Quantcast
Channel: Jadaliyya Ezine
Viewing all 6235 articles
Browse latest View live

Badr Shakir Essayyab: A Profile from the Archives

$
0
0

[”A Profile from the Archives“ is a new series published by Jadaliyya in both Arabic and English in cooperation with the Lebanese newspaper, Assafir. These profiles will feature iconic figures who left indelible marks in the politics and culture of the Middle East and North Africa.]

Name: Badr

Name of father: Shakir

Date of birth: 1925

Name of wife: Iqbal Taha Abduljalil

Children: Ghaida/Ghilan/Alaa

Major: Degree from the High School of Teachers

Profession: Poet 

 

Badr Shakir Essayyab

  • Iraqi.
  • One of the pioneers who renewed modern Arabic poetry. He is considered, along with Abdul Wahab Al-Bayati and Nazik Al-Malaeka, the first who attempted to write the new form of the Arabic poem, what is called "Al-Taf'aila poem."
  • Born in the town of Jaikour, south of Basra. He was the oldest of his brothers, Abdullah and Mustafa. His father was so happy of his birth that he wrote down his date of birth but forgot it later. The researcher, Mahmoud Al-'Aabta, checked the records of Al-Mahmudiya school, where the poet studied, and found out that his date of birth was in 1925.
  • His father, Shakir Abdul Jabbar bin Marzouk Assayab, used to work at the Bureau of Dates.
  • His mother, Kareema, was an illiterate woman and his father's cousin. She died in 1932. His father remarried, so he and his brothers moved to live with his paternal grandmother, Ameena.
  • He married Iqbal Taha Abdul Jaleel on 19 June 1955 and had three children: Ghaida, Ghailan and Aala.
  • He studied in Bab Suleiman School, and Al-Mahmoudiya School in Abi Al-Khaseeb, and then he joined Al-Basra high school.
  • He finished his high school studies in 1943. He suffered from anemia due to the extremely poor life he had, which caused malnutrition. He also suffered from tuberculosis in his youth, which made him thin.
  • He joined the High School of Teachers in Baghdad in 1943, where he received his academic degree and met with Baland Al-Haydari, Suleiman Al-Esa, Ebrahim Al-Samarae, and Nazik Al-Malaeka. At that time, he joined the Communis Party and was elected the President of the Student Union of the High School of Teachers.
  • Between 1944 and 1945, a group named "Abqar Brothers" was established in the High School of Teachers. This group addressed issues about poetry with unrestricted freedom relying on the support of the dean of the school, Matta Aqrawi. Essayyab was a member of this group.
  • He was fired from the High School on 1 August 1946 because of his political activism as a member of the Communist Party.
  • He moved later to work as a clerk in the Bureau of Imports.
  • He met with Lamea Abbas Amara in 1948 and fell in love with her but certain social circumstances ended the relationship. He graduated in the same year from the High School of Teachers and was appointed as English teacher in Ramadi High School.
  • He was fired on 25 January 1949, from the Ministry of Dducation and banned from teaching for ten years. He was arrested and sent to jail in the same year.
  • He travelled to Basra where he worked as a taster of dates in the Iraqi Dates Company.
  • He worked as a clerk in Basra Oil Company.
  • He returned to Baghdad and suffered from unemployment until he found a job as a warehouse manager for a roads paving company in Baghdad.
  • After the political turbulence In Baghdad in 1952, he feared arrest and fled to Iran and later to Kuwait using a forged Iranian passport with the name of "Ali Arting" on board a sailing ship from Abadan In 1953. He described this trip in his poem "Al-Firar" or "Fleeing."
  • In Kuwait, he found an office job in Kuwait's Electricity Company.
  • In 1954, "Adab" magazine hired him and published his work.
  • Few months later, he returned to Baghdad and cut his ties with the Communist Party. He was appointed in the General Bureau of Imports and Exports.
  • In the winter of 1957, he was introduced to the Lebanese newspaper, "Alshi'ar", published by Yousif Al-Khal, and Essayyab soon became one of its writers alongside Adonis and Unsi Al-Haj. At that time, he cut his relationship with "Adab" magazine which previously hired him.
  • On 7 April 1959, a ministerial order fired him from government service for three years.
  • He visited Beirut in 1960 to publish a collection of his poetry and met with Yousif Al-Khal, Unsi Al-Haj, Khaleel Hawi and others. A poetry competition for the best poetry collection organized by "Shi'ar" magazine coincided with his visit. He won the first prize (1000 Lebanese Lira then) for his collection "Unshudat Al-Matar" or "The Song of the Rain," that was published later by "Shi'ar" publishing company.
  • He returned to Baghdad after his dismissal was overturned and he was appointed in the Iraqi Ports Bureau, which drove him to move to Basra.
  • He was arrested on 4 February 1961, and released on 20 February of the same year. He then returned to his work in the bureau.
  • His financial situation forced him to translate two American books for The Franklin Institution in 1961.
  • He received an invitation in 1961, to join "The Contemporary Literature" Convention in Rome under the patronage of the International Organization for the Freedom of Culture.
  • His health started to detoriorate in 1961 and he was unable to walk.
  • He returned to Beirut in April 1962.
  • On 18 April 1962 he was admitted to the hospital of the American University of Beirut. Some of his friends, including the poet, Yousif Al-Khal, helped him pay the costs of the hospital.
  • His health deteriorated badly, so he went back to Basra in September 1962. The International Organization for the Freedom of Culture paid his expenses for a whole year after arranging for a scholarship for him.
  • He travelled to London to seek treatment. He could not join the PhD program in Oxford University, but Mr. Albert Hurani succeeded in securing a place for him in Durham University in Northern England.
  • After a short stay in Durham, he left to Paris on 15 March 1963.
  • He feft Paris on 23 March 1963 on a wheelchair on his way to his homeland.
  • Two weeks after his arrival to Basra he was fired from government service for three years starting 4 April 1963.
  • He worked as literature correspondent in Iraq for "Hiwar" magazine. He used to send reports about the literary movement in Iraq to the editor of the magazine in Beirut, Tawfik Zayegh, for forty dollars a piece.
  • He agreed to be treated by a Bedouin from Zubair who cauterized Essayyab's legs and back but this treatment did not improve his condition.
  • He returned to his government work in the Bureau of Ports on 11 July 1963.
  • His health deteriorated suddenly on 9 February 1964, which required his immediate transfer to the port's hospital in Basra after his temperature reached forty degrees celsius. Medical checkup showed that he had double pneumonia and the beginning of heart failure, along with severe diarrhea and vomiting. He also suffered from a twenty-five centimeter septic ulcer in the iliac area, in addition to the spread of  the hardening of his spinal code, which caused him paralysis in his limbs.
  • On 1 April 1964, his sick leave reached its maximum limit and the Society of Iraqi Writers and Authors, in which he was a member, asked the ministry of health to treat him.
  • Kuwaiti poet, Ali Al-Sabti, published an appeal to the Kuwaiti minister of health, Abdul Latif Muhammad Al-Thanyan, asking him to treat Badr in Kuwait on the expense of the Kuwaiti government. The minister agreed and Essayyab was transferred to Al- Amiri hospital in Kuwait on 6 July 1964.
  • Essayyab published some poems while in Al-Amiri hospital in Kuwait in "Al-Raed Al-Arabi" magazine for a good compensation.
  • He died on 12 December 1964 in Al-Amiri hospital in Kuwait after a long battle with a disease that he tried, uselessly, to treat in Beirut and London.

Some of his work:

  • “Azhar Thaabila” or “Wilting Flowers” was his first collection of poems published in 1947 by Al-Karnak publishing company in Cairo.
  • “Asatir” or “Legends” published in 1950.
  • “Fajr Assalam” or “The Dawn of Peace” published in 1950.
  • ” Haffar Al-Qubur” or ” The Grave digger” published in 1950.
  • “Al-Asliha Walatfal” or “Weapons and Children” published in 1953.
  • “Al-Mumis Al-‘Aamyaa” or “The Blind Prostitute” published in 1953.
  • “Unshudat Al-Matar” or “The Song of the Rain” published in 1960.
  • “Al-Ma’abad Al-Ghariq” or “The Drowned Temple” published in 1962.
  • “Manzil Al-Aqnan” or “The House of Slaves” published in 1963.
  • “Shanasheel of  Bint Al-Chalabi” published in 1964.
  • “Iqbal” was published in 1965.
  • “Al-Hadaya” or “The Gifts” was published in 1971 after his death.
  • ”Qitharat Arrih” or “The Violin of Wind” was published in 1973 after his death.
  • “A’aasir” or “Hurricanes” was published in 1973 after his death.
  • “Al-Bawakir” or “The Beginnings” was published in 1974 after his death.

Prose Translations:

  • Three Centuries of Literature, multiple authors - The Library of Al-Hayat, Beirut. Two volumes, the first volume has no date and the second was done in 1966.
  • The Poet, The Inventor and the Colonel, Peter Ustinuv - One chapter play in Al-Usbu’a newspaper, Baghdad. Volume 23 in 1953.

Poetry translations:

  • "The Eyes of Elsa" or "Love and War."
  • "Poems about the Atomic Age."
  • Selected poems from the "International Modern Poetry."
  • Poems by Nadhim Hikmat in Al-‘Aalam Al-‘Aarabi magazine, Baghdad in 1951.

[This article was translated from the Arabic by Ali Adeeb AlnaemiClick here for the Arabic text.]

 


Maghreb Media Roundup (October 11)

$
0
0

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Wednesday night of every week.]

Algeria

Thinking About Algeria and “Analytic Overshooting” Steven Cook dissects historically misdirected optimism concerning Algeria's democratization.

A Way of Thinking About Algeria and Mali Kal assesses the Algeria's role in the Mali crises resolution. 

L’arrestation de Yacine Zaïd est un "coup bien calculé" Kader Affak explains the peculiar political motivations behind Yacine Zaid's arrest. Zaid was recently sentenced to six months in jail.

Algeria: Former Algerian President Bendjedid Dies

Libya

Hashtag #GaddafiVsAmazigh evince the oppression of Amazigh under Gaddafi's regime.

Libya’s current political crisis could lead to disaster Adrian Hong discusses the opposition to Abushagur's proposed cabinet and implications of postponing a new government.

Abushagur’s dismissal not such a disaster Hanan Al-Mansouri counters Adrian Hong's op-ed, arguing that Abushagur's leadership deficiencies were the primary cause of his termination.

Political Islam and the Fate of Two Libyan Brothers David Kirkpatrick profiles the divergent paths of "Abu Yayya al-Libi" and his brother Adebl Wahab Mohamed Qaid, now a member of the GNC.

Sacked Libya PM pays price of Liberal-Islamist thaw Imed Lamloum examines reconciliation between the National Forces Alliances and the Justice and Construction party, which preceded the rejection of Abushagur''s cabinets and his subsequent dismissal.

Opinion: The Future of Libya Yousef Hamed calls for an end to the political fighting that has fractured the GNC.

'No Food, No Drugs': Libyan Troops Siege ex-Gaddafi Stronghold Allegations of attacks against civilians arise following clashes in Bani Walid.

New Details From Libya Consulate Attack: State Department Abandons Claim Of Protest Outside Gates

Mauritania

#Mauritania's MCM: Digging for Minerals, Burying the Truth Anita Hunt discusses the silencing of protests against Mauritania Copper Mines (MCM)'s exploitative practices.

Morocco

Le bateau de l’avortement au Maroc : Un militantisme adolescent Karim El Hajjaji discusses the "abortion boat's" problematic mission.

Reporters Sans Frontières tire le signal d’alarme : « Dangers sur la liberté de l’information au Maroc » Reporters without Borders detail several recent intrusions against journalists (English version here).

Transparency alerte le Maroc sur la nécessité de lutter contre la corruption Transparency International urges Morocco to confront extensive corruption.

Sit-in calls for re-opening Morocco-Algeria border Siham Ali reports on a sit-in conducted by Moroccan and Algerian activists, a component of the Maghreb Social Forum aimed at opening of Moroccan-Algerian borders.

Morocco: Skirmishes Flare in Tangier Authorities kill one protestor following demonstrations against an eviction ruling.

Morocco magistrates stage sit-in against corruption Over 800 magistrates gathered in Rabat to protest corruption in the judicial system.

L'audace d'un groupe de jeunes d'Errachidia : Rebranding Morocco Two Moroccan youth articulate Morocco through visual media.

Une syndicaliste proteste dans un domaine agricole royal, elle est kidnappée A member of the Moroccan Labor Union was kidnapped by authorities after protesting against lay offs in an agricultural sector operated by the monarchy.

Morocco: Divine Right Won't Save the Arab Kings Jane Kinninmont argues against the "monarchial exceptionalism" theory.

Tunisia

Ministère de l’éducation , ou antre de la corruption? Fairouz Boudali reports on educational strikes following petitions against corruption in the Ministry of Education.

Tunisia: 'Ghannouchi for president'? Larbi Sadiki posits Ghannouchi's role in articulating a moderated, shared "Islamo-political" space.

Tunisia’s unemployed revolutionaries head to Europe Louisie Sherwood profiles the diverse experiences of recent Tunisian migrants escaping Tunisia's deteriorating economy.

Leftist Parties Ally To Oppose Tunisia's Two Dominant Parties Othman Lehlani describes Tunisia's new "Popular Front" coalition, which includes the Workers' Party, the People's Party, and the Vanguard Party.

Arabic

عمر بروكسي يرد على أسئلة مامفاكينش، و هاتف الخلفي يرن دون رد
Mamfakinch interview with former AFP journalist Omar Brousky, who was de-credited following his reports on the monarchy's conflicting role in elections.

مجموعة ال25 ستُقدّم مقترحا عمليّا للجوء إلى المحكمة الجنائية الدولية
Group of 25 lawyers attempt to take the case of martyrs and those wounded in the revolution to the ICC following Tunisian's courts superficial indemnity.

07/10/2012
LibyaTV segment on the censorship of Libyan history during the Gaddafi regime (video).

MCM والموت القادم من كندا
"Ould Euler" provides another installment in a series on the exploitative practices of mining companies in Mauritania.

مصطفى أبوشاقور
Former Prime Minister Mustafa Absushagur's interview with Al-Arabiya, following his dismissal.

ملخص الخبر | #موريتانيا أخبار#ضد_نهب_معادننا
Curation of recent blog posts exposing MNC exploitation in Mauritania.


Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb

Maghreb Monthly Edition on Jadaliyya (September 2012)
Dissipating Dissent: Morocco's Stabilizing Spatial Tactics
Tunisia: Long Live The Defender of 'National Morality'
Nasser Weddady on Youth Protests in Mauritania and Social Media
“Rescue Benghazi Friday”: Peaceful Crowds Fill the Streets of Benghazi (Part 2 of 2)
Libyan Eastern Tribal Chiefs, Population, and Government (Part 1 of 2)

غازي الغبلاوي عن مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي والثورة الليبية

$
0
0

جدلية: ما هي أكثر الخواص إمتاعاً في خدمة تويتر وإرسال التغريدات؟

غازي غبلاوي: إنها حرية كتابة أفكارك دونما محددات كثيرة، نحوية كانت أو لغوية، إضافة إلى الطبيعة المختصرة لتويتر والتي تجعل من المهم للشخص أن يصوغ أفكاره بأسلوب غاية في الاختصار، والتركيز، والتثقيف. الخاصية الأخرى هي أن أغلب الحواجز الاجتماعية، والثقافية، والاجتماعية-الاقتصادية تختفي نسبيا على صفحات التويتر، حيث يمكن للناس من مختلف الخلفيات والثقافات أن يتواصلوا مع بعضهم بغض النظر عن المركز أو المكانة الاجتماعية.

جدلية: ما هي بعض المحددات السياسية، والثقافية، والاجتماعية التي واجهتها خلال استعمالك لوسيلة التواصل هذه؟

غازي: لقد وفر تويتر الامكانية للناس من مختلف الخلفيات ليتواصلوا مع بعضهم، وهو وسيلة أكثر انفتاحاً من شبكات التواصل الاجتماعي الأخرى. من خلال خبرتي، فإن المحدد الوحيد هو عدد المتابعين الذين يستطيع الشخص أن يتفاعل معهم في كل مرة. بخلاف ذلك، فإن شخصاً من بلد متقدم لديه الفرصة للتفاعل بحرية مع شخص في بلد نامٍ بدون مشاكل تذكر طالما أنهما يستعملان نفس اللغة في التواصل.

جدلية: من خلال خبريتك واستعمالك لتويتر، هل تشعر أن تويتر يساعد في التعبئة أم أنه يفسد التنظيم؟ وهل يساعد في التركيز أم أنه يخلق زحاماً؟ وهل هو سهل الادارة أم يعلو فيه الضجيج؟ وهل يساعد في الاقناع بالتعبئة أم أنه يحول الجميع إلى متصفحين ومشاهدين؟

غازي: يعتمد تويتر، وكأي وسيلة تواصل أخرى، على كيفية استغلال خواصه المتعددة من قبل المستخدمين. من خلال خبرتي أرى أن تويتر يمكنه أن يصبح أي شيء تريده أن يكون، ولكن في البداية يجب أن يسأل المستخدم نفسه: "ما هو هدفي من استخدام هذه الوسيلة؟".

على سبيل المثال، تويتر سهل التحكم أكثر بكثير من الوسائل الأخرى، ويمكن لك أن تخفض الضوضاء فيه إلى حد كبير متى ما تحكمت بعدد محدود من الخيارات. ولكن هناك جانب آخر من تويتر يمكن أن يكون مخادعاً، حيث يمكن له أن يمنحك شعوراً زائفاً بالثقة والأهمية. يمكنه أيضاً أن يحدد مدى المعلومات والآراء التي تتعرض لها، وفي بعض الحالات يمكنه أن يحرف الصورة التي تبحث عنها لتشكل رأيك الخاص.

جدلية: هل كان تويتر عاملاً مساعداً أو معوقاً لقضيتك؟ وهل يحول التويتر الناشطين إلى ناشطين على كراسي (ناشطين كسالى)؟

غازي: أثبت التويتر أهميته خلال الثورة الليبية، فقد كان منبراً مهماً للكثير من الناشطين لترويج ونشر الأخبار الهامة، خصوصا إذا أخذنا بنظر الاعتبار أن عدد الناشطين الليبيين الذين استعملوا التويتر في عام 2011 لم يزد على ألفي ناشط ممن كانوا مشتركين في العديد من الفعاليات. وقد قاموا بعملية منظمة لكسر حواجز الصمت التي استعملها القذافي ليزود الاعلام العالمي بمعلومات خاطئة.

صحيح أن العديد من مستعملي التويتر قد يتحولون إلى ناشطين كسالى، الأمر الذي لا أجده نافعاً، ولكن كلما ازداد عدد الأشخاص الذين نتمكن من تزويدهم بالمعلومات، كلما حصلنا على نتائج أفضل مع أغلبية المستعملين الذين يستعملون هذه الوسيلة بين حين وآخر ولا يدافعون عن قضية معينة.

جدلية: كيف ساعدك تويتر كمصدر للمعلومات؟ كيف تمر على كل هذا الكم من المعلومات وتقرر الموثوق منه؟

غازي: كان تويتر وسبيقى مصدراً موثوقاً جداً للمعلومات في ما يخص عملي، ولكن من المهم أن نطور آلية للاستعمال الكفء. من خلال التجربة، وحين نتعامل مع مصادر معينة للمعلومات، فإنه من المهم أن نطور وسائل اتصال مادية مع مصادرنا، وألا نعتمد بالكامل على التواصل عبر المحيط الافتراضي فقط حيث الأسماء المستعارة والصور الرمزية.

جدلية: ما هي التغريدات التي وجدت أنها تجتذب أكبر عدد من الردود وإعادة النشر؟

غازي: يعتمد هذا على نوعية الأشخاص الذين تتبعهم، أو الذين يتبعوك. من المثير للاهتمام أنني أرسل تغريدات باللغتبن العربية والانجليزية فيما يخص الشؤون الليبية. وفي أغلب الأحيان تجتذب التغريدات الانجليزية استجابات أوسع بكثير من تلك العربية ولنفس المعلومة. كذلك، فإن التغريدات التي تعبر عن رأي في موضوع معين (اجتماعي، ديني،سياسي) وجدالات حول الشؤون الحالية تولد الكثير من الاستجابات والتفاعلات. ولكن كل هذا يعتمد على مدى انخراطك مع من يتبعوك وعلى ديناميكية المجتمع الصغير الذي تنشئه على التويتر.

[نشرت هذه المقابلة للمرة الأولى على "جدلية" باللغة الإنجليزية وترجمها إلى العربية علي اديب]

Turkish Fragments

$
0
0

Orhan Pamuk, The Museum of Innocence. Translated by Maureen Freely. New York: Knopf, 2009.

Nurdan Gürbilek, The New Cultural Climate in Turkey: Living in a Shop Window. Translated by Victoria Holbrook. London: Zed Books, 2011.

The year 2009 brought us an English translation of the Turkish Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk’s The Museum of Innocence; the year 2011, a translation of Nurdan Gürbilek’s The New Cultural Climate in Turkey: Living in a Shop Window. Gürbilek is an equally prominent figure in Turkey, the recipient of awards including the 2010 Erdal Öz and 2011 Cevdet Kudret Literature Awards in literary and cultural criticism and a former editor of the journal Defter (Notebook), published quarterly from 1987 to 2002 and widely acclaimed for its intellectual vanguardism during a period of systematically brutal suppression of all modes of critical thought in Turkey. The New Cultural Climate in Turkey: Living in a Shop Window collects revised versions of ten essays selected from Vitrinde Yaşamak: 1980'lerin Kültürel İklimi (Living in a Shop Window: The Cultural Climate of the 1980s, published in 1992) and Kötü Çocuk Türk (Bad Boy Turk, published in 2001). (Composed between the 1980s and the early 2000s, early versions of these essays first appeared in Defter.) The coincidence in translational history is a fortunate one, as read alongside one another, these two works have something important to tell us about the cultural history of Turkey during the last quarter of the twentieth century.

The military coup of 1960 produced a constitution ensuring the reorganized armed forces an active role in political governance while providing for new civil liberties, including the right to strike and to form political parties on a broader range of the ideological spectrum. With successive coalition and Adalet Partisi (Justice Party) governments both accelerating and protecting industrialization, the 1960s was a vibrant decade of mass politicization, with left movements expanding rapidly among a growing Turkish and Kurdish urban proletariat, students, and intellectuals. Violent conflict between militant left and right groups led to “anarchy” and another coup in 1971, which saw harsh repression of the left and new restrictions placed on organized labor. The world economic crisis of the 1970s, economic and political problems produced by the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, and enduring political violence set the stage for a third coup in 1980, far more brutal than its predecessors, which saw 650,000 people detained, more than a million and a half placed under surveillance, and fifty executed by 1988. 

With the left in disarray, many government posts would come to be occupied by neo-conservative Turkist-Islamist cadres, while the coup subdued workers’ opposition to an economic reform package approved seven months previously, courting support from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. More so than those preceding it, the 1980 coup radically transformed the social, political, and cultural fabric of Turkey, opening the door to IMF-directed economic plunder through privatization, wage cuts, and the imposition of free trade, while the constitution ratified in 1982 extended the powers of the executive and further curbed civil liberties, especially with respect to expressions of Kurdish identity.[1]

Unlike Pamuk's 1983 novel Sessiz Ev (Silent House, 1983), set on the eve of the 1980 coup and populated by figures of the youth movements of both left and right, The Museum of Innocence avoids any direct engagement with recent Turkish political history. Set in Istanbul between 1975 and 2007, the bulk of its six hundred pages follows Kemal, the thirty-year-old US-educated manager of a prosperous family-owned distribution and export firm. Kemal makes repeated visits to a distant cousin twelve years his junior, with whom he is in love and who lives in the lower middle-class Çukurcuma district of Istanbul with her mother, a seamstress, her father, a retired schoolteacher, and her husband, an aspiring film scenarist. Unable to “obtain” Füsun (“elde edemedeğim”),[2] Kemal obsessively collects objects during these visits: matchboxes, Füsun's cigarette stubs, salt shakers, coffee cups, pins, hair pins, ashtrays, china dogs, slippers (MM, 418). The 1980 coup serves merely as a comic backdrop to one such “pilgrimage” and collecting expedition when, stopped and searched while returning from Çukurcuma, Kemal is temporarily detained on account of a quince grater he has “stolen” from Füsun's house.

But there is no reason to rebuke Pamuk for not writing a more “political” novel in The Museum of Innocence. True, in meticulously reconstructing this historical period, Pamuk actually de-realizes it, transmuting the signs of politics into abstract registers of elite alienation. As the fictional counterpart of Pamuk's 2003 memoir Istanbul: Memories and the City (work on which temporarily interrupted the writing of The Museum of Innocence), the novel completes the memoir’s hüzünlü street setting by bringing it into a lower middle-class home, imagined as a more authentic match than the Pamuk family apartment houses in the Nişantaşı and Cihangir districts described in Istanbul. Purchasing the Çukurcuma house after Füsun's death in 1984, Kemal plans in the novel’s final segment to convert it into a museum, placing the interior on display along with his collection of transitional objects. Kemal is a mouthpiece for the argument that it is impossible to overcome the distance separating the alienated Westernized Turkish elite from the lower classes embodied in Füsun, a distance the museum is to exhibit. In many ways, it is this theatricalization of the discontent of an alienated elite, fetishizing a Turkish “interior,” that shows us Pamuk at his best. Indeed, Pamuk is heir to a tradition of such reflection running from Ahmed Midhat to Recaizade Ekrem, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (a tradition on which Gürbilek has memorably commented).

That project has its limits, marked by the concurrent idealization of otherness (as something transcendent) and refusal to permit it any escape: thus the only option it leaves to Füsun, by the novel's end, is an implied (if also unexplained) suicide. When distance itself, the space of relation to alterity, becomes a fixation, it serves to foreclose on any real possibility of such relation. To the extent that it is nourished exclusively by the consumption of others, the melancholy of the alienated elite lacks any outside.[3] The Museum of Innocence has been compared with Lolita, though a more ethically daring comparison might juxtapose Pamuk’s novel with Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) or Disgrace (1999). Coetzee, too, is a master constructor of figures of imperious or pathetic masculine narcissism, but one who always finds a way to place that narcissism under erasure. The playful postmodernist irony that the narrator, “Orhan,” deploys against Kemal, in the final chapter of The Museum of Innocence, is just that and little more, no real obstacle to Kemal’s redemption and rehabilitation. “With my museum,” Kemal tells us, “I want to teach not only the Turkish nation but also all nations in the world to be proud of [gururlanmayı] the lives we live. While Westerners live in pride, a majority of the world lives in shame [utanç]. When things that shame us are exhibited in a museum, they become things of pride” (MM, 571-572). It is hardly so easy, of course. Abruptly distancing the “West” that to that moment was the very bulwark of elite self-understanding, the museum is now to show us the unified interior of a nation. Exit one of the most divisive and traumatic periods of modern Turkish history with peace of mind.[4]

Gürbilek's Living in a Shop Window, too, offers a catalog of the symbolic settings, artifacts, and imaginaries of a recent cultural past: the “cold, functionless guestrooms” or salons of middle-class homes reserved for guests, on the one hand, and Turkey’s first shopping mall, The Galleria in Istanbul, on the other;[5] a newspaper photograph of the body of the 1970s porn star Feri Cansel “stuffed in a morgue drawer” (LISW, 119); the 1980s political metaphor of the “squeezed lemon,” used to describe the poor; a poster depicting a weeping child on the rear windows of intercity buses. Where such cultural fragments are locked as fetishes in the alienated melancholy of Pamuk’s museum, Living in a Shop Window archives them as “social hieroglyphs” and subjects them to demystification. Near the conclusion of “Living in a Shop Window,” the first essay here, Gürbilek makes reference to Marx’s characterization of the commodity as a “social hieroglyph,” marking the extension of the critique of the fetishism of commodities, in the Lukácsian tradition, into the cultural domain. It is a project that has produced some of the most sophisticated and insightful readings to date of the “great transformation” in Turkey after 1980.

These are “works of mourning,” as Gürbilek admits in her introduction, composed in the effort to comprehend the submergence of the oppositional left of the 1970s “and to digest that reality” (LISW, 16). Taken as a whole, the essays engage the 1980s as a “fracturing point” in modern Turkish history, productive of the socio-political assemblages of religion and capital, conservatism and liberalism that puzzle and fascinate outsiders to this day. For Gürbilek, what distinguishes the repression of the 1980s from those of the decades preceding it is not its intensity, not even the intensity of state violence marked by arrests, detentions, and deaths under torture, but the interlacing of state repression with economic liberalization and a permissive consumerism. Shopping malls offering new foreign and luxury goods and expanding media conglomerates deploying consumer advertising were, Gürbilek argues, integral to a “more liberal, more comprehensive, more inclusive strategy of power, aiming to encircle by speech rather than silence, to transform rather than prohibit, internalize rather than destroy, tame rather than suppress” (LISW, 6). One consequence was a return of the repressed in an “explosion of speech” on previously submerged topics such as sexuality, “private life,” and rural identity, as women, gay people, Islamists, and Kurds found means of expression outside the domain of the state.

“Living in a Shop Window,” then, describes the transformation of Istanbul into what Gürbilek calls a “society of spectacle.” In the three essays that follow, Gürbilek turns her attention to the limits of this explosion of speech mediated by a culture industry. In “To Be Named,” she follows the emergence of a new discourse focused on sex as the body’s secret, reminding us of the weekly popular magazines featuring questionnaires focused on sexual fantasies and the Turkish state channel TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation) program Kronik Bunalım (Chronic Depression), which hosted confessions by eşcinseller (rendered here as “homosexuals”). But sexuality was not the only locus of the new incitement to speak, at a time marked by the appearance of the phrase “private life” (özel hayat), which came to displace the Arabic loanword mahrem (LISW, 58). And unlike its Western counterpart, the new discourse on “private life,” including sexuality, did not become an object of medical and psychiatric study in Turkey. “What put its stamp on the process,” Gürbilek observes, “was less an institutional authority which insisted upon knowing than the readiness of voluntary narrators to describe frankly their sexual fantasies, seeing in their confessions a potential for liberation, and respond hungrily to the questionnaires of a press culture seeking to create new arenas for journalism” (LISW, 42). The grammar of the sayable, here, was determined in advance by a media industry that named and formed “public opinion” as a condition of the publicity of confession itself.

In “Privation,” the essay that follows, Gürbilek emphasizes the ironies of a “private life” constituted by “the most public of discourses—the language of newspapers and news magazines, television and advertising” (LISW, 69), in a process accompanied by the privatization of the public language of media and politics, as a chatty new public idiom displaced the idea of public space as a space of encounter with anonymous strangers. In turn, “The Return of the Repressed” reminds us that it was the Turkey of the 1980s that first offered wealth and distinction to those whom a nationalist-secularist Kemalist elite had marginalized as “backward” and “non-modern,” a development that enticed members of that elite to rediscover and affirm their own roots in a “rural” periphery. The possibility inherent in this cultural opening would be quickly absorbed, and to some extent destroyed, by the market and the new culture industry. In this context Gürbilek views the recent return of religion, “locked into its target with the energy of victimhood, empowered to the extent it is able to set in motion the energy of resentment, and joined to capitalism thanks to that,” as a mark of closure (LISW, 87).

All in all, readers will find in these first four early essays an indispensably rigorous and suggestive critical account of the Turkish 1980s. Tapping areas of material that still await further exploration in sociological and anthropological research on contemporary Turkey, Gürbilek's essays point to the need for a more comprehensive genealogy of sexuality and privacy in Turkey from the nineteenth century onward. Gürbilek's mode of cultural criticism presents us with an ethical antidote to the presentist forms of media studies that have temporarily recovered their appeal to a cowed and opportunistic US academic intellectual culture. The somber, sometimes defeated mood here notwithstanding (it is strongest in “The Return of the Repressed”), Gürbilek makes it clear that the new regime of signs under analysis is and can never be complete. We are reminded, by what we might call the specters of externality that haunt these essays, of the subaltern struggle ongoing in “the other Turkey [which] begins where the images end” (LISW, 52): of Hanım Sönmez, who, in protest of the repression that led her imprisoned son to a hunger strike, attempted to set herself on fire in Istanbul in November 1988 (LISW, 29); of the million and half public and private sector workers who shaved their heads and worked barefoot through 1989, demanding fair wages and other rights (LISW, 32); of all those many silenced by being locked away in prisons (LISW, 52).

The essays that follow were composed during the 1990s and early 2000s and collected in Turkish in Kötü Çocuk Türk (Bad Boy Turk) in 2001. In some ways they take a wider stance, looking back at the “great transformation” of the 1980s from within what Gürbilek, drawing on the work of Martin Jay, calls “the uncanny 1990s.” It was an era in which, as she puts it, “unfulfilled promises aroused rancour, not desire, and once again, the city street was etched into consciousness as a site of crime while the struggle over the city's resources was carried out in a much more tense environment, under much harsher conditions” (LISW, 13-14). The 1990s was marked by the European Union accession negotiations, an intensification of the war in the southeast, the rise of political Islam, and serial economic crises, including the currency crisis of 1994 and the crash of 2001. Here Gürbilek suggests that we imagine kötülük or “evil” (to which one is tempted to add shamelessness) as a dominant new social structure of feeling. Where for Pamuk, Turkey’s fallen condition is a temporal condition, a belated modernity marking an innate Turkish innocence, Gürbilek subjects such “urban legends” to critical scrutiny as products of the myth of neoliberal globalization promising justice, equality, and an end of history.

“Me Too,” the volume’s fifth essay, offers a comparative analysis of the trade in desire in popular arabesk hits by the “Arabesk King” of the 1970s, Orhan Gencebay, and “The Emperor” of the 1980s, the Kurdish construction worker İbrahim Tatlıses.[6] Rooted in the pain of betrayed love and wallowing in its wretched dignity, Gencebay's proudly melancholic, renunciatory songs would go out of fashion in a mass culture becoming accustomed to instant gratification. For Gürbilek, Tatlıses’s song “Ben de İsterem” (“Me Too”), describing the open pursuit of the “cherry lips” and “rose-like breasts” of female bounty, is an emblem of the shift. In “Death of the Stranger,” drawing on Phillippe Ariès's Essais sur l’histoire de la mort en Occident du Moyen à nos jours (Western Attitudes towards Death, 1975), Gürbilek notes a changing relation to death in Turkey that mirrored that change in the world at large, as graphic images of the victims of domestic violence, road accidents, terrorist bombings, and the civil war were disseminated in the mass media. Gürbilek suggests that this new “pornography” of what she calls “unnatural death” (LISW, 114) represents death as monstrous, effectively effacing its social and political determination and banishing it to the shanty town or the province outside the middle-class home (or further abroad: Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan), “transform[in]g the social violence we can escape into an event so routine we can afford to be indifferent to it” (LISW, 115).

Another exemplary essay in Turkish cultural studies, the volume's sixth essay, entitled “Child of Agony,” is focused on the image of the innocent child popularized by the Yeşilçam film industry during the late 1960s and 1970s. Named for their child hero and heroine, the “Ömercik” and “Ayşecik” films featured victimized children who fought back without comprising their innocence, promising their adult audiences, locked in struggle with an uneven modernity, what Gürbilek calls “a national, local, Eastern pride” (LISW, 125). Gürbilek reminds us that this “urban legend” of the righteous child effectively disappeared as an element of the Turkish social imaginary during the 1990s, as real disenfranchised and displaced orphan children, mostly of Kurdish origin, appeared in large numbers in Turkey’s big cities, becoming emblems of poverty and criminality. The cultural hero that would take its place was the “new young man type who has no need to see himself as innocent, the strong Turk full of rage, ready to commit crimes in order to rid society of its new objects of fear, ready to do anything to protect the city from filth and anarchy” (LISW, 136). In time, this transformation would give us Ogün Samast, the seventeen-year-old from Trabzon who on 19 January 2007 assassinated the prominent Turkish Armenian journalist Hrant Dink outside the Istanbul office of his newspaper Agos.

The volume's final three essays are focused on the Turkish novel, offering a literary genealogy of the concept of evil (kötülük) and seeking new ways of thinking through the questions of authenticity and belatedness that have absorbed modern Turkish literature and its criticism since the nineteenth century. “Bad Boy Turk (1),” on Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's 1949 novel Huzur (translated into English as A Mind at Peace) and the character of the nihilist Suad whom critics have long deemed the novel's least successful artifice, suggests that in the early postwar period evil, in stark contrast with the generalized institutional evil of today, stood for a revolutionary critical desire to destroy the very foundations of normative morality. Where the construction of Suad as “bad boy” is weak to the extent that it represents a weak translation of elements from Dostoevsky, that, Gürbilek argues, marks Tanpınar as a believer in civilizational synthesis, refusing to “face up to his inevitable derivativeness” (LISW, 156). (A companion essay, “Bad Boy Turk (2),” extends the analysis of literary evil into the uncanny 1990s.)

In the final essay, “The Original Turkish Spirit,” Gürbilek deconstructs the antipodes of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, cultural originality and derivation, and nativity and dandyism (the latter of which Holbrook represents with the Turkish-English portmanteau “züppery”) that ground and organize rival formations of Turkish literary criticism. Reminding us that belatedness is a constitutive feature of the western European novel itself, born of a modernity that is fundamentally mediated and inauthentic, Gürbilek suggests that redress for the “problem” of Turkish belatedness lies not in some impossible Turkish authenticity but in the acceptance of züppery as “a foundational element of 'the orijinal Turkish spirit’” (LISW, 194).

Gürbilek’s is a criticism spanning the divide between the academy and a larger educated and curious reading public, and Living in a Shop Window will be read with profit not only by those interested in Turkish society, media culture, and literature, but by anyone with an interest in the contemporary history of neoliberal globalization and world media. The Turkey one encounters here is neither the Turkey of exotic negation, nor the Turkey of auratic redemption of the West, but a real locale that reflects the real, ongoing violence of that history.

Let me conclude with a word on Gürbilek's prose, which locates these essays in a cultural essayistic tradition marked by the signature of Tanpınar but also of thinkers like Georg Simmel, Walter Benjamin, and Siegfried Kracauer. The voice of the essayist, which Victoria Holbrook's translation skillfully reproduces in English, is at once intimate and remote, fluid in its affective engagement with a “glocal” world held in common while revealing little of the critical self or persona as such. It is a potent combination, in so far as, more than merely “describing” critically the privatized public life of the 1980s, these essays actively imagine, even come to create, something like a new common of strangers to take its place. As Gürbilek notes, in her introduction:

In “On the Nature and Form of the Essay,” the introductory piece [of Soul and Form], [Lukács] likened the essayist to a precursor awaiting the coming of someone else….That other. For a generation that discovered intellectuality not on its own but through others, and believed it could be sustained only through others, this was important, I think. And for that reason I too wish these essays to be read as writings biding their time while waiting for an other. (LISW, 17)

It is as custodians of such an other, and of its promise, that Gürbilek's essays may now come to be read in the English language.

NOTES

[1] On the history of the postwar period, see Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1993), and Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, third edition (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005). 

[2] Orhan Pamuk, Masumiyet Müzesi (Istanbul: İletişim), 416; hereafter cited parenthetically as MM. All translations from Turkish into English are my own.

[3] A more detailed analysis would, of course, have to account for the rituals of Kemal's “visitations” during dinner time.

[4] On the final pages of The Museum of Innocence, “Pamuk” (via Kemal) actively distances himself from Orhan Pamuk’s 2002 novel Kar (Snow). But as I have argued elsewhere, the approach Pamuk has taken to questions of shame and innocence in that novel is a highly nuanced and deeply valuable one. See my “Those Outside the Scene: Snow in the World Republic of Letters,” New Literary History 41.3 (Summer 2010): 633-651.

[5] Nurdan Gürbilek, The New Cultural Climate in Turkey: Living in a Shop Window, trans. Victoria Holbrook (London: Zed Books, 2011), 32; hereafter cited parenthetically as LISW.

[6] Popular from the late 1960s through the late 1990s in Turkey, arabesk combined elements of Turkish classical and folk music and Egyptian and Lebanese popular music, its songwriting articulating the urban griefs and grievances of migrants from the Turkish provinces. See Martin Stokes, The Arabesk Debate: Music and Musicians in Modern Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

Nora Abdulkarim on Twitter and Political Dissent in Saudi Arabia

$
0
0

[This post is part of an ongoing Profile of a Contemporary Conduit series on Jadaliyya that seeks to highlight distinct voices primarily in and from the Middle East and North Africa.]

Jadaliyya: What do you think are the most gratifying aspects of Tweeting, and Twitter?

Nora Abdulkarim: Twitter provides the chance to see different worldviews and their effect on people’s interpretations of the same news and topics. I find this fascinating, and immensely useful in strengthening my own perspective. It has also been a great way to participate in open discussions and interact with individuals that I would otherwise not have the chance to. This exposure to a variety of opinions and critiques allows one to learn from others, re-evaluate their own positions, and crystallize their understanding of how their arguments sound to others.

J: What are some of the political/social/cultural limits you’ve encountered using the platform?

NA: As your followers’ count grows, there is always the temptation to write what you know the majority would like to hear. But, authenticity is important. Repetitive, careful tweeting is uncreative and terribly predictable. There are plenty of ‘polite commentators’ saying what others want or expect. Why be one of them?

J: In your experience and use of Twitter, do you feel it helps mobilize or disorganize? Focus or crowd? Is it manageable or noisy? Can it help persuade and mobilize or does it turn everyone into a voyeur and spectator?

NA: Twitter is all these things and more. I think it’s that flexibility that has kept me interested in it. I find it far better than all other social media. Each Twitter account can be used in any manner the user wishes and there is always the choice to alternate between roles: either writing numerous replies in personal and light conversations, tweeting continuously on events (like a protest) as they happen, or getting on a soapbox and writing a string of numbered tweets outlining your opinion on a current issue. That’s the beauty of Twitter; you will only be as rigidly boxed into a ‘pattern of use’ as you allow yourself to be.

J: In what ways has Twitter helped you as a source of information? How do you sift through that information and determine its credibility?

NA: I tend to sift through information on Twitter by first mentally categorizing who produces it. It’s important to remember whom you are reading before you take in what they are saying, since essentially the who and what are inseparable. Also, Twitter was designed such that your timeline is filled with opinions you agree with, assuming that’s why you followed their authors, along with a sidebar that’s constantly encouraging you to follow more like-minded people. It is easy to remain in a reinforced frame around the same information. I find it prudent to actively seek out those I differ from, follow them, and favorite some of their thought provoking tweets to think about further. As for credibility, Twitter, by its nature, is fast-paced, and encourages impassioned reactionary stances. But passion without knowledge is worthless. Luckily, I was advised early on to balance intake of immediate information with independent, regular reading and analysis. Tweets are 140 characters; they are only snippets of the big picture. If information presented to you feels flat, it probably is: don’t take it at face value, go read up on it. This prevents getting caught up in “groupthink” and strikes a balance between information of the moment and its roots in the past. Credibility is in holistic opinions, in voices grounded in context.

J: Some of your Tweets deal with recent, controversial “savage” ads by a pro-Israel group in New York City, and others deal with the portrayal of Muslims during the “Innocence of Muslims” controversy. Do you see a connection between pro-Israel advocacy and way Muslims are depicted in mainstream American media?

NA: Such reductionism benefits many political actors: pro-Israel advocacy groups, the military-industrial complex, Arab dictators, and so on. Realistically, these actors will continue to operate based on their interests. The narrative surrounding Muslims, and Arabs more generally, in the media can also be traced to the absentminded or intended acceptance it receives from some journalists, academics, and readers. Their willingness to take on this imposed framework is in part due to lazy intellect, fueled by moral panics that resulted from the War on Terror, as it is easier to generalize the negative acts of a few than to look for the positive acts of the rest. It is also due to the seemingly total inability to analyze those violent few, as there is a strong reluctance to understand violence in the political realm, as evidenced by their forever-repeated, falsely-phrased question: “why do ‘they’ hate ‘us’?”.

This is the “Modern” man’s empty reaction to political violence. Not all violence, of course, as violence toward “progress” is warmly welcomed, believed to be both legitimate and understandable, as argued by the Bush Administration during the “liberation” of Iraq. Other political violence, however, is currently deemed “religious extremism”, its religiosity is in focus to frame the violence as beyond rational comprehension, and its extremity emphasized as though it were beyond the acts of the rest of humanity, part of an exclusive “culture of Terror”. As Mahmood Mamdani, a professor of Anthropology and Government at Columbia University, observed, “faced with political violence that arises in a modern context but will not fit the story of progress, theory has tended to take refuge in theology and culture”.

In the modern political discourse, used by the media and various political actors, there is an underlying idealistic image of humanity (defined as those who adhere to so-called Western values) as “Progressive” and “Civilized”. This leaves no room for contextualizing political violence as within humanity. This has lead to shallow rhetoric that simply deems events and peoples as “barbaric”, i.e. unexplainable as part of Modernity, and “savage”, i.e. beyond “civilized” humanity. But it makes little sense to accept such a discourse that excludes individuals, however violent they may be, and comfortably equate “Terror” (implied in the pro-Israel ads’ phrase “defeat Jihad”) with these “Others”. This rhetorical trickery fails to recognize violence as a product of the Modern project; a sign of weakness from both the non-state actors, who found all other alternatives to violence as futile, and weakness from the state itself, that was either unable (or unwilling) to provide those political alternatives.

It is the stark “good” and “evil” or “Western freedoms” and “Eastern enemies” dichotomy in the prevalent rhetoric that has become a sort of secular takfir, as Shiraz Doss, a professor of Political Theory at St. Francis Xavier University, argued, “this is indeed the paradoxical nature of morality properly understood: when it strays outside its legitimate sphere it inevitably becomes tyrannical and dangerous because its only concern is the integrity of its own self, not the shared community, not the common world”. It is this introduction of “evil” into the political realm that has meant the undermining of the law as a “moral necessity” to deal with “terrorists/jihadis”. But, there is no political fabric connecting citizen to government other than law, and once this is shattered, when “good/bad” is replaced with “good/evil”, individuals become actors beyond citizenry and are susceptible to treatment that citizens do not have to experience. Thus, this demonization is indeed a “secular takfir”, physically embodied in Guantanamo Bay, for example, as its location is excluded from the “civilized” West, beneath humanity, and beyond the Geneva Conventions.

Thus, in a more realistic framework that did away with shallow dichotomies and false portrayals of peoples and events, the “enlightened” would appear rather similar to those violent few from the “backwards”, Third World. This does not justify violence, by any actor, but it does invite explanations for it as something other than simply acts of “savages” that “hate” Western values.

J: You have discussed in depth the actions of several Saudi dissidents, including Manal Al-Sharif and Mohammed Al Qahtani; what do you consider the most viable means forward for political dissent in Saudi Arabia regarding women's rights and civil rights more generally?

NA: I think the most viable means forward in political dissent in Saudi Arabia is first to look to its past. There is a common joke in Saudi that it has the most polarized society, despite a governmental ban on political parties. I’d like to explain this by drawing attention to a superb article that is both insightful and concise, written by Sultan al-Amer, a Saudi intellectual. Al-Amer explains the rise of political factions in Saudi Arabia, the first large-scale Saudi political movement being the ‘Sahwa’, or ‘Islamic Awakening’, of the 1980s to mid 1990s. Its sole focus was on preserving Arab and Islamic identity and interests of the region, ignoring political rights, and directly opposing and actively suppressing individual freedoms. As an opposite to this, the Saudi Liberal movement emerged that was preoccupied with individual freedoms. Both movements lack what the current political dissent in Saudi Arabia must include: a focus on political rights and democracy. As al-Amer puts it, “it is for this reason that I reject the liberal narrative. Not because I am against individual rights, but because I refuse the dismissal of political rights and identity. This is the same reason why I previously rejected the ‘Sahwa’ narrative as well, not because I was against Arabism or Islam, rather, I cannot accept the sidelining of political and individual rights”. And, in my opinion, the cause of Saudi women’s rights will only be successful when it is no longer treated as separate from that same movement for political and individual rights in Saudi Arabia.

Political dissent in Saudi Arabia is fractured today by some liberals who insist on labeling the religious conservatives and much of what is considered to be Saudi/Arab culture as “backwards”, echoing the Orientalist narrative of many Western scholars. I’ve called it “self-Orientalism”: when the liberals decided to idolize the West and internalize Orientalist rhetoric, all while fetishizing a fictitious image that only existed in their imaginations of a homogeneous and superior “Western culture”. They are typically fearful of political rights and display passive acceptance of the status quo of a non-democratic government as a protective shield against a possible democratically induced “conservative take over”. Likewise, some conservatives will typically cloak political motives in religious rhetoric, demonizing liberal’s desires for freedom as a sign of cultural decay and atheism. The existence of these factions is not in itself the problem; the issue is when either side will accept, and at times applause, the government for oppressing the other. This can be seen when a cleric is illegally arrested, and some liberals assure themselves “he’s a terrorist”. And when a liberal is illegally detained, some conservatives will argue, “he was a religious and cultural threat anyway”. Neither necessarily hold these opinions, though some may, but these factions rationalize in this manner in order to ignore the objectionable arrest and violation of rights itself. They judge their interest to be only in the immediate political point won, rather than in the long-term interest of preserving political and individual rights. This is foolish since the government has shown that time and time again: just as it giveth, it taketh away – regardless of political faction.

Thus, the way forward for political dissent in Saudi Arabia is that, unlike some liberals, it ought not be timid in the face of conservatives’ political rights, nor ought it shun liberal sentiments for individual’s freedoms, as some conservatives have. Such rights-based discourse is making its way to the general public through intellectuals’ written words and activists’ actions in protests or court trials. It is sometimes opposed by the more polarized on either side of the spectrum, but it will be supported more generally, I believe, largely as a natural consequence of witnessing the Arab Spring and the resulting democracies. There’s another joke in Saudi that despite the absence of democracy, Saudis watch political debates and elections in other countries so closely, you’d think it were their own. Obviously, they wish it were.

[Nora Abdulkarim blogs at Ana3rabeya and tweets at @Ana3rabeya]

An Overview of the Egyptian Legal System and Legal Research

$
0
0

The Arab Republic of Egypt lies in the northeastern part of Africa. Whilst most of the country is located in Africa, the easternmost part, the Sinai Peninsula, is considered part of Asia and is the only land bridge between the two continents.  Egypt is divided into two unequal parts by the Nile River, and its terrain is mostly desert except for the Valley and Delta of the Nile, the most extensive oasis on earth and one of the main centers of habitation in Egypt. While Cairo is the largest city and the capital of Egypt, Alexandria, the second largest city, remains the principal port of Egypt on the Mediterranean. 

With an area of more than one million square kilometers (1,001,450 sq. km.), Egypt prides itself in having extensive borders: to the west is Libya, to the south is Sudan, to the northeast are Israel and the Gaza strip, to the north is Mediterranean Sea, and to the east is the Red Sea.

Egypt is the sixteenth most populous country in the world with a population of approx. 85,000,000 people, according to the July 2011 Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook estimate. Unsurprisingly, most of the population is concentrated near the banks of the Nile River, which amounts to about 40,000 sq. km, leaving about 961,450 sq. km uninhabited. This is due to the fact that the land near the banks of the Nile is the only arable agricultural land in Egypt. However, there are ongoing efforts toward expansion of urban development and populating the desert in order to reduce the heavy concentration of the population along the Nile.      

Egypt has been a coherent political entity since 3200 B.C. and was one of the first civilizations to develop irrigated agriculture, urban life, and large-scale political structures.

On the muddy banks of the Nile, the oldest political and administrative systems were established along with Egypt’s first central state. These systems have come a long way, and are now used in the modern institutions and administrative systems, and have also been used in the formulation of the constitution, parliament, responsible government and judicial authority since the 19th century. At the present time, Egypt is making history again by creating a new phase of economic development and reform, ascertaining political and democratic authority and practices, enhancing freedoms and adhering to the rule of law, and respecting human rights.   


Table of Contents

1.     Introduction
2.     The Egyptian Legal System
3.     The Executive Power
3.1  The President
3.2  Cabinet
3.3  Ministries
4.     The Legislative Power: Parliament
4.1   People's Assembly
4.2  Jurisdiction
4.3  Bodies
4.4  Committees
5      Shura Council
5.1  Term of Membership and Activities
6      The Judicial Power
6.1  Court System
6.2  The Supreme Constitutional Court
6.3  Court of Cassation
6.4  Court of Appeal
6.5  Court of First Instance
6.6  Family Court
6.7  New Economic Courts
6.8  Egyptian State Lawsuits Authority
6.9  Public Prosecution
6.10        Administrative Courts (State Council)
7      Courts Jurisdiction
8      Arbitration
9      Enforcement of Judgments and Appeal
10    Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
11    Primary materials
12    Political Parties
13    Notable Parties
14    Governorates
15    Official Websites
16    Inter-Governmental Organizations
17    Law Faculties (Public Universities)
18    Important Libraries
19    Legal Guide

[This piece and the remaining table of contents originally available at NYU GlobaLex]

تساؤلات لا بد منها: الجزء الأول

$
0
0

أزمة اقتصادية ليس لها حل اقتصادي

في أعقاب الاحتجاجات الشعبية الأخيرة والتي كانت معظم شعاراتها تركز على مطالب اقتصادية واجتماعية ومحاسبة القائمين عليها، صدرت أربعة تقارير دولية تناولت الأوضاع الاقتصادية والمالية الفلسطينية من مختلف جوانبها، وأُعدت جميعها قبل اندلاع الموجة الأخيرة من التذمر/الغضب الاقتصادي الفلسطيني الذي تمحورت أولى ظواهره في بداية السنة حول مسألة تعديل النظام الضريبي. وبينما أجمعت تلك الجهات الدولية على مدى تردي أداء الاقتصاد عموما والآثار الضارة اللازمة لمالية لسلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية خاصة، تجرأ المنسق لخاص للأمم المتحدة (الأونسكو) بتسمية الأمور باسمها حيث عنوَن تقريره: "الجهود الفلسطينية لبناء الدولة المهددة والنهوض من أجل إنقاذ حل الدولتين"، مما يعكس درجة ليست قليلة من القلق الدولي تجاه المخاطر الكامنة في اللازمة الاقتصادية الحالية.

وطبعا يشير هؤلاء المراقبين الدوليين (بدرجات متفاوتة من الوضوح أو الخجل) بأن السبب الأساسي للأزمة الاقتصادية ما زال العقبات التي يضعها الاحتلال الإسرائيلي امام النشاط الاقتصادي، لكن "الحكمة التقليدية" الصادرة عن البنك وصندوق النقد الدوليين ما زالت تردد منذ عدة سنوات بأن على السلطة الفلسطينية القيام بالمزيد من الإصلاح المالي والمؤسسي والسياساتي اذا كانت ستواجه الأزمة، وتجري المزيد من عمليات التمهيد ل"بناء الدولة"، وكأن قلة الإصلاح أو سوء إدارة السياسات والضعف المؤسسي هي ما تحول دون تحقيق التحرر الوطني والاستقلال والسيادة.

هذا الادعاء الذي استوطن في العقل الفلسطيني الرسمي ولدى "اهل الخبرة" الاقتصاديين منذ أول "خطة إصلاح وتنمية" في 2007 وصولا إلى إنجاز خطة "إنهاء الاحتلال وإقامة الدولة" في 2011، رفع سقف التوقعات السياسية والمعيشية لدى مختلف الطبقات الاجتماعية مما ساهم في تشجيع الانتعاش بصورة لا بأس به في النمو الاقتصادي بين 2009-2011. لكن ما لم يستطع تحقيقه هذا "الوهم والسراب" الإصلاحي (كما اسماه جو ناصر من البنك الدولي)، هو تغيير دائم في "جودة الحياة" أو في احتمالات التنمية بشكل أشمل، ناهيك عن مساهمته في تراجع الحالة السياسية الفلسطينية والمشروع التحرري الفلسطيني من خلال اشاعة ثقافة من "اللا سياسي" بانتظار بلوغ الحل السياسي .

من الطبيعي ان المواطن المتعَب من عبء الغلاء والمديونية والضرائب وغيرها من ظواهر الاقتصاد الفلسطيني المعولم، يضع أمام حكومته ونظام الحكم مسؤولية حل هذه المشاكل (هكذا عودناه خلال السنوات الماضية بأن السلطة تتكفل بتأمين احتياجاته)، وفي نفس السياق فإنه من الطبيعي ان يحمّل المواطن الاحتلال وآلياته (اتفاقيات اوسلو وخاصة بروتوكوله الاقتصادي) مسؤولية استمرار متاعبه، فلا تناقض أو تخبط بين هذا وذاك، حتى لو أنها لم تعبر حتى الآن عن مطلب واسع النطاق أو رؤية بديلة متماسكة، أو حراك منظم يمضي في ذلك الاتجاه نحو نهايته المنطقية، لكن يبدو ان المواطن "العادي" بات يستوعب جيدا ما كان يعيه من قبل (ربما مع استعداده لصرف النظر عنه)، حول التشابك بين اوسلو - رمز إدامة الاحتلال وتأجيل الاستقلال، وباريس - رمز التبعية الاقتصادية لإسرائيل والويلات المعيشية المختلفة، ورام اللة - رمز الوعد غير المحقق والحياة البديلة العابرة، وسلطة أصبحت بعيدة عن آمال حركة التحرر الوطني التي أنشأتها.

ويتميز التقرير الصادر عن منظمة "الأونكتاد" والمعنية بالتنمية الاقتصادية الفلسطينية، في رسالته المتكررة لمن لم يفهم بعد الحقيقة الأساسية والثابتة، أنه لا يمكن تحقيق التنمية في ظل الاحتلال، وأنه ليس من حل اقتصادي للأزمة الاقتصادية الخانقة والمزمنة، دون سيادة واستقلال. يغني هذا التقرير المختصر والمليء بالأرقام والتحليل القارئ عن الحاجة لمراجعة أي تقرير آخر، لما يتضمنه من دقة وشمولية في وصفه للحقائق الاقتصادية على الأرض كما هي، وفي تحليله الأمين لأبعاد التنمية في ظل الاحتلال وفي توصياته الواقعية. وتكمن الأهمية الخاصة لرؤية الأونكتاد في أنها وضعت الأمور الاقتصادية في سياقها الصحيح ودون مراوغة. ويبين ان انسداد الأفق الاقتصادي الفلسطيني لا يعود إلى فشل سياساتي أو مؤسساتي اقتصادي فلسطيني كما يروج البعض، بل هو نتيجة طبيعية للآثار الضارة المتراكمة منذ عقود لمواجهة شعب اعزل مع ما يسميها الأونكتاد بـ "مؤسسة توسعية من النوع الاستيطاني/الاستعماري"، يحرسه احتلال عسكري متفوق، وتموله إحدى اكبر القوى الاقتصادية في المنطقة: إسرائيل، وتحميه القوة العظمة الأولى، الولايات المتحدة الأميركية. "فإﻧﻬاء الاستيطان والاحتلال شرط لا غنى عنه لترسيخ التنمية المستدامة، وما لم يحدث تحوُّل جذري في ميزان القوة الاقتصادية والسياسية بين الاحتلال الإسرائيلي والشعب الفلسطيني، سيظل الانتعاش الاقتصادي الحقيقي في الأرض الفلسطينية المحتلة بعيد المنال ."

يمكن من خلال استعراض العناوين الرئيسية لتقرير الأونكتاد، إجراء قراءة شاملة ومؤلمة للوضع الاقتصادي رغم مساعي السلطة الوطنية ضمن ما هو متاح لها للتخفيف من وطآه "الاحتلال الاقتصادي" والفقر والبطالة و فقدان القوة الشرائية للأسر الناجمة عنه، وأبرزها:

1. نمو خادع واستمرار الخسائر الاقتصادية الفلسطينية: حيث صُوّر الانتعاش الاقتصادي الفلسطيني للأعوام الـ3 الماضية من قبل المجتمع الدولي وإسرائيل على أنه بديل للانتعاش في المسار السياسي المتعثر، واليوم يؤكد الأونكتاد وصلنا إلى نهاية أسطورة النمو الخادع فعلا وغير القابل للدوام؛

2. القيود المفروضة على التنقل وتراجع المعونة والأزمة المالية عوامل تقوض النمو: حيث اصبح الشغل الشاغل للشعب الفلسطيني وقيادته كيفية مواجهة تلك الأزمة المالية والاقتصادية، بدل من صب جهودها في دحر الاحتلال وإقامة الدولة الفلسطينية، التي لا بد من وجودها فعليا وليس افتراضيا لصياغة وتنفيذ أيه سياسات اقتصادية لصالح شعب طال عذابه المعيشي والإنساني؛

3. ارتفاع معدلات البطالة وتدني الإنتاجية والأجور الحقيقية: بسبب الحاقه بالاقتصاد الإسرائيلي ضمن ببروتوكول باريس الاقتصادي، فإن الاقتصاد الفلسطيني يواجه نفس ضغوطات التحرير التجاري والاقتصادي والمالي العالمي دون القدرة لاستخدام تلك الأدوات السياساتية الاقتصادية والتجارية والنقدية المتوفرة لإسرائيل أو "لأية دولة متوسطة الدخل" كما عمّدها البنك الدولي في 2011.

4. تآكل الدخول الحقيقية وتزايد الفقر بسبب التضخم: وخير شاهد على خطورة هذه الظواهر أن المواطن الفلسطيني لم يعد يتقبل بأن تفرض عليه ما هي بمثابة "ضريبة احتلال"، وكما جاء في شعار رفعه عجوز فلسطيني في الخليل: "ألا يكفينا احتلال بل علينا تحمل غلاء فاحش أيضا؟"

5. استمرار الأزمة المالية رغم الإصلاحات التي تجريها السلطة الفلسطينية: ولا يخفى على احد ما رُوّج منذ عام 2011 حول الجاهزية المؤسسية الفلسطينية لإدارة اقتصاد معاصر، فها نحن بعد عام على رفض مجلس الأمن الموافقة على طلب انضمام دولة فلسطين المحتلة للأمم المتحدة، يبدو أنه ليس هناك إصلاح كاف لضمان إصلاح العقول والقوى السياسية التي ما زالت تعتقد بأن الشعب الفلسطيني يمكن ان يقبل العيش دون نيل حقوقه الوطنية و صون كرامته الإنسانية.

6. تزايد الهشاشة المالية بسبب انعدام اليقين بشأن الدعم المقدم من الجهات المانحة: وهو عنوان هام للمانحين والذين تكرموا منذ فترة بالمساهمة في دعم السلطة الفلسطينية، ومن الطبيعي انهم اصبحوا اكثر مترددين من أيه فترة ماضية بشأن استمرار تمويلهم لنظام مالي ووظيفي اصبح يخفف عبء الاحتلال على القوة القائمة بالاحتلال، بينما يزيده ثقلا على كاهل المواطن الفلسطيني.

7. استمرار العجز التجاري والتبعية الاقتصادية لإسرائيل: وهنا بيت القصيد، حيث يبدو اليوم غير مقبول سياسيا وشعبيا وقانونيا ان يبقى الاقتصاد الفلسطيني أسير لاتفاقية اقتصادية مقيدة واتحاد جمركي مشوه أبرمت اتفاقيته قبل 18 سنة لخدمة مرحلة انتقالية وسلطة حكم ذاتي مدتها 5 سنوات، على ان تخلفها اتفاقية اقتصادية عادية بين دولتين. ومن الطبيعي اليوم ان يطالب الشعب الفلسطيني بالخروج من التبعية المتمثلة بهذه الاتفاقية على اسرع وجه ممكن، ومن واجب قيادة هذا الشعب التجاوب مع المصالح الوطنية العليا ودراسة جميع البدائل "غير الطبيعية" التي من شأنها إيقاف النزيف والتدهور الاقتصادي المتواصل.

8. وفيما يتعلق بالعقبات الرئيسية أمام التنمية الفلسطينية، لقد لخصت الأونكتاد بأسلوب بسيط وشفاف حقيقة ما يواجه الشعب الفلسطيني عندما تؤكد انه: "مثلما أظهر الرصد المنهجي لاقتصاد الأرض الفلسطينية المحتلة بمرور السنين، وعلى الرغم من أي مظاهر توحي بالعكس، ترتبط جميع العقبات الرئيسية التي تواجه الاقتصاد الفلسطيني بالاحتلال أكثر من ارتباطها بالسياسات الاقتصادية للسلطة الفلسطينية التي هي سياسات محدودة النطاق بطبيعتها".

9. تقترح الأونكتاد رؤية واقعية وتوجه استراتيجي هام في استنتاجها بأنه: "في ظل هذه ا لظروف القاسية التي تؤثر في الوصول إلى الأصول الوطنية والموارد الطبيعية الاستراتيجية، يظل بناء الدولة مفهوم بعيد المنال. وفي الظروف الراهنة، ينبغي أن تركز جميع الجهود على منع المزيد من التعدي على الاقتصاد واﻟﻤﺠتمع الفلسطينيين من خلال الاستيطان والاحتلال، بل والعمل على عكس اتجاه هذا المسار بالفعل."

الحقيقة أن الأزمة الاقتصادية وحدها ليست أخطر أزمة بل اصبحنا نواجه أزمة سياسية وأزمة ثقة، بل أزمة وجود السلطة الفلسطينية، ما يمكن تسميتها "بالعاصفة المثالية" (perfect storm) ، التي قد تطيح بكل شيء أو بقلبه رأسًا على عقب. وما قاله جليا رئيس الوزراء حول نفاذ البدائل السياساتية المالية والاقتصادية ضمن قيود اتفاقية باريس إنما هو صحيح: لم يعد ممكن إدارة نظام حكم يتحمل (ويُحمّله المجتمع الدولي) كل مسؤوليات الدولة دون التمتع بالصلاحيات والمؤسسات السيادية، بل في اطار احتلال عسكري إسرائيلي لا محدود، واليوم في غياب أي حل اقتصادي للأزمة المزمنة، تواجه م.ت.ف خيارات غير جذابة: أما الدخول في "صراع اجتماعي" مع شعبها، على ان تسعى لضبط الأمور وتهدئة الخواطر وتصحيح بعض التشوهات هنا وهناك، أو ان تخوض "حرب اقتصادية" مع خصمها الاحتلالي لتحل محل "السلام الاقتصادي" الإسرائيلي المرفوض جماهيريا، لكن دون القدرة على معرفة التكاليف المحتملة لذلك أو احتسابها... أو ان تغلق الأبواب والنوافذ بانتظار مرور "العاصفة"...

وبينما يدور الجدل الآن حول جدوى التخلص من باريس دون التخلي عن اوسلو برمتها وحول مخاطر لجوء م.ت.ف إلى لتبرئ من إدارة السلطة الذاتية في الضفة الغربية (بعد ان فقدت السيطرة على إدارة السلطة في غزة) ، يبقى هناك سؤالان يهمان كل مواطن يتساءل عن مستقبله المعيشي:

- اذا اعتبرنا ان اتفاقية باريس هي فعلا "اصل البلى"، فهل يمكن التخلص منها دون تفكيك اوسلو وألياتها ومؤسساتها؟

- وقبل الشروع بتفكيك أي شيء، أليس من الضروري أولا تصوير ما يراد من نظام اقتصادي وتجاري بديل والعمل على بلورة برنامجه؟

سأحاول الإجابة على هذه التساؤلات في الحلقتين القادمتين. [نشر هذه المقال في جريدة "القدس" الفلسطينينة و"جدلية تعيد نشره بالإتفاق مع الكاتب]

Last Week on Jadaliyya (Oct 8-14)

$
0
0

 This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes a list of the most read articles.  Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series. 

 


الأردن يبحث عن نفسه: الحكم والإصلاح والبعد الإسرائيلي

$
0
0

يعاني الجسم السياسي الأردني من حالة إنهاك واستنزاف متفاقمين. فالحكم يعيد اجترار نفسه ضمن نفس المجموعة من المسؤولين الذين أصبحوا عبئاً على النظام أكثر من كونهم سنداً له. وبواقع الممارسة، عزل النظام نفسه عن قاعدته الشعبية خصوصاً المتعلمة والمثقفة والناشطة سياسياً مما جعله يدور في حلقة مفرغة. واستعاض الحكم عن أسلوب الحوار كوسيلة للتواصل مع قاعدته الشعبية بأسلوب إدارة القطيع حيث يتم استعمال سطوة الدولة لفرض وجهة نظر الحكم أو للحصول على تأييد شعبي مصطنع لسياسات أو قرارات حكومية لا تحظى أصلاً بشعبية أو قبول. وقد ساهم أولئك المسؤولين في تفاقم الوضع نتيجة قناعاتهم بأن الشعب لا يملك حولاً و لا قوة، وأنهم بالتالي فوق الشعب وفوق القانون وأن ما هو غير مباح يمكن أن يُستباح.

لقد خلق الشعور بفقدان قنوات الاتصال والتواصل بين الحكم والشعب حالة من الإحباط الشعبي الذي أخذ يعبر عن نفسه بهبات من الغضب حيناً والاحتجاجات أحياناً، تطورت بالنتيجة ومع حلول الربيع العربي إلى المطالبة الشعبية ببرامج إصلاح متشعبة، استندت إلى قاعدة صلبة من إجماع وطني على محاربة الفساد ومحاكمة الفاسدين واسترجاع المال العام. ولكن نظراً لحالة الانغلاق التي يعيشها النظام ضمن إطار تلك الأقلية الحاكمة المنغلقة على نفسها، يبدو أن النظام اعتبر هذا المطلب وكأنه لائحة اتهام ضده. وتضافرت قوى مؤسسة الحكم لمقاومة هذا المطلب إما دفاعاً عن النفس أو دفاعاً عن الافتراض الخاطىء بأن في هذا المطلب إدانة للجميع. وابتدأت المسيرة المؤلمة التي صبغت العلاقة الغامضة بين الحكم والشعب وتراوحت بين المسايرة والاسترضاء والاحتواء إلى الالتفاف على مطالب الإصلاح إلى أن انتهت بانتصار قوى الشد العكسي ضمن مؤسسة الحكم وتُوِّجَ هذا الانتصار بالإعلان عن تشكيل أسوأ حكومة شهدها الأردن منذ ما يزيد عن عقدين من الزمن وهي حكومة فايز الطراونة. وعادت قوى الانغلاق لتمارس سياساتها العرفية بشكل علني وابتدأت عملية البطش بحرية الرأي والتعبير وكذلك بقيادات الحراكات الشبابية وقادة الرأي العام في الأردن. ويبقى السؤال الكبير يلوح في ذهن الكثيرين، إذا كان الحكم في هذا المزاج العدواني ، فمن سيشفع للشعب الأردني ومن سيقف إلى جانبه في مواجهة هذا العدوان القادم من مؤسسة الحكم على حقوقه الدستورية خصوصاً وأن الجميع راغب في المحافظة على سلمية الحراك الشعبي ومطالب الإصلاح؟

عندما ينحدر مستوى أداء بعض أدوات الحكم في تعاملها مع المعارضة إلى حد الردح والكذب والشتيمة ، كما تجسده بعض الصحف المحسوبة على النظام وكذلك تصريحات بعض المسؤولين، فماذا يتبقى؟ وماذا عن البديل الحضاري المتمثل في الحوار وقبول الرأي الآخر والانحناء أمام رغبة الأغلبية؟ إن تشويه الحقائق والتلاعب بها لن يؤدي في نهاية الأمر إلا إلى خلق أوهام كاذبة لدى الحاكم، وغضب مكبوت أو معلن لدى المحكوم. وهكذا، فإن الإدعاء الرسمي الأردني بأن المعارضة ومطالب الإصلاح محصورة بالحركة الإسلامية هو إدعاء غير صحيح ويهدف إلى خلق انطباع عام داخلي وخارجي بأن الرهان هو بين الحكم والاستقرار من جهة والحركة الإسلامية وأسلمة الدولة الأردنية وبالتالي الفوضى من جهة أخرى. لعبة شيطانية لا تخفى على أحد. ومع ذلك فإننا لسنا بصدد تفنيد مناورات واتهامات ومخططات حكومية تستهدف التضليل والإلهاء ، بقدر ما نحن بصدد الغوص في عمق الحقيقة بهدف استكشاف ومعرفة ما نحن مقبلون عليه، وما هو مخبأ للأردن والأردنيين. القليل جداً قد يعلم كنه ما نحن بصدد الحديث عنه، ولكن الأغلبية الساحقة قد حُجبت عنها الحقيقة وخضعت لعملية تضليل رافقت مسيرة الدولة منذ نشأتها وحتى الآن.

لقد تمكنت الدولة الأردنية منذ نكبة فلسطين من العيش ببحبوحة فاقت إمكاناتها الحقيقية. بحبوحة مصطنعة أبقت هذه الدولة قادرة على الاستمرار ولكن دون السماح لها بترف العيش الرغيد. معادلة محسوبة بدقة حتى لا تتجاوز هذه الدولة الخطوط الحمراء المرسومة لها، والمهمات الثقيلة الملقاة على كاهلها. فالفقر الزائد قد يدفع إلى الثورة والترف الزائد قد يوهم الضعيف بأنه قادر والصغير بأنه كبير. وهكذا، فقد عاش الأردن منذ نشأته معتمداً على مساعدات خارجية أضعفت من استقلاليته السياسية ورهنت مواقفه برضا الدول المانحة. وتم بناء الاقتصاد الأردني على أساس أنه اقتصاد رعوي والمنظومة الاجتماعية باعتبارها منظومة رعوية بهدف إبقاء معظم السكان مرهونين للحكم. ومن هنا نرى أن معظم ميزانية الدولة الأردنية تذهب إلى الرواتب ، ورخاء الشعب أو معاناته هي أيضاً مرهونة للحكم وسياساته وقراراته الاقتصادية. وقد وَلَّد هذا الواقع شعوراً عاماً بأهمية استمرار الحكم واستقرار الدولة حتى يبقى النظام الرعوي قادراً على تلبية الحد الأدنى من المطالب الحياتية للشعب. وقد شجع هذا الواقع العجيب الحكم على اعتبار ما تملكه الدولة مِنَّة من الحاكم وهو صاحب الفضل في كل شيء. وترجم هذا الواقع نفسه في استبدال السياسات الحكومية بالمكرمات، وأصبح الشعب ينظر إلى الحكم وليس إلى الحكومة في كل ما يريد وما لا يريد. ولا عجب أن يعتبر الحكم، انطلاقاً من ذلك، أن مطالب الإصلاح هي اقرب إلى نكران الجميل منها إلى الحق الطبيعي للشعب. وأصبح تعامله مع تلك المطالب أيضاً بمنظور المكرمات مما يتنافى وأبسط مطالب الإصلاح الحقيقي.    

المشكلة التي تجابهها المعارضة الأردنية الآن هي في كون القضايا الإصلاحية التي تطرحها كقضايا داخلية تجيء في أدنى سلم الأولويات بالنسبة للعالم الخارجي في علاقته مع النظام الأردني . وقد ساهم في تكريس ذلك موقف الشعب الأردني من معاهدة وادي عربة وانحسار التأييد لها بشكل متواصل منذ التوقيع عليها وحتى الآن.

إن وجود الدولة الأردنية واستمرارها كان مرتبطاً منذ البداية بالقضية الفلسطينية والمصالح الإسرائيلية. والمطلوب من الأردن إقليمياً أهم لمعظم دول العالم مما يريده الأردنيون لأنفسهم من إصلاحات داخلية. وما يريده الأردنيين من إصلاحات لنظامهم السياسي لن يحظى بأي دعم خارجي إذا كان ثمن ذلك إضعاف قدرته على القيام بالواجبات المناطة به فيما يتعلق بإسرائيل وبرنامج التسوية النهائية. فالمشكلة التي تجابه الأردن، في الحقيقة، هي في كون القضايا المتعلقة بالإصلاح وحقوق المواطنين في الأردن تأتي في أدنى سلم الأولويات بالنسبة للعالم الخارجي في علاقته مع الأردن. فما يهم العالم الخارجي فيما يتعلق بالأردن هي استمرار قدرته على الاستجابة لمتطلبات الأمن الإسرائيلي والمصالح الإسرائيلية التي تتلخص في النهاية في حل سلمي للمشكلة الإسرائيلية وفي تنظيف تبعات هذا الحل سواء أكان دور الأردن فيه كمنطقة عازلة أو كجسر موصل للتطبيع، أو كوعاء يستوعب ذيول وتبعات ذلك الحل.

وفي كل الأحوال، فإن الدعم لمثل هذا الدور لا يأتي من القاعدة الشعبية العريضة للأردنيين، ولا من المعارضة الأردنية، ولكن من الحكم والمؤسسات التابعة له. لقد ناضل الشعب الأردني لما يزيد عن ستين عاماً لتعديل المسار المرسوم للدولة الأردنية بشكل يعيد رسم الدور المناط بها لمصلحة الشعب، ولكن يد الحكم كانت دائماً أقوى. فقد ارتبط بقاء الحكم ببقاء الدولة، وارتبط بقاء الدولة بقدرتها على القيام بالواجبات المناطة بها.

المعادلة إذاً واضحة، فقدرة النظام في الأردن على الوفاء بالتزاماته أو بما هو مطلوب منه تجاه إسرائيل وأمنها ومصالحها وإلزامه بذلك هو أكثر أهمية من إلزامه باحترام حقوق الإنسان الأردني. وهكذا، فإن ما يعتقده معظم الأردنيين بأن ما نحن بصدده من مطالب إصلاحية هو شأن أردني قد يثبت خطأه في نهاية المطاف. ما نحن بصدده هو، في الحقيقة، أكبر من الأردن. فالأردن وُلِد وكتابه بيساره وأمره محسوم. وعلاقة القوة التي تحكم أطراف المعادلة السياسية فيه ما زالت حتى الآن خاضعة لتلك المعادلة. وقد استوعب النظام الأردني ذلك، ومن هنا فإن تعامله مع الشعب يأتي بفوقية واضحة أساسها قناعته بأن معادلة القوة التي تحكم بقاءه وترغب في استمراره أقوى من معادلة القوة الداخلية التي تسعى إلى تحجيمه ووضع قيود على سلطاته المطلقة. وبين هذا وذاك، فإن على الشعب الأردني أن يسعى لتغيير واقعه نحو الأفضل، خصوصاً وأن مطلبه الإصلاحي الرئيسي باستبدال النظام الرئاسي الملكي بالنظام النيابي الملكي هو مطلب عادل ودستوري.

إن بقاء النظام هو خيارٌ أردنيٌ حقيقيٌ، ولكنه أيضاً خيارٌ غربيٌ مرتبطٌ بالدور المرسوم للأردن. وعلى الأردنيين العمل على إيجاد معادلة توفق بين بقاء النظام كخيار أردني والإصلاح السياسي كمطلب أردني وفك الارتباط بين الأردن والدور المرسوم له كهدف أردني.

فالأردن إذا كان بنظر البعض حالة طارئة فهذه هي مشكلة من يؤمن بذلك ، إلا أن الشعب الأردني ليس كذلك وهو مكون أصيل وجزء حقيقي من تاريخ وتراث المنطقة لا يجوز إهماله والتعامل معه باعتباره كماً لا قيمة له. وتحويل قضايا الشعب الأردني ومطالبه العادلة إلى حالة اعتداء على الشرعية أمرٌ مرفوضٌ ولا يمكن القبول به. فالشرعية أساسها الشعب حسب الدستور الأردني الذي ينص على أن "الأمة هي مصدر السلطات". والدولة الأردنية يجب أن تكون تجسيداًً لإرادة الشعب الأردني أمينة على تلك الإرادة أولاً وأخيراً وليست أمينة على قرار وزير المستعمرات البريطاني قبل ما يقارب من مائة عام. إن الوفاء المطلوب هو لإرادة الشعب ومصلحته وهذا هو أساس الشرعية الحقيقية. والشعب الأردني الذي رافق تأسيس الدولة وابتدأ كمجموعات من أصول مختلفة قد أصبح الآن شعباً واحداً متجانساً ومتلاحماً له وطن يدافع عنه ويعيش في كنفه، وعليه واجب إنقاذه من الإرث التاريخي الذي فرضه الاستعمار على الدولة ورافقها منذ تأسيسها.   

[نشر للمرة الأولى في جريدة ”القدس العربي“ اللندنية وجدلية تعيد نشره بالإتفاق مع الكاتب]

Egypt Media Roundup (October 15)

$
0
0

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.]  

“Democracy from within: FJP elections and the influence of the Brotherhood”
The Muslim Brotherhood’s elections, lauded as a demonstration of democratic practices within, might already be prearranged.

“Egypt's 'Accountability Friday' turns up the heat on Brotherhood rule”
Clashes erupt after supporters of the president attack and demolition an anti-Morsi stage on Tahrir Square; the Muslim Brotherhood denies reports that its members were involved.

“Protests spread through governorates”
Protests across the country voice different demands including the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the retrial for the suspects in the Camel Battle case, and accountability for the president’s actions.

“A politicized justice”
Analysts say the prosecution is to blame for the disappointing outcome of Camel Battle, as others criticize President Mohamed Morsi’s decision to fire the prosecutor general.

“Egyptian Judges' Club backs 'sacked' prosecutor general”
Judges say the president is infringing upon judicial independence.

“Morsi politely 'asks' defiant prosecutor-general to stay on”
After a stand-off between the president and the prosecutor-general, the latter is allowed to retain his position.

“EIPR accuses Meit Ghamr chief of pressuring victims’ families”
Residents of Delta town Meit Ghamr struggle to bring to justice officers responsible for killing civilians.

“Free Egypt Party to merge with Al-Dostor”
Free Egypt Party, headed by former MP Amr Hamzawy, joins Mohamed ElBaradei’s El-Dostor, as the liberals prepare for the upcoming parliamentary elections.

“Egypt constitution: The good, the bad and the ugly”
Activists praise the constitutional draft for guaranteeing freedom of expression and protest, but criticize it for not banning torture and human trafficking and infringing on women’s rights.

“Egypt: Fix Draft Constitution to Protect Key Rights”
Human Rights Watch criticizes the draft constitution for failing to address issues of women’s and children’s rights, freedom of speech and religion, torture and human trafficking.

“Within the Islamist movement who is moderate…and who is extremist?”
Farid Zahran writes about the different Islamist groups he met in prison and the different approaches they have to implementing Sharia.

“Morsy grants all “revolutionary prisoners” amnesty”
The president grants amnesty to people arrested between 25 January and 30 June in circumstances related to the revolution.

“Rise in number of US Copts”
Number of Coptic asylum seekers to the US doubles, as Christians face uncertainties in Egypt.

“Thousands of Egyptians march on Maspero to mark first anniversary of military crackdown”
Muslims and Christians march together to commemorate the death of 27 Copts during clashes with the military last year.

“Remembering the Maspero Massacre”
Wael Eskander shares his thoughts on the Maspero events of October 9, 2011.

“What 2011 meant for Egypt’s Copts”
Sara Naguib chronicles the incidents of violence against Christians throughout 2011.

“Egypt's Morsi Gets Marks for Speed, Not Style in Foreign Policy”
Former ambassador to Washington, Nabil Fahmy, comments on the president’s successes and failures in foreign policy during his first 100 days in power.

“And the Egyptian revolution seriously does not need those hooligans”
Zenobia talks about a recent attack by self-professed anarchists on two Central Security trucks.

 

In Arabic:

“وعاشروهن بالمعروف”
A short film by Suraya Hagagy and Ahmed Yusri on women’s issues in Egypt. [English subititles].

“«الإخوان» ردًا على وزير خارجية الإمارات: نُقدس قوانين الدولة التي نعيش فيها”
Tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Emirati authorities continue.

“دار الخدمات النقابية والعمالية تعلن مشاركتها في مليونية غدا... وتؤكد أن مرسى يسير على نهج مبارك”
Organization for Syndicate and Labor Services calls for the cancellation of the trade union law of 1976 which limits the freedoms of trade unions in Egypt.

“«من الميدان إلى الفاتيكان».. مسرحية هزلية من أربعة فصول”
Amr Ezzat comments on the recent scandal with the president firing the prosecutor-general.

“«تاريخ ازدهار وانهيار النخبة القانونية المصرية» «1ــ4»”
Amr Shalqani talks about the events of March 1954, when protests attacked the National Council in Giza, arguing that Gamal Abd El-Nasser was targeting the independence of the judiciary.

“عندما تكلم الرئيس”
Emad El-Din Adeeb annalyzes President Mohamed Morsi’s speech on the anniversary of the 1973 War.

“النائب العام يكلّف "أمن الدولة العليا" بالتحقيق في بلاغات ضد الرئيس والمرشد والشاطر”
The prosecutor general commissions State Security to investigate cases against the president, the Murshid and Khairat El-Shater.

“مستشار الرئيس: قانون العفو الشامل عن معتقلي الثورة يشمل العسكريين”
Mohamed Fouad Gadallah says the president’s amnesty of revolutionary prisoners extends to members of the military as well.

“إبراهيم عيسى يكتب: المحاكم الثورية تفتح باب الجحيم”
Ibrahim Eissa argues against the formation of revolutionary courts to try does guilty of killing protesters.

“«6 أكتوبر»: الرصاصة في جيب مَن؟”
Ahmed Tagi criticizes history of the 1973 War in Egypt is clouded in myth.

 

Recent Jadaliyya articles on Egypt:

An Overview of the Egyptian Legal System and Legal Research
A short overview of Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab’s new book on Egypt’s legal system.

New Texts Out Now: Myriam Ababsa, Baudouin Dupret, and Eric Denis, Popular Housing and Urban Land Tenure in the Middle East
An interview with the authors of a new book on urban development.

Text of Manal El-Tibi's Resignation Letter to Egypt's Constituent Assembly
Human rights activist Manal El-Tibi justifies her resignation with the incapacity of the constitution to provide freedom and equality for all citizens, but favoring one particular interest group.

Martyrdom at Maspero: Searching for meaning
Paul Sedra tries to explain what happened on October 9-10, 2011, arguing that it was not simply a pogrom.

Justice Denied: Egypt's Maspero Massacre One Year On
Ekram Ibrahim writes that justice still eludes the families of the killed during the Maspero Massacre; so far only three soldiers and no officers have been sentenced to short-term prison terms.

A Firsthand Account: Marching From Shubra to Deaths at Maspero
Sarah Carr’s witness account of the events of October 9, 2011.

Egypt’s Withering Paternalism and the Future of Its Political Economy
Amr Adly says the ruling party has three options to cope with social conflict which the collapsed paternalistic authoritarian system set up by Gamal Abd El-Nasser can no longer mange. 

The Tunisian Revolution Continues: An Interview with Lina Ben Mhenni

$
0
0

[On Tuesday, 9 October, Tunisian blogger and activist, Lina Ben Mhenni, was awarded the "Prix alsacien de l'engagement démocratique" for her activities and involvement during the Tunisian Revolution. She blogs at A Tunisian Girl and also contributes to Global Voices.]

Samia Errazzouki (SE): Regarding the drafting of the new constitution, as a Tunisian woman, how do you respond to the proposed article 28 that define women as complements of men?

Lina Ben Mhenni (LBM): The attacks against women, freedom, and human rights continue to multiply in Tunisia. And unfortunately, these attacks are coming mostly from the Tunisian government. This article 28 that discusses women in complementary terms to men instead of equal terms is revolting. I ended up protesting against this article on the streets during an unauthorized demonstration and ten policemen beat me. If I could do it again, I would, because in all the internationally recognized charters that speak of human rights, they always address the relationship between men and women in equal terms. Complementarity, as a term, is large and fluid--each individual can interpret it differently. What is the government seeking to achieve or prevent by using complementarity to define the relationship between men and women, instead of equality? Why make detours to avoid being honest?

SE: After a Tunisian woman was raped, then consequently charged with indecency, what was your reaction to the Tunisian government response?

LBM: Every time this incident comes up, I get goose bumps. I am truly shocked and disgusted by the government’s reaction. Here we have a woman who was raped by police officers--officers who are supposed to ensure security and protect citizens. Instead of taking care of the woman by providing either physical or psychological help, she was instead accused of committing a crime. They said they found her in an “indecent situation.” But even if she was found in an “indecent situation,” that does not justify the act of rape. It is not an excuse. I was truly shocked to hear this reaction of the spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior.

 SE: What measures have been taken by activists and movements to continue placing pressure on the new government, and to push for change in Tunisia?

LBM: Like I previously said, we can deduct that despite the fact that this is an elected government, nothing has been done to construct a real democracy in Tunisia. A government that justifies rape is shameful. For me, it is no longer legal. Even if this government was democratically elected, it is not legal. What this demonstrates is that this government is incompetent and no measures have been set in place to address, for example, the socioeconomic conditions in Tunisia that continue to worsen. They are incompetent; they attack individual liberties and human rights. Recently, they even refused to include the matter of human rights in the constitution.

SE: What have you done to continue demanding for the initial causes of the uprising?

LBM: As a blogger, it is important for me that we first talk and discuss these matters. Then, march on the streets to demonstrate and continue placing pressure. Anytime there is a major issue, I try to go on the streets, talk to people, and to report all of this. I try to be objective, and when it is time to demonstrate on the streets, I am there to do so.

تساؤلات لا بد منها: الجزء الثاني

$
0
0

تساؤلات لا بد منها: الجزء الثاني: لا يكفي فتح بروتوكول باريس، بل حان الوقت لطي صفحته

ما تم التعبير عنه مؤخرا من احتجاج شعبي وسياسي تجاه الأوضاع المعيشية المتردية، نجح أيضا على صعيد الشارع الفلسطيني، ولأول مرة، في إبراز الصِلة بين تلك الأوضاع والهيمنة الإسرائيلية على الاقتصاد الفلسطيني من خلال آليات "بروتوكول العلاقات الاقتصادية"، الموقعة بين إسرائيل و م.ت.ف. في باريس عام 1994. ولم تغفل الشعارات التي رفعت والتحليل والتعقيب المكثف منذ ذاك الحين بأن بروتوكول باريس كان الملحق الأول لاتفاقيات أوسلو، وأن استمرار سريانها مرتبط بنتائج الجدل الدائر حول مستقبل الأطر المؤسسية والأمنية والسياسية لأوسلو، بل حول نظام الحكم الذاتي نفسه. وقد يُنظر إلى جميع هذه الاتفاقيات على أنها رزمة واحدة متكاملة ومكملة لبعضها، غير قابلة للتجزئة. وانعكس ذلك بوضوح في سياسات السلطة الفلسطينية منذ 2007 على الأقل، حيث كان العنوان العريض للمرحلة السابقة "الوفاء بالالتزامات الموقعة" وإظهار حسن النوايا والجاهزية المؤسسية، على أمل التجاوب بالمثل من طرف "القوة القائمة بالاحتلال."

وبينما توصل الرأي العام الفلسطيني أخيرًا إلى أن بروتوكول باريس يبدو "أصل البلى" الاقتصادي (مع الاستدراك بأن أوسلو هي "الورطة الكبرى")، فإن التجربة التنفيذية التاريخية والأخيرة لها دلت على أن البروتوكول يحد بشكل شبه مطلق قدرة الساسة الاقتصاديين الفلسطينيين على منع حدوث المزيد من التدهور الاقتصادي، ناهيك عن أنها تقوض وتلجم أيّة احتمالات تنمية (وليست فقط احتمالات النمو) فعلية. وهذا الاستنتاج الشعبي يأتي ليؤكد ما يردده عدد من الخبراء والمؤسسات الفلسطينية والدولية منذ سنوات، مما يجعل من المنطقي التساؤل الذي انتهيت بطرحه في مقال سابق (رابط للمقال الأول) أي إذا كان من الممكن التخلص (أو الخروج) من بروتوكول باريس دون تفكيك أوسلو وألياتها ومؤسساتها.. فهل من بدائل سياساتية اقتصادية خارج اطار باريس يمكن جديا وفي الواقع السياسي الراهن الاحتماء بها واعتمادها بغية معالجة التحديات الاقتصادية الآنية والمستقبلية، دون الإطاحة باتفاقية أوسلو أو التبريء من التزاماتها المتشابكة؟

قبل محاولة الإجابة، لا بد من استذكار بعض أهم ملامح بروتوكول باريس التي تقيد حتمًا احتمالات التنمية والاستقلال والسيادة الفلسطينية، حتى بين دولتي إسرائيل وفلسطين العتيدة، ثم أن أوضح لماذا لا تجدي محاولة إصلاح البروتوكول اليوم، بعد كل ما تعرض له من تآكل وانتهاك وتجاهل من قبل إسرائيل حتى الوصول إلى مرحلة، وكما جاء في قصة الأطفال الغربية حول البيضة المكسورة ،"لن يستطع كل رجال وكل خيول الملك إعادة تركيب هامبتي دمبتي ثانية".

***

عندما قررت م.ت.ف. قبول ترتيبات أوسلو للحكم الذاتي الانتقالي السياسية والمدنية والأمنية، كان عليها إبرام اتفاقية مناسبة لتنظيم العلاقات الاقتصادية بين كيان الحكم الذاتي والقوة القائمة بالاحتلال. بالرغم من كل ما يحتوي البروتوكول من أوجه قصور في تصميمه وشروطه، بما في ذلك الادعاء في مقدمته أنه يهدف لوضع الأسس الصلبة لاقتصاد فلسطيني مزدهر في الضفة الغربية وغزة، التي تشكل وحدة جغرافية اقتصادية واحدة، لا ينفع اليوم مواصلة هذا الجدل الذي لم يتوقف بين الخبراء والسياسيين منذ ما يزيد عن 15 سنة، ونكتفي بالقول أنه إذا كان البروتوكول الخيار الوحيد لتنظيم العلاقات الاقتصادية لإدارة شؤون سلطة فلسطينية ناشئة، فان تلك المرحلة انتهت منذ حين، ويعيش الشعب الفلسطيني اليوم ظروف سياسية وميدانية مختلفة تمامًا، بل تحديات وجدانية ليست اقل ضاغطة من تلك التي أجبرت قبل 20 سنة الدخول في عملية سلام ولّدت أوسلو.

يتمحور بروتوكول باريس حول عدة مجالات للعلاقات الاقتصادية ربطت مصير الاقتصاد الفلسطيني بمتطلبات الاقتصاد الإسرائيلي الأكبر والأقوى. وأهم قنوات هذا "الارتهان" وأضراره الموثقة للاقتصاد الفلسطيني، الأمس واليوم وغدًا، هي:

1. اعتماد النظام التجاري الإسرائيلي (مع بعض الاستثنائيات) من تعرفة جمركية وضرائب غير مباشرة ومواصفات، الذي قد يخدم مسار إنماء الاقتصاد الإسرائيلي المصنّع والمتقدم علميًا والمنفتح تجاريًا وماليًا على أسواق العالم، لكنه غير ملائم لعملية بناء قاعدة إنتاجية متينة أو لحماية المصالح الحيوية لشعب يكافح لتحرير أرضه المحتلة، حيث ينطوي على انفتاح تجاري مبكر ومفرط يؤدي إلى طمس احتمالات بناء "صناعات وليدة" ويدمر الزراعة التقليدية ويزيد من التبعية لإسرائيل ومساره الاقتصادي ؛

2. شروط انسياب التدفقات التجارية بين مناطق السلطة الفلسطينية وإسرائيل وسائر الأسواق الأخرى، والتي تقيدت بالموانئ والمخلصين ووسائل النقل الإسرائيلية والتكاليف الإضافية المترتبة على ذلك، وبالرغم من كل التطور المحقق في القدرة المؤسسية والفنية المكتسبة لدى الجمارك الفلسطينية وقطاع الشحن والتخليص الفلسطيني، في إدارة التدفقات التجارية الحدودية بكفاءة عالية، فإنها ما زالت أسيرة ل"عنق الزجاجة" الإسرائيلية ولا وجود لهم لا على الحدود الدولية ولا داخل الموانئ، بينما لم يعد احد يتحدث عن ميناء غزة البحري (أو مطارها الدولي) المنصوص حرفيًا علي إنشائه في أولى اتفاقيات أوسلو، إعلان المبادئ لعام 1993 ؛ 

3. تسيير التبادل التجاري الزراعي بين الطرفين على أسس "التنافس الحر"، والذي تحول فعلا إلى عملية إغراق للسوق المحلية بالمنتجات الزراعية الإسرائيلية المشبعة بالإعانات العامة ودعم للأسعار وشبكات للتسويق، مما يقوض تماما فرص التنمية الزراعية والمجتمعات الريفية؛

4.    شروط دخول العمال الفلسطينيين إلى إسرائيل، والتي تحددت سقفها دائمًا بحسب مقتضيات الأمن واحتياجات سوق العمل الإسرائيلي دون مراعاة احتياجات السوق الفلسطيني، مع أن تأمين فرص عمل في إسرائيل اعتبرت من اهم مبررات قبول صيغة "الاتحاد الجمركي" ومن أهم "المكاسب" من تنفيذ البروتوكول حتى عام 2000؛

5. اعتماد العملة الإسرائيلية للتداول والتقييد بالسياسة النقدية والاقتصادية الكلية الإسرائيلية في فصل من بروتوكول باريس لا يذكر عادة عند مناقشة سلبياته المذكورة أعلاه. وكان هناك مبرر في 1994، و ما زال، للتعامل مع هذا الموضوع بمزيد من الحذر وحس رفيع من المسؤولية المهنية والوطنية. لكن نظرًا لما يسببه هذا الارتهان النقدي من تشوه في عدد من المؤشرات الاقتصادية الكلية (نسب الفائدة والتضخم وأسعار صرف العملة والأجور والقوة الشرائية عامة)، وعلى ضوء أهمية اعتماد سياسة نقدية مستقلة (أو ذاتية) لإرساء قواعد حقيقية لاقتصاد يتمتع بحيز من السياسات والسيادة، فان استثناء هذا الموضوع من الحوار الاقتصادي الحالي غير معقول، خاصة وأن السلطة استنفذت جميع "الأسلحة" الضريبية والتجارية المتبقية في "جعبة" بروتوكول باريس لمواجهة الأزمة.

وعندما قرر الرئيس أبو مازن، في أعقاب خطابه أمام الأمم المتحدة في 2011، ان يتم فحص قيود بروتوكول باريس والبدائل المتاحة، كان ربما يرى ماذا ستواجه هذه الاتفاقية من نقد وإلقاء اللوم اذا لم تتحسن الظروف السياسية والاقتصادية. وها نحن بعد عام من ذلك، وتم تجديد القرار ب"فتح" باريس دون تحديد ما هي الملفات التي ستفتح ولأي هدف تماما. وفي نفس الوقت أعلن رئيس الوزراء سلام فياض عن عدد من الاتفاقات (لم يكشف عن جميع تفاصيلها أو نصوصها كما جرت العادة في الماضي) لتحسين آليات التعاون الجمركي ولتسهيل انسياب التجارة بين الضفة الغربية وإسرائيل. كما كتب في هذه الصفحات مؤخرا كبار المفاوضين في باريس (وأوسلو)، السيد احمد قريع، بأنه إذا كان هناك خلل في الأداء الفلسطيني في موضوع البروتوكول، فإن ذلك لا يتعلق بتصميمه بقدر ما هو نتيجة الضعف في التنفيذ الفني والمؤسسي والتفاوضي الفلسطيني، وبالتالي على الجانب الفلسطيني اليوم أن يحسن الاستفادة القصوى منه.

ومع أهمية ما تشير لها هذه التطورات، من استدراك لصناع القرار لخطورة الوضع الحالي والإلحاح في إتمام تعديلات كانت من بين المطالب الاقتصادية الفلسطينية منذ أكثر من عقد من الزمن، فإن المشكلة الكبرى اليوم أنه يبدو أن القرار الاقتصادي يتجه نحو إصلاح البروتوكول، بغية المزيد من التشابك مع اقتصاد القوة القائمة بالاحتلال.

يبدو أن الرهان هو أن إسرائيل قد تقبل اليوم تنفيذ ما رفضته قبل 2000، عندما كانت م.ت.ف. في وضع اقتصادي وسياسي وتفاوضي اقوى ولم تكن إسرائيل قد أحكمت بعد قبضتها الاستعمارية وطوقها حول مناطق نفوذ السلطة الفلسطينية. وهذا في لحظة تُرفع شعارات، ليس لتجديد سريان باريس أو إطالة أمد السيطرة الاقتصادية الإسرائيلية، بل مناهضة للاتفاقية ومطالبة بفك الارتهان لاقتصاد إسرائيل، ناهيك عن تجاهل رأي غالبية الخبراء، الذي يؤكد على ضرورة التخلص من الاتحاد الجمركي والاتحاد النقدي اذا كان سيقام يوم ما اقتصاد فلسطيني "قابل للحياة" لدولة فلسطينية مستقلة.

***

مع ان بروتوكول باريس موقّع عليه من قبل طرفين، فإن السلطات الإسرائيلية تعاملت معه وعدلت من إجراءات تنفيذه دائما حسب متطلباتها الأمنية ومزاجها السياسي، وأبدا ليس حسب نصوصه أو حتى روحه. بمعنى آخر، لم يكن يومًا البروتوكول المرجعية الأساسية أو الضرورية لترشيد القرار الاقتصادي الاسرائيلي بشأن الأراضي المحتلة، بل كانت مخططات توسع المستوطنات والطرق وشبكات الطاقة والجدران الفاصلة والحواجز والمعابر وكل بنية الاستعمار هي المرجعية والدليل التي لا ترى إسرائيل سواها. من جانب آخر مع مرور السنين والانخفاض المتواصل في سقف التوقعات والمطالبات الفلسطينية، فإن البروتوكول أصبح المرجعية الاقتصادية الفلسطينية الوحيدة، التي لا يرى صانع القرار الفلسطيني سواها، وكأنه منقوش في الصخر أو أنه لا توجد نماذج اقتصادية بديلة في العالم، سوى تلك الصيغة البائتة والمتقادمة والمجحفة بحق الشعب الفلسطيني ومقدراته وقدراته الكامنة.  

ومع مواصلة الجدل حول مستقبل باريس وأوسلو (بل مدريد نفسه وعملية السلام برمتها)، سيكون من المفيد دراسة جميع الإمكانيات من النواحي القانونية والوظيفية والسياسية، ليس لتعديل أو تصحيح بروتوكول باريس أو للتنفيذ "الأمين" له، إنما باتجاه الخروج تدريجيا ومنطقيا من اعتباره المرجعية الوحيدة. وذلك حيث يمكن بالتراضي مع إسرائيل ودون تفاوض، أو بالسعي السياسي والديبلوماسي والميداني تحقيق كل ما هو ضروري لتأمين الأمن الاقتصادي للمواطن ولحماية الاقتصاد الممزق من الحرب من المزيد من التدهور، بغض النظر عن نصوص باريس.

ومن خلال برنامج سياساتي يضع نصب عينيه المحاور الأساسية للارتهان الاقتصادي ("نقاط الوجع") والحلول البديلة لمعالجتها (اليوم وليس بعد الاستقلال)، يصبح من الممكن تصوّر علاقة اقتصادية مختلفة مع الاقتصاد الإسرائيلي يبتعد عن قيود بروتوكول باريس. من المؤكد انه كما يعكس البرتوكول الاطار الاقتصادي الوحيد المسموح احتلالياً الاسترشاد به فلسطينياً، فان أوسلو (أم باريس) يبقى الاطار الوحيد المسموح لإدارة مناطق الحكم الذاتي في الضفة الغربية. ومَن كان يطالب منذ زمن بتفكيك أوسلو أو اصبح اليوم ينادي بذلك، على حق بالادعاء بان أوسلو يقتضى باريس وأنه ليس هناك ما يبرر باريس اقتصادياً سوى أوسلو. لكن ذلك لا يفرض بالضرورة أنه لا حياة لأوسلو دون باريس.

من هذا المنطلق اذًا، ومع الاعتراف بأهمية معالجة جذرية للازمة الاقتصادية، وضرورة تغيير الاطار التنظيمي الاقتصادي الحاكم (الذي بحد ذاته يكون بمثابة تغيير سياسي)، وصعوبة (بل خطورة) التخلص من أوسلو (أو باريس) بين ليلة وضحاها، وانطلاقا ايضاً من عدم قدسية أية اتفاقات تهدد "الأمن الاقتصادي القومي"، يصبح من الواجب فتح الطريق أمام حوار وطني عاجل وشامل للتدارس في السياسات التجارية والضريبية والنقدية المناسبة لمواجهة تحديات اليوم، وأن يطوى ملف باريس هذه المرة، لكي تعمل العقول الحرة وقادة الرأي الشابة والمخضرمة على رسم احتياجات وأولويات وآليات مرحلة صمود قد تطول، وبانتظار هبوب رياح أي تغيير سياسي أو اختراق ديبلوماسي قد تخلط الأوراق كلها، وتجعل كل هذا الجدل نافل وغير ضروري!

في الحلقة القادمة والأخيرة: ما هو متوفر كبدائل عن اطار باريس، وكيف يتحقق وعلى ارض الواقع باقل خسارة؟

[إضغط هنا لقراءة الجزء الأول]

Power, Rebirth, and Scandal: A Decade of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina

$
0
0

No other library in the world today courts as much international awe and controversy as the Bibliotheca Alexandrina – the resurrected library of Alexandria that was unveiled ten years ago to commemorate its forebear lost in antiquity to a fire. A UNESCO project that started off as an idea by Alexandrian academics in the 1970s quickly gained pace with the aim of becoming “the fourth pyramid”, as the toppled president Hosni Mubarak put it, and endowing the “Mediterranean region with a center of cultural and scientific excellence.”

The project was bankrolled by the governments of Egypt, the Gulf, Europe, US, Russia and international bodies. The Greeks aided in the area of antiquities, the French in the development of the science museum, and Americans for the computer systems and Internet archive. There was also a fair deal of ego investment, from the disproportionately high number of Francophone books donated by the French government (surpassing the combined total of such books in the former French colonies of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) to the clearly visible “From Greece” gift of the Alexander the Great statue on the library’s steps as a reminder --not least to visiting Macedonian nationals-- as to who lays claim to the legendary founder of the city.

On 16 October 2002 world dignitaries, including Queen Sophia of Spain and then-French president Jacques Chirac, descended for the inauguration of the Bibliotheca, as Mubarak and his wife, Suzanne, spoke of having returned a famed monument back to the pearl of the Mediterranean. It was a little over a year since the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and a few months before the Iraq War. The event provided a desperately needed reprieve from the seemingly impending “clash of civilizations” that was looming large on the world stage.


[Opening of the Bibliotheca Alexandria, 16 October 2012. Photo by Caryle Murphy]

Contrast this grandiose scene of seated world presidents, monarchs, and other VIPs, amidst the tightest security the coastal city has ever witnessed in living memory, with what happened a decade later: in January 2012, in a moment not so peculiar to Egypt’s post-revolutionary upheaval, the controversial head of the Bibliotheca, Ismail Serageldin, was locked up in his office by four hundred library staff members and refused exit until he tendered his resignation. He phoned the army who arrived with a ladder to aid his escape through his fifth floor office window in a scene that has come to characterize an emboldened Egyptian workforce.

The odyssey of the Bibliotheca goes deeper than the Mubaraks’ grandstanding platitudes of the “melting pot” and “center that unites together the Arab, Islamic, and international heritages.” The library rests at the heart of international power plays seeking to carve out a stake in the “sacred drama” of the Alexandria myth, Egypt’s political repositioning with the West, the Mubaraks’ unabashed narcissism, coupled with the self-styled “culture wars” of Alexandria’s elites. The foundational drama that midwifed the Bibliotheca would give way to a decade of corruption, abuse of power, while also positively shaping the socio-cultural landscape of the coastal city, even making it a vital player in the post-Mubarak environment. Yet to understand any of this, one needs to go back to one warm afternoon in June 1974 when an unexpected guest showed up.

When Nixon came to town for some “cosmopolitanism-gate”

In her excellently researched work, Return to Alexandria: An Ethnography of Cultural Heritage Revivalism and Museum,[1] Beverley Butler interviewed the original proponent of the library project, Mostafa El Abaddi, Professor of Greco-Roman Studies at Alexandria University. Abaddi recounts a story when Richard Nixon, two months before his infamous resignation in 1974, visited Alexandria in which the president “displayed the interest that many foreigners do. He had an idealized image of Alexandria already formed in his imagination and obviously felt a certain affinity and a nostalgia for Alexandria’s Golden Age: its Greco-Roman, Hellenistic, and cosmopolitan pasts. This became particularly obvious when Nixon asked us if we could show him the site where the ancient ‘Universal’ Library…once stood.” Except no one knew where it stood.


[Richard Nixon with Anwar al-Sadat on 12 June 1974. Photo by Robert Leroy Knudsen. From Wikimedia Commons]

Such questions, whether at home or abroad, with presidents or with tourists, were not uncommon. Academics at Alexandria University, and the dispirited elites of the city, saw an opportunity to revive one of their long-standing ideas – resurrecting the library. They were long frustrated that the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s policy of centralization saw resources and cultural activity shift to Cairo, along with the flight of foreign communities, making the coastal city a shadow of its former self. Alexandria found itself in a post-1952 Republican Egypt; disoriented and with little to contribute in an era of Pan-Arabism and anti-colonialism, it had little heritage of the former and was implicitly associated with the latter due to its Western Mediterranean (Greco-Roman) heritage. This was manifested, for example, in the diversion of funding to projects related to Arab and Pharaonic heritage – Cairo’s strength but Alexandria’s weakness. One older intellectual woman, projecting a not so uncommon Alexandrian insecurity, brashly stated to me “We were the leading cultural elites of this country.” Anecdotally, Alexandrians born pre-1952 are most likely to exhibit fondness for the monarchical era more than any other Egyptian population center.

Abaddi and his colleagues engaged in a strategic endeavor to bring the library back, as he unapologetically states:

“We could make use of specific associations of the ancient library for propaganda purposes and…We found that playing the “cosmopolitan card” was useful, as it worked very well within UNESCO’s own interests and values.”[2]

In the late 1970s, they approached the Minister of Education Mostafa Kamal Helmy, appealing to his Alexandrian roots and sympathy to the project, to be able to get the idea to the attention of UNESCO in Paris. The UNESCO director general at the time Ahmed Mukhtar Embu was swayed and upon his visit to Alexandria in the late 1980s, and stated: “If the project is implemented to the level of the idea which inspired it; it will be capable of changing the cultural map of the whole area.”[3]

The politicization of a library

Following a 1988 global design competition won by a Norwegian design, the Alexandrina project was seized from Abaddi and the scholars and usurped by a culture of politicians, bureaucrats, and diplomats operating within the mindset and framework of international and national domains. The scene that played out at the 1990 Aswan meeting to inaugurate the project, centered on President Mubarak and his wife, was one of theatrics that sucked the participants into a whirlpool of a “sacred drama” as Butler put it.


[Design of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina. Photo from Bibliotheca site]

The list of international actors bought into the “ancient Alexandrina’s myth/history and redemptive formula” and attempted to outdo each other in their statements, from the likes of Queen Noor of Jordan’s “honoring our ancestors,” French President François Mitterrand’s “Let us imagine the poets and thinkers, from all corners of the known earth, working together and cooperating with each other” to the UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor describing the historical loss as a “sobering reminder of how fragile the constructs of the civilized mind can be.” Mubarak, not to be outshone: “On the soil of Alexandria, the ancient Egyptian civilization met and merged with Greek, Roman, and Arab civilizations.” Rather than actual debate, the event was a descent into “Alexandria’s ancient imaginary”[4] and --further entrenched by the overuse of buzzwords like universal origins, progress, revivalism, peace, democracy, humanity, enlightenment, and development – was part and parcel of the library’s foundational drama that served to evoke emotional responses and unchallengeable statements. In short, it was a diplomatic Woodstock.


[Delegates at 1990 Aswan meeting. Photo from UNESCO]

These theatrics, Butler argues, enabled nation-state leaders the means to acquire or further consolidate an identity as “High Priests” to their domestic constituencies as well as elevating their international stature. Moreover, their alignment with Egypt’s cultural heritage carried weight and potency that translated into the “apparel of ‘universal’ heritage, within highly ‘dramatized’ and ‘moralizing’ performances as a means for ‘actors’ to legitimate themselves within the UN/UNESCO’s universalizing, liberal, and democratic cosmopolitics of diversity and dialogue, even if ‘at-home’ authoritarianism may block the reality of exercising such ‘values.’”[5]

Ian McNeely and Lisa Wolverton in Reinventing Knowledge: From Alexandria to the Internet provide a compelling frame of reference to understand this fixation with the project: 

"The libraries they [Ptolemy’s] founded enabled knowledge to flourish for the first time in the radically different social environment of the Hellenistic empire. Since then, libraries have been supported by an astonishing variety of political systems down to the present day. Any institution that has lasted well over two millennia has to have appealed not just to scholars and academics but to society at large. It must have fulfilled some of the deepest aspirations of ancient people, reflected the wishes of those commanding influence and resources, and meshed with the structures of social and political power."[6]

This can be seen by the reaction of the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Iraq pledged US$64 million.[7] But it was Saddam Hussein who upstaged the others, within twenty-four hours, gave the largest contribution of US$21 million to “claim his place to be the patron of world civilization/culture.”[8] Not surprisingly, the Iraqi delegation was given prime seating during the 2002 opening of the Bibliotheca (the Iraqi regime would be toppled six months later). (Click here to view a scanned copy of the Aswan Declaration in English, Arabic and French on my blog).


[Mubarak and Suzanne with heads of state. Photo from UNESCO]

Yet what does this say about the aspirations of Mubarak given that he had no regional ambitions for Egypt, was no Nasser, and a lackluster imagination did not enable him to think too far? Mubarak was following in the footsteps of Sadat’s brief utilization of Alexandria as a bridge to the West; Mubarak strategically understood the library and city to be part and parcel of his cultural reconciliation with the West and promotion of “softer steps” towards “democracy.” Just as the Spanish city of Cordoba fires up the Arab imagination, as the Moorish city that came to represent the peak of Arab and Islamic civilization, Alexandria has a powerful hold over the Western imagination, the city seen to be, in large part, the metaphysical origin and blueprint of Western culture.

Rising from the ashes

During the later construction phase, I would often pass by, on my way to see relatives in the adjacent suburb of Azarita, to gawk at the rising sundial disc library for a good ten minutes. Though disappointed that I was overseas during the opening, I beamed with some shallow delight that at least it was being inaugurated on my birthday.

Someone who was there during the opening, Tarek, a student at Alexandria University at the time, describes the ecstatic feeling: “it was high joy for everyone, and seeing so many Alexandrians happy was infectious. It was like Alexandria was back on the map again. The library we had lost 2000 years ago had come back to us." Schools had shut down for three days, public transportation, due to the intense security, halted for the day, and celebrations continued roughly for a month. 

Yet controversy marred it from the start. There were grumblings at the cost of US$220 million (US$70 million over-budget) that could have been better spent on other areas in a developing country like Egypt. Some worried that Alexandria’s crumbling infrastructure would not be able to live up to the monumental task of attending the needs and care of the UNESCO project. Also there was widespread criticism that a regime built on censorship would stifle the creative spirit and literary content of the library.

Yet for all the talk of libraries around the world keen to donate books to their spiritual forebear, it became an international scandal when numerous libraries (possibly not knowing others were doing the same) seized the opportunity to offload obsolete books they did not want; upon its inauguration, the Bibliotheca was “graced” with books such as The Guide to British Directories, 1953 and the 1974 edition of the Guinness Book of records.[9] It was also a major fiasco when Alexandria University sold its library collection the year before on the presumption the incoming catalogue of books at the Bibliotheca would be of a higher quality then what they had. It never was.[10]

Egypt and the literary world were almost given a two thousand year-rewind heart attack when a fire broke out in March 2003 on the fourth floor of the Bibliotheca. Twenty-nine people were treated for smoke inhalation but no book was affected. It is disturbing when rabid proponents describe the building as “fireproof.” – forgetting the irony of what happened to a now-famous “unsinkable” ship exactly one hundred years ago.

Nevertheless, the library has been nothing short of impressive and continues to inspire me every time I step onto its grounds. As the Bibliotheca website states, it can hold up to eight million books (at the current rate of acquisition, would take several decades to fill). It includes an internet archive, six specialized libraries, four museums, a planetarium, eight research centers, fifteen permanent exhibitions, four art galleries, a conference center, and is home to nine institutions including the Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures, and the International Federation for Library Associations. One of the gems that never fails to bring me back constantly is the manuscript museum with its priceless collection covering “120 manuscripts and rare books in a multitude of languages including Arabic and Latin,” as well as the state of the art digital archives is one of many crowning achievements of the Bibliotheca.

 
[Manuscripts Museum. Photo from Bibliotheca Alexandrina website]

Amani Massoud, a former employee of the library from 2003 to 2007, remarks, “the Library did an excellent job in shaping a new culture in the city. I have seen how the visitors’ attitude towards books and respecting the place has evolved over time. More and more students were coming in to actually read than to just hang out in this cool new place. The cultural and scientific events were diverse and enriching and brought to Alexandria many arts and performances that otherwise we would not have been exposed to.”

It would not be until the 2011 January 25 Revolution that the library would experience its own uprising and string of scandals and revelations of the past decade would come out in full force.

Revolution and the “Regime” of Ismail Serageldin

The library was shut down during the 2011 eighteen-day uprising and it brought out countless youths to form a chain around to protect it, video footage of which awed the world.

Soon after the ouster of Mubarak, Egypt’s Illicit Gains Authority discovered US$145 million, intended for the library, to be in a bank account belonging to Suzanne Mubarak.


[Guarding the library during the eighteen-days.
Photo from Bibliotheca Alexandrina website]

It was rare to find a ministry or institute in the Mubarak era that was not closely associated with personalities. For the Bibliotheca, no man inspired admiration and loathing as “Egypt’s most intelligent man” – Ismail Serageldin, a Harvard-educated intellectual with more degrees than the Dead Sea Scrolls.

Serageldin currently stands accused of squandering public funds and abusing his power. Serageldin was supposed to stand trial on 8 October 2012, but his trial has been postponed to 12 November.

In March 2012, Australian journalist Jess Hill inserted a thorough investigative piece, “The Angry Librarians of Alexandria”, into the controversy. Hill poses to Serageldin “…Your employees aren’t contesting their wages…their most pressing concern is the quality of the library’s academic output.” Serageldin explodes at this. “What?! Please! Please! This is such total nonsense…The library is one of the most distinguished institutions in the world. We collaborate with the Library of Congress, the Smithsonian... For heaven’s sake, who are these people to discuss the academic output of the library? They know nothing about the academic output.”


[Protesters against Seragaldin. Photo by Jess Hill.]

The reports on Serageldin’s character are consistent, as one person described him to me following an encounter: “A worldly, intelligent man, with a fair amount of self-entitlement on board. It seemed to me that he was very used to getting his own way, and didn’t hold people who disagreed with him in very high esteem.” A glance of his speeches and Twitter feed seems to support the view of a pontificating director.

Massoud, who worked as Research Assistant to Serageldin (October 2006 to August 2007), tends to be more sympathetic:

“I have nothing but the highest regards for him. People may disagree on many things surrounding him but the man is a genius. I am yet to meet someone with his intellectual capabilities…I sincerely believe no other person would have been capable of turning the Library, in a very short span of time, into the place it became. If it weren't for him I can only imagine the library turning into yet another equally unpromising government institution.”

When I asked Massoud to explain all the hostility towards the director, she responds:

“The main problem with the Library was that it was not an institution as much as it was one person, which is Serageldin. All the department heads seemed to work towards impressing and pleasing him. That would differ from one manager to the other…there was no fair salary framework and the differences [in pay] were shocking. That alone is sufficient to create a lot of resentment. There was a lot of internal favoritism when it came to promotions or travel and privileges and there was a lot of financial low-scale corruption. The kind that would go unnoticed but collectively amounts to a lot. Some managers for example would do personal trips and record them down as business trips getting all the compensation that comes with it. Working hard was not always the road to success and promotion but there were a lot of other factors involved.”

Aly El Raggal’s critiques are less compromising than those of Massoud. Having briefly worked in the heated days of the Bibliotheca in 2011, he resigned in anger at the director, and told me: “Let’s face it, Serageldin brought to the Bibliotheca an elite driven non-inclusive discourse with talks of enlightenment and rationalization that recreates social divides. Also being picked by the first lady was no surprise.”

 It is not uncommon to come across sympathizers who argue that the director’s association with the former first lady was imposed, and that the only way he could acquire such a position was through her. As Massoud states: “The only way he could have avoided that is if he had turned down the job to start with.” Raggal shoots back: “He is after all the former vice-president of the World Bank. He was handpicked because of his neoliberal views that were compatible with the Mubarak regime’s programs.”


[With Mubarak's portrait overseeing them, Serageldin with former first lady Suzanne Mubarak at an event convened at the Bibliotheca in January 2007. Photo from childfamily.gr]

Raggal argues that Serageldin was integral to the former regime yet chose to play up revolutionary credentials despite his authoritarian-style behavior. Raggal points to the commencement of Serageldin’s administration of the Bibliotheca at a time the privatization movement took control of business life in Egypt. These were the days when the World Bank was urging the opening of markets, economic restructuring and liberalization of the economy, in addition to American neoliberal policies that countries such as Egypt were pressured to adopt. In this environment, the rich-poor gap grew wider. Also combined with the corruption and favoritism plaguing the library, this led to a stratified environment. As Massoud points out:  “When I first worked at the Library, with a Master’s degree, I was paid less than 1000 EGP when others, whether in the same department or in other departments would get ten times as much.”


[Alexandria Library staff protest for the dismissal of Serageldin. Photo by Ahmed Tarek.]

Raggal points out that there was a clear connection between the rules and procedures governing the World Bank and those governing the Library and other organizations in Egypt. He also stresses that Serageldin adopted the same economic approach of the World Bank and the same political approach to guide and strengthen the interests and system led by Mubarak and his cronies in the National Democratic Party (NDP).

I further asked Raggal to clarify how the library as an institution could sustain the system. He responded boldly: “The library became one of the most important pillars of this corrupt system in the practice of so-called soft power by some of its NDP oriented youth conferences, but it also solidified questionable economic relations and interests. It is no coincidence, for example, that Medicare and health insurance services for the library’s employees were owned by NDP figure Hossam Badrawi. So what we see is a network of corrupt power relations working seamlessly through organizations and companies, and the Bibliotheca, which was supposed to be a center for development, civilization and what not, is made a mockery of.”

In a surreal twist of fate packed with ironies, a two-day conference at the Bibliotheca took place on 16 June 2010 that illustrated a profound divide between the institute and Egyptian society. The conference titled “A New Beginning: US-Muslims Relations”, (in hindsight, quite premature given the Arab uprisings were six months away) was quite telling because it came just ten days after Khaled Saeed’s death – the young Alexandrian who was beaten to death by policemen and would spark the swift countdown to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution (See my Jadaliyya piece on Khaled’s life and death: Saeeds of Revolution: De-Mythologizing Khaled Saeed). A large number of silent protesters in black formed a chain outside the grounds to protest Khaled’s death and the hated emergency laws. Georgetown University Media scholar Adel Iskandar, a guest at the conference, noted that security was so tight that it was made extremely difficult for international delegates to be a privy to the historic youth protest movement. Moreover, the library's facilities themselves were practically off limits to members of the public to ensure the public protest movement unfolding outside would not spill over into the Library. Incidentally, there were four tracks in the conference, namely Youth, IT, Media, and Women – four crucial components that would be integral to the dynamics of the revolution that was soon to come.


[Silent protest stand for Khaled Saeed in 2010. Photo from Elshaheed Facebook page.]

On the panel was a young woman attendee who brought up the protests outside the venue as an example of youth empowerment. This was followed by a chilling silence by those present. As Iskandar aptly put it, "catatonia had struck." No one spoke – agreeing with her would translate into a political statement against the sitting government, essentially the hosts of the event. Speaking against her would appear as an endorsement of police brutality. The comment dissipated into the auditorium’s air – the usual international indifference towards the Mubarak regime’s brutal human rights record.

I queried Iskandar as to what degree could Serageldin be responsible for the atmosphere of censorship given it was “normal” policy and practice at the time. He said: “He certainly didn’t jump up and personally shut people up, it was simply clear that no discussion of politics was permissible. He may not have necessarily micromanaged the event, because he didn't need too – Serageldin isn’t just a person, he is a regime.”

A former intern who spoke on condition of anonymity stated: “One of the anecdotes that we were told when we started was that there was a retreat every year where all the heads of departments would convene, discuss the plans etc. That was at the beginning [of Bibliotheca’s early days]. Along the years it has become a two-day retreat where nobody but Serageldin only speaks for two straight days.”

Massoud urges the need for the library to create a separate identity from the one entangled with Serageldin. She voiced an ominous concern: “My fear was always that the place will stop running if he ever decided to leave and that fear still holds. More effort needs to be put into ensuring a skilled efficient staff and mechanisms to turn the place into a self-running institution that does not count on the director's name for success.”

Radwa, a former intern at the library, lamented: “The library's lack of outreach to the Alexandrian community, although many employees want to do that but for some reason their attempts haven't been successful. I can attest that there are some creative and very dedicated people with brilliant ideas and initiatives but suffer from the narrow mindedness of their bosses who are not keen to innovate.” Both Radwa and Massoud concur that the library is way overstaffed which is creating many of the inefficiencies in the system.  

How the Library Shaped Alexandria’s Social Landscape

Despite all the criticisms of the library, I can say, from personal experience with youth groups, the social changes it promoted are immeasurable. Considerably, the library has become an agent of socialization that is shaping Alexandria’s sense of self and social identity. It helps the young to better appreciate reading and the arts, realize their human capacities and negotiate the social and physical environment they have inherited.[11] This is because the library, like mosques and churches, is integrating itself into the social structure of Alexandria, and by extension, Egypt. It can therefore aid the youth in reinterpreting and reconstituting their role in post-revolutionary Egypt. Importantly, it plays a vital ideational counterbalance to conservative Islamist trends in the coastal city.


[Protesters gathered by Bibliotheca Alexandrina on 11 February 2011 demand
the resignation of Mubarak (He would do so that evening). Photo by Mohamed Hossny.]

While some criticize the library for not having fulfilled the dream of reviving robust scholarship, that is too much to expect in a mere decade. The dearth of scholarship is partly a by-product of a dysfunctional education system that is in dire need of reform. (I partly address this question in my September piece, Turning the tide on Egypt’s sinking book reading culture.) Despite this limitation, the library has done quite remarkable work in the context of the revolution. It has held seminars, debates, workshops and symposiums on how to move Egypt forward. Where the education system churns out rote learners, the Bibliotheca’s events are aimed at nurturing critical thinkers. Significantly, when Napoleon’s institute burnt in Cairo amidst protests in December 2011, it was the Bibliotheca team that was sent out to recover manuscripts and undertake a process of restoration.

The sacred drama played out in the 1990 elite-saturated Aswan meeting has been acquisitioned by much of the youth and Egypt’s growing civil society. They have taken Queen Noor’s “honoring our ancestors” and transformed it into “honoring our descendants.” A progressive outlook shapes their role and activity in Egypt’s future. This was not just marked by their reaction to the upheaval of the revolution’s eighteen days and the human chain they formed around the library, but until this day, the Bibliotheca forms a crucial venue for activists, protesters, scholars, artists, musicians and students, and not to mention the new type of tourist – the “book tourist.” The library acts as the soul of the revolutionary youth community and civil groups. It also plays an inadvertent role in influencing the style and content of the protests that congregate in the nearby courtyard of Qaed Ibrahim Mosque (or as some call it, “Alexandria’s Tahrir Square”). The library’s location alongside the colleges of arts, law and commerce enhances the creativity and refinement of the protest movements.


[Syrian activists gather outside the Bibliotheca to rally support for the Syrian Revolution. Photo by Amro Ali.]

The cynics will continue to worry about the library’s future from the likes of President Mohamed Morsi and his group, the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet the Bibliotheca Alexandrina, as Tarek notes, will continue to “underpin the civic spirit, and be above the problems that divide Egyptian society, and I believe the library will greatly help lay the crucial cultural groundwork for Egypt as it transitions towards democracy, pluralism, freedom to think and so on. It will take time, but the library will only get stronger and more dynamic in the new Egypt.” The Brotherhood are just but one actor on the stage, a dominant one for sure, but Egypt is bigger than Morsi and his affiliates, and Alexandria – which voted overwhelmingly for a secular-leaning presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi – is becoming much more socio-politically diverse. The library is clearly reflecting such trends and there is an international stake to allow it to continue in that manner. The talented array of staff members now see their roles as performers of checks and balances against any corrupt practices, and they are not afraid to march in their hundreds up against the “smartest man in Egypt.” When all is said and done, the Bibliotheca will outlive the Mubaraks, Serageldins and Morsis.

The poet Jorge Luis Borges once lamented “I, who had always thought of Paradise in form and image as a library.” That “paradise”, in many respects, has returned to Alexandria – with a new script, new actors, and, this time, a more compelling sacred drama.


[1] Beverley Butler, Return to Alexandria: an ethnography of cultural heritage, revivalism, and Museum History (Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press Inc., 2007)

[2] Ibid., 97.

[3] Ibid., 98.

[4] Ibid., 121-22.

[5] Ibid., 110.

[6] Ian F. McNeely, Lisa Wolverton, Reinventing Knowledge: From Alexandria to the Internet (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc.: 2008) 5.

[7] GOAL 1990. Bibliotheca Alexandrina: Record of the Inaugural Meeting of the International Commission for the Revival of the Ancient Library of Alexandria, Aswan, 11-12 February 1990. Alexandria: Goal Publications. 7.

[8] Butler, Return to Alexandria, 121.

[9] MacFaruhar, R. 2001. Shadow of a Library, The New York Times 11/5/01:20

[10] Butler, Return to Alexandria, 183.

[11] Joan Ferrante, Sociology: A Global Perspective (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2012), 91.

The US Media’s Schizophrenic Approach to Mass Shootings

$
0
0

On July 20, 2012, twelve people died and many were injured when James Holmes attacked a crowd of moviegoers at the premiere of The Dark Knight Rises in Aurora, Colorado. The coverage of the event by the American media distracted the audience from a necessary conversation about race in the United States. It is time to reflect on how being a white middle-class male may also be part of the equation.

Distractions

The first distracting trajectory was the conversation about gun control. Only months ahead of the US presidential elections, politicians across the spectrum expressed their opinions on issues of gun ownership. Gun rights cheerleaders, quite unconvincingly, went so far as to argue that the Aurora shooting could have been prevented had other people in the audience been armed. Those statements by right-wing politicians fueled various debates, none of which addressed the real issue at hand: who is using those guns, how and why? 

The second, and more dangerous distracting trajectory lies in the portrayal of James Holmes himself. Many alternative outlets were quick to suggest that, had the shooter been a Muslim, the media would have hinted at his faith for somewhat ingraining in him a culture of violence and terrorism rather than casting him in a positive light. 

Double standards

To be sure, the act perpetrated by James Holmes does not appear to be an act of terrorism, if terrorism implies the “systematic use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring about a particular political objective” (as defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary). However, the 1995 Oklahoma city bombings, and more recently, the Norway killings by Anders Breivik, were terrorist acts committed by white people though they were rarely qualified as such.

The conversation about terrorism, albeit misused in the case of James Holmes, raises interesting questions. Why do we hint at a person’s culture as having triggered their violent behaviour while refusing to concede that white people could be socialized toward violence? The Aurora shooting reveals how the media, and by extension, the general public, make sense of events in highly racialized ways.

Assessing the impact of the media and its representations on the general public is empirically challenging. However, one can be certain that, had a Bangladeshi man ordered a fraction of the phenomenal quantity of explosives Holmes purchased, the FBI would have been knocking at his door in no time. Holmes, however, was able to buy dangerous substances through regular mail and quietly booby trap his house with them without arousing suspicion. Neither the neighbors, nor the mailing personnel or the company sending the explosives to a residential home seemed alarmed by his purchases.

Unpacking white privilege

In a 1989 piece called White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, Peggy McIntosh wrote: "I was taught to see racism only in individual acts of meanness, not in invisible systems conferring dominance on my group." She provides a list of 50 advantages that white people have over people of other races in their everyday lives, advantages that seem equally ubiquitous today. Number 21 states: “I am never asked to speak for all the people of my racial group.”

After a Korean student shot dead 34 students on Virginia Tech campus in 2009, some in the Korean American community expressed their fear of a possible revenge as a result of the act. Korean groups offered their sympathy to victims' families. The internalization of an individual act by an entire community is something unknown to white people. To put it more bluntly, we have yet to see white groups apologizing for Holmes’ actions. Why would they? Sadly, not everybody in this country has the luxury of finding the connections between an individual act and his larger community to be irrelevant.

As underlined by Hugo Schwyzer, a professor of history and gender studies at Pasedena City College, the media plays an important role in connecting an individual’s behavior to a socio-cultural stereotype. In the case of Seung-Hei Cho, the Virginia Tech shooter, “media attention focused on the likelihood that a Korean culture unwilling to acknowledge mental illness helped drive the young man to commit the worst mass murder in U.S. history.”

Such negative socio-cultural stereotyping does not exist for whites. The description of Holmes in the news portrayed him at best as an outlier from his own racial group, and at worst as someone brilliant gone mad. Holmes, a former “smart” neuroscience PhD student was a “psychiatric patient”, described by friends as a “loner”, and a recent college drop-out. Those attributes do not draw any negative connections between his culture and his act. Quite the contrary, the articles and headlines conveyed a sense of surprise at an unexpected act that could only be the result of mental illness. Portrayals of shooters who belong to minority communities are less apologetic, as if their crime was expected.

A white pathology?

Schwyzer goes further and suggests possible ways of using the racial lens to understand acts perpetrated by whites. Like others before him, he notes that most mass murders in the United States have been committed by white middle-class males. By suggesting that “every killer makes his pain another’s problem. But only those who’ve marinated in privilege can conclude that their private pain is the entire world’s problem with which to deal”, Schwyzer argues that being socialized as a white middle-class male cannot be separated from an individual’s experience and thus can trigger violent behaviors, too.

This argument, which needs to be appreciated for its attempt at breaking the so-called color blind policy which holds the white race as its default, is not without its flaws. For one thing, it is becoming increasingly difficult to treat white men as an insulated group. One cannot ignore the fact that women and other minorities have enjoyed, to some extent, more socio-economic opportunities in recent decades. Does that mean that white men are more prone to becoming violent, or that the notion of privilege will be a phenomenon across gender and racial lines?

Also, many countries have historically favored some group over others, but mass shooting does not seem to be an outlet used to express anger over disenfranchisement. Michael Moore, in an incisive blog entry about the Aurora shooting (named It's the Guns – But We All Know, It's Not Really the Guns) explains how the US is “responsible for over 80% of all the gun deaths in the 23 richest countries combined". So what is it about the US that allows for such public display of violence on the part of white men?

Scholarly articles on the correlation between white privilege and mass shootings are slowly emerging (although it has to be noted that scholars such as Peggy McIntosh will argue that the use of the word ”privilege” is problematic since whites did not earn their whiteness; they were born with it). In an article about the phenomenon of suicide by mass murder, Rachel Kalish and Michael Kimmel point out the fact that “only when white boys began to open fire in their schools did psychologists and journalists rush to diagnosis of mental illness.”

In addition to presenting James Holmes as an outlier of his group who could only have been afflicted by mental illness, the media understood how he conducted the act in a racialized way. CNN reporters were quick to point at how “cold” and “calculated” his action had been. In A Perverse Kind of Sense: Urban Spaces, Ghetto Places and the Discourse of School Shootings, Abraham P. Deleon addresses those very biases that distinguish between white and black crime by noting that “whereas the white school shooter is calculating, intelligent and conniving, urban crime is constructed as random, wild and tied to 'ghetto' issues such as gangs, reputation and revenge.”

In recent decades, some journalists have advocated for a “color blind” policy when it comes to reporting crimes, unless a suspect’s description is essential for the investigation. This color blind policy is a mere fantasy. We might not be as bold about making black and white distinctions in articles, but the understanding of violence is mediated in various outlets based on racialized understandings and socio-cultural stereotypes which recognize white as the norm. How else can we explain that all communities, except whites, internalize the behaviors of individuals of their groups and reflect on the impact that such actions will have on them?

[This article was originally published on openDemocracy.]

Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (October 16)

$
0
0

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

Regional and International Relations


Saudi Arabia ‘insulted’ by UK inquiry Frank Gardner reports on the Saudi government’s reaction to a parliamentary review of the UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, on BBC.

Reports and Opinions

Saudi: Corruption, dictators the enemy, not Israel Ilene Prusher writes on the Saudi journalist Abdulateef al-Mulhim’s article “Arab Spring and the Israeli enemy,” in The Jerusalem Post.

Emirati nerves rattled by Islamists rise Ian Black examines the United Arab Emirates’ increasing fear of protests and of Islamists, which led it to accuse the Guardian and BBC of receiving Qatari money after publishing a statement by an Islah activist in the Guardian.

The Myth of Kuwaiti Democracy Mona Kareem describes the transformation of the Kuwaiti political scene since the 1980s, in al-Akhbar English.

Crisis in Yemen

Yemen: time for Hadi to move beyond managing power struggles Atiaf Zaid Alwazir argues that the Yemeni president’s early promising measures were followed by the adoption of his predecessor’s tactics, in The Guardian. 

Yemeni Officer at U.S. Embassy in Sana Is Shot Dead Nasser Arrabyee reports on the death of Qassim Aklan during an attack on the US Embassy in the Yemeni capital, in The New York Times.

Families of killed Yemenis demand Saleh trial A news report on charges filed by families of Yemenis killed during anti-regime protests last year to bring ex-government officials, including the former Yemeni president, to justice, on Al-Jazeera English. 

Yemen’s Universities Want Rid of Military Rule Atiaf Alwazir writes on Yemeni students’ demand to end military presence on campus, in al-Akhbar English.

Repression in Bahrain

How the police recruit radicals An article on the ongoing repression of protesters in Bahrain, in The Economist.

Police in Bahrain clash with protesters A news report on the latest anti-government protests in Bahrain, on Al-Jazeera English.

Bahrain king blasts ‘foreign’ links to unrest in swipe at Iran A news report on King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa’s blaming of Iran for protests in the kingdom.

Human Rights Watch

Bahrain: Overturn Rights Activist’s Conviction A statement by the organization demanding the release of Nabeel Rajab.

Media

Kuwaiti Presenter Yusra Muhammad Affronts the Islamists Mariam Abdulla reflects on the Kuwaiti media ministry’s legal action against Muhammad for her report on underage prostitution, in al-Akhbar English.

Al-Arabiya’s Fabrications: Methods of Bandar As’ad AbuKhalil writes a critique of Al-Arabiya’s reliance on fabrication in its coverage of Hezbollah, in al-Akhbar English.


Arabic


ملف من الأرشيف: سميحة الخليل

$
0
0

[”ملف من الأرشيف“ هي سلسة تقوم ”جدلية“ بنشرها بالعربية والإنجليزية بالتعاون مع جريدة ”السفير“ اللبنانية. الملفات ستكون لشخصيات أيقونية تركت أثراً عميقاً في الحقل السياسي والثقافي في العالم العربي.]

 

 

الإسم: سميحة

الشهرة: الخليل

إسم الأب: يوسف القبج

إسم الأم: حيلمة طوقان

مكان الولادة: عنبتا

تاريخ الولادة: 1923

تاريخ الوفاة: 1999

إسم الزوج: سلامة خليل

الأولاد:خليل/ساجي/سائد/سمير/سميح

الجنسية: فلسطينية

الإختصاص: الأدب العربي

الفئة: سياسة

المهنة:عضو في المجلس الوطني الفلسطيني

Gaza Water Confined and Contaminated

$
0
0

"Take ANY city in the world and cut it off from its hinterland and then try to organise "automonous" water supply within and for the city! No, city, I repeat, no city in the world would be able to survive."  --C. Messerschmid to Visualizing Palestine 
 
The Gaza Strip is in its sixth year of siege, in the 21st year of closure and the 46th year of occupation. The Coastal Aquifer, shared with Israel is its only accessible source of water, polluted at 90-95%. Decades of (systematic) de-development and, since 2007, persisting restrictions on material and equipment entry means maintenance works are on hold. In 2008-2009, Israeli military attacks - Operation Cast Lead - aggravated the damage on wells along with other deliberate and wanton (Goldstone) human and infrastructural losses. Scarcity of water sources have resulted in the over-abstraction of water, accelerating natural brackish water inflows from the SE (Negev) and seawater intrusions from the W (Mediterranean). Electricity cuts contribute to the pollution of water due to sewage interruptions on sewage treatment. 26% of illnesses in the Gaza Strip are water related. Gaza Water Confined and Contaminated communicates the tip of the iceberg. 

 

[Image originally published by Visualizing Palestine.]

Yehouda Shenav's "Beyond the Two-State Solution"

$
0
0

…the Green Line is a cultural myth, harnessed to advance the economic-political and cultural interests of a broad liberal Jewish stratum of society in Israel.  This is the source of the paradox: The principle obstacle for a shift in the historical language resides with the liberal classes frequently referred to as 'leftist', who have a significant impact in shaping and offering solutions to the conflict. This liberal “left” offers an outlook on the conflict derived from a cultural and politico-economic position which is both sectorial and conservative.  In fact, among the Jewish political right there has long been broad agreement that the 1948 war is the pivotal question which needs to be addressed – rather than concealed.  Consequently, a renewed thinking about a solution to the conflict calls for us to redraw the Israeli political map – including reshaping the conventional distinction between "left" and "right" – in a manner which may produce surprising new alliances. These are the tasks I undertake in this essay.  
- Yehouda Shenhav

In his book Beyond the Two-State Solution, Yehouda Shenhav makes an unusual and unsettling argument. It is an argument that targets the Israeli left in the English-speaking world and those who take their heed of them. Shenhav argues that what appears on its face a "progressive" position on the question of Israel and Palestine, is in fact censorial and duplicitous. The Israeli left's sanctimonious insistence in the face of the Jewish settlers of the West Bank that the settlements were illegal and that the proper borders of Israel are those of 1967, is nothing short of an ideological maneuver. The purpose of the maneuver is to obfuscate the fact that Israel itself is noth­ing short of a huge settlement project that was founded upon the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and the systematic expropriation of the land they left behind. The ideological maneuver is accomplished, according to Shenhav, through a shift in terminology from "the Green Line" to "the 1967 borders:" "the Green Line" signified the borders Israel fell upon in 1949 following the 1948 war, but after the 1967 war, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, these very same borders came to be called "the 1967 borders." They were the same borders but they were now called something different. This transmutation in sign from "Green Line" to "1967 borders" in the language of the left is premised on a moral distinction: the 1948 war and the outcome it yielded was legitimate-- not so with 1967 and the occupation/settlement in its aftermath.

The translation of Shenhav's book into English is a welcome intervention because it is not just the Israeli left that doesn't want to "touch" 1948. The Jewish left and its allies in the US also insist, often vociferously, on dating Israel's injustice to 1967. Any Palestinian who has attempted to enter coalition politics with the progressive forces in the US on the question of Israel and Palestine feels the heavy handed, almost authoritarian manner in which such moral distinctions are made. There is a demand by one's allies that one should forget 1948, that one should split one's own diasporic experience, one's uprooting, one's trajectory over time, so that it tracks that of the moral judgment of the Israeli left. Many of us Palestinians, who have attempted (and stubbornly refuse to despair of) such coalition politics, whether on the streets, in activist organizations, in media interventions, in academia as activist students or professors, have had the experience of "stepping on someone's toe" by evoking 1948-- the very hint of it, it would seem, causes a meltdown of sorts, a denunciatory rage, a charge that we have misunderstood our well-deserved and "self-inflicted" banishment, that we should just get on with the international (read “Western”) consensus, that the national (list) division premised on theirs in 1948, ours in 1967, is a just and rightful one; in short, a demand that we should “put up and shut up already” about 1948.

In the academic literature in the US, the situation is just as dire, and the defense of the moral distinction as tight. In legal scholarship, for instance, the farthest to the left on the political spectrum one can get is a law review article that denounces Israeli occupation of the "territories," declares the "transfer of the occupier's nationals to the occupied territories" as violating international law, and demands the dismantlement of the "settlements" and the "return to the 1967 borders." Such an author might marvel at the Israeli occupation's tenacity: an occupation that has stumped the International Law of Occupation with its duration, per­sistence and the legal adroitness and resourcefulness of its administrators and national apologists; and one that has, ironically enough, by transferring half a million of its own nationals into the occupied "territories," proven itself abso­lutely correct in denying it's an "occupation."

From this position on the left, one can only move to the right. The progressive author insisting on "withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967" is then dragged into a debate with the apologist for Israel. Such an apologist would insist that these territories could not be considered occupied in my legal sense since no legitimate sovereign authority con­trolled them when they were occupied by Israel in 1967. This was no-man's-land, according to the apologist, and therefore the rule prohibiting transfer of population doesn't apply. This was no man's land and therefore there was no rush for the Israeli authorities to leave. This was no-man’s-land and therefore the humane and humanitarian standards limiting the conduct of the occupier vis-à-vis the occupied population do not apply, though the Israeli authorities could choose to follow them out of generosity, rather than by rule of law. The author might go as far as adopting the Israeli term “Judea and Samaria” in referring to the “territories,” thereby completing in sign what the author had made in argument. Then is the never-failing argument about "security" and "terrorism," with reference to which everything from building a fence, to dismembering territory through check­points, to waging a war on Gaza, to passing a discriminatory legislation, to building yet another settlement, is justified ­a discourse that "confuses cause and effect" as Shenhav so rightly puts it.

From left to right, no robust political position exists in the US that would be based on the injustice of 1948. One can appreciate, in this light, the radical-ness of Shenhav's insistence on evoking politically the injustices of that year. It would seem by doing so he is pushing the left to be more left.

But Shenhav might not be too pleased with this charac­terization of the politics of his project. As you reach the last part of his book, you find that he aims at nothing less than confusing the political spectrum of left to right altogether on the issue of Israel/Palestine.

Shenhav doesn't just charge the Israeli left with selec­tive morality (obscuring 1948 and highlighting 1967), he also contends that the move to settlements in the territories that the Israeli left finds so objectionable was in large part a convenient resolution of an ethnic/class conflict internal to Israel (among its Jewish population) that the ruling elites welcomed and in which their victims found comfort and respite. The "Third Israel" Mizrahim, ultra-orthodox Jews and poor Russians – found “migrating” to settlements in the new land and escape from racism and marginality in Israel proper, and their racial superiors (the Ashkenazi) found in such migration an easy solution to the social and economic crisis that had intensified over the past three decades due to Israel’s adoption of neo-liberal economics. In fact, Shenhav stresses that the settlement project has been most profitable for the ruling elites of Israel – the left being members of this class – in the most convenient and self-serving ways. It has, on the one hand, allowed the elites to profit economi­cally from building the settlements while waxing eloquent and nostalgic for an Israel that was morally unburdened by their existence. They have built walls and highways to pro­tect the settlers while blaming them for obstructing the way to a two-state solution. They have provided military support for the settlers while decrying their increasing political influ­ence in Israel.

If the Israeli left is duplicitous, and the settlers - a good part of them, at least - are migrants from oppression, then, surely, one should get off one's moral high ground and develop some sympathy for the latter. This would only com­plete the "Hip" that Shenhav started by describing the Israeli left as not so left. In this case, then, the right, classically sym­pathetic towards the settlements, might not be so "right."

Shenhav points, for instance, to the ways in which Mizrahi participation in the administration of the occupied territories given their mastery of the Arabic language -his own family, of Iraqi origins, being an example - was liberating for them. It provided opportunities for upward mobility for this com­munity, otherwise doomed to manual labor or lower-rung jobs inside Israel, through managerial work in the military administration of the territories. It has also allowed them to interact with other Arabic-speaking people who have experienced, as migrants from the Arab world to Israel, a diminution in value of their Arabic language and culture by the general Ashkenazi public.

He also points to the deconstructive sensibility of some of the settlers themselves who bring to light what the Israeli left keeps hidden through its moral high ground: there is no real difference between the settlement project in the occupied territories and the settlement project that is Israel proper, those settlers would insist. Indeed, some settlers, as Shenhav points out, are more attached to the land of than the state of Israel itself, and would rather share the land with the Palestinians from sea to river, including returning refu­gees, than be forced out of biblical "Judea and Samaria" to go to live in the state of Israel. If the left is not so left, then surely the right is not so right, and there is some left to be gleaned from its positions?

Of course, Shenhav is perfectly aware that, even if there are understandable reasons for settlers to move to the West Bank, they have done so at the expense of the Palestinians. Some Jews win more than other Jews in this ongoing set­tlement project called Israel, but there is this one consistent loser: the Palestinians. Shenhav doesn't argue with that at all; he is happy to accede that not only has the Ashkenazi Jew built his empire on the grand larceny of Palestinian land in the aftermath of 1948, but also his brethren less-esteemed Jews were complicit in no less of a crime in the West Bank, even if they were running away from sibling tyranny. Still Shenhav wants us to sympathize with at least some of the settlers; even more, he's arguing that those settlers should just stay put!

That the settlers should stay comes as a surprising twist in Shenhav's otherwise on-its-face-radical argument insisting on the injustice of 1948. At this point in your reading, you will start to move uneasily in your chair!

If you had, especially as a Palestinian, imagined a land-free-of-the-Jews, even if it were a fragment of Palestine, on which you can project your Volksgeist, and call it a state, of if you were a progressive Jew who had always thought that a just solution would necessarily require “unsettling” the settlers, evacuating the settlements, so that you could have a land to attach your Volksgeist to, Shenhav doesn’t offer such a place.  That settlers should stay – a classically right-wing position – acquires with Shenhav a different political resonance, though what kind takes a bit of work to comprehend.

Shenhav's argument for settlers to stay is premised on an implicit trade-off: recognition of Nakba and the return of refugees. Settlers should stay in all the areas in Palestine, from river to sea. No areas of Jewish habitation should be disturbed, no matter 'what the historic inequities. That is Shenhav's position, for which the return of refugees is traded. But if this is so, where would the refugees return, you might ask? Everywhere else is Shenhav's answer. Why? “Because a wrong cannot be remedied by another wrong." Villages that were destroyed and resettled by Jews will not he destroyed again," he declares.

Instead:

…new communities may be constructed – in the Galilee, in the Negev and in the West Bank and Gaza. The refugees' resettlement will be on individual basis (for example, in big cities like Haifa) or on communal basis, by rebuilding some of the destroyed communities on new sites. The building of new sites will be based on a general outlined plan nego­tiated by the two peoples, and the redistribution of space will not harm the existing and already settled population. The refugees will be rehabilitated and afforded broad-based affirmative action. Those who will choose not to return will receive financial compensation. The eradicated communities will retain their mono-national characters if they request it.

Such a proposal would require, according to Shenhav, that Palestinians give up, on the one hand, “the narrative of destruction and redemption” and replace it with the idea of return as a “multivalent process.”  On the other, it would require of the Israelis giving up "the land that Jews exclusive preference."

But it is not just the idea of prohibiting the undoing of a historic wrong through the commission of another that inspires Shenhav's proposal. It is something far more affirmative than that. Shenhav is inspired by what he calls "consociational democracy," which he describes as "a model of partnership that presupposes the national and religious rights of both peoples, which will be expressed through dividing the space into smaller national spaces and into reli­gious and secular communities, canton/federation-like." The presence of historic wrongs -no empty land to inherit, as Zionism had claimed, but a land encumbered by a people who had to be expelled so the land could be inherited - all this doesn't deny that Jews also have "national and religious rights" to the land, and it is in accommodation to these rights, as well as to those of the Palestinians, that Shenhav proposes a form of joint-living-based "consociational democracy" as a solution.

Shenhav's solution is an intermediate one, between a one-state solution – which he opposes because it "does not consider the fact that most of the population of the area concerned is both religious and nationalist," irreducible to a "homogeneous public with individual interests" and a two-state solution which ignores the that respective communities’ nationalist and religious interests are spread across the whole land of Palestine and cannot be coercively divided through arbitrary boarders.  This is an interesting proposal that I would like to briefly un-pack to determine whether the political “flip” which Shenhav attempted can be done. I will do so by asking how it would line up with the interests of the Palestinians.

How the Palestinians, the biggest losers in the drama of Jewish settlement of Palestine, would fare under Shenhav’s consociational democracy is an interesting question. We don't really have much to go on by way of a proposal from Shenhav, merely a sketch and an outline. But whether one is discussing a one-state, two-state, or consociational democ­racy, the distributional consequences for Palestinians in relation to Jews simply depends on the details of the institu­tional structures being proposed and the extent to which they respond to historical inequities by opening up the current regime. After all, the current Oslo regime could very well be described as "consociational democracy" that is premised on an idea of "joint sovereignty," which Shenhav makes much of. The trouble of course, is that under Oslo, land, wealth, and power are tilted so much to one side at the expense of the other -so that one, the Jews, gets a "surplus" in national­ism and sovereignty, and the other, the Palestinians, a gross deficit of both.

Shenhav does propose an amendment of the land regime to remove the in-built preferences for Jews, to allow for land the refugees can return to. He, however, conditions transfer of land to considerations of keeping Jewish communities "undisturbed" as communities. This is a general formula premised on a kind of balancing, and, depending on how it is legally and institutionally worked out, could either turn out badly for the Palestinians (giving them little in return stamping Jewish settlements with legality) or turn out well for them (the reward for recognition of legality of would well worth their while).

It would seem to me that there are two primary challenges to Shenhav’s consociational democracy model. The UN Resolution 194 (December 11, 1948) grants the Palestinians right of return to properties they lost in 1948, a right that they can exercise by returning to their actual homes where ever they might be, and if they choose not to, they are entitled to compensation for the “loss of damage to [such] property."[1] If this is the case, why would Palestinians accede to a regime, such as the one proposed by Shenhav, that would limit the exercise of that right to a "chosen" few (in the cities) and balances its exercise with the consideration of not disturbing the Jewishness of established communities? Even if they accede to not returning to those properties, would they be able to rent them out to their current Jewish occupiers? Can they become landlords in Jewish cities? If so, do they have the right to sell those properties and buy others inside Jewish cities? In other words, if they themselves cannot physically inhabit and reside in Jewish communities, can they become investors and capital owners in them? This question is deeply related to the second challenge.

If returning refugees can only reside in "Palestinian" com­munities, and the current structural relationship -spatial and economic of Palestinian to Jewish communities is the outcome of the latter swallowing up and appropriating the material and symbolic resources of the former over a long period of time, to what land exactly is the returning refugee returning? To be cramped along with other fellow Palestinians in the Galilee? To replace the Jews in competi­tion for land spaces claimed by the Bedouins in the Negev? To the towns and villages outside the ones they had lost in 1948, as outsiders looking in? Hadn't their relatives who survived 1948 done that already?

If the contemporary structure will remain in general unperturbed in the name of preserving the Jewishness of current communities, wouldn't the returning refugees simply become themselves the new settlers of Palestine, this time settlers in an essentially Jewish state? But unlike the Zionist settlers who came to Palestine unimpeded by law or custom, would they not find themselves bumping against the limits of the Jewishness of the Jewish communities, by law, custom and history? Wouldn't they be better off staying where they are, settlers in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan -at least there they are settlers in a land cohabitated by fellow Arabs?

If, realistically speaking, the only spaces available for them to settle are the hills of the West Bank not already claimed Jewish settlers, where they can dig roots in a community they can claim organic bonds with and an economy they can participate in as "owners" and not just as workers, wouldn't Shenhav's consociational democracy have essentially reverted to a "two-state" solution with "large land swaps?"

In the end, Shenhav's consociational democracy, an attempt at flipping the current line-up of left to right, simply depends on the "quality" of return this form of democracy offers the Palestinians. 

[This book review was first published as a Preface to the book, Beyond the Two-State Solution: A Jewish Political Essay by the Israel author Yahuda Shenhav (Polity Press, 2012). ]


 [1] The Resolution resolves “that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that the compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments responsible”: UN General Assembly Resolution 194 passed on December 11, 1948, (Article 11). 

New Texts Out Now: Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, Libya, Social Origins of Dictatorship, and the Challenge for Democracy

$
0
0

Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, "Libya, Social Origins of Dictatorship, and the Challenge for Democracy." North African Revolutions, special issue of The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 3.1 (2012)

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this article?

Ali Ahmida (AA): This article was inspired by the democratic revolutionary uprising in the Arab World, especially Libya, the least known country. Also, I wanted to go beyond the orientalist and the colonial filtering and categories by bringing in the historical, comparative, and post-colonial context. For example, Libya’s colonial genocide under Italian Fascism is often ignored and is viewed through the category of tribalism, despite the fact the majority of the Libyan people live in urban areas, and it has the highest literacy rate in Africa. The New York Times, the New York Review of Books, and even the critical London Review of Books have published material on Libya conditioned by these conventional views. The category of tribalism is an easy and simplistic one, but ahistorical and misleading. 

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does your article address?

AA: I examine the current media and mainstream academic view of Libya as a tribal country, mainly an invention of Qaddafi, and outside of history. I also analyze the national/colonial question and the social question in Libyan modern history, especially the genocide under Italian colonialism, the roots of the dictatorship, and the social changes in Libyan society since 1951. I looked at this social history from the point of view of the middle class and the subaltern forces and groups. The old regime was a populist one in the early stages and was supported by the vast majority of the Libyan people. Its social base changed after 1975, when a conflict emerged within the revolutionary twelve members who toppled the Sanusi Monarchy. Qaddafi‘s faction won the battle, and from this point on he eliminated his rival and dissolved the army. By 1980, the seeds of dictatorship became stronger and he relied on his own kin group, allies from central and southern Libya, and excluded all the rival opposition especially in the Eastern region of Barqa, the old social base for the Sanusi Monarchy between 1951-1969. The regime relied on informal organization such as his close associates, revolutionary committees, and the security apparatus. Ironically, the regime’s early progressive policies in supporting education for most men and women in the country created a high expectation for political and social rights. But by 2011, the regime was isolated and out of ideas. The very young men and women who were educated under the regime are the ones who challenged it. The current revolution is urban, not rural, as have been most resistance movements in Libyan modern history.  

J: How does this work connect to and/or depart from your previous research and writing?

AA: My PhD dissertation was on the social and regional origins of collaboration and anti-colonial resistance in Libya from 1835-1932. It was published under the title The Making of Modern Libya by the State University of New York Press in 2004, and a second revised edition was published in 2009. This book was published in Arabic in two editions, but was banned in Libya. My edited book, Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism in the Maghrib: History, Culture and Politics, was published by Palgrave Press in 2000, and in 2005 I published my second book, Forgotten Voices; Power and Agency in Colonial and Post Colonial Libya, published by Routledge. This book was translated into Arabic but was banned in Libya, too. Then I edited a second book, Bridges Across the Sahara, published by Cambridge Scholars in 2009. This book challenged the colonial category of the Sahara as a divided and empty space. Based on this critical postcolonial theory and method, I updated my research and scholarship on the social history of the colonial period by examining the new context of the crisis of the state, the alienation of the youth, and the process of social mobilization, old and new, such as social media and international TV stations. I also took notes from my own visits to Libya and my interactions with my audiences to write this article. I built on my New York Times op-ed piece (published in March 2011) "Why Qaddafi Has Already Lost," which was circulated nationally and internationally.

J: Who do you hope will read this article, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

AA: I hope readers will became aware of the poverty of conventional views regarding the elite, tribalism, and other clichés regarding Libya, and discover the long struggles of Libyan civil society against both colonialism and dictatorship. This is a society that is modern, diverse, and has the highest literacy rate in Africa. As I said, Libya society is urban and literate and comes first in the whole continent of Africa, ahead of even Tunisia. It is really silly to describe it as tribal and to overlook the fact that Qaddafi’s regime tried to invent this ideology for its own survival, despite the fact that most Libyans live in cities, and are economically integrated into the modern economy. I call this the ideology of tribalism. Let me add that this ill-informed image of Libya is common in the Arab world too. Libya is reduced to oil, terrorism, and Qaddafi.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

AA: I am working on three book projects now. The first is a new book called The Libya We Do Not Know: A Social and Cultural History. The second is a book entitled Genocide and Silence: The Oral History of Concentration Camps in Colonial Libya, 1928-34. This is the forgotten genocide in Libya and the first one after World War I. I collected one hundred and fifty interviews among the survivors during the last ten years. Finally, I am finishing a biography of Omar Mukhtar, the legendary leader of the Libyan anti-colonial resistance.

J: What do you think are some of the implications of lack of political reform in Libya in previous years for similar political repression in other contexts across the Arab world today?

AA: We have to be aware that revolutions go through complex processes. The current struggle is not just internal, but also regional and international. The outside forces and money, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are trying to support the Islamists and the right-wing exiled Libyans. The question of arms and militias is crucial, but the question of transitional justice and of truth and reconciliation is an even bigger issue. There are at least half a million Libyans living in exile now, and many others inside Libya who feel they are branded as agents of the old regime. This exclusion is a big threat to the current revolution. Unless there are alliances and means for empowering and institutionalizing the revolution, these revolutions may be stalled, defeated, or appropriated by outside forces and the reactionary opposition. I have been teaching late twentieth century revolutions for ten years, and these are some of the lessons of the past.

J: Why have western academics tended to produce oversimplified analyses of the Arab Spring?

AA: They often focus only on elites and rarely take Arab civil society seriously, only through the category of Americanization or Westernization. Also, they are silent about the Western political support of the dictatorship—just remember that Tunisia was regarded as a model and Egypt as a stable country under Ben Ali and Mubarak, and even Qaddafi’s brutal regime was rehabilitated after Lockerbie.

Excerpts from "Libya, Social Origins of Dictatorship, and the Challenge for Democracy"

In 1911, Italy invaded Libya. The invading forces faced a well-integrated, unified, and cohesive society in eastern and southern Libya and northern Chad that maintained a significant resistance until 1931. Within western Libya, the leaders of local resistance organized their disparate groups into the first republic in the Arab world, the Tripolitanian Republic, in 1918. This republic had a collective four-person leadership, a shura or parliamentary council, a flag, a newspaper, and an army. The Italians managed to defeat the republic in 1922, when Mussolini and his Fascist army decided to reconquer the colony and abrogate all agreements that had been made with the resistance movement. The Sanusi movement and the Tripolitanian Republic constitute two early cases of state formation within Libya that make up the germ of modern Libyan nationalism. Qaddafi's new Libyan state emerged from these two precursors and incorporated a unique blend of pan-Islamic aspirations, skepticism toward central state rule, and social linkages based on fluid, far-reaching, family-based organizations.

After the 1969 revolution, Libyan society experienced major social, political, and economic advances, but Qaddafi's new government initially enacted its policies without significant popular support. The pro-Qaddafi faction within the RCC did not consolidate its power within Libya until 1976. At that time, it began to experiment with creating what it called an “indigenous pastoralist socialist society.” While trying to attain this objective, the state simultaneously benefited from significant petroleum revenues that provided steady employment to not only Libyans, but also a large expatriate workforce.

To give Qaddafi credit, he was able to create a state ideology that resonated strongly with the entire spectrum of pan-Arab, pan-African, and Third-World national liberation movements. He achieved this aim while employing language and referring to a common history that could be understood by all Libyans. Qaddafi was able to mobilize nationalist cadres effectively and attack his opponents and rivals both inside and outside the country. At the core of his self-presentation was the image of the Bedouin tribesman. He spoke, ate, and dressed like a Bedouin from the hinterland. He led prayers like an imam.

The new regime also began to pursue a cultural policy of “bedouinization” that attacked urban culture and encouraged the propagation of rituals based on “tribal values,” as evidenced in dress, music, and festivals. Students, intellectuals, and the urban middle class in the big cities found themselves on the cultural defensive and were compelled to shift their own self-presentation. They were not wrong in imagining that the regime's bedouinization policies were aimed at undermining their own prestige in society. As a result of deliberate de-urbanization policies, Tripoli, the most urban and cosmopolitan city in the country, lost its relative cultural importance even as its population increased to two million people.

Behind the rhetoric of a pure Bedouin identity unsullied by Western modernity, however, lurked a more mundane reality. The Libyan population had increased from one million in 1950 to 6.5 million by 2010, with a very large youth cohort whose median age was twenty-four. Sixty-five percent of the population was under the age of thirty, but the unemployment rate was very high, at thirty percent. Today, eighty percent of Libyans live in towns and cities. Well-paying jobs in Tripoli, Benghazi, and the oil fields have attracted many rural people to move north to these cities. As a result, the population of Tripoli increased from 130,000 in 1951 to 1.8 million in 2010, and Benghazi grew from 70,000 residents in 1951 to 650,000 in 2010.

Supporters of the Qaddafi regime—like those of the democratic uprising—included lawyers, judges, journalists, engineers, writers, academics, officers, and diplomats. Libyan citizens fully participate in the state's complex oil-driven economy. Libya enjoys the highest literacy rate in Africa (eighty-eight percent), and the average life expectancy is seventy-eight years. The 2010 UN Human Development Index ranks Libya first in Africa and fifty-third in the world.

In other words, it is necessary to account for the disconnect between the official regime's image of Libyans as timeless Bedouins and the more complex reality of its modern society. Moreover, it is important to confront the fact that the representation of Libya as inherently tribal is rooted in the Qaddafi regime's battle to ideologically disenfranchise the country's urban middle class—that is, the majority of the population. The anti-Qaddafi revolution included 6.5 million persons who are globally connected to international education, travel opportunities, social media, and international television stations such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya. These factors of globalization played important roles in supporting the Libyan revolution.

[…]

The revolutions that occurred in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt may have precipitated the events in Libya, but the Libyan revolution was at core motivated by the nation's brutal experience of colonialism. The first set of young protesters in Benghazi replaced Qaddafi's green flag with the pre-Qaddafi flag and resurrected the figure of Omar al-Mukhtar, one of the heroes of the anticolonial resistance. Other young men in Nalut, Zentan, and Misurata raised photos of their own local anticolonial resistance heroes. What is most striking about the rhetoric of the Libyan revolution is how Colonel Qaddafi's anticolonialist themes, such as quotes from Omar al-Mukhtar, were turned against him in antiregime cell phone text messages and TV videos broadcast through al-Jazeera and Facebook. Yet even while assaulting Qaddafi's forces, the rebels resisted calling for Western intervention by NATO military forces while simultaneously asking NATO to impose a no-fly zone. Libya's experience with colonialism explains the reasoning behind this decision.

Processes of modernization, urbanization, and especially education played important roles in this revolution. The expansion of education began as early as independence in 1951 and was facilitated by the help of the United Nations. The educational initiatives introduced at this time helped accelerate social change. In 1954, the foundation of a new Libyan university with two campuses in Benghazi and Tripoli created additional educational opportunities, which led to the expansion of colleges and universities across the country. New educational policies led to the rise of a salaried middle class, a student movement, a small working class, trade unions, and the emergence of modern intellectuals by the late 1960s. The number of students increased from 33,000 in 1952 to 300,000 in 1970. By 2010, there were two million students in Libya, including 300,000 at the college and university levels.

The position of women in Libya has been remarkable. In 1943, Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world, with an illiteracy rate as high as 98 percent. Thanks to women's social movements in Libya, education has particularly increased among women. Such progress made it possible for women to participate in the 2011 revolution. It is important to remember that mothers of the 1,200 political prisoners who were killed at Abu Salim Prison in 1996 have marched every year since in memory of their deaths. Their February 15, 2011, protest and the arrest of Fathi Terbil, the lawyer representing the families of the executed prisoners, triggered the revolution. Women also contributed to the Libyan revolution by taking care of the wounded, providing food for the fighters, filming videos of the regime's atrocities, speaking to the media, and broadcasting Internet messages. In Libya today, there are more women in higher education than men. In the humanities and social sciences faculties, female students make up eighty percent of the student population.

Beginning in the 1980s, excessive centralization, heightened repression by security forces, and a decline in the rule of law undermined Qaddafi's experiment in creating an authoritarian regime based on indigenous populism. Many civic associations, which had made Libyan society seem more democratic than other Persian Gulf states in the 1970s, withered or were eliminated. A hostile international climate and fluctuations in oil revenues added pressures to the regime. Nevertheless, because education and health care were free and energy, basic food materials, and water were subsidized, Qaddafi's Jamahiriya government continued to receive public support from the lower and middle classes. But these educational and social achievements were diminished by the regime's excessive political control and the development of a cult of personality that centered on Qaddafi as “Brother Leader” of Libya and led to his assumption of the position of president for life. Power became a personal matter.

The regime responded by transforming its rituals of hero-worship and joining them with pan-African ideology while using violence to repress dissent. Because of repeated coup attempts, the regime tortured, imprisoned, and exiled dissidents. Qaddafi's state staffed its security forces with reliable relatives and allies from central and southern Libya. As economic sanctions took their toll during the 1990s, health care and education began to deteriorate and unemployment soared to thirty percent. The economy became even more dependent on oil, and the regime grew increasingly corrupt. Qaddafi's sons dominated the oil industry, communications, and most state-controlled contracts. His sons, including Mu'tasim, Hanibal, and Sa'adi, spent millions on wild parties that many young Libyans viewed via YouTube videos. At the same time, many educated Libyan professionals were paid a mere three hundred dollars a month and were forced to borrow money to obtain medical treatments in Tunisia. In 2010, Transparency International ranked Libya as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, at number 146 out of 178 nations.

Although social media were not used as widely in Libya as in Tunisia, Egypt, and the rest of the Maghreb, thousands of people still used cell phones and had access to independent websites, al-Jazeera, and other TV stations. Furthermore, after the resolution of the Lockerbie crisis and Libya's renewal of contacts with the international community, more media outlets and newspapers were allowed to circulate within the nation, which helped accelerate the rise of reformist and dissident forces, especially among the youth, whose interaction with the outside world had begun to increase.

The regime's growing reliance on excessive centralization and informal security organizations at the expense of more formal state institutions and the rule of law undermined its earlier achievements and led to the decline of the experiment in indigenous political populism. A hostile international climate and declining oil revenues from the late 1970s onwards compounded the regime's crisis of legitimacy and further weakened important public institutions such as courts, universities, unions, hospitals, and banks. Thus, a confluence of internal and external dynamics weakened the state's ideology, which was based on populist authoritarianism and Qaddafi's cult of personality.

This decline was exacerbated by Libya's June 1983 defeat in its war with Chad, in which 10,000 Libyans were killed. Also significant was the regime's confrontation with the United States in April 1986. Conditions worsened further after 1992, when the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya after evidence was presented linking Libyan agents to the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over the town of Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. Four years later, in 1996, the regime killed 1,200 Islamist political prisoners in the Abu Salim prison massacre. According to human rights organizations, the victims were Islamist political prisoners who had opposed the Libyan regime in the early 1990s. When they protested against their guards and expressed their demands, General Abdullah al-Sanusi, head of Libyan intelligence and brother in-law of Colonel Qaddafi, ordered his troops to open fire on the prisoners. The regime buried the corpses in a secret location and refused to say anything about their fate. However, this horrific massacre haunted the regime and was one of the primary issues that instigated the 2011 revolution.

The 2011 revolution started when the families of the Abu Salim victims gathered for a protest in Benghazi on 15 February 2011. Many of the city's residents subsequently joined the original group of protestors. During the demonstration, Fathi Terbal, the lawyer representing the aggrieved families, was arrested. His arrest led to a social media announcement declaring a Day of Rage on 17 February. When the regime's troops fired on the peaceful demonstrators, residents of the cities of Bayda and Benghazi rebelled, and protestors stormed the Qaddafi security garrisons. Many soldiers and officers defected, including General Abdulfattah Younes, the Minister of the Interior, and Mustafa Abduljalil, the Minister of Justice. Younes and Abduljalil would later become leaders of the newly formed Interim Libyan Transitional Council in Benghazi.

[Excerpted from The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 3.1 (2012), Special Issue: North African Revolutions. For the full text of the article, please click here.]

La Libye un an après

$
0
0

Alors que la scène politique libyenne commence difficilement à se stabiliser (élections au Congrès National le 7 juillet, passation des pouvoirs avec le Conseil National de Transition le 9 août, élection du Premier ministre Mustafa Abou Shagour le 12 septembre puis son renvoi par le Congrès le 7 octobre), les nouvelles autorités se retrouvent toujours confrontées à des défis de gouvernance considérables. Outre la nécessité de répondre aux besoins humanitaires de la population et de localiser les actifs financiers libyens à l’étranger, les autorités libyennes doivent relever les défis posés par les crises sociales et identitaires héritées des années Kadhafi. Faisant de son pays une antithèse de l’État-nation moderne, celui-ci a poussé les Libyens à se retrancher davantage dans des réseaux sécuritaires et d’appartenance relevant de la religion, de la géographie ou de la parenté, au détriment d’un sentiment d’appartenance nationale. La méfiance traditionnelle des groupes tribaux et des provinces au pouvoir central émanant de Tripoli s’est donc renforcée, et se conjugue désormais à un manque d’institution et de cadres capables de résoudre les conflits et les différends. Cela explique par exemple le problème de l’intégration des brigades et milices aux forces armées et de police officielles, ou encore le mouvement fédéraliste de l’est libyen, qui a résulté en la création du Conseil Barqa et du Parti Unioniste Libyen. Si aucun de ces mouvements n’a les capacités d’exploiter les sentiments régionaux ou nationaux des Libyens, ils ont une capacité de nuisance suffisamment importante pour déstabiliser le processus de transition à un État moderne. La mort de l’ambassadeur américain Chris Stevens est venue renforcer l’image d’un pays qui est au bord de l’abîme. Pourtant si elle a révélé les fortes capacités de nuisance des mouvements extrémistes qui fleurissent en Libye et dans la région (ils s’attaquaient notamment depuis plusieurs mois à des sanctuaires), la réponse des Libyens à cette attaque a montré que les Libyens ne comptaient pas laisser leur pays aux mains des extrémistes. Descendant par milliers dans les rues de Benghazi, ils ont condamné cette attaque avec la plus grande fermeté avant de chasser par plusieurs centaines Ansar el-Sharia de ses locaux. Par ailleurs, il est indéniable que l’Islam fera partie de la trajectoire sociale et politique du pays, puisqu’il en demeure l’une des principales forces fédératrices. Il n’en reste pas moins que les Libyens sont opposés aux extrêmes, ce qui s’est clairement manifesté durant les élections, où tant les partis que l’on a présenté comme « libéraux » que les « islamistes », ne voulaient se voir étiquetés de la sorte. Durant la campagne, peu de différences se sont manifestées entre les positions publiques de ces partis, qui s’accordaient tous sur la nécessité d’un nouvel État modéré et l’établissement d’une économie moderne.

Les difficultés du New Deal libyen

Durant les années Kadhafi, la redistribution de la rente pétrolière avait permis d’acheter la paix sociale, et la population connait l’un des plus hauts niveaux de vie du monde arabe. Après quelques réformes économiques efficaces à partir de 2003[1], et le lancement d’importants programmes d’équipements industriels et agricoles (Grande Rivière par exemple), les services publics n’ont fait que de se détériorer, et le climat des affaires, corrompu et juridiquement pauvre, n’a pas encouragé les investissements et le développement du secteur privé. Quelques réformes avaient été entreprises ces dernières années : création de la bourse des valeurs de Tripoli en mars 2007, rationalisation du système bancaire, création de l’Autorité libyenne d’investissements (LIA), politiques d’exportations pour stimuler le commerce, notamment sur les marchés régionaux, mais elles n’ont pas suffit à assainir le climat économique et social, aggravé par le conflit armé de l’année passée. Durant l’insurrection armée de février à octobre 2011, la production pétrolière est passée de 1,8 millions de barils par jour en 2010 à 22 000 en juillet 2011 (les hydrocarbures fournissent 70% du Produit Intérieur Brut et 95% des recettes d’exportation). Cette quasi interruption de la production pétrolière et gazière s’est accompagnée d’une paralysie du système financier et de l’effondrement des importations du fait du manque d’accès aux devises étrangères (l’excédent de la balance commerciale est passé de 21% du PIB en 2010 à 4,5% en 2011). Enfin, les équipements publics, qui étaient de bonne qualité, ont pour la plupart été endommagés ou détruits par les combats.

Selon les prévisions de The Economist Intelligence Unit, l'économie libyenne connaitra en 2012 la croissance la plus élevée au monde en raison du démarrage du chantier de la reconstruction du pays estimé à plus de 200 milliards de dollars, et du maintien du cours du baril de pétrole à un niveau élevé. Le FMI en effet prévoit une croissance du PIB de 116,6% en 2012, stimulée par la production pétrolière dont le niveau de production est reparti à la hausse, après une chute de 60% du PIB l’année dernière. Le taux de croissance devrait se stabiliser à 16,5% et 13,2% en 2013 et 2014 respectivement, mais cette croissance devra être inclusive, et représentative d’une économie diversifiée qui reste encore trop sensible à l’évolution du marché des hydrocarbures. La Libye pourra compter sur de nombreux atouts pour se (re)construire : un pays relativement riche, une population jeune et dynamique (50% a en dessous de 25 ans), une ligne côtière exploitable (commerce, tourisme), une position géographique privilégiée entre l’Europe et l’Afrique (avec des opportunités d’intégration régionale, surtout avec la Tunisie), 41 milliards de barils de réserves de pétrole, des réserves d’or estimées à 8 milliards de dollars, sans compter les actifs de l’Autorité Libyenne d’Investissements, d’environ 65 milliards de dollars. L’économie libyenne a déjà commencé à montrer des signes positifs d’une réelle reprise, les importations sont par ailleurs revenues à la normale, et l’inflation des prix à la consommation semble se stabiliser autour de 10%. La Bourse libyenne a par ailleurs repris ses activités à la mi-mars 2012 après sa fermeture en février 2011, signalant sa réouverture aux affaires. Les autorités sont tout de même face à plusieurs défis, sociaux et fiscaux notamment. Les derniers chiffres du chômage de 2011 indiquent d’abord un taux de chômage de 26%, surtout parmi les jeunes, alors que la Libye connait un suremploi massif dans certains secteurs (banques, hôtellerie, entreprises d’utilité publique), et absorbait le chômage de ses voisins, attirant 3 à 4 millions d’étrangers, surtout venus d’Afrique du Nord (Égypte, Maghreb) et subsaharienne. Le secteur énergétique représente 60% du PIB mais seulement 3% de la population active officielle, alors que les services publics emploient 51% de la population active officielle, mais ne représentent que 9% au PIB, sans compter le nombre considérable de fonctionnaires de l'État inactifs mais touchant un salaire mensuel. Cela requiert des politiques publiques de rééquilibrage, mais également une discipline fiscale, d’autant plus que les salaires plus élevés et les subventions affectent le budget ainsi que les perspectives pour les finances futures du gouvernement. Les dépenses en salaires ont en effet augmenté d'environ 60%, notamment du fait de l’augmentation des salaires du secteur public en mars 2011, ce qui devrait engendrer une hausse de la masse salariale de 9% du PIB en 2010 à environ 19% du PIB cette année. Cela risque de réduire l'incitation pour les individus de chercher un emploi dans le secteur privé, et n’encourage pas la diversification économique.

Du fait de son abondance des ressources, la Libye a plus besoin d’assistance technique dans la gestion de sa richesse que d’assistance financière, c’est dans ce but que le FMI et la Banque mondiale ont commencé à travailler avec les autorités pour la gestion des finances publiques dès janvier 2012. La reconstruction doit inclure les aspects sociaux, politiques, juridiques et économiques pour une reconstruction intégrée et systémique, et favoriser transparence et responsabilité afin de promouvoir le secteur privé, dont le crédit a diminué de 6% en 2011. Le problème de son financement sera majeur, puisque jusque là, les banques locales disposant de ressources n’ont pas prêté aux PME, du fait de la pauvre infrastructure juridique (leurs droits ne sont pas garantis) et de l’absence de disponibilité de finance islamique. La création d’institutions gouvernementales devra favoriser l’émergence d’une communauté d’affaire indépendante, puisque la Libye manque de gestionnaires professionnels, qui du fait d’un manque de formation intra et intersectorielle ne sont ni concurrentiels ni efficaces. Le climat des affaires reste faible, avec des lois d’investissement incertaines, des partenariats locaux indéfinis, une gouvernance d’entreprise encore naissante, et des accords commerciaux hérités de l’ancien régime dont le sort reste à fixer. Il devra donc être revu, avec des critères de transparence, de responsabilité, de primauté du droit, de droits de propriété et d’accès au financement. Par ailleurs, les institutions de coordination tels les normes juridiques ou les syndicats et partenaires sociaux, ont été jusque là inexistants. Toute la législation héritée de l’ancien régime est en phase d’être revue, les règles pour les coentreprises ont d’ailleurs déjà été fixées par le décret n°103 de l'année 2012 publié le 13 mai, mais modifiées suite à des protestations[2] par le nouveau texte 207/2012. Ce dernier plafonne à 49% la participation étrangère, avec 51% de participation obligatoire de la part d’une entreprise libyenne dans un projet de joint-venture (la participation étrangère peut aller jusqu’à 60% selon son type d’activité, sa localisation et ses contraintes technologiques, et sur décision du ministre de l’Économie).

Les autorités ont insisté sur le besoin d’investissements étrangers pour redresser le pays et son économie. A ce titre, la volonté d’établir une zone de libre-échange à Benghazi pour en faire une plaque tournante commerciale, et l’activisme du port de Misrata et de sa zone de libre-échange, sont des signes encourageants. Les ambitions libyennes de devenir un pôle d’affaire régional restent cependant conditionnées à la diminution des risques sécuritaires et aux prix internationaux du pétrole[3].

Vers une démocratie du profit ?

Depuis plusieurs années, les regards libyens vers le Sud, ses élans panafricanistes et sa politique d’investissements ont fait de la Libye une plaque tournante entre le Soudan, l’Afrique noire et la Méditerranée[4]. Suite à l’insurrection libyenne et à l’intervention de l’OTAN, soutenue par des pays européens, les Etats-Unis et le Qatar, la Libye devra surement réorienter sa position géostratégique et régionale. Redevable envers l’OTAN et le Qatar, il est probable que la coopération et les échanges s’accroissent entre la Libye et ses partenaires européens ainsi que les pays du Golfe, sans oublier le rôle croissant que sont amenées à y jouer les puissances émergentes. Étant vue par beaucoup comme une nouvelle frontière, la Libye devra réussir à gérer et réglementer les implantations et investissements étrangers sur son territoire si elle veut appartenir aux Libyens et non aux grandes firmes multinationales. C’est ce qu’ont fait savoir les autorités, privilégiant les investissements de long-terme, où les entreprises étrangères entretiennent des relations locales et emploient la main d’œuvre locale. Les investissements étrangers sont l’un des éléments essentiels à la reconstruction libyenne, et les différentes expositions et forums industriels et économiques tenus en Libye cette année, ainsi que les défilés incessants des délégations étrangères venues se rendre compte sur le terrain des opportunités d’investissements et de partenariats, traduisent une forte volonté, à l’internationale, d’investir en Libye. En effet, des centaines d'entreprises et hommes d'affaires venus du monde entier, certains financés par leurs gouvernements, ont été en visite en Libye au cours des 6 derniers mois pour évaluer le climat d'investissement et rechercher des partenaires. Une probable augmentation des échanges avec l’Europe et l’Amérique du Nord, un accroissement de la coopération régionale (Tunisie, Égypte), une présence renforcée des pays du Golfe, mais surtout une présence nouvelle et en expansion des pays émergents, BRIC et surtout Turquie, sont autant d’éléments nouveaux qui devront être observés notamment en fonction de leur capacité à favoriser le développement et l’emploi.

Parmi les puissances européennes, l'Italie, ancienne puissance coloniale en Libye et premier partenaire commercial, dont la compagnie pétrolière ENI a de nombreux atouts en Libye, voit ses relations avec la Libye en plein essor. Le Libyan British Business Council et la Middle East Association ont quant à eux organisé plusieurs délégations économiques et commerciales britanniques durant l’année, et l’Allemagne, dont les exportations vers la Libye en 2011 ont baissé de 66% et ses importations de 36%, devrait pouvoir retrouver son commerce d’avant-guerre, généré en grande partie par quelque 40 entreprises, notamment Bilfinger Berger, E.On, RWE et Siemens. La France enfin, du fait de son rôle majeur joué durant l’intervention de l’OTAN, bénéficie d’une considérable côte de popularité en Libye, et entend l’aider principalement en matière d’éducation, de santé et de sécurité. La Turquie, de son côté, a agit auprès des Libyens depuis le début de la révolution, et se destine à soutenir la Libye dans son développement économique et industriel de manière considérable. Les autorités ont fait savoir que les cotisations dues aux entreprises qui travaillaient sur place leurs seraient versées, et la Turquie a été l'un des premiers pays à rouvrir son ambassade en Libye, tout en s’activant pour obtenir des contrats commerciaux dans la Libye de l'après-Kadhafi, notamment dans le secteur des transports. Elle est, avec la Chine, la puissance montante en Libye et dans la région, au moins en termes d’échanges commerciaux et d’investissements. La Libye a présenté un  défi inhabituel pour la Chine, notamment parce qu’elle a mis l’Empire du Milieu face aux contradictions d'une attitude de non-ingérence avec une présence et des intérêts économiques accrus en Libye. A l’éclatement des hostilités, 75 entreprises chinoises avaient entrepris 50 projets sous contrat en Libye, d'une valeur de 18,8 milliards de dollars. Le gouvernement chinois a activement négocié avec la Libye en ce qui concerne des questions telles que la rémunération et la réouverture des projets, et la Libye, qui attache une grande importance au rôle de la Chine dans la reconstruction du pays, va s'efforcer de sauvegarder les droits et intérêts légitimes des entreprises chinoises en Libye. A noter que la Chine a fait de la compensation et du règlement immédiat des arriérés de paiement de ses projets et contrats conclus avec l’ancien régime une pré-condition majeure d'un retour de ses investissements en Libye.

Concernant les Etats-Unis, l’environnement libyen est globalement favorable aux entreprises américaines, en grande partie parce que l'administration Obama est créditée par des Libyens de par son appui à l'action militaire qui a aidé à renverser Kadhafi l'an dernier. ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil Corp et Occidental Petroleum Corp font parti des géantes multinationales de l’énergie présentes sur le terrain, mais la Libye cherche également des universités et hôpitaux américains intéressés à aider à la formation, au développement technologique et à la création de succursales ou de partenariats avec des institutions libyennes, puisqu’elle recherche les investissements américains dans le tourisme, la santé et l'éducation. Le dernier pôle d’investissement vient ensuite du Golfe. Les EAU d’abord sont prêts à aider le gouvernement libyen, avec des compétences ou des transferts de connaissances, ainsi que d'encourager les entreprises des Emirats Arabes Unis à investir en Libye. Pour preuve, c’est Dubai qui a accueilli le Future Libya Development Forum 2012 Rebuild & Infrastructure Conference en juin dernier, avec 150 participants représentant environ 60 entreprises régionales et européennes. Le Qatar, enfin, occupera une position de choix dans la nouvelle Libye, notamment de par son rôle joué durant l’intervention de l’OTAN, et l’aide qu’il a apporté à la Libye pour maintenir sa production et vente de rente pétrolière. Dès lors, les sociétés qataries s’activent en Libye : la Ghanim Al-Ghanim Corporation a par exemple signé des accords de partenariat avec un certain nombre d'hommes d'affaires libyens, afin de créer une société commune, la Qatari Libyan Corporation, avec un capital de 100 millions de dollars.

Dans cette ruée vers l’or, la plupart des puissances étrangères et émergentes et leurs entreprises adoptent une attitude prudente, même si d’autres s’activent déjà sur le terrain (pays européens et du Golfe, Turquie). Ces mêmes puissances doivent actuellement faire oublier leur passivité face aux souffrances des Libyens durant l’insurrection de 2011, mais toutes ont développé ces dernières années des intérêts croissants en Libye (le groupe brésilien Petrobras et le russe Gazprom étaient déjà présents sur place), et ne voudront pas rester sur le banc de touche. Comprendre cet engagement, ses mécanismes et impacts est d’une importance considérable pour cerner ce qu’il se passera en Libye ces prochaines années. Le pays se remet plus vite que prévu des combats armés qui ont ravagés plusieurs de ses villes, mais l’accroissement du pouvoir dans les mains des acteurs locaux et régionaux au détriment du gouvernement de Tripoli, conjugué à une situation économique et sociale encore irrégulière, constituent des défis considérables au processus de transition libyen.



[1] « Libye: Défis d’après guerre », Note économique, Banque africaine de développement, septembre 2011

[2] La Chambre de commerce de Tripoli, de l'Industrie et de l'Agriculture avait protesté contre la facilité pour les entreprises étrangères de venir s’installer en Libye, et la mesure avait surpris les milieux d’affaires locaux et étrangers par son libéralisme comparé aux mesures des années précédentes.

[3] Le budget 2012 est équilibré avec un prix de $91 le baril

[4] HADDAD, Said. « La politique africaine de la Libye : de la tentation impériale à la stratégie unitaire ». Monde arabe Maghreb Machrek, la Documentation française, n°170, octobre-décembre 2000, Paris, pp 29-38.

Viewing all 6235 articles
Browse latest View live