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Tradition and the Anti-Politics Machine: DAM Seduced by the “Honor Crime”

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We write this piece as (disappointed) fans of the Palestinian hip hop group DAM at a time when the fierce attack on Gaza reminds us of grim realities that are the everyday stuff of life and death for Palestinian women and men.

With songs like “Who’s the Terrorist?” and “Born Here,” DAM gave thrilling political voice to a new generation of Palestinians who were no longer silent about the racism of the Israeli state. They challenged the state violence that was devastating Palestinian lives and­ communities, whether in the ghettos of Israeli cities or the territories occupied, suffocated, and bombarded since 1967. This was political music; sharp, angry, born of experience.

Given DAM's unapologetic and sophisticated political positions, it is surprising that when they decide to champion women’s rights, they succumb to an international anti-politics machine that blames only tradition for the intractability of (some) people's problems. Why, when they decide to speak up about violence against women, do they suddenly forget the gritty and complex realities of life on the ground in the places they know?

DAM’s new music video, “If I Could Go Back in Time,” is about the “honor crime,” even if the final credit insists that there is no connection between killing women and honor. Directed by Jackie Salloum, who gave the world the intelligent beauty of Sling Shot Hip Hop, it operates in a total political, legal, and historical vacuum. The setting is not given. Perhaps one is not needed when the story seems so familiar. The threat of a forced marriage. A brother hits his sister. A car somewhere. Some woods somewhere. A grave dug. A woman shot in the head by two men, her brother and father. The only indicator of who the people in the video are is the family home where a mother answers the telephone and where a group of men recite the fatiha together to bless their decision. Muslim men.


Gaza Reprieve: Jadaliyya Co-Editor Mouin Rabbani On What The Cease-Fire Tells Us About the Balance of Power

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The following interview was conducted on Friday 23 Novemeber 2012 by Russia Today's CrossTalk. Jadaliyya Co-Editor Mouin Rabbani, Harry Fear, and Yoram Meital discusses several issues in the aftermath of the most recent assualt on Gaza: What side can legitimately claim victory, or is it too early for an assessment? How long will this peace last? Israel continues to occupy the West Bank. What is the future of the two-state solution?

 

Thousands Fill Tahrir on Friday to Protest Morsi's New 'Dictatorial Powers'

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By Friday night, the number of the protesters, who began arriving in Tahrir Square for "Eyes of Freedom" Friday throughout the morning, had reached tens of thousands after rallies from Talaat Harb Street, Shubra, Sayyida Zeinab, and Mustafa Mahmoud Square in Giza reached Tahrir.

While many protesters had started leaving the square, others were just arriving.

For one, Ultras football fans arrived in torrents at sundown, adding thousands to the square.

Protesters chanted “The people want to topple the regime,” “Do not be afraid, Morsi has to leave,” and “Down with the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide.”

Over thirty opposition political groups took part in the protest. Their demands include the dismissal of Morsi's cabinet, the prosecution of police officers responsible for killing and injuring protesters, and a purge and restructuring of the police.

However, a new Constitutional Declaration announced by president Mohamed Morsi on Thursday altered the focus of the expected rallies. 

The declaration gained the ire of liberal and leftist forces across the country who charge that the president has awarded himself dictatorial powers since the new rules stipulate that no presidential decision taken since 30 June, when he assumed office, can be appealed.

The declaration also angered many Egyptians since it shields the Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly and Shura Council (upper house of parliament) from possible dissolution by pending court orders.

On the march to Tahrir from Mostafa Mahmoud mosque in the Mohandessin district, the ten thousand strong protesters haunted the Muslim Brotherhood and president Morsi with chants over the five mile route.

"Keep selling out the revolution, Badie," the protestors chanted, targeting the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood.

"Down with Mohamed Morsi Mubarak;" the chanters likened the current president's performance to that of the ousted dictator.

"Bread, freedom, and down with the Constituent Assembly."

However, along the route, news that Amr Moussa, a former Mubarak foreign minister and a 2012 presidential contender, had joined the rallies sparked anger from many protesters and led to skirmishes between some revolutionary youth and other Moussa supporters on the march.

"We say no to both the Brotherhood and people like Moussa who are remnants of the corrupt regime," Haitham Mohameddain of the Revolutionary Socialists, carried on shoulders by a fellow protester, called to the crowds.

As news arrived that Moussa was not leading the march and that he might have left altogether, the tense situation was diffused and the crowd returned to think of a next chant against Morsi.

Back in Tahrir Square, Ramdan Abul-Azam, forty, told Ahram Online: “[Morsi's] decisions are shocking. Now he has all the power and he insists on keeping the Constituent Assembly even though we reject it. We had to protest in Tahrir Square.”

“The declaration incriminates President Morsi,” said Mahmoud Mohamed,  seventy, from Upper Egypt. “The Brotherhood took over the revolution and I urge them to take the Salafists with them on a trip to the Cape of Good Hope in order to learn about human rights in Islam.”

Clashes on Mohamed Mahmoud Street between protesters and Central Security Forces (CSF) continued for a fifth day. Protesters accused CSF of using gunshots, tear gas, and rocks.

Young protesters threw rocks and Molotov cocktails. Several protesters were injured, mostly suffering from head injuries. One protester, Salah Gaber, was killed.

Small rallies entered the street from time to time chanting anti-Brotherhood slogans and Ultras songs.

In Mohamed Mahmoud Street, an emotional Ahmed Mounir, fifteen, told Ahram Online that his brother was injured in last year’s Mohamed Mahmoud clashes and had to have his leg amputated.

“I have been in the square for three days now. I want to secure my brother’s rights and I don’t care if I live or die,” he said.

More intense clashes continued in Qasr El-Aini Street right off the square between protesters and security forces well into the night.

Ultras fans joined hundreds of others engaging in skirmishes with the police, braving tear-gas and throwing stones at the forces based deeper along the street.

At one point earlier in the afternoon an armoured police vehicle was set afire by the protesters. 

During the afternoon, some protesters formed a human shield between CSF and protesters on Qasr El-Aini Street in a failed attempt to prevent further violence.

Barbed-wire barricade were set up earlier by security forces, but that did not work to stop the clashes either.

Tens of protesters were ferried on motorcycles to the field hospital set up in the square after suffering suffocation from teargas and stone injuries.

"We were protesting peacefully as we usually do, but as soon as we approached the police they started attacking us," Ahmed Hamido, a protester suffering from the effects of tear gas, said.

"God willing we will remove Morsi as we did Mubarak," he told Ahram Online.

Two tents were set up in Tahrir Square by the Constitution Party and the Popular Current, but there are no reported plans for a sit-in.

Parties will deliberate on next steps after protest.

"We will evaluate the situation and see whether there will be a sit-in or not, parties will meet at the end of the day to discuss our future actions," Emad Attiya, a founding member of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party told Ahram Online.

Some of the rallies were led by political figures such as veteran socialist Kamel Khalil, and Socialist Popular Alliance Party leader Abdel-Ghafr Shukr. The Popular Current, the Constitution Party, the liberal Wafd Party, April 6 (Democratic Front), Revolutionary Socialists, and the Social Democratic Party also took part in the rallies.

[Developed in partnership with Ahram Online.]

Revolution Protection Law May Fail To Live Up To Its Name

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After passing a controversial constitutional declaration late Thursday giving himself expansive powers, President Mohamed Morsy later went on to articulate the details of the Revolution Protection Law introduced in the declaration. 

Meant to uphold revolutionary demands, the law failed to quell the anger of the thousands of protesters in Tahrir Square, who vociferously called for the downfall of Morsy and the new regime. 

Although there have been numerous calls for such a law since Hosni Mubarak's ouster, Morsy's carrot-wielding is lost in the midst of what many perceived as an unprecedented power grab. 

The Revolution Protection Law is sandwiched in the middle of a declaration that renders the president's decrees and laws immune from appeal or cancellation. It also protects both the Shura Council and the Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly from dissolution by any judicial authority and extends its mandate by two months. 

It also gives immunity to all decisions and decrees issued by Morsy, who also granted himself the exclusive right to take any measures he sees fit to protect the country's national unity, national security and the revolution.

The Revolution Protection Law establishes a new prosecution dedicated to investigating violations committed against protesters during the 25 January revolution, which typically refers to the eighteen-day uprising that toppled Mubarak and brought the military council into power. It does not, however, necessarily include investigations into the ensuing aggression committed by security and army forces against protesters in the months that followed. 

The law also calls for the retrial of those who held executive posts during the time these violations occurred, including those responsible for ordering or failing to stop the killing of protesters and those complicit in hiding evidence against the perpetrators, as well as investigating cases of political and financial corruption of former regime officials.

However, the technicalities of the law may mean that retrials of former regime officials are more difficult than most people think, leaving the one upside of the declaration in shambles. 

Tricky Retrials

A main criticism of the new law is that it ties the retrials of former regime officials to finding new evidence.

Prosecutors of the Mubarak trial constantly complained of police and intelligence institutions being uncooperative, indirectly hinting that they hid or destroyed evidence.

"The whole concept of retrying them depends on finding new evidence. Is there any new evidence to be found? This is the question," Ahmed Ragheb, lawyer and executive director of the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, tells Egypt Independent. 

Raafat Fouda, professor of constitutional law at Cairo University, says, "Those who were already sentenced cannot be retried because the same person cannot be tried twice," again unless new evidence is found. 

Most police officers were found innocent due to insufficient evidence, and "you cannot just retry them because you do not like the fact they were acquitted," he adds. 

Ragheb also says that although the law has been one of the main demands of rights groups, it does not establish a solid foundation for transitional justice. 

For one, it fails to outline mechanisms by which the newly-established prosecution can collect evidence. 

In gearing up for the trials of former regime officials and police officers involved in the killing of protesters, the prosecution's only source of evidence was police investigation records, which ultimately impeded any indictments and led to most officers walking away scot-free.

"Most of the evidence used in the trials of police officers and Mubarak was collected by the police. The law in question does not provide an alternative for this, which means we will be going around in the same circle," he says.

The types of crimes committed against protesters are somewhat out of the scope of current evidence-collecting mechanisms outlined in Egyptian laws, which depend solely on probes conducted by police forces who, in these cases, are themselves the accused. 

Ragheb previously proposed a transitional justice law comprising mechanisms for collecting evidence mainly based on codes present in international human rights laws which Egypt is a signatory to and which are said to be more flexible and efficient. 

Rights lawyer Nasser Amin says Egypt needs to ratify the Rome Statute Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court.

"If this treaty is ratified, its legal codes will be automatically part of Egypt's legal system, providing a broader context for the types of crimes in question," he says. 

The law passed by Morsy using his sweeping legislative powers still functions according to the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedures Law, both not malleable enough to deal with these crimes, he adds. 

Of equal importance is the law's vagueness in specifying the time period in which violations were committed against protesters, whether it encompasses violence that occurred during the reign of the military council. 

The law repeatedly refers to the "former regime" and the "25 January revolutionaries." But as clashes continue around Tahrir this week, it's unclear whether protesters who come out against the new ruling powers will be considered "revolutionary."

"The decisions issued by Morsy specify exceptional pensions for martyrs including those who were killed under the military regime. The fact-finding committee appointed by Morsy to investigate crimes against protesters includes the time of military rule."

"Why this point is not clear in the new law is questionable," Ragheb adds.

 [This article originally appeared in Egypt Independent.]

From Opposition to Puppet: Morocco’s Party of Justice and Development

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A protest repressed, a journalist beaten, an artist detained, a newspaper censored, and an activist tortured. Sixteen months after what was hailed as a “landmark” constitutional referendum, and exactly one year after a new government was elected, like a broken record, headlines from Morocco continue to repeat themselves. When the announcement for the 25 November 2011 parliamentary elections was made, the February 20 Movement and its supporters quickly agreed to boycott--a decision rooted in the prediction that the elections would bring about no real change. A year after the elections that gave the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) a majority win, the “path of reform” promised by the regime has yet to take off. Moreover, a combination of tax exemptions for the wealthy, food subsidies intended to prevent a popular uprising, and the disproportionate allocation of the state budget provide the outlines of an abysmal economic outlook for a country growing increasingly dependent on aid packages and International Monetary Fund loans.  

The November 2011 elections, which were initially scheduled for the following year, were seen by many observers as the first test to the constitutional reforms introduced by the king. Along with the reforms, a controversial quota was set in place intended to reserve a certain amount of seats for women and young adults. The elections were also the first that legally required the king to appoint the prime minister based on the party that received the most votes. The prime minister would also take on the title of “Head of Government,” giving him the power to dissolve parliament. However, even with the reforms, the vast majority of power remains within the hands of the king. These limited reforms that indicated a step towards liberalization, rather than democratization, as demanded by various parties, movements, and civil society members, failed to mobilize even half of the Moroccan population eligible to vote during elections. Turn out hovered at around forty-five percent, with the PJD winning about twenty-three percent of the vote, leading to the appointment of PJD leader, Abdelilah Benkirane, as prime minister. The November 2011 elections, like previous elections, yielded a coalition government, this time comprised of the PJD, the Istiqlal Party, the Popular Movement, and the Party of Progress and Socialism. 

Before Abdelilah Benkirane could even formally present his cabinet, the palace was pumping out press releases announcing a round of royal advisor appointments. Among them was Fouad Ali El Himma, a childhood friend of King Mohammed VI and a notorious palace crony who benefits both politically and financially from his relationship with the king. In the years leading up to the PJD win, Benkirane and El Himma were public rivals. During that time, Benkirane was quite vocal about his critical views towards figures such as El Himma. Yet less than two weeks into his term, Benkirane had this to say in reaction to Mohammed VI appointing El Himma as a royal adviser: “I am forming the new government in a country whose head of state is King Mohamed VI, he is my boss. It is not my business how the head of state, who is my boss, manages his royal court.” Beyond simply recognizing the authority that Mohammed VI has over him as Prime Minister, Benkirane unintentionally provided the skeptical voices within Morocco hard evidence that there is truly no indication that what the regime claims is a “path towards reform” is anything more than a stagnant wall built to preserve the status quo. 

The PJD and its members exuded a cha’abi spirit that many of those in Morocco who were disenchanted with politics related to. Unlike previous winning parties, the PJD’s structure was transparent and based on internal party elections. In numerous public appearances, Benkirane’s expression in the colloquial dialect displayed what many described as a step away from the elitism and disconnection so often associated with other political figures. Some of its members were previously detained, and even the current minister of justice, Mustapha Ramid, served on the defense team of recently released Moroccan journalist, Rachid Nini. Bassima Hakkaoui, the only woman serving in Benkirane’s cabinet, came out in full force denouncing her colleagues’ decision to appoint only one female minister. Despite such promising beginnings, once again, the current political climate in Morocco illustrates that the worst thing that can happen to a political party is for it to win elections. Benkirane’s colloquial language has become a target of ridicule; despite Ramid’s previously held position in favor of reforms, under his current position as minister of justice, activists are detained for the simple act of peacefully protesting; and when a sixteen-year-old Moroccan girl committed suicide after being forced to marry her rapist, Hakkaoui defended the marriage between a victim and her rapist, suggesting it causes “no real harm.” 

The continued failure of the PJD and deafening silence of its most critical voices captures the multifaceted nature of power within the Moroccan regime. There is a cooptation of the PJD, as the monarchy simultaneously asserts its authority while appropriating the language of reform advocated by voices of the opposition. The PJD’s reputation as a party that skillfully placed itself within the political sphere, while maintaining a relatively critical stance regarding vague notions of corruption and nepotism associated with other popular parties, made it a compatible actor in the monarchy’s strategy. The election of the PJD was more of a political win for Mohammed VI than it was for the party. It was a convenient way for Mohammed VI to sustain the narrative of a “reforming Morocco”—a narrative crucial to the preservation of the monarchy. It is also the monarchy’s assertion of power that is damaging the PJD both in its image and its ability to effectively rule. In the most explicit way possible, Mohammed VI sent a message to the PJD and its leadership by not only appointing the party’s staunchest rival as a royal adviser, but prominent figures of the previous government as well. In an embarrassing display of Mohammed VI treading over the PJD, during US Secretary Clinton’s first official visit to Morocco after the November 2011 elections, her first public meeting was not with the foreign minister, but with Taib Fassi-Fihri who is the former foreign minister turned royal adviser.

Though not all the blame should be placed on the monarchy. That the PJD leadership were previously such ardent critics demonstrates there is certainly an acknowledgment on their behalf of the power structures in place, making their failure that much more destructive to their political image. Some of its most prominent members, including the aforementioned Ramid, were sympathetic and at times, openly supportive of the voices of dissent, including the February 20th Movement. That sympathy and support quickly wore away within months after elections, and the systematic crackdown on the movement continued. More recently, in July 2012, a judge ruled that the movement itself was an illegal entity, and any association with the movement was therefore subject to prosecution. Even when presented with evidence of human rights violations and the questionable judicial process many members of the movement go through, any effort to rectify these rampant practices never go beyond a public acknowledgment

Finding little room to maintain its reputation as a former party of the opposition within the regime, the PJD has looked elsewhere to maintain a positive image abroad and avoid an abrupt political demise. One such arena is Morocco’s temporary seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which has allowed it to play an active role in the diplomatic maneuverings surrounding the ongoing crisis in Syria. Current foreign minister and former PJD leader Saad-Eddine El Othmani has been consistently vocal against the violent actions of the Syrian regime. Morocco has hosted Arab League meetings, pushed resolutions in the UNSC, and acted as a mediator between Russian and American parties during negotiations, among other activities. US Secretary Clinton singled out Othmani’s position on Syria during a press briefing, saying, “I thank the foreign minister for the important role that Morocco has played, first within the Arab League and second within the Security Council. Morocco is in a unique position to help shape the international community’s efforts.” 

Even when the PJD attempts to establish itself as a legitimate political force, it avoids threatening the monarchy’s unchecked power. With Benkirane fully accepting the conditions under which him and his government can “rule”--conditions shaped by the power structures tilted in favor of the monarchy over an elected government--the PJD ventures into a realm where political parties are manipulated for the sake of preserving the monarchy. The PJD, like previous ruling parties, are useful to the monarchy as shock absorbers for political dissent. Meanwhile, the bickering ruling coalition of Islamists, socialists, and conservative nationalists allows the monarchy to maintain distance from critiques of political deadlock, and emerge as a “neutral” institution that “enforces change” for the “good” of the Moroccan people, as was the case for the constitutional referendum. But even the distance the monarchy enjoyed from direct opposition within civil society continues to lessen as economic conditions worsen. Just last week, members of the February 20th Movement and the Moroccan Association for Human Rights were beaten for protesting against the palace’s 895,000 USD daily budget. Pundits may continue to describe Morocco as an “exception,” but it was the combination of “exceptional” circumstances, including authoritarianism, repression of freedoms, and dire socioeconomic conditions that brought down neighboring regimes less than two years ago.

تيار استقلال القضاء: من مواجهة مبارك إلى تقاسم كعكة السلطة مع الإخوان

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 بعد فوز الرئيس محمد مرسي بالانتخابات الرئاسية شهدت قيادات تيار الاستقلال صعوداً كبيراً، سواء في مؤسسة الرئاسة أو على صعيد الجمعية التأسيسية أو مؤسسات رقابية وقضائية، حيث احتل المستشار محمود مكي منصب نائب رئيس الجمهورية، وعين شقيقه المستشار أحمد مكي، وزيرا للعدل، وأصبح المستشار هشام جنينة رئيسا للجهاز المركزي للمحاسبات، واختير المستشار حسام الغرياني رئيساً للجمعية التأسيسية لوضع الدستور، ورئيساً للمجلس القومي لحقوق الإنسان، وكان المستشار محمود الخضيري رئيساً للجنة التشريعية بمجلس الشعب، الذي تم حله بحكم قضائي.

ولم تتوقف السيطرة عند ذلك بل أصدر المستشار أحمد مكي وزير العدل تغيرات مهمة فى أسماء مساعديه من خلال حركة قضائية اعتمدها مجلس القضاء الأعلى شملت تغيير 6 من مساعدي وزير العدل، أبرزهم المستشار عاصم الجوهري، مساعد وزير العدل للكسب غير المشروع، رئيس لجنة استرداد الأموال بالخارج، والاستعانة بمستشارين آخرين من تيار الاستقلال منهم المستشار يحيى جلال، نائب رئيس محكمة النقض، الذي تولى إدارة الكسب غير المشروع، والمستشار هشام رؤوف، الذى أصبح مساعداً لشؤون الديوان العام، والمستشار أحمد سليمان الذي أصبح مساعداً للوزير لشؤون المركز القومي للدراسات القضائية، والمستشار رفعت حنا شنودة مساعداً للوزير للإدارات القانونية.

ظهور تيار الاستقلال بقوة في عهد الدكتور محمد مرسي ترجع جذوره الواضحة أمام المجتمع إلى نهاية عام 2005 أثناء دعم الإخوان مع تيارات وحركات وطنية تيار الاستقلال في مظاهرات حاشدة، عندما طالب أعضاء التيار بتعديل قانون السلطة القضائية للحد من تدخل السلطة التنفيذية فى العدالة، وكشف عدد من رموزه عن قيام جهاز مباحث أمن الدولة بعمليات تزوير واسعة فى انتخابات مجلس الشعب آنذاك خلال المرحلتين الثانية والثالثة من الانتخابات.

بعد ثورة 25 يناير خاض التيار عدداً من المعارك لبسط سيطرته الكاملة على المؤسسات القائمة والمتماسكة فى الدولة، فكانت البداية بأزمة النائب العام السابق المستشار عبدالمجيد محمود عندما أصدر رئيس الجمهورية قراراً جمهورياً بإقالة النائب العام وتعيينه سفيراً للفاتيكان، وما تبعه هذا القرار من أزمة بين مؤسسة القضاء والرئاسة ليبقى النائب العام في منصبه بعد أحاديث عن دور المستشار حسام الغرياني في إقناع المستشار عبدالمجيد محمود بقبول المنصب الجديد، مخالفاً ما دافع عنه من تدخل السلطة التنفيذية فى عمل القضاء، وخرج ليصرح: «لو ثبتت إدانتى فى أزمة النائب العام سأتقدم باستقالتي».

وبعد إثارة اسمه في هذه الأزمة اقترح «الغرياني» تشكيل لجنة ثلاثية مكونة من أعضاء التأسيسية تقوم بزيارة مكتب النائب العام وسؤاله حول مكالمة «الغرياني» لتقوم الجمعية بتقييم الأمر، وفى حالة إدانته من جانب نسبة 30٪ من أعضاء التأسيسية بشيء في أزمة النائب العام سيقوم بتقديم استقالته من التأسيسية ومن المجلس القومي لحقوق الإنسان.

وأخيراً رحب عدد من رموز تيار استقلال القضاء بقرارات الرئيس مرسي الأخيرة، فأصدرت حركة قضاة من أجل مصر بياناً أعلنت فيه تأييدها قرارات الدكتور محمد مرسي الأخيرة وأرجعوها إلى: «إحساسه بوجود أحداث تنذر بخطر داهم يهدد الثورة المصرية واستقرار البلاد، ولما كان رئيس الجمهورية المنتخب هو المنوط به الحفاظ على أمن واستقرار البلاد، وله فى سبيل ذلك اتخاذ ما يلزم من إجراءات ثورية للحفاظ على سلامة البلاد ومؤسساتها خاصة المنتخبة منها».

[عن "المصري اليوم"]

Infographic: Palestinian & Israeli Deaths

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This infographic reflects the death toll and peaks of armed force in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. It draws on detailed data gathered by Israeli human rights organisation B'Tselem since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000. 

The chart also includes figures from a previous study on the peaks of armed force and ensuing death tolls. The chart is particularly pertinent as a new and tenuous ceasefire has halted Israel's most recent military campaign, Operation Pillar of Cloud, which left more than 150 Palestinians and 5 Israelis dead.

Of course this timeline is an ahistorical snapshot of a settler-colonial conflict that stretches back six decades. Still, it demonstrates a stark assymetry in the use of  force even over this shorter twelve-year period.

[Download full-size image here.]

 

 

[Image originally published by Visualizing Palestine.]

Democracy, Democracy, But The Courts Can’t Touch Me

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Through the release of a controversial set of executive decrees, President Mohamed Morsi has granted himself unheralded powers—powers normally reserved for dictators, not democratic leaders. The raft of decrees effectively renders him as “above the law,” meaning that the jurisdiction of Egypt’s courts no longer applies to the Egyptian president, or any of his Islamist-controlled executive bodies—an unprecedented move that not even Hosni Mubarak himself dared to employ.

The promises of democracy, social justice, and transparency in government remain as out of reach right now as they were during the Mubarak era. Egypt’s president holds executive powers, and legislative powers (which he usurped based on the dissolution of Parliament last June), and is not longer checked by any judicial authority. Thus any hope of a system of “checks and balances” is now in tatters. Morsi claimed in his speech on Friday that he does not seek to monopolize power. Yet his recent actions seem to suggest otherwise.

The timing of the decrees arrival is no surprise. No doubt buoyed by his elevated status following the Gaza ceasefire, Morsi did what any politician strives to do: ride a wave of public goodwill and use it to advance his own interests.

Morsi declared the upper chamber of Parliament immune from judicial dissolution at a time when the Egyptian judiciary was  widely expected to issue rulings that  would adversely affect the Muslim Brotherhood, such as the dissolution of the upper house of Parliament, the Shura Council, and possibly a declaration that the Constituent Assembly was unconstitutional. Last June, the Supreme Constitutional Court dissolved the parliament’s lower chamber, which was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood.

More importantly, the decree sets the Constituent Assembly, a hundred-member constitution-drafting body, out of the reach of the courts. The Assembly, which is more than seventy-percent Islamist, has been plagued with problems, most notably fierce criticism of its composition, which is said to favor Islamist political currents. Recently, a majority of the assembly’s non-Islamist members resigned in protest of the dominance of Islamist political groups of the constitution writing process.

While the fate of the Constituent Assembly is unclear, a bleak future awaits in the event that it remains tasked with the drafting Egypt’s new constitution. Already, a tentative first draft of the constitution institutes the entrenchment of religion in government affairs to a level unprecedented in Egypt’s history. The draft constitution gives Parliament unlimited powers of interpretation of sharia, which would be the “primary source of legislation.” In other words, the draft constitution, if ratified, could result in a mode of governance with an extremely conservative Islamist orientation.

By placing the constituent assembly and the Shura Council, along with his own executive decisions, out the reach of Egypt’s courts, Morsi has effectively told the Egyptian people that not only is he above the law, but that he is the law. He has declared these powers for himself based, not on any legal reasoning, but rather the absence of any restraints that could prevent him from taking these decisions.

These moves seem to be geared toward promoting the Brotherhood’s influence inside the Egypt’s judiciary, famed for its non-partisan orientations and independence from political jockeying. The courts have already dealt Morsi multiple embarrassing defeats, including rebuffing his attempt to reinstitute the dissolved parliament. After Morsi had attempted to oust Prosecutor-General Abdel Meguid Mahmoud last month,  prominent judges publicly protested, arguing that the President did not have that authority to do so. Mahmoud, a Mubarak-era figure, is one the causalities of Morsi's latest decrees.

Egypt’s quest for democracy in large part lies within the judicial branch. That the judiciary is only one official body separating Egyptians from complete autocracy puts partisans of the January 25 Revolution in an awkward spot. On the one hand, many of Egypt’s top judges are remnants of Mubarak’s era. At the same time, if allowed to stand, the decree’s “unprecedented assault on judicial independence” would result in inviolable rights that would render any hints of democracy in Egypt meaningless, particularly the right to a fair trial and an impartial hearing. Crucially, it would also mean that there would be no channel to challenge Morsi and the Islamist-dominated constituent assembly and shura council.. The Supreme Judicial Council has called for the entire judiciary to go on strike, including all judges and prosecutors, until the decree is overturned. Alexandria’s entire court system has already been declared closed. While the courts cannot legally challenge the decrees – having been banned from doing so – an outright challenge such as the strike puts the legitimacy of Morsi’s action in serious question. Besides the strike, the ongoing battles in Tahrir Square will be crucial in the next few weeks.

Now that Morsi has granted himself absolute power, he will no doubt be itching to use it. Meanwhile, the hope for democracy in Egypt will in no small part lie within the fate of Egypt’s third branch of government. 


فواز طرابلسي: حرير وحديد

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[“كتب” هي سلسلة تستضيف “جدلية” فيها المؤلفين والمؤلفات في حوار حول أعمالهم الجديدة ونرفقه بفصل من الكتاب.]

فواز طرابلسي،حرير وحديد:من جبل لبنان الى قناة السويس، رياض الريس للكتب والنشر، بيروت، كانون الثاني ٢٠١٣.

جدليّة: كيف تبلورتْ فكرة الكتاب وما الذي قادك نحو الموضوع؟

فواز طرابلسي: الكتاب الحالي نتاج الفائض من الشغل على كتابة ”تاريخ لبنان الحديث“. قادتني ابحاثي الى اكتشاف ثلاثة امور: الاول، تميّز القرن التاسع عشر بحركة إنتقال واتصال وتبادل واسعة النطاق ومدهشة الابعاد بين بلدان حوض المتوسط، وتحديدا تكاثر البعثات والرحلات وبناء وسائل المواصلات وتطور شبكات الاتصالات وتزاحم الحملات العسكرية والمقاومات بين اوروبا الغربية والعالم العربي. الامر الثاني هو اكتشاف علاقات بين شخصيات واحداث، خلال تلك الفترة، لم تكن معروفة كثيرا او حتى متخيلة الحدوث. والثالث: كان الكتاب مناسبة لتدوين ما فاتني تدوينه في “تاريخ لبنان الحديث” من وقائع ومعلومات وتأويلات جديدة عن الحركات الاجتماعية والنزاعات الاهلية ١٨٤٠-١٨٦٠ في جبل لبنان وخصوصا الدور الذي إحتلته تلك البقعة الصغيرة من السلطنة العثمانية في السياسات والنزاعات الكولونيالية على المنطقة.

جدلية: ماهي الأفكار والأطروحات الرئيسية التي يتضمنها الكتاب؟

ف. ط: لا يطمح الكتاب الى تقديم اية افكار او اطروحات. يسرد الكيفية التي بها تتشابك مصائر فردية بمصائر جماعية، وتؤثرّّ مصائر هؤلاء ولا زالت تؤثر فينا.

جدلية: ماهي التحديات التي جابهتك أثناء البحث والكتابة؟

ف. ط:الكتاب مكتوب على شكل حوليات ومدوّنات. يمكن اعتبارها مدوّنات لـ«بلوغر» من ذلك الزمن يسجّل الاحداث في نبذات يتبيّّن له انها مترابطة ومتشابكة ومتقاطعة اكثر مما كان يتصوّر.

التحدي الاكبر هو الالتزام بالمعارف التاريخية. مادة الكتاب هي التاريخ. وإن يكن السرد يقارب الرواية. سعيت للالتزام الصارم بالوقائع التاريخية، على الاقل ما هو معروف منها معرفة مسنودة الى يومنا هذا. لم أسمح لنفسي بأي تخييل الا في ثلاث حالات موضعية أملاها السرد التاريخي نفسه. لم اكن بحاجة لاكثر من ذلك: الحياة الحقيقية، كما عوّدتنا، أغرب بكثير من الخيال.

جدلية: كيف يتموضع هذا الكتاب في الحقل الفكري/الجنس الكتابي الخاص به وكيف سيتفاعل معه؟

ف. ط: لست اعرف له جنسا او نوعا. وانا فضولي لمعرفة كيف سوف يجري تصنيفه.

جدلية: ما هو موقع هذا الكتاب في مسيرتك الفكرية والإبداعية؟

ف. ط: منذ أن قررت الكتابة عن تجربة العنف في لبنان تقلّب انتاجي بين تدوين اليوميات (صورة الفتى بالاحمر، عن امل لا شفاء منه عن  حصار بيروت ١٩٨٢) ونقد الفكر السياسي والاقتصادي (صلات بلا وصل-ميشال شيحا والاديولوجية اللبنانية، عكس السير، الخ.) والدراسات الادبية والفنية (غيرنيكا-بيروت، ومسرح فيروز والاخوين الرحباني، إن كان بدّك تعشق، الخ.) وما لبثت ان قادتني هذه الانواع المختلفة الى النوع الاكثر شمولا وهو التأريخ (تاريخ لبنان الحديث). والتاريخ هو النوع الجامع. ينتمي «حرير وحديد» الى السياق ذاته وإن يكن بإسلوب مختلف.  

جدلية: من هو الجمهور المفترض للكتاب وما الذي تأمل أن يصل إليه القراء؟

ف. ط:همّي الرئيس وصول كتبي وكتاباتي الى اكبر عدد من الشباب. اكتب الى القاريء العربي. لدي جمهوري المتواضع من القراء، بحدود الندرة المتزايدة في عدد القراء في المنطقة، ويسرّّني ان كتاب «تاريخ لبنان الحديث» هو الآن في طبعته الرابعة في غضون اربع سنوات. لكني اطمح بطبيعة الحال الى المزيد من القراء.

جدلية: ماهي مشاريعك الأخرى/المستقبلية؟

ف. ط: اعمل حاليا على دراسة عن التركيب الطبقي للمجتمع والسلطة في لبنان.

فواز طرابلسي، حرير وحديد:من جبل لبنان الى قناة السويس، رياض الريس للكتب والنشر، بيروت، كانون الثاني ٢٠١٣.

من الشرنقة الى البزرة 

داخل الشرنقة تتحول الدودة الى يرقة عمياء تعيش في حرارة بين ٢٠ و ٢٥ درجة. تتحول وتغيّر جلدها. ومنها يولد الفراش. يعيش فَراش القزّ في الشرنقة حوالي عشرين يوما وعندما يحين وقت خروجه، يفرز مادة لعابية يثقب بها جدار الشرنقة ويخرج منها فَرَاشا من الجنسين، ذكرا وانثى. وفراش القز لا يطير ولا يأكل. إنْ هو الا اعضاء تناسلية معدة للتلاقح لا غير. والانثى عادة أكبر حجما من الذكر وأطول عمرا. 

يسافد الفراشُ الذكرُ الواحد عددا من الاناث يصل الى ست ولا تستغرق عملية السفاد واللقاح اطول من ربع ساعة، يحرّك خلالها الذكر جناحيه دليل الاثارة الجنسية. وإسم الفراش مأخوذ من هذه الحركة. يقال: «فرّش الطائر» على الشيء اي رفرف عليه. ولكن ليس كل انواع الفراش يرفرف عندما يثار جنسيا. وإعلم ان فراش القزّ يرفرف ولا يطير (وتقول العامة «يفرفر» لانه اخفّ على النطق). ولعل رفرفته من غير طيران مردّها ان الغلمة قد أثقلته. 

بعد ان يرفرف ذكر الفراش على أنثاه ويقضي منها الوَطَر، يخرّ مغشياً عليه ويقضي نحبه. تعيش الانثى بعده ثلاث ايام وليال تبيض خلالها بين ٤٠٠ و٨٠٠ بيضة. والبيوض أشبه بحبّات لؤلو صغيرة بيضاء ثم يميل لونها الى الرمادي الى ان يصير اقرب الى السواد. ولا يتعدّى طول البيضة الميلمتر الواحد وتزن الالف منها غراما واحدا. وبعد خمسة ايام من المبيض، تتوقف حركة البيضة وتدخل في حالة سبات تستمر خلال الصيف والخريف والشتاء لتتفتح في الربيع. 

١٨٣١ - باريس: الانثى هي الاصل 

لم يكتفِ الصبياني بالدعوة الى تحرر المرأة واعادة الاعتبار للجسد على ما علّم السمعاني. قال ان لا امل في حلّ اي قضية اجتماعية للشعوب والافراد الا بحلّ قضية العلاقات بين الرجل والمرأة ذلك ان التحريمات الجنسية تعقّد المشاكل الاجتماعية. والحل؟ إباحة الحرية المطلقة للغرائز. يتوجب ان تتحرر المرأة والرجل من واجب الاخلاص الزوجي، لانه لا يراعي غرائز الطبيعة البشرية ويدفع الى اشباع تلك الغرائز بواسطة الخيانة الزوجية او البغاء. لمكافحة هاتين الآفتين، طالب «الاب» بتعديل قوانين الاحوال الشخصية لتجيز الزيجات العابرة والمؤقتة. حتى انه أباح تعدد الزيجات والحرية الجنسية المطلقة للرجل والمرأة على حد سواء. ودافع عن حق المرأة المتزوجة في اقامة علاقات جنسية خارج اطار الزواج أسوة بالرجل.

ودفع الصبياني بفكرة «الزوج» المتكون من ثنائي الرجل-المرأة المتساوي في الجوهر الى اقصى النهايات. أفتى بأن الله - عزّ وجلّ - انما هو ذكر وأنثى. وطالب بأن تكون رئاسة الكنيسة الكاثوليكية شراكة بين رجل وإمرأة.

      وكما يحدث عادة في التنظيمات ذات الرأسين، ذرّ الخلاف قرنه بين بازار والصبياني. والرجلان على مقدار كبير من الاختلاف في الطبع والقصد. بازار منظّم وقائد سياسي جمهوري واشتراكي يسعى الى الثورة. والصبياني معلّم ومبلسِم جراح وداعية تغيير اجتماعي واخلاقي سلمي يؤمن بأن النزاعات السياسية والثورات لا تؤدي الى اكثر من إثارة الكراهية والعنف. بازار يوحي بالاحترام، أما الصبياني فيستدعي الوله إن لم نقل العبادة. إتسعت شقة الخلاف بين «الأبوين» وإنفجرت حول موضوع المرأة. إستنكر بازار افكار الصبياني عن الحب الحرّ ونادى بالعودة الى الأصل السمعاني للعقيدة. وقع الانشقاق وخرج بازار مخليا الساحة للسمعاني ينفرد بالزعامة وقد رأى نفسه مختارا من الله وتشبّه بالمسيح. 

قدّسه مريدوه ولقّبوه «القانون الحيّ» و«إكسير الحب» و«كاتدرائية المحبة» و «سيّد الدنيا». قالوا «يسرع يعيش في الصبياني. كانت السمعانية عقيد. انها الآن فرقة دينية». وباشروا البحث عن «الام» لتكون نصفه الاخر. سعوا اول الامر لدى كلير بازار وقد هجرت زوجها المنشقّ وظلّت وفية للكنيسة الاصلية. إعتذرت كلير. وإستمر البحث.

نسوية واشتراكية

هي الابنة غير الشرعية لاب پيروڤي وأمّ فرنسية. ذات عصرية، حضرت اجتماعا للسمعانيين في حيّ سان جيرمان بباريس. سمعتهم يتحدثون عن انتظار المسيح-الانثى، تجامِع «الاب» لتكوين «الزوج الاسمى .» وفي الاجتماع، حيث يتركون كرسيا شاغرا للمسيح الانثى، سمعت الصبياني يسهب في وصف الزوج المسيحياني الذي سوف يخلّص العالم. 

قرأتْ اعمال السمعاني واعجبت بها، خصوصا هجسه بالماء، إذ كان يعتقد ان تيارات المعرفة الانسانية - المال والاحترام والقوة - يجب ان تنساب بحرّية مثل الانهر والشلالات لكي يتحقق التقدّم. وراقها منه انه تخلى عن لقب «كونت» لاعتباره اياه ادنى من لقب «مواطن».

لم يطل بها المقام بين القوم السمعانيين. لم يعجبها تراتبهم. ولا تعصّبهم الاعمى للعلوم. يريدون تحقيق نصف ما تريد: حقوق المرأة لا حقوق العمال. سخرت بنوع خاص من سذاجة ارائهم الاقتصادية والاجتماعية خصوصا ظنهم ان مجرد تسليم الصناعيين والخبراء السلطة ليديروا المجتمع كما لو انه مصنع او شركة يكفي لتحقيق التقدم والعدالة.

أرادت بناء «قصر العمال» فذهبتْ الى الاشتراكية.

ظل سؤال يؤرقها: «لماذا لا اكون انا «انثى المسيح؟». قطعت عهدا على نفسها ان تسعى لأن تكونها. لم ترق لها فكرة مضاجعة الصبياني وقد باتت تنفر من الجنس بعد زواجها الفاشل. 

نسوية واشتراكية تحلم بتغيير العالم. الإسم فلورا تريستان.

خريف ١٨٣١- ثورة الحرير

«ليون مدينة رمادية مثل حال عمالها»، كتبت فلورا تريستان. أزقتها مرصوفة بحجارة بركانية مدبّبة ترهق الارجل وتوجعها. تقوم مشاغل الحرير والنسيج على تلة تسمّى «كروا روس»، الارتقاء اليها يخطف منك الانفاس. هناك الرجال حفاة رثو الثيات وجوههم فارغة التعابير من تعب، يعملون من الخامسة حتى الثامنة ليلا مع استراحة قصيرة على الغداء. اما الفتاة النساجة فتتقاضى على الساعات الاربع او الخمس عشرة التي تكدح بها ٥٠ سنتيم، اي ربع او ثلث ما يتقاضاه الرجل. 

«الكانو» هو الإسم الذي يطلق على حرفيي وعمال حل الحرير وغزله وحياكته في ليون. درج استخدام المفردة كنيَةً لعمال وعاملات «التافتا» ثم شاعت التسمية على جميع العاملين في النسيج او القطن او الحرير. و«التافتا» نسيج حريري صقيل لا يزالون يتغزلون به في بلادنا في أغنية «تفتا هندي.» 

تجولت تريستان في المبغى في حيّ «غيللوتيير». شاهدت المومسات في عمر الثانية عشرة والرابعة عشرة وتساءلت كيف يمكنهن اثارة رجل اصلا وهن كائنات من جلد وعظم؟ لم يكدن يغادرن الطفولة حتى يلتقطهن السيفلس والسلّ. 

في عاصمة الحرير العالمية هذه، يقوم الانتاج على ثلاثة «اصناف»: صنف ارباب العمل واصحاب مشاغل الحياكة وصنف رؤساء المشاغل، وصنف الحرفيين والعمال- «الكانو». اراد اصحاب مشاغل الحرير خفض كلفة الانتاج لمنافسة النسيج البريطاني. فخفضوا أسعار «القطعة» من الحرير المنسوج. رفض الحرفيون والعمال العاملون على القطعة التلاعب بأسعار القطعة. نظموا أنفسهم في ودادية مطالبين بتثبيت الحد الادنى لسعر قطعة الحرير المنسوج. ولما لم يستجب ارباب العمل للمطلب، اعلنوا الاضراب يوم ٢٥ تشرين الاول وسار نحو ستة الاف رئيس مشغل وزميل حِرَفي وعامل في مسيرة سلمية هادئة طافت  شوارع ليون بإنضباط شبه عسكري. 

فرض المتظاهرون على اصحاب المشاغل توقيع عقد يحدّد تعرفة موحدة لقطعة النسيج. رفض اصحاب المشاغل تنفيد الاتفاق. قامت تظاهرة ثانية واعلِن الاضراب العام يوم ٢١ تشرين الثاني. انقلب الاضراب الى انتفاضة. رفع «الكانو» العلم الاسود، رمز الحداد، وعلقوا يافطات تحمل شعارهم «نحيا عاملين او نموت مناضلين » وسيطروا على المدينة بعد إن انسحب الجنود وفرّت القيادات العسكرية. ويوم ٣ كانون الاول ١٨٣١ أعلنت السلطات الاحكام العرفية ومنْع التظاهرات. وهجم على المدينة جيش من عشرين الف جندي بقيادة الماريشال سولت وولي العهد دوك دورليان، ابن الملك لوي فيليب. أعاد عسكر الملك احتلال ليون بالحديد والنار. قتل المئات واعتقل الالوف. ويوم ٧ كانون الاول، صدر مرسوم يلغي التعرفة الموحدة ويحظر التنظيم العمالي. 

تضامنت مدن عديدة مع الثوار: سانت إتيين، غرينوبل، ڤيين، مارسيليا، أربوا، بيزانصون، لونيفيل، وغيرها. ويوم ١٣ نيسان نظّم الجمهوريون في باريس تظاهرة حاشدة تضامنا مع عمال الحرير الثائرين. تحولت تظاهرات باريس الى شبه انتفاضة وقعت خلالها اشتباكات دامية مع العسكر استمرّت يومين كاملين وقُمِعتْ بعنف لا يقل شراسة عن عنف القمع في ليون. 

تضامن المثقفون بدورهم مع الثوار وشجبوا العنف السلطوي. رأوا في الانتفاضة فجر عالم جديد. حيّاها شاعر فرنسا الكبير شاتوبريان على انها «الارهاص بمجتمع جديد ». واعلن انه «سيأتي زمن لن يمكن ان يتصوّر فيه انه كان يوجد نظام اجتماعي يبلغ فيه دَخْلُ رجلٍ واحد مليون فرنك فيما رجل آخر لا يجد ما يشتري به عشاءه ».

من جملة العاملات المعتقلات بتهمة اثارة الشغب في ليون عاملة شابة لم يكن مضى وقت طويل على مغادرتها قريتها في منطقة الدروم. 

إلاسم: لويز برونيت.

صيف ١٨٣٢- تاجر بريطاني في قنوبين

اثار اعتقال اسعد الشدياق ردود فعل تجاوزت تداعياتها حدود جبل لبنان الصغير. حمل لواءها المرسلون الانجيليون البريطانيون والاميركيون ونجحوا في نشرها على العالم لما لهم في وسائل اعلام من صلات، وفرضوا تدخل الدول والقناصل في البحث عن المعتقل والعمل على اطلاق سراحه. ولما اعيتهم الحيلة اوفدوا من يستطيع استطلاع الامر عن قرب.

صيف ١٨٣٢ وصل تاجر بريطاني الى عكا موفداً من المرسلين الانجيليين للتحقيق في مصير اسعد الشدياق.حظي ريتشارد تود، وهذا إسمه، بمقابلة ابراهيم باشا وإلتمس منه توصية الى الامير بشير الشهابي للمساعدة على البحث عن الشدياق. بعث ابراهيم باشا برسالة الى الامير الحاكم يعلمه فيها ان الشدياق مسجون بأمر من البطريرك الماروني لرفضه عبادة الصور المقدسة. فردّ الامير بشير بأن معلوماته تقول إن السجين قد توفي. أصرّ تود على ان يتحرّى الامر بنفسه. فحرّر ابراهيم باشا له طلبا الى حليفه اللبناني. إستجاب الامير الحاكم لطلب الباشا المصري فوضع في تصرّف تود ستة من عسكره لمرافقته الى قنوبين وزوّده بأمر خطي بتسهيل مهمته. 

في طريقه الى كرسي البطريركية المارونية، عرّج بيرد على بلدة تنورين الجردية، ونزل عند أحد وجهائها، الشيخ فارس ابو انطون. فوجيء تود عندما علم ان الشيخ فارس قد قابل اسعد الشدياق في محبسه في قنوبين مرات عدة وناقشه طويلا في شؤون خلافه العقيدي مع الكنيسة. لم يقتنع الشيخ التنوري بوجهة نظر المثقف الشاب، لكنه ابلغ الموفدالبريطاني بمعارضته اصدار حكم كنسي بالسجن على امريء لمجرد الاختلاف معه في الرأي.

عند وصوله الى دير قنوبين، كانت مفاجأة تنتظر التاجر. وجد البطرك حبيش شخصيا في استقباله ليعلمه بأن اسعد الشدياق قد توفي منذ عامين. وضع البطريرك في تصرفه الكاهن بولس مسعد ليريه محبس السجين وقبره. مسعد، الذي نفى للمرسل اي دور للتعذيب في وفاة أسعد. عزاها الى مرض الاستسقاء، مدلّلا على صدق قوله بصلة القربى والصداقة التي تجمعه بالسجين. عبّر تود عن رغبته في مشاهدة قبر اسعد. قاده مسعد اليه وأبدى الاستعداد لنبش القبر. لم يجد التاجر حاجة لذلك. أصرّ البطرك على تود للمبيت في الدير. إعتذر وعاد أدراجه عن طريق الساحل مرورا بأميون والبترون وجبيل.

لم يقتنع تود بحجة مرض الاستسقاء. كتب الى اسحق بيرد يقول «دم أسعد على رأس البطرك.»

وظل شبح أسعد الشدياق يرود الجبال والاودية في ذاك الجبل ويأوي الى كهوفها ويقض مضاجع رجال الدين فيها. وصار الرجل اول رمز لشهداء حرية التعبير والرأي والنضال ضد جور الاقطاع والكنيسة.

فارس له رأي

لم يقتنع فارس بحجة البطرك ولا بتشخيص ابن خاله لمرض أخيه. حمّل البطرك المسؤولية عن وفاته. وتساءل اي حق واية سلطة يملك البطرك أصلا ليحاسب أخاه على آرائه؟ ليس له سلطان ديني او مدني عليه. «أما الدِين فإن السيد المسيح ورُسُله لم يأمروا بسجن من كان يخالف كلامهم وإن كانوا يعتزلونهم فقط. ولو كان دِين النصارى نشأ على هذه القساوة والوحشية التي إتصفتم بها... لما آمن به احد.» وأضاف: 

  «... وهِبْ ان اخي حاول في الدِين وناظر وقال انكم على ضلال فليس لكم ان تميتوه بسبب هذا، وانما كان يجب عليكم ان تنقضوا أدلته وتدحضوا حجته بالكلام او الكتابة اذا انزلتموه منزلة عالم تخشون تبِعته... وكأني بكم معاشر السفهاء تقولون ان إهلاك نفس واحدة  لسلامة نفوس كثيرة مَحمدة يندب عليها. ولكن لو كان لكم بصيرة ورشد لعلمتم ان الاضطهاد والاجبار على شيء لا يزيد المضطهد وشيعته الا كلفاً بما إضطهد عليه. ولا سيما اذا علم من نفسه انه على الحق وان خصمه القادر له على ضلال... ». 

ولم يعفِِ فارس القس بولس مسعد من العتاب على دوره في تلك المأساة: «وكنت اودّ لو أختم هذا العرض بعتاب أوجهه الى حضرة المطران بولس مسعد ابن خالي وخال اخي وكاتب اسرار البطريرك. ولكني خشيت الان من الاطالة، وفيما قلت ما يغني اللبيب.»

 

١٨٣٢- مينِلمونطان، قرب شارع الموارنة

في الربيع، تفشّى وباء الكوليرا في فرنسا. فتطوّع السمعانيون لمكافحته والعناية بضحاياه فأبلوا بلاء حسنا فمات منهم عدد من الاطباء والممرضات خلال أداء مهمتهم الانسانية.

أثارت الافكار التي طرحتها «لُ غلوب» (الكرة الارضية ) حفيظة السلطات. قُدّم «الاب» وعدد من محرريها الى المحاكمة. حكمت عليهم المحكمة بغرامات مالية وبإقفال الصحيفة. لجأ الصبياني مع اربعين من الاخوة والابناء الى ملكية له في مينيلمونتان. 

في تلك القرية في ضواحي باريس، ليس بعيداً عن «شارع الموارنة» المفضي الى «شارع لبنان»، بوابة خشب تقودك الى ممشى تحفّ به أشجار الزيزفون وحديقة كبيرة جميلة وإسطبل للخيل يفضي الى باحة يقوم فيها مسكن من بنايتين. منه تستطيع ان تستشرف باريس منبسطة تحتك، تلفها سحابة من غَطيط. 

في تلك المحبسة إحتجب الصبياني عن مريديه ليلقي نظراته الاخيرة على العالم القديم. وعاد بعد ثلاثة ايام ليبلغهم: 

- لم أعد استطيع ان اكون لكم الأم التي تهدهد اطفالها وتربّيهم على رخاوة المداعبات. انتم الآن رجال وانا أبٌ لرجال.

عقد الجمع احتفالا ضخما إبتهاجا بعودته واخذوا ينشدون: «السلام عليك يا أبتِِ، السلام/السلام والمجد للخالق./عندما المسيح غادر الرُسُلَ، قال لهم: «لا تناموا »،/ لكنهم ناموا/اما انت فقلت لنا: «إعملوا»،/فعملنا،وعُدْتَ وقد أنجزنا العمل.»

ثم إرتقى الصبياني مرتفعا صغيرا من الارض وإلتفت الى الاب بارو وسأله:

-  ماذا أنجزتم في غيابي؟ 

- أكملنا قطيعتنا مع العالم. لم نعد نكتفي برمي الشعب بالبيانات والمنشورات. نريد ان نتحول الى «منشورات حيّة » نرمي بانفسنا الى الشعب. في سبيل ذلك اتخذنا قرارنا الجريء بأن نصرم كل صلة لنا بالعالم الخارجي. 

ثم القى الصبياني خطبة أعلن فيها أن حياته السابقة قد إنتهت وبدأت حياة جديدة. وقال لهم لا يكفي إن تتم القطيعة خلف الجدران. يجب المجاهرة بها. وأول الجهر ان يتميز السمعانيون بأزياء مميزة. وأعلمهم انه صمّم لهم زيّا جديدا. ثم خلع ثيابه القديمة ليرتدي الزي الجديد المكوّن من حذاء اسود، سروال ابيض، قميص بيضاء بلا ياقة تزّرر من خلف وعليها طرّزت بالاحمر كلمة «الاب»، وصدرية حمراء وفوقها جبّة قصيرة زرقاء، إضافة الى قلنسوة حمراء للرأس وحزام أسود. وقال لهم ان لكل لون رمزيته. الابيض رمز الحب. والازرق الكحلي رمز الايمان. والاحمر رمز العمل. وقو أرسل الصبياني شَعره واطلق لحيته للمزيد من التمّيز في المظهر. وشرح لاتباعه ان القميص يزرّر من خلف ليضطر كل منهم الى الاستعانة بزميله لارتداء زيّه، دليل التضامن بين اعضاء الاخوية. وفيما هو يرتدي زيّه الجديد، إرتفع فوق سارية العلم الجديد لـ «كنيسة العمل»: ثلاث شرائط أفقية بيضاء وكحلية وحمراء تمثل الدِين والعِلم والصناعة. وقال لهم:

-  يا اخواني وابنائي، لن اقبّلكم بعد الآن. سوف نتبادل تحيات الابوة والرعاية والاخوة.

ثم دعا اصغرهم سنّاً اليه واخذ يدَه اليمنى بيده اليمنى ووضع يدَه اليسرى على كتفه الأيسر وقال:

- هذه هي تحية الابوة. 

ثم شبكا ايديهما الاربعة وقال لهم «الاب»: 

- هذه تحية الرعاية. 

ثم وضع يدَه اليمنى على كتف زميله اليسرى ووضع ذاك يدَه اليسرى على كتف «الاب» الايمن وقال لهم «الاب»: 

- وهذه تحية الاخوّة.

ثم اخذ يُلبِسهم كلاً زيَّه. ويقلّدهم القلادة الرمزية لكنيسة العمل المكونة من متوزايات ومثلثات ودوائر ومستطيلات من الفولاذ والنحاس الاحمر، تتدلى منها نصف كرة محفور عليها «الام». 

رفض بعض الابناء ارتداء الزي لانهم لم يكونوا مستعدين بعد للانخراط في السلك. فطلب منهم الاب ان يغادورا. وقال للباقين:

- لا تجزعوا، سوف يعودون. 

وعندما إنتهت مراسيم التزيّي، ساروا وراءه في موكب ينشدون:

  «هلمّوا عمّالاً وبرجوازيين 

قد جَعَلنا العمل كلنا متساوين

نقلب الارض عاليها سافلها

نولِد الانسان الجديد هَدْياً للعالمِين ». 

Why Israel Didn't Win

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The ceasefire agreed by Israel and Hamas in Cairo after eight days of fighting is merely a pause in the Israel-Palestine conflict. It promises to ease movement at all border crossings with the Gaza Strip, but will not lift the blockade. It requires Israel to end its assault on the Strip, and Palestinian militants to stop firing rockets at southern Israel, but it leaves Gaza as miserable as ever: according to a recent UN report, the Strip will be ‘uninhabitable’ by 2020. And this is to speak only of Gaza. How easily one is made to forget that Gaza is only a part – a very brutalised part – of the ‘future Palestinian state’ that once seemed inevitable, and which now seems to exist mainly in the lullabies of Western peace processors. None of the core issues of the Israel-Palestine conflict – the Occupation, borders, water rights, repatriation and compensation of refugees – is addressed by this agreement.

The fighting will erupt again, because Hamas will come under continued pressure from its members and from other militant factions, and because Israel has never needed much pretext to go to war. In 1982, it broke its ceasefire with Arafat’s PLO and invaded Lebanon, citing the attempted assassination of its ambassador to London, even though the attack was the work of Arafat’s sworn enemy, the Iraqi agent Abu Nidal. In 1996, during a period of relative calm, it assassinated Hamas’s bomb-maker Yahya Ayyash, the ‘Engineer’, leading Hamas to strike back with a wave of suicide attacks in Israeli cities. When, a year later, Hamas proposed a thirty-year hudna, or truce, Binyamin Netanyahu dispatched a team of Mossad agents to poison the Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Amman; under pressure from Jordan and the US, Israel was forced to provide the antidote, and Meshaal is now the head of Hamas’s political bureau – and an ally of Egypt’s new president, Mohamed Morsi.

Operation Pillar of Defence, Israel’s latest war, began just as Hamas was cobbling together an agreement for a long-term ceasefire. Its military commander, Ahmed al-Jabari, was assassinated only hours after he reviewed the draft proposal. Netanyahu and his defence minister, Ehud Barak, could have had a ceasefire – probably on more favourable terms – without the deaths of more than 160 Palestinians and five Israelis, but then they would have missed a chance to test their new missile defence shield, Iron Dome, whose performance was Israel’s main success in the war. They would also have missed a chance to remind the people of Gaza of their weakness in the face of Israeli military might. The destruction in Gaza was less extensive than it had been in Operation Cast Lead, but on this occasion too the aim, as Gilad Sharon, Ariel’s son, put it in the Jerusalem Post, was to send out ‘a Tarzan-like cry that lets the entire jungle know in no uncertain terms just who won, and just who was defeated’.

Victory in war is not measured solely in terms of body counts, however. And the ‘jungle’ – the Israeli word not just for the Palestinians but for the Arabs as a whole – may have the last laugh. Not only did Hamas put up a better fight than it had in the last war, it averted an Israeli ground offensive, won implicit recognition as a legitimate actor from the United States (which helped to broker the talks in Cairo), and achieved concrete gains, above all an end to targeted assassinations and the easing of restrictions on the movement of people and the transfer of goods at the crossings. There was no talk in Cairo, either, of the Quartet Principles requiring Hamas to renounce violence, recognise Israel and adhere to past agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority: a symbolic victory for Hamas, but not a small one. And the Palestinians were not the only Arabs who could claim victory in Cairo. In diplomatic terms, the end of fighting under Egyptian mediation marked the dawn of a new Egypt, keen to reclaim the role that it lost when Sadat signed a separate peace with Israel. ‘Egypt is different from yesterday,’ Morsi warned Israel on the first day of the war. ‘We assure them that the price will be high for continued aggression.’ He underscored this point by sending his prime minister, Hesham Kandil, to Gaza the following day. While refraining from incendiary rhetoric, Morsi made it plain that Israel could not depend on Egyptian support for its attack on Gaza, as it had when Mubarak was in power, and would only have itself to blame if the peace treaty were jeopardised. After all, he has to answer to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’s parent organisation, and to the Egyptian people, who are overwhelmingly hostile to Israel. The Obama administration, keen to preserve relations with Egypt, got the message, and so apparently did Israel. Morsi proved that he could negotiate with Israel without ‘selling out the resistance’, in Meshaal’s words. Internationally, it was his finest hour, though Egyptians may remember it as the prelude to his move a day after the ceasefire to award himself far-reaching executive powers that place him above any law.

That Netanyahu stopped short of a ground war, and gave in to key demands at the Cairo talks, is an indication not only of Egypt’s growing stature, but of Israel’s weakened position. Its relations with Turkey, once its closest ally in the region and the pillar of its ‘doctrine of the periphery’ (a strategy based on alliances with non-Arab states) have deteriorated with the rise of Erdogan and the AKP. The Jordanian monarchy, the second Arab government to sign a peace treaty with Israel, is facing increasingly radical protests. And though Israel may welcome the fall of Assad, an ally of Hizbullah and Iran, it is worried that a post-Assad government, dominated by the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brothers, may be no less hostile to the occupying power in the Golan: the occasional rocket fire from inside Syria in recent days has been a reminder for Israel of how quiet that border was under the Assad family. Israeli leaders lamented for years that theirs was the only democracy in the region. What this season of revolts has revealed is that Israel had a very deep investment in Arab authoritarianism. The unravelling of the old Arab order, when Israel could count on the quiet complicity of Arab big men who satisfied their subjects with flamboyant denunciations of Israeli misdeeds but did little to block them, has been painful for Israel, leaving it feeling lonelier than ever. It is this acute sense of vulnerability, even more than Netanyahu’s desire to bolster his martial credentials before the January elections, that led Israel into war.

Hamas, meanwhile, has been buoyed by the same regional shifts, particularly the triumph of Islamist movements in Tunisia and Egypt: Hamas, not Israel, has been ‘normalised’ by the Arab uprisings. Since the flotilla affair, it has developed a close relationship with Turkey, which is keen to use the Palestinian question to project its influence in the Arab world. It also took the risk of breaking with its patrons in Syria: earlier this year, Khaled Meshaal left Damascus for Doha, while his number two, Mousa Abu Marzook, set himself up in Cairo. Since then, Hamas has thrown in its lot with the Syrian uprising, distanced itself from Iran, and found new sources of financial and political support in Qatar, Egypt and Tunisia. It has circumvented the difficulties of the blockade by turning the tunnels into a lucrative source of revenue and worked, with erratic success, to impose discipline on Islamic Jihad and other militant factions in the Strip. The result has been growing regional prestige, and a procession of high-profile visitors, including the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, who came to Gaza three weeks before the war and promised $400 million dollars to build housing and repair roads. The emir did not make a similar trip to Ramallah.

Hamas’s growing clout has not gone unnoticed in Tel Aviv: cutting Hamas down to size was surely one of its war aims. If Israel were truly interested in achieving a peaceful settlement on the basis of the 1967 borders – parameters which Hamas has accepted – it might have tried to strengthen Abbas by ending settlement activity, and by supporting, or at least not opposing, his bid for non-member observer status for Palestine at the UN. Instead it has done its utmost to sabotage his UN initiative (with the robust collaboration of the Obama administration), threatening to build more settlements if he persists: such, Hamas has been only too happy to point out, are the rewards for non-violent Palestinian resistance. Operation Pillar of Defence will further undermine Abbas’s already fragile standing in the West Bank, where support for Hamas has never been higher.

Hardly had the ceasefire come into effect than Israel raided the West Bank to round up more than fifty Hamas supporters, while Netanyahu warned that Israel ‘might be compelled to embark’ on ‘a much harsher military operation’. (Avigdor Lieberman, his foreign minister, is said to have pushed for a ground war.) After all, Israel has a right to defend itself. This is what the Israelis say and what the Israel lobby says, along with much of the Western press, including the New York Times. In an editorial headed ‘Hamas’s Illegitimacy’ – a curious phrase, since Hamas only seized power in Gaza after winning a majority in the 2006 parliamentary elections – the Times accused Hamas of attacking Israel because it is ‘consumed with hatred for Israel’. The Times didn’t mention that Hamas’s hatred might have been stoked by a punishing economic blockade. It didn’t mention that between the start of the year and the outbreak of this war, 78 Palestinians in Gaza had been killed by Israeli fire, as against a single Israeli in all of Hamas’s notorious rocket fire. Or – until the war started – that this had been a relatively peaceful year for the miserable Strip, where nearly three thousand Palestinians have been killed by Israel since 2006, as against 47 Israelis by Palestinian fire.

Those who invoke Israel’s right to defend itself are not troubled by this disparity in casualties, because the unspoken corollary is that Palestinians do not have the same right. If they dare to exercise this non-right, they must be taught a lesson. ‘We need to flatten entire neighbourhoods in Gaza,’ Gilad Sharon wrote in the Jerusalem Post. ‘Flatten all of Gaza. The Americans didn’t stop with Hiroshima – the Japanese weren’t surrendering fast enough, so they hit Nagasaki too.’ Israel shouldn’t worry about innocent civilians in Gaza, he said, because there are no innocent civilians in Gaza: ‘They elected Hamas … they chose this freely, and must live with the consequences.’ Such language would be shocking were it not so familiar: in Israel the rhetoric of righteous victimhood has merged with the belligerent rhetoric – and the racism – of the conqueror. Sharon’s Tarzan allusion is merely a variation on Barak’s description of Israel as a villa in the jungle; his invocation of nuclear war reminds us that in 2008, the deputy defence minister Matan Vilnai proposed ‘a bigger holocaust’ if Gaza continued to resist.

But the price of war is higher for Israel than it was during Cast Lead, and its room for manoeuvre more limited, because the Jewish state’s only real ally, the American government, has to maintain good relations with Egypt and other democratically elected Islamist governments. During the eight days of Pillar of Defence, Israel put on an impressive and deadly fireworks show, as it always does, lighting up the skies of Gaza and putting out menacing tweets straight from The Sopranos. But the killing of entire families and the destruction of government buildings and police stations, far from encouraging Palestinians to submit, will only fortify their resistance, something Israel might have learned by consulting the pages of recent Jewish history. The Palestinians understand that they are no longer facing Israel on their own: Israel, not Hamas, is the region’s pariah. The Arab world is changing, but Israel is not. Instead, it has retreated further behind Jabotinsky’s ‘iron wall’, deepening its hold on the Occupied Territories, thumbing its nose at a region that is at last acquiring a taste of its own power, exploding in spasms of high-tech violence that fail to conceal its lack of a political strategy to end the conflict. Iron Dome may shield Israel from Qassam rockets, but it won’t shield it from the future.

[This article was originally published in the London Review of Books here]

تفكيك أمننة المجتمع

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ألقت الثورة المصرية الكثير من زجاجات المولتوف الحارقة على خطوط المواجهات بين قوات الأمن والثوار على مدار أكثر من عامين- أشتدت فيهما المواجهات تارة وهدأت تارة أخرى. فالصراع على نمط السلطة وتجلياتها في أشكال الممارسة ما يزال قائماً حتى هذه اللحظة. والقطيعة مع النظام السابق صارت تتمحور حول تلك النقطة، وهى مفترق الطرق بين الانعتاق والعبودية للدولة والنظام السياسي الحاكم والهوس الأمني. والقطعية والمفارقة مع المنظومة الأمنية لا تتمثل مع الدولة والنظام السياسي فقط. ولكنها مع خطوط متشابكة تتقاطع بين الدولة والمجتمع والنظام الأقتصادي والقائمين عليه، وبين المحلي والأقليمي والدولي. وحركة وأفعال الثورة تعكس هذه المحاولة وتوضح خطوط الأشتباك بين الثورة والنظام القديم/الحالي. فخطاب الثورة كان أعظم أشتباكاته الفكرية في محاولته لتفكيك ثنائية الأمن مقابل الفوضى. وهذه الثنائية لم تكن فقط في خطاب مبارك ولكن في خطاب قطاعات واسعة من المجتمع أمتدت بين طبقات وشرائح أجتماعية مختلفة؛ فمن الرأسمالية والبرجوازية إلي كبار وصغار التجار والحرفيين وحتى بعض القطاعات المهمشة. فخطاب الثورة المضادة كان يعمل على إثارة عوامل الفزع والخوف في المجتمع. وجائت ذروته مع وعود شفيق بعودة الأمن في أقل من 24 ساعة في حالة فوزه بمنصب رئيس الجمهورية.

ويعني مصطلح الأمننة، طبقاً لكثير من العلماء والمختصين في مجال الدراسات الأمنية، تحويل أي خطاب سياسي أو أجتماعي أو أقتصادي إلي خطاب أمني في المقام الأول. حيث تسيطر مفردات الخوف على عملية إنتاج الخطاب والحلول التي يطرحها. فالثنائية الجامدة التي يخلقها الخطاب الأمني وأمننة المجتمع تقتل المساحات ولا تسمح بالاختلاف والتنوع في الفكر والممارسة. وتضع المجتمع في أشد حالات المراقبة وتحوله إلي سجن كبير على أفراده الانضباط والطاعة على طريقة ورغبة السلطة. بل الأسوء من ذلك هو خلق المجتمع بنفسه لثنائيات تجعله يتمحور حول الخوف ويبدأ في استبطان نفس مكينزمات السلطة وأدواتها.
ويبدو لي أن مؤسسات الدولة المصرية تتمع بقدر من الأستقلال كمنظومات تابعة لها منطقها الذاتي بعيداً عن رغبات الملك (سواء كان مبارك أو المجلس العسكري أو حتى دكتور محمد مرسي). ولذلك فما ظنه الكثيرون من أن قطع رأس الملك سيعني بالضرورة إنعتاق تلك المؤسسات وتصحيح مسارتها بشكل ذاتي أثبت فشلاً كبيراً وبالأخص في النهج والخطاب الأمني الصادر عنها. أضف إلي ذلك أن أمننة المجتمع ليست مجرد إنعكاس للدولة والسلطة والخطاب الناتج عنهم. فهناك أحياناً خطوط وحالات من التقطاع وأخرى من التماهي. فتعامل الداخلية مع اعتصامي جامعة النيل وسائقي النقل العام لم يختلف كثيراً لا على مستوى الممارسة ولا الخطاب. فنفس النهج الأمني الذي يتعامل مع الأمور السياسية بمنطق التهديد ثم اللجوء للعنف هو ما حدث في ظل حكومة منتخبة جائت بعد ثورة شعبية. وهو أيضاً نفس الخطاب الذي يخون المعتصمين والمتظاهرين ويتهمهم بمحاولة هدم الدولة والمساس بهيبتها وأشاعة الفوضى. بل الأخطر من كلا الأمرين هو تعامل السلطة الحاكمة مع قضية سيناء. فالسلطة حتى الآن لم تلجأ حقيقة –رغم مزاعم بدء حوار مع آهالي سيناء- إلا للحلول الأمنية. فما يحدث في سيناء هو قصف عسكري يطال الجميع وحملات أمنية وكمائن مكثفة تنتهك من حرمة المواطنين وأجسادهم، وتعامل فيه قدر كبير من الأذلال وخطاب به قدر كبير من التخوين. ونفس الممارسات والخطاب في عهد مبارك كانوا أحد أهم أسباب أشتعال الثورة في سيناء إلي حد وصولها إلي ثورة مسلحة في الشيخ زويد. حيث دارت معاركها العنيفة من مساء الخامس والعشرين من يناير حتى صباح التاسع والعشرين من نفس الشهر.

وتعبر الجدران العازلة المحيطة بوزارة الداخلية والسفارة الأمريكية مؤخراً عن تجلي الخطاب الأمني في
الممارسات وإدارة المساحات، وعن غلبة نمط السلطة الأمنية المعسكرة في الدولة. فالسلطة الأمنية تتمحور حول الأرهاب وأمكانية ممارسة العنف والعزل والأقصاء. وصارت تلك السلطة وخطابها في مواجهة مفتوحة ودائمة مع الثورة كفعل وخطاب. وتعكس الجدران ورسومات الجرافيتي عليها الفرق بين الأثنين. فالأولى تسعى لاستتباب الأمن ولو على حساب قتل المساحة وحرية الحركة. وتلجأ لمعداتها الثقيلة من كتل وبولكات حجرية كحواجز عازلة. وهى في ذلك ترسخ الشعور بالخوف والا أمن. أما رسومات الثورة فكانت أغلبها عبارة عن رسم بقية الشارع المغلق وكأن الجدران ليست واقعة. والجرافيتي عليها كان يتسم بالخضرة وآلوان قوس قزح وأطفال يمرحون في الشارع الذي غلقه الجدار العازل. وعلى كل فالجدران وما عليها من رسومات كانا نتاج معارك حامية الوطيس بين الثورة وقوات الأمن أمتدت لخلف تلك الشوارع المغلقة الآن.

والخطاب الأمني مثلما يؤكد ميكل ديلون "يعيد إنتاج الفزع والخوف" ؛ فالأمن والإرهاب يسيران يدا بيد ولا ينفك أحداهما عن الآخر. ويزيد الخطاب الأمني من وطئة الشعور بفقدان الأمان. ووعود الأمن هي دائما وعود مستقبلية وهي أيضا مرهونة بمدي التطور والتقدم التقني للجريمة والإرهاب وتفاعلهما مع العنصر البشري. وهذا خليط لا يمكن التوقع بأبعاده وتداعياته. والنظم الأمنية السلطوية تستمد شرعيتها من الخطر وإعادة إنتاجه. حيث يتحول الخطر إلي أداة حكم وهيمنة تستطيع تلك النظم من خلالها أن تفرض حالة الأستثناء عبر جهاز الدولة. ولقد تحولت حالة الأستثناء في مصر إلي حالة دائمة تحت مسمى الأمن والأستقرار. وفي ظل قوانين وظروف الطورايء يسهل للسطة الحاكمة قمع أي نوع من المعارضة وإضاعف فرص تكوين مجتمع مدني قوي، حيث لا تسمح السلطة بتكوين كيانات ومؤسسات شعبية وجماهيرية. وتنعكس تداعيات الأمننة على المعمار وهيكلة المجتمع وهندسة المساحات به. وتتحكم في رؤيته للذات والآخر. وتعدو خطورة تبني الدولة والمجتمع للنهج الأمني في خلقه لأفراد وجماعات عرضة للإشتباه، وحتمية الخضوع للممارسات الأمنية المتوحشة. فجورجو أجمبين يشير إلي عمليات تقليص المواطنة حيث تحرم جماعات من حق التحدث والتعبير وتحرم من الحقوق بل تحرم من تاريخها. وهو الأمر الذي رأيناه في تعامل السلطة والمجتمع والاعلام مع آهالي سيناء. ومن الجدير بالذكر أن نظام مبارك كان يمنع آهالي سيوة من الأحتفال بلغتهم الأمازيغية. فأحد شيوخ القبائل بسيوة، ذكر لي كيف منع جهاز أمن الدولة أحد مشاريع تدوين وتوثيق اللغة الأمازيغية. وهناك الكثير مما يمكن أن يقال ولكن لا يحتمله المقال عن شعور آهالي النوبة بأقصى درجات التهميش وسوء المعاملة من قبل جهاز الدولة والسلطة.

وهناك ثلاثة تحركات، تمحور حولهم الفعل الثوري، شهدوا ومازلوا يشهدون صدامات عنيفة بين قوات الأمن والثوار والمحتجين بشكل عام وهما: الأول: إعادة أسترداد المجال والفضاء العام من سطوة الأمن. وعبر عن هذا الفعل والمستوى من التفاعل الصدام الدائم مع قوات الأمن حول احتلال الميادين العامة وأبرزهم ميدان التحرير. والثاني حرق الأقسام. فلقد تم حرق ما يزيد عن ألف قسم على عموم الجمهورية. والثالث هو الأضرابات العمالية والتي تشهد صدامات شديدة ودورية مع قوات الأمن منذ عام 2006. وكان أعنفها قبل الثورة في إضراب عمال غزل المحلة الذي أنتهى بحرب بين المدينة وقوات الأمن. إلا أن الأمر الأخطر هو ردة فعل المجتمع والاعلام على تلك الأحداث. فلقد أدانت قنوات وبرامج أعلامية مثل القاهرة اليوم ذلك الحدث وصورته على أنه نشر للفوضى والرعب في المجتمع. وكذلك أدانت كثير من الشرئح تلك الأضرابات ووصفتها قبل وبعض الثورة أنها تعطيل لعجلة الأنتاج وتتسبب في غياب الأمن وتهدد هيبة الدولة.

ولكي نفهم كيف تم أمننة خطاب السلطة في المجتمع المصري والثورة كممارسة وفعل وخطاب مضاد، يجب علينا الرجوع لملابسات ميلاد نظام وعصر مبارك على المستويين السياسي والأجتماعي. فالميلاد كان حادث المنصة. هكذا ولد نظام مبارك من رحم اختبائه تحت كرسيه والسادات يلفظ أنفاسه الأخيرة. لقد كان السياق التاريخي لميلاد نظام مبارك راسماً إلي حد كبير ملامح نظامه وقصته الكبرى وخطاب عصر ومجتمع منذ الميلاد وحتى لحظة كتابة هذه السطور مسيطر عليه الأمن. فالبداية كانت مليئة بالدم والاضطراب الداخلي ونظام إقليمي في حالة عدم استقرار وإعادة صياغة لعلاقات القوة به، ونظام عالمي يعاد تشكيله كانت المنطقة العربية هي مسرح عملياته الأول. أضف إلي هذا إتفاقية سلام مع إسرائيل كانت لم تستكمل كلياً بعد. ويرفضها قطاع واسع من المجتمع المصري والعربي، ومحاولة إعادة تعريف للعدو الخارجي، هذا مع تغير كبير للبنية الاجتماعية والاقتصادية؛ حيث يتم ربط النظام الاقتصادي لمصر بالرأسمالية العالمية من خلال سياسات الانفتاح التي تبناها السادات وصار مبارك على خطاه. فشرعية هذا النظام داخلياً وخارجياً تأسست على ثنائية الأمن والفوضى. وتلاحم خطابه الداخلي والأقليمي مع النظام العالمي بقيادة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في العشر سنوات الأخيرة من عمره. حيث ساد الساحة الدولية هوس أمني واسع النطاق وخطاب مضاد لإرهاب غير معرف بعيداً عن كونه إسلامي ومنبعه المنطقة العربية.

ومن البداية طرح مبارك نفسه على الساحة الخارجية كعامل أستقرار للمنطقة على المستويين الجيو-سياسي والأقتصادي. فكان نظامه داعم لإسرائيل وسياسات البنك الدولي والسوق العالمي، وقامع داخلي لكل القوى المعادية للهيمنة الأمريكية والأحتلال الصهيوني. وتعامل خطاب مبارك مع الأنتفاضة في 2000 وحربي 2006 في لبنان و2008 في غزة بشكل أمني يؤكد على قدر الفزع وعدم الأستقرار الذان يتسبب فيهما حزب الله وحماس. وشيطن الخطاب الحركتين من خلال التلاعب بفزاعة الأمن وأفصح الخطاب عن أقصى درجاته في الممارسة من خلال قمع جميع المظاهرات الداخلية وغلق المعابر في رفح، وفي البضع سنين الأخيرة قام بتصدير خطاب أعلامي يعمل على خلق حالة من الفزع تحت وهم أن الغزاوية سيقوما بالسيطرة على سيناء تدريجياً إن فتح الطريق أمامهم. الغريب في الأمر أن الخوف من سيطرة حماس وآهالي غزة على سيناء مازال قائم حتى اليوم. فقلد أثار الأعلام المصري ضجة كبيرة حول خطر بيع الأراضي في سيناء لآهالي غزة دون دليل واضح. وأنتجت وتلقفت قطاعات واسعة من المجتمع هذا الخطاب وأعادة إنتاجه. وهو أمر يعكس أمننة الخطاب الأجتماعي وتناقضه.

فالتعامل مع القضية الفلسطنية صار مقبولاً فقط في نطاق البكاء والنعيل. وهو أمر أفصح عن نفسه بالكلية في أحداث أقتحام السفارة الإسرائيلية بالقاهرة بعد الثورة. ويرجع ذلك الخطاب لأمرين. الأول تصدير صورة إعلامية من قبل السلطة الحاكمة وأصحاب المصالح تعمل على خلق وعي وتصورات معادية لأي عمل ثوري من شأنه تغير ترتيب وأوضاع المنطقة في ظل اتفاقية كامب دافيد. والثاني هو أرتباط شرائح كثيرة بعلاقات أقتصادية مع إسرائيل بسبب أتفاقية الكويز التجارية. ومن هنا ينتج أي فعل ثوري أو سياسي مفارق للسياسات الأقتصادية والأجتماعية والجيو-سياسية في المنطقة خطاب أمني مضاد من الدولة وبعض شرائح المجتمع. وبهذا يتضح كيف يتم أمننة الخطاب على المستوى المحلي والأقليمي والدولي، وكيف تلعب شبكات السلطة والمصالح المختلفة من خلال الاعلام وأرض الواقع على إنتاج خطاب يتمحور حول الفزع والفوضى ويغزي شعور الخطر المجتمعي.

وحتى على مستوى السياسات الخارجية الأخرى مثل العلاقات مع دول حوض النيل أتسمت سياسات النظام بالطابع الأمني فقط. فلم تدعم مصر تواجدها الأستراتيجي من الناحية الأقتصادية والثقافية والسياسية في العمق الأفريقي بقدر تلويحها الدائم بإمكانية استخدام الآلة العسكرية في حالة أشتداد النزاع. ولقد تحركت الثورة المصرية منذ البداية لتغير هذا النمط الأمني في علاقات مصر الخارجية. فخرجت المليونات لتنصر القضية الفلسطنية وتعترض بشكل صريح على سياسات الأنبطاح لأمريكا وإسرائيل. ثم تمت اكثر من محاولة لاقتحام مبنى السفارة الإسرائيلية في القاهرة ونتج عنها أشتباكات دموية مع قوات الأمن. وأيضاً شهدنا ما سمى ببعثات الدبلوماسية الشعبية والرسمية لدول حوض النيل في محاولة لإعادة صياغة العلاقت على أسس تتجاوز البعد الأمني.

وفي الداخل مثل مبارك الأب الذي يحمي العائلة من شرور الخارج بل ومن شرور أبنائها. وقادت حربه على الأرهاب في التسعينيات إلي توغل الداخلية وأطلاق يدها في وعلى المجتمع. وبعد أنتصارها صارت الزراع اليمنى للنظام. ومن هنا صارت أقسام الشرطة وجهاز أمن الدولة هما ممثلان النظام السياسي والعام. وأسس قانون الطواريء لوضع فوق الأستثنائي لقوات الشرطة في المجتمع. فأقسام البوليس لعبت دوراً مهماً كممثل لسلطة الدولة والنظام السياسي في المرحلة من 81 إلي 2000 ثم ممثل لدولة والنظام النيو ليبرالي من 2000 حتى اليوم. فهى كممثل للدولة تلعب دور برج المراقبة الذي يفرض الأنضباط على المجتمع ويحتكر الحق الشرعي في ممارسة العنف. وبسبب طبيعة الحرب على الأرهاب التي كانت تدور في الخطوط الأممامية والخلفية للمجتمع، أضطرت الداخلية لتوسيع رقعة الأشتباه ونطاق المعركة. وتسبب ذلك في تضخيم حجم المخبرين والمرشدين الذين لعبوا دوراً مزدوجاً مما ضاعف تأثير السلطة ووطأتها على المجتمع. فهما ممثلان لسلطة المؤسسة حيث تتجسد فيهم. وأدي أيضاً إطلاق يدهم في المجتمع لتغول سلطتهم الشخصية في إدارة مصالحهم الأجتماعية والأقتصادية. ومع توحش الجهاز الشرطي ككل وهيمنة سلطته على الدولة والمجتمع صارت قوات الأمن بشكلها الرسمي والمؤسسي والغير رسمي والا مؤسسي أحد أهم عناصر إنتاج الفزع في المجتمع. وبات كل من جهاز أمن الدولة وقوات الأمن المركزي أحد أهم عناصر الأرهاب السياسي والمجتمعي. فأمن الدولة أصبح لها الحق في مراقبة جميع أركان المجتمع وتسيطر على كافة مؤسساته الرسمية من تعينات وإدارة. فصارت تتدخل في تعيين عمداء الجامعات إلي النقابات المهنية، ومن التدخل والسيطرة على المجتمع المدني إلي هيمنتها على الأنتاج الفكري والفني. وكان الأمن المركزي يتم الدفع به في أي مظاهرة أو علمية إحتجاجية. واعتاد أن يقوم بعملية عسكرة وإرهاب لمسرح الأحداث وممارسة أقصى درجات العنف والوحشية على مئات وأحياناً عشرات المتظاهرين.
وتشير تقارير حقوق الأنسان المختلفة إلي تغير خطير في النهج الأمني من بعد الألفية الجديدة. ففي التسعينات كان التعذيب يستهدف بعض الجماعات الأسلامية بعينها وبعض المعارضين الرادكالين للنظام داخل أقبعة المعتقلات وأمن الدولة. إلا أن ظاهرة التعذيب والعنف العام على المجتمع بدأت في التفشي بعد عام 2000. وتصاعدت حدتها في الأعوام التي تلت 2005 وصولاً لمقتل خالد سعيد في شارع عام في 2010. وعلى الرغم من توحش وتوغل الجهاز الأمني، تصاعدت ظاهرة البلطجة المنظمة والعشوائية وغاب الأنضباط العام عن الشارع المصري. واستخدمت البلطجة كأداة من أدوات الحكم والسيطرة من قل النظام وأعوانه.

وكان اول مراحل ظهورها بشكل ممنهج في انتخابات عام 2000 وأشتدت في إنتخابات 2005 و2010. ولا يمكن فصل هذا عن التحول الكبير إلي النيو ليبرالية وحكم رجال الأعمال بقيادة جمال مبارك منذ عام 2000. فالنيو ليبرالية قائمة على ذراعين: أمني واقتصادي. وكلاهما قائم على خطاب أمني وأنتاج للفزع. وتستخدم النيو ليبرالية الأمن الخاص المتمثل في شركات التأمين أو جماعات بلطجة منظمة بالإضافة إلي الداخلية. ويقوم الزراع الثاني بأنتاج نوعين من الخطاب حول المدينة والعمل وكلاهما يتم أمننته. فالأول يتصور سكان المدينة من الفقراء كعبء وخطر على المدينة يجب التخلص منه. ويتجلى هذا في الخطاب حول العشوائيات والأحياء الفقيرة، وبالأخص في حالة طمع بعض رجال الأعمال في تلك المناطق مثلما هو الحال مع رملة بولاق أحد الأحياء ذات الطابع العشوائي بالقاهرة. ويقع ذلك الحي على كورنيش النيل ويطمح رجل الأعمال الشهير سويرس بتحويل المنطقة إلي فنادق وأماكن سياحية ومكاتب خدمية. ويعمل هذا الخطاب على عزل الفضائات الاجتماعية المختلفة عن بعض في المجال العام ويجعلها تقتصر على علاقات عمل وأخضاع وخدمة. ويتجلى هذا في فكرة المجتمعات الجديدة المسيجة ويتجلى فيما يسمى بمعمار الحصن وغلبة الهوس الأمني على هيكلة المدينة. وهناك محاولة دائمة في ما يسمى بجتمع السيطرة القائم على النيو ليبرالية لتخصيص المجال العام وتقسيمه. ووقعت اشتباكات عديدة بين قوات الأمن وبلطجية مأجورين في جانب ضد آهالي تلك المناطق في الجانب الآخر. فرملة بولاق ليست حادث شاذ أو فريد من نوعه. فوقعت أحداث مشابهة كثيرة. منها على سبيل المثال لا الحصر ما وقع مع آهالي منطقتي المفروزة وطوسون بالإسكندرية، حينما قامت قوات الأمن باجتياح تلك الأحياء وهدم منازل السكان لصالح مشاريع استثمارية، بعدما رفض الآهالي ترك أراضيهم مقابل مبالغ ضعيفة. وولدت السلطة في كل تلك الحالات خطاب شيطنة لآهالي تلك المنطق يؤكد على ضرورة التخلص منهم لصالح نهضة المدينة وأمنها. ويستند خطاب السلطة في بعض الأحيان لوقائع حقيقية. فبعض المناطق العشوائية بها نقاط إجرام وبلطجة منظمة. وتعاني أغلب تلك المناطق من غياب خدمات رئيسية مثل الكهرباء والصرف الصحي. إلا أن خطاب السلطة يتم أمننته فلا يتعامل مع أي أبعاد أخرى. ومنهجيته الأولى في الخطاب هى الشيطنة وفي الممارسة العنف والقضاء على تلك المناطق كلية. وحتى مع تحلل جهاز الدولة لصالح النهج النيو ليبرالي. والزراع الأول هو عماد النيو ليبرالية في استقرار الأوضاع. فالأمن العام المتمثل في جهاز الداخلية يصير حائل دون تغير الأوضاع الاجتماعية والاقتصادية للجماهير. وتظل السلطة تلوح بهذا الزراع لمنع حتى التفكير في التغير وتظل تضخم من حجم هذا الجهاز وامكانيته في البطش والقمع. فنظام مبارك ظل يلوح ويشير أن عدد قوات الأمن المركزي قد وصل لقرابة الأثنين مليون. وهو رقم يبدو فيه قدر من المبالغة. ولكن المهم هو ليس حقيقة الرقم من عدمها. ولكن توظيفه في خطبي أمني أخضاعي. وعلى الرغم من تحلل جهاز الدولة ورخاوته في العهد النيو ليبرالي ظلت أقسام الشرطة محتفظة بدور مهم في المجتمع. فهى لم تصير فقط أحد أبراج المراقبة واستخدام العنف ولكن تحولت أيضاً لنقطة أرتكاز وتلاقي لعلاقات السلطة في المجتمع. وصار القسم هو مركز لإدارة العمليات الاقتصادية في منطقته محافظاً على هيمنة وسطوة رجال الأعمال والترتيب الاجتماعي بها. وهكذا يمكن فهم لماذا حرقت الكثير من الجماهير الثائرة أقسام الشرطة واقتحمت مقار جهاز أمن الدولة، ولماذا شهدت الثورة –ومازالت تشهد- صدامات موسعة مع قوات الأمني المركزي
والداخلية بشكل موسع سواء في الميادين أو الأضرابات والاحتجاجات الاجتماعية والعمالية.

إن أهم مهمات الثورة المصرية وأكثرها استعجلاً هي تفكيك النزعة الأمنية للسطة وتفكيك أمننة الخطاب واسقاط شرعيته. وينبغي على الثورة إنتزاع مكونات الخطاب الأمني من البنية العقلية للمواطن. إن النظم والمؤسسات في حقيقة الأمر لا تعمل في الخارج؛ فوجودها الحقيقي داخل الأذهان. فربما تتواجد بعض المؤسسات في الواقع ولكنها ما لم تمد جذورها وتواجدها داخل بينتنا العقلية فوجودها لا يصبح أكثر من مبنى. وهناك مؤسسات أخرى هى أكثر من مباني وجدارن. وهذا لأنها تعمل دوماً في مخيلتنا العقلية وتسيطر عليها بل أحيناً كثيرة تتحكم في إنتاجنا للمعرفة ونوعيتها. وبهذا يتضاعف تواجدها مرتين، وربما لا تحتاج أن تقوم بكل العمل لأن الكثير منه يتم من خلالنا نحن عن طريق قرين المؤسسة في عقولنا. إننا في أمس الحاجة للإنعتاق من الهيمنة الأمنية إذا أردنا المضي قدوماً في مشاريع إنعتاقية كبرى والتحرر من قيود الخوف والفزع. فكيف يمكننا تصور نهضة علمية ومعرفية على مستوى العمل الأكاديمي والتقني إذا أستمرت الأجهزة الأمنية في اختيار أساتذة الجامعات والوزراء وظلت تلاحق الأقلام؟
إن أبطال المشهد، الأمن المركزي وأمن الدولة/الأمن الوطني والمخبر والاعلام ورجل الأعمال، كما هم والمخرج هو نفسه مخرج المشهد السابق ولكن بوجوه كثيرة. وبالتالي من الصعب توقع أو انتظار أداء ومشاهد وعروض جديدة غير تلك العروض الأمنية التي يتسيدها عروض طلقات النيران والدم والمتاريس والخوف. وهم يحاولون بكل إستماتة إبقاء المجتمع على مكان عليه والحفاظ على نفس شبكات القوى
والسلطة كما هى، وإعادة ترسيخ بنية الدولة القمعية.

ولكن المجتمع القديم يحتضر وربما يزداد عنفه في لحظاته الأخيرة. ولا أرى أي إمكانية لإنقاذه إلا الحرب 
ويجب أن تكون حرب ذات ظلال كثيفة وثقيلة على المجتمع لا أحداث ومناواشات عسكرية مثل التي تحدث في سيناء ولم تستطع إلهاء الثورة وتحيدها عن مسار الحرية. فالحرب هى الشيء الوحيد القادر على تجيش كل القوى الإجتماعية وراء السلطة وإعادة ترتيب علاقات القوة الإجتماعية كما كانت وعندها يكون خطاب التخوين والثنائيات الجامدة ذات جدوى مرة أخرى. وسنحتاج بعض الوقت لسحق مؤسساته بالكلية ثم محو ظله وأطيافه وبقاياه في بنيتنا العقلية والثقافية. علينا أن نعلن موت هذا المجتمع الآن حتى نستطيع بلورة الرؤية البديلة في السنوات القادمة.

Last Week on Jadaliyya (Nov 19-25)

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This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes a list of the most read articles.  Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series.

نزع القداسة عن سلطان عمان

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 امتلأ صيف 2012 بتقارير متعددة تتحدث عن اعتقالات وإدانات لمدونين وناشطي حقوق إنسان. حملة القمع هذه بدأت في أيار (مايو) حين تم اعتقال ناشطي حقوق انسان ومحامٍ أثناء محاولتهم الالتقاء بعمال نفط مضربين في اثنين من أهم حقول النفط العمانية. في بداية حزيران (يونيو)، تم اعتقال ثمانية مدونين وكتاب وهو يوثقون الاضرابات وقلة الاصلاحات الجدية منذ 2011. وفيما قبع بعضهم في الحبس الانفرادي، ومنعت عوائلهم ومحاميهم من الحصول على أية معلومات عن أماكن تواجدهم، فإن الثلاثين عمانياً الذين تظاهروا بسلام للمطالبة بالافراج عنهم تم اعتقالهم في الحادي عشر من حزيران. منذ بداية تموز (يوليو) 2012، تم اعتقال أكثر من أربعين طالباً جامعياً، وكاتباً، وصحفياً، وناشط حقوق انسان، ومحامياً – تعرض بعضهم لسوء معاملة نفسية وجسدية تصل إلى درجة التعذيب- وتم إصدار أحكام بحبسهم لسنة أو أكثر مع تغريمهم مبالغ مالية طائلة بعد اتهامهم بالتحريض على "إثارة الشغب" و"الانفلات الأمني"، و"خرق قانون جرائم المعلومات"، و"إهانة السلطان."

لقد شهد ربيع 2011 أوسع احتجاجات تمر بها سلطنة عمان منذ انتهاء حرب ظفار في السبعينات. مع ذلك، فقد سارع الكثير من المراقبين بالقول إن الحاكم لم يكن هدف هذه الاحتجاجات، وأنه أظهر نفسه "متجاوباً مع القلق الشعبي،" وأن إدارته للأحداث فسرت لماذا " انتهى العنف بالسرعة التي بدأ بها." هذه الاستنتاجات- والتي يمكن أن نقول إنها جاءت مبكرة في ضوء أحداث 2012- أساءت قراءة "الربيع العماني" بشكل جزئي، وغفلت عن النتيجة الأساسية له. إنه من الواضح أن الاحتجاجات لم تتطور بنفس الكثافة والمقياس الذي تطورت به الانتفاضات الأخرى في العالم العربي. ولكن "الربيع العماني" أفرز نتيجة لا تقل أهمية أو دلالة لمستقبل السياسة العمانية وهي: نزع القداسة عن السلطان قابوس.

طلب مساعدة مهمل

لقد كان للديناميكيات الاقليمية تأثير واضح على الأحداث التي هزت السلطنة منذ 2011، وهي بلد تُمنع فيه الحركات السياسية، وتتطلب التجمعات الشعبية إذناً مسبقاً من السلطات. وبعيداً عن صورة "السلطنة النائمة،" والتي تُقدم عمان عادة على أنها جزيرة التطور الآمن تحت "القيادة الحكيمة لوالد الأمة،" قابوس بن سعيد، فإن صوت المجتمع المدني بدأ يعلو شيئاً فشيئاً منذ سنوات مؤشراً الأخطاء الاقتصادية والسياسية في النظام. إن النتائج المحدودة لسياسات العومنة، والبطء في عملية تنويع موارد الدخل تظهر في التفاوت الاجتماعي المحزن، والبطالة  والفقر المزمنين الناتجين من سياسات تحرير السوق والخصخصة. لقد انخفض معدل العومنة في القطاع الخاص من 18.8 بالمئة في نهاية 2005 إلى 12.2 بالمئة في آب (أغسطس) 2012. تظهر التوقعات معدل بطالة مستمراً بحدود عشرين بالمئة في أوساط المواطنين، وما يقرب من خمس وعشرين بالمئة في أوساط الشباب من عمر ثمانية عشر إلى أربعة وعشرين عاماً. هذه الأرقام تغفل ما يمكن أن يعد نسبة كبيرة من العمالة الناقصة خصوصاً في المناطق الريفية.  وحين اندلعت الاحتجاجات في كانون الثاني (يناير) 2011، كانت نسبة العمانيين العاملين في القطاع الخاص والذين يحصلون على دخل أقل من الدخل الرسمي الشهري ( مئتي ريال عماني) تبلغ سبعين بالمئة.  كما ارتفعت كلفة المعيشة بشكل متزامن، فمن المستحيل الآن أن تجد شقة بغرفتي نوم للايجار بأقل من أربعمئة ريال في الشهر في عمان وأقل من مئة وخمسين ريال عماني في عبري أو صور.

الأكثر من هذا أنه من المعتاد الآن أن تسمع العمانيين يشتكون من أن أعضاء الحكومة، والنخبة الاقتصادية القريبة من الحكومة قد حصلوا على نفوذ كبير في عملية صنع القرار مما سمح لهم أن يستغلوا هذا الوضع لمصالحهم الشخصية. لقد عزز هذا الانغماس من قبل النخبة الصانعة للقرار في قطاع الأعمال صورة النخبة الفاسدة في أعين العامة، المنشغلة بحماية امتيازاتها في الوقت الذي تُخرس فيه كل الألسنة التي تسأل عن تضارب المصالح بين مصلحة البلاد العامة التي من المفترض أن تحميها النخبة – كسياسات العومنة- والمصالح الخاصة التي يدافع عنها رجال الأعمال.

لقد وجدت الهموم السياسية أيضاً تربة خصبة لتنمو فيها. فقد نتج عن حملة اعتقالات في عام 2005، في صفوف مسؤولين عسكريين ومدنيين رفيعي المستوى عن سجن ما يقرب من أربعين شخصاً. وكانت التهمة هي العضوية في منظمات سرية تهدف للإطاحة بالنظام. ومنذ 2005، نشأت منتديات على الانترنت يستخدم فيها أغلب المشاركين أسماءهم الحقيقية مروجين دعوات لنقاشات سياسية واجتماعية حول المجتمع العماني. ورغم التضييق المنهجي والاعتقالات في صفوف الصحفيين والناشطين على الانترنت- مثل الصحفي المستقل علي الزويدي الذي اعتقل لانتقاده الحكومة وتوفيره أدلة على فساد أعضاء الحكومة في 2009- فإن الروايات عن ممارسات الفساد والتزوير من قبل أعضاء بارزين في النظام (باستثناء الحاكم) أصبحت أمراً معتاداً. في صيف 2010، استغل مثقفون وناشطو حقوق انسان فرصة الذكرى الأربعين لتولي قابوس العرش ليقدموا  له التماساً على الانترنت، طالبوا فيه بعمليات إصلاح واسعة كإصدار "دستور جديد" يقود إلى ملكية دستورية ويضع قواعد تحكم عمل المسؤولين الحاليين.

اعتمدت شرعية السلطان قابوس منذ السبعينات على استيعاب كل عمان في "الدولة" وهو ما لا يزال  مثالاً بارعاً على التطور الاقتصادي والاجتماعي، ومن ثم اختزال "الدولة" في شخص قابوس نفسه. ومع الانجازات المذهلة في مجالات التكنولوجيا، والاقتصاد، والتطور الاجتماعي منذ السبعينات، فقد تم إعادة صياغة صورة قابوس التاريخية على أنه التجسيد الحي لعمان. ينظر عادة لتاريخ ما قبل السبعينات على أنه المعنى المناقض للثالث والعشرين من تموز( يوليو) 1970، وهو تاريخ جلوس قابوس على العرش، والذي أطلق عليه فيما بعد يوم النهضة ( عيد النهضة). يهدف هذا التوجيه السياسي للتاريخ "لتطبيع" حكم قابوس. حتى الآن، كان السلطان هو مصدر كل القوانين، ولم تكن هناك  إمكانية للاستئناف ضد قرارات الحاكم. إن المادة 41 من القانون الأساسي لعام 1996 تنص صراحة على أن هذا الشخص مصون، وأن احترامه واجب، وأن قراراته يجب أن تطاع. إن الشخصنة الحادة التي صبغت النظام السياسي العماني منذ 1970 قد طبعت الكثير من العمانيين على فكرة أن مصير كل المواطنين معتمد على النوايا الطيبة لقابوس.

وضمن هذا التفكير، فإن مختلف التعبيرات عن الوعي السياسي في فترة ما قبل 2011 كانت طلبات عون موجهة للسلطان من قبل مواطنين قلقين على مستقبلهم وغير قادرين على مواجهة متطلبات الحياة يوماً بعد آخر. ترجمت السلطات هذه المناشدات بهذا الشكل وأخذتها على أنها أجراس إنذار متكررة. ورغم ذلك، فإن مظاهرات مسقط في كانون الثاني( يناير) 2011، والجو العام من الاحباط الذي أشعل النار في صحار في فبراير، أخذ السلطات على حين غرة مخالفاً كل التوقعات. إن النظام لم يثبت فقط أنه عاجز عن التنبؤ بتلك التظاهرات، ولكنه فشل أيضاً في فهم أن أعمال الاحتجاج هذه مثلت صرخة إحباط- كما هو واضح في قائمة المطالب التي رفعت في دوار صحار في الأيام الأولى للمظاهرات والموجهة لقابوس شخصياً. وهكذا، فإن المطالب الأساسية للاضرابات والمظاهرات تمحورت حول فرص العمل والإجراءات الفاعلة لكبح جماح الأسعار المتزايدة والتفاوت بين الطبقات، ولكنهم طالبوا السلطان أيضاً أن يتدخل شخصياً ليحارب الفساد في أوساط الطبقات العليا من مسؤولي الدولة.

لم تتم الاستجابة بعد لطلبات المساعدة هذه الموجهة للحاكم، ولم ينتج عنها أي إصلاح يذكر. في عام 1994 وعام 2005، أخذ النظام زمام المبادرة  عن طريق بدء حملة أمنية قاسية في أوساط المثقفين وناشطي المجتمع المدني. كان الهدف من الحملة هو التأكيد على أن أي تعبير عن رأي خارج عن الخطاب الرسمي يبقى محرماً وأن الرد سيكون بلا رحمة. ولكن في 2011، كان النظام يجر قدميه خلف مطالب المحتجين. لقد توهم النظام أن بمقدوره أن يستعمل نفس الوصفات القديمة، أي أن يقمع بلا رحمة ويقوم في الوقت ذاته بعمليات إصلاح تجميلية ليكسب أمناً إجتماعياً. تم توظيف بعض الاستراتيجيات السياسية لمواجهة هذا الحشد في 2011- التلاعب بالهوية المحلية والأمور القبلية لاظهار المطالب وكأنها دعوات انفصال- و اتبع سياسة تهدف لمنع انتشار الحشود: إدخال أصوات بديلة، ومبادرات الحاكم الكيفية للتعبير عن حسن النية ( كزيادة الدخل الشهري بنسبة أربعة وثلاثين بالمئة في منتصف فبراير 2011، والاعلان عن إعطاء دخل شهري للمسجلين كباحثين عن عمل، وخلق خمسين ألف فرصة عمل جديدة في القطاع العام في أواخر شباط- فبراير)، والادعاء أن أصوات الاحتجاج المستقلة واقعة تحت نفوذ خارجي في محاولة لتجريدها من المصداقية تحت ذريعة متطلبات الحفاظ على الوحدة الوطنية خلف الحاكم، وفصل بعض الموظفين الرفيعين لجعلهم أكباش فداء وتحميلهم مسؤولية فشل النظام- ولكن كل هذه المحاولات باءت بالفشل. لقد فشلت هذه القرارات التي كانت تهدف إلى التأكيد على محورية السلطان في الوحدة الوطنية ومحاربة الفساد، ولتعزيز شرعيته عن طريق التركيز على اهتمامه بمطالب شعبه وطموحاتهم في الفت في عضد المحتجين.

حين دخلت القوات السعودية والاماراتية البحرين في الرابع عشر من مارس 2011، أصدر قابوس أمراً ملكياً يعلن فيه عن عزمه على إعطاء مجلس عمان سلطات تشريعية وتنظيمية أوسع. وقد أصبح واضحاً أن السلطان، ونظرائه في مجلس التعاون الخليجي،  لا يعتزم الذهاب إلى ما يعتبره بشكل أساسي خطاً أحمر، وهو الحفاظ على سلطاته السياسية ( التي تشمل السلطات التشريعية والتنفيذية) كحق شخصي غير خاضع للنقاش. إن قانون الحد من جرائم الانترنت الذي صدر بأمر ملكي في شباط( فبراير) 2011، والتعزيز الكبير لمدى عمل الادعاء العام يضمن السلطات والنفوذ الشخصي اللذان يتمتع بهما المفتش العام للشرطة والكمارك بمرسوم ملكي في مارس 2011، والتشديد في المادة 137 من قانون العقوبات المعدلة بمرسوم ملكي في تشرين الأول( أكتوبر) 2011، والتي تنص على أن "أي شخص يشارك في تجمع يضم على الأقل عشرة أشخاص بنية تهديد النظام العام، يتعرض للحبس مدة لا تقل عن شهر ولا تزيد عن سنة." تؤكد كلها طبيعة الرد الأمني للنظام.    

من التوقعات إلى التحرر من الوهم

دفع هذا الرد القمعي من قبل النظام الكثير من العمانيين إلى وهدة الاستغراب. حتى هذه اللحظة، لم يكن العمانيون قد رأوا انتقادات علنية للسياسات تندلع في الشوارع. على خلاف ذلك، فقد اعتادوا منذ أربعين عاماً على الاعتماد على تطمينات الشخصية الأبوية "بابا قابوس" ليحكم في ويحل كل القضايا العامة. من أكثر الأشياء التي أزعجت العمانيين هذا الوصف المتكرر من قبل مسؤولين بارزين في الدولة للمتظاهرين بأنهم "جانحون" و"مخربون"، إضافة إلى الحكم على أكثر من مئة شخص من كافة أنحاء الدولة بالسجن بتهم ملفقة تشمل "حيازة مواد بغرض صناعة متفجرات لنشر الارهاب." هؤلاء الأشخاص هم، في واقع الحال، أقرباء وجيران أو أعضاء في مجتمع أوسع يطالب بكل بساطة بحياة أفضل. كما لم يكن مفهوماً قلة الظهور العلني لقابوس وفشله في مقابلة المتظاهرين في 2011. إن قراره بالجلوس في قصره في منح أبرز بوضوح عدم رغبته في تحدي صورته كحكم فوق المشاكل اليومية، أو أن يخاطر بتقويض مكانته إذا هو واجه نقداً علنياً من الشعب. إن هذا التردد في كشر المحرمات في قضايا رئيسة  لم يفعل شيئاً سوى إشعال المزيد من القلق حول الافتقاد إلى نظرة اقتصادية وسياسية بعيدة المدى.

لقد أسهم رفض قابوس في تعيين رئيس وزراء ووضع الأساس لعمان ما بعد قابوس في زيادة القلق الشعبي، وأصبح النقد المباشر للسلطان مألوفاً  بشكل متزايد في المظاهرات الشعبية.  ففي صلالة، شكك المتظاهرون علناً في مسؤولية الحاكم عن سوء الإدارة المالية قائلين ( إن كنت لا تدري ] بسوء الادارة[ فتلك مصيبة، وإن كنت تدري فالمصيبة أعظم)، كما أنهم هددوه بشكل ضمني حين أشاروا إلى حرب ظفار ("من ينسى حرب السبعينات يجب ان يفكر في أحفاد الأحرار"). لقد عبر الناشطون الذين كانوا مقتنعين برغبة الحاكم في الاصلاح عن تحررهم من الوهم بأن النظام سيتجاوب مع دعوات المجتمع للعون. يوضح أحد المدرسين قائلاً:

قابوس رجل كبير السن، إنه رجل وحيد ولم يعد يفهم بلده جيداً.  هو لا يثق بأحد، يثق فقط في حلقة ضيقة من الأفراد الذين يقدمون له التقارير حول الوضع في البلاد ]...[  وأخشى أنه سيبدد كل ما بناه و كل التأييد الشعبي الذي جمعه طوال أربعين عاماً. أنا أؤيد تسمية رئيس للوزراء أو ولي للعهد بأسرع ما يمكن، حتى يحتفظ قابوس بالصورة التي بناها لنفسه "كخليفة الله على الأرض."

إن الحاكم الذي فصل في عام 2011 وزراء رفيعي المستوى وضحى بهم سياسياً لم يعد لديه من يلومه حتى يهدئ الرأي العام ويخفف من غضب المحتجين. إنه الآن على خط النار كما تشهد بهذا النكات العديدة التي يزخر بها الفيسبوك: فقد انتشرت قصص التضييق الأمني، والانتهاكات لأبسط حقوق الانسان، والادانات لوجود دولة الأمن والبوليس بشكل كبير على الانترنت والتويتر. لقد تم، وفي عجالة، اعتقال كتّاب الانترنت والمحتجين الذين ينتقدون علناً ممارسات الحاكم- وبشكل خاص قربه من المصالح البريطانية والأمريكية وإدارته للمدخول النفطي- والحكم عليهم بالسجن لإهانة صاحب الجلالة.  إن عملية إضفاء الشرعية على النظام، والتي استمرت منذ سنوات طويلة، المبنية على تعريف عمان العصرية على أنها قابوس، بدأت بالاهتزاز ويتم نقدها علناً في المدونات بأقلام الناشطين الذين يفرقون الآن بين النظام الحاكم والأمة العمانية. إن الانتقادات ضد الحاكم وسلطاته والقلق على مستقبل البلاد  يعبر عنه بشكل صريح بإسم عمان. لقد ذهب أحد الناشطين إلى حد أنه اعتبر الحاكم المشكلة وليس الحل:

أردنا في عام 2011 أن نفهم ما هي العلة التي تعاني منها البلاد. أردنا أن نزيح النخبة الفاسدة ] حول السلطان[ من النظام السياسي ونرى إذا كان هذا سيحل المشكلة. استطعنا أن نجبر هذه النخبة على الرحيل..ولكننا فهمنا سريعاً أن الجسد ما زال مريضاً بشكل كبير.

إضافة إلى هذا، فقد ظهرت رسوم جرافيتي على الجدران في صحار تدعو إلى الإطاحة بالسلطان. لقد أصبح المدعي العام الذي تعين بموجب مرسوم سلطاني في 2004 أكثر الشخصيات المكروهة في النظام. إن تصريحات المدعي العام المتكررة منذ يونيو 2012 تبدو وكأنها تنتمي لعهود غابرة، فقد قال إنه سيتخذ "كل الاجراءات القانونية المناسبة" ضد الكتاب والمشاركين في الاعتصامات الذين يعملون "ضد القيم والأخلاق للمجتمع العماني" و يحاولون " المس بالوحدة الوطنية والصالح العام،" وهذا يؤكد التشوش الحاصل عند السلطات في مواجهة تطور فشلت في توقعه ألا وهو: التفكيك المستمر في أسطورة أن قابوس هو تجسيد لعمان المعاصرة.

وكنتيجة لانعدام الرغبة في التجاوب مع الدعوات العديدة للمساعدة من قبل رعاياه، فقد هوى السلطان قابوس من مكانته الرمزية. إن الرواية الرسمية التي تشدد على أن من واجب العمانيين أن يدينوا بالولاء لبابا قابوس بإسم فكرة النهضة تبدو وكأنها اسطوانة مشروخة لم يعد أحد يستمع إليها في بلد وُلد ثمانية وأربعون بالمئة من سكانه بعد 1970، وسبعون بالمئة بعد 1980. إن المجتمع العماني المدني الشاب مكون من رجال ونساء متعلمين، لا يوافقون على التنازل عن حقهم في أن يكون لهم دور في القرارات السياسية والاقتصادية في بلدهم، كما فعل آباؤهم باسم الرفاه الاجتماعي أو لمتطلبات الوحدة الوطنية خلف الحاكم. الكثير من العمانيين يؤمنون الآن أن السلطان  يجب أن يعتبر مسؤولاً عن قرارات ستؤثر على أجيال عديدة في عمان ما بعد قابوس. وكما لخص هذا أحد الناشطين في صحار، " لقد أصبح قابوس شخصاً كسائر الأشخاص، إن بإمكانه أن يخطئ كأي فرد آخر.."

لا حاجة للقول إن قابوس لا يزال، حتى الآن، المرشح الوحيد للسلطة. ولكن إذا كان "الربيع العماني" قد أنجز شيئاً، فإنه قد نزع القداسة عن السلطان قابوس. هذا التغيير الدرامي في العلاقة بين المجتمع وقيادته يواجه السلطان قابوس بتساؤلات غير مسبوقة ويجبر السلطان على إعادة تقييم أساليب أضفاء الشرعية بشكل عام. إن هذا التصادم الحاد مع الواقع "لخليفة الله على الأرض" يؤشر وبشكل أكيد على بداية فصل جديد في تاريخ عمان وعملية اضفاء الشرعية على الحكم الاستبدادي.

The President and the Fatal Trilateral Logic of US, Egyptian and Israeli Relations

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In 2007, Mohammed Morsi, then chairman of the Brotherhood’s political department and member of the Executive Bureau, complained of the inability of Washington to match its rhetoric on promoting democracy in Egypt. He said that Israel had no interest in a democratic Egypt as it, “would do more to support the Palestinians.” Now Morsi, having brokered a Gaza ceasefire has shown that his policy on the Palestinians is no more imaginative than Mubarak-era policies and, partly as a result of US approval, has undertaken a democratic rollback that has ignited Egypt’s streets. 

Morsi has inadvertently, and in part, fallen victim to the trilateral logic of Egypt’s bilateral relationship with the United States vis-à-vis the 1979 Camp David treaty.

This was defined by Steven A. Cook in his book, The Struggle for Egypt: from Nasser to Tahrir Square, as the dubious strategic relationship between Egypt and the US that is accompanied with the informal requirement of good Egyptian-Israeli relations – a requirement which, “built into these ties from the very start meant that Washington would almost always view Cairo through the prism of Israel." 

Such a premise, not surprisingly in its close proximity to the Gaza saga, has a strong tendency to foment illiberal domestic policies, as Morsi has done, with a nod from the US and IMF backing, by abrogating the role of the judiciary to render his decrees immune from appeal, simultaneously protecting his Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly from dissolution by the judiciary or anyone else.  

This is not so different from the Mubarak era in which, despite human rights abuses, the relationship with Israel was the trump card that would always sway the White House and mute the US congress. Year after year, the 1.3 billion dollar aid would come rolling in, – just about providing international, diplomatic and financial cover for the regime.

It is this deal that has caused what Khaled Fahmy labels, the “Israelisation” of Egyptian foreign policy: this has helped to strip the Palestinian problem of questions regarding international law, right of return, Gaza siege, land theft, reducing it to a security concern. The Israel portfolio is disturbingly not so much in the hands of Egypt’s foreign ministry as it is in the hands of military intelligence - an organ that operates in a parallel universe above oversight and grossly detached from the prevailing Egyptian discourse and public that is overwhelmingly hostile to Israel due to its subjugation of the Palestinians.

The spirit (whatever that originally meant) of Camp David was quashed from its early days when two consecutive bombing raids were conducted by the Israeli airforce, one on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in early June 1981, and the other in mid-July on Beirut in which hundreds of civilians were killed. Both incidents happened within 48 hours of face-to-face meetings between Sadat and Israeli leader Menachim Begin. Most observers argued the timing of both events were intended either to make the Egyptian leader look complicit in the bombings or like a fool. Yet the Sadat regime's unwillingness to respond in any meaningful way set a dangerous precedent that was swiftly digested by elite actors, foreign and domestic, and taken for permanent Egyptian acquiescence. Sadat did not want to do anything to jeopardise the return of the Sinai, yet such aloofness had longer term consequences.

The Paradox of Camp David

It is one of the paradoxes of Camp David that, while it brought (cold) peace between Egypt and Israel, it exacerbated the region’s tensions. The removal of Israel’s greatest strategic threat has enabled it to pursue hawkish policies, leading to the invasion of Lebanon (1982 and 2006) and a ruthless occupation maintained in between border skirmishes, incursions, attacking Iraq, bombing Syria, entrenching its hold over the Golan Heights, and fuelling and increasing exponentially settlement activities in the occupied territories, while declaring a “completed and undivided” Jerusalem, and last but not least, killing or jailing untold numbers of Palestinians, the recent Gaza bloodbath being only the latest in many violent episodes. All this while Egypt has not played any significant part in counterbalancing or altering the rules of engagement to ensure that the region is guided to peace. Instead, Egypt has sat on the sidelines and ineffectively protested at Israeli violations.

Moreover, Camp David skewed Egyptian foreign policy so as to make it align with US/Israeli interests such as, for example, taking on the Iran nuclear threat when one would be hard-pressed to find Egypt’s public or intellectual discourse prioritising an Iranian threat over Israeli settlement-building and extra-judicial killings. This is not to mention what Cook highlights – that is, “the U.S.-sponsored modernization of Egypt’s armed forces has been purposefully slow and has emphasized a defensive military posture.”

More than three-quarters of Egyptians have called for a revision of Camp David in order to redress the loopholes and one-sided effects of the treaty. It would not only be in Egypt’s best interest, but Israel’s as well. Yet three-quarters of Egyptians are being too optimistic.

Recent events should set alarm bells for the Egypt-first isolationists as a reminder that their country is intertwined with the region’s geo-strategic politics, and some external actors want more of the Mubarak days for Egypt as it served their interest so well – this ranges from Israel to even the Gulf states. It is not enough for Egyptian apologists for the trilateral logic to call themselves “realists” to the detriment of their country’s security, the Palestinians, and the entire region.

The late Ismail Sabri Abdullah, Sadat’s Minister for Planning, lamented “If we [Egypt] wanted to have a good relationship with the United States, we needed to spend the night in Tel Aviv.” Now once again, Egyptians, will be spending the night (and nights) in Tahrir to tell the Morsi government that, first and foremost, a good relationship comes from a subservience to the people, not to themselves, let alone to foreign capitals.

[This piece was originally published in Open Democracy

Egypt Media Roundup (November 26)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.]     

“State TV: Court to examine dual nationality of president's children”
Lawsuit launched for stripping President’s son and daughter of their Egyptian citizenship.

“Dream TV says decision to cut transmission politicized”
Government shuts down private channel amid fears that the Muslim Brotherhood is trying to crack down on media critical of the president.

“Subsidy on 95-octane gasoline to be lifted in 3 days, says Finance Ministry source”
The Finance Ministry hopes to get LE120-130 million into the treasury from subsidy cuts.

“Brotherhood to mobilize in Tahrir ahead of Morsy announcement”
Muslim Brotherhood mobilizes members in anticipation of a significant announcement by the president.

“Wave of walkouts leaves Constituent Assembly in Islamists' hands”
Secular powers withdraw from constitution writing process, days after Coptic Church representatives did the same.

“Police officers protest against army in Alexandria”
Clashes erupt between police and army in Alexandria, after a naval officer is detained for arguing with a police officer.

“Army officers clash with policemen in New Cairo”
Clashes erupt after a policeman stops a military officer at a roadblock.

“Children tortured by Egyptian security forces”
A Human Rights Watch says more than 300 children have been tortured in Egypt over the past one year.

“In Dabaa, the fight to halt nuclear power continues”
Residents of Dabaa continue activism against the planned nuclear plant near their settlement.

“Inside the Ikhwan”
An interview with former Muslim Brother Tharwat El-Kharbaw.

“Morsi declaration hailed by supporters, deemed 'coup' by opposition”
Different reactions to the presidential constitutional declaration divide the Egyptians.

“Brotherhood's Shura Council chairman criticises Morsi declaration”
Ahmed Fahmy, chairman of the Shura Council and member of the Freedom and Justice Party, says the president should have put the constitutional declaration before a referendum.

“Press syndicate meeting on Egypt draft charter ends in fistfight”
Violent fight erupts in press syndicate as members fail to issue a unified position on the constitutional declaration.

“Meet Egypt’s Mr Mursi: a president without checks and balances”
H.E. Hellyer says the president doesn’t have the legitimacy of a revolutionary president.

“The Good, The Bad, The Elazul”
Elazul says the Muslim Brotherhood is unable to counter the oppositions protests without bussing in supporters from rural areas.

“Explaining Mursi’s Decisions”
Abdel Rahman Youssef explains the president’s motivation to issue the constitutional declaration.

“#Nov23 : There is anger all over the country”
Zenobia’s overview of days-long violent protests across the country that between the police, Muslim Brotherhood supporters, and angry crowds dissatisfied with the president’s recent decisions.

“The tragic fate of Sinai's dual-nationals”
Nabil Shawkat talks about the consequences of a recent government decision requiring Egyptians with dual nationalities in Sinai to sell their homes, lands, and businesses within six month.

“Egyptian Belly Dancer's Salacious Video Mocking Muslim Brotherhood Goes Viral”
The controversial Sama Al-Masry makes a video mocking the Muslim Brotherhood using popular protesters’ chants.

“Raid on Egyptian Island Fuels Discontent With Army, Morsi”
The military raids an island killing one resident over land that it claims since before the fall of Hosni Mubarak.

 

In Arabic:

“بالفيديو:"البديل" تنشر نص الإعلان الدستوري الجديد ..وتعيين طلعت إبراهيم نائبا عاما لمدة 4 سنوات”
The president announces new “constitutional declaration,” including the canceling legal provisions for challenging presidential decisions and appointing a new Prosecutor General.

“البرادعي: مرسي نصب نفسه "حاكمًا بأمر الله "”
Mohamed ElBaradei criticizes the recent constitutional declaration by the presidency.

“تعليق العمل بالمكتب الفني للنائب العام و"الأموال العامة" و"أمن الدولة" و"التهرب الضريبي"”
Attorneys of the Finance Prosecution, State Security Prosecution and Tax Evasion Prosecution have stopped work in protest to the president’s constitutional declaration.

“ مفاجأة: النائب العام يوقع بيانًا يعتبر الإعلان الدستوري «اعتداء على القضاء»”
The new Prosecutor General, appointed by the president, criticizes the constitutional declaration and calls it an attack on the judiciary.

“مصادر رئاسية: التحقيق قريبًا في «مؤامرات» لزعزعة نظام الحكم”
The President accuses unnamed former regime officials and members of the opposition of conspiring against the revolution as sources say investigations will be launched into the matter.

“مصادر: قنديل «مكتئب» بسبب الهجوم عليه بعد حادث أسيوط”
PM Hesham Qandil is “depressed” over negative reaction against the government after the Assiut bus and train crash.

 

Recent Jadaliyya articles on Egypt:

Joint Statement by Twenty-Two Egyptian Rights Organizations on Morsi Declaration
Various organizations condemn the presidents constitutional declaration saying that it is impeding delivering justice.

تيار استقلال القضاء: من مواجهة مبارك إلى تقاسم كعكة السلطة مع الإخوان
Ayat Alhabal looks into the relationship between the Movement for Independent Judiciary and the new Egyptian regime.

Revolution Protection Law May Fail To Live Up To Its Name
Mai Shams El-Din says the Revolution Protection Law is thwarted by the president’s declaration giving him unchallengeable decision-making powers and making the Constituent Assembly immune to dissolution.

Thousands Fill Tahrir on Friday to Protest Morsi's New 'Dictatorial Powers'
Zeinab El Gundy, Mostafa Ali, and Osman El Sharnoubi document the Friday protests in Tahrir against the presidential constitutional declaration.

Human Trafficking in the Sinai: Refugees Between Life and Death
A summary of a recent report on human trafficking in Sinai documenting the suffering of thousands of African migrants who fall victim of Egyptian traffickers.

الجبهة القومية ترفض انقلاب مرسي على الثورة وتدعو للنزول إلى التحرير بقوة
A statement by the National Front for Justice and Democracy calling on Egyptians to protest the presidential constitutional declaration.

Egypt Political Forces Call for Mass 'Eyes of Freedom' Rally Friday
Over thirty political groups call for an 'Eyes of Freedom' Friday protest calling on Mohamed Morsi’s government to quit and interior ministry to be purged.

The President's New Powers
Heba Afify, Amira Ahmed, and Lina Attalah look into the consequences of the president’s new legislative and executive powers granted to him by his own declaration.

Morsy and the "Nationalization" of the Revolution: Some Initial Reflections
Jadaliyya’s Hesham Sallam reacts to Mohamed Morsi’s constitutional declaration.

Eyewitness from Gaza: Historic Convoy Breaks the Siege
Hundreds of activists from leftist, secular and moderate forces reach the Gaza strip amid continuing Israeli bombardment.

الثورة بصفة شخصية
Amro Eletrebi recalls past protests and reflects on the current condition of the revolution.

الجبهة القومية للعدالة والديمقراطية تحمل "مرسي" مسؤولية أحداث "محمد محمود" وتدعوكم للمشاركة في جمعة عيون الحرية
A statement by the National Front for Justice and Democracy accusing Mohamed Morsi of being responsible for the violence during the Mohamed Mahmoud protests.


Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (November 27)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.comby Monday night of every week.]

Regional and International Relations

Qatar hosts climate summit amid criticism A news report on the eighteenth United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Doha, on Al-Jazeera English.

Qatar hosts critical climate talks A news report on the opening of the climate summit, on Al-Jazeera English.

Doha 2012: US claims ‘enormous’ efforts to cut carbon emissions Fiona Harvey reports on the objectives of the summit, in The Guardian.

Reports and Opinions

Saudi Arabia criticised over text alerts tracking women’s movements Luke Harding writes on a new technology introduced that informs male guardians of their female relatives’ travels, in The Guardian.

Repression in Bahrain

Clashes at protest hub in Bahraini capital A news report on clashes between the police and protesters at the end of Ashoura, in The Independent.

Crisis in Yemen

Trouble again in the north An article on the Houthis and the war with the government in Saada, in The Economist.

Protests and the Election Law in Kuwait

Kuwait emir’s change to election rules stirs signs of Arab spring Ian Black examines the implications of the ongoing protests for the election in Kuwait on Saturday, in The Guardian.

Kuwait’s democracy is being undermined – that’s why its people are protesting A statement by Musallam Al-Barrak, a Kuwaiti opposition leader and former MP, on the current political scene in Kuwait, in The Guardian.

Human Rights Watch

Bahrain: Promises Unkept, Rights Still Violated A statement by the organization condemning the Bahraini government’s failure to implement the recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry.

Markets and Business

Abu Dhabi: Where are the jobs for the boys? An article on the future repercussions of the government’s policy to find jobs for unemployed Emirates in order to curb social unrest, in The Economist.

Culture

Andrew WK forced to cancel ‘world peace’ performance in Bahrain Matt Williams report on the State Department’s decision to rescind the rock star’s invitation to perform in Bahrain, in The Guardian.


Arabic

Dispatch from Mohamed Mahmoud Street: Egyptian Revolts

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“We are not thugs, and we are not criminals,” It is the sentence that every single protester in Mohamed Mahmoud street used as they began to tell me about the protests that began on November 19. That day is significant. It is the first anniversary of the “Mohamed Mahmoud Events,” when families and friends of those killed in the Tahrir uprisings of last year gathered to demand justice, and when the police dispersed their peaceful gathering.

These anniversary “events” began three days before Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi’s constitutional declaration that ordered a slew of measures: the unconstitutional removal of the public prosecutor, the curtailment of the judiciary’s power and of the shura council, and the reinvestigation of the violence against the protestors in last year’s revolt against the Mubarak regime. These measures have been called a “soft coup.”

Egyptians, having tasted the fruits of democratic possibility when they ousted Mubarak on January 25, 2011, were not willing to put up with such a constrained political dispensation. They joined the already ongoing street protests around Tahrir Square, in the two avenues of Mohamed Mahmoud and Qasr Eyni.

“It all started on the 19th,” said a 17-year old protestor. “The parties and different groups came to commemorate the anniversary and left. One of our friends was hit by the police. We responded. It has been going on since then. The security services reacted to these new protests with extraordinary violence, filling up the emergency rooms and beds at Mounira Hospital, Hussein University Hospital, Qasr Al-Aini Hospital and Agouza Police Hospital. Over fifty protestors were grievously hurt in the first few days, and one of them, Gaber Salah (Jica), a member of the April 6 movement and two other parties, is clinically dead. (He died on November 26.)

“Muslim Brotherhood are banned from entering the street,” a yellow banner hangs at the entrance of the wrecked Mohamed Mahmoud Street. Visitors are also received by a pond of sewage where the children and the teenagers clashing with the police gather.

Most of the protesters are under 18, and a large number of them are between 8 and 11, many of them street kids. They gather at the entrance of the street and in groups attack the police stations at the Lycée school on the other side of the street. The police respond with tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition The youth run fast to face the police and then retreat as fast, hiding as the police lob their tear gas canisters. Rushing between Mohamed Mahmoud Streets and Qasr El-Aini Street, the children beam.

Who are these young people? The media, even the Left media, call them youth, as if they are an abstract category with no stories of their own, no names, no hopes, and no dreams. They are no longer the mythical Youth of the Revolution, just youth, a sneering term that now seems to mean juvenile and immature rather than hopeful. Al-Jazeera found it easy to say that the “youth” are part of a conspiracy. The fuloul (remnants of the Mubarak regime) sent them to create insecurity; these are not youth, but thugs of the fuloul. “It is easier for them to say we are thugs and criminals, what do you want them to call us, revolutionaries? If they say we are revolutionaries, it means we have rights, but if they label us as thugs it means we are the ones who are guilty and not them,” a 15 years old street child responded to my question about the origin of the label thugs.

No political party has adopted them. The April 6 Youth Movement, formed in 2008 to support the textile workers of Mahalla and who had a lead role in Tahrir 1, said that they do not know these youth. But they do not denounce them. They say that they “understand” why they are fighting the police. The same reaction came from a newly formed youth political party, “Nobody knows who they are.” One member of the newly formed parties said during the march on Friday, “They are the youth of the working class neighborhood around Tahrir.” Abstractions, they children are not of interest to the established channels of political life.

Down the street, I met a young man. He had a Palestinian headscarf around his face and was throwing rocks in the direction of the police. He looked like one of the children of the second Intifada. He didn’t want to talk to me at first. Later he came and said, I’ll talk to you if you buy me lunch. But don’t give my name to anyone, he warned. He posed a bit, saying, before we proceed I just want to reassure you that we do not attack people’s homes or stores — meaning private property; we only attack the state property and the police. Why do you attack the police, I ask? Because I want revenge for the death of my friends who died last year, he says. Both died in Mahmoud Street. All of us from al-haram were sitting together when someone told us, watch out the army is going to attack you. While he was telling us this, he was hit and fell. One of his friends came to rescue him, and he was hit and died. I am here to tell the police that we won’t forget our friends, he told me. They need to watch out, the police; we won’t forget our rights. We still remember. We can still attack.

He is seventeen. He is out of school and can’t find a job. He comes from al-haram, from one of the sha’bi (working-class) parts of this Cairo area. His family lives in a small house, with no municipal services. He has been part of the Mahmoud street attacks since the first day.

I asked him how the other people are in the street. He recited a list of poor areas: manateq el sahabiya. None of them with money to eat, with futures to tend to. Matariyya, al Giza, Boulaq, Sayyida Zeynab, boulaq al Dakrour, Al Amiriya. We have become friends, he says, because we protect each other and cover for each other.

We were interrupted by some more commotion. Some people were running from Tahrir to the High Court. Clashes had broken out there when a group of Muslim Brotherhood attacked the high court and fired at it. The Tahrir people had gathered near the Court to chant against the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi’s power grab. Judges came outside. The police ringed the Court, trying to disperse the people. We went back to Mahmoud Street.

Pandemonium greets us. Young people are running between the streets, around the Square. When the police hit bad on Mohamed Mahmoud, the kids run to Qasr Eyni street, We stopped a young man and asked him if he’d like to talk. He agreed after we reassured him we won’t use his name. He is thirteen. He is a child of the streets, living in and out of this or that avenue for the past four years. His parents are divorced. He used to live with his grandfather in Dar el Salam, the slum in the outskirts of Maadi, but after he died, he went to the streets. I had 35 Egyptian Pounds ($5) and under the Nile bridge where I slept, I met another street child who has a bit of money so we started a company to sell biscuits from a cart. The police destroyed it, and then they had nothing once more. We them began to clean car windows at traffic lights, till we were kicked by the police…Then we started to sell goods in Cairo’s Metro till this was banned too.

Last January, he thought Tahrir Square would be a nice place to sell things. Cigarettes from a cart was the new mode of business. On January 27, the army destroyed his cart. The next day, he joined a group of other street children in a new activity: attacking police stations to free prisoners. There was something fantastic about this young boy, liberating prisoners one minute and then protecting the museum in another. His bravery came from his desire to inflict revenge on the police and the army who had made it impossible for him to live his life. So much had been taken from him; he had so little to lose. What did the children do to sleep in the streets and on top be harassed and humiliated by the police? And what did the youth before even starting their lives do in order to be killed? And what did the prisoners do, stole small things to eat and be kept in prisons for year? This was the 14 years old response to my question why he is attacking the police.

He joined the recent clashes two days after they had already begun. He was at work in a workshop, saw the events on TV and felt he needed to defend his friends. He left work and engaged the police. We want to tell them that we do not forget, he said.

Another boy strolls by. He is eight. He is a rag-picker, going through the garbage and finding things to resell. Police harassment is the coin of his trade. He comes with his friends from el Amiriyya. I came to harass the police as they harass me everyday in the streets, he says, maybe when this is over they will think before they hit every time they see me looking for something to eat. His friend, the 12 years old had other reasons to join in the attack on the police. I’m attacking them because I want good schools where teachers teach and not sit and ask 3ammi el Sayyed (the school janitor) to bring them tea and sandwiches to the classrooms and to hit us if we talk; I am attacking them because I want them to build factories and farms so kids like us find work easily and live with dignity.

For these kids, the police represent the worst of the State. Their attack on the police is not only revenge. It is also a demand for reforms so that they can live with dignity. This 12 years old is also a street child who is scared that Egypt will be led to a civil war. Last year Egypt was one hand, he says, and now we are divided.

At the end of the night yesterday, the police built barracks at the entrance of Qasr Eyni and Mohamed Mahmoud streets. The kids had their own construction in mind. Before moving to attack the police barricade that protects the road leading to the US Embassy, they wrote on the barracks, “Down With the Regime of the Muslim Brotherhood.”

[This article was originally published on Counter Punch.]

New Texts Out Now: Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights

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Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics, Fifth Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Ann Elizabeth Mayer (AEM): Many things have changed in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since the first edition of this book, published in the mid-1980s, examined proposed “Islamic” versions of human rights. I wanted to update the earlier versions of this book to take into account new developments in the ongoing contention about Islam and human rights, which has intensified in the wake of the crushing of the Green Movement by Iran’s ruling theocrats and the ascendancy of Islamist factions after the upheavals of the Arab Spring, both of which have intensified the current debates about the merits of including Islamic provisions in constitutions.

Among the recent events meriting examination is the intense international controversy engendered by the Danish Cartoons case and related attempts by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in the UN to win support for injecting a principle in international law criminalizing “defamation of Islam,” which would turn international law into a tool of religious censorship. Also deserving of scrutiny are current efforts in the UN human rights system to expand international human rights law to protect people regardless of their gender identity and sexual orientation. These have been met with fierce opposition by MENA states, which in this, as in some other areas, have managed to forge opportunistic alliances with non-Muslim countries like China and Russia in efforts to stifle plans to strengthen human rights. In consequence, Islamic grounds for challenging human rights are now being combined with others that can appeal to non-OIC members.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does it address?

AEM: It assesses the policies and strategies of regimes and Islamist ideologues as they engage in selectively wielding elements of Islamic law to construct supposedly Islamic versions of human rights in efforts to dilute and restrict the human rights that have been guaranteed to all people in international law. The book dissects the often obscure and misleading formulations that are employed in the literature advocating Islamic human rights and in the various models of Islamic human rights that are designed to cloak their retrograde features. Far from being pure outgrowths of the Islamic tradition, Islamic human rights schemes are shown to constitute politically charged, hybrid mixtures of ideas from different sources. These so-called Islamic human rights are compared with their international counterparts, showing how they relate to the aims of anti-democratic forces that are wedded to upholding traditional hierarchies. These anti-democratic forces seek to wean Muslims off international human rights law and consign them to a set of enfeebled rights that accommodate inequality and restrictions on freedoms—all in the name of upholding the primacy of Islamic law. My assessments demonstrate the setbacks that this entails for the human rights, including setbacks for the rights of women and minorities and for the principle of freedom of religion. Critiques by progressive Muslims, including Islamic feminists, are cited to prove that people working within the Islamic tradition dispute the notion that Islam mandates relegating Muslims to a status where they are deprived of human rights protections.

J: How does this work connect to and/or depart from your previous research and writing?

AEM: The fifth edition builds on the previous material while highlighting new trends. It documents how Muslim human rights activists have increasingly emerged as forceful proponents of human rights universalism, speaking out to denounce appeals to cultural particularisms that would deny Muslims the protections of international human rights law. It also examines recent developments at the UN that illustrate how the strategies of wielding Islam as a tool to subvert human rights have become more complex, and their proponents more disingenuous, than they were decades ago. One used to hear spokesmen for MENA countries invoking Islam to justify non-compliance with international human rights law. In tribute to the prestige that human rights have acquired over the last decades, regimes that formerly squarely denounced UN human rights instruments as contravening Islamic requirements have changed tactics. They currently prefer to speak as if they were supportive of human rights and are merely asking for reasonable accommodations of certain cultural concerns. This shift has entailed particularly striking hypocrisy with regard to women’s international human rights, with MENA countries like Saudi Arabia now making claims that their laws embrace full equality for women—but at the same time making vague appeals to the need to respect cultural differences.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

AEM: The book aims to enlighten readers with an interest in the conflicts over human rights in contemporary MENA countries about how Islam fits into the politics of human rights in that region and to disabuse them of the notion that a monolithic Islamic tradition governs attitudes and behavior there. There continues to be a tendency in the West to misapply cultural relativism and also to give far too much weight to the claims by undemocratic governments—like those in Iran and Saudi Arabia—that Islam stands in the way of allowing their citizens to enjoy human rights. It hopes to prompt reconsideration by people who believe that calling for upholding the human rights of people in Muslim countries violates the principles of cultural relativism and is disrespectful of Islamic beliefs. Ideally, this study would encourage readers to rethink and reject stereotypes about Islam as an obstacle to accepting human rights and to recognize the importance of the vital human rights culture that has managed to emerge, against great obstacles, in the MENA region.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

AEM: I am examining the campaign by the OIC to persuade the UN to accept the principle that defamation of Islam constitutes a violation of human rights and that it must be criminalized in international law. I dissect the flawed justifications for including in the human rights system a principle that amounts to the criminalization of blasphemy. I propose that the regimes behind this campaign are both endeavoring to justify repressive domestic policies that harshly penalize expressions of dissent, and are also trying to establish a basis for pressuring Western countries to follow their policies of censoring discussions of Islam and the politics of human rights in the MENA region.

J: In what ways do you address the potential for further advancements in human rights under Islamic law?

AEM: As I indicate at many points, emerging from environments where civil and political rights are blatantly violated, Muslim human rights activists in the MENA region now figure among the most courageous and eloquent supporters of human rights, finding support in their religious heritage for asserting that, far from being in conflict, Islam and human rights propose similar visions of human dignity and equality. At the same time, in the turbulent political settings left after the overthrow of brutal dictatorships, the programs of Islamist leaders have gained traction—a troubling trend, because Islamists have not been the friends of human rights in the past. As the book discusses, the upheavals of the Arab Spring have created a complex dynamic, both unleashing the potency of Islamist parties that appeal to Islamic criteria to curb rights and instilling in the populace a heightened appreciation of the value and importance of democratic freedoms. As one sees in Iran, repressive government policies that consistently invoke Islam have managed to alienate much of the younger generation, prompting calls for secularization as the necessary precondition for realizing human rights. Whether Islamists in Arab countries will emulate Iran’s ruling theocracy and wield their growing political clout to deploy official Islamic rationales for crushing aspirations for human rights will have momentous implications for the prestige and authority of Islamic law.

J: What makes thefifth edition particularly timely?

AEM: The stunning political upheavals of 2011 in the MENA region revealed how calls for human rights and democracy could mobilize the populace to revolt against ingrained despotisms in the same way that the thwarted Green Movement had done in Iran in 2009. As the fifth edition shows, unresolved tensions in sorting out the relationship of Islam and human rights mean that this topic will continue to preoccupy societies that are struggling with difficult transitions. The current contention over proposed Islamic provisions in new constitutions is foreshadowed in the problematic formulations utilized in Islamic human rights schemes. Moreover, the discussion of the human rights dimensions of the Danish Cartoons controversy provides background for appreciating the stakes involved in the international crisis over the posting of the trailer for the offensive film Innocence of Muslims and in the widespread Muslim demands for US authorities to undertake criminal prosecution of those responsible for the film.

Excerpts from Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics

From Chapter Nine:

In the years since the Rushdie Affair, the OIC has honed its diplomatic skills and has radically changed the way that it represents its human rights positions, making strained attempts to convince the international community that it does respect freedom of religion and freedom of expression. Nonetheless, careful examination of its UN resolutions on the duty to combat defamation of religions reveal that these continue to embody the same mentality that the OIC exhibited in the Rushdie Affair, an attitude that human rights should be sacrificed where preserving Islamic sanctities is concerned. This is consistent with the basic premise of Islamic human rights schemes, that Islam must be treated as the overriding concern.

Since 1999, the OIC has repeatedly sponsored resolutions on combating defamation of religions in the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly and has tried to convince the international community to accept the idea that all governments are bound to punish such defamation….The fact that in votes in the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council these resolutions have repeatedly won majority support is emboldening the OIC to claim that its position has now become part of international law….

The lack of protections for freedom of religion in Islamic human rights schemes is one of the factors that most sharply distinguishes them from international human rights law, which treats freedom of religion as an unqualified right. The refusal to guarantee freedom of religion reveals the enormous gap between their authors’ mentalities and the philosophy of human rights.

Despite their records of routinely violating the right to freedom of religion, Middle Eastern governments are loathe to make candid avowals of their policies of persecuting people because of their religious beliefs, realizing that their practice is indefensible.

It would be simplistic to blame Islam per se for the lack of religious freedom in the Middle East. In each country, the violations correlate closely with the specific political objectives of the regimes involved. Non-Muslims and persons who convert from Islam are not necessarily the main victims. After all, in the Middle East, believing Muslims live in a climate of intellectual repression where they are regularly exposed to prosecutions for religious crimes merely for expressing ideas at odds with whatever religious doctrines that the local authorities currently endorse. Muslims are exposed to charges of heresy, blasphemy, and apostasy for what is actually political or theological dissent from officially mandated orthodoxy—or for having offended powerful figures. It seems fairer to assess the egregious violations of religious freedom regularly perpetrated in the Middle East as resulting from such factors as states’ determination to monopolize religious authority as part of their monopoly of all fonts of power, a disposition to crush all dissent and suppress all critical thought, the wish to placate influential clerics or Islamist factions, and a pattern of pandering to popular prejudices in hopes of shoring up faltering popular support.

There have long been efforts to politicize the international human rights system and to inject bias and selectivity into deciding which countries’ human rights violations warrant condemnation. In this respect, the OIC’s attempts to get the UN to focus on alleged defamation of Islam occurring in the West while deflecting attention away from OIC members’ own egregious human rights violations do not stand out as exceptional. Nonetheless, the OIC campaign to insert in the list of UN human rights principles the duty to combat defamation of Islam does stand out in that it potentially involves a major alteration to the substantive rights set forth in international human rights law. This alteration will introduce a principle that is on its face incongruous, being designed to protect an institution, not the rights of human beings, and that also clashes with long-established human rights principles in areas like freedom of expression and freedom of religion, which will have to be compromised to accommodate it.

From Chapter Ten:

Contrary to what their authors would claim, the Islamic restrictions placed on human rights, which are so central to Islamic human rights schemes, are not compelled by unimpeachable Islamic authority; the idea that Islam acts as a constraint on rights is vigorously contested. If the authors’ aim had been to advance protection for human rights, they could have located ample raw material in the Islamic heritage, which is replete with values that complement human rights, such as concern for human welfare, compassion for the weak, social justice, tolerance, respect for diversity, and egalitarianism. These and other core principles could provide the basis for constructing a viable synthesis of Islam and international human rights law, as the work of Muslim proponents of democratization and the philosophies of many Muslim human rights activists amply demonstrate.

From an array of options in the Islamic heritage that include principles friendly to rights, the schemes deliberately select those elements that present obstacles to the accommodation of international human rights law—obstacles that are then attributed to Islamic requirements. In reality, it is more accurate to say that the obstacles lie in politics. The authors are interested in rationalizing governmental repression, enforcing social and religious conformity, delegitimizing and even criminalizing dissent, censoring critical perspectives, and perpetuating ingrained hierarchies that include discriminatory treatment of women, non-Muslims, and Muslims belonging to what are locally disfavored sects.

Authors of Islamic human rights schemes seek to convince the world that they constitute valid counterparts of international human rights law. This constitutes a misrepresentation because their objective is inimical to rights—cutting back on the civil and political rights that are afforded by international law. Careful comparisons with international documents inevitably reveal the deficiencies of the Islamic schemes. The latter assert the supremacy of vague Islamic criteria in all areas relevant for the protection of human rights, but these Islamic criteria are left so malleable that they leave those in power with unlimited discretion to interpret them in ways that crush rights.

Even though they are in no sense definitive statements of Islamic positions on human rights, Islamic human rights schemes deserve attention because of their proliferation and their real-world impact. State policy in the Middle East and the ongoing demands for Islamization mean that models embodying the idea that Muslims do have human rights but only subject to significant Islamic qualifications will continue to be promoted and may influence laws and constitutions. Added to this, one observes the proactive roles increasingly assumed in the UN human rights system by the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and its members in efforts to inject ideas taken from Islamic human rights schemes into the fabric of international human rights law….

The OIC and its members have dramatically altered their official stances on human rights in the course of the last two decades. Instead of regularly pressing the idea of Islamic cultural particularism being at odds with human rights and boldly asserting that their commitment to Islamic law entails violating international human rights law, they now hypocritically affirm their support for international human rights law and claim that their projects are aligned with its philosophy. Having altered their rhetoric so that it fits better in the human rights mainstream, Middle Eastern countries have been able to make strategic alliances with countries from outside the region, such as Russia, that also want to employ stealth tactics to undermine human rights. In Russia’s case, it is elevating “traditional values” to a concern of human rights. Working in such alliances has given OIC members expanded influence in the UN human rights system but has also necessitated adjusting their tactics.

Thus, when rejecting proposals at the UN that are designed to advance human rights of sexual minorities, they make only occasional objections grounded in Islamic law, for the most part condemning such proposals on grounds that their non-Muslim allies would also endorse….

The Islam and human rights nexus has been in a state of acute tension for decades. Every indication is that we are far from having seen the last chapter in Muslims’ efforts to settle on the optimal relationship of these two vital factors in contemporary Middle Eastern political life. In the wake of the popular uprisings and mass protests of the Arab Spring, which manifested both a great hunger for democratization and the disposition on the part of many to assume that Islamists offered the best prospects for good governance, one can anticipate debates on Islam and human rights to intensify. In Tunisia in December 2011, one observed the spectacle of Moncef Marzouki, the prominent human rights activist, assuming the office of president, while Hamadi Jebali, a leader of the Islamist Ennahda Party, took the office of prime minister. How they would sort out their respective perspectives on what policies a country that was embarking on a new venture of democratization should adopt would be just one of many experiments with achieving the right balance. And, in Yemen, in the person of Tawakkul Karman, the dynamic pro-democracy activist whose championing of women’s rights won her a share in the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize, one had a woman with Islamist ties who was also a foe of interpretations of Islam that would limit women’s role. Obviously, Karman aspires to combine her Islamic loyalties with a fight to ensure that the end of dictatorship opens the door to women’s full participation in society and politics, seeing no necessary opposition between Islam and women’s rights. In the wake of the Arab Spring, hers will be only one of many struggles to spread of vision of Islam as supporting aspirations for human rights, difficult struggles that have momentous implications for the future.

[Excerpted from Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics, by Ann Elizabeth Mayer, by permission of the author. Copyright © 2012 by Westview Press. For more information, or to purchase this book, please click here.]

New Texts Out Now: Elisabeth Weber, Living Together: Jacques Derrida's Communities of Violence and Peace

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Elisabeth Weber, editor, Living Together: Jacques Derrida’s Communities of Violence and Peace. New York: Fordham University Press, 2012.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you put together this collection?

Elisabeth Weber (EW): The volume was conceived after the conference I organized with my colleague Thomas Carlson in October 2003 at the University of California at Santa Barbara, on “Irreconcilable Differences? Jacques Derrida and the Question of Religion.” The conference turned out to be Jacques Derrida’s last public appearance in the United States. The collection of essays is grouped around Derrida’s keynote address, “Avowing—The Impossible: ‘Returns,’ Repentance and Reconciliation,” which was first presented in French in 1998. Its English translation, by Gil Anidjar, appears here for the first time.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does it address?

EW: Derrida’s essay deals intensely with the question of “vivre ensemble”/ “living together” and is dedicated to a very significant degree to the question of living together in Israel/Palestine. Derrida’s main argument is that the substantive “ensemble” (whole, totality) makes any adverbial “ensemble” (together) impossible, and that the adverbial “ensemble” is always the first contestation of the substantive “ensemble.” I invited scholars from a variety of fields to take Derrida’s text as a point of departure for their own essays. The collection includes essays by scholars in religious studies, Middle East studies, philosophy, literature, and law who work at universities and as lawyers/activists in Canada, the United States, Israel, and Egypt. The essays offer analyses inspired by Jacques Derrida’s oeuvre, in particular the keynote, and focus on concepts/experiences such as the stranger, forgiveness, hospitality, religion, and torture. Some of the essays also delve into contemporary conflicts in specific geographic areas (including India, Israel/Palestine, South Africa, Turkey, and the US).

J: How does this work connect to and/or depart from your previous research and writing?

EW: My work focuses on the philosophical reflection on and literary representation of human rights violations. In particular, I have worked on French and German writers, philosophers, and psychoanalysts who wrote in the aftermath of the annihilation of the European Jews by Nazi Germany.

Most recently, I have edited, together with Julie Carlson, a collection entitled Speaking about Torture, also published recently by Fordham University Press. That volume takes up the issue of torture from the array of approaches offered by the arts and humanities and challenges the appalingly widespread acceptance of state-sanctioned torture among Americans, including academics and the media entertainment complex.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

EW: The book is, I believe, of great significance to the fields of critical theory in general and deconstruction in particular, as well as religious studies, Middle East studies, and also, to a certain degree, critical legal studies. To my knowledge, there are currently no comparable collections on the market. I believe that this is the first collection on Derrida’s thinking that includes what could be called “case studies on the ground”: concretely, how to translate Derrida’s thinking on “living together” in areas of intense political/ethnic conflict. Examples for this are provided by the Palestinian Israeli civil rights lawyer Raef Zreik; by Richard Falk, the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories and professor of international law;, by Joseph Massads’s text on the invention of “semitism” and “anti-semitism”: by Priya Kumar’s analysis of the “production of the Muslim as a stranger” in both V. D. Savarkar’s Hindu nationalist text Hindutva (1923) and an emblematic secular nationalist text, Jawaharlal Nehru’s magnum opus The Discovery of India (1946); and by Marc Nichanian’s analysis of the South African “Truth and Reconciliation” commissions. Other essays in the book also address concrete situations of the difficulty of “living together.” To name one additional example: Is “living-together” still possible when torture is a state-approved method of warfare?

J: What other projects are you working on now?

EW: I am working on an essay dealing with poems written on and in the Guantánamo Bay Prison Camp, especially the collection Poems from Guantánamo: The Detainees Speak, which was published in 2007 by Marc Falkoff, one of the pro bono lawyers representing detainees in the prison camp.

Excerpt from Living Together: Jacques Derrida’s Communities of Violence and Peace

From Elisabeth Weber, “Introduction: Pleading Irreconcilable Differences”

For Jacques Derrida, the notions and experiences of “community,” “living,” “together,” never ceased to harbor radical, in fact infinite interrogations. The often anguished question of how to “live together” moved Derrida throughout his life and career, animating a host of concepts, most evidently perhaps in the writings on hospitality, “auto-immunity,” in all the essays on law, right(s), and justice. Derrida reflected as well, in instances too many to recount, on the folds, difficulties, and aporias of the concept and the experience of responsibility. The “deconstructive unfolding of the tension between justice and law,” Christoph Menke succinctly comments, occurs “in the name of an experience that no political stance can capture, but that nevertheless affects any politics as its border, and therefore as its interruption.”

During his opening address of the 1989 colloquium “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice” at Cardozo Law School, Derrida famously asserted: “Deconstruction is justice.” This provocative assertion, sharply giving the lie to decades-old criticism of deconstruction as an aestheticizing, apolitical, or ahistorical exercise, recapitulated the stakes of an infinite task and responsibility that, in spite of and because of its infinity, cannot be relegated to tomorrow. “Justice, however unpresentable it remains, does not wait. It is that which must not wait.” It is in the spirit of such urgency, of a responsibility that cannot be postponed, that Jacques Derrida was an active and outspoken critic and commentator on issues such as South Africa’s apartheid, the Israel/Palestine conflict, the bloody civil war in his native Algeria, human rights abuses, French immigration laws, the death penalty, and on what Richard Falk has termed “the great terror war.”

Derrida’s oeuvre as philosopher is inseparable from these interventions. In 1997, in response to an invitation to “define, briefly, what an intellectual is for you today,” Derrida noted that “never has the task of defining the intellectual rigorously seemed so impossible to me as it does today.” He goes on to name several problematic assumptions on which such a definition depends: It assumes first that the “right to speech and writing, in the name of justice, should be claimed, assigned, reserved, and specialized” in the name of presumed “rhetorical skills”; it assumes, second, “a division between the private and the political event” and a “particular configuration of the places of public speaking”; and third, “a division of labor between the intellectual and the nonintellectual.” Derrida deduces that “now and in the future it would be a betrayal” of a recognized intellectual’s “mission” to “write or speak in public, or be an activist in general,” without questioning these assumptions that present themselves as “a matter of course,” and without “seeking to associate with those who are deprived of this right to speech and writing, or without demanding it for them, whether directly or not. Whence the necessity of writing in different tones—of changing the codes, the rhythms, the theater, and the music.” At the same time, Derrida insists “on the responsibilities, rights and powers that I am still recognized as having under the title of ‘intellectual,’” to be “at the service both of those ‘without a voice’ and of that which is approaching and offered for ‘thinking’—which is always, in a different way, ‘without a voice,’” especially considering that “the ‘intellectual’ (the writer, the artist, the journalist, the philosopher) is the victim, all over the world, of persecutions today that are new and concentrated.” The intellectual’s task is that of an “inventive engagement,” that is, a “transaction that suspends the safe horizons and criteria, the existing norms and rules,” in order to “analyze, to criticize, to deconstruct them…yet without ever leaving the space empty, in other words open to the straightforward return of any power, investment, language, and so on.” Such “invention or proposal of new conceptual, normative, or criteriological figures, according to new singularities” can never “lose sight of the macrodimensional—which is not reducible to what is put out about it in dogmatic ideas of globalization.” The examples Derrida goes on to name are infinite in their scope:

"1. The hundreds of millions of illiterate people; the massive scale of malnutrition, rarely taken into account by the media champions of human rights; the tens of millions of children who die every year because of water; the forty to fifty percent of women who are subject to violence, and often life-threatening violence, all the time—and so on. The list would be endless;

2.   The way that capitalist powers are concentrated into transnational and cross-state monopolies in the appropriation of the media, multimedia, and productions of the tele-technologies and even the languages that they use."

I quote this text at length because it shows how for Derrida the presumed microdimensional (such as the unwavering attention to “new singularities”) is always intricately connected to the “macrodimensional”; how community cannot but be at the very heart of the “inventive engagement” of the intellectual, an inventive engagement to which Derrida’s entire oeuvre gives powerful testimony. That Derrida almost never uses the word “community” only adds to the challenge of thinking that engagement, that testimony. Commenting on the attacks perpetrated on 11 September 2001, as well as on state-sponsored violence in its variety of forms, Derrida asserts in the dialogue with Giovanna Borradori that “if intellectuals, writers, scholars, professors, artists, and journalists do not, before all else, stand up together against such violence, their abdication will be at once irresponsible and suicidal.”

In Richard Beardsworth’s succinct formulation, Derrida’s “negotiations with the western tradition,” rather than “betraying a reduction of political possibility—a retreat onto the margins of the political community at the ‘closure’ of metaphysics—amount to an active transformation of the political field.” Derrida’s “inventive” thought contributes to the necessary “reinvention” of political thought and practice, caught—and paralyzed—“in the increasing tension between internationalization and virtualization, on the one hand, and territorial difference and the corporal realities of human life, on the other.” As Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac note in the introduction to their collection, Derrida and the Time of the Political,

“Deconstruction can itself be considered an event and an activity insofar as it brings about a confrontation between philosophemes and categories of knowledge and decisive mutations in the world, causing an interruption of the former by the latter in order to force a mutation in thought so that it can be adequate to the task of thinking these important shifts, instead of being outstripped and rendered irrelevant or effete by them.”

The present collection might be described as a series of “inventive engagements” with the question of how to live together in a world in which the de-localizing and uprooting forces evoked by the term “globalization” and embodied or transmitted by increasingly complex and ambivalently de-materialized networks (technological, economic, cultural) threaten boundaries of place and time and hence, the integrity and the safety of homes and lands, communities and traditions, languages and cultures, bodies both literal and figurative. Through all of these, globalization renders ever more fragile the possibility (and meaning) of “life” and “together.” The violence that dominates international politics makes it clear that any productive reflection on what might appear as irreconcilable differences needs to go beyond the assertions of ecumenism and mutual understanding. The wounds of irreconcilable differences, in other words, need to be addressed as well as the enduring conditions under which such wounds can and do continue to be inflicted. The success of just and peaceful settlements of today’s conflicts may well depend on the conviction that irreconcilable differences are not a dead end from which only violence can follow. Otherwise, and without the courage to welcome the unreconciled other, our thinking, instruction, and discussion will do little more than repeat the prejudices that already deepen, on all sides, with every explosion.

[Excerpted from Living Together: Jacques Derrida’s Communities of Violence and Peace, edited by Elisabeth Weber, by permission of the editor. Copyright © 2012 by Fordham University Press, Inc. For more information, or to purchase this book, please click here.]

What is Jadaliyya? "Portal 9" Interview with Jadaliyya Co-Founder Bassam Haddad

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[This interview was published recently in the innaugural issue of  the Portal 9 Journal, by Nat Muller and Omar Kholeif. However, the interview was conducted many months prior, and awaited the launching of the publication.] 

The modest launch of the bilingual English-Arabic online magazine Jadaliyya in September 2010, an initiative of the not-for-profit Arab Studies Institute (ASI) in Washington DC and Beirut, could not have anticipated its current status. The Arab uprisings, which gained momentum only a few months after Jadaliyya was established, firmly catapulted it to the forefront of critical debates and analysis of the Arab world. With its constant feed of articles, reviews, video reportages, interviews, and tweets, the platform is run mainly on a voluntary basis, and it has become an essential resource for many in and outside the Arab world. Its editorial team, especially co-founder Bassam Haddad, have become oft-quoted pundits on mainstream broadcast media, such as the BBC and Al Jazeera.

Jadaliyya combines the individualist voice of the contemporary blogosphere with scholarly gravitas and the kind of in-depth analysis of a current affairs magazine. It hosts reportage that could be found in a political affairs magazine such as Majalla, rivals contemporary art and culture platforms like Bidounand Ibraaz, and boasts the immediacy of Al Jazeera and the academic spice of the Middle East Research and Information Project Online – woven into an eclectic virtual canvas. Culled together using an open-source ideology, Jadaliyya is fuelled by an urgency and responsiveness that befits the current political climate in the region. Portal 9 sits down with its Bassam Haddad, co-founder of Jadaliyya and also founding editor of the Arab Studies Journal published by ASI, to discuss the new platform.

Portal 9 (P9): Can you tell us why you established Jadaliyya and talk about the process by which it came to fruition? 

Bassam Haddad (BH)Jadaliyya is the product of fifteen very hard-working co-editors and a robust research team, all listed on the website. After finishing my PhD in 2002, a vacuum erupted. My friends and colleagues at the Arab Studies Journal (ASJ) – Sinan Antoon, Sherene Seikaly, and Nadya Sbaiti – were still working on their own doctoral degrees. Sinan and I were toying with the idea of a publication that would have a wider circulation than our all-too-serious but solid peer-reviewed ASJ (launched in 1992). We felt that good knowledge was being hoarded in journals that are largely inaccessible to the general public. And while it is crucial to continue to produce researched scholarship based on primary sources, we were ready to reach beyond the academic community.

The war on Iraq got in the way, and we decided to shelve the idea, which we also discussed with Asaad Abu Khalil, who had just started his own blog. In 2008-9, as new (social) media began to overtake other forms of producing news, knowledge, and analysis, I drummed up the idea of an electronic magazine anew. A group of six of us – including Sinan, Sherene, and Nadya, in addition to Noura Erakat and Maya Mikdashi – ended up launching Jadaliyya privately, writing and posting articles for three months starting in the summer of 2010 before going public, so we could have a thick launch. Our team continued to expand through mid-2011. I promised everyone Jadaliyya would not take up a lot of their time. I didn’t realize I was lying at the time! We could not keep up with the work. What kept us all going was the demand for continued and continuous coverage by our readers who saw something fresh in Jadaliyya.

We all shared a desire to produce an electronic publication to fill the vacuum in analysis on the Middle East between individual blogs and peer-reviewed articles and books. We also wanted to produce the kind of analysis that would put a dent in the dominant discourse on the region. We developed our idea and practice towards producing, in due time, the first truly peer-reviewed daily journal in magazine-ish form, in both Arabic and English. It’s essentially endless work, the kind that ruins social relationships and makes leisure time a thing of the past – for now. The solution was to marry people at Jadaliyya so that partners can’t complain! It only worked for a few of us. 

P9: We’re curious about how the relationship between the Arab Studies Journal and Jadaliyya has evolved. How has the web platform influenced the print? And vice versa?

BH: From the beginning, we decided to make a serious break between the Arab Studies Journal (ASJ) and Jadaliyya precisely to preserve the identity and mission of both publications. Established in the early 1990s, ASJ is a biannual peer-reviewed journal that has its own scholarly standards and standard operating procedures, and Jadaliyya is an electronic magazine that produces daily analysis based on an insanely faster pace, all the more so as we try to approximate a peer-review process.

But there are points of intersection. The projects are brought together by a particular ethos. They were both volunteer-based until November 2011, when we received our first penny of funding. From the first minute of Jadaliyya, we set out to create an anti-corporate and solidarity-based model of work. Whenever possible, our mode of operation is largely non-hierarchical, though not without leadership. Joining something for which you are not getting paid already filters so much! Worse, some of us invest so much of our own income to stay afloat. Thus, the personalities and political mindsets that these organizations attract are similar in sufficient ways so to make the work and associations we build quite harmonious, long-term, and effective.

Beyond that, ASJ has lent Jadaliyya gravitas, and Jadaliyya has in turn alerted more and more people to ASJ through very simple advertising of its published issues. Jadaliyya has also brought a “cool” element to ASJ, in an odd way. They co-exist nicely.

P9: Jadaliyya has become a talking point for many groups interested in the Arab world – groups, as you say, that aren’t necessarily a part of the academic community. Did you ever imagine it would be the platform that it has become today? 

BH: We never dreamed that Jadaliyya would expand so much and so quickly to reach audiences by the tens of thousands, sometimes on a daily basis. Surely it was in part because it offered something new and missing, but in all honesty, it was the Arab uprisings that catapulted Jadaliyya into the big leagues. I am not trying to be too modest, for we all have learned of dozens of new blogs and magazines that started shortly after we did but have either folded or reached a plateau in terms of their circulation and readership.

P9: One of the most fascinating elements of Jadaliyya is the platform and interface itself – its social element and its mixed identity as a forum and a space for academic writing. How have you developed this identity, and what are the challenges and results of this process? How did you go about designing the platform?

BH: Well, this is a bit embarrassing. But because we did not have the funds, I had to rely on my design and typesetting experience based on putting together ASJ’s former design platform. As for the social media and other bells and whistles, we actually wanted to make the website as interactive and as user-friendly/accessible as ever. We are trailing behind in this regard as the demand for solid content always takes precedence.

In a sense, we do not take ourselves too seriously, but we take the issues very seriously. The development of our platforms mirrors that approach. We refused to do certain things on political and epistemological grounds. For instance, we refused to take a cookie-cutter approach to our submission guidelines. You can see an 800-word post next to a 3500-word post; a rational choice analysis next to a poem in Arabic by Sargon Boulos; a review of a forty year-old classic book recently translated from Arabic next to an irreverent thesis on sexual identity, in Arabic. They are all important. 

Finally, it is worth noting that our division of labor also reflects our attitude toward content. As I share with new recruits at all levels, we like to operate like the Holland soccer team of the 1970s, known as the initiators of “Total Football,” where all players know/can play all positions despite having single formal positions.

P9: What about social media? How do you engage with it, and how does this enable you to interface with your readership? Was it always something integral to you? 

BH: Even before we launched, we were on Facebook, Twitter, and all of us had jadaliyya.com email addresses. We then actually worked very hard to develop iPhone and Android apps and immediately followed that by ReadSpeaker, which allows readers to listen and/or download the audio of any article, both in Arabic and English, with the press of a button. If you want to reach a broad audience, especially one that increasingly includes young readers for whom email is an ancient mode of communication, you have to diversify the means by which you disseminate “knowledge/information.”

P9: How critical are reviews to Jadaliyya’s identity, especially to the overall meaning and intent of Jadaliyya and its editors? For instance, many Arab cultural magazines have been criticized because their reviews are not critical enough. Can you situate Jadaliyya within this context?

BH: We sort of have the opposite experience. We have been bitten a few times because some reviews were not too kind to the authors/editors/directors. But we go on. The entire idea of critique is central to what we are doing, including critique of our own articles. Though this is not the kind of “review” you are asking about, our comments section reveals the extent to which we are happy to post scathing critique of articles, including our own, so long as personal insults are avoided.

We are keen on presenting innovative approaches to “reviews,” especially in what we call the NEWTON section, where we feature new books/articles by asking the authors questions that ultimately produce a self-review/evaluation, which is then used by other reviewers. Bringing the personal/intellectual context to authors’ book-writing helps to break the often artificial construction of knowledge production as wholly “scientific” or impersonal or objective in the crude sense.

P9: What is user traffic like? 

BH: We have currently reached 1.5 million readers, but that does not account for forwarded articles and other means by which Jadaliyya is read. At this point, we are at 70,000 visitors a week, read in 210 countries, and the numbers are rising. We are read most in the United States, United Kingdom, and Egypt. We currently have almost 6,500 Facebook followers and 7,000 Twitter followers. [Facebook followers are at nearly 15,000, and Twitter at nearly 14,000 in November 2012]

P9: Can you tell us a bit about the editorial process? How does it work? Is most of the work commissioned by the editors or gathered by open submission? 

BH: We no longer do much commissioning of pieces as the flow of submissions has become sufficiently steady. Nearly every submission goes through a rigorous review process that includes at least two reviews before going to the copy editor. If there is some sort of urgency, we might post first after a quick(-ish) review and edit, and then copyedit thoroughly later. The faster we can move and the more we can publish while maintaining the highest standards, the better.

P9: What is the ratio of Arabic to English submissions and indeed published contributions? What does their geographic spread look like? Have the editors noticed any trends in any of the submissions they are receiving? 

BH: The ratio of Arabic to English was 1 to 5, but we are currently expanding our Arabic section under the editorship of Ibtisam Azem and Sinan Antoon. Most of our submissions come from the countries where Jadaliyya is read most: United States, Egypt, UK, and Lebanon.

P9: There isn’t any advertising on the site. Do you intend to continue without advertising? Why or why not? 

BH: We were approached dozens of times to place paid advertisements for others, but we turned them down. It was not the route we wanted to take, even during the first year after September 2010 when we were in dire need of more funds. We preferred to stay away from advertising generally; however, if we do change our minds, we might allow only for certain kinds of advertising, such as book publishers.

P9: In this respect, can you tell us who is your main funder?

BH: We never received funding from any individual or institution, but we became too costly as our work and projects expanded in the last year. Beginning in November 2011, we received our first penny of funding from the Open Society Institute. But we always assume that funding is “extra,” that it can disappear at any moment. Most of our big projects so far have been done by barter: we offer brains, organization, and networking, and our co-sponsors handle the financing of projects.

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