energizes the street and acts as a temperament, more often than not, against violent forms of protest.  All these dynamics are important to note as it means a certain honing in of messages that carries a certain media-fueled “Who runs the show” narrative to the rest of Egypt and are digested by respective actors. (See the visual timeline of the revolution in Alexandria on my blog).


[The close proximity of the three zones of unrest. Design by Amro Ali.]

Where to after the Constitution?

Such factors should not mask what social scientist Samuli Schelke insightfully points out, that Alexandria is relatively divided into two forces. On one side are a diverse set of revolutionary leftists and liberals who, from the ideological standpoint, seem to have the upper hand, and are more in line with Alexandrian urban public opinion. The other happens to be the conservative Islamists who excel at exerting their organizational clout and have now been re-armored with the emergence of a number of loosely organized Islamist movements that are unaffiliated with political parties but seek to defend the Islamist project. These include Hazemoun, the Third Islamist Current, and the Salafist Front. The crisis that started with President Mohamed Morsi’s power grab and the constitutional referendum has left deep fractures throughout the nation. Alexandria, once known as the Islamist bastion, has thrown up a range of political bastions and which actor prevails will depend on who can hold their fort out the longest.


[Revolutionary protestors battle out Islamists in the back streets of the Azarita neighborhood on 21 December 2012. Photo by Sameh Meshally from Alex Eyes Facebook Group]

In some ways, Alexandria, as the nation’s bellwether, highlight the troubling dilemma that Islamists face: To hold onto power, they will have to rely mainly on rural, low-income constituencies. If Morsi continues the same unimaginative Mubarak era neoliberal policies – in a worsening economic climate wherein the Egyptian pound has fallen to an all almost decade low and Egypt’s credit rating has dropped to “Greek” proportions – then unrest will be ignited sooner and will be more difficult to contain.

Yet even if the Morsi government devised a miraculous economic and social plan grounded in their economic orthodoxy to pull Egypt through, it would eventually (though it has already happened) nurture the growth of an environment that structurally strengthens a progressive and anti-system politics, and this will eventually create further unrest and a much stronger opposition.

The looming danger for the Islamists is not a failure of policies, but the rapid erosion of Morsi and the Brotherhood’s legitimacy in public discourse. Their gamble at abandoning the urban gravity centers of Cairo and Alexandria means they will remain an organized but fractured political actor. In order to achieve tactical objectives (such as elections), Islamist activists will be forced to become more beholden to the Brotherhood’s meddling Guidance Bureau, seek the services of the Brotherhood militias (like at the presidential palace early in December), appeal to Salafist allies, fan the flames of sectarianism, and play the identity politics card. Whereas tactical objective may be achievable, the trajectory employing the above inevitably destroys their strategic longevity as a credible political player. Morsi and the Brotherhood could have earlier on chosen to form broader coalitions to build up political capital to heal a polarized nation and reform the stubborn institutions, instead they chose a course of action that put them “past the point of no return.”

One of several concerns for me over the past two years has been the appropriation of religion and thrusting it onto a dangerous identity based politics trajectory in the city of Alexandria. I cannot help but make a personal contrast. As a child, my uncle, a Muslim Imam at a local mosque, would often take me with him on routine runs, in the Alexandrian suburb of Camb Shezar (Camp Caesar), to assist an old widowed Christian lady, and in contrast with the conventional discourse adopted by “TV celebrity sheikhs,” I had never heard him use the word infidel, demonize others, or even raise his voice. To me, what he humbly did and does until this day is a revolutionary act in the face of an encroaching reactionary Islamist conservatism that continues to inflame the toxic mixture of religion and politics. Not only is this trend severely harming the social fabric of the coastal city, but also it is sending disturbing signals throughout the country.

It is often said the one who controls Tahrir, controls Cairo, and controls Egypt. Yet it can also be said the one who wins the ongoing “Battle of Alexandria” is handed the baton, like a Maestro, to wave and direct the tempo, rhythm, nuances, and dynamics of Egypt’s political orchestra that plays to an 83-million strong theatre—all yearning for a happier ending.


[1] It can also be argued that this extends, based on similar voting behavior and socio-economic patterns, up until San Stefano where it dilutes before the Salafist stronghold of Sidi Bishr, where the head of the Salafist movement, Sheikh Yasser Borhami, resides

My Father is Still a Communist

$
0
0

My Father is Still a Communist. Dir. Ahmad Ghossein, (Lebanon, 2011, 32’)

The transient circulations of bodies for labor constitutes a hidden history of the late-20th century world, with an accumulation of yet unspoken stories of abuse and struggle, exploitation and protest, inscribed in the letters that cross continents to speak of home. 

In March 2012 in Bkfaya Lebanon, at a cardboard factory in a rough-scrub industrial area, 50 Nepalese and Indian workers engage in a strike over wages. Three men, identified as the leaders of the action, are arrested and deported by authorities upon the request of the factory owners. The remaining workers return to their jobs, surely realizing that being deported home, minus the fees and charges for work permits and travel, would be ruinous for their families.

In the late 1970s, a young mother in a village in southern Lebanon begins to record cassette-tape letters for her husband working in the Gulf. Over the years, while their lives are changed by the growth of their family, she records more and more audio letters. The cassettes are a compilation of monologues, some shorter and others longer, and the mother sometimes re-records over older parts of one tape which are no longer of interest because the time it has taken to complete the tape rendered the earlier information no longer current. During the years that these cassettes chronicle, years marked by long separations, she has more children, and lives through the Lebanese civil war, the Israeli invasion of 1982, and the subsequent occupation of the south. As she grows older, the contents and performance of the tapes change, but what remains are the painfully unfulfilled desires that separation from her beloved husband has imposed upon her life.

My Father is Still a Communist is a living chronicle of lives marked by the economies of migrant labor, and by the effects of war. But more than these, it is a work that documents the roles that women are often left to play in the face of men, sometimes beloved, who depart to work in other lands; women who remain with only the memories of love, and fading hopes for a future together. The audio of the letters, edited in shorter and longer excerpts in the film, provide an epistolary soundtrack to contemplative and sometimes heart-rending image sequences. At times, a long take of a nighttime landscape, perhaps of the remote area in which the mother lives. At other times, static shots of the mother in the present day, walking along a road toward the camera, or in bed asleep, or changing her clothes. Yet other sequences include photos of the fatherless family in bygone years, into which steps a middle-aged working-class man, who tries (often in vain but sometimes humorously) to find a place for himself within the action captured within the image. The present images of the stoic mother, set against the audio of her often impassioned voice from years in the past, evoke a gap of irreconcilability and loss. The father, who is only represented in the figure of the man who climbs into the family photos, is himself a ghost, a haunting specter that hangs over the film. We never learn his fate, but the continuing solitude of the mother indicates that his absence continues, due to death or other distancing factors.

A Filipina woman who works as a domestic worker in Beirut arrives in the country in 1991, just after the Ta’if accords. She walks through the airport and is shocked that people have urinated in the passageways. She works for years with a Lebanese family who treat her professionally. In 2005 she returns to Beirut after visiting her family, including her two young children, in the Philippines. Shortly afterward, the Philippine government bans its citizens from work in Lebanon, given the poor protections afforded them. She remains in Lebanon at her job, knowing that if she visits the Philippines she will not be able return to her only work, which is the primary sustenance for her family. Her children grow older, and she chats with them several times a week on the internet, not having seen them or touched them for years.

The audio letters of the mother provide copious details about the daily lives of the family and the society in which they live; the cost of basic goods, the rhythm of life in the sleepy village, what the local villagers did in the face of the arrival of Israeli troops in 1982, the difficulty of finding fresh meat or suitable school shoes during wartime. They report in a matter of fact manner on the birth of a new son, carried out in a neighboring village so expeditiously that the other children did not notice the absence of their mother. Despite the interest these details may hold, what is most affecting is the unvarnished desire that the mother’s voice communicates, the ache that tears at her as she suffers months of solitude from a man whom she undoubtedly loves. The pain of that distance is marked in the texture of her beautiful, intelligent, and unmasked voice.

Set against the backdrop of a love delayed, and of lives unable to find fulfillment, the title of the film refers to a fantasy that explained the father’s disappearance to his son -- now the filmmaker -- by imaginatively proclaiming the missing father to be a heroic fighter with the communist party. The south of Lebanon supplied many of the fighters with the communist party during the war (as Maroun Baghdadi’s documentary Kuluna lil Watan, 1979, so poignantly records). This alternative image, the coding the father in a more heroic mould than that which a life as a migrant laborer would accord, shines a light upon the distinct and often heroic sacrifices that the choice to travel for work would demand. But even more importantly, this mythos around the father occludes the day to day depravations and hardships that constitute the mother’s life, which accumulate to form a sort of unrecognized heroism on their own.

Knowing that these patterns of labor migration, which comprise the personal histories of thousands of families torn apart, have only increased in recent years, while watching the film one cannot but wonder, How many Skype calls or YouTube letters are transmitted today from Manilla to Doha, or Addis Ababa to Beirut, correspondences which are filled with the same lilting sounds of voices accented by loss, weighed down by lives suspended while awaiting the expected but always postponed return of a distant beloved?   


Baghdad: Mirages and Melancholia

$
0
0

It is well known that preeminent figures of early modernism, such as Le Corbusier and Frank Lloyd Wright, designed architectural proposals for Baghdad around the middle of the 20th century. Many may be surprised however to discover that several other important international architects were also involved with the city at one point or another in its recent history, hoping to erect some remarkable structures that would have transformed Baghdad beyond recognition. A current exhibition at the BSA Space, home to the Boston Society of Architects, titled City of Mirages: Baghdad, 1952–1982, brings together some of these proposals and presents the work of Alvar and Aino Aalto, Venturi, Rauch and Scott Brown, Walter Gropius, José Luis Sert, GioPonti, Alison and Peter Smithson, Constantinos Doxiadis, Ricardo Bofill, Willem MarinusDudok, in addition to Le Corbusier and Frank Lloyd Wright.

The proposals on display are part of a travelling exhibition that was initially installed at the Collegid’Arquitectes de Catalunya (COAC) in Barcelona in 2008, before moving to the Center for Architecture in New York City in early 2012, and eventually landing in Boston. The BSA Space exhibition (October 2nd - January 10th, 2013) features thirteen architectural and urban proposals, covering a wide range of building types, such as housing, civic centers, museums, educational facilities, mosques, among others. Unlike conventional architectural exhibitions, the curators chose to exhibit the material in a very particular manner: as archival objects rather than museum pieces. The emphasis is not on the aesthetic merits of a particular drawing, or the conceptual position espoused by each proposal, but more on raw informational value that all proposals offer collectively. The visual material in the exhibition is laid out on equal terms with the accompanying textual description, all displayed in small panels organized in constellations that introduce each proposal. These undistinguished constellations pasted on the gallery’s walls, along with the scale models distributed across the floor, constitute the specific curatorial strategy employed, which invites the visitor to study the material presented in its totality.

 

 [A General View of the Exhibition "City of Mirages: Baghdad, 1952-1982" at the BSA Space, Boston. Image by Amin Alsaden]

Following a quick survey, the visitor discerns that out of the thirteen proposals on display, only three were built but subsequently damaged or torn down, and three others were partially realized, while the rest remained ideas on paper. It soon dawns on the visitor that the exhibition tells the history of a modern Baghdad that could have been, not the Baghdad that was. It also becomes evident that the title of the exhibition is not just a title, but more of a metaphor, an underlying theme, a larger phenomenon that the displayed material both points to, and in a way, also represents.

The exhibition suggests a connection between the chosen title and a work by the pioneer of Iraqi and Arab modern poetry, Badr Shakir al-Sayyab (1926-1964). His piece "City of Mirages" is the first text that visitors read upon encountering the exhibited material: "The years stretch out in front of us; blood and fire, I forge bridges with them; But they become a wall... For ten years now I have not ceased walking; Towards you, 'City of Mirages! Destruction of their life!'". These verses, which immortalize the poet’s absorption in grave mourning toward the end of his short life, set the scene for the exhibition’s contents, repeatedly narrating the tragic story of how the displayed proposals were not realized because of political turmoil, and they also set the tone for what the exhibition itself stands for. Indeed, it becomes abundantly clear that the visitor is not simply apprehending the story of modern architecture in the city of mirages, but is also perceiving the many mirages latent in the exhibition, and is ultimately confronting the melancholic reality of contemporary Baghdad.

The idea of the mirage operates on numerous registers, and emerges in various guises. The exhibition itself can be thought of as a mirage, as a manifestation of something illusory, without content or reality. In that regard, the choice of material on display is very telling. Never original, the material presented consists of facsimile reproductions of various archival documents that exist elsewhere. The curators seem to also have consciously chosen not to include photographs of what little has been realized. The strategy is understandable –recent photographs of built projects could have proven disappointing, revealing the decades of poor maintenance, not to mention the damage these precious structures have undergone. Historical photographs would have been equally disappointing, largely because they would only depict the partially realized proposals, the half fulfilled dreams of architectural modernism; or they would be sad reminders of the decline that took place ever since. Instead of photographs, the exhibition chooses to present the proposals exclusively through typical means of architectural representation: drawings, renderings, models, and text. The exhibition, in other words, conveys a vision for a potential future Baghdad as strictly imagined by the featured Western architects. The exhibition is thus a secondary simulation, of a simulated Baghdad that was never attained. The mirage is experienced here as an obsessive-compulsive reenactment of a particular imaginary, one that induces pleasure by distancing itself from the real.

The exhibition is also a mirage in the way it characterizes Baghdad as a distant land of mirages, that is, in its conflation of the visual phenomenon of mirage with Baghdad itself. The visitor is challenged to question this notion of the mirage, and is prompted to ask: to whom exactly is the city a mirage? How can a city be a mirage? And what gives it this distinctive quality? Whether the curators are cognizant of the fact or not, the message of the exhibition is precisely that: just as mirages in the desert disappoint the thirsty, Baghdad was a land of architectural opportunity that eventually disappointed those who perceived it as such. The exhibition does not necessarily address those who lived within the mirage city, whose lives were shaped and affected by the mirage city, or who actually built and modified the mirage city. It is primarily concerned with how Baghdad is perceived and valued from the outside, by the cohort of foreign architects mesmerized by the possibilities of building ambitious projects in the nascent oil-rich nation. The fact that most of their ambitions were thwarted, and that the history of architecture had to contend itself with a host of unrealized proposals for Baghdad, makes the city a mirage for those looking at it abstractly from a distance.

This distant reading, and the specific context that the exhibition considers, points out that Baghdad is also still being portrayed in the most traditional sense of what the mirage connotes: the Western imaginary of Arabia, the land of the desert, of scorching heat, of hallucinatory oases, and thus of the very optical illusion of the mirage. After all, the word mirage is deemed more appropriate for cities like Dubai, Marrakesh, or Baghdad, than it is for Paris or Berlin – the latter association would simply be ludicrous. The exhibition therefore conjures the mirage of Orientalism, a discourse that reduces the complex cultural, geographic, and historical diversity of the "Orient" to a manageable set of stereotypes and. The exhibition seems preoccupied solely with a modernism whose protagonists are from the West, reaffirming the by now widely challenged canonical Euro-centric narratives of modernity, and overlooking the recent critical and revisionist approaches to inclusive international narratives of architectural modernism. Cursory mention of a few notable Iraqi modern architects, such as Rifat Chadirji, Muhammad Makiya, Nizar Jawdat, and Hisham Munir, does little in countering the fact that the exhibition shows no interest in what has actually taken place in Baghdad. It disregards the unique local brand of modernism which distinguished the metropolis from its Middle Eastern counterparts, and which elevated it to an emulated model for emerging urban centers particularly in the Gulf region, where many Iraqi architects continued their careers as conditions in their home country deteriorated. The exhibition can easily be defended by its curators of course, who may claim that the show is aware of the existence of a larger picture, and that its focus on the famous Western architects working in Baghdad was entirely intentional. But it is precisely this distinction that is problematic. It is the conventional hierarchization or categorization of various modernisms by various agencies that perpetuates the customary divisive and essentializing narratives of modernity.

[A Model of Gio Ponti's Built Headquarters for the Development Board and Ministry of Planning, 1958. Image from Author]

What is most alarming, however, is not this exhibition's truncated understanding of the history of built form in modern Baghdad. What is distressing is the realization that besides this delimited approach, there is perhaps very little documentation of the development of built form and its relationship to larger socio-political processes in modern Iraq. The idea of the mirage surfaces here again, lodged in the exhibition’s value as an emblem for a larger crisis of history that lies beyond the limited scope of the material presented. But the exhibition does hint at some of the reasons behind this crisis: it incessantly reiterates the history of turmoil, violence, and instability, and it points out the detrimental effect war and internal strife had on a complete understanding of the legacy of modernization in Iraq. But instead of these volatile circumstances serving as props for a rich historical record that chronicles the myriad events and milestones of the country's recent past, they became excuses for a lack of engagement with historical scholarship, and a customary justification for the current knowledge vacuum. It certainly cannot be denied that historical scholarship is difficult to sustain during troubled times. But it is one thing to have a destroyed city, and another to not have a record of the destruction. Most historical accounts of modern Iraq available today concern themselves with the political or economic history of the nation, paying little or no attention to artistic, architectural, or cultural developments. It is not necessary to make an argument here for the centrality of history to several crucial aspects of a properly-functioning modern society, from national identity and nation building (or nation re-building in the case of Iraq), to rigorous academic scholarship, or for the mere purpose of documenting a society's achievements to date, preventing it from lapsing backwards, and providing it with the milestones and impetus for further developments. But it is imperative to note that there is a collective responsibility for the preservation and recording of this history. That this exhibition attempts to put together a history of modernism in Baghdad is its redemptive merit – it is an initial step toward an understanding of perhaps not the complexities of modernization in Iraq, but the enormity of the task of writing the actual complex history of modernization awaiting scholars.

A history of modernization which simply documents the key actors, from political figures, to architects and planners, and their role in transforming modern Iraq (a strategy followed by traditional general histories) is inadequate. What is needed is an appraisal of what has actually been erected, how Iraqi society has produced and interacted with the new spatial realities, how it perceived the various institutions and monuments it built and inhabited - in short, how architectural modernism was lived and how it shaped Iraqi society, rather than how it was brought about. But considerable challenges present themselves in the context of Iraq when one begins to wonder how to write this history, when Baghdad has been mutilated over and again, when archives have been looted and burned, when the local educational and research establishment has been paralyzed, and when international scholarship continues to find little interest in probing topics related to local built form in Iraq. Indeed, the obstacle to historical work presented by these challenges seems insurmountable at times. Disturbingly, Baghdad's deplorable contemporary reality may even begin to be conceived as the norm, rather than the exception. If other global cities have particular stereotypical identities, Baghdad has become synonymous with destruction, erasure, disappearance. Upon closer inspection, the idea of the mirage is not really that foreign to the city - it is perhaps the most appropriate metaphor for its existence.

In opposition to this notion, and perhaps in a direct response to it, the exhibition relays yet another mirage to the visitor, which has to do with the hint of tacit optimism detected in its overall tone – optimism that does not fail to betray an awareness of the sad reality of contemporary Baghdad. The exhibition’s credits offer a glimpse of this mirage. Naming the Spanish Ambassador to Iraq from 2005-2008, D. Ignacio Ruperez, as the figure behind the whole initiative, the exhibition suggests the mixed feelings that external observes in Iraq must have experienced as they witnessed the realities of Baghdad a few years after the 2003 occupation: pity toward the country's modern heritage and the destruction it has undergone, but also, and more importantly, a realization that a massive reconstruction campaign was to ensue in the very near future. The timing of the exhibition is not arbitrary, after all. The exhibition can be understood as both nostalgic, documenting the history of modern architecture in Baghdad at a time of extreme loss, but also potentially opportunistic, implying a possible resurrection of some of the displayed schemes, and envisioning a future for Baghdad along similar lines of development. And although the mirage lies in the bleak realities on the ground that promise no such scenario in the near future, that is, of an informed, massive government-led reconstruction effort with a clear vision for the country's development (given the ongoing political impasse and the reported pervasive administrative dysfunction), the exhibition does succeed in insulating the visitor, at least temporarily, and inducing the faint sense of pleasure inherent in pondering an exciting Baghdad that could have been. In other words, the exhibition succeeds in concocting a delusional defense mechanism, in the show’s deliberate, although perhaps partly unconscious, attempt to distance the visitor from the hideous realities of contemporary Baghdad.

But despite this momentary success, the exhibition does not manage to alleviate the suffocating weight of melancholia the space is saturated with. As Freud posited, melancholia, as opposed to normal mourning, is characterized by a sense of deprivation that is not of a conscious kind - there is an acknowledgement that something has been lost, accompanied however with a lack of awareness of a more profound, and painfully deep, loss. The exhibition mourns the loss of the opportunity to realize some fine examples of modern architecture in Baghdad, but the real mourning, exacerbated by the series of mirages conjured, is an internalized one that devotes itself to remembering the loss of a larger history, the history of numerous irretrievable episodes, ideas, agencies, enunciations, and objects. It is this intense mourning that produces the acute melancholia endured during a visit to the exhibition. Indeed, the exhibition leaves the visitor utterly speechless, with an ambivalence about what the exhibition conveys, vis-à-vis what it laconically evokes. The exhibition violently represses the visitor’s desire to confront the losses of Baghdad the city - a potentially painful confrontation, no doubt - by displacing this desire onto the pleasant mirage of Baghdad the imaginary.

To diagnose a melancholia is the first step toward catharsis – both a coming to terms with a profound loss, as well as a possible remedy for the pondered condition. If not catharsis, then at least a partial amelioration. The diagnosis presented here is therefore not simply about lamenting the tragic reality of modern Baghdad and its emaciated, or even nonexistent, history; neither is it about suggesting that Iraqis, and the rest of the world, should resolve themselves to the inevitability of the current situation, and accept it as though an unalterable fate, or an acceptable and unique quality that characterizes the city; nor is it about extending an invitation to making predictions about Baghdad's future, or to propose a propensity the city has for self-destruction. It is instead an attempt to identify a crisis, to highlight a grave and pressing situation that requires not just attention, but urgent action. The action needed, by Iraqis and the international community, entails addressing several fronts simultaneously: identifying whatever is left of Baghdad's salient built heritage, modern or otherwise, protecting it from further damage; locating, collecting, and properly preserving whatever is available of historical documents to form a body of archival material that can begin to narrate the city's history; and most importantly, urging scholars, both within Iraq and outside, to work on grappling with the present challenges of the knowledge vacuum, and to work diligently on producing works that engage with the city's history. But above all, the action needed today entails a radical revision to the way built form is thought about and interacted with in the region. Built form needs to be accorded more reverence, and should be appreciated for its value as a historical record for both Iraqis and humanity at large. One has to remember that the main difference between Rome and Baghdad - both capitals of vast empires, built over several centuries, and whose legacies continue to influence the world - is that Rome became the Eternal City, the archetype of the historical urban record, with its built form encapsulating multi-layered, coexistent, and mutually enriching epochs; Baghdad, in contrast, was condemned to repeatedly losing the traces of its history, and thus part of its evidentiary claim to civilizational contribution. Not that there is much to be done about what has been lost to date, but to continue to treat lightly and dismissively the city's built heritage is to perpetuate a tragedy that must be brought to an end. Preserving and documenting the history of modern Baghdad in particular should not remain a mirage. Baghdad must be kind to its own history, if history is to be kind to Baghdad.

[An amended version of this article is being publishing in a special issue on culture in Iraq, WTD Magazine, Dubai]

Four Poems

$
0
0

The Box of Pain

 

You were not there at daybreak

When patients, passengers and soldiers

Stretched their heads, bald or shaven,

Like tiny cottages in distant windows.

The boy passed the light fog

Which didn't stay long

Before the hospital gate

Where he found a pistol lying on the grass.

You were not there.

Now, you are a story

Being told in a place you are not in.

Your throat: that box of pain,

Is full of bones and feathers.

In the white of your eye

There is a blood dot, small and rusty,

Like a sun setting in the distance

Over a snowy field 

Which was trampled

By long rows of hungry soldiers.

[Translated from the Arabic by Golan Haji & Kristina Stoltz]

 

March Light

 

Raise your eyes

to the cloud above your head:

it’s like the belly of an animal

you’d like to play with.

Snow in the shadow

covers a stone & crumbs of bread.

 

Do you hear the wind

between the blossoming peach branches?

 

Ah, you understand me?

 

It’s morning, the air is sharper than our eyes

and no one leaves any trace

in the mirror.

* * * 

The sparrow that flew down from the washing-line recognized me without knowing my name. His legs were thinner than the line, weak but they served his needs well. I terrified him when I appeared & the terror took his wings high & away. He doesn’t differentiate between all of us who are called human; it’s the same whether it’s me or someone else since his shining eyes don’t feel safe with any of us. But I hate it that I keep watch over the name I was given to capture me, that I drag it & it drags me, and that it’s stuck to my face & has become part of my voice. Sometimes it seems strange to me when I read it or hear it, or it bores me & I detest it. Like everyone I have spent a long time imprisoning myself in my name, since all of us are buried alive, each in his own : a grave of fear & delight & misunderstanding.

[Translated from the Arabic by Golan Haji & Stephen Watts]

 

The Adulterers

 

My thoughts are colder than your hand

Harder than a nipple which awoke between the teeth of a stranger.

A whiff of air will scatter me among the shadows

Where signs and vows glimmer,

The sleepless grow old,

And dishes get cold as do faces forgetting us.

Death chatters

When my hand passes the table like a slow straw cart

Then goes away, far from us, angry like us,

Leaving this handkerchief

And a sheet carrying your name

So you won't get lost if you go out.

 

[Translated from the Arabic by Golan Haji with Lauren Pyott] 

Three Poems

$
0
0

Three Poems

Ghassan Zaqtan

Translated from the Arabic by Fady Joudah. 

That Life

I’m going to see how they died
going toward that wreckage
going to see them there
tranquil on the hill of engagement

Dear Wednesday’s narcissus, what time is it
what death is it
what planet in the widow’s hand
five or three?

Her dress was blooming
we were
neglected flowers on her dress

Dear women’s thresholds, how much is a lifetime
what time is a river
how many daggers in the blood
of the whirling storm
five or three?

We let the city play
and rolled our widespread shrouds shut

I’m going to see how they died
going toward that wreckage
going to see their death
hills of the north
wind-rise of the south
I’m going to call them by their names


Collective Death

Evening didn’t come without its darkness
we slept roofless but with cover
and no survivor came in the night
to tell us of the death of others.
The roads kept whistling
and the place was packed with the murdered
who came from the neighboring quarter
whose screams escaped toward us.
We saw and heard
the dead walk on air
tied by the thread of their shock
their rustle pulling our bodies
off our glowing straw mats.
A glistening blade
kept falling over the roads.
The women gave birth only to those who passed
and the women will not give birth

 

Will They Believe

Will the children forgive the generation
trampled by horses of war, exile and preparation for departure?

Will they think of us as we were:
ambushes in ravines
we’d shake our jealousy
and carve trees into the earth’s shirt
to sit under
we the factional fighters
who’d shoo the clouds of war out of their carriages
and peer around our eternal siege
or catch the dead
like sudden fruit fallen on a wasteland?

Will the children forgive what we were:
missile shepherds and masters of exile and chaotic celebration
whenever a neighboring war gestured to us
we’d rise
to set up in its braids a place
good for love and residence?

The bombing rarely took a rest
the missile launchers rarely returned unharmed
we rarely picked flowers for the dead or went on
with our lives
If only that summer had
given us a bit of time’s space
before our mad departure

Will they believe?

* * *

[Translated from the Arabic by Fady Joudah. From Ghassan Zaqtan, Butulat al-Ashya’ (The Heroism of Things) (Beirut: Dar al-Kalimah, 1988)]
 

Leila Sebbar: I Do Not Speak My Father's Language

$
0
0

From Leila Sebbar's Je ne parle pas la langue de mon père

Translated from the French by Marilyn Hacker.

 

I Do Not Speak My Father's Language

 

A few useful dates so as not to get lost in the maze of memory:

My father is born in 1913 in Tènès.

From 1932 to 1935, he studies at the teachers’ college in Bouzaréah, in Algiers, where he meets Mouloud Feraoun, assassinated in March 1962 by the OAS.

He will be a schoolteacher and school principal:

from 1935 to 1940, in El-Bordj

from 1940 to 1945, in Aflou

from 1945 to 1947, in Mascara

from 1947 to 1955, in Hennaya, near Tlemcen

from 1955 to 1960, in Blida (in 1957, he is imprisoned at Orléansville; Maurice Audin is assassinated the same year, by the French army.)

from 1960 to 1965, in Algiers, in Salembier-Gardens

He leaves Algeria for Nice, with my mother, in 1968.

He dies in 1997. 

 

I do not speak my father’s language.

I did not know that these neighborhoods were cursed.

Peripheral neighborhoods, always. Beyond the colonial village, beyond the city, Blida the Muslim town, Alger, Salembier-Gardens. It was there that the family’s voyage had ended, on the edge of the Wild Woman’s Ravine, the last outpost of schoolteachers loyal to the Republic, whom the revolution had not had time to liquidate as traitors and agents of the French enemy, and whom the Secret Army Organization, clandestine French terrorist commandos, had not succeeded in getting at either. My father’s name was on a blacklist: it was necessary to cut the future elite of the young country off at the root, Moloud Feraoun, his fellow teacher, his friend, the writer, had been assassinated with others (on March 15th 1962), at the back of the classroom, against a wall, Feraoun the peaceful, he kept a journal like a scholarship boy at boarding school, his calm voice, the Kabyle accent beneath the black mustache, I had asked the writer questions, as an adolescent, I had spoken with my father’s friend. I’ve forgotten his answers, he had answered, certainly, answers modest as his thoughtful gestures. He is dead. My father would be next. How had he learned it? I can no longer ask him, telephone him from Paris to Nice several times a day to learn, a few decades later, what he had not said, because he didn’t speak of things which might cause us pain, he thought that one had to forget, not recall the troubles and grief, again and again….Of those years, I knew nothing. My father, obstinately, had said nothing about them. And as for me, no less obstinately, I call him, I telephone. His tender and ironic voice, he knows that I’m going to ask him questions again, I’m no longer a child and I ask questions like a child. He will say “So then, daughter, how are things? The children…” I will interrupt him, rudely, I only realize now, I understood that Oriental protocol too late, I ought to have respected it , my father never made the slightest remark, he didn’t like to be called to order. I don’t permit my father to go down the familial chain. “I’d like to know… -- What is it that you’d like to know this time? … Why do you want to know all this? … One has to forget…. – Forget, why? You say one has to forget and you don’t want to say what… No, my child , no… let it be, forget all that…. It’s not worth it , believe me, it’s not worth it… -- But papa, the things you know, you might be the only one…And if you don’t tell anything…-- The only one… You’re joking, my daughter, I’m not the only one who knows, and now the whole world knows, what good does it do to repeat…--To repeat what… what? Tell me… You think that the whole world knows… Books say nothing and neither do you…-- Listen, my girl, if I thought that it was important, I would answer you…So, what is it you want to know? – Everything” My father laughs. “Everything, like that, on the telephone… come to Nice, come to see us, spend a little time with us, at home. We’ll talk. It takes time, you understand. You’ll stay three days, maybe five, that’s not enough… -- But every time you tell me later, later…--And later…I know what you’re thinking, later it will be too late… I know, daughter, I know… We’ll see. Go on now, kiss the little ones for me. Good-bye, my child.”

I will not be able to tell my father what I learned recently, what he perhaps knew. Salembier-Gardens. Working-class and wild. This neighborhood which first frightened the poor Whites of the colony, then the dignitaries of Algerian Algeria, revolutionaries are born in its modest houses, from the school’s passageways one could hardly see the too-narrow little streets, dark in the sunlight, like a shantytown. But I don’t remember it as a shantytown, really, the way one sees them depicted, on screens which offer ethnographic tours of Nanterre and the suburbs, not far from the capital of France, Paris. Houses made of boards, perhaps, of earth that is too dry or too wet, , not the tar reserved for the new neighborhoods, for repair work on quickly damaged roads, the odor of tar, sweet as corkscrews of licorice, acrid and smoking, it gushed out as we followed the steamroller’s progress, the road-workers’ hands, fast, skilled, they could have been badly burned, they had to go quickly like the workers who, in Paris, re-lay the pavement torn up by jackhammers, their arms jump, rhythmic, and their muscles and their cheeks, the workers are the same, they haven’t aged, some are slightly blacker, it’s not the tar, in the white smoke spat out by the rear end of the truck with the hot black paste. Houses made of boards, not all, brown and lighter, of different heights, nailed, laundry drying on the protruding nails. You can’t see the women in their closed courtyards, you had to go out on the balcony, but that school, I think, had been built without a balcony, not like the smaller one in the village near Tlemcen, Hennaya, there was nothing to see around it. Once a year, the fantasia in the stadium, to be closer to the horsemen and the rifles, you had to look out of the screened classroom window, window-screens or bars? Level with the red earth from which the lined-up horses started, all the way to the other end of the stadium, then the men, their white burnooses puffed out, fired their guns all at once, standing up in the stirrups. When they returned at a gallop toward us girls, half hidden under the schoolroom tables, choked by the dust, the armed men, shouting in the disorder of the race, we knew that they’d stop short, upright, half a yard from the school window, with the dexterity and precision of great horsemen, not one of them ever failed, yet even so, all three of us would huddle together under the wooden platform, holding our breath, we waited for the stopped horses pawing the ground, before the stirrup-kick that marked a new departure, the same choreography, simple, repetitive, every hour of the afternoon, before the storm that dispersed men and beasts, we would stay at the window overlooking the stadium, protected by the window-screens or by metal bars, my father wouldn’t have given us permission to be in the classroom, on the edge of the wing alongside the stadium if we had been able to jump from the windowsill to the red earth, among the legs of the horses, against the tawny boots of the horsemen occupied with reloading their old rifles…

I would have asked my father, telephoning him once more, well before the football match which he would explain to me a few hours later, because he couldn’t miss the beginning of the celebrated game in which his favorite champion, Zidane, was playing, my mother stayed close to my father because she thought the football player was handsome, she was less bored when he played. I would have asked him what the men were shouting during the fantasia. The men howled out with a single repeated cry, on the erratic line galloping up to the other end of the stadium, where the excited boys waited for them, with a few girls escaped from the closed courtyard, they jumped and clapped their hands, in time they’d be themselves the fine horsemen with rifles, but some of them would fight, without horse or turban, and the burnoose would be their covering in the maquis of the nearby mountain. Whom could I ask today, after the year 2000, if the young men who had not been killed by the enemy or by their own countrymen, who returned to the village, to their mothers’ houses, have kept up the tradition of the fantasia? Who would know how to tell me, to whom could I recount our mute fascination with those white horsemen shouting beyond the window screens which rust attacked slowly, for years, and the terror if one of them hadn’t stopped his horse in time, but we hadn’t needed to move back suddenly, after two or three hours of battle, we knew that these men wouldn’t let their horses run away with them --- “They uttered cries, my father would have said to me, like battle-cries or cries of celebration, not meaning anything in particular, onomatopoeia. --- Are you sure? --- What do you mean, am I sure? What did you hear, you who are so clever, tell me?… I don’t know. I don’t remember… it was words that I didn’t know… --- Words… What words? Will you tell me? There were no words, no articulated words… -- But I’m sure. --- What are you sure of? That they were saying words? Then, my child, listen especially hard, and you will tell me what words.” Much later, it was the second uprising, I asked myself if the men who were playing at war didn’t cry out, then, the collective cry of jihad, of holy war “Allahu akbar” Would my father have told me? It would have been necessary to pronounce it clearly, to translate, to explain without becoming upset, as if, in the course of the war game, words had burst out by accident, those words which would be murmured in prisons and in the maquis, against the armies of France, stubbornly sending its young, too-young soldiers into a foreign country, become a sudden and ferocious enemy, young men in uniforms green or camouflage, helmets and caps, solid walking shoes which would be taken back from those who died for France on the bank of a ditch, in a wood where the ambush had numerous victims, and the comrade, the boy from home, they had so often talked about the Vosges, the woodcutter and the farmer, would bend toward the young dead man, he would weep on the still-warm chest, before taking away what would be sent to the family, he, not even wounded, would take every risk to bring his friend’s body to the army helicopter. The letters, his name-tag, his army record, his books, the book lent to him by the officer on leave, bulky, used, the pages were beginning to come out of the notebooks, he would read it in his turn thinking of his stricken friend, the face had not been touched, the belly, yes, but he didn’t look, only the eyes which he closed and the mouth, fleshy, as if alive. He remembers the book, War and Peace, his friend loved the Russia of the czars, not the USSR, how many times did they argue, because he quoted Lenin and his friend read chapters of the novel out loud to drown out the words of the one he used to call the Bolshevik, spitting on the earth of the camp, at the edge of the army tent, near the tent-ropes where they were seated.

Did my father know who lived in the Arab quarter where the city’s poor lived at the edge of the Wild Woman’s Ravine -- what wild woman? Today I know nothing about her, the same one written about by Kateb Yacine? I seem to remember a wild woman in his books. His mad mother? Nedjma in the grotto where she was conceived or banished to the tribe’s enclosed courtyard, taken there by the tall Negro? The wild woman of Hélène Cixous who lived in a house in Salembier-Gardens, I had learned from her Dreams of the Wild Woman ? A neighborhood on the outskirts, dangerous, for whom? For my father on the blacklist, for his wife, for us, his children, but we knew nothing about the danger, only that it was dangerous, that we had to accept being in the square courtyard, watched over, the dormitories and the classrooms where we were shut up, my sisters and I. But the men of the cursed neighborhood kept watch, the men of my father’s people, over the schoolmaster and his wife, the Frenchwoman. They stopped the black Citroëns which forced their way along the road toward the town and the school, alongside the houses lined with boards and sheet-metal strips to close up the women’s courtyards. With cudgels, long wooden sticks, solid, thick, the Brothers controlled the road and access to the forbidden neighborhood. They would have thrown hand-grenades at the closest houses, the men in the black sedan. The car made a U-turn before being struck with great blows by the watchmen who knew that my father was in danger. My father was calm, he spoke with his pupils’ fathers, neighbors, in his language, close to us, their words were not words of anger, sometimes they were joyful, I could feel it because my father would laugh gently while speaking, companionable, as with a brother. I didn’t understand my father’s language, I heard it, lacking all meaning, and I knew, by the voices, that my father had nothing to fear, at the very moment when, perhaps, those men from the homes of the poor were telling him that the OAS were winnowing the Arab neighborhoods to accomplish the missions of honor to which their members were sworn, the most fanatical of them, those who made no mistake as to their targets, the Arabs on the list, and the others as well if possible, for the cause. My father laughed, in Arabic, with these unknown men. What they were telling each other made them laugh, I didn’t know, I will never know what they were saying to each other then, at the corner of the balcony, near the schoolmaster’s house, where I stayed standing in the doorway, waiting for the moment when my father and his friends would go down to his office, I heard the voices fade off towards the master’s study where they would close themselves up to chat some more, I would walk, silently, along the balcony which seemed to be hooked onto the houses built in the disorder of the little dirt streets, pieced-together roofs, laundry which divided the courtyards in so many entranceways to enlarge the too-small bedrooms full of children who couldn’t yet run on the ground, wet because, even if it didn’t rain, the drain-water dampened it. The women talked with each other in the evening, always loudly. I heard them. Resounding voices, violent, the children dawdled bringing water, bread…their mothers waited, they disobeyed and slaps didn’t discipline them. Further away, there was less anger, the women talked among themselves, the children weren’t there, the little ones, tiny against their bodies, quiet, happy, so they chatted and from the balcony, their voices seemed gentle, young, cheerful. Soon, it would be the men’s hour, I could hardly hear them, murmurs. My father calls me “Don’t stay there on the balcony.—Why? – It’s dangerous. – Dangerous? – Are you listening to me? Don’t stay there. It’s beginning to get dark. – Because it’s dark? – You know why, so don’t ask questions, I don’t want to see you there, that’s all.”

I didn’t speak Aïsha’s and Fatima’s language.

Aïsha and Fatima. Why do I imagine Fatima sterile, married against her will, they had to marry her off, they would have married her to an older man, much older and a widower, whose eldest son was her own age, he came to see his father when he wasn’t working on the Frenchman’s estate on the plains, a rich colonist who had had houses built for his workers, but their wives didn’t live with them, the boss had prohibited spouses and mothers, he didn’t want any complications. Fatima, sterile, was not repudiated, she had had to raise her husband’s last children, still small, two boys and a girl, all of whom she had loved.

She had pleaded that the boys, at least one of them, should go to the schoolmaster’s school, the “school for native boys,” it was for them, that school, the teacher an Arab also, like them… They would have crossed the town, not far, Tlemcen, where she had never been, they would have had to take the bus, it was expensive. The father had said no, they would be farm workers, like their older brother, on the estate, they would learn winemaking in the boss’s cellars, and if they were clever… Fatima said: “Why wine? You know that God forbids it… --- You don’t understand anything, it’s not to drink, it’s to know what others don’t know… The secret of the Christians…” Fatima had persisted, for the school, in vain. Her sons, she says “my sons,” had worked for the colonist, up till the day that he sent them away, he left the country, it was war, threats from the FLN every day, he had sold the estate, let them work things out with the new owner, if he wasn’t assassinated, like so many others, he would not return to this country which was no longer his country, France was giving it to the Arabs, as for him, as soon as he had sensed war coming, he had made investments in France, he left at ease. The country would be theirs, the estate, the houses, and everything that they had built, they, the Algerian French, the roads, the railroads, the factories, the ports, the dams… everything… They would have everything, so if they were clever enough crooks…they’d be the masters. “I’m leaving, fend for yourselves, I never want to hear of this country again, it’s accursed, I’m going to forget it.” Fatima’s stepsons left the estate before learning the French secret of winemaking. The youngest, her favorite, sent money orders from a city in France, the little girls (the schoolmaster’s daughters: MH ) were no longer there to show her her son’s city on a map of France, if she had had a schoolbook, she would have found it, alone, in secret, she wouldn’t have shown the book to anyone – up until the day the money orders stopped. Fatima waited, no news, cousins who came back to the village hadn’t seen her son, Fatima died without knowing that her favorite son belonged to a clandestine Islamist network, that he had helped recruit young Arabs in La Courneuve, just outside Paris, and that he had been sent to jail in France. During the trial, in a restricted space that doesn’t look like a courtroom, he claimed responsibility for his acts, political attacks. He spoke of Kelkal, child of the peripheral slums , recruited on orders, trained in the homeland, a studious young man, crazed for God, crazed for Allah, courageous, he would have become a local bigwig around Lyon, the French police shot him down in a bus station, his photo on a poster all over France, someone had informed on him, he had just left his hiding-place, the forest where he lived like an Indian in the comic books that he used to read, crouched in a corner of the library, in the town of his birth, the 4000 block in La Courneuve.

Fatima knew nothing about this son’s European years and that he would succeed in escaping from prison. He would come back to the village, the abandoned house, his father long since dead, his mother… no one could have told him the year of her death, could barely have found her grave in the little cemetery, his brothers and his sisters dispersed, no gossip about them, disappeared from the village’s memory. What he was told, could he believe it? A few days after his departure for the foreign country where he would work as a crane operator on construction sites, replacing a young Portuguese worker who died in a traffic accident, his first motorcycle, too powerful… His brother had gone underground with a neighbor girl who had begun her nurse’s training. The simultaneous disappearance of the two young people caused a scandal, the neighbor girl’s family accusing Fatima’s son of having abducted their daughter, serous and intelligent, promised to the local functionary’s eldest son. Their disappearance lasted two weeks, inquiries were made before filing charges, and then the charges had to be withdrawn on the orders of the local insurgent group. Fatima understood that her son was a soldier in the anti-French resistance. Why her son? Five times a day, she prayed to God for his young life. One night, she knows it’s him, he takes risks, they don’t speak, Fatima puts the bread she’s baked in a safe spot, he comes to get it, at dawn she knows that he’s been there. That night there are two of them, she hears them. The father is away. Fatima doesn’t sleep. She doesn’t really listen, until the moment when she hears the name, repeated several times, of the schoolmaster. Why that insistence? The two young men continue talking for a moment, the mother waits for the end of the dialogue, the name is pronounced again, they talk about the Frenchwoman, the Arab schoolmaster…She suddenly understands and bursts into the dark little room which looks out onto the mountain’s flank. She addresses herself to her son: “What are you planning to do? I want to know. The resistance, it’s you and your chiefs, the village doesn’t obey the resistance. I make bread because you’re hungry out there, a mother feeds her children, but…” The son interrupts her. “Mother, you are the home and we are the maquis. We do what we have to do. It’s the revolution, you know it, you can help us, not stand in our way… No one will listen to you. --- What are you talking about, my son, what do you intend to do? Tell me. I’m your mother, I must know, in my own house… --- Your house will be safe, mother, as long as I’m alive.---Don’t speak of death…--- Death, it’s every day, you don’t know it, we die morning, noon and even at night. Brothers fall in action, the underground infirmary doesn’t always succeed against death…. --- The neighbor girl, the administrator’s daughter, is she with you? --- Yes. She needs napkins, you know what I’m talking about, give me a package, with soap, and a comb, for her. – You’re not answering my question. What do you intend to do in the village? The French soldiers are watching… The schoolmaster, do you know him? --- You were the maid in his house, for his family, you worked like a slave…--- What do you know, you, about my life in the schoolmaster’s house? I worked every day for you, not like a slave, no, not in their house… If the schoolmaster’s wife hadn’t taught classes, with what money would I have bought your food? And I learned the language of the school… --- What good did it do you, the language of the school? None at all. And the Arab schoolmaster who teaches the boys of our people the enemy’s language, he is an agent of the colonists, worse than the French masters, he is a traitor, he must…” The son doesn’t finish his sentence, his mother looks at him, dumbfounded: “If you do that, you are no longer my son… Don’t come back to my house, you will find stones instead of bread… --- Mother…---I am not the mother of an assassin, don’t call me “mother” any more… If it’s an order from your chief, disobey, this is an order from your mother. That man is one of the Just, if you were all like him, war would not be war and you would have your victory without crime. Are you listening to me? --- I’m listening to you, I don’t know if you’re right. I said yes to this mission. I would be a coward… Do you want your son to be a coward? --- I want a son who fights for justice, not a criminal, do you hear me?” Fatima gives her son a bundle of linens and the fresh bread. He kisses her forehead. The sun is about to rise.

The schoolmaster, who is standing near the open gateway, it’s time, he’s going to blow his whistle, the boys will come rushing like soldiers charging, in groups, close together and howling, looks toward the edge of the narrow garden, where orange-trees are planted. Beneath the windows of his office… the beehives. Seven of them. At Bouzaréah, horticulture was taught to future rural schoolteachers, Moloud Feraoun whom my father knew at that school, Emmanuel Roblès, whom I met in a café in Paris a long time afterwards, I had just published Sheherezade, aged 17, curly brown hair, green eyes… So skilled schoolmasters would also know how to make a school garden grow, fruits and vegetables, they would teach the boys modern methods unknown to their fathers and grandfathers, and the teachers would have fresh vegetables for the school lunchroom, and would give a midday meal to the children who came from far off. The schoolmaster, with some notion of apiculture, had begun to raise bees, and he gathered honey, not much, but his daughters expected the golden honey as soon as they saw their father put on the white suit, an overall, gloves, a helmet with netting, of wire or metal? I don’t know, you had to protect your face, even if the bees knew my father, his bees; their territory at the end of the orange-orchard and the wild rose bushes was forbidden to us.

The schoolmaster turns his head towards the street where the boys are waiting. Suddenly a woman arrives, almost running, she has trouble keeping the haïk, the white veil which covers her, over her face. The boys move away to let her pass, surprised at such haste, mothers who come to see the teacher never come in by the schoolyard gate, they wait patiently in the hallway, beyond the porch and the big hobnailed wooden door, for the moment when each one would speak with the schoolmaster, in his office. The woman, out of breath, stops in front of the school director who has not recognized her. She does not speak until he has seated her in the room above the beehives, the window is closed. Fatima uncovers her face, she doesn’t take off her haïk, the way she did in the schoolmaster’s house where every morning the Frenchwoman’s daughters watch her, fascinated, as she slowly takes off the veil, unfold it and then fold it according to the rules she had learned, they would have liked Fatima to veil them like the neighborhood women, whose garments billowed on the days when the sirocco blew. When she had to go out to hang the wash or to do some household task which didn’t oblige her to cross a street, Fatima took her fouta, a piece of cloth with colored stripes that she placed on her head, folding each corner with a rapid movement, precise, difficult to imitate, to hide her hair, already hidden by one or two scarves, but the tight knot tied at the side of her forehead could not be visible. She didn’t know, nor did I at that time, before her magician’s effects, that she looked like an Alsatian woman with the traditional coif, the big knot flattened atop her skull… In Paris I tried to wear a fouta I bought at Barbès like that, in front of a mirror I made Fatima’s gestures, tossing first to one side and then to the other the right side then the left on my head covered with cloth at its center. All I succeeded in making was a formless bundle which would have provoked her laugh, young, resounding, happy. Have these gestures completely disappeared? How can I know? Go back to Fatima’s village, watch women putting on the haïk if it still exists, or the fouta. Each time that I’ve tried to explain these movements to put on the fouta, people have been surprised. I’m convinced that I’m not making them up.

Fatima is seated facing the schoolmaster in his office. They hear the whistle. It’s the hour for school, the first hour. Fatima knew, by the whistle, without having to read the clock, which she could not read, the moment of the day and the tasks she still had to do before the mistress of the house came home. Fatima lowers her head toward the diamond-tiled floor, she speaks, the words go too quickly, the schoolmaster tries in vain to stop her, she goes on, faster and faster, up till the moment when she brusquely stops. The schoolmaster says nothing. He waits. Fatima raises her eyes toward him, the school director’s blue eyes interrogate her. He has not quite understood. She starts again, applying herself to its importance , what she has to say… The teacher, at the end of the story, addresses the weeping woman, she is drying her eyes with a corner of the häik: “You speak of your son. Did you have a son? You left, you and your sister. I know nothing. Tell me, your husband, your children… --- I raised his children, the last ones, two boys and a girl, like my own children, you can believe me. --- Did your sons go to school? I would have known, you would have told me, I would have taken them in my own class, but… -- My husband said no. The younger one sends money orders from France, the other one…” Fatima hesitates. “He’s the one who’s been ordered to kill me?” The mother adjusts her veil, hides her face and her tears. “You’re sure? His chiefs picked him? “ Fatima nodded her head yes. “And I, when they were little, I wanted to teach them the language of the school, what I knew, to talk a little, to understand, for work outside, on the estate and, later, in the city. But to read and write… I couldn’t. And this is what he says to me, my son. It’s true. You must believe me. He will do it, he will obey. Your wife, your children, what will become of them?” Fatima weeps. She rises. “There where Aïsha lives, you are all welcome, no one will harm you, go there, Aïsha, her husband, they’ll protect you. Here is her name, her address.” Fatima takes out of a little pouch made of mattress-ticking, solidly sewn, a folded paper which she gives to the schoolmaster. He accompanies her back to the door of the school. He says “May God protect your son.--- May God protect your wife, the children, and you, you are the best…” The woman kisses the schoolmaster’s hand, he smiles at her, his blue eyes are gentle. Fatima is no longer afraid.

Did my father receive threats during those first years of the war? Were the brothers of his pupils ordered to assassinate the teacher of the French school? I will never know.

[Translated from the French by Marilyn Hacker. From Leila Sebbar, Je ne parle pas la langue de mon père (Editions Juillard, 2003)]

Labor Representation in Post-Mubarak Egypt: An Interview with the Late Samer Soliman

$
0
0

[The following is the audio and transcript of an interview conducted by Julia Simon with the late Samer Soliman in September 2011. The interview discusses the state workers’ organization and associational freedom in post-Mubarak Egypt. Soliman was Professor of Political Science at American University in Cairo (AUC), and a founding member of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party. His publications include The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak.]

Julia Simon (JS): What is the ETUF [Egyptian Trade Union Federation]?

Samer Soliman (SS): The Egyptian [Trade Union] Federation was created in the 50s. This was an initiative of the political regime at that time, the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser. It was a kind of military dictatorship, and a military dictatorship sometimes needs organized labor in order to impose order and to negotiate with the labor. So before the foundation of this federation we had syndicates, many syndicates, many trade unions, [which were] free more or less free [and] independent. So the creation of this federation was a mechanism to centralize these many unions in order to impose state control over the working class.

JS: Up until recently ETUF was the monopoly?

SS: The system of representation in Egypt was based on a monopoly—monopoly in the political sphere. The system of representation was monopolistic: One federation should represent the whole working class; one syndicate should represent the doctors. There was no pluralism for representation. Nasser gave some rights to the workers in exchange for their submission to the state. So they did have something in exchange for their loss of independence. Shifting from Nasser to [Anwar] Sadat is the opening and economic liberalization.

Gradually since the 70s, the workers [have been] losing [their] central place in the regime. Workers are not given their social rights as in the time of Gamal Abdel Nasser. And at the same time, the federation is not fighting back. The workers were losing their socioeconomic rights at the same time, being without an organization instrument to fight back.

This is why here we have the mobilization of the workers since the 60s and 70s…normally [happening] outside the rank federation. Usually it is against the federation.

One of the first slogans of any strike in Egypt is “Down with the Federation of the Workers.” So it was not really representative of the workers. It was controlled by the state security office, by the secret police, [and] fraud in their elections. So it was not really representative of the workers.

In recent times, we have the emergence of independent workers unions. This was a very old idea—the need to create parallel independent trade unions. But it came to be materialized only in the last two or three years.

The trade union of the tax collectors…created a new independent [union]. Now we have many [unions]; especially after the end of the revolution, we have many free trade unions and there is a big question in Egypt, a big debate within the working class: should we finish with the federation of the trade unions and start from scratch to create new syndicates, or should we keep both and keep reforming the federation at the same time to have parallel syndicates and trade unions. This is a debate and we have different positions.

JS: So correct me if I am wrong, but in August [2011] ETUF dissolved the board of directors?

SS: Yes, during the revolution the leadership of the federation was very connected the [Hosni] Mubarak regime. They acted like gangs during the revolution. They even hired thugs in order to attack demonstrations. So the head of the federation [Hussein Megawer] was accused of [attempted] assassination, so he’s in prison now. [Editor’s note: Megawer, along with other defendants in the “battle of the camels” case, was acquitted in October 2012].  So this was leverage for the opposition within the federation and within the working class to ask the interim government and military council to dissolve the board of the federation, which they finally did after resistance. They finally dissolved the board and there is now a transition and we will have elections maybe in a few months.

JS: But ETUF still exists? It hasn’t been dissolved?

SS: The federation still exists and we have an opinion inside the working class that says we need a centralized unified workers movement—[that is], we need the federation. Personally speaking, I think this is very important for the workers. I don’t think that it is wise to dissolve the federation.

I think it is wise and for the benefit of the workers to reform--to radically reform—the federation by changing the institutional framework of this federation, [through] new elections, by fighting against corruption, [and] by empowering the federation.

But today in Egypt you are in transition. New independent syndicates and trade unions…are weak. They are emerging. So I cannot imagine how we can draft a new constitution without organized labor represented.

The new constitution of Egypt will be drafted in a few months and in any society you have representations of civil society and other groups… so it is very important to have a strong voice of the working class. And I think the federation before the election and after the election could play an important role under one condition: that it always guarantees the workers the right…to create their own free independent unions. The system under Mubarak and under Nasser and Sadat was to monopolize the worker representation. Today it is finished. Today there shouldn’t be any monopoly of representation. The federation should exist and it is for the workers to decide whether they are united in one federation or want to have multiplicity of representation.

JS: What are the current assets of ETUF? Are most of Egypt’s workers members? How many members do they have?

SS: On paper they have maybe four million. But [this] is not a real membership since it is not voluntary membership. Workers were becoming members, but not by consent. Normally if you are a worker, especially in the public sector, if you are hired, automatically you become a member and you pay the fees of the federation as a kind of tax. So you are not asked. [It] is taken from the source. So yes, they have a big membership, but it is not a real membership.

They have many assets—economic assets. And this is also important, [which is] why dissolving the federation, personally speaking, is very bad, because they have important assets, which is [part of] the ownership of the working class. They have a university, they have a bank, [and] they have some assets. So this is the ownership of the workers, [and] it should be kept for the workers. 

JS: And there are new independent unions? Parallel unions? Do they want to dissolve ETUF?

SS: Some of them are pushing to dissolve the federation itself.

JS: Why do they want that?

SS: Some think that there is no possibility of reform of that federation, but I think there is some personal interest behind it. Because…some activists or leaders of the new trade unions…don’t want competition. They know that the federation has important economic assets, [and] important membership. So maybe they want to finish with this federation.

JS: So what are some examples of new unions since the revolution?

SS: The most important is the tax collector unions. It was created after a successful strike and it is normally strong. We have other more emerging weaker trade unions, and they are organized in the Coalition or Egyptian Independent Trade Union Federation. So they are trying to be organized in just one federation.

JS: And what are their demands?

SS: Minimum wage, [and] better working conditions. But the minimum wage is the main slogan; the main demand now that’s getting much of popularity. And they are also politicized. They were participating in the mobilization of the revolution so they have political demands. They have certain demands regarding freedom of association and this is very important for them without which they can’t exist. Pluralism. Syndicates and social representation, but minimum wage is the most important demand they are raising.

JS: And that’s supposed to be addressed next month, [October 2011]?

SS: There is a promise related to the maximum wage. Maximum wage is important in the state, [and] the bureaucracy, because we have some people, very rich people. They are mediocre they are not brilliant to deserve huge wages or income. So it is time now to impose maximum wage in the state bureaucracy. And using this resource in order to increase the minimum wage. It is possible but I’m not sure when it will be.

It is time now to impose a maximum wage in the state bureaucracy and using this resource to increase the minimum wage.  It is possible but the minimum wage they are talking about is not that important—700 pounds. About 120 dollars.

So this is not the minimum wage the workers are asking. The workers are asking about 160 dollars per month.

JS: The current Minister [of Manpower and Migration] Ahmed Al Borai – what is the stance of the workers toward Al-Borai?

SS: Al-Borai is a gift for the workers and for their rights, especially political rights of independent syndicates and free representation because he defended the rights of pluralism and he drafted a new law defending these rights. And he also resisted all the pressures from the federation coming before [the] dissolving [of its] board.

They were pushing, and he resisted and finally he dissolved the board. So Al- Borai is very good, very liberal, [and] open-minded.

JS: Is he being attacked by ETUF?

SS: He is harshly attacked by them, but now some of them are criminals in the leadership. Some of them are corrupt [and are] in prison now. And the rest…are fighting back. But I think they are weakened.

JS: People say unions are losing power in America – how would you categorize state of trade unions in Egypt?

SS: Trade unions in the United States and in developed countries are in crisis and this is related to sometimes globalization, [and] sometimes you have pressures on the trade unions to accept less wages because there is competition. American trade unions are in competition with Asian [countries], Chinese. So I understand the situation but here I think we have much to achieve before coming to your crisis. [Laugh]

Here there is a better future for the workers by organization. You know, usually the only power of the workers is their collective action and organization. They don’t have economic power. They don’t have ideological power. What they have is the collective action to impose their demands.

So these collective actions was weakened by political authoritarianism; by a dictatorship. As [long] as we are having a democratic process now, workers will benefit, without any doubt.

They are more free now to act, to organize on a syndical trade union level and in politics….They are just in the process of organizing as workers in the workplace and on the economic level. In politics in the future in a few years I think they will be represented on the political scene. They may form their own party or parties or they will be strongly connected to some political party.

This is a very political voting bloc in Egypt. Democracy, as it is giving power to the majority, will empower the workers. Workers in Egypt are the majority of the population.

JS: Biggest obstacle for the Egyptian labor union movement?

SS: One is what we call in Egypt the counter-revolution. The counter-revolution is a kind of socio-economic forces aligned with some politicians sometimes with the military council. We have conservative forces in Egypt trying to keep the situation; keep the Mubarak regime without Mubarak. So this is a challenge because they want to empty the achievements of the revolution to make it just decorative reforms. So this is a challenge. It’s a challenge to consolidate their rights in free representation, to defend their right to strike because the military council is trying to limit this right.

The second challenge is economic. Because the cake is limited. So if workers want to increase their share in the cake they should participate in increasing the cake itself. So the cake itself, the size of the economy, economic growth is very important to improve the situation in Egypt. Otherwise it will be difficult to make real improvement in their lives.

The forces resisting change are everywhere. What we call today the counter-revolution includes state officials, military officers, includes businessmen, [and] some people from the wider society. They don’t want change either because they are very conservative or because they have interest in the old system. They are very diverse people.

JS: Dissolution [of ETUF is] good?

SS: Yes, this is really good news. These people were not really workers. They were not representative of the working class. They were almost businessmen. Members of the board of administration of the worker’s bank and they were getting a lot of money out of it. One of them has a swimming pool in his villa. So these people were not really workers. So dissolving this board was something very good, very necessary, and it was a dream. I was very happy. I think most of the workers were very happy about it.

December Culture

$
0
0

Our last culture bouquet this year features poetry from Syria and Palestine, fiction from Algeria/France, and two reviews. Marilyn Hacker translates two chapters from Leila Sebbar's I Don't Speak My Father's Language. Kamran Rastegar reviews Ahmad Ghossein's My Father is Still a Communist. Syrian poet Golan Haji co-translates four of his poems. Fady Joudah translates poems by Ghassan Zaqtan. Amin Alsaden reviews a current exhibit about Baghdadi architecture:

* "Leila Sebbar's I Don't Speak My Father's Language" (tr. Marilyn Hacker)

* "My Father is Still a Communist" (reviewed by Kamran Rastegar)

* "Four poems by Golan Haji"

* "Three Poems by Ghassan Zaqtan" (tr. Fady Joudah).

* "Baghdad: Mirages and Melancholia" by Amin Alsaden.

You can access all previous culture posts here. Tell us what you think and contribute:

culture@jadaliyya.com

Supporting Rula Quawas and Academic Freedom: An Interview With A Former Student

$
0
0

On 2 September 2012, Professor Rula Quawas was removed from her position as the Dean of the Faculty of Foreign Languages at the University of Jordan under nebulous circumstances. In a letter addressed to the president of the university, the president of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), Professor Fred Donner, urged the former to repeal his decision. Donner hinted that the decision might have been related to the circulation of a video that Dr. Quawas’ students made for her Feminist Theory course in the fall semester of 2011. The film addressed the issue of sexual harassment on the university campus. In the months leading up to the removal of Dr. Quawas, the film became a major source of debate in Jordan. In response to the debate, as well as the removal of Dr. Quawas, one former student of hers anonymously co-founded the “Supporting Rula Quawas & Academic Freedom” website. In the following interview conducted over email, that student shares her experiences and views regarding the reception of the video in Jordanian media and public space, as well as her motives for creating the website.

Audrey Ann Lavallee-Belanger (AALB): How did you find out about the controversy?

Student (S): I wonder if there is anyone in Jordan who has not yet heard of the “controversial” video. I remember it was everywhere, from Facebook statuses to local news websites. As for the removal of Professor Rula Quawas from her post as dean, a friend sent me the link to the MESA letter the day it was published on Jadaliyya. We were both students at the University of Jordan back in the day, and now we are both part of the group managing the “Supporting Rula Quawas & Academic Freedom” website.

When I first heard about the controversy surrounding the video, I felt I had witnessed an unjust act. I felt sadness mixed with anger. The decision of dismissing Dr. Quawas was not as shocking as the university’s reaction. The university blamed the victim. Once local and international supporters started speaking up, the university’s administration tried to silence Dr. Quawas’ supporters just as much as they tried to silence her. They made many inaccurate statements. For instance, they announced the dismissal of twelve more deans as if they were all part of a larger related process. However, many of those deans were dismissed due to their positions being canceled, and others were substituted for reasons known to them as well as to the faculty and staff. Those cases were unlike that of Dr. Quawas, who learned of her dismissal from a newspaper. Later, many other online attacks were directed at the cause, and at Dr. Rula Quawas personally. Lies were building up, and I felt provoked whenever a new attempt to manipulate the truth arose.

AALB: Why did you feel compelled to make a website in defense of Dr. Quawas?

S: The website was initially just an idea, but we took the decision to make it happen when I and other supporters noticed that some news websites did not publish any of our comments. Rather, they highlighted the other opposing opinions in their extreme perspective. We felt like we were being silenced in a social war directly targeting our freedom of speech. When the video became an issue, before September 2012, we were awed by the general reaction. But it did not really bother us. It was the news of the Dr. Quawas’ dismissal that made us all agree that we should act now or never.

Another reason for creating the website was the way the university handled all of this. It had issued a statement that we viewed as unsatisfactory. We wanted to show exactly where we stood on both aspects that the controversy revealed. We wanted to denounce a society that prefers to silence the problem and denounce the decision of the university's president, which we believe should not reflect the approach of the oldest academic institution in Jordan.

What happened to Dr. Quawas is not only an issue of a dean who was dismissed. It is a direct strike at academic freedom and the potential for a better future. If a professor such as Dr. Quawas is punished for supervising academic research, where does that leave the students’ stance on freedom? What kind of a message does the university’s president, Ikhlaif al-Tarawneh, send to scholars, instructors, and Jordanian society about honoring education? We wanted to take action fast, and at the time we were left with two options. We could either fight in many directions, or create a platform where we gather all of our efforts to create a space for other supporters to join us.

AALB: What has been your experience since the release of the video and launching of website? What kind of conversations and debates arose from the video and how did people receive your position?

S: The reactions towards the video were extremely polarized. The issue with this video is that it did not only bother people who denied the fact that sexual harassment exists on campus, but it ultimately provoked people who found the mere introduction of such a taboo topic as catastrophic. The fact that female students raised such an issue caused more anger than the harassment phenomenon itself. If you read the comments on the video’s YouTube page, you will notice that there are mainly messages that are hateful towards females in general. To tell you the truth, I was never bothered by that reaction. It was to be expected. Social change is always gradual and has always required tiny steps throughout history.

From what I have encountered, people who were against the video were not very moved by Dr. Quawas’ dismissal to begin with. It is those who saw the video as a brave attempt to reform the climate that are the ones sending us support messages and writing about it on their personal blogs, Facebook pages, and Twitter accounts. We come across new articles everyday. It is not only academic instructors or news reporters who feel obliged to fight for this cause, many people are concerned and they happen to be from all sorts of backgrounds.

AALB: Do you think that the video helped tackle the issue of sexual harassment? What debates arose in the media, in the government (if any), and at the university level?

S: Definitely. What was once a single project done by four women for a class assignment has now become the talk of the town. Almost all local print newspapers have published at least two articles addressing the video, and later addressed the dismissal of Dr. Quawas from her position as dean. A friend recently told me that he heard a group of people discussing the issue in a restaurant over coffee. The video has actually raised many questions, and that alone is generating an immeasurably positive effect.

As for the university, it expressed an overwhelmingly negative view of the video. In a recent case, an instructor of shari’a at the University of Jordan, Dr. Amjad Qourshah, publicly organized a protest on campus using his private Facebook page. He called for “action” against Dr. Quawas. He openly accused her of “tarnishing the reputation of the university,” demanded that she be dismissed not only as dean but as a faculty member, and requested that students file legal action against her for defaming the university. The university’s administrative staff paid no attention to Dr. Qourshah’s objectionable and intimidating behavior, nor did they take any action against such an academic violation. On the contrary, the university’s president approached the media and denied that there was any “sexual harassment” worth mentioning on campus, and accused Dr. Quawas of “delusional heroism.”

In general, I felt more intimidated than attacked. People directly involved were/are left feeling insecure on campus, thanks to Dr. Qourshah’s call for action. He claimed that we were “externally funded,” implying that we were funded by parties with hateful/harmful agendas. By calling us a "suspicious organization," which is an unfounded accusation, he legitimized attacking us. On the other hand, our website only quotes legitimate sources and keeps an objective approach in addressing every article. We are pleased that many are joining us, and that our visitors-base is growing larger by the minute.  

AALB: What kind of impact do you think the website has had or can have with regards to the situation of Dr. Quawas, as well as issues of sexual harassment on campus?

S: We tried our best to collect online reactions in a diary style. We made sure to copy anything that supported our cause. We list all the sources from the posts we put up. Our statistics show that hundreds of people from all over the world visit the website daily. Many choose to leave comments and share their point of view on the matter. We aim to keep this blog up and running to assist in an academic revolution, which is the first of its kind here in Jordan. We are certain that our efforts are not in vein, and that this is the first step in a journey that has yet to begin. Even if we fail to effect change right away, we will keep trying regardless. Something that I also find to be quite expressive, and speaks almost the same language as all of the supporters of this cause is a recent article written by Nermeen Murad.

In my humble opinion, there is a silver lining to the polarized debate over the video. It has encouraged people to write more and more about the issue, and to raise awareness about the gravity of sexual harassment on campuses. The lack of convincing arguments from the other side made some people ponder the issue. Indeed, the university president’s argument that Dr. Quawas was seeking publicity is not convincing. The “controversial” video was never meant for publishing. It was in fact leaked. The video’s popularity was an accident. University president Ikhlaif Tarwaneh claimed that “Western forces and NGO’s” were behind Dr.Quawas, and that they sought to tarnish the university’s reputation. There is a limit to how far you can utilize conspiracy theory. For me, that is totally absurd.

What was the impact that Dr. Quawas had in your life?

Back when I was a student, I did not really understand how much of an influence any one teacher could have on my life. I took about five classes with Dr. Quawas between the 2002 and 2005, and each of them had a different taste. It took me a while to appreciate what she did, and how profound her inspiration was. At the time, she was one of the very few instructors who encouraged creative thinking and intellectual discussions. Her lectures were a mixture of mental-fireworks and difficult assignments. Her approach in the classroom was unmatched. Examinations with Dr. Quawas were anything but traditional. I remember how we had to write an essay by matching a collection of symbolic photographs displayed on a projector with various themes of a novel we had studied. That exercise alone was exceptional in a time when the “Q &A” style exams were the norm to evaluate students. Rula Quawas is that kind of teacher, one who—as Robert Frost would say—"just gives you a little prod behind and you jump to the skies.” I am indebted to Professor Quawas for the way I perceive life now and then.


Ongoing Ethnic Cleansing: Israeli Settlers to Take Over Another Palestinian Home

$
0
0

On Monday 31 December 2012, Israeli forces will evict the Shamasneh family from their home in Sheikh Jarrah. The family of ten, including six children, have  lived in the home since 1963. Ayoub Shamasneh, the family elder, recently appealed to the international solidarity community to stand with them to resist their forced displacement

Sheikh Jarrah, is a residential neighborhood in the north of the Old City of Occupied East Jerusalem and home to 2,800 Palestinians. Due to its strategic location around the Old City, It has been the site of an aggressive ethnic cleansing campaign. In 2009, Israeli settlers, supported by Israeli state forces, forcibly removed the Hanoun and the Al-Ghawi families (53 people, including 20 children) from their homes.

More recently, a group of Jewish-Israeli settler young men took over part of the Al-Kud family home. Nadia Al-Kurd explains that they release their dog on them frequently, which has terrified their children and caused injuries. In response to international solidarity campaigns aimed at supporting the Al-Kurd family to reclaim their confiscated property and remain in their home, the settlers poured sewage over the solidarity encampment to drive them away. Today, the Al-Kurd continues to live in constant fear of settler violence and further control of their home (a full report on Al-Kurd family's

       

      [The Shamasneh home in Sheikh Jarrah, East Jerusalem]

The ethnic cleansing campaign targeting the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood threatens to forcibly displace approximately sixty families or nearly seven hundred people. Sheikh Jarrah is among several Palestinian cities surrounding East Jerusalem at high-risk of forcible displacement. Other cities include Issawiyyeh, Shuffat, Beit Hanina, Beit Iksa, and Silwan. According to Jerusalem's Master Municipal Plan (2000), Israel has an explicit policy of reducing the ratio of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, which would otherwise equal the city's Jewish population by 2030 due to natural population growth. In February 2012, the UN Special Rapporteur on Housing, Raquel Rolnik, described Israel's policy as a Judaization campaign targeting Palestinian communities within Israel Proper as well as the Occupied Territory. 



 [Entering Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem]

According to Palestinian journalist Dalia Hatuqa, the eviction has been postponed until Thursday. On 30 December 2012, we were able to speak with Dirar Shamasneh outside his home. He describes his family's ordeal and their determination to resist forced displacement. See the brief video below, and a translated transcription of the video beneath it.

[Update: the case is now postponed until March, 2013. More on this soon]

Additional Sources: 

 [We wish to thank the superb efforts of Daoud Mahmmod in helping us navigate the local context in Palestine]

 

 

Egypt Media Roundup (December 31)

$
0
0

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.]  

“Accusations against ElBaradei, Sabbahi and Moussa dropped”
Lawyer who filed the complaint against the opposition leaders, decides to withdraw it.

“Power cut in seven governorates”
Blackouts spread across the country because of irregular gas supplies to power stations

“Workers of CID pharmaceuticals company strike, cut-off vital Al-Haram Street”
Pharmaceutical workers strike, demanding payment of dues, higher wages and better working conditions.

“My resignation is not 'personal' against PM Qandil: former minister Mahsoub”
Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs says he is not resigning due to conflict with the prime minister or shifted support in Al-Wasat Party.

“Egypt's 'civil servants' told not to criticise president Morsi”
Diplomats and media workers say they are pressure to drop opposition to the president.

“Silencing the critics”
Shahira Amin says she is deeply troubled by recent investigations launched against journalists for “insulting the president.”

“Egypt: building on sand”
The Guardian’s editorial claims the president has come out in a weaker position from the constitutional referendum.

"Rights lawyer challenges Morsi's appointment of 90 Shura members"
Hafez Abu-Seida says the constitution does not allow the president to appoint Shura Council members.

“Egypt's constitution passes with 63.8 percent approval rate”
At a press conference, the High Electoral Commission announces official results for the constitutional referendum and turnout rate of 32.9%.

“Mass resignations from Salafist Nour Party”
150 members resign after alleged resignation of party leader Emad Abdel-Ghafour .

“Al-Azhar's Grand Imam to respond to Salafists' 'plan' to remove him”
A video posted on the internet shows a Salafi preacher saying that the immunity of the Grand Imam can be circumventing with a law setting a retirement age for his position.

“Parliament elections law remains debated”
The Freedom and Justice Party insist on a law similar to the one used for last year’s elections.

“Constitutional court reconvenes”
At its first session of the new year, the constitutional court will consider the cases for the dissolution of the Shoura Coundil and the Constituent Assembly.

“Cabinet spokesperson: PM to resign after parliamentary elections”
The president will decide whether to keep Hisham Qandil in office or accept his resignation.

“Suzanne Mubarak's assets to be transferred to Central Bank”
The prosecutor-general approves a transfer of Suzanne Mubarak’s LE 27 million kept in the National Bank of Egypt.

“The new Egyptian constitution: an initial assessment of its merits and flaws”
Ziad Al-Ali argues that claims that the constitution will usher in an Islamic regime are exaggerated and that the constitution is flawed because of its vagueness and the absence of certain personal rights.

“In Egypt, How to Lie And Remain Pure”
A translation of Alaa Al-Aswany’s article in which he says Islamists do not abide by Islam and instead pursue power grabbing.

 

In Arabic:

“النص الكامل لكلمة مرسي أمام «الشورى» في افتتاح دورته الـ33 عقب تسلّم التشريع”
The complete text of the president’s speech in front of the Shoura Council.

“مرسي يُلقي بيانًا رئاسيًا أمام «الشورى» بعد انتقال السلطة التشريعية له”
The president gives a speech before the Shoura Council, as he hands over legislative powers.

“«صباحى»: أقبل نتيجة الاستفتاء.. والدستور فقد شرعيته بعد تقسيم المصريين”
Opposition leader Hamdeen Sabahy says he accepts the results of the referendum , but sees the constitution as illegitimate.

“«الإخوان» ترفع اشتراك الأعضاء إلى 50% من دخلهم شهرياً للإنفاق على الانتخابات”
The Muslim Brotherhood is raising the required portion of its members’ wages in order to raise money for the upcoming elections.

“«أبو إسماعيل»: المشهد السياسي تحسمه مواجهة عنيفة وقوية بين الإسلاميين والمعارضة”
Hazem Abo Ismail says the current political situation should be resolved through a violent clash between Islamists and the opposition.

“كل دولة وأنتم طيبين”
Abd El-Aziz Sami recalls the past half year of the new regime in power and criticizes its failures.

“بلاغ للنيابة يطالب بالتحقيق مع «العريان» بعد ندائه ليهود مصر بالعودة”
A lawyer submits a complaint to the prosecutor general against Essam El-Arian for saying Egyptians Jews can return to the country.

“لماذا صلى الإخوان صلاة الخوف؟”
Mohamed Abo Gheit says the Muslim Brotherhood does not understand how the situation in Egypt has changed since Mubarak’s time.

“نقيب المهندسين: من يهاجمنا الآن كان يجري «وراء عربية الرش»”
Members of the Engineer’s Union criticizes the union council for speaking on behalf of all of them as supporting the new constitutions and the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood.

“سائقون وفنيو خراطة وصيانة ومشرفو حضانة وتغذية فى خريطة نواب الشورى.. المجلس يتولى التشريع فى غياب مجلس الشعب.. والأغلبية للتيار الإسلامى بما يضمن تفوق التصويت”
After the presidential appointment of 90 new members, Islamists retain majority in Shoura Council, which is taking over legislative powers from the president.

“لماذا يحتج العمال؟”
Fatma Ramadan argues that workers continue to go on strikes because officials do not keep their promises to them.

 

Recent Jadaliyya articles on Egypt:

Labor Representation in Post-Mubarak Egypt: An Interview with the Late Samer Soliman
The audio and the text of an interview from September 2011with the late Samer Soliman on the labor movement in Egypt.

Sons of Beaches: How Alexandria's Ideological Battles Shape Egypt
Amro Ali argues that Alexandria is the vanguard city of socio-political developments in Egypt.

Call for Applicants: Building Knowledge in Media Policy for Arab Countries in Transition (Cairo, 12-21 March 2013)
AUC announces third round of training for members of civil society, journalists and media professionals.

Egypt’s Anti-Freedom Constitution: The Borhami Video
Sheikh Yasser Borhami’s scandalous video in which he admits that the constitution was drafted in such a way as to allow loopholes to circumvent non-Islamist demands.

اقتصاد مصر بين المُفْلِسين والمُفَلِّسين
Wael Gamal talks about the imminent bankruptcy of Egypt.

A New Judicial Moment in Egypt
Atef Said says that the silence of the Independence Current in the Egyptian Judiciary over the encroachment of the regime means that its collapse has come.

Egypt’s Constitutional Referendum Results
Rayna Stamboliyska offers a short commentary of the referendum results.

ملف من الأرشيف: أحمد فؤاد نجم
This week’s “File from the Archives” is dedicated to Egyptian poet Ahmed Fouad Negm.

Revolution’s Cost

$
0
0

He told me to get off at the last kiosk on the highway that connects East with West Cairo. After the driver dropped me off, there was no one to be seen in the area. I walked down the concrete stairs by the side of the road. The stairs led me into the pit of this neighborhood named after a village that never was. There was Mahmoud, sitting in a coffee shop only meters away. He told me he had stood by the road for some time waiting for me but then had gotten cold and came down below. We walked together to his home, but slowly, because Mahmoud limped, and I wondered if he had ever made it up those makeshift steps or if he had merely said so out of politeness.

By the time we were finished with our interview I saw pain in his eyes. Earlier in the evening he had told me that he took painkillers, the effect of which lasted for two days, making it bearable for him to walk and work. Mahmoud works as a day laborer, a construction worker. Living meters away from the highway that leads past old Cairo and into the vast frontiers of the constant construction of "New" Cairo places him in the perfect location as a builder. But that is where his stroke of luck ends. His son Ahmed disappeared one year ago on the very day of my visit. During the course of the interview, Mahmoud told me that Ahmed limped the same way that he does.

I can only imagine the day Ahmed joined the battle against Central Security Forces and army soldiers who killed him that day outside the cabinet office on 17 December 2011. Ahmed had just returned to Cairo after losing his job in Alexandria two days earlier, like so many others. Egypt's economy, increasingly dependent on foreign pleasure seekers, had taken a hard hit as the number of travelers dropped greatly. The people who oiled the tourism machine stayed home penniless. Ahmed went to the front lines near Tahrir Square in demand of a future. I imagine that his lack of familiarity with the space and the conditions of the battle lines put him at a disadvantage in the face of his armed, trained attackers. Ahmed tried to escape the unannounced onslaught, struggling with his cursed leg. The boy was not fast enough, and was shot, captured, beaten, tortured, and finally murdered. His captors threw his lifeless body into the Nile. Ahmed carried no form of identification that day and was added to the list of disappeared—those eaten by the revolution. But his parents sought after him until—through the maze of paperwork, lies, and legal dead ends—they found him. The clothes he was wearing that day in a plastic bag allowed them to identify his bloated, charred body.

Ahmed is one of the many martyrs who remain unnamed—Ahmed Mahmoud Mohamed Bekheit. The opposition of such a frail person against a mighty state apparatus is at the soul of this revolution—people against a system that is meant to represent us, decide the best for us, provide for our welfare, and yet does the exact opposite wherever possible.

Ahmed's motives and desires like so many fighters remain unspoken—this one will forever hold his silence. With all the honesty I can muster, I write these feeble words, which he may have uttered but was never given a chance to.

A Paper that Buries a Murder 

When Ahmed's bereaved parents finally found their son's body they were shocked. Mahmoud went to the deputy public prosecutor and lost all sense of control. “I cannot burry my son like this,” he said. He had just seen Ahmed's body after thirty-six days of searching. This was not the body of a person who had drowned, as the officials at the morgue had told him. Mahmoud's son was murdered. The bureaucrat told him to just burry his son because for seventeen days he had been "tortured." He did not imply that for the past seventeen days he had been tortured under police custody, but rather used the Arabic expression evoking the idea that his son's soul would remain tormented until receiving religious burial. The pretext of religious ritual would pave the way to clearing the members of the state apparatus of the crimes they had committed. The bureaucrat told Mahmoud to put his son at ease by burying his scorched and broken body and place his trust in the document that would prove the cause of his son's death: the forensics report. One year later that document has still not appeared and the records of Ahmed's body arriving at the police station on 22 December 2011 have disappeared, much like Ahmed did for those three weeks—criminally hidden from those who deserve to know.

Ahmed's eleven-year-old brother Islam is the last member of his family to have seen him alive. On the morning of his murder Ahmed had said he was leaving to run an errand. He was well dressed, and told his little brother he would go alone. Islam looked into the lens and told the world, "no matter what, I will not rest until those who did this to my brother and to all the other martyrs are brought to justice. Until I am older, bear this in mind." This revolution has shown a tendency to create new revolutionaries in the place of every fallen martyr.

              

These reflections on a video I filmed are only but an excerpt of the many details that are lost among the startling images captured and the breaking news written for immediate public consumption. These thoughts are an attempt to raise a matter of no triviality and that escapes the meta-narratives of revolution: the cost. Today the Muslim Brothers are attempting to build their hegemony of control. As this new political elite tries to erect its own empire of financial gain—justified by the "economic crisis" in a period of "instability”—this priceless cost that people pay is washed over in the process.

It is the risk of martyrdom that is at the heart of revolution. And it is the risk of martyrdom that is entailed in opposing a system of control. The names of Mina Danial, Sheikh Emad Effat and Jika may carry this revolution's loudest echo, but there are thousands others, recorded and unrecorded, who have borne this same cost.

It is the most powerful gift one can give—in Ahmed's case, as so often, without articulated intent. This is yet again, the cost of fighting for a freedom from the suppression performed today by the very men claiming to act in the name of the revolution, yet another set of criminals killing in the name of the state.

Tadween Publishing Roundup: News and Analysis from the Publishing World

$
0
0

[The following is roundup of the latest news and analyses from the publishing world that relates to pedagogy and knowledge production. It was originally published on Tadween Publishing's blog. For more updates, follow Tadween Publishing on Facebook and Twitter.] 

Three Predictions for Book Publishing in 2013 By Jeremy Greenfield (Forbes)
With a new year on the horizon, Forbes’ Jeremy Greenfield makes some predictions about what will rock the publishing world in 2013.

2012: The year of self-publishing By Husna Haq (Christian Science Monitor)
In a year of economic hardship, with bookstores closing and publishing houses merging in order to stay afloat, self-publishing remains a beacon of hope.

Scholastic Revenue Down 10% for Q2 By Maryann Yin (MediaBistro/Galley Cat)
Despite high hopes with some successful book series on the shelves, Scholastic revealed that its revenue for the second fiscal quarter of 2012 dropped 10% in comparison to last year.

How 6 New tools Change the Equation for Writing and Self-Publishing Your Book By Carla King (MediaShift/PBS)
Six new technological tools in the writing and publishing industry have the potential to revolutionize the way authors view writing and publishing in 2013.

Self-Publishing: No Longer Just a Vanity Project By Lynn Neary (NPR)
The success of self-published books is having a profound impact on the way authors and publishers think about the publishing world.

Legal Issues in Self-Publishing: What Authors Need to Know By Bernard Starr (Huffington Post)
Interview: Paul Rapp, an attorney who specializes in intellectual property rights, discusses the legal responsibilities of self-publishers.

All Armies - the Syrian Regime, the FSA and Islamist - Are Thieves

$
0
0

During the 1990s, my small village which felt like it was cut off from half the known world experienced a strange new phenomenon. A big mosque was built by donors from the city of Hama, the cost of which at the time outstripped the earnings of the residents of the whole village combined. The thing I remember most about the mosque was the huge quantities of rice and olive oil deposited in front of the mosque to distribute among the regular visitors. We began to see a few of the men from the village let their beards grow while some women started wearing the hijab. 

For those residents of the village it was worth changing certain life-long habits and modes of dress in exchange for a freely available source of much-needed nutrition. It mattered little to them whence it came. However, with the passing of time the children of that generation have adopted conservative Islamic ideas in a way in which their parents never had. Growing up at that time, the notion of Islamic conservatism is strongly wedded in my mind to long queues of impoverished people waiting in line at the door of the mosque for their winter supply of olive oil.  

Sunni Muslims account for approximately 70% of Syria's population. The success of conservative Islamists in spreading their ideas is intimately related to their closeness to the day to day essential needs of these ordinary people. Meeting these needs is the most important way of spreading ideologies and religious ideas among the public. This is precisely what Islamists in Syria and proselytizers in all societies do to achieve political and authoritarian goals. Despite the spread of conservative Islam in Syria, there had proved to be no fertile ground for Salafist and Jihadi ideas such as those of al-Qaeda. This, at least, was the case until the events of the past year.    

In a small village in the province of Idlib near the Syrian-Turkish border, Khaled, one of the residents had just returned from a month-long campaign  in rural Damascus with the National Unity battalion of the FSA to see his family. He was surprised to see a picture of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri on the wall of the living room: but the greater shock was to hear the people of the village talking about the figureheads of al-Qaeda in glowing terms as if they were living saints.

Khaled's village can be any of a number of conservative villages in Syria, butthis does not necessarily mean that they support fundamentalist ideas in the mould of al-Qaeda. However, now the people of the village find themselves indebted to Jubhat al-Nusra – an armed group affiliated to al-Qaeda – which led the battle to liberate the village and its surrounding areas from the brutal bombing campaign of the  forces of the Syrian regime.

According to local residents, a fighter from Jubhat al-Nusra blew himself up while targeting a key military checkpoint which had until then been able to withstand pressure from other FSA fighters. This action opened a window of opportunity for the FSA to raid the local military base and liberate it. Whether this is entirely true or an embellished account of reality, its impact has made a difference on the way the local residents think about Jubhat al-Nusra and this shift cannot be underestimated.  

We are faced not only with a shift in the needs and priorities of rural communities in Syria, but also the ways in which they now perceive themselves. Such communities have borne the brunt of much of this armed conflict. Achieving relative security and stability has become the overriding priority of local residents in villages such as Khaled's. Moreover, military victories seen to be putting the regime on the back foot are highly prized.

In areas under the control of the FSA, fighters from Jubhat al-Nusra can be found at the frontline battling the regime forces as well as taking responsibility for most of the critical attacks on regime forces thus far - such as the series of high profile explosions targeting key state institutions in the heart of the capital. This has engendered overwhelming feelings of respect and admiration towards Islamist extremists and Jubhat al-Nusra.  

When Ahmed, a resident of al-Ghouta al-Sharqiyeh in Damascus province, conveyed his gratitude and admiration for the courage of the Jihadi fighters to me, he said: "Although I myself haven't adopted the ideology of al-Qaeda, and I don't agree with many of their ideas, we have to admit that they are the best equipped to take on the fight against the Assadi regime because they have strict principles. You never see any of them making a song and dance in the media about what they have done – not like the others. Most of the FSA battalions want to show themselves off as being the most effective force on the ground. They're always releasing videos boasting about their power and achievements, however futile these actions may be. It's all done to get more funding, but the truth is that Jubhat al-Nusra are the real heroes". 

This isn't just the personal opinion of one individual but an opinion shared by many and is growing by the day, particularly with the revelation of increasing corruption within the ranks of some FSA groups. There is a real fear that many more Syrian Islamists may deviate towards extreme positionsin the coming period. The accumulated successes of Jubhat al-Nusra and their recognition as heroes by ordinary Syrians may lead to the adoption of extreme ideas in the near, not the distant future.

Jubhat al Nusra has recently been placed on the terrorist list by the US State Department, yet at the same time on the ground in Syria a united military command has been established as an umbrella for the many diverse strands of the FSA. This has brought the FSA semi-international acceptance so that it is considered a legitimate actor by a number of states. By separating the combatants against the regime in such a way there is a danger in creating greater fissures between the two groups. The FSA may refuse to co-operate with Jubhat al-Nusra for fear of losing its recently-acquired international standing. This will result in a weakening of its fighting capabilities. Moreover, the two groups will have less co-ordination in their actions leading to the increased possibility of armed confrontations between them. The split may extend to ordinary Syrians who may find themselves split  between their loyalties to Jubhat al-Nusra or the FSA. This is an option we can ill afford; such a cleavage would be too much for Syria to bear.   

The events of last week in the Bostan al-Qasr neighbourhood of Aleppo, which saw Jubhat al-Nusra fighters attack peaceful protestors, is a scandalous indicator of the infighting between the armed groups – taking them away from the principles of the revolution. Witnesses at the protest told me that Jubhat al-Nusra combatants fired live bullets in the air and attempted to arrest an activist because the protesters were heard shouting "kull jaysh harami, nizami, hurr wa islami" [all armies are thieves: regime, FSA and Islamist's]. The FSA failed to intervene despite being present at the protest. Social network forums were replete with angry criticism from both sides. 

We need a great deal of maturity and awareness to overcome the differences and competing interests in Syria. It has become evident that the armed conflict in no shape or form is directed towards the interests of the Syrian people. We cling to the hope that time will eventually bring forth a genuine Syrian leadership which is able to save the revolution from the paralysis of opportunism. 

[This article originally reposted from opendemocracy.net.]

Viewing all 6235 articles
Browse latest View live