[”A Profile from the Archives“ is a new series published by Jadaliyya in both Arabic and English in cooperation with the Lebanese newspaper, Assafir. These profiles will feature iconic figures who left indelible marks in the politics and culture of the Middle East and North Africa.]

Name: Samiha

Known as: Al-Khalil

Name of father: Yousif Al-Qubuj

Name of mother: Halima Tukan

Place of birth: Anabta

Date of birth: 1923

Date of death: 1999

Name of husband: Salam Khalil

Sons: Khalil, Saji, Saed, Sameer, Samih

Nationality: Palestinian

Specialization: Arabic Literature

Category: Politics

Profession: Member of the Palestinian National Assembly

Samiha Al-Khalil

• Palestinian
• Her full name is: Samiha Yousif Al-Qabaj
• Born in 1923 in Anabta in Tulkarem
• Her father, Yousif Al-Qabaj, was the chairman of the municipality of Anabta for thirty-six years. Her mother is Halima Tukan.
• She married Salama Khalil from Al-Teeba village in 1940. She gave birth to Khalil, Saji, Saed, Sameer, and Saeh.
• She was enrolled in a private school in the city of Nablus when she was seven years old. She studied until the second grade of elementary school. In the early thirties, she joined a school in Tul Karem and studied until seventh grade, and then she joined "The Friends" School in Ramallah and studied until second grade in high school. She continued her studies of the Arabic language until her third year in Beirut Arab University but could not finish her studies because she was banned from travelling by the Israeli occupation.
• She earned her high school degree twenty-five years after she got married.
• Her son, Saji, was arrested after being charged for joining the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and was exiled outside of Palestine.
• She is considered one of the pioneers in social and women's action in the West Bank.
• She was called the "The Oak Tree" of Palestine.
• She established the "The Society for Arab Women Unity" in Al-Bira in 1955.
• She became the secretary general of the Public Union of Palestinian Women upon its establishment in Jerusalem in July 1965.
• She was a member in the leadership of the "National Front in the West Bank" in 1970, a political coalition of Palestinian organizations and social, union, and partisan figures.
• In 1978, she was chosen to be a member in the "The National Committee of Guidance," the supreme leading bureau of the Palestinian people inside Palestine. She was the only woman in that committee.
• She established, and later became president of, the "Society of Reviving the Family" for thirty consecutive years. This society was one of the most prominent national societies to stand up against the occupation of the West Bank after 5 June 1967.
• She was a member of the Young Christian Women.
• She was a member of the administrative bureau of the Union of Charities in Jerusalem.
• She was the chairman of the Union of Volunteer Women Societies, which includes fifty-five societies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
• She was a member of the administrative committee of the branches of the Charities Union in Jerusalem, Al-Khalil, and Nablus.
• She was the treasurer of the Illiteracy and Senior Teaching Committee.
• She was a member of Al-Maqasid Charity.
• She was an honorary member of the Arab Lawyers Union.
• She was arrested and jailed six times by the Israeli occupation with the charge of inciting violence, having ties with the Palestinian National Front, and taking part in several demonstrations and sit-in strikes denouncing the occupation. She was sentenced to house arrest between 1980 and 1983 and was banned from travelling between 1967 and 1973, and then between 1982 and 1991.
• She refused to use the Israeli currency (Lira and later Shekel), and refused to wear head cover because she believed that character is more important than appearance.
• She was a member of the first Palestinian National Assembly in 1964, which produced the PLO.
• She ran for President of the Palestinian Authority, the first woman to run for the post and the only opponent to Yasir Arafat in 1996. She received twelve percent of the votes. She realized that her position sends a message to the Palestinian woman and to Arafat himself, saying that the Palestinians are looking for a modern democratic political system that is not based on religious compulsion or political singularity and that the Palestinian woman is capable of competing for all political posts, including the presidency.
• She died on 26 February 1999.
• "She struggled for the freedom and Independence of the Palestinian people" was engraved on her gravestone.
• Samiha Khalil High School in Al-Bira was named after her.
• She wrote a poetry book entitled Uprising to Statehood.

Medals and Prizes:

• Medal of Jerusalem for culture and literature-1991
• Medal from the Public Union of the Students of Palestine-1992
• Medal from the Cultural Sports Center, Baka Al-Gharbiya
• Medal from the Arab American Society, Ramallah-1993
• Medal from the American Union, Ramallah-1993
• Medal from the Palestinian Society of Mathematical Sciences-1993
• Medal from the Palestinian Ministry of Culture-1995
• Medal of "For you, Jerusalem" Conference-1995
• Medal from Al-Bira municipality, Palestine-1995

[This article was translated from the Arabic by Ali Adeeb Alnaemi. Click here for the Arabic text.]

As the control of disease became a pressing concern of colonial administrators in the late nineteenth century, the hajj was transformed by novel and intensified legal and institutional arrangements developed for the management of transitory Muslim populations. In 1880, the Ottoman Empire issued a decree that all pilgrims would be required to produce a passport upon arrival in the Hjjaz. In 1882, the Ottomans opened the Kamaran Island quarantine station. All pilgrimage vessels arriving from the Indian Ocean were subjected to a stop on this barren patch of earth just off the coast of Yemen. At roughly the same time, British officials in Bombay dispatched Muslim Vice-Consuls to Jeddah and Hudayda in order to monitor the increasing medicalization of the hajj. Due to repeated outbreaks of cholera among pilgrims during the preceding decades, the management of hajj had become an object of international scrutiny. Pilgrims were racialized and singled out as a dangerous, decidedly pre-modern class of travelers, requiring new documentary practices and constant medical surveillance. While the empires that erected these mobility controls have long since crumbled, the medicalization of the modern hajj continues to echo down to the present. And although both the science of epidemiology and the technologies of surveillance deployed to monitor pilgrims have undergone radical transformations since the late nineteenth century, the stubborn persistence of the underlying assumption that pilgrims are a uniquely dangerous category of travelers suggests that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has taken up the mantle of its colonial predecessors.

Just days before the start of the current hajj season, Saudi authorities and international disease control experts find themselves locked in another “urgent” struggle against an emerging public health threat. With some three million Muslims from around the world expected to arrive in Saudi Arabia for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, scheduled to take place between 24-29 October, a new SARS-like coronavirus is thought to be circulating in the Arabian Peninsula. This year, a reinforced army of medical professionals will greet pilgrims. And like every other year, they will be forced to run a gauntlet of visas, vaccinations, and medical inspections. Yet few will think that they are experiencing a form of colonial governmentality. Most will likely view these intrusive measures as a necessary, even natural, part of the pilgrimage experience. After all, aren’t these measures meant to protect them?

But is the risk posed by the novel Arabian coronavirus serious or will it turn out to be another non-event like the H1N1 influenza scare of 2009? More importantly, is the recent fascination with the hajj’s epidemic potential warranted, or are the hajj-related panics of recent years a symptom of something else? Are these surges of medical surveillance actually just repackaged versions of old colonial discourses and institutions? And, if so, for whose benefit are they performed?    

Finding Meaning in Non-Events

First identified in the 1960s, coronaviruses usually produce the mild respiratory symptoms associated with the common cold in humans. However, this family of viruses also appears in a wide range of domesticated animals, birds, and bats. The potential for coronaviruses to jump species from animals to humans, causing severe illnesses to be transmitted from person to person, was painfully demonstrated during the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). SARS affected more than eight thousand people worldwide, proving fatal in roughly ten percent of infected patients. 

The exact origin of this latest incarnation of the coronavirus is still unknown. According to Ron Fouchier, the virologist who led the effort to sequence the genome of this new SARS-like illness, the new coronavirus likely came from bats. The new pathogen most closely resembles coronavirus infections among Southeast Asian bat populations. As Fouchier explained to Shots, NPR’s Health Blog, “Bats harbor many coronaviruses, so it's logical to assume that bats are the natural reservoir” for this new strand. However, Fouchier added that this does not necessarily mean that the victims of the Arabian novel coronavirus were infected by bats. “When viruses jump from animals to humans, there's usually a second animal that connects the natural carrier with humans. This species is called the amplifier because it increases the number of viral particles that can hop over into people.” Others have hypothesized that the secondary source of this new coronavirus may be the Gulf’s camel or sheep population. 

Despite its familial resemblance to SARS, great caution should be taken not to stretch this comparison too far. It should also be stressed that coronaviruses display a wide spectrum of infectiousness, severity, and mortality. At present, this new illness appears considerably less explosive than its more contagious cousin. 

Thus far, there have been only two confirmed cases of the novel Arabian corona virus. A previously healthy forty-nine-year-old Qatari man, who had traveled to the Red Sea port city of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in August, was admitted to the hospital in Qatar on 8 September. The man presented with fever and pneumonia in both lungs. With his condition rapidly deteriorating, his family had him transferred by air ambulance to London. However, by that time he was already suffering from kidney failure. Once in London, the patient’s mystery illness was reported to the United Kingdom Health Protection Agency’s Imported Fever Service. No longer able to breathe on his own, the man still remains on life support in a London hospital. 

The trail of this mysterious respiratory illness could easily have gone cold there, but one of the patient’s doctors noticed a Saudi case report posted on ProMED Mail, the International Society for Infectious Diseases’ online reporting system. The report described the first case of the novel coronavirus, a sixty-year-old Saudi man who had been treated in Jeddah and had died from severe respiratory symptoms and kidney failure. As a result of this break, the Qatari patient’s London doctors conducted a general test for coronaviruses. When tests came back positive, they quickly compared the genetic sequence of the Qatari patient’s coronavirus with the deceased Saudi man’s revealing a practically identical match. It was at this point that the UK doctors alerted the World Health Organization of a second confirmed case of the Arabian novel coronavirus.

Once a link between two cases had been established, the Qatari victim’s travel history began to yield new clues about the virus. It was initially assumed that the Qatari man contracted the coronavirus while traveling to Jeddah in August. He had reported recovering from a mild illness during his travels. Had this nightmare scenario proven true, it would have placed the main transportation hub for Mecca-bound pilgrims as the pathogen’s ground zero. However, according to reports in the journal, Eurosurveillance, it now appears more likely that the Qatari man contracted the coronavirus after his return to Qatar. This hypothesis is partially supported by reports by the man’s family that he spent time on a farm in Qatar, where he is reported to keep camels and sheep.

Evidence suggesting that the illness was possibly contracted through contact with domesticated animals in Qatar, rather than in Jeddah, is sure to relieve officials in the Saudi ministries of Health and Hajj. Another promising sign for anxious Saudi officials is that of the Qatari patient’s sixty-four known contacts, including healthcare works, family, and friends, only thirteen reported mild respiratory symptoms after contact with the patient and all recovered completely within ten days. Other suspected cases in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong have also been ruled out. However, information regarding the deceased Saudi man’s possible contacts with animals and travel history has yet to be made public.

This is encouraging news, suggesting that infections from this new coronavirus may prove isolated. The absence of an outbreak among the victims’ contacts provides strong evidence that the new coronavirus came from animals and that the pathogen is not yet transmissible from human to human. 

Another positive sign is that the Saudi government has reached out for help from the international public health community. Teams of experts from the World Health Organization, the US Centers for Disease Control, and a Columbia University team headed by Ian Lipkin, the man Discovery Magazine dubbed “the world’s most celebrated disease hunter,” have all descended on the Kingdom. In light of the rapid pace of the recent findings and the apparent absence of human-to-human transmission, both the statements of the Saudi Ministry of Health and international health authorities have downplayed fears of a worst-case scenario and arriving pilgrims are now being assured that there is little to worry about. According to the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report of 4 October, the WHO and CDC have issued no new travel alerts and have made no alterations to their recommendations to citizens traveling to Saudi Arabia in order to make the hajj. In short, the Arabian novel coronavirus is likely to be a non-event.

This is certainly the impression one gets from Elizabeth Dickinson’s recent article, “Haj at the heart of global health,” in the The National. It reads a bit like a cross between an advertisement for the Saudi monarchy’s benevolent stewardship of the pilgrimage and an admiring love note to Dr. Ziad Memish, Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Minister of Health. As Dickinson puts it: “Every year, the kingdom spends hundreds of millions of dollars to deploy a small army of medical professionals to the pilgrimage, in what is easily the world's largest—and arguably most successful—experiment in public health.” Upon their arrival in Jeddah, pilgrims often receive health pamphlets and masks to prevent the spread of airborne illness. In the run-up to this year’s hajj, more than a million brochures in five languages have already been distributed. Pilgrims will be met by some twenty-two thousand Saudi-employed health professionals staffing one hundred fifty locations. Pilgrimage group leaders are also mandated to report any alarming symptoms to security or medical staff. Citing Maurizio Barbeschi, an expert on mass-gathering medicine at the WHO, Dickinson concludes her article with this ringing endorsement: “Are the Saudis ready for this year? The answer is that they cannot be more prepared, because everything they’ve learnt in past years has been incorporated…They are the best possible given the knowledge they have.”

In recent years, we have become accustomed to hajj-related panics that turn out to be non-events. Vaccinations required in order to obtain pilgrimage visas have decreased the risk of hajj-related meningitis, polio, and yellow fever infections. In living memory, the hajj has mostly been free of catastrophic outbreaks of disease. In many respects, the risks associated with stampedes and trampling have been the most deadly threats to pilgrims in recent decades. Many have complained bitterly about Saudi stewardship of the Holy Places themselves, citing the “cultural vandalism” and wholesale bulldozing of Mecca’s architectural heritage, which has transformed the city into what Jerome Taylor recently dubbed a “Las Vegas” of gaudy skyscrapers, shopping malls, and luxury hotels. At the same time, however, Saudi management of public health aspects of the hajj has never enjoyed more respect.

To what should we attribute this vaulting confidence in the Saudi pilgrimage regime? The answer is at least partially a product of the Saudi mobilization to thwart the last big epidemic scare. In 2009, newspapers and cable news channels across the globe raised the specter of a catastrophic outbreak of the H1N1 Influenza or “Swine Flu” during the hajj. Photographs of Muslim men and women’s faces obscured by respiratory masks blended almost seamlessly with the orientalist post-9/11 symbols of a violent Islamic world, masked terrorists and burqa-clad women. Worried Arab ministers placed a ban on pilgrims over the age of sixty-five and under age twelve. Even the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Ali Gomaa, flirted with the idea of issuing a fatwa calling for the postponement of the hajj. Instead, the Saudi Ministry of Health mobilized a surge of more than seventeen thousand medical personnel. Thermal cameras were installed in both air and sea terminals in order to screen for sick pilgrims. Tens of thousands of pilgrims were targeted for further screening, vaccinations, preventative medication, and/or quarantine. In the end, the swine flu scare fizzled. There were only five confirmed deaths from H1N1 influenza during the 2009 hajj season.

To be sure, this year’s even larger surge to guard against the novel Arabian coronavirus builds on the template forged during 2009 panic. However, journalists chasing down each hajj season’s potential for disaster tend to overlook or only dimly grasp the political stakes of the hajj, the deeply-rooted significance of public health’s role in the Saudi pilgrimage regime, and its centrality for the monarchy’s self-image, legitimacy, and sovereignty.

Global Public Health and the Colonization of the Hajj

The hajj has not always been a symbol of Saudi sovereignty. In fact, for the first three decades of the kingdom’s existence, the administration of the hajj was a painful reminder of the extent to which the Hijaz was still a semi-colonial space. It should not be forgotten that global public health institutions like the WHO are the direct descendants of the international sanitary conferences of late nineteenth century. These colonial-era diplomatic and scientific conventions produced the first global networks for reporting and tracking the outbreak and spread of epidemic diseases.

During the 1865 hajj season, cholera struck the Hijaz, killing some fifteen thousand pilgrims. As the surviving pilgrims returned home from Mecca, they carried cholera in their wake, setting in motion further outbreaks across Egypt, the ports of the Mediterranean, Europe, and even as far away as New York City. The severity of the epidemic focused international attention on cholera prevention for the remainder of the century. In 1866, the third international sanitary conference was held in Istanbul in order to discuss how best to protect Europe from future outbreaks of “Asiatic cholera.” Conference attendees concluded that cholera was endemic in India. As for the mode of transmission, the delegates pointed to the squalid conditions of Hindu pilgrimage centers within India, as well as the hajj, which they argued was the second stage by which cholera was spread from the subcontinent to Europe. Between 1831 and 1912, cholera spread from India to the Hijaz on at least forty separate occasions.

With the dawn of the steamship era and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the volume of oceangoing traffic between India and the Red Sea increased exponentially. As a result of the shift from sail to steam, pilgrims were freed from the rhythms of the monsoon cycle, leading to a dramatic decrease in both the cost and duration of passage. Thus, while previous generations of pilgrims had consisted mainly of nawabs, wealthy merchants, and members of the ulama, the relative affordability of the steamship-era made the journey possible for Muslims of modest means. These so-called “pauper pilgrims” were blamed as the primary conduit for the globalization of cholera. In an attempt to discourage the poor, colonial regimes marshaled Islamic legal arguments against making the hajj without the necessary physical and financial means (istitā‘a). They also imposed passport fees, financial means tests, and mandatory roundtrip tickets, and even attempted to manipulate steamship markets to raise ticket prices.  

Although the Ottoman Empire’s Board of Health was ostensibly responsible for the administration of the international quarantine system and the policing of the hajj, in reality, this organization was itself a mixed body of Ottoman and European representatives, an almost perfect symbol of the Capitulations. The situation on the ground in the Hijaz was no better. By the 1880s, European consular agents in Jeddah spent much of their time charging their Ottoman counterparts with fleecing pilgrims and gross medical incompetence. Likewise, Ottoman officials posted to the Hijaz came to regard European attempts to provide consular protection for their colonial subjects as merely a pretense for espionage and, thus, a corrosive threat to Ottoman sovereignty. However, as Ottoman officials well knew, the Ottoman state could no longer act as the sole protector of the hajj and the Holy Places. The conduct of the hajj had become an interdependent system, requiring coordination and cooperation between the Ottoman Empire, British India, Dutch Java, French Algeria, and the rest of the European colonial world. The hajj became ensnared in an inter-imperial web of conflicting regulations governing passports, quarantines, shipping firms, pilgrimage guides, and even the legal interpretation of Islamic ritual itself. The result was a weak and fractured regime of mobility controls, which produced decades of diplomatic gridlock and horrific levels of mortality.

With the Ottoman Empire’s collapse during World War One, the Ottoman quarantine system and the public health of the hajj became a ward of the colonial powers. This is the hajj that the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inherited when it conquered the Hijaz in 1925. Although the Saudis took over political and religious control of the pilgrimage in 1926, public health aspects of the hajj remained under the extraterritorial supervision of the Jeddah-based consulates of European colonial states. Following the drafting of a new international sanitary convention in 1926, a League of Nations office was established in Paris to coordinate public health controls over Mecca with Egyptian Quarantine Board. This system remained in effect until the World Health Organization’s creation in 1948. In 1951, the Saudis created the Ministry of Hajj. However, the kingdom was not deemed capable of taking over full control of its public health responsibilities from the WHO until 1957. While it is tempting to mark this event as the decolonization of the hajj, in reality, the Saudi hajj regime has reproduced the same colonial logic.

While it is undoubtedly true that much of Saudi Arabia’s power is derived from its oil wealth, the monarchy knows that the efficient and safe conduct of the hajj is perhaps its greatest legitimizing tool, offering it a measure of protection from a myriad of internal and foreign threats. Thus, while King Fahd’s adoption of the title Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn in 1986 was motivated by the ideological threat posed by Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary Iran and, to a lesser degree, by Juhayman al-‘Utaybi’s attack on the Masjid al-Haram in 1979, an argument could easily be made that the most consistent threat to Saudi prestige comes not from attacks on the regime’s religious legitimacy but from microbes and pathogens borne by the hajj. Mismanagement of the hajj leading to a great pandemic like the cholera and plague outbreaks of the colonial era would prove equally devastating to the Saudi monarchy’s standing in the world. Moreover, repeated failures would also likely raise the prospect of outside interference from the international community.

Despite Saudi Arabia’s impressive track record, ghosts from the decades of cholera’s dark reign still linger and their lessons still apply. Pilgrims will invariably desire to make the hajj regardless of the risks. The governments responsible for managing the hajj are loath to inspire panic or be viewed as restricting access to the pilgrimage, regardless of the potential risks. Whether it was the Ottomans, the British Raj, or today the Saudis, governments tasked with maintaining the hajj derive legitimacy, religious authority, and international power from it, making it extremely difficult for them to admit when mistakes are made. Saudi Arabia’s position is made doubly difficult by the re-articulation of colonial narratives in the Western media marking the hajj as a dangerous, even uncivilized mode of travel. Thus, while the management of the hajj is generally framed as a “legitimate” object of disease and passport controls, there is a risk that the repeated production of ostensibly public health crises is yet another pretense for the ever-expanding political program of monitoring, documenting, and circumscribing the mobility of “suspect” Muslim populations.

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.]  

“El-Katany elected FJP president”
Former Parliament speaker beats Essam al-Erian for the Muslim Brotherhood’s part presidency.

“Op-ed:Tahrir Square: Rent-a-thug culture”
Amr Ali responds to the clashes on 12 October between anti-Morsi protesters and members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

“Op-ed: Hypocrisy or religion?”
Reham Barakat comments on debates in the society about religiosity and societal pressure using religion.

“Brotherhood acknowledges members participated in Friday clashes”
The spokesman of the Muslim Brotherhood confirms that some of the MB youth participated in the clashes on 12 October.

“Egypt court rejects constitutional draft articles spelling out its powers”
The Constitutional Court says the draft constitution contains provisions for interference with its affairs and threaten its independence.

“Islamist businessmen challenge Egypt's old money”
Muslim Brotherhood businessmen follow in the footsteps of MUSIAD, the Turkish business organization supportive of the AKP.

“Trial of 'atheist' Alber Saber resumes”
Alber Saber faces up to five years in prison if found guilty in latest “contempt of religion” case.

“Coptic Candidate for Freedom and Justice Party Secretary-General Post: FJP for All Egyptians”
A Copt member of the FJP applies for Secretary General position in Giza.

“The Brotherhood needs us more than we need them: Salafist Nour Party spokesman”
Nader Bakkar talks about the recent crisis in Al-Nour and its relation with other Islamist parties.

“Translation of the released constitutional draft- Part 1”
Direct translation of the draft constitutions’ articles 1-27.

“Report: 88 tortured, 34 killed in Morsy's first 100 days”
The Nadim Human Rights Center’s report on police abuse says statistics have not changed much for the first 100 days of Mori’s presidency.

“Sorour back in custody, arrest warrant issued for Ibrahim Kamel”
Judge orders re-arrest of Fathi Sorour and Ibrahim Kamel, who were acquitted a week earlier in the Camel Battle court case.

“Workers protest against harshest sentences for strikers since Sadat”
Workers from the Alexandria Port Containers Company are sentenced to 3 years in prison for inciting strikes and sabotage.

“Independent unions declare new alliance”
The new National Front for the Defense of Labor Rights and Union Liberties demands cancellation of the Trade Unions’ Law of 1976.

“Public prosecutor investigates Tahrir violence”
Investigation starts over fifty-three complaints against Muslim Brotherhood figures for inciting violence during Friday protests last week.

“Thousands in Tahrir demand an 'Egypt for all Egyptians'”
Protesters reject Muslim Brotherhood’s rule and call for a representative constitution.

“Switzerland to return $700 million frozen assets to Egypt”
Swiss foreign minister in Cairo to discuss cooperation on repatriating funds of convicted former regime officials and ex-president Hosni Mubarak.

“Religious Education and Pluralism in Egypt and Tunisia”
Mohamed Faour says religious education should be part of curricula in Egypt and Tunisia, but it has to be coupled with teaching the principles of diversity, citizenship and democracy.

“Egypt Bristling Over US Rhetoric, Defense Attache Says”
Al-Monitor’s exclusive interview with Maj. Gen. Mohamed Elkeshky, Egypt’s defense attaché in Washington.

In Arabic:

“مظاهرة التحرير ومؤتمر الإخوان”
Amr Al-Shawiki comments on the coincidence of the FJP congress and an anti-Muslim Brotherhood protest happening on the same day.

“مبروك للكتاتنى وللديمقراطية”
Emad Al-Din Hussein says Saad Al-Katatny’s victory in the FJP elections is explained by the desire of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to have someone less controversial heading the party.

“عار على الإخوان”
Hamdi Qandil comments on the recent scandal with the failed attempt by the presidency to fire the Attorney General.

“الإدارة المحلية فى مشروع الدستور الجديد.. ملاحظات عامة”
Samir Abd El-Wahab discusses decentralization and local governance in the new constitution.

“أمن سيناء... هدف استراتيجى أمريكى”
Mohamed Manshawi says American interests in securing Sinai overshadow the interest of the Egyptian people.

“بعد انفراد «الوطن».. «قنديل» يحصر تدخلات «الإخوان» فى أعمال الحكومة لرفعها إلى «مرسى»”
The prime minister issues an order to the government and the governorates to resist attempts by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party to interfere with their work.

“مصادر: «الحرية والعدالة» حذر «مرسى» من زيارة السويس والرئاسة تستبدل «مطروح» بها”
The Freedom and Justice Party warns the president against visiting Suez as not to face the anger of its people.

In Arabic:

“مظاهرة التحرير ومؤتمر الإخوان”
Amr Al-Shawiki comments on the coincidence of the FJP Congress and an anti-Muslim Brotherhood protest happening on the same day.

“مبروك للكتاتنى وللديمقراطية”
Emad Al-Din Hussein says Saad Al-Katatny’s victory in the FJP elections is explained by the desire of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to have someone less controversial heading the party.

“عار على الإخوان”
Hamdi Qandil comments on the recent scandal with the failed attempt by the presidency to fire the Attorney General.

“الإدارة المحلية فى مشروع الدستور الجديد.. ملاحظات عامة”
Samir Abd El-Wahab discusses decentralization and local governance in the new constitution.

“أمن سيناء... هدف استراتيجى أمريكى”
Mohamed Manshawi says American interests in securing Sinai overshadow the interest of the Egyptian people.

“بعد انفراد «الوطن».. «قنديل» يحصر تدخلات «الإخوان» فى أعمال الحكومة لرفعها إلى «مرسى»”
The prime minister issues an order to the government and the governorates to resist attempts by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party in interfering with their work.

“مصادر: «الحرية والعدالة» حذر «مرسى» من زيارة السويس والرئاسة تستبدل «مطروح» بها”
The Freedom and Justice Party warns the president against visiting Suez as not to face the anger of its people.

Recent Jadaliyya articles on Egypt:

Hossam El-Hamalawy on Social Media and Protests in Egypt
An interview with labor activist Hossam El-Hamalawy discussing social media and the revolution.

الهامش الاحتجاجي يسقط المركز التسلطي: العملية الثورية لا تنتصر إلا بالتضامن العالمي
An review of the recently published book Marginalization and the marginalized in Egypt and the Middle East.

الربيع العربي: الصحة والرعاية في المرحلة الانتقالية
Adam Coutts, Sharif Ismail, and Mark Dempsey point out a number of steps that transitioning Arab states should take in order to secure effective healthcare reforms.

October Culture
Jadaliyya’s translations and culture commentaries for the month of October.

Huda Lutfi: The Artist and the Historical Moment
Mai Serhan presents an overview of Huda Lutfi’s artistic life since 1992.

Power, Rebirth, and Scandal: A Decade of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina
Amro Ali recounts the history of the Alexandrian library from its inception in the 1970s as an idea to the humiliating forced resignation of its corrupt former president.

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Occupation, Intervention, and Law and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the O.I.L. Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each biweekly roundup to OIL@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every other week] 

News

"CIA Seeks to Expand Drone Fleet, Officials Say," Greg Miller
CIA director David Petraeus has proposed an expansion of the agency's armed drone program, arguing that it would allow the agency to sustain its current targeted killing programs in Pakistan and Yemen and respond to "emerging al-Qaeda threats" in North Africa.  An unnamed official is quoted as describing the proposal as largely motivated by the 11 September attack on a U.S. diplomatic facility in Benghazi, Libya.

"Suspect in Libya Attack, in Plain Sight, Scoffs at U.S.," David D. Kirkpatrick
Kirkpatrick, writing for The New York Times, interviews Ahmed Abu Khattala, one of the alleged "ringleaders" of the 11 September attacks on American diplomatic facilities in Libya.  Sitting on the patio of a hotel in Benghazi, Khattala is dismisses American and Libyan efforts to bring justice to the attackers, calling the Libyan government a "chicken army" and accusing the Obama Administration of "using the consulate attack just to gather votes…"

"It's daylight in America - US and Iran reportedly agree to one-on-one talks post-election," Annie Robbins
Robbins, of Mondoweiss, rounds up several pieces relating to the recent leak that the US and Iran have agreed to negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, albeit after the elections due to a desire on the Iranian side to know "with whom they will be negotiating."  Robbins notes that Tehran has hinted at being open to a deal where uranium enrichment is limited in exchange for sanctions being eased, and that Michael Oren, Israel's ambassador to the United States, has expressed disappointment in the idea of the US in direct talks with Iran.

"PM Praises EU for Bolstering Sanctions Against Iran," Herb Keinon
Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu has praised the European Union's recent expansion of sanctions and asset freezes on Iran (in particular, the Iranian oil industry), arguing that they while they will do much to hit the Iranian economy, they must also be backed by a "credible military option." 

"West Bank Elections Show Mixed Results for Fatah," Khaled Abu Aker, Jodi Rudoren
The New York Times reports on recent municipal elections across the West Bank, noting that while the dominant Fatah party suffered losses in several key cities, the election was largely set apart by a low turnout compared to past elections in the Palestinian Authority.

"Israeli Forces Used 'Excessive Force', Say Gaza Boat Activists," Natasha Lennard
Israeli activists aboard the ship Estelle, blocked and rerouted by the Israeli Defense Forces on 21 October from attempting to deliver humanitarian goods to Palestinians, have reported disproportionate force on the part of the IDF, including the aggressive use of tasters against activists.

"Killing of Security Chief Raises Fears for Lebanon," Samia Nakhoul
In what Nakhoul reports may "prove to be the most destabilizing attack in Lebanon since the 2005 assassination of former prime minister Rafik al-Hariri," a car bomb in Beirut killed Lebanese security official Wissam al-Hassan, along with seven others 19 October 2012.

"Airstrikes on North Gaza Kill At Least 2," Ma'an News
Ma'an News reports a series Israeli air strikes on the northern Gaza Strip, allegedly in response to a "rocket launching squad," injuring four and killing two people, claimed as fighters by Hamas' military wing and Islamic Jihad, respectively. 

Blogs

"Comments on Maqaleh and Hamidullah," Benjamine Wittes
Wittes, writing for Lawfare, writes of two recent opinions from Judge John D. Bates of the D.C. Circuit Court in the cases of Al Maqelah v. Gates and Hamidullah v. Obama.  In these cases, the petitioners asked the court to assume jurisdiction over non-Afghani detainees held at Bagram Air Base, a request Bates declined, holding that the government has, in Wittes' words, "a plausible argument that it is handling Bagram by other, non-judicial, means."

"What Congress Should Take From Hamdan," Deborah Pearlstein
Pearlstein advises Congress on Opinio Juris to reconsider opposition to trying Guantanamo detainees in criminal courts in the United States in light of the DC Circuit Court's decision to overturn Salim Hamdan's conviction, writing that the opinion is a "shot across the bow" of military commissions used to try Hamdan and other Guantanamo detainees in the past.
 

Commentary 

"Syrian and Turkish Military Activities and International Law," Başak Çali 
Writing for the European Journal of International Law's Talk! blog, Çali alleges that the Turkish government's assertion that its recent retaliatory shelling of Syrian targets was "in accordance with international law" may rest on an inaccurate reading of the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the definition of "armed conflict" under Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

"Rewarding Impunity," David Cole
David Cole, in an op-ed for Foreign Policy Magazine, criticizes the Department of Justice's decision to award Attorney John Durham, who recently led an investigation into the legality of CIA interrogation techniques, for failing to hold anyone responsible for torture at the CIA's "black sites."

"Arm, Train, Fail (Repeat as Necessary)," Stephen M. Walt
Walt, writing for Foreign Policy, surveys two recent New York Times pieces--one on the pitfalls largely preventing the United States from adequately training Afghan security forces, the other on upcoming U.S. efforts to train an "elite Libyan force" to combat extremism.  While noting that the two situations are not analogous, Walt warns that the U.S. will face similar problems in training a Libyan force as those it currently faces in Afghanistan--in addition to warning that the U.S. will "succeed, and end up creating the nucleus of a new authoritarian regime."

"Conservative pro-Israel groups' relevance at risk in 2012," Alexander Burns, Maggie Haberman
For Politico, Burns and Haberman describe efforts by a number of political action groups and wealthy donors to "target President Barack Obama's policies towards the Jewish state," carrying with it the dire warning that should the President win the election in the face of these efforts, the political influence of such pro-Israel actors may be severely diminished in future elections as well.
  

Reports

"Opinion: Salim Ahmed Hamdan v. United States of America," Justice Brett Kavanaugh
In a 3-0 ruling, Justice Kavanaugh of the US Court of Appeals for the DC circuit throws out the conviction of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a former driver for Osama bin Laden, holding that material support for terrorism, for which Hamdan served time in Guantanamo Bay's detention facility, was not a war crime at the time of Hamdan engaged in it.
 

Conferences

"Women After the Arab Awakening: Making Change," 25 October 2012; Saul/Zilkha Rooms, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC; Register here.

“The Boundaries of the Battlefield: A Critical Look at the Legal Paradigms and Rules in Countering Terrorism,” 10-11 January 2013; T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague; Register here.

من المظاهر الأكثر دلالةً على الاستئثار بالسلطة في أي مجتمع هو تفشي «الفساد الكبير»،.

العوائد النفطية الهائلة في دول مجلس التعاون خلقت تناقضاً غريباً على مدى العقود الماضية؛ فالطفرات في أسعار النفط بلورت في دولنا فساداً كبيراً تخطى في كمه ونسبته أية مقارنة مع باقي دول العالم، فتمكن المتنفذون من تجميع ثروات هائلة تعذر إحصاؤها، نظراً لانعدام الرقابة ولضخامة حجمها، حيث من شبه المؤكد أنها تعدت مئات البلايين من الدولارات.

لكن العوائد الهائلة من النفط سمحت لدول المجلس في الوقت ذاته بتقديم خدمات متقدمة نسبياً على المستوى العالمي لمواطنيها، بما في ذلك نواحي السكن والبنية التحتية والصحة والتعليم. وأسّس هذا التناقض عقداً غير مكتوب في الدولة الريعية: على الدولة توفير الخدمات المتقدمة والرفاهية لمواطنيها، في المقابل يحصل متخذو القرار على الولاء من المواطنين وعدم تعرضهم للمساءلة أو المعارضة.

هذا التضاد، بين الفساد الكبير المستفحل من جهة، والمقدرة على تقديم دولة ريعية متقدمة من جهة أخرى، جعل الفساد الكبير ظاهرةً معروفةً في المجتمع، ولكن مسكوتٌ عنها طالما تواصل عقد الدولة الريعية.

في أطروحة الدكتوراه التي أعدها قبل أكثر من أربعة عقود، بيَّن د.علي الكواري أن نسبة إيرادات دول الخليج التي كانت تستقطع للعوائل الحاكمة منذ النصف الأول من القرن العشرين تُقدّر بحوالي الثلث.

في دراسةٍ أخرى أعدها وتركزت في الأساس على إيرادات دول الخليج من النفط في 2008، أي في أوجّ الطفرة النفطية الأخيرة، نجد أن ما لا يقل عن الثلث من إيرادات الدولة من النفط غير مدرجة في الأرقام الرسمية. وقد تضاعفت عوائد النفط في غضون نصف القرن الماضي مئات المرات، وبذلك تضاعفت كمية الإيرادات المختفية مئات المرات أيضاً. فأغلب الدول، وبرغم أن عوائدها تقدر بمئات البلايين، لازالت تعتبر ميزانياتها واحتياطها من النفط أموراً سريةً لا تصلح للنشر!

الفساد الكبير أخذ أشكالاً متعددة على مر العقود الماضية، فبعضه تلبس طابع استقطاب الآلاف من عمال الـ «فري فيزا» الذين لا حول لهم ولا قوة، وبعضه تمثّل في مصادرة نسبة معينة من أرباح أي مشاريع تجارية كبيرة في الدولة. ولكن قد يكون نوع الفساد الكبير الأكثر تأثيراً وغلياناً في نفوس المواطنين هو ذلك الذي يرونه أمام ناظريهم، وبالتحديد الفساد المتعلق بالأراضي. فها هي الأرض التي كان الناس يتجوّلون فيها ويستخدمونها مشاعاً، هي الآن تُسوّر، ويُبنى حولها حائط. بل إن الأمر وصل إلى دفن البحر، ذلك المورد الأساسي الذي اعتمدت عليه أغلب شعوب الخليج في عملها وحياتها، ومن بعدها يُسوّر البحر المدفون ويُحوّل إلى أملاكٍ خاصة.

ونحن هنا نتكلم عن مئات الكيلومترات المربعة، والتي تقدّر بمئات البلايين من الدولارات التي تم الاستيلاء عليها. ومهما تم سن قوانين وصفقات وأعذار لتبرير مصادرة هذه الأراضي، فإن حقيقة هذه الظاهرة معروفة، فما هو حقٌّ لا يمكن طمسه بقوانين جائرة. ففي إحدى دول الخليج، على جدران إحدى الأراضي البحرية المصادرة والمسوّرة، كتب أحد الشباب نقشاً يقول: «هذا بحر ربّنا».

تفشي الفساد الكبير في دول الخليج ظاهرةٌ معروفة، ولكن ما أودُّ أن أركّز عليه هنا هو أنه من غير الممكن أن يتواصل الفساد على نفس الوتيرة إلى أبد الآبدين، وأن هذا الفساد الكبير إن لم يتغير سيكون محل تصادم بين المتنفذين والمواطنين.

أرقام د.علي الكواري تبين أن الفساد تزايد بشكل هائل على مدى العقود الماضية، ومع تزايد الفساد تتزايد تطلعات المتنفذين والمستفيدين منه. فالمتنفذ الذي كان سيقبل ببيت عريش قبل أكثر من نصف قرن في وسط المدينة القديمة، أصبح الآن يتطلع إلى عدة قصور ضخمة، متناثرة بين المدن الأوروبية والأميركية. وقد يتطلع أيضاً إلى اقتناء مضمار خيول أو مطارٍ أو حلبة سيارات للـ «بريستيج»، فميزانية الدولة ككل قبل أكثر من نصف قرن لا تساوي متطلبات متنفذ واحد لمدة شهر في عصرنا الحالي... وعدد المتنفذين ما انفك يزداد.

متطلبات الشعوب أيضاً لن تتقلص، فأعدادها أيضاً في نمو، ومن الصعب عليها أن تتقبل تخفيضاً في الخدمات والمميزات التي تعودت عليها على مدى العقود الماضية، خصوصاً عندما تتواصل أمام أعينهم حياة الفخامة والبذخ بين أوساط المتنفذين، فكيف يطلب منهم أن يقتصدوا فيما هو فتات أصلاً؟

كل هذا يخلق فجوةً بين تطلعات المتنفذين، وتطلعات الشعوب، والموارد المتوافرة. قد تسمح العوائد النفطية الضخمة بتفشي الفساد الكبير ومواصلة عقد الدولة الريعية لفترة معينة. فكما يشير د.علي فخرو في مقالة حديثة، من المتوقع أن يتدفق ما يقارب 9 تريليون (أي 9 آلاف بليون) دولار من عوائد النفط على دول الخليج على مدى الـ 12 سنة المقبلة.

الاشكالية تقع في أن تطلعات المتنفذين والشعوب في مقابل الكعكة المتوافرة لإشباعها تسير في اتجاهات معاكسة. فالمتنفذون تعوّدوا على مرتبة اجتماعية معينة، تتطلب كميةً معينةً «هائلةً جداً» من المصروفات والموارد، ومن الصعب جداً عليهم أن يستغنوا عن نمط الحياة والمرتبة الاجتماعية التي تعوّدوا عليها. الشعب أيضاً تعوّد على خدمات ومميزات اجتماعية معينة، ولن يقبل بتقلصها.

في المقابل، النفط ثروةٌ ناضبة، ومن غير الممكن استمرار صرفه على تطلعات الحكام والشعوب إلى أبد الآبدين. وبما أن اقتصاديات الخليج لا زالت فعلياً غير منتجة على المستوى العالمي في أي قطاعات أخرى غير النفط، ولا يبدو أن هذا الأمر سيتغير في المستقبل القريب، فالسيناريو المتوقع -إن لم يطرأ تغير جذري في اقتصاديات ومجتمعات المنطقة- هو الوصول إلى مرحلة تصادم تطلعات الشعوب مع تطلعات الحكام عند بلوغ المرحلة الحرجة في الإيرادات النفطية.

وقد لا تكون هذه المرحلة بعيدة جداً، فسعر النفط المطلوب لتغطية مصروفات الميزانيات في كثيرٍ من دول الخليج قد شارف أو تعدّى مئة دولار للبرميل، وهذا الرقم في تصاعد مستمر.

وعند الوصول إلى هذه المرحلة الحرجة، فإن تواصل الفساد الكبير المتفشي في دول مجلس التعاون سيصبح نقطة تصادمٍ بين من ينتفع منه، ومن لا يحصل إلا على الفتات.

‎‫عمر الشهابي مدير‫مركز الخليج لسياسات التنمية.‬‬

J’ai regardé, comme vous cette vidéo édifiante, enregistrée ce lundi 17 septembre, lorsqu’au  matin, avait eu lieu une invasion  de fonctionnaires, au voisinage immédiat de Ali Lmrabet, celui que le régime a pensé condamner au silence en l’emprisonnant et le condamnant à une interdiction d’exercice de son métier de journaliste, pour dix ans.

Les fonctionnaires qui arpentent consciencieusement la terrasse voisine, scrutent chaque mètre carré et semblent mémoriser d’occultes détails, en vue de la préparation d’une mystérieuse opération à venir.

Il y a là le caïd, caméra en main, assisté de rien moins que trois de ses adjoints, des « mokaddems », ces fonctionnaires pléthoriques qui rappellent les tristement célèbres commissaires politiques des républiques soviétiques, tant ils sont  acquis à la cause de la dictature. Le régime marocain en a tissé un maillage si serré sur le territoire marocain qu’ils font remonter aux « services » du ministère de l’Intérieur, la moindre parcelle d’information, le plus infime renseignement sur chaque citoyen de ce pays, si bien qu’un pet de souris au fond de son trou, ne saurait leur échapper.

Il y a également des policiers en civils et deux agents des renseignements généraux. 

En tout une bonne quinzaine de personnes, dont deux femmes qui ferment la marche de cet étrange cortège de comploteurs.

Une débauche de moyens humains dans un pays qui en manque cruellement dans les secteurs clés qui font le développement humain. Pas étonnant que le pays traîne au fond du classement mondial. Une démonstration supplémentaire que nous sommes bien en dictature, ce genre de régimes qui mobilisent un maximum de personnes en un minimum de temps pour punir, sévir, laver les affronts et intimider, au lieu de servir, aider, encourager et soutenir les initiatives citoyennes.

Mais ce n’est pas tant ce lâcher de sbires et le déploiement insensé de moyens qui interpellent, mais plutôt le sens à donner à tout ce remue-ménage. Des manigances indicibles en forme de trucs, de machins et de choses,  qui ne font plus honte, depuis bien longtemps,  aux ennemis de la liberté.

Quel mauvais coup pétrit de nouveau le Makhzen, pour venger les publications courageuses d’Ali et  ses dénonciations de la dictature ?

Quelles idées assassines ont à nouveau germé dans l’esprit malade de nos sécuritaires, pour impressionner ou mettre hors d’état de nuire ce parangon de la liberté ?

Quel obscur traquenard ont imaginé ces états-majors de l’indignité, pour faire taire ce pourfendeur du despotisme ?

C’est la caméra d’Ali qui fournit peut-être, quelques indices, lorsqu’elle zoome  sur les gravats et les maisons menaçant ruine alentour.

Autour du domicile de l’intéressé tout n’est que ruine et désolation. Les gravats des maisons démolies, jonchent les environs sur une hauteur de deux étages et menacent jusqu’à la sécurité des passants qui empruntent les ruelles étroites de cette partie de la médina de Tétouan. Pas de quoi inquiéter cette réunion d’espions, de sicaires et de barbouzes, dont on connaît le peu de cas qu’ils font de la sécurité de leurs semblables, eux si empressés lorsqu’il s’agit de défendre l’insupportable.

Les fonctionnaires seraient-ils en train de tramer une nouvelle démolition, afin d’isoler un peu plus l’intéressé et le frapper d’ostracisme, en préméditant un « no man’s land », une sorte de « terre brûlée » ?

Cherchent-ils à le persuader de quitter la ville, voire le pays ?

On peut raisonnablement le penser, connaissant les méthodes du makhzen accoutumé à puiser dans les complots et les méthodes peu orthodoxes, son inspiration.

C’est l’avenir qui nous apportera les réponses à toutes ces questions.

Je m’entretenais avec lui, au lendemain de cette curieuse incursion, lui conseillant à tout le moins la prudence, sinon d’étudier sérieusement la question de quitter le pays pour se mettre à l’abri. Sa réponse a fusé aussi cinglante que catégorique : « Je ne quitterai jamais le Maroc ! .»

Harcelé, espionné, emprisonné, battu et privé de ce qui fait la dignité d’un père de famille et sa raison d’être, son droit à l’exercice de son métier, Ali Lmrabet semble avoir débroussaillé et tracé, comme l’ont fait d’autres avant lui, un chemin vers la liberté. Il le fait à sa manière, à coups de dénonciations et tel un phare planté au milieu des ténèbres de la dictature, il est le juste qui éclaire le chemin à ceux qui le suivent.

La dictature marocaine ressemble tellement aux autres dictatures. Elle s’accommode rarement du courage et de l’exercice de la citoyenneté et n’apprécie que l’échine courbée et le panégyrique. A force d’injustices, de turpitudes et de crimes, elle ne doit s’en prendre qu’à elle-même, d’avoir forgé tant de détermination chez un seul homme.

On ne rend hommage qu’aux morts, dit-on, mais face à tant de courage et de patriotisme on ne peut que s’incliner.

[Cet article a été publié sur Demain Online.] 

[Flagrant délit : Le Makhzen et ses moukhabarates envahissent la terrasse d'Ali Lmrabet.]

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

Regional and International Relations

Breaking News … KSA accuses Hakim of smuggling explosives into Qatif city A news report on Saudi Arabia’s accusation of the Head of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, Ammar al-Hakim, of smuggling explosives to Qatif, on IraqiNews.

United Arab Emirates and Britain: best of friends An editorial condemning a Foreign Office spokesman’s laudatory remarks on the Gulf state and failure to mention the regime’s human rights abuses during the fourth Abu Dhabi Investment Forum, in The Guardian.

The UAE is not the intolerant society it’s claimed to be Abdul Rahman al Mutaiwee writes a response to the editorial Best of Friends, in The Guardian.

UK-Saudi relations strained by ‘support’ of Arab spring changes Ian Black analyzes the relations between the two countries following a parliamentary review of the UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, in The Guardian.

Reports and Opinions

Saudi Arabia plans female religious police A news report on the decision of the Saudi authorities to employ more women in the religious police, on BBC.

Kuwait’s emir warned at opposition protest A news report on a demonstration organized by the opposition in the aftermath of the emir’s decision to dissolve the National Assembly without announcing a date for new parliamentary elections, on BBC.  

Kuwait police fire tear gas at protesters A news report on clashes between protesters and the police over changes in the Kuwaiti voting laws, on Al-Jazeera English.

Twitter Gives Saudi Arabia a Revolution of Its Own Robert Worth argues that though the Gulf kingdom did not have an Arab Spring, it still has a revolution, in The New York Times.

Crisis in Yemen

US drone kills al-Qaeda suspects in Yemen A news report on the death of seven people suspected of belonging to al-Qaeda in city of Jaar, on Al-Jazeera English.

Assault on Yemen base blamed on al-Qaeda A news report on an attack that left fifteen soldiers dead in Yemen following the US drone strikes earlier last week, on Al-Jazeera English.

Repression in Bahrain

Bahrain rights defender Maryam al-Khawaja pulls out of UNESCO ceremony over honor to Israel’s Peres Ali Abunimah writes on al-Khawaja’s withdrawal from the ceremony that honored the Israeli President Shimon Peres alongside her father, Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, on The Electronic Intifada.

Bahrain: Urgent Appeal – “Al Eker” Village is Under Arbitrary Police Siege for more than 48 hours As a Collective Punishment A statement issued by Bahrain Centre for Human Rights condemning, and documenting, repressive measures taken by the government following the death of a policeman in the village of Al-Eker.

Two Narratives to Explain Unrest in One Bahrain Village Christine Hauser and Robert Mackey document the claims of both the opposition and the government on the developments in the village of El-Eker through posting videos and tweets, in The New York Times.

Bahrain charges four men with insulting king A news report on the imminent trial of four young men accused of insulting the king on their Twitter accounts.

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International

Yemen: Security Forces Raiding Aden Hospitals A statement by HRW condemning the removal of wounded alleged militants from hospitals by force.

Bahrain: Teachers face further jail time after ‘nightmare’ verdict A statement by AI condemning the jail sentences of two Bahraini teachers who were active in the Bahrain Teachers’ Association.

Saudi Arabia must halt attempts to stifle peaceful protest A statement by AI calling upon Saudi authorities to withdraw their threats of dealing harshly with protesters in the kingdom.

Market and Business

Qatari cash divides Paris opinion Nadim Baba examines the mixed reactions of Qatar’s pledge to invest sixty-five million dollars in deprived neighborhoods in Paris, on Al-Jazeera English.

Saudi Arabia reveals plans to be powered entirely by renewable energy Fiona Harvey examines Prince Turki al-Faisal al-Saud’s assertion that the kingdom will make a shift towards low-carbon energy in the near future, in The Guardian.

Qatar announces £157m plan to rebuild Gaza A news report on the Qatari government’s pledge to rebuild Gaza.

Qatari’s Gaza Visit Spurs Hope, Concern Joshua Mitnick, Matt Bradley, and Alex Delmar-Morgan report on the Qatari emir’s visit to inaugurate multi-million dollar projects to rebuild Gaza, in The Wall Street Journal.

Culture

Secret cinema gently subverts Saudi Arabia’s puritanism David Batty writes on the launch of a secret cinema by a group of Saudi filmmakers, in The Guardian.
 

Arabic

At seven o'clock in the morning, I was already up, so excited was I by the idea of voting for the first time in my life. The joy felt at finally being a citizen was one shared by all Tunisians a year ago, on 23 October 2011. After the fall of the Ben Ali dictatorship, our hopes for Tunisia, as citizens, were great. We wanted a new constitution in which the principles of the Rule of Law, human rights and above all, the demands of the Tunisian Revolution, which began on 17 December 2010, for "Work, Freedom and Dignity" were inscribed in the very foundations of our new Republic. Those elected committed themselves to a year-long mandate, with the exception of CPR (Congress for the Republic - the centre-left party of President Moncef Marzouki) who thought it would take at least three years for the new constitutional laws to be fully completed. 

Within the Constituent Assembly, the deputies have been working feverishly. Indeed, despite the evidence of short clips taken from plenary sessions in the ANC (National Constituent Assembly) that can be viewed online, it is important to recognise the tremendous amount of work being done by these people, with whom I have worked closely. Always on the move or in meetings and discussions, these deputies have been working more than eight hours a day, even during the month of Ramadan when they would go home late, barely an hour before breaking the fast after which they would go back to work until three o'clock in the morning. They have been forced to deal with the huge amount of work that they are expected to do as well as the wide-scale criticism to which they are subjected on the part of both the public and the media. 

Nevertheless, one should also be very clear: the majority of the deputies are not qualified to write a constitution. We've effectively been asking a small car to run at 250-kph for a whole year. So far, more than 191 articles have been written. However, these will all have to be reviewed by a constitutional court, a body which needs to be established at the earliest to ensure the constitutionality of these laws and see to it that they fall in line with the principles of law. 

Fragile national security

It was in the absence of such a body that we were treated to the quite laughable example of article 28 (which later became article 21) by which Ennahdha sought to assert the "complementarity" of women in relation to men, something which is in no way constitutional and will sooner or later need to be scratched. The same goes for the plan for an "Islamic Supreme Council" which was proposed by the Islamist party and which constitutes a blatant example of religious discrimination. 

Currently, aside from the creation of a constitutional court, the plans and proposals for the laws governing the three bodies to be created - those pertaining to the media, the justice system and the forthcoming elections - are debated in separate committees by the deputies. 

The three leaders of the Republic, the government and the ANC recently proposed the dates of 23 June 2013, for the legislative and presidential elections and 7 July  2013, for the second round of the presidential elections. 

It is therefore clear that the deadline of 23 October, by which the work of the ANC was to be completed, is not going to be met. This failure then risks giving opposition leaders, who are after seats in power, a convenient pretext to dissolve the government. 

Recently, the rise of the new party, Nidaa Tounes (Call for Tunisia) headed by ex-minister Beji Caid Essebsi, from the Destour Party (under Bourguiba) and later a member of the RCD (Constitutional Democratic Rally) party under Ben Ali, has split the political scene in two. One half continues to support the Troika (the three parties currently governing Tunisia: Ennahdha, CPR and Ettaktol) and the other half supports Nidaa Tounes. However, a third grouping is beginning to emerge; a coalition of leftist parties known as the Popular Front. On 7 October, a large meeting incorporating all twelve parties which make up this coalition was organised in Tunis. 

Thousands of Tunisians attended the meeting at which chants were heard calling for democracy, equality, citizenship and all the other universally recognised republican values. One hitch in all this is that the Popular Front also contains some Stalinists and supporters of Bashar al-Assad (from the Tunisian Baath Party). 

As such, as far as politics is concerned, this turbulent year risks ending in a set of disparate results at the elections in which many will be forced to make a choice between the lesser of two evils. The fragile national security context, in which violent clashes between citizens have become the norm across Tunisian towns and villages, and religious extremists known as Salafists continue to sew disorder, has heightened the sense of insecurity for the average citizen. And yet, particularly among the younger generation, a revolutionary spirit, a spirit of defiance, still exists. 

Democratic transition

There now exists in Tunisia an active civil society with press conferences, assemblies, meetings, discussions and different forms of citizen action being organised every day. Looking in from the outside, one would think the country on the verge of descending into chaos, however, on the ground, one realises that even if the old structures of the dictatorship have not been completely wiped away, the people now have the required weaponry - the pen and freedom of speech - to bring them down. 

Beyond this, the unconditional support lent by the European Union and the West in general to help the democratic transition in Tunisia to succeed can be seen in the various agreements which have been reached with the Tunisian government. Recently, the European Commission adopted a new programme worth 25 million euros which aims to bolster the Rule of Law and support the democratic transition by lending assistance to the process of penal and justice reform in line with European and international standards. Faced with the rise of religious extremist groups and in order to ensure its own security, the EU has an interest in supporting Tunisia which has come to be regarded as the cradle of revolution. 

Yet the original causes for which this large-scale movement broke out in 2011 have not been remedied. Indeed, in Tunisia we have seen a huge expansion in informal work and the provision of work schemes for young people, who represent a large percentage of the population, is still not seen as a priority for the Jebali government. 

By way of conclusion, we might say that the date of 23 October 2012, the anniversary of the first real example of democracy in action in Tunisia, will not be greeted with joy, particularly after the release of an audio recording of a private conversation between the head of the government Hamadi Jebali (Ennahdha) and former Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi in which neither of the two seem to envisage any sort of real reform in Tunisia. 

It is true that there is a lack of political will, but more importantly, the will for change among impoverished people who have nothing more to lose does point to the possibility of a second revolution. 

We have learnt that rights and freedoms do not fall from the sky but that to exercise one's rights as a citizen means to grab them. There are, in my humble opinion, three main priorities in the building of a new Tunisia. 

Firstly, an independent justice system with executive powers, secondly, fundamental reform of the education sector and thirdly, proper regulation of the informal labour market. 

As the 13th century Tunisian scholar Ibn Khaldoun said in his famous Muqadddimah (Prolegomenon): "Community is based on justice." His words remain pertinent even seven centuries later. If the politicians continue on the road of limited reform and decisions motivated by their own personal interests rather than the common good, they will soon find themselves once again faced by cries of "Dégage!" 

[This article was originally published on Al Jazeera English.]

Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle and Francesco Cavatorta, "Beyond Ghannouchi: Social Changes and Islamism in Tunisia," Middle East Report 262 (Spring 2012).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this article?

Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle and Francesco Cavatorta (RHH and FC): In October 2011, Tunisia had the first elections after the uprising that had led Ben Ali to flee the country. The months prior to the elections were very confusing and no one really knew whether elections would take place at all. At the same time, it was a very exciting period for the country and those like us who had been working on it. New parties were emerging, and the Islamist Ennahda, whose leaders had been in prison or in exile for decades, was one of the favorites to take first place, so we were very interested in how the situation would develop, given that new energies had been released with the revolution. Our interest was already partially on the rise of what can be called "social Islamism" in the country, and now we also had the opportunity to see an Islamist party running for office in meaningfully competitive elections. On top of that, Ennahda’s leader Rachid Ghannouchi is not only a prominent politician, but also a scholar and an intellectual who began writing about Islam and democracy in the 1980s. Therefore, there was a lot of media and scholarly attention on him, understandably so. But he had not been in Tunisia for decades, and so we wanted to examine what else was out there in Tunisian society that might allow us to understand the popularity of the party.

We had been doing research on Tunisian politics and society for quite some time, and when the country opened up we jumped at the chance to finally have access to people and groups that we had not had the chance to talk to so openly and examine before the fall of Ben Ali. We had this idea that there was a linkage between the rise in personal religiosity during the 2000s among ordinary Tunisians, which had gone largely undetected in scholarship, and Ennahda’s success. This had nothing to do with the notions bandied about regarding the creation of an Islamic state because the new supporters and militants of Ennahda, or at least many of them, were shaped by the socio-economic reforms of the Ben Ali period, which had profoundly changed many aspects of Tunisian society. Obviously, we wanted to follow the electoral campaign and were eager to talk to Ennahda, but we also wanted to examine where their support came from and to look at the linkage with the rise in personal piety and religiosity.

Since 2008, we had been working together on Tunisia, and we carried out our first joint research project on the relation between civil society actors and the media with a specific focus on the private radios and TV channels then emerging. While both journalists and civil activists were heavily repressed if they dared to cross the regime’s red lines, our fieldwork also demonstrated that developments were taking place which were not in line with what the literature on Tunisian authoritarianism claimed. In some ways, our work found parallels with what Laryssa Chomiak, John Entelis, and Amin Allal, among others, were doing when examining Tunisian society. They were arguing that below the state and its institutions, there was a degree of dissent being organized and there were social changes taking place that were not examined because they did not fit with the image the regime wanted to present and that were at odds with the literature on authoritarian upgrading. We thought that this was indeed the case and, in short, we wanted to see if the same logic applied to issues related to party support, to the elections in general, and to the emerging role of Islam in Tunisia after the uprising.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does it address?

RHH and FC: We were primarily interested in what long-term socio-economic changes contributed to Ennahda’s resounding electoral victory. While many expected that the party would do well at the polls, very few analysts thought it would do so well, although in a number of conversations with leading Ennahda members, with strategists of other political parties, and with civil society actors, it emerged that there was a consensus that Ennahda would indeed come quite close to taking an absolute majority, and this indeed turned out to be the case, with the party obtaining ninety seats out of 217. A lot of explanations were given at the time for Ennahda's success, ranging from the party’s shrewd campaigning to the disarray of the left and from their focus on economic matters to their legitimacy as inflexible opponents of the regime. These explanations all made sense and contain a degree of truth, but we wanted to investigate how a party that had been “disappeared” for over two decades could count on such cross-regional, cross-class, and cross-generational support in a country that was supposed to be heavily secular after decades of modernizing French-style reforms. For this purpose, we took advantage of our previous studies and wanted to include long-term socio-economic changes. This topic and how such changes influence politics is not new in comparative politics, but we wanted to apply this to an Arab country that never featured prominently in the literature on the Middle East and North Africa to demonstrate that continuity and fixity at the institutional level do not mean that profound changes are not occurring in society, with the result that when stability at the top ends, all sorts of ideological and political trends that used to be below the radar suddenly emerge out of nowhere.

A second topic of interest in our research was the wider debate between democratization and authoritarian resilience. In this debate, the role and democratic credibility of Islamist parties/movements are central, particularly when framed through the literature on Islamist moderation. Tunisia offered the possibility to focus on an Islamist party running in free and fair elections. Understanding how it managed to win and what the victory implies are issues of interest for the debate on democratization in the Arab world.  

J: How does this work connect to and/or depart from your previous research and writing?

RHH and FC: The article connects specifically with the research we published in the Journal of North African Studies in early 2012 on media and civil activism, which dealt with the unexpected and unintended developments that can take place within authoritarian regimes when they implement sham liberalising reforms. In the case of this Middle East Report article, we found that the liberalization of the economy during the 1990s and 2000s had created both a new upper middle class and a new “working poor” class. Sectors of both classes were respectively exposed to the hollowness of the new consumer society and left out as the losers of globalization. Both found personal solace in the private practice of Islam and the re-discovery of religion and a means to start changing social behaviour around them to create a different society through civil engagement within the limits imposed by the regime. When the free and fair elections of 2011 came around, many of these people activated themselves to support and influence the party that embodied their private ethical values so that they could be translated into social values respected at the top of the new Tunisia being created. It became obvious that the party of choice was Ennahda because it embodied ethical values that should, according to these activists, become the foundation of the new Tunisia. What is most interesting about this, however, is the actual degree of "liberalism" that many Ennahda militants and voters display when it comes to think about and legislate for individual rights and behavior. While members and activists and ordinary supporters would probably not self-describe as liberal, they do display a degree of tolerance for what they might term un-Islamic behavior.  

In addition, in the MERIP article we also relied on Rikke’s experience and fieldwork in the southern regions of Tunisia to bring in a regional dimension often missing from studies on Tunisia. The whole story could not be told by only doing fieldwork in Tunis, as different values and perspectives of identity exist in the south. What was happening on the ground far from Tunis confirmed to us that the support for Ennahda did not really have that much to do with Ghannounchi or the exiles who had returned with him, but with the changes that had occurred there over time.

J: Who do you hope will read this article, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

RHH and FC: We had a number of audiences in mind. First, the article is directed to Western scholars of Islamism and of Islamist parties who might find it beneficial to examine Islamist movements by looking beyond their internal workings and politics usually focused on the leadership. The basic idea is to widen the conceptualization of party politics and examine how bottom-up engagement in newly reconstituted parties influences the choices of the leadership. Second, it is directed to policy-makers both in Tunisia and in the West to encourage them to look at Ennahda not as a unified movement under the tight leadership of one man, but as a movement in which many different social forces and groups come together, giving rise to different demands and visions of society although they all share the belief that proper ethical behaviour in public affairs depends on the personal ethical and religious beliefs of the individuals involved. Our objective for this constituency was to try and demonstrate the importance of engaging with Ennahda and with its different constituent groups. Finally, it is directed to Tunisians who still today do not know very much about Ennahda, who stereotype the party, and who have prejudices against it. Understanding, knowledge, and acceptance of differences is one of the main challenges to the democratization process in Tunisia, and we hope to have demonstrated that such differences do not necessarily have to be extremely divisive. This does not mean that we share the party’s beliefs and ideology on a personal level, but we would certainly have respect for the way in which they view politics.  

J: What other projects are you working on now?

RHH: I am going through my empirical data about “new expressions of Islam” from fieldwork prior to the uprising. I am turning the data into an article in which I demonstrate how very different and new actors were expressing novel ideas about the role of Islam in Tunisia. I pay special attention to senses such as sound and “seeing.” What impact did it have that people could listen to “Islam” from the recently launched Islamic Radio Zitouna? That they could see new mosques being constructed by the state in many towns? That they for the first time could hear the president speak about Islam during Ramadan? In this way, this work relates to the article, as it demonstrates that Islam was evolving in many and very different ways and that it is not sufficient to understand Islamism only as open and institutional political activism.

FC: Together with a colleague, Fabio Merone, I am examining the history, ideology, influence, and political strategies of Tunisian Salafist movements in the context of a much wider five-country research project on Islamism funded by the German Gerda Henkel Foundation. We wrote a short article for Jadaliyya in the summer on the emergence of Salafism in Tunisia, and we are now working to deepen our understanding of this phenomenon and account for the arrival of these movements on the Tunisian political scene. The central research questions are what explains their rise and how they relate to the other political actors. Specifically, we are trying to look at the ways in which Salafism can potentially help the democratic process in Tunisia by politically “activating” citizens who do not buy into the Salafist project and are quite repulsed by it. As Nadia Merzouki has said, during the Ben Ali regime, very unpalatable religion-inspired visions of society were repressed so that citizens who were not in agreement simply relied on the regime to counter them. Today, in a plural political and social system, it is up to citizens themselves to stand up for their beliefs by becoming active and transformative agents.     

J: What methodologies did you use in the writing of this article?

RHH and FC: We used the qualitative method and interviewed a significant number of actors. When it comes to Ennahda, we used the snowballing technique, meaning that we met with members who then referred us to other members and so on. We did the same for Islamist activists working in civil associations like Quranic schools. Relying on referrals worked very well because there was a degree of difficulty in identifying exactly the correct sample, but at the same time a lot of Islamist activists were very open, wanted to talk, and were very engaged with researchers who showed a genuine interest in what the party or the associations were trying to achieve, how they were structured, and what views they had about the new Tunisia. In this respect, we did interviews both in Tunis and in the south of the country in order to have a fuller picture of the ways in which different social groups influenced the party and participated in its life. This helped us demonstrate the social movement-dimension of Ennahda. As mentioned, we also interviewed members of Qur’an associations that had been present in Tunisia since the mid-2000s in order to gauge how social Islam expressed itself before the fall of the regime and to highlight that Ennahda is not the whole story of Islam in Tunisia. This has ultimately been confirmed by the rise of Salafism, which many Tunisians still today refer to as a foreign import, neglecting the fact that Salafism in its current form is very much an indigenous product. We also relied quite substantially on observations, fieldwork, and interviews and writings we have done together since 2008, and we drew on Rikke’s fieldwork experience which dates back to the late 1990s. All this enabled us to connect what was taking place in 2011 with the past in order to put the ongoing dynamics in a broader context and in the longue durée.

In many ways, our study can be interpreted as an ethnography-inspired area study meeting political science. The two of us come from different disciplines, and mixing our methodological skills has proved to be a very good and fruitful collaboration, as we see different things in the field and contribute with different takes in the writing process. In fact, we took the article in MERIP as the starting point to explore further some of the “below the radar” trends and events that characterised Ben Ali’s Tunisia and to question some of the most widely-held assumptions in both the democratization and the authoritarian resilience paradigms. This article came out in Mediterranean Politics over the summer.

J: How do you see the article feeding into the current Tunisian reality?

RHH and FC: We did the fieldwork for the article a year ago, and a lot has happened in Tunisia since then. Ennahda is leading a three-party government coalition in an increasingly difficult time for the country, particularly from a socio-economic point of view. At the time, the electoral victory of Ennahda generated both surprise and fear in the secular left wing sector of society. On the one hand, fear that Tunisia would be turned into an Iran-style Islamic state subsided somewhat over time, as Ennahda demonstrated a significant degree of political pragmatism and a clear understanding of the plural nature of Tunisian society. The surprise over the popular support Ennahda and Salafist groups enjoy, on the other hand, is still very much present and has generated a return to original Bourguibism, as the secular left feels that it is losing the intellectual influence and status it had in Tunisia before the uprising. It looks in amazement at fellow Tunisians who have such strong feelings about the public role Islam should have in Tunisia.

Another important development that we had hints of, but failed to investigate more convincingly at the time, has to do with the multiple expressions of Islamism that are now evident in the country. At the time when we did our fieldwork and wrote the article, Ennahda was the new actor that everybody was interested in. Today, it is clear that work on Islam and political participation in Tunisia would have to take Salafism into consideration, because it is in part a reaction to the secularism of Tunisian public policy under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, but also an answer to the perceived softening of Ennahda on issues that Salafists feel are crucial in building a new country, such as the application of sharia law and its enshrinement in the constitution.

Overall, despite some surprising developments that are to be expected in a volatile transition process, the article retains its validity insofar as it indicated that there was a popular demand for an engagement with Islam and politics, pointing to the problematic nature of the perception of Tunisia as a secular country.

Excerpts from “Beyond Ghannouchi: Social Changes and Islamism in Tunisia”

New Social Forces and Islamic Values

Ennahda is not a classic opposition actor, a party run from the top down that takes advantage of a sudden opening in a political system that previously was tightly controlled. It was the activism of ordinary citizens, much of it near spontaneous, that carried the party so far, so fast. Party leader Rafik Abdessalim, now minister of foreign affairs, recognizes this reality: “In 1989, many of the leaders and members went into exile, while 4,000 were in prison….Before January 2011, there were no offices, no public activities, no visible signs of Ennahda…so the structure of the party today is a product of people’s engagement. You cannot explain everything based on the organization itself and on the idea that what should be done is dictated from the top. Local people are opening local offices of Ennahda. It is not the top of the party opening these offices. It is based on people on the ground.” From this premise, it follows that Ennahda is best understood as a broad movement with multiple constituencies that broadly subscribe to an Islamic ideal, as it developed during Ben Ali’s rule but under the radar of the regime. These constituencies had few or no ties with the Ennahda of the 1980s, the outspoken Islamist movement of Rachid Ghannouchi, the historical leader who flew home from exile after Ben Ali’s dictatorship ended. They have strong feelings, however, about Ennahda as an idea of what public life and political engagement should be. The party’s political project has been, and to some extent still is, built from below as continuation of a re-Islamization of society in the 2000s. More than twenty-five years elapsed since Ennahda’s chances to operate openly arose—and the country changed dramatically in that duration.

Three phenomena are noteworthy in this respect: the emergence of a pro-market middle class at ease with much of Western modernity; the enunciation of a stronger Arab Muslim identity that deviates from the Western-inspired and particularly French-inspired project of modernization in post-independence Tunisia; and the parallel emphasis on Islam as personal piety.

[…]

Circles of Conviction

Gradually, these vectors of social change came together in an attempt to influence public life. One powerful example is the Qur’an association called Riadh Ennasr, founded in 2007 in Cité An-Nasr, a middle-class suburb north of the capital of Tunis. The six co-founders, all men under forty, lived in Cité An-Nasr but were alienated by what they felt was its hollow, consumerist culture. One of the founders explained that the spark for the association was the realization that the neighborhood “lacked values and warmth.” The local imam parroted the regime’s line and thus lacked the moral qualities that believers should expect and demand. To better themselves, and lead by example, they decided to create a space where people could meet, under the guidance of various religious scholars, to learn to read the Qur’an properly. This project reinforced their own identity as pious Muslims, but it was also social activism in the sense that they believed better training in the Qur’an would spur others to rediscover a genuine Muslim way of life and improve the neighborhood. Implicit in the association was a critique of what seemed to be the dominant values in Tunisia, namely consumerism, corruption and a more general loss of self. The founders felt that Tunisians could cultivate an identity of their own—one that combined the best of what they saw coming from the West and the best from Islam. By April 2010, 1,800 people had signed up for reading classes, 1,200 of them women.

In the battle with the regime for the soul of Tunisia, women were of course strategic terrain—with the veil or headscarf the immediate objective. A 1986 decree stated that it was forbidden to wear the veil in public. The ban was kept in force by the regime with regular campaigns directed against women who defied it. The controversy over the headscarf came to a head in 2006. That year, during Ramadan, the president and minister of religious affairs declared that the veil was out of keeping with the Tunisian cultural heritage and national identity. Police stopped veiled women in the streets and told them to bare their heads. Many women kept on wearing the headscarf, however, presenting an increasing challenge to the regime.

The women attending the Qur’an classes in Cité An-Nasr range in age from the early twenties to the sixties. Many are well educated, working as engineers, doctors or teachers. One woman, fifty-two, traced her motivation for attending the classes to practices she learned in her childhood: “My parents were practicing Muslims, so I have always heard the reading of the Qur’an and prayers in the house.” Another woman of the same age explained, “Islam was present even then [under Bourguiba]. We learned the Qur’an at home because a sheikh came to our house.” These memories recall a past when Arab Muslim identity was cherished; they also indicate that, under the radar, such practices always existed. The women felt a need to rediscover these practices to make sense of their own upbringing and identity.

[…]

The 2011 revolution has freed these social forces that challenge the myth of Tunisian laicité. An example is the Jerba Association for Solidarity and Development, which was established after the revolution by ten men and two women, many of them professionals, and all of them practicing Muslims in their forties with no experience of associational life. The founders explain that they had always talked about helping others as a duty at the core of their faith. Only after January 2011, however, did the law permit them to harness their spirit of social engagement, with a small initial budget of 24,000 Tunisian dinars (about $16,000). The group decided to use one third of the monies to help Libyans in distress during the war to topple the Qaddafi regime. One third would go to the poor during Ramadan, and the remaining third would be used to back entrepreneurs in Jerba.

Private Islamic activism has been on the rise in Tunisia for a decade, with a number of associations testing the monopoly of the regime over the public sphere and also, since the late 2000s, providing social goods. This activism was in part a response to the deterioration of welfare provisions and widespread public corruption, but, more significantly, to what Hamza Meddeb described as “the disappearance of the moral egalitarianism that the State had promoted under Bourguiba.”[1] It is the linkage between ethics and Islam as counter to the immorality of the regime that matters for the rise of private Islamic activism, while left-wing secular forces focused much more strongly on economic shortcomings as the uprising of 2008 in the Gafsa mining district indicates.[2]

While the number of active associations has grown after the revolution, the phenomenon is not a function of the fall of Ben Ali. It is characterized by an Islam that is deeply personal, centered on social activism rather than politics and dependent on local networks for support and expansion. The glue of these networks is a specific understanding and practice of Islam whereby religious precepts apply to those who choose them and are not imposed on the whole of the community. This shift in perspective has filtered up to the Ennahda leadership, which has repeated professions of tolerance incessantly since being legalized, partly to reassure secular Tunisians, but partly to reflect the views and practices of its new members and supporters. As Tirad Labbane of Riadh Ennasr said: “Our commitment to Islam does not mean that we want to impose what we do on others. In that sense, you could say that we are anti-salafi, because we do not approve of imposing behavior. If you want to wear a mini-skirt, it is not my problem; if you do not want to wear the veil, it is also not my problem. Choices have to be left to individuals; the state cannot impose behavior. From the state authorities we ask only that they let us do our work in peace.”

Filtering Up

It would be misleading to draw a solitary bright line of causality between the Qur’anic associations and the Jerba charitable society, on the one hand, and Ennahda’s electoral triumph, on the other. But there is a clear resonance between discourse and practice of the social activists and Ennahda, and membership in the two circles overlaps. The social activism was flourishing years before Ennahda was legalized and allowed to operate freely in 2011, suggesting that many party cadre and constituents come from the social activists’ ranks and brought with them the experiences and values formed under Ben Ali’s dictatorship. It follows that there are echoes of the attitudes of the Islamist sector of society in the official positions of Ennahda. The dimension of personal choice and individual piety, for instance, is notable in how Ennahda members at all levels talk. “You cannot impose Islam on people. It has to be a personal choice, to come from the heart,” explained a physician in Jerba, who supported Ennahda. At the top, Jawhara Ehiss, a member of Ennahda’s office of women’s affairs and a deputy in the Constitutional Assembly, underlines that Islam is a personal matter: “it is not the role of the state to give religious lessons and set religious rules.” In this respect, the stated interest of Ennahda coincides with that of many social activists, who simply want to be left alone by the state to pursue their task as they see fit. It is largely these younger middle-class activists, together with the older generation of militants returning from exile and coming out of prison, who have swollen the ranks of Ennahda and contributed to its success. Their rallying to Ennahda is not necessarily based on the party’s policy statements or past record or Ghannouchi’s leadership, but on the assumption that it is the closest political actor to their beliefs.

NOTES

[1] Hamza Meddeb, “La course à el khobza,” La Revue Economia 13 (November 2011-February 2012), 50.

[2] Amin Allal, “La ‘reconversion’ problématique du bassin minier de Gafsa en Tunisie.Réformes néolibérales, clientélismes et protestations en situation politique autoritaire,” Politique Africaine 117 (March 2010), 107-126.

[Excerpted from Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle and Francesco Cavatorta, “Beyond Ghannouchi: Social Changes and Islamism in Tunisia,” Middle East Report 262 (Spring 2012). For more information, or to subscribe and read the whole issue, please click here.]

كتب الروائي الراحل السعودي عبدالرحمن منيف رائعته «مدن الملح» في ثمانينات القرن الماضي، والتي تم منعها في بعض دول الخليج. ولو كان الأمر في حكمي، لجعلت «مدن الملح» المادة الرئيسية في مناهج التاريخ الدراسية في دول المنطقة، لأنها ببساطةٍ، أفضل ما حاكى واقع الخليج وشبه الجزيرة العربية في عصر النفط، العصر الأبرز في تاريخها منذ بزوغ الإسلام.

ليس بطل مدن الملح شخصاً أو اثنين، بل هو المكان، المدينة، المساحة، وتغيرها ومن يأهلها على امتداد عصر النفط. تبدأ القصة بوادي العيون، تلك القرية الواحة التي تجسد الحياة في عصر ما قبل النفط، وكيف تغيّرت وسكانها مع اكتشاف الذهب الأسود. ثم تنتقل الرواية إلى حران، مدينة جديدة كلياً بنيت على ضفاف الخليج العربي لتحتضن الصناعة النفطية. بعدها يأخذنا منيف إلى موران، عاصمة الدولة، لنتبع دهاليز الحكم والسياسة والطبقة المستفيدة التي تشكّلت حولهما.

رغم الأسماء الخيالية لهذه المدن، فليس بخفيٍّ على أحد أن منيف بناها على مدنٍ في السعودية، بل انها قد تنطبق على التاريخ المعاصر لأغلب المدن في الخليج. الرواية في الأساس هي قصة ساكني هذه المدن، وكيف تأقلموا وتغيّروا مع التحولات الجذرية التي هزّت المجتمع مع قدوم الصناعة النفطية وتدفّق الايرادات منها.

على مدى السنتين الماضيتين، استهوتني قضية المدينة والمساحة في الخليج العربي، فهي أكثر ما يتفاعل معها الشخص بشكل مباشر في حياته اليومية. فهي المكان الذي يعيش فيه، ويعمل، ويأكل، وينام، ويحب، ويموت. مما لاشك فيه أن مدن دول الخليج العربية تحوّلت تحولاً هائلاً على مدى العقود التي يصوّرها عبدالرحمن منيف في مدن الملح. وهذه التحولات تبعتها تغيرات جذرية أخرى على مدى العقد الأول من الألفية الثالثة، هذا العقد الأخير الذي احتوى على الطفرة النفطية من 2001 إلى 2008، ومن ثم الأزمة المالية العالمية.

هذه التحولات على مدى العقد الأخير هي ما استهوتني في كتابي «اقتلاع الجذور»، وهي محاولةٌ لرصد وفهم التقلبات على مستوى المدينة في دول الخليج في هذه الفترة. التحولات كانت واسعةًً ناطقةً، وشاملةً في نطاقها الطبيعةَ والبشرَ والمادة.

إن ما شدّني بدايةً لموضوع المدينة في الخليج العربي، هو ما كان يحصل في بلدي الأم البحرين، ولم يكن ما يحصل في البحرين يختلف كثيراً عن باقي دول الخليج. فعلى مدى هذه السنوات العشر، برزت في البحرين ظاهرةٌ غريبةٌ تمثّلت في ردم البحر، أو ما يسمى محلياً بـ «الدفان»، حيث يُدفن البحر بالرمال إلى مثواه الأخير بلا عودة لتشكيل أراضٍ عذراء للاستثمار الاقتصادي في مكانه. ورغم أن ظاهرة ردم البحر ليست بجديدة، إلا أنها أخذت في البحرين شكلاً كان من الصعب فهمه. فعلى مدى هذه السنوات العشر، تم ردم أكثر من 60 كيلومتراً من بحر الدولة، أي ما يوازي نحو 10 في المئة من مساحة يابسة البحرين الأصلية. هذا الحجم الهائل من الردم حصل في جزيرةٍ اعتمدت على البحر كموردها الرئيسي لمئات بل آلاف السنين (فالبحر للبحرين كان بمثابة النيل لمصر). وفي غضون سنوات معدودة تم قتل جزء ليس بيسير منه. صودرت الأراضي الناتجة من هذا الردم إلى قلةٍ متنفذةٍ منتفعة، ومن بعدها تم تسويق هذه الأراضي لبناء مشاريع خاصة، مثّلت في كثير من الأحيان مدناً جديدة كلياً تعد قاطنيها المقتدرين بالفخامة والراحة الخالدة. وشاءت سخرية الأقدار أن تم التسويق والتهليل لهذا الردم والمشاريع التي بنيت عليه وكأنها عملٌ رائعٌ وحكيمٌ، بل هو أساس التنمية الحميدة للدولة.

معالم المدينة تغيّرت في البحرين بلا عودة، فمن مدنٍ وقرى كان البحر أساسها، أصبح الشاطئ مكوّناً غير مألوف وغريباً على أغلب سكان الجزيرة. أضحى البحر بعيداً، ومنعت الأغلبية من الوصول إليه، اللهم إلا الطبقة الميسورة التي تستطيع أن تدفع للدخول أو سكن هذه المدن الخاصة والمجتمعات المغلقة التي برزت في مكان البحر.

ومع زوال البحر، اختفت معه حرفٌ وأعمالٌ عُرفت بها البحرين لقرون، حتى سميت عوائلها بالنهّام والطوّاش والقلاف والغوّاص والسمّاك تيمناً بهذه المهن. وتحولت مع ردم البحر طريقة حياة وتفاعل المجتمع، وطرأ تحوّلٌ عميقٌ طال اليم والمدينة والإنسان، وهذا الأخير سيكون محور حديثنا في المقال القادم.

‫‎‫عمر الشهابي مدير‫ مركز الخليج لسياسات التنمية.‬‬‬

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

Regional and International Perspectives

Noam Chomsky | Emerging World Order and the Arab Spring Professor Chomsky’s lecture at the American University of Cairo.

NATO dilemma: Turkey and Article 5 Riccardo Dugulin says Turkey has no interest in entering into a military conflict with Syria.

The Dilemma in Syria From Annan to Brahimi: Security Solution Comes First Nicolas Nassif on Lakhdar Brahimi’s visit to Lebanon- two days before the bombing in Ashrafiyeh- when officials allegedly relayed their position on Syria.

After MoJo Investigation, US Company Admits Its Technology Used in Syria Hamed Aleaziz on California's Blue Coat Systems, whose technology helped the Syrian government crack down on dissidents.

Hezbollah Hedges Its Bets on Assad Giorgio Cafiero says Hezbollah's ability to cooperate with another government in Damascus could make up for its current loss of legitimacy from some of its supporters.

Jordan seeks to curb flow of fighters to Syria  

Syria will be a defining issue of the next US presidency Martin Chulov says the United States' response to Syria “will prove a defining chapter for US interests.”

Egypt’s Syrian refugees live on the edge Nada Moselha provides a glimpse into the lives of Syrian refugees in Egypt by following a Syrian family and a Syrian humanitarian worker.

Le Liban dans la tourmente syrienne Alain Gresh speculates about the car bombing that killed, among other people, Wissam al Hassan.

Who Was Wissam al-Hassan A portrait of the man in question.

Car Bomb in Beirut: Wissam Al-Hassan As’ad AbuKhalil says “Hassan was clearly coordinating help and assistance for the armed Syrian groups and he bragged to journalists about his support for the ‘Syrian revolution.’”

Imperialism and the Left

Rightists and Leftists Against the Revolution Ziad Majed argues that “the Syrian revolution until now does not have a sound political leadership or a media apparatus” to deal with “culturalistic doctrines” and the “disdain” of some “progressive ‘prominent’ writers.”

Syrian Narratives

Defected woman general trains Syria's rebels Basma Atassi on Zubaida al-Meeki’s decision to leave the Syrian army.

Syria's black market in housing adds to the nation's turmoil Hassan Hassan on Syrian neighborhoods becoming reshaped by new illegal housing market practices.

An Introduction to Helen Zughaib's "Stories My Father Told Me" Helen Zughaib’s paintings are inspired from her father’s memories of his life under the French mandate in Damascus.

Voices from Syria’s Opposition Bassma Kodmani, Nicholas Noe and Yara Nseir discuss the evolution of the opposition and the developments in Syria.

Haytham Manna: Violence and Democratic Perspectives in Syria Haytham Manna deplores the violent and sectarian turn that the revolution took, warning that “never in the modern history of the region have we seen an example of democracy being built after such an escalation of violence.”

 The Syrian Agony Graham Peebles provides an overview of the developments in Syria and says that “the guiding principle of all efforts in Syria should be peace. Peace is the number one priority for humanity.”

What is a Car Bomb? Maya Mikdashi writes: “A car bomb is not a car bomb. It is a spectacle.”

Uniting Syria Volker Perthes says “the Syrian opposition needs to establish an umbrella organization accepted by all, including the de facto civilian and military leaders who have emerged locally over the last year and a half.”

Syrian Opposition Driven Into Arms of Islamists An interview with Peter Harling from the International Crisis group.

The US Must Supply anti-Aircraft Missiles to the Syrian Opposition Joshua Landis changes his mind about an intervention in Syria, causing an uproar in some opposition circles.

Criticism Joshua Landis posts criticisms he received for his post, including messages from Nir Rosen and Kamal Haykal.

This Is Not a Revolution Hussein Agha and Robert Malley write: “Most Syrians fight neither to defend the regime nor to support the opposition. They are at the receiving end of this vicious confrontation, their wishes unnoticed, their voices unheard, their fates forgotten.”

Inside Syria

One Thing Syrians Agree On: Sense of Collective Loss Kayla M. complicates the sectarian discourse by voicing common concerns of Damascenes having different allegiances.

Brahimi 'lost temper' with LCC when it rejected Assad talks and Syria ceasefire  An interview with Rafif Joujeti.

Going Home, to Aleppo Jess Hills interviews a Syrian who explains why he is disillusioned with the FSA.

Qudsayya: Syrian Town Tries to Pick up the Pieces Marah Mashi on the civilians trying to build their lives after months of fighting between the opposition and the army.

Inside the Free Syrian Army’s ‘Candy Factories,’ the Secret Rebel Arms Workshops Anna Therese Day visits the makeshift rebel installation in Aleppo.

On Syria’s Frontlines, Sniper Hunts Sniper Toby Muse observes a sniper’s workday in Aleppo.

Damascus vigilantes vow to defend turf Michael Peel on civilians taking up arms to defend their neighborhoods.

Art and Social Media

Syria--road to freedom Joseph Hamoud at TEDxCopenhagen 2012.

Syrian pop artist depicts suffering with 'black comedy'                                    

Syrian Activists Attack Assad Regime, With Puppets Kelly McEvers on the now famous Masasit Mati and their puppet plays called "Top Goon."

Culture in Defiance: Continuing Traditions of Satire, Art, and the Struggle for Freedom in Syria Prince Claus Fund Gallery releases this report on the role of art in the revolution.  

Weary World  A song composed by Dylan Connor for Syrians.

Listen to what the Syrian popular movement and revolutionaries have to say! A collection of banners that aim to complicate media conversations about sectarianism, jihadis, and imperialism.

Policy and Reports

Syria: Despite Denials, More Cluster Bomb Attacks says Human Rights Watch  

Arabic:

حصيلة 4 أيام دمشقية محبطة للإبراهيمي

Mohammas Al-Balloot writes about the hardships facing Al-Ibrahimi in implementing his call for a cease-fire during Eid Al-Adha.  

القراءتان الإختزاليتان للوضع السوري

Michael About Najm writes about the problems surrounding the two shortsighted readings and assessments of the situation in Syria.

روايات من يوميات الخطف السورية.. بين تأمين «لقمة العيش» و«الانتقام»

Tarek Al-Abed provides an account of the kidnappings that have become an everyday fear of Syrian families.  

نظام أمن أم قمع   

Michael Kilo writes about the irony in using the term "security regime" in order to describe the Asad regime type. 
 

سوريا اليوم: نحنُ والموت جيران!

Mohammad Dahnoon writes about the normalization of death in Syria. 

ليس هكذا.. تحيا سوريا

Nasri Assayegh also problematizes the normalization of the everyday death that is occurring in Syria and calls for a revitalization of humanitarian sentiments when talking about the struggles and brutality that Syrian citizens are facing. 

نعم للهدنة.. لا للمكابرة

Adel Bari Atwan writes in favour of a ceasefire agreement and criticizes the reluctance on the part of some members of the opposition to accept it. 

 لهذه الأسباب يموت السوريون!

Allam Ahmad writes about the shift in the path of the Syrian revolution that has led to the increase in the civilian death toll in the country. 

المصالحة الوطنية

Majed Hebbo writes about the need for a national reconciliation in Syria.

الموقف التركي بعد تغيير قواعد الاشتباك مع النظام السوري

Ali Husein Bakir investigates the Turkish stance on Syria.

حتى لا تضيع دار الكتب الوطنية في حلب

Shady Azzam writes about the destruction of national treasures in the country.  

الصعود التركي والنفوذ الخليجي: علاقة عكسيّة

Mona Safwan analyzes the role of Turkey and the Gulf in the politics of the region.

ناشطات في حلب: بين الصعوبات الميدانية والتمييز

Rasha Rami writes about the struggle that women activists face in Syria today. 

في الخوف من اليسار

Ammar Dyoub writes about the fear of the Syrian revolutionary left.

It is no secret that the lives of ordinary Iranians, the wage earners and the poor, have been adversely affected in recent months by the soaring prices of staple goods. The country is now facing a currency crisis, as the Rial has plunged by nearly 60 percent over the past three months. Popular disaffection with the worsening economic conditions has even led to a rare eruption of protests and merchant strikes in the capital. What are the reasons for the collapse of the Rial and accompanying soaring inflation? Is this solely due to United States and European Union sanctions reducing Iran’s ability to export petroleum while increasing the cost of financial transactions for the country? Or have certain Iranian government economic policies also played a major role in the current crisis? Shahram Aghamir spoke about these topics with Hamid Zangeneh, who is a professor of economics at Widener University in Pensylvania. He also spoke with Mohammad Moeini, who teaches economics at Bard College at Simon's Rock.

Last year, on 9 and 10 October, thirty Egyptians,almost all Coptic Christians, were murdered by government police as they marched in a protest in front of the Maspero Building in central Cairo. What started as a peaceful march by both Copts and Muslim Egyptians to protest the government's lack of legal protections for the Christian minority, promptly degenerated into a major new trauma that is now seared into the memory of Egyptian Copts. Khalil Bendib spoke with Middle East historian Paul Sedra about the plight of the minority Christian Copts in a country now officially governed by an Islamist government.

“وهكذا الشاعر، هو المطوَّق بصيحاتِ القبيلة

حين يجولُ بينَ الخرائب

ويرثي أبناء مدينته.” ١

كثيراً ما نقرأ عن عجز القول الشعري، والنص الأدبي عموماً، عن الارتقاء إلى ما يُتوقّع منه في اللحظات المفصلية والكارثية التي يسود فيها الخراب، ويجرف فيها الموت أعداداً مهولة من البشر. هذا إن أفلح المرء في الكتابة أصلاً ولم يُصَب بالشلل الإبداعي. وحتى لو نجح، فليس من السهل أن يفلت من شراك شتّى تقف له بالمرصاد على طريق المعانى الوعر. ومن هذه الشراك ما هو واضح كالمباشرة والمنبريّة وغيرها، ومنها ما هو أقل وضوحاً، كالشراك الأيديولوجية التي يكون الإفلات منها أكثر صعوبة. وتزداد احتمالات السقوط فيها عندما تـؤدي الـكـوارث الــسياسيّـة، والـحـروب في شـكل خـاص، إلى تهـشيـم الـثوابـت وتحـطـيم البنـى والقناعات الفكرية بعد أن تحطّم البنى التحتيّة. وما نعنيه بالشرك الأيديولوجي هو النزوع اللاواعي إلى إعادة إنتاج رواية تاريخية ما، تضمّد جراح الوطن المبتلى والمـدمّر، كفـكـرة ومـكان، وتعيد تركيب بنيانه على مـسـتوى الخطاب والخيال، فترثيه من دون أن تواجه وتسائل تعقيدات اللحظة وتناقضاتها. ولعل العراق، مثال قاسي الوضوح والحضور، في هذا السياق، لوطن مزّقته الدكتاتوريّة والحروب والاحتلال والاقتتال الطائفي، حتّى صار وجوده وتاريخه كوطن وكمكان ساحة حرب موازية. أسوق هذا كمدخل لقراءة مقترحة لواحدة من قصائد الشاعر العراقي سركون بولص الذي رحل قبل خمس سنوات. إذ أرى أنّها قصيدة آسرة ومتميّزة، مثل كل قصائده، ينجح فيها الشاعر في التحدّي الأكبر ويحقّق حلمه في “أن يحلّق كأي نسرٍ فوق رؤوس القتلى والقتلة/آملاً أن يجندل بكلماته/مخلوقاً رائعاً ممعناً في الهرب/وأن ينشب صنّارة خياله/في لحم الفريسة”.٢

بورتريه للشخص العراقي في آخر الزمن

أراهُ هنا، أو هناك:

عينهُ الزائغة في نهر النكبات

منخراه المتجذّران في تربة المجازر

بطنهُ التي طحنت قمح الجنون في طواحين بابل

لعشرة آلاف عام...

أرى صورته التي فقدت إطارها

في انفجارات التاريخ المستعادة:

عدوّ يدمّر أور. خرابُ نيبور. يدمّر نينوى.

خراب بابل. يدمّر بغداد.

خراب أوروك.

صورته التي تستعيد ملامحها كمرآةٍ

لتدهشنا في كل مرّة

بقدرتها الباذخة على التبذير.

وفي جبينه المغضّن، مثل شاشة

يمكنك أن ترى طوابير الغزاة

تمرّ كما في شريط بالأبيض والأسود.

اعطه أيّ سجنٍ ومقبرة، اعطه أيّ منفى...

سترى المنجنيقات تدكّ الأسوار

لتعلو في وجهك من جديد.

وبأيّ وجهٍ ستأتينا هذه المرة، أيها العدوّ؟

بأيّ وجه،

ستأتينا أيّها العدوّ،

هذه المرة؟ ٣ 

يضئ العنوان النص واحتمالات القراءة. تحيلنا المفردة الأولى، «بورتريه»، إلى الفن المعروف الذي يصور ملامح شخص/ذات وتقاطيعه. والشخص هنا هو «الشخص العراقي» وتاريخ البورتريه هو «آخر الزمن». هل هو هاجس التاريخ واستيعاب تراكماته وتـجـاعـيـده، أم أنـّه شـعـور بـدنـو النهـايـات؟ (تـحـضـر ثيمة «نهاية التاريخ» بقوّة في ديوان سركون الأخير، بالمعنى السـلبـي التراجيدي، لا بالمعنى الذي روّج له فوكويـاما، والـذي تـنصّل منـه هذا المفكّر في ما بعد.٤

تفترض فكرة البورتريه وتتطلب وجود موضوعها في مكان ثابت ومحيط يؤطّره في لحظة التمثيل/التصوير. لكن الجملة الأولى في النص تزعزع هذه الصفة وكأن هذا الموضوع عصيٌّ على التصوير: «أراهُ هنا، أو هناك». وحين تتقدّم أصابع الشاعر لترسم أول جزء من الوجه، العين، يتعزّز الشعور بعدم الاستقرار واللاثبات. إذ إن هذه العين «زائغة في نهر النكبات». هكذا تقودنا الحركة الأولى للتعرّف على أولى الملامح ومحاولة رسمها إلى ما هو خارج الجسد كليّاً، بعيداً من اللحظة الآنية. فكأن هذا الشخص، لا يُرى ولا يَرى، إلا عبر حيّز آخر، خارج الإطار المفترض للصورة. يتكرّر الأمر في الجملة التي تلي: «منخراه المتجذّران في تربة المجازر». لا يقترن النهر والتربة في هذا السياق بالحياة والخصب، بل بنقيضيهما (النكبات، المجازر). ويغيب الفم عن الوجه أو عن تصويره. فلا ينطق الشخص، أو أننا لا يمكن أن نراه وهو يتكلم. وقبل أن تكتمل معالم الوجه ينتقل النص إلى البطن «التي طحنت قمح الجنون في طواحين بابل/لعشرة آلاف عام...». ثم ننتقل من التفاصيل والأجزاء إلى الصورة/البورتريه نفسها، التي يمكن أن تُرى الآن على رغم النقصان الذي يكتنفها. «أرى صورته التي فقدت إطارها/في انفجارات التاريخ المستعادة: «وهذه جملة محورية في النص وفي مقاربتنا. فإضافة إلى كون الإطار هنا، في معناه المباشر والواضح، هو ما يحمي ويجمع مكونات الصورة ويحدّد ويفصل داخلها عن خارجها، فإننا سنغامر ونقرأه كرمز إلى الإطار السياسي والتاريخي الجامع للمكان-الوطن، في الذاكرة والتاريخ الجمعيّين. والمقطع الذي يلي يدعم قراءتنا حيث تستعاد سلسلة يدمّر فيها «عدوّ» لا تذكر هويته سلسلة من المدن-الدول من التاريخ العراقي الرافديني، من ضمنها عاصمة العراق الحديث، بغداد. وليس مسار التاريخ في هذه السلسلة خطيّاً ولا ترتيبياً، بل بهيئة حلقات متداخلة في دوامة تنتهي دائماً بالخراب. فيجئ خراب أوروك (التي تحضر هي وأسوارها كثيراً في ديوان الشاعر الأخير) بعد خراب بغداد.

على رغم هذا التاريخ الكارثي وفقدان الإطار الذي يحميها، فإن الصورة «تستعيد ملامحها كمرآة». يغري حضور المرآة هنا بطرح سؤال مهم. هل يكون ما نراه في الصورة، إذاً، العنف المتجذّر في العالم وفي التاريخ أيضاً، وفي الذات إذ تنظر إلى الآخر، وليس فقط العنف الكامن في الشخص/ الموضوع الذي يتم تصويره؟ ليس الهدف من هذا السؤال نفي العنف الكامن عن «الشخص العراقي» مهما كان فهمنا له، بل تعقيد او تعميق فهمنا لتمظهر العنف في النص وتجذّره في التاريخ، ولنا عودة إلى هذا في نهاية المقالة. هنا يعيدنا النص مرة أخرى إلى الوجه، الجبين تحديداً، الذي يشبه شاشة تعبر عليها طوابير الغزاة. تتضح وتتعمّق صورة الجسد، والوجه تحديداً، كمسرح للتاريخ وعنفه. في قصيدة أخرى في الديوان نقرأ عن «الوجه الذي برت ملامحه المذابح والكوارث».٥

ليست الحياة داخل الإطار/الأسوار حياة مكتملة أو حرّة، قد تكون لا حياة البتّة: «سجن، مقبرة». وخارج الأسوار لا يوجد إلا «منفى». ليس الوطن فردوساً ينسجه الحنين والذاكرة الانتقائية أو فقدانها. وليس تاريخه سلسلة عصور ذهبيّة قطعها قدوم العدو. فالأسوار التي تحمي تتأسّس وتنبني على لحم ودم أبنائها وضيمهم. لا يرتد الشاعر هنا إلى الخطاب الذي ترتد إليه الغالبية عندما يُهاجَم الوطن ويتعرض للغزو. لكن، ومهما استعر الجحيم داخل الأسوار، فإن القادم من خارجها ليس، في المقابل، إلا عدوّا جديداً وقدومه ليس إلا فصلاً في مسلسل الغزوات المألوف. قد تبدو المعادلة بسيطة، لكن الكثير من المثقفين والشعراء سقطوا في شراك هذه الثنائية قبيل الغزو الأميركي للعراق وأثناءه. 

في نهاية النص يصبح المخاطَب هو هذا العدو ويتساءل الشاعر، مرّتين، عن الوجه الذي سيأتي به هذه المرّة. بدأ النص بمحاولة رسم معالم وجه «الشخص العراقي» لكنه ينتهي بسؤال عن وجه العدو القادم.

في الفصل الأخير من كتابها المعنون «أطر الحرب» تطرح جوديث بتلر سؤالاً مهماً عن ضرورة مواجهة العنف الذي يكوّن الفرد والذات ومواجهة تاريخه. لا لكي يمحو تاريخه، بل ليحاول عكس مجراه، وليدرك أنّه يعيشه ويعيش آثاره. ٦

إن سؤال «من هو الشخص العراقي وكيف نصوّره أو نتخيّله وكيف نسرد تاريخه؟» هو سؤال في غاية الخطورة والأهميّة، سياسيّاً ووجوديّاً. ولا تقل أجوبته، مهما كان محتواها، خطورة وأهميّة. لا يمكن تصوير الذات أو التفكير بها في فراغ وإنما في سياق تاريخي ماديّ. وليس العنف ما يجيء من الخارج فحسب وما يقترفه العدوّ والغزاة، ولا هو، في المقابل، عنف كامن فقط (وهذا الخطاب المازوخي سائد لدى الكثيرين، عراقيين وعرباً وأجانب، الذين لا يكفون عن ترديد مقولة مفادها أن العراق وتاريخه المعقّد يمثّل طرازاً خاصّاً واستثنائياً، من العنف) بل هو مزيج من الإثنين.

لا ترثي القصيدة وطناً يتمزّق فحسب، بل تواجه إشكالية «العنف كقابِلَة للتاريخ» (بتعبير لماركس). عنف الذات والآخر، وعنف وعبثية الوجود بأكمله وتاريخ البشريّة الذي تهيكله جدلية الخراب.

هوامش:

١- قصيدة «هنود الآباتشي» سركون بولص، عظمة أخرى لكلب القبيلة، دار الجمل، ٢٠٠٨، ص. ١١٨.

٢- المصدر السابق، نفس الصفحة.

٣- المصدر السابق، ص. ٤٠-٤١.

٤- أنظر، مثلاً، قصيدة «سكّة»: «آخر الغرب. نهاية الخط. سكّة الختام»، و قصيدة «جئت إليك من هناك»: «نهاية العام/عام النهايات» المصدر السابق، ص. ١٩١ و ٧٠.

٥- ص. ٦١-٦٢.

٦- Judith Butler, Frames of War (New York: Verso, 2010) p. 170

[نشرت المقالة في جريدة “الحياة” تحت عنوان “تاريخ سركون بولص مأسوي والوطن خارج الأسوار”، يوم ١٩ أكتوبر، ٢٠١٢. وتعيد جدلية نشرها]

[The following report was released by Human Rights Watch. Below the report is an interview conducted by Mamfakinch with AFP reporter, Omar Brouksy, on the loss of accreditation and the recent assault he endured while covering a protest in Rabat. The English and French versions of both the report and interview can be found below.]

Moroccan authorities should restore the accreditation of Agence France-Presse (AFP) journalist Omar Brouksy and stop retaliating against foreign media for what they report. On 4 October, 2012, authorities withdrew Brouksy’s accreditation, citing an article published that day about an election contest in which Brouksy noted that the founder of one political party was close to the royal palace.

29 October will mark two years since authorities shut down the Morocco bureau of Al Jazeera television in response to its coverage of the disputed territory of Western Sahara. In a country where the two main languages are Arabic and French, Al Jazeera and the AFP are closely followed.

“A country that respects freedom of expression should not be yanking press cards for mentioning the monarchy in the ‘wrong’ context or shutting down news bureaus because it dislikes their coverage,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch.

The AFP story by Brouksy concerned special elections for three parliamentary seats in districts where results had been invalidated in the November 2011 general elections. His article described the contest in Tangiers as primarily between the Islamist Party of Justice and Development, which won a plurality in the general elections, and “candidates close to the royal palace running under the banner of the Party of Authenticity and Modernity, founded in 2008 by Fouad Ali el-Himma, who is close to King Mohammed VI.” The article also referred to “a power struggle between the government and the royal palace.”

Communications Minister Moustapha Khalfi, the government spokesman, said in an 4 October statement that the government was rescinding Brouksy’s accreditation because of an “anti-professional dispatch” that contained “statements implicating the institution of the monarchy in this election contest,” thereby “undermining” the monarchy’s “neutrality and role as referee above all electoral competition between political formations.”

The next day, Khalfi told the AFP that Brouksy had disregarded the regulations governing journalists, in particular an article requiring that they “respect national sovereignty, professional rules, and the laws in effect.”

The AFP stood by Brouksy’s article and justified the passage in question as providing context for the election.

“Even if the journalist had in fact questioned the palace’s neutrality in this election, it would not justify a sanction from the government, much less one as drastic as taking away his accreditation,” Whitson said.

Without accreditation, a journalist risks being denied entry to government news conferences and being unable to obtain comments from government officials or to renew his press card. Morocco should revise its regulations to prohibit the government from using arbitrary criteria, especially any that can be used to punish political commentary, to rescind press accreditation, Human Rights Watch said.

In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which is considered the authoritative interpreter of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), held in its General Comment 34,

"Limited accreditation schemes are permissible only where necessary to provide journalists with privileged access to certain places and/or events. Such schemes should be applied in a manner that is non-discriminatory and compatible with Article 19 and other provisions of the [ICCPR], based on objective criteria and taking into account that journalism is a function shared by a wide range of actors."

The press code provides prison terms for a number of nonviolent speech offenses, including, in Article 41, for any “offense” directed at the king or the royal princes or princesses, or speech that “harms” the institution of the monarchy, the Islamic religion, or Morocco’s “territorial integrity.”  The latter usually is applied to disputing Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over Western Sahara.

On 29 October, 2010, Moroccan authorities ordered the closure of Al Jazeera’s Rabat bureau after withdrawing the accreditation of eight of its Morocco-based correspondents over the previous two years. The channel had, according to an official statement, “seriously distorted Morocco's image and manifestly damaged its greater interests, most notably its territorial integrity,” an apparent allusion to Western Sahara.

In January, a new government led by the Party of Justice and Development took office following its victory in the legislative elections. Khalfi, the new minister of communications and government spokesman, told Human Rights Watch on 4 April, 2012, that he expected to resolve the problem of Al Jazeera so that it could operate again in Morocco; Al Jazeera confirmed that it had held discussions with Moroccan authorities. However, six months later, the station’s Rabat bureau remains shut and Al Jazeera is forced to prepare its reports on Morocco from its head office in Doha, Qatar.

This is not the first time that authorities have withheld accreditation from Brouksy, who is a Moroccan citizen. After the AFP hired him to report for its Rabat bureau in March 2010, authorities refused, without explanation, to accredit him for nearly one year. Some Moroccan observers speculated in the press that the ministry objected to his previous journalistic work as editor-in-chief and a reporter for Le Journal Hebdomadaire, Morocco's most outspoken news organ before it closed. He wrote articles critical of the country's political leadership, including King Mohammed VI and those close to him.

“With Al Jazeera now able to report from post-revolution Tunisia and Libya, Morocco finds itself among the shrinking club of governments in the region that bans Al Jazeera,” Whitson said. “It should exit that club and stop trying to control how journalists cover sensitive subjects like the monarchy and Western Sahara.”

An Interview with Omar Brouksy

With the hopes of getting more clarification on the revocation of Omar Brouksy's accreditation, Mamfakinch contacted him by telephone, followed by an attempt to reach Mustapha El Khalfi. Respectively, they are an AFP journalist whose accreditation was revoked in Morocco by the Moroccan government, and the Moroccan government spokesperson/Minister of Communication. Brouksy’s accreditation was revoked after a press release that described his report as "unprofessional." The release also alluded to an infringement of the monarchy’s “constitutionality,” and accused Brouksy, who remained unnamed in the release, of having undermined the king and the royal family by linking the monarchy to the electoral process.

In a recent report, Brouksy exposed the role of the Party of Authenticity and Modernity’s (PAM) founder, a friend and close ally to the king. Fouad Ali El Himma, formerly head of the PAM, was a former classmate of the king and remains an intimate friend of his. El Himma was also recently appointed as a royal adviser. In June 2009, AFP published a report noting the success of the PAM just one year after its creation, highlighting: “The Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), founded by a close friend of King Mohammed VI in 2008, has emerged victorious in the municipal elections.” (Read the article on Jeune Afrique – PAM at the lead of municipal elections). The publication of that article caused no issue at the time. It should also be noted that Article 28 of the new constitution, proposed by a commission whose members were chosen by King Mohammed and adapted in 2011, guarantees the freedom of the press, as well as the freedom of expression, the spread of information, ideas, and opinions.

Below is a transcription of the telephone interview with Omar Brouksy, conducted by Mamfakinch:

Mamfakinch (M): Why was your accreditation revoked and how were you informed of this decision?

Omar Brouksy (OB): The government press release was both clear and ambiguous.  The press release highlighted that it was related to the monarchy but it did not clearly mention the exact reason. I still do not understand why or what the problem is. I suppose that it is because I evoke the PAM and that the decision is linked to this.

M: Who do you think instigated this decision?

OB: I have no tangible evidence, but what is certain is that it went through the government. I suspect it came from Fouad Ali El Himma or people close to the king, because these decisions are made at the top of the government. It reminds me of what happened in 2000, when Le Journal was banned, the government at the time, headed by Abderahmane Youssoufi was simply used as a vehicle to pass down decisions made at the top.

M: In your opinion, what has bothered Moroccan authorities most about your writing?

OB: I do not know, but it seems that the authorities prefer an activist journalist rather than an independent journalist. I presume that it is my independence that bothers them.

M: You were recently brutalized by forces during a recent protest. Do you know who the people were and have you filed any complaint?

OB: I have not yet filed a complaint, and I have not yet decided whether or not I will. In any case, I have five years to do so.  As for those who assaulted me, because brutalize is a strong word, they were part of the police, authorities in uniform, and authorities not in uniform. It goes without saying that members of the DST (Moroccan intelligence services) were also present.

M: What do you intend to do now?

OB: I am going to continue working. I am a journalist with the AFP, and they are the ones who judge my work. My job and my professional work is not in question.

Following the interview, an attempt to reach government spokesperson, Mustapha El Khalfi, was made. The phone rang with no answer. Mamfakinch also sent the following message to the Ministry of Communication.

We are contacting you on behalf of Mamfakinch. We hope to get your comments and an explanation concerning the press release that announced the revocation of AFP’s Omar Brouksy’s accreditation. Mr. Brouksy has responded to questions and we hope to get your opinion on this matter. Thank you for taking the time to answer our request.

The attempt to reach the Ministry of Communication went unanswered.

Maroc: L’accréditation d’un journaliste de l’AFP doit être rétablie

Les autorités marocaines devraient rétablir l’accréditation du journaliste de l’Agence France-Presse (AFP) Omar Brouksy, et cesser leurs représailles contre des médias étrangers suite à des informations qu’ils rapportent. Le 4 octobre 2012, les autorités ont retiré l’accréditation d’Omar Brouksy, citant une dépêche publiée le même jour sur une compétition électorale, où Omar Brouksy notait que le fondateur d’un parti politique était proche du palais royal.

Le 29 octobre, cela fera exactement deux ans que les autorités ont fermé le bureau de la chaîne de télévision Al Jazeera au Maroc, en réponse à sa façon de couvrir les événements sur le territoire contesté du Sahara occidental. Dans un pays où les deux langues les plus utilisées sont l’arabe et le français, la chaîne Al Jazeera et l’AFP sont suivies de près.

« Un pays qui respecte la liberté d’expression ne devrait pas confisquer de carte de presse parce la monarchie a été mentionnée dans le ‘mauvais’ contexte, ni fermer  certains bureaux de médias d’information parce qu’il n’apprécie pas leur couverture », a déclaré Sarah Leah Whitson, directrice de la division Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord à Human Rights Watch.

L'article de l’AFP signé Brouksy traitait des élections partielles pour trois sièges parlementaires dans des circonscriptions où les résultats avaient été invalidés lors des élections législatives de novembre 2011. Son article décrivait la course électorale à Tanger comme axée sur une rivalité entre le Parti de la Justice et du Développement (islamiste), qui a remporté la majorité relative aux élections législatives, et « des candidats proches du palais royal se présentant sous la bannière du Parti authenticité et modernité (PAM), fondé en 2008 par Fouad Ali El Himma, un proche du roi Mohammed VI ». L’article évoquait aussi une « lutte de pouvoir entre gouvernement et palais royal ».

Le ministre de la Communication Moustapha Khalfi, porte-parole du gouvernement, a déclaré dans uncommuniqué du 4 octobre que le gouvernement annulait l’accréditation d’Omar Brouksy à cause d’une « dépêche anti-professionnelle », contenant « des allégations mêlant l'institution monarchique à cette compétition électorale », et donc « portant préjudice à sa position de neutralité et à son rôle d'arbitre se situant au-dessus de toute concurrence électorale entre les formations politiques ».

Le lendemain, Khalfi déclarait à l’AFP qu’Omar Brouksy n’avait pas tenu compte des dispositions régissant le travail des journalistes, notamment d’un article exigeant qu’ils « respectent la souveraineté nationale, les règles professionnelles et les lois en vigueur ».

L’AFP a défendu l’article d’Omar Brouksy et justifié le passage en question, qui visait à décrire le contexte des élections.

« Même si le journaliste avait réellement mis en doute la neutralité du palais dans ces élections, cela ne pourrait pas justifier une sanction du gouvernement, et encore moins une sanction aussi lourde que le retrait de son accréditation », a déclaré Sarah Leah Whitson.

Sans accréditation, un journaliste risque de se voir interdire l’accès aux conférences de presse, de ne pas pouvoir obtenir de commentaires de la part des responsables gouvernementaux ou de ne pas pouvoir renouveler sa carte de presse. Le Maroc devrait revoir sa règlementation pour interdire au gouvernement d’utiliser des critères arbitraires - en particulier ceux pouvant être utilisés pour punir les commentaires politiques - afin de retirer l’accréditation de presse, a déclaré Human Rights Watch.

En 2011, le Comité des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies, qui fait autorité pour interpréter le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques (PIDCP), a soutenu dans son Observations générale n°34 que « les régimes d’accréditation limitée peuvent être licites uniquement dans le cas où ils sont nécessaires pour donner aux journalistes un accès privilégié à certains lieux ou à certaines manifestations et événements. Ces régimes devraient être appliqués d’une manière qui ne soit pas discriminatoire et soit compatible avec l’article 19 et les autres dispositions du [PIDCP], en vertu de critères objectifs et compte tenu du fait que le journalisme est une fonction exercée par des personnes de tous horizons ».

Le code de la presse prévoit des peines de prison pour un certain nombre de délits d’expression non violents, y compris, dans son article 41, pour toute « offense » envers le roi, les princes ou les princesses royaux, ou tout discours qui « porte atteinte » au régime monarchique, à la religion islamique ou à « l’intégrité territoriale » du Maroc. Cette dernière expression est généralement appliquée au fait de contester la souveraineté revendiquée par le Maroc sur le Sahara occidental.

Le 29 octobre 2010, les autorités marocaines ont ordonné la fermeture du bureau d’Al Jazeeraà Rabat après avoir retiré l’accréditation de huit de ses correspondants basés au Maroc au cours des deux années précédentes. La chaîne avait, selon un communiqué officiel, « déformé gravement l'image du Maroc et nui manifestement à ses intérêts, plus particulièrement à son intégrité territoriale », apparemment une allusion au Sahara occidental.

En janvier, un nouveau gouvernement dirigé par le Parti de la Justice et du Développement a pris ses fonctions suite à sa victoire aux élections législatives. Khalfi, le nouveau ministre de la Communication et porte-parole du gouvernement, a déclaré à Human Rights Watch le 4 avril 2012 qu’il espérait résoudre le problème d’Al Jazeera pour qu’elle puisse à nouveau travailler au Maroc; Al Jazeera a confirmé qu’elle avait eu des discussions à ce sujet avec les autorités marocaines. Pourtant, six mois après, le bureau de la chaîne à Rabat est toujours fermé et Al Jazeera est obligée de préparer ses bulletins sur le Maroc depuis son siège à Doha, au Qatar.

Ce n’est pas la première fois que les autorités refusent l’accréditation à Omar Brouksy, qui est un citoyen marocain. Lorsque l’AFP l’avait embauché pour travailler dans son bureau de Rabat en mars 2010, les autorités avaient refusé de l’accréditer, sans explication, pendant près d’une année. Des observateurs marocains ont avancé dans la presse que le ministère devait avoir des objections contre Omar Brouksy à cause de sa précédente activité journalistique en tant que rédacteur en chef et reporter duJournal Hebdomadaire, qui était le journal d’informations le plus audacieux du Maroc avant qu’il ne ferme. Il écrivait alors des articles critiquant les dirigeants politiques du pays, y compris le roi Mohammed VI et ses proches.

« Al Jazeera étant désormais autorisée à faire des reportages depuis la Tunisie et la Libye suite aux révolutions dans ces pays, le Maroc se retrouve dans le club réduit de gouvernements qui interdisent cette chaîne », a conclu Sarah Leah Whitson. « Le Maroc devrait plutôt sortir de ce club et cesser de contrôler la façon dont les journalistes couvrent des sujets sensibles tels que la monarchie et le Sahara occidental. »

Omar Brouksy répond aux questions de Mamfakinch

Dans le but d’élucider les raisons derrière le retrait de l’accréditation du journaliste AFP Omar Brousky, l’équipe Mamfakinch a pris contact avec ce dernier. 

Rappelons tout d’abord que le titre du communiqué parle de « diffusion d’une dépêche anti-professionnelle » comme motif  tandis que son contenu fait allusion à une atteinte à la monarchie, accusant Brousky sans le nommer, d’avoir porté atteinte au roi et à la famille royale en liant l’institution monarchique au processus électoral. Brousky a exposé dans un reportage récent le fait que le fondateur du Parti de l’Authenticité et Modernité Marocain est un ami et proche du Roi. Fouad Ali El Himma, précédemment à la tête du PAM, était en effet ex camarade de classe et ami intime du Roi, il a par ailleurs siégé dans le cabinet royal en tant que conseiller. Rappelons qu’en Juin 2009, l’AFP a publié une dépêche marquant le succès du PAM un an seulement après sa création et soulignant: « Le Parti Authenticité et Modernité (PAM), fondé par un proche du roi Mohammed VI en 2008, est sorti vainqueur des élections municipales » (Lire l’article sur Jeuneafrique.com : Le PAM en tête des élections municipales | Jeuneafrique.com – le premier site d’information et d’actualité sur l’Afrique).  La publication de cet article n’avait causé aucun problème à l’époque. Rappelons aussi que l’article 28 de la nouvelle constitution Marocaine proposée par une commission nommée par le Roi Mohammed VI et adoptée en 2011 garantit la liberté de la presse ainsi que le droit d’expression et de diffusion d’informations, idées et opinions.

Voici dans ce qui suit l’échange que nos avons eu avec Omar Brousky : 

Mamfakinch (M) : Pourquoi vous a-t-on retiré votre accréditation et comment vous a-t-on communique ce retrait ?

Omar Brouksy (OB) : Le communiqué du gouvernement était à la fois clair et ambigu [Nouvelle reçu à travers le communiqué], le communiqué souligne que c’est lié à la monarchie mais ne mentionne pas clairement la raison exacte. Je ne comprends toujours pas pourquoi ni où est le problème d’ailleurs. Je suppose que j’ai évoqué le PAM et que cela doit être relié à cette décision.

M : Qui soupçonnez-vous d’être la partie instigatrice de ce retrait?

OB :Je n’ai pas de preuves matérielles, mais ce qui est sûr, c’est que cela dépasse le gouvernement. Je soupçonne Fouad Ali el Himma ou des personnes proches du Roi, car ces décisions se prennent au-delà du gouvernement. Cela me rappelle ce qui s’est passé en l’an 2000, quand Le Journal a été interdit, le gouvernement dans le temps d’abderahmane Youssoufi a été tout simplement utilisé mais la décision a émané de plus haut.

M : A votre avis, qu’est ce qui dérange les autorités marocaines dans vos écrits?

OB : Je ne sais pas, mais il parait que les autorités préfèrent un journaliste militant à un journaliste indépendant. Je présume que mon indépendance les dérange. 

M : Vous avez été brutalisé lors d’une précédente manifestation, connaissez-vous l’identité de ceux qui vous ont brutalisé? Avez-vous porté plainte?

Je n’ai pas encore porté plainte, je n’ai pas encore décidé si je le ferai ou pas, en tous cas j’ai 5 ans pour le faire. Quant à ceux qui m’ont agressé, car brutalisé est un mot fort, ils faisaient partie de la police, des membres des autorités en civil et pas en uniforme. Il va sans dire que des membres de la DST étaient présents aussi.

M : Que comptez-vous faire à présent ?

OB : Je vais continuer à travailler. Je suis journaliste de l’AFP qui a jugé mon documentaire irréprochable. Mon boulot et Ma performance professionnelle ne sont pas mis en cause. 

Dans un souci de transparence, nous avons essayé de contacter le porte-parole du gouvernement, Mustapha Lkhalfi, pour avoir sa version des faits. Son téléphone a sonné dans le vide…

Nous avons aussi envoyé le texto ci-dessous au ministre de la communication :

« Nous vous contactons au nom de mamfakinch.com, nous souhaitons votre commentaire/explications concernant le communiqué par le biais duquel l’accréditation de Mr Omar Brousky journaliste AFP aurait été retirée. Mr Brousky ayant répondu à nos questions, nous souhaitons connaitre votre opinion à ce sujet. Nous vous remercions de donner suite à notre requête »

 Nous attendons toujours sa réponse…

ومع أننا ظللنا نتعامل بطريقة عادية... يخطر لي الآن أن مساحة وجودنا المتقلصة تلك – الأماكن التي ضاقت علينا في التسعينيات – هي نفسها أماكن التظاهر التي تحاصرنا فيها قوات الأمن إذا خرجنا، ولا يكفي ألف وخمسمئة شهيد أو أكثر وعام كامل لجعلها تتسع...

في المساء أفكر في مون من حيث تصلني أخبار الأحداث وأضحك من أن الاحتجاجات مازالت سلمية. أهنّئ نفسي على فتح حاوية "التماسيح" ولا أشعر بالذنب. لا يستهويني الجري في الشوارع واستنشاق الغاز؛ وبالمنطق الانهزامي ذاته الذي أعانني على الحياة في مصر منذ ٢٠٠١ – "ما بعد اليأس"، كما يسميه باولو – لا أظن وجودي ضمن مئة أو ألف أو مليون أعزل معرّض لضرب النار والدهس والاختطاف سيقدّم أو يؤخّر. أحس أنني جريتُ بما يكفي في الشهور السابقة، وأن ما يمكن أن يحقّقه مقتلي لا يساوي فجيعة أختي، حتى لو لم يدم حزنها علي سوى بضعة أيام؛ أحس بضوء قارص يخلّف ألماً حاداً في بطني وأتساءل بجدية جديدة علي في هذا السياق: كل هذا من أجل أن يتنازل المجلس العسكري عن الحكم؛ طيب، ماذا بعد أن يتنازل المجلس العسكري عن الحكم؟ ضوء قارص وقناعة متزايدة بأن سقوط المجلس لا يعني أن شيئاً إيجابياً سيحدث يساوي فجيعة أخت على أخيها، حتى لو لم يدم حزنها سوى بضعة أيام.

أفكر في مون وأتذكر أنها لم تبادل نايف عنفه في ليلتهما الأولى معاً. بفرحة قالت لي إنها كانت تُفقدها القدرة على التنفس، أمضت عشرة أيام – وهما لا يلتقيان – وكأنها تحتفل بيديه وعضوه ولسانه حيث تلقتها فجواتها. وبدا أن فجوات جديدة ظهرتْ فيها على الكنبة لتتلقّى لسانه وعضوه ويديه. لم تفطن إلى جدوى إيلامه قبل أسبوع آخر لم يلتقيا خلاله؛ وحين ناولته اللكمة الأولى في وجهه أثناء لقائهما الرابع وهي ترتعش – عيناها على وسطه في أثنائها – أضحكها أن تراه ينتصب على الفور، الضحكة الصفراء القبيحة ذاتها. كان عليه أن يبتدع عذاباً جديداً على سبيل الرد، أمكنها أن تصرخ أخيراً وهو يعرّضها إليه. وأفرحه صراخها.

دام لقاؤهما الثالث، كما ستدوم كل لقاءاتهما، يومين متصلين؛ كان نايف يتعطل عن عمله ليظل معها لو أتت في غير يومي العُطلة الأسبوعية، ثم يصبر على غياب عشرة أيام أو أكثر لا يسألها أين تمضيها وقد افترض أنها مع زوجها... إلى أن بدأت تحكي عن أعمال سكرتاريّة مؤقتة كالعمل الذي تعرّف إليها من خلاله (وغادرتْه خلال أسبوعين لتبدأ عملاً آخر مشابهاً)، موحية بأنها تبيت بحكم هذه الأعمال لوحدها. وللمرة الأولى في حياته، رغم استمرار حضور الأسد، بدأ نايف يتحرق إلى معرفة كل شيء. بدأ يرى مون جزءً من حركة أو مدرسة أو لوثة هي التحدي الأمثل للشاعر السري. وقبل أن يدرك ما يحدث كان هوس تلك اللوثة أو المدرسة أو الحركة قد تمكن منه. بدأ يتحرق إلى السيطرة على وقتها وحركتها؛ بدأ، مع ضيقها بأسئلته، ينتبه إلى كذباتها... كان يعاقبها ويتضرع إليها تباعاً حتى تُعلِمه بمكان وجودها أو تتابع الاتصال أو تمضي معه المزيد من الوقت، لكنها لم تستجب أبداً. "مشكلتك أنك تنسى يا بيبي،" كانت تقول له: "أنا بنت دين كلب متزوجة!"

[الصورة من يوسف رخا]

في ليلتهما الأولى معاً، أقول – عندما عاد نايف ومعه الكوفية وتفاحة الشمع التي سارع بإشعالها على مقبض الكنبة، متمتماً "عارف أنك تحبين الشمع الساخن، لا يمكن أساساً أحرمك من شيء تحبينه" – نظرت إليه غير مصدّقةً فعلاً ثم قاومته – مصدومة – بلا فائدة. بقيت على صمتها بينما هو، بإصرار ومهارة غير متوقعة ولا حتى منه، يربط يديها وراء ظهرها بالكوفية إلى أن يشل ذراعيها تماماً، ثم يشدها من حلمتها إلى حيث الشمعة تتأرجح قليلاً وتبعث رائحة تفاح خافتة – كان يقبّل رقبتها بحنان صادق وهو يفعل، متمتماً "هانت يا بيبي، لحظة وتُحسّين بالشمع" – إلى أن طرحها هناك على بطنها وجلس القرفصاء فوق ظهرها وقدماه على جنبيها بالشمعة في يد والقداحة في الأخرى؛ وحتى حين سقطت أولى القطرات لزجة وثقيلة وموجعة على جلدها (نايف يتابع المشهد مثل معلق رياضي، مهللاً مع كل لسعة حيث الشمع الأحمر يتجمد وينغرس في اللحم على الفور، فيبدو كأنه دم تخثر منذ حين)، كانت تتلوى وتهمهم، تهمهم ولا تصرخ والقطرات تحرق وركها.

أذكر أن رائحة الدخان والفلفل خفتت شيئاً فشيئاً خلال ذلك وقد اختلطت برائحة الشمع، ومع ذلك عادت إلى أنف نايف – بكثافتها الأولى – رائحة الريحان الأخضر.

ليلتها حين قذف نايف أخيراً في حلق مون قبل أن يحرر ذراعيها من كوفيته ويدعها تضمد جسدها وتتحمم – إلى آخر لحظة كانت يده في فرجها تبلّغها ذروتها كما فعل عضوه ثم لسانه – كان مندهشاً من قسوته وحنكة يديه؛ أحس – كما سيقول لي وهو يشكو منها في سياق آخر – أن القوة التي تحركه وهو معها موجودة خارجه، أن مصدرها أكبر من شخصه أو أي شخص سواه: طاقة الدفع ذاتها التي دفعته إلى ترجمة ألن جينزبرج. وخطر له للمرة الأولى أن مون والقصيدة حدان على طريق قوامها الأسد، وأنه سائر على هذه الطريق إلى ذروة ما، بداية أو نهاية.

قلتُ إنني نمت مع مون وأنا لا أصدق أنه حدث حقاً قبل نهاية الحكاية، لا أصدق أنني ملّست على شعرها قصيراً ومعقوصاً بلون الشيكولاتة وجسدها النحيف المكهرب ينتفض بين ذراعي. لكن متعتنا لم يشبها الوجع. ربما أحببتها قليلاً، ربما لم يحركني حيالها إلا ما هو موجود داخلي. بعدما تحولنا من "أولاد ناس" ذلوا إلى تماسيح ظللنا نتعامل على أن ما يُكتَب لا يعنينا، هذا المهم. وبتحولنا إلى نُصُب رخامي بلا تمثال سنة ١٩٩٧، تسلّمنا حقيبة المستقبل.

[مقتطف من رواية "التماسيح" ليوسف رخا، الصادرة حديثاً عن دار الساقي، بيروت]

[”ملف من الأرشيف“ هي سلسة تقوم ”جدلية“ بنشرها بالعربية والإنجليزية بالتعاون مع جريدة ”السفير“ اللبنانية. الملفات ستكون لشخصيات أيقونية تركت أثراً عميقاً في الحقل السياسي والثقافي في العالم العربي.]

الإسم: أحمد

الشهرة: الخطيب

إسم الأب: محمد

إسم الأم: وضحة الخبيزي

تاريخ الولادة: 1926

الجنسية: كويتي

الإختصاص: إجازة في الطب

الفئة: سياسي

المهنة: طبيب - نائب 

• أحمد محمد الخطيب 

• كويتي.

• ولد في الكويت سنة 1926.

• متزوج وله ثلاثة أولاد.

• بدأ دراسته الابتدائية في المدرسة المباركية وكان في السابعة، ثمّ انتقل إلى مدرسة "العنجري" وكانت تعمل على طريقة "الكتاتيب" حيث تعلم القرآن ومبادئ القراءة والحساب ثمّ التحق بالمدرسة الأحمدية في الصف الثاني الابتدائي، وبعدها ذهب إلى المدرسة القبلية ثم عاد إلى المباركية لينهي المرحلة الثانوية.

•غادر الكويت عام 1942 إلى بيروت لمتابعة دراسته في الجامعة الأميركية ، فتخرج عام 1952 طبيباً متخصصاً بالجراحة. وفي بيروت تعرّف إلى جورج حبش ووديع حداد من فلسطين، وإلى هاني الهندي من سوريا، وأسّس هؤلاء الأربعة مع رفاق لهم أمثال صالح شبل وحامد الجبوري "حركة القوميين العرب" في عام 1951 متأثرين بأفكار قسطنطين زريق من دمشق.

• شارك عام 1952 في تظاهرات طلابية احتجاجاً على تدخل الولايات المتحدة الأميركية في الشرق الأوسط وحدثت مصادمات مع رجال الشرطة في بيروت، وفصل مع زميل له فلسطيني كان يدرس معه في الجامعة الأميركية. إلا أن تظاهرات طلابية احتجاجية دفعت بالحكومة اللبنانية إلى التدخل لسحب قرار الفصل.

• أحد مؤسسي النادي الثقافي القومي في الكويت الذي أنشئ عام 1953.

• سافر في دورة لمدة ستة أشهر إلى لندن حيث نال دبلوم في أمراض المناطق الحارة في العام 1954.

• في عام 1954 عاد إلى الكويت وعمل في المستشفى الأميركي حتى عام 1957، حيث قدم استقالته ليمارس مهنته في عيادته الخاصة.

• في عام 1958 زار العراق برفقة جاسم القطامي على رأس وفد من الشباب القومي العربي- فرع الكويت، لتهنئة كل من عبد الكريم قاسم وعبد السلام عارف بسقوط النظام الملكي وقال في خطاب ألقاه أمامهما :"إننا متأكدون انكم سوف تتحدون بوحدة سريعة مع الجمهورية العربية المتحدة"( أي مصر وسوريا).

• كان نائباً لرئيس المجلس التأسيسي الذي أقر الدستور الكويتي عقب الاستقلال عام 1962.

• انتخب عام 1963 نائباً في أول مجلس للأمة في الكويت، حيث لمع كأحد المنادين بالإصلاح والحريات الديمقراطية الكاملة، الأمر الذي أزعج السلطات الحاكمة فكان القرار بإبعاده عن المجالس الثاني والثالث والخامس.

• في 7 كانون الأول 1965 قدم استقالته مع ثمانية أعضاء من مجلس الأمة بسبب إقرار عدد من القوانين وصفوها بأنها مقيدة للحريات.

• خسر الانتخابات النيابية في عام 1967.

• فاز بانتخابات عامي 1971 و 1975، إلا أنه عاد وخسر في انتخابات عام 1981.

• في 29 شباط 1985، وبعد تجميد للحياة البرلمانية دام أربع سنوات جرت انتخابات عامة للفصل التشريعي السادس ففاز بمقعد برلماني وعاد إلى مجلس الأمة. إلا أن أمراً أميرياً صدر في 3 تموز 1986 قضى بحل المجلس المذكور بسبب خلافات بينه وبين الحكومة.

• في 8 أيار 1990 اقتحمت قوات الأمن الكويتية ديوانيته واعتقلته مع عشرين نائباً سابقاً، خلال عقدهم اجتماعاً للمطالبة بإحياء الحياة البرلمانية في البلاد. ثم أفرج عنه في 12 من الشهر نفسه.

• انتخب نائباً في مجلس الأمة الكويتي في الانتخابات التي جرت في تشرين الأول 1992.

• أصدر مذكراته بعنوان "الكويت: من الإمارة إلى الدولة".

 مواقف:  

• رداً على سؤال عن الأسباب المباشرة أو غير المباشرة التي دفعت المسؤولين في الكويت إلى إسقاط تاج الديمقراطية أجاب: إن السبب الرئيسي هو أزمة سوق المناخ التي انهارت فيها سوق الأوراق المالية الكويتية في عام 1982 وتورط فيها بعض الكبار. ( الوفد، 30 تشرين الأول 1986).

• الديمقراطية الصحيحة بحاجة إلى جو من الحريات العامة، حرية الصحافة وحرية الجمعيات وحرية الأحزاب السياسية وهي القاعدة الأساسية لقيام أي مجلس ديمقراطي. (الجرائد، 25 كانون الأول 1989).

• أمن الكويت في أن تكون عنصر استقرار للمنطقة. (الحياة، 1 تموز 1999).

• تحريم الحديث عن ترتيبات بيت الحكم اعتداء على تاريخ الكويت ووجودها. (السفير، 27 تشرين الثاني 2001).

• حذر من أن الكويت تتجه نحو عزلة أشد من سقوط صدام حسين.
( القبس، 21 كانون الثاني 2003).

• أعلن أن حكومتنا تساعد الأنظمة الديكتاتورية وهو ما يثير شعوبها ضد الكويت. (السياسة،11 آذار 2003).

يشكل الوافدون جزءاً كبيراً من سكان الخليج، لكن قلّما يتم التطرّق إليهم في الإعلام. وقد زاد عدد الوافدين بشكل هائل في دول مجلس التعاون على مدى السنوات الأخيرة، فكانت نسبة نموهم السنوية أكثر من ضعف نسبة النمو السنوية للمواطنين، حيث ارتفعت أرقامهم من نحو عشرة ملايين في العام 2000 إلى ستة عشر مليوناً في العام 2008.

أصبح الوافدون يشكلون الأغلبية من السكان في أربعة من دول المجلس (الإمارات والبحرين وقطر والكويت). في قطر، على سبيل المثال، زاد عدد الوافدين من 400 ألف إلى نحو مليون ونصف المليون نسمة بين 2000 و2008، مشكّلين بذلك ما يقارب 90 في المئة من سكان الدولة. ومن الملفت للنظر أيضاً أن نسبة العرب من بين الوافدين في دول مجلس التعاون في انخفاض مستمر، فمن نحو 75 في المئة قبل العام 1975، تدنت نسبة العرب الوافدين إلى الثلث بحلول العام 2004.

إذاً أصبح الوافدون عنصراً رئيسياً في مجتمع ومدينة الخليج العربي، وأصبحت ظاهرة ما يسمى محلياً بـ «الخلل السكاني» قضيةً مصيريةً تثير العواطف من كل الاتجاهات. فهناك من ينظر إلى حالة الوافدين في دول الخليج كمثال لأسوأ أنواع العنصرية والاضطهاد التي يتعرض لها المهاجرون عالمياً، نظراً لتدني حقوقهم السياسية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية، فيما هناك من ينظر إلى «الخلل السكاني» من الطرف الآخر بأنه خطر مصيري يهدد هوية وأمن شعوب المنطقة.

والحقيقة أن «الخلل السكاني» هو اعتداء على حقوق المواطنين والوافدين معاً، وهو ناتج في الأساس من منظومة اقتصادية - سياسية تعامل البشر عامةً كسلعة، وهذا ما أحاول تبيانه في كتاب «اقتلاع الجذور»، حيث تم توظيف التركيبة السكانية بشكل أساسي لخدمة متطلبات رؤوس الأموال والمصالح السياسية لمتخذي القرار.

على صعيد المواطنين، أدت العوائد النفطية إلى فك الاعتمادية التاريخية من متخذي القرار على شعوب المنطقة في تزويدها بالعوائد المالية، وتم تهميش دور المواطنين على المستوى العمالي عبر تقليص الاعتماد عليهم في أغلب القطاعات المنتجة، حيث تم تركيز توظيفهم في القطاع الحكومي أساساً. في المقابل، مكّن ريع النفط متخذي القرار من إضفاء وحصر مزايا الدولة بشكل رئيسي على المواطنين، حيث زادت الاعتمادية على الدولة لتلبية أغلب احتياجاتهم بدءاً من الرواتب وصولاً إلى السكن وحتى الدفن، وتم ربط هذه المزايا بالولاء لرجال الحكم.

على صعيدٍ موازٍ، تم تلبية الطلب المتزايد للعمال عبر استقطاب الأيدي العاملة الأجنبية بشكل موسع، ولكن تم السيطرة على هذه الفئة عبر قوانين وتشريعات قيّدت قدرتهم على بناء النفوذ والاندماج الاقتصادي أو السياسي، وجعلتهم في حالةٍ من «عدم الاستقرار» والتغير المحتمل الدائم. فمع تطور الفترة أصبحت نسب الوافدين غير العرب تزداد، والتي نظر إليها بأنها أقل تكلفةً وأقل خطراً سياسياً وأمنياً من نظيرتها العربية. وهكذا أصبح الهدف الأساسي للتركيبة السكانية في دول الخليج هو توظيفها لخدمة متطلبات رؤوس الأموال المستثمرة والفئة التي تتحكم فيها، حيث أصبحت المنطقة أقرب إلى معسكر عمل، توجّهها الرئيسي يتمحور حول تدوير عوائد النفط والتغيرات الاقتصادية المتسارعة، من دون أن تتبلور قوة اقتصادية - سياسية سواءً للعمال المواطنين أو الوافدين.

وصل حال الخلل السكاني بأن برزت مع بدء الألفية الجديدة ظاهرة غريبة في دول المجلس، هي لعلمي فريدةٌ عالمياً. ففي الفترة الممتدة من 2000 إلى 2008، انشغلت دول المجلس بالتخطيط والتفعيل لتشييد مدن ضخمة وجديدة كلياً، كانت تشكل وتبنى من الصفر. الأموال التي انصبت في هذه المشاريع كانت خياليةً، حيث وصلت القيمة المعلنة لها إلى 1.2 تريليون دولار (أي 57 في المئة) من إجمالي قيمة المشاريع المعلنة في المنطقة العام 2008. إن أكبر عشر مشاريع في دول الخليج من ناحية القيمة كلها من النوع العقاري الضخم، وتقدر قيمتها بنحو 393 بليون دولار. هذا التوسع العقاري جاء ضمن خطط مدروسة لجعله في قلب الرؤى الحكومية المستقبلية للمنطقة، فتم تجييش الموارد والخطط لجعلها في صلب برامج الدولة، حيث سيطرت على أهم مخططين وضعا لرسم المسار الاقتصادي والجغرافي المستقبلي، وهما الرؤى الاقتصادية لهذه الدول والتخطيط الهيكلي لمدنها. فظهرت رؤية البحرين وأبوظبي وقطر 2030 وغيرها.

بالإضافة إلى التخطيطات الهيكلية لهذه المدن الجديدة، أدت الزيادة المتوقعة في السكان والمشاريع العقارية إلى الإعلان عن صرف هائل على البنية التحتية، بما في ذلك مشاريع طاقة تقدّر بـ 134 بليون دولار، وخدمات مياه ومجارٍ تُقدّر بنحو 40 بليون دولار.

ونظراً لانخفاض عدد المواطنين نسبياً في دول المجلس، ما كان لهذه المدن الجديدة والمشاريع العقارية العملاقة أن تنجح إلا باستقطاب أعدادٍ متزايدةٍ من الوافدين المقتدرين لسكنها. تم الإعلان عن حزمة من القوانين في أربعة من دول المجلس (الإمارات، البحرين، عمان، قطر) تشرّع شراء هذه الوحدات العقارية للأجانب في أول مرةٍ في تاريخ المنطقة، وتم ربط شراء العقار بالحصول على إقامات طويلة المدى من قبل المشترين الأجانب. وأعلن عن النية لبناء ما لا يقل عن 1.3 مليون وحدة سكنية ذات التملك الحر أو الإيجار الطويل المدى في هذه الدول الأربع فقط، ما يسع لاستيعاب ما لا يقل عن 4.3 مليون قاطن فيها. إذاً ما يبنى من وحدات سكنية بهدف بيعها على غير مواطني المنطقة يَعِدُ بجلب سكّانٍ يتعدّون في عددهم مجموع مواطني هذه الدول الأربع، والذي لم يتعدَّ 3.6 مليون نسمة العام 2008.

أخذت أغلب هذه المشاريع شكل المشاريع «المتكاملة» و «العملاقة»، فهي تتميز بهول حجمها حتى اقتربت من صنف الخيال العلمي. وأكثرها كانت مشاريع جديدة كلياً، حيث ركزت على خلق مجتمعات متكاملة من لا شيء. أما أحجام هذه المدن والمبالغ المنصبة فيها فتقترب من الخرافية. وما علينا إلا أن نلقي نظرةً على مشروع دبي «واترفرونت»? أو «الواجهة المائية»? المزمع إنجازه حوالي العام 2020، وهو عبارةٌ عن مدينة جديدة كلياً، يتوقع أن تستوعب مليون وثلاثمئة ألف شخص على مساحة 130 كم مربع، أي على مساحة تتعدى بكثير حجم مدينة باريس عاصمة فرنسا، وبتكلفة 20 بليون دولار.

وعلى رغم أن الأزمة المالية العالمية أدت إلى توقف عدد معتبر (ولكن ليس بغالبية) هذه المشاريع العقارية، إلا أن الرؤى والموارد الهائلة والحملات التسويقية التي جُيّشت لهذه المشاريع العقارية، كل هذه الأمور تبيّن جدية هذه المشاريع وتدعو إلى التوقف عندها، وتحليل تداعياتها على الخليج ومدنه وتركيبته الاجتماعية والسياسية والاقتصادية.

عمر الشهابي مدير مركز الخليج لسياسات التنمية. 

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Wednesday night of every week.]

Algeria

François Hollande Tells the Truth – it Hurts Less Than Lies Flachra Gibbons explains the importance of recognizing the 16 October massacre to reconciliation with Algeria as well as its own past.  

Abdelaziz Bouteflika fera une deuxième lecture des réformes politiques Algeria's president announces his intention to review amendments passed by the parliament as a component of last year's "reforms."

The Paranoid Neighbor: Algeria and the Conflict in Mali by Anouar Boukhars Peter Tinti critiques Boukhar's recent paper published for The Carnegie Endowment (available here).

Libya

Sirte – One Year On George Grant suggests that recent protests in Sirte, while proximately caused by the intervention in Bani Walid, also  purposely  coincided with the anniversary of Gaddafi's death. 

Libya: Is Khamis Gaddafi Really Really Dead? Amira al Hussaini curates social-media speculation on the death of Gaddafi's son during the Bani Waleed siege. 

Storyline of Negotiation Committee Timeline of negotiations between Misrata and Bani Walid as tweeted by @eljarh.

Grand Mufti Describes Libya’s Political System as “a Failed Experiment” Valerie Stocker summarizes Sheikh Sadeq al Ghariani's criticism of Libya's multi-party system and the GNC.

Liberation, Cleansing or National Reconciliation? Sufyan Maghur  discusses the divergent paths that lay ahead of Libya's yet irresolute electorate.

Mauritania

Mauritanian Army Breaks Silence On Presidential Shooting Jemal Oumar describes the ramifications of the regime's official story,  including popular fears of security and military competence.

Military Officer who Fired at Mauritania’s President Says it Was "Mistake" Mauritania's opposition party questions the regimes story of events.

Mauritania: Human Chain Asks “Who Rules Mauritania?” Ahmed Jadu reports on the Feb25 movement's protest following the president's shooting.

RE: The "Accidental" Shooting of the Mauritanian President Kal examines several rumors and their redounding effects on Mauritania's political stability.

#Mauritania: Sex, Lies And Videotape Anita Hunt explores the increasingly popular theory that Aziz's shooting was the result of, or falsified in order to cover up, a sexual encounter.

Mauritania: President's Shooting Reveals Military Regime Parading As a Democracy Boubacar N'diaye discusses Aziz's shooting in the context of the country's recent political upheavals.

Morocco

Solaire marocain : le nouveau TGV, le nouveau Cosumar? Critical assessment of the government's new solar proposal.

Morocco: Amazigh Activist On Identity Radio Med stages a mock court-trial to examine cross-sections of identity and other salient social issues in Morocco. 

Julie Chaudler Reports on Arrest of Camaara Laye Report on the arrest of a coordinator of the Council of Sub-Saharan Migrants in Morocco, one of four human rights association members recently arrested.

Le Maroc emploie des techniques de torture UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Juan Mendez charged Morocco with torturing regime opponents and citizens in the Western Sahara during his presentation to the General Assembly. 

Tunisia

Salafism: A Question of Progress! Mohamed Firas Arfaoui counters dominant media portrayals of Salafis as "reactionary and regressive."

Rapport d’Amnesty International: « Un pas en avant, deux pas en arrière ? » Amnesty International's newest report of Tunisia's current political state.  

Tunisia Celebrates One-Year Anniversary of First Democratic Elections Amid Protests Hend Hassassi chronicles citizen protests as well as the opinions of NCA members regarding the postponement of the new draft constitution.  

Tunisia Clash Leaves Opposition Official Dead Al Jazeera covers the divergent explanations behind the death of an opposition party coordinator, which occured  following clashes with pro-government protestors.  

Arabic

بني وليد اللغــز
Musa Mohamed Al Maghrabi examines the government's rationale for the siege of Bani Walid. 

هللوا ياأبناء المغرب؛ الجوع بيننا !
Discussion of causes and likely reactions to Morocco's relatively high hunger rate, as determined through a new international report.  

نحو انتقالٍ سلِسٍ من حكم عزيز إلى حكم الشعب/ محمد بن المختار الشنقيطي
Mohamed Ben Mokhtar calls for the transition of power following Aziz's shooting and the country's current political climate.  

السينما حلم موريتاني أيضا| #موريتانيا أخبار
Ahmed Jadu discusses his efforts to bring cinematic experiences to Mauritainia, including the 23 October Noukchott Film Festival.


Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb

New Texts Out Now: Rikke Hostrup Haugbolle and Francesco Cavatorta, Beyond Ghannouchi: Social Changes and Islamism in Tunisia
"Community is Based on Justice"
Des trucs, des machins et des choses
La Libye un an après
New Texts Out Now: Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, Libya, Social Origins of Dictatorship, and the Challenge for Democracy
Averting a Moroccan Revolution: The Monarchy's Preemptive Spatial Tactics and the Quest for Stability
The Struggle for Security in Eastern Libya
The Tunisian Revolution Continues: An Interview with Lina Ben Mhenni
Yes, Morocco is a Regional Model
غازي القبلاوي عن مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي والثورة الليبية

Over three-hundred thousand refugees have fled across Syria’s borders to Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, according to the latest UNHCR statistics. This number accounts for only those who have registered with the UN, or are waiting to register. The UN also estimates that one to one and a half million people are internally displaced within Syria. If correct, then nearly ten percent of the population of the country (twenty-two million) no longer lives in their homes. Inside Syria as of mid-September, the World Food Program increased its target for food rations from 850,000 to 1.5 million people in all fourteen governorates. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Syrian government has authorized eight international NGOs to assist those “affected by the conflict.” The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and its thousands of volunteers have been critical partners in assisting those in need and in the distribution of aid.

As the Syrian civil war drags on, fierce fighting continues between the Free Syrian Army (financially and logistically supported by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, among others, and based out of Turkey) and the Syrian regime headed by Bashar al-Asad (supported financially and logistically by Russia and Iran). In this war, the non-combatant population must contend with intense fear and danger, and the UN OCHA asserts that, “civilians – ordinary men, women and children – are bearing the brunt of the violence.” Mortars fired at villages and urban neighborhoods often land on houses, apartment buildings, and shops. Government airplanes and helicopters drop bombs. In addition, summary executions, targeted killings, and disappearances of individuals and entire families have been on the rise since August. In many cases the culprit is unclear or unstated, whether they are proxy government thugs (al-Shabeeha) or militant groups. People walking and driving around their towns and cities also fall victims to sniper fire and checkpoint violence.

To date, the number of people killed in the eighteen-month uprising is more than 23,000, with tens of thousands of people wounded and struggling to find medical care in the besieged areas. The government continues to cut electricity and water supplies, as punishment to rebellious areas as well as due to the challenges of maintaining state services. Heavy fighting in Aleppo and the Damascus suburbs in September, along with roadblocks and other factors, prevented some from fleeing to more stable areas. Given the widespread destruction of both homes and business undoubtedly many more will choose, or be forced, to flee for safety.

UN officials suggest that refugees may number up to 710,000 by the end of the year. As a result, the UN issued the second revision of the Syria Regional Response Plan Appeal (to cover March through December 2012) for 487 million dollars in order to provide humanitarian assistance, in particular for the increasingly vulnerable refugees and host communities as winter approaches. As of 27 September, the Appeal had received 141.5 million dollars. Turkey and Jordan host the largest number of refugees, with Iraq and Lebanon close behind. Recently, however, Turkey has closed or limited a number of its border crossings along the 546 mile (878 km) border with Syria, and in Jordan, living conditions in Zaatari camp are miserable. Also, Iraq has either closed or put restrictions on entry through one of its border crossings. Despite these cases, the majority of those fleeing Syria have found zones of safety and aid in surrounding countries.

[Syrians who fled their homes due to fighting between the Syrian army and the rebels, shout slogans as they march toward the Turkish side of the border, during a protest asking the Turkish government to let them enter to their refugee camps, at the Bab Al-Salameh border crossing, near the Syrian town of Azaz, Aug. 28, 2012. Image by Muhammed Muheisen/AP Photo.]

In late August and early September, the Turkish government closed the border at Bab al-Salameh in Kilis province for security reasons while also claiming there was no place for the refugees to be housed nearby. Turkey now allows some five hundred refugees to cross this border daily. As a result, according to UNICEF, some fourteen thousand Syrians are massed waiting to cross.  Turkish border guards have allowed aid to be sent across the border into Syria for those trapped between the border and the fighting in their nearby villages and towns.

[A Syrian family, who fled their home due to government shelling, take refuge at Bab Al-Salameh crossing border as they wait to cross into Turkey, September 13, 2012. The days are still hot across northern Syria, but at night there is a hint of a chill -- an ominous harbinger of winter's approach and the deepening of the humanitarian crisis. Image by Muhammed Muheisen/AP Photo.]
 

As of mid-October, Turkey’s Turkish Disaster Management Agency (AFAD) reported that there are over 100,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey. Turkey has fourteen refugee camps and restricts access in and out of the camps. The government maintains tight control on the provision of aid to the refugees but has recently requested financial and material assistance, which prompted the UN along with a number of governments and aid organizations to step forward.

[Syrian barbers shave the heads of other displaced men, as they take refuge at the Bab Al-Salameh border crossing, in hopes of entering one of the refugee camps in Turkey, Sept. 2, 2012. Image by Muhammed Muheisen/AP Photo.]

 

Since August, the northern Syrian border area has seen heavy fighting between the rebels and the Syrian government. On 3 October, a Syrian shell fell on the Turkish town of Akcakale, just inside the border, killing five. Turkey responded with mortars. The Turkish parliament then approved a provision that allows it, if necessary, to take military action outside of its borders for the period of one year.

Back and forth movement across some of the border areas has also been reported. This includes stories of those in need of medical care crossing into Turkey and then returning to their homes in Syria either by force or by choice, as well as fighters and others with family members on the other side of the border seeking temporary respite from the fighting.

[Syrians who fled their homes due to fighting between the Syrian army and the rebels line up to collect water from a tanker as they take refuge at the Bab Al-Salameh border crossing in hopes of entering one of the refugee camps in Turkey, near the Syrian town of Azaz, Friday, Sept. 7, 2012. (AP Photo/Muhammed Muheisen).]

Since September, the Turkish government has also been trying to relocate Syrian refugees living in Turkish towns into camps. A number of cases were reported in the Antakya area of officials showing up at apartments where Syrians were living and threatening them with deportation if they did not move to one of the camps.

[A Syrian boy, who fled his home with his family, draws a military tank with the Syrian flag at the UNHCR nursery, in Baalbek, eastern Lebanon, Sept. 18, 2012. Image by Bilal Hussein/AP Photo.]

According to UNHCR, Syrian refugees are concentrated in northern Lebanon (thirty-nine percent of the refugee population in Lebanon) and the Bekaa Valley (twenty-nine percent), with only two percent of those registered in Beirut. In northern Lebanon, refugees have been taken in by Lebanese host families thus straining local and community resources. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Lebanese border villages, such as Kfartoum and Akroum, also no longer have the capacity to host the growing refugee population and rent options are scarce.” The aid community has decided to relocate families that were living in schools. Pre-fabricated units are being installed in a number of towns in Lebanon, and unfinished houses are being completed to house refugees.

[A Kurdish flag waves as Syrian refugees arrive in the Domiz refugee camp in Dahuk, Iraq, Aug. 13, 2012. Image by Khalid Mohammed/AP Photo.]

 

Syrian refugees are entering Iraq mainly in two areas – the Kurdistan region (Dahuk) which hosts over 30,000 refugees and al-Qa’im border crossing. The Iraqi government has been intermittently opening and closing al-Qa’im crossing and restricting the entry of adult men (even with families).  The UNHCR and IOM in Domiz camp in Dahuk, with over 19,000 people, have shifted away from providing hot meals to distributing cooking equipment. In al-Qa’im, a new camp is being constructed that will host 25,000 people. Currently, child friendly spaces exist for one hundred children and health cases are referred outside the camp to Al-Qa'im Hospital.

The situation in Syria has also affected the Iraqi refugee community that sought shelter there following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. While estimates of the Iraqi population in Syria hover around one million, more than 35,000 have returned to Iraq in recent months, mostly to Baghdad, Anbar, or Diala provinces.

[Newly-arrived Syrian refugee children are helped by Jordanian soldiers after they crossed the border from Tal Shehab city in Syria, through the Al Yarmouk River valley, into Thnebeh town, in Ramtha , Jordan, Sept. 5, 2012.  Image by Mohammad Hannon/AP Photo.]

More than half of the refugees in Jordan are from the Deraa province in southern Syria. The Jordanian military continues to help refugees get from the border safely, including transporting them to Zaatari camp. This both protects the refugees from the weather and border dangers, and ensures monitoring of the refugees and their containment in the camp.

 
[Newly-arrived Syrian refugee families rest among olive trees in a  field  after they crossed the border from Syria, through the Al Yarmouk River valley , Jordan, Sept. 5, 2012.  Image by Mohammad Hannon/AP Photo.]

Host countries have been acutely aware of the plight of children and their disrupted lives. While it took years for those hosting Iraqi refugees to allow them into local schools, the governments of Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey with the assistance of UN, international, and local organizations, are all addressing the issues faced by school-aged children. This has been made easier by the concentrations of Syrian refugees in camps and specific areas. In Dohuk, Iraq, local Ministry of Education offices along with UNICEF and UNHCR set up a summer school as well as a child-friendly space. In Jordan’s Zaatari Camp, UNICEF set up “temporary learning spaces” that employ Jordanian teachers teaching the Jordanian curriculum in double shifts for over 2000 children. In addition, UNICEF has built two large playgrounds and a football pitch for older children and youth. The Jordanian Ministry of Education agreed in Ramtha to operate schools in double shifts for refugee children living in the host community.

Inside Syria, the beginning of the school year presents another challenge. According to UNOCHA, over 470 schools throughout the country were used in the summer to shelter internally displaced refugees; this included 34 schools in Damascus and another 137 schools in the surrounding areas, according to the Syrian Ministry of Local Administration. In some cases the refugees have been asked to leave, but it is not clear if alternative spaces are being provided for them. The Palestinian refugee camps in Syria have also been seen as safe spaces by those displaced, and UNRWA reported in August that its schools were hosting 11,000 refugees, with twice that number or more being absorbed into the Palestinian host communities in homes, mosques and other spaces.

[Syrians walk through the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, Aug. 13, 2012. Refugees in the desert camp have expressed dissatisfaction with its harsh conditions, including extreme heat and cold and constant dust-laden winds. Resource-poor Jordan is struggling to deal with the influx of refugees from the Syrian civil war. Jordanian officials estimate that 150,000 Syrians are seeking refuge in their country. Image by Clemens Bilan/AP Photo/dapd.]

Over 30,000 refugees are living in Zaatari camp. It has just opened 176 communal kitchens in order to transition families from the provision of hot meals to dry food rations that they prepare themselves. Water – amount, availability, and hygiene – remains an issue. While aid and governmental agencies provide temporary assistance and facilities for food and water in the camps, refugees are expressing how difficult it is to live in inadequate tent housing in harsh desert conditions. Thus, when they are able, refugees are leaving the camp. UNHCR noted that in October, the number of Syrians registering in the Amman, Mafraq, and Irbid offices has significantly increased. 

[Text by Rochelle Davis, photos from the Associated Press selected by Michelle Woodward.]

Power-sharing is always a messy affair. Under the best of circumstances striking a balance between competing forces is a perpetual work in progress, with political actors continually vying for control of the driver’s seat. In advanced democracies the structural checks and balances built into the system limit the powers of each branch and (largely) constrain the contest for control within predefined limits. In countries such as Kuwait, where democratization is an ongoing experiment, these limits themselves remain a subject of contestation that oppositional political forces exploit for often narrow, short-term interests. In fact, the escalating battle to reconstitute the country’s power structures has spilled out of the predefined limits for contestation and entered a new territory of uncertainty—street demonstrations have intensified, confrontations with authority are on the rise, and political groups from across the spectrum are boycotting the upcoming elections. In short, the legitimacy of the existing system has come under threat.

How did the situation reach this point? The heart of the issue revolves around the balance of power between an elected fifty-member assembly and an appointed sixteen-member cabinet, a hybrid political system that is neither fully democratic nor monarchical. Since the establishment of an elected parliament in 1962, Kuwait’s government has been experimenting with a power-sharing system that cedes considerable influence to the public but still maintains control over the executive branch, whose members are also granted automatic membership in the national assembly. The frictions between these two bodies have led to several political crises over the years, including two unconstitutional suspensions of parliament (1976 and 1986) and several constitutional dissolutions, five of which have occurred since 2006.

Ballets, Bribes, and Batons

The most recent direct confrontation occurred last Sunday and involved what some have declared to be the largest public protests in the country’s history. Tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in protest of an emergency emiri decree by the government to modify the electoral law and change the number of votes allowed per citizen from four to one. Riot police confronted the protesters, resulting in numerous injuries and arrests.

While the consequences of the modified voting law and its ultimate sustainability remain to be seen, its history is telling. In 1981, Kuwait was officially divided into twenty-five voting districts, which many saw as a gerrymandered system favoring pro-government forces. In 2006, a youth-led movement—largely aided by new media technologies—used popular pressure to force the government to change the law to five districts, with each person casting four votes. Since then, the country has witnessed unprecedented government opposition in the parliament and constant stalemates that have hampered the country’s ability to pass important legislation and reforms.

In an attempt to get the country back on track and partially appease the opposition, in November 2011 the government accepted the resignation of then Prime Minister and the Emir’s nephew, Shaykh Nasser al-Mohammed Al Sabah, largely as a response to a corruption scandal that involved bribes to several parliament members allegedly in return for supporting government policies. With the PM’s replacement by his deputy, Shaykh Jaber al-Mubarak Al Sabah, in December the cabinet and parliament were dissolved and new ones formed. An opposition of mostly tribal and Islamist candidates won thirty-four of the fifty seats and dominated the new parliament. Not surprisingly, the newly formed government did not function effectively and the parliament was annulled by the constitutional court after just four intense months, based on the claim that it was unconstitutionally elected in the absence of a sitting cabinet. The situation spiraled downward from there. The reinstated (previous) parliament failed to reach a quorum and thus it was again dissolved in mid-August and new elections called. The cabinet then sent a proposal to the constitutional court requesting it to review the legality of the five-district system in an attempt to find justification for redrawing them in the government’s favor. On 25 September, while surrounded by riot police and protestors, the court rejected the government’s efforts. Taking another tack, the cabinet used its emergency powers, granted under the absence of a standing parliament, and issued the emiri decree that reduced the number of votes to one per citizen. Demonstrations immediately followed, violence ensued, and many MPs and other political groups announced that they will boycott the upcoming 1 December elections in protest.

Looming Questions

No one really knows the consequences of these events until they are put into practice. The new system should eliminate the illegal (but common) exchange of loyalist voters between powerful candidates in each district, since voters are now restricted to but one precious vote. This may make it easier for new individual candidates with strong resources to dominate the polls in the absence of such powerful alliances by their opponents. Assuming the 1 December vote goes ahead as planned, will the new members of parliament have popular legitimacy? Will they be able to function effectively without political veterans in their midst since so many have chosen to boycott the elections? Will they actually work well enough with the executive branch to push through many of the stalled and badly needed reforms? And, as is their right, will they review the emergency emiri decree that allowed them to gain power but is widely rejected by the major opposition forces and significant populations in the country? How will the opposition members who intend to boycott the elections try to wield their political influence in the absence of formal parliamentary authority? These are just some of the questions that loom large.

Only two things are certain: (1) The battle to redefine the country’s power-sharing arrangements is getting hotter, making predefined limits through which power is tenuous at best; and (2) Tensions between the government and opposition will continue to escalate until something eventually gives. However, with both sides regularly engaging in practices that are questionably democratic, it is hard to envision an alternative arrangement in which power will be effectively redistributed to the ultimate benefit of the Kuwaiti people and not primarily for those who claim to represent their interests either by ballot or birthright.

And so the kettle continues to boil.

[This article originally appeared on the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore "Insight" series.]