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Last Week on Jadaliyya (Sep 10-16)

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This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes a list of the most read articles.  Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series. 


Egypt Media Roundup (September 17)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.]  

“Seven police personnel injured in US Consulate clashes in Alexandria”
Anti-US protests spread to Alexandria as protesters try to storm the US Consulate.

“Egypt PM says 'number' of US embassy rioters were paid”
Prime Minister Hisham Qandil says some of the protesters in front of the US embassy were paid to wreak havoc.

“Nader Bakkar calls for revoking citizenship for insulting prophets”
Salafist call for revoking citizenship of Egyptians who insult any of the prophets in Islam.

“Man died in embassy clashes, uneasy calm after protesters dispersed”
After five days of clashes, Egyptian authorities report one death and more than three hundred arrested.

“Editor’s Letter: Sand coalitions on the beach”
Maher Hamoud comments on the recent announcements of new coalitions on the Egyptian political scene.

“The Art of Making Enemies”
Sarah El Sirgany comments on the recent events surrounding the protest against the controversial film “Innocence of Muslims.”

“Conspiracies of convenience: what's behind the film fracas?”
Hani Shukrallah says a number of different parties were interested in the violent end result that the film insulting the Prophet produced.

“Cairo’s Many Shades of Protests: What They Reveal About How the New Egypt Operates”
Ashraf Khalil argues that the recent violent protests in Egypt illustrate the lack of experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in ruling the country.

“US media angrily marvels at the lack of Muslim gratitude”
Glenn Greenwald comments on remarks in US media saying that Egyptians and Libyans should be grateful for US help in overthrowing their dictators.

“What Europe should tell Mohammed Morsi”
Elijah Zarwan and Issandr El Amrani discuss the relationship between Egypt and the EU and President Morsi’s recent visit to Brussels.

“Morsy’s Syria quartet in Cairo”
The President attempts to resolve the crisis in Syria at a meeting with envoys from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in Cairo.

“Egypt’s Greatest ‘Pyramid Scheme’”
Rebel Economy reports a pyramid scheme that is exploiting the difficult economic conditions in Egypt to gain greater popularity.

“Protests at five universities with the beginning of the school year”
Students and staff at universities across the country protest against lack of positive steps of the new government towards better financing of high education.

“Former AIO chief slams El-Brince’s statements”
Former head of the military industrial body says accusations that he offered a bribe to the president are false.

“An Egyptian Obama?”
Mark LeVine looks into Mohamed Morsi’s presidency, discussing the recent history of the metal scene in Egypt.

“‘Our Condolences,’ the Muslim Brotherhood Says”
Khairat Al-Shater says he doesn’t hold the American government and citizens responsible for the film “Innocence of Muslims.”

“Muslim Brotherhood Press Release regarding Today’s Rallies in Front of All Mosques”
The Muslim Brotherhood says it will participate in Friday’s protests only symbolically, calling protesters to be peaceful.

“Egypt’s interior ministry confronted by deep-rooted wrath”
The escalation of violence in downtown Cairo might not necessarily be only because of the film insulting the Prophet.

 

In Arabic:

“في انتظار نهاية العالم”
Mohamed Abou Al-Gheit talks about the questionable background of new interior minister Ahmed Gamal El-Din

“ماذا بعد غزوة السفارة الأمريكية؟”
Wael Qandil argues that Egypt’s enemies won from the recent violent protests in Cairo.

“أول اجتماع لـ«كبار العلماء» برئاسة «الطيب»: الاتفاق على عدم تغيير «المادة الثانية»”
Al-Azhar Ulema discuss the need for independence of the religious institution from the government.

“المصرية نصف الثورة هل تودّع الحريات بفتاوى؟”
Amina Kheiry talks about the lack of political gains of women in the new government.

“بعد تقديمها لنتائج تحقيقاتها الميدانية للجنة جمع المعلومات والأدلة وتقصي الحقائق المبادرة المصرية: نتطلع لمحاسبة كافة المسؤولين عن قتل واصابة المواطنين حسابا عادلا”
The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights accuses in a report the military police of failing to prevent sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims in March 2011.

“يا نساء مصر تقدمن”
Mostafa Al-Naggar’s follow-up article talking about women’s empowerment in Egypt.

“من مكة إلى واشنطن عبر طهران: مـصـر «إخـوانـيـة» فـي إيــران؟”
Talal Salman discusses the implications of President Morsi’s visit to Iran.

 

Recent Jadailyya articles on Egypt:

انتفاضة الدفاع عن الرسول بين لوع جماعة الإخوان ومقاومة الاستعمار
Mohamed Waked discusses the political consequences in Egypt of the tension the film insulting the Prophet has produced.

Of Stupid Men and Smart Machines
Ahmad Shokr and Anjali Kamat argue that there are reasons beyond the film insulting the Prophet for the recent violence in the Muslim world.

Democracy Now! Interview with Islamic Scholar Tariq Ramadan on the Growing Mideast Protests and "Islam & the Arab Awakening"
Professor Tariq Ramadan says that the recent violence in Libya is not necessarily connected to the film insulting the Prophet.

Activism in the Coptic Diaspora: A Brief Introduction
Paul Sedra reflects on the difference between the Coptic community in Egypt and its diaspora abroad. 

September 11th, Islamophobia, and the ‘Persecution Industry'
Paul Sedra writes about the realpolitik behind Westerners’ preoccupation with sectarian violence against Christians in Egypt.  

Notes on Inequalities in Autism Activism and Care in Morocco

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“Autistic,” “Crazy,” and Other Conflicting Categories

We typically think of autism activism as awareness raising or political lobbying. These are no doubt important aspects of it, and my Moroccan friends spend much time engaged in such work. But more than anything, autism activism in Morocco is a project in world-making, an attempt to create novel spaces and institutions for – as well as to cultivate new dispositions toward – people who might otherwise be considered crazy (ḥemmaq), retarded (met’akhkhar), or possessed (mejnun). In other words, it is an attempt to create worlds where certain marginalized people can thrive and experience a measure of belonging. Such social projects live on the determination and energies of particular human beings, and so we inevitably find ourselves in the realms of exhaustion and endurance. It is little wonder, then, that I heard repeatedly throughout my research about the sheer physical and emotional toll of the work of being an autism parent.[1]

“Autism,” says Jamila, a dedicated Moroccan mother who singlehandedly founded and runs the first autism association in her hometown, “the word, ‘autism,’ for me is a word we have applied, invented. But autism, what is it? These children…” she gestures around her. Four students are scattered about the classroom, here in the middle of an urban public school. Her association was granted these rooms – bare of any equipment and unstaffed – by the Ministry of Education. We are in a special room, elegantly equipped for a particular kind of physical therapy (psychomotricité), for which they have yet to find a trained professional. At the moment, it houses a modest dance party. A teenage girl twists with exaggerated, expressive gestures, eying the two aides at her side. A young boy stares mesmerized at his slow-moving limbs in a full-length mirror. Another girl rocks front to back on her staggered feet, exactly in rhythm. Jamila’s son hinges deeply at the hips, dipping down past 90-degrees and shooting back up again. Music plays. “Excuse me, but these children are little crazy people (des petits fous),” Jamila continues. “Yes or no? I mean – we never called this autism before… Frankly, we would say, he is crazy (fou). She is crazy. But now, when certain parents were affected (touché), they found this word: autism. But it’s not true. It is unfortunate to say this. But when you go into a psychiatric hospital, the people locked up in there, are they not like this?” She gestures again around the room. “My son, for example, if I did not exist. Imagine: me, I do not exist. He would be locked up somewhere. I’m here, and I organize his life. But without me, he can’t do anything – go to the bathroom, prepare food, nothing.” She goes on to talk about a young homeless man who picks through the trash in her neighborhood. “He is young and beautiful, and he is crazy. He is just like my son,” she says, “except that I am here and his parents are not.”

Jamila’s remarks will strike some as insensitive, perhaps plain wrong. But she captures something important about the wave of autism activism swelling across urban Morocco. Indeed, what makes the children in Jamila’s association “autistic” rather than “crazy,” sociologically speaking, is precisely the intense effort of their parents. In fact, it is not an epistemological question, as Jamila poses it – “it’s not true” – but rather an ethical distinction implying a very different economy of effort, one to which Jamila is deeply committed. An autism diagnosis (whether made officially by a physician or informally by a fellow parent) implies a potential for improvement and demands an investment of time and resources far surpassing what a child labeled “crazy” or simply “retarded” could expect. In this ethical economy, people assigned to the latter categories are more properly the recipients of charity or compassion than of intensive educational practices.

Before continuing, a caveat is needed. The concept of the autism spectrum has expanded widely in many circles over the past three decades. Some readers will notice that my descriptions hover at the more severe end of that spectrum. In my home country, the U.S., some people who are “on the spectrum” are, in fact, exceptionally autonomous and capable: they graduate college, hold jobs, live independently, write books, raise children of their own. In Morocco, the diagnosis is typically (though not exclusively) applied to people with more dramatic symptoms. These are the children and adults with whom I typically worked and whose families I most often met. The reasons for this are multiple and debated, but for present purposes we must leave them aside.

Exhaustion

Autism care in Morocco is intense. This is partly due, as I mentioned, to the characteristics of some of the people so diagnosed. Take Selma. She does not speak. When upset, she might bite the back of her hand until blood streams out. For years, she stayed up all night: now laughing, now screaming, now crying. To allow her siblings and neighbors some rest, her father would walk her hand-in-hand through the emptied streets of their poor neighborhood. The next night would be her mother’s turn, and she would sling Selma onto her back and rock her to sleep on the roof, crouching under the quiet, unjudging night sky.

As a child, while walking through the old medina, Selma would touch and even take items she passed. Shopkeepers accused Karima of teaching her daughter to steal. Others told her to keep her daughter at home or to pay for the things she broke. One day Selma disappeared into the crowded market while Karima shopped with her son for a soccer jersey. After finding her, Karima made a decision. Whenever she went out, she would wrap Selma to her back. She continued to do this well past her daughter’s sixth birthday. No schools or centers would accept her, and it became increasingly difficult to take her out of the house. Karima’s knees started wearing down. Their home, she told me, became a prison. Indeed, throughout my interviews, parents spoke of being “locked” or “trapped” or “imprisoned” in their home with their child, whether by fears of others’ judging eyes, their own child’s violent outbursts, or the thought of losing a child who can neither speak nor fend for him- or herself.

It is not surprising, then, that so many spoke to me of exhaustion, of low-running stamina. To describe this, parents used a variety of idioms. Youssra told me she feels “choked” or “strangled” (mekhnuqa) when caring alone for her son over long stretches of time. One day, she passed a breaking point. “On Sunday,” Youssra told me, “it was me who had a crise. I started to scream and bang my head and finally I fell to the ground (ṭeḥt). I was the one who fell. In the end,” she continued, “I too became autistic.”

Labors

Autism associations are unique in that they are service providers and that almost all are founded and operated by parents.[2] Morocco’s first halting experiments in autism care began in the 1980s and 90s. In 2000, only two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) catered specifically to autistic children. But the past decade has brought an explosion of more than forty new autism associations across cities big and small.[3] The parents running these NGOs have educated themselves about things they never imagined learning: accounting, the legalese of statutes, the principles and finer technical points of therapies, the tangled jargon of psychiatry, and much, much more. They manage employees, square up budgets, write grant proposals, hire experts, organize trainings – and then they come home to care for their own children.

These associations and the classrooms they run open up new horizons of possibility, however fragile and fleeting, for families. They receive children who were refused by school after school, and ultimately turned back to their homes where their underprepared and exhausted parents do their best to cope largely on their own.

When an association opened in her small city, Karima was a founding member. Her daughter was nine, and it was only then, when she met the president-to-be, that she heard the word “autism” (tawaḥḥoud) for the first time. And with this word came many things. Selma now goes to school. She now knows the difference between day and night. When the bus driver honks in the morning, she grabs her backpack and steps out the door. Not only that: Karima is no longer bound to the home. She now joins her daughter all day every day in the school, where she cleans and helps to care for the children.

But the word autism also comes with a particular ethical economy. Indeed, the autism diagnosis often brings hope for significant improvement through incremental progress. And in this model, the parent is the modal therapist. When giving advice to young mothers, one parent-activist uses the metaphor of a train. Others (doctors, teachers, aides, etc.), she tells them, will get on board and join you for a stretch; they will help you for a time. But, when their time comes – and it must come – they will get off. They will have children, move to other cities, pursue their own lives. Only you (the mother) will be on that train with your child until the end.

When an association opened in her town, Karima soon learned that she must “work with” her child (tekhdem me‘aha), not simply take care of her. In fact, in this configuration “working with” equals caring, and care itself becomes a sort of technical labor.[4] Karima was told to stop hand-feeding Selma, to teach her to dress herself. She needed to talk to her and to fill her time with activities and interactions whenever possible. It is deeply rewarding for her to see her daughter transforming. But it is also hugely taxing and demands moment-to-moment engagement. And much about the future remains uncertain. For example, where will eleven-year old Selma go when she outgrows this elementary school?

By creating associations, a small group of committed parents have managed to pry open the door to special education for hundreds of children (and now adolescents and adults, too), including their own. But, as I discuss below, in the current division of labor, the parents are forever left holding the crowbar. Charitable donations and grants help to lessen the burden. But, as anyone in the field will tell you, the labor and finances necessary to keep these associations afloat rest largely on the shoulders of affected parents. And there the load has remained. In what follows, I will sketch the current state of autism care in urban Morocco and detail some of the consequences for the families that are constructing, maintaining, and inhabiting this new Moroccan autism world.

Paradoxes

The first autism associations opened centers, which they have expanded over the years. In the flurry of new NGOs, however, the modal unit is the classe intégrée (integration classroom).[5] Overhead costs are much lower than for centers, and because such classes are housed in public schools, they afford opportunities for autistic children to interact with “typical” peers during recess or through initiatives that bring them into one another’s classrooms. The Ministry of Education often provides empty classrooms – or, as one mother put it, “they give you the walls” – but the associations equip, staff, and operate them. Charitable and governmental institutions contribute funds to specific projects, typically focusing on trainings, materials, and equipment.

No one wants to give money for monthly operating costs, parents told me again and again. Indeed, very few associations I met receive any outside support to help cover salaries or other recurring expenses. Almost all rely on out-of-pocket tuition payments from families; these typically cover the salaries of the educators who animate classrooms and the experts who train and oversee their work. Monthly fees range from 1,000 to well over 2,000 dirhams (from about 90 to over 180 Euros), far surpassing the monthly salaries of many families and putting autism care well out of reach for most average Moroccans. Several NGOs have waiting lists brimming with families who cannot afford to pay. Others take on a few poor families and cover their costs through private donations or fundraisers.

All this ad hoc support presents a paradox. Step into some NGO classrooms, for example, and you may find a pristine space with brand-new, high-quality therapeutic toys and a flat-screen TV. On freshly painted walls hang handmade plastic visual schedules with strips of Velcro (a luxury only recently available in Morocco). Children work at special desks with aides in white smocks. They play on big bouncy balls, or take breaks on cushy beanbag chairs. Their work materials rest orderly on colorful bookshelves. But you quickly learn that the association is borrowing money, or going door-to-door in search of charitable donations to pay the aides’ meager monthly salaries. Further, with a dearth of qualified professionals and limited means for paying them, the aides who carry out the day-to-day work are often themselves trained by the parents. There are many speech therapy rooms but few speech therapists, many walls but often little to do within them. 

In the slip and slide of obligations and patchwork of contributions, roles are easily confused. “I thought we, as an association,” one mother told me, “were supposed to lighten the load of the State. But now, it’s the opposite.” “The new parents come along,” another mother said, “and they treat you like you are the State (bḥal nti hiya ad-dawla).” They demand their rights and they bristle at the mention of monthly fees and waiting lists.

That families mistake NGOs for the State is not at all unreasonable. Several factors create this impression. Classrooms are typically situated in public schools, and the NGOs often receive funds from bodies connected to the government and the royal palace. In classrooms, one finds many logos – l’Initiative Nationale de Développement Humain (INDH); Ministère de la Solidarité, de la Femme, de la Famille et du Développement Social; La Fondation Mohammed V Pour la Solidarité and other similar organizations – stuck proudly to walls, televisions, computers and other equipment. The INDH and Fondation Mohammed V are clearly tied to the monarchy and the Ministry is, of course, a government body. It is also common for a new center or set of classrooms to be inaugurated by a representative of the monarchy or the government and broadcast on television and the radio. Seeing all this, families understandably imagine certain entitlements for themselves. For example, they might assume their child cannot be turned away. But due to limited capacities, strained resources, and self-imposed quality standards, the NGOs cannot and do not accept everyone.

The ideal  ratio for autism education is said to be one aide to each student. Indeed, “one-to-one” has become a sort of mantra in much of Morocco, and I have heard it all over the country associated with autism and the most popular autism therapy: ABA (Applied Behavioral Analysis). Associations with less staff per student, of course, can afford to lower their fees. Centers for the intellectually disabled or for multiple handicaps often charge much less than those specializing in autism (some are 200 dirhams [18 Euros] a month), with each staff member responsible for a group of five to ten children. The landscape of care is thus highly variable in terms of price and quality, and several families I know have described ping-ponging from one association to the next, finding the price too high here or the quality too low there. Fifteen year-old Rachid, for example, has been to twelve schools in ten years. Others decide to keep their child at home, unable to pay for the best care and fearful of placing him or her in a large, poorly supervised center.

Finding, training, and retaining staff to carry out autism care constitute an unending struggle for parents and NGO leadership. The work is arduous and poorly paid. Some aides make less than a 1,000 dirhams a month (about 90 Euros), and very few make as much as the national SMIG – the minimum-wage monthly salary – of 2,231 dirhams (roughly 200 Euros). Parents often hire unemployed youth with no prior experience and little investment in the work, and then train them in autism therapies. Eventually, wealthier families sometimes cherry-pick the more apt or dedicated among them to work with their children at home. They can more than double their salary, in many cases. Parents, thus, find themselves recruiting and training new staff over and over, only to lose them to wealthier employers. Bahija, for example, hired and trained twelve aides to work with her son during a 14-month period. She is demanding of the people who work for her, but she provides them with the training and materials they need. Her son is difficult, but he is also extremely sweet, charming, and making impressive, if measured, progress. Some aides burn out. Others seek better pay once they have acquired some skills through training and experience.

Having found a certain measure of hope – whether through internet searches, discussions with other parents, or the therapies they have begun – many parents express a deep discontent with the lack of available expertise. They consider moving to Europe or the United States. Some even do emigrate. Parents and staff alike repeatedly told me that there are only two psychologists in the country trained in ABA. Certain parents, especially those running NGOs and coordinating their activities, tend to have privileged access to these experts, and others accuse them of monopolizing their time. Ultimately, this tenuous configuration of care fosters multiple kinds of suspicion and competition among parents and staff, making their situation even more fragile.

Conclusion

It is perhaps unsurprising that there are significant inequalities in autism education and care in Morocco. Indeed, the Moroccan healthcare and education systems, more broadly, are riddled with inequities. And there is no doubt that caring for severely autistic children and adults is often challenging the world over. But the political and economic structure of the field of autism care in Morocco creates an unusually complicated scenario as different kinds of inequalities and expectations collide. As one mother told me, “If you are going to have an autistic child in Morocco, you need to be very rich (khessek tekoun la bas ‘alik).” There is much truth in this. Yet, even those with resources and connections find themselves caught in an impossible dynamic where their Herculean efforts are only just barely enough to keep the whole thing going: the classrooms, the trainings, the budgets and salaries, the round-the-clock engagement. So there they stand, like the Greek hero Atlas, bearing the weight of the autism world on their shoulders as they struggle to provide special education, social belonging, and, perhaps, a better life for their children.

[This article was originally published on Farzyat/Inégalités.]



[1] I would like to thank Anne Montgomery, Dave Crawford, Jesse Neider, Marouane Laouina and the editors at the Centre Jacques Berque. Their detailed readings, comments, and suggestions greatly improved this essay. All failings and mistakes, however, rest with me.

[2] In the U.S., for example, parent-run autistic associations largely elected to focus on lobbying and awareness-raising and decided against providing services themselves. See Eyal et al. 2010 for more detailed descriptions and analysis of autism parent activism in the U.S.

[3] To date, I have visited associations in Rabat, Temara, Salé, Casablanca, Fkih ben Saleh, Ouled Teima, Agadir, Fes, Meknes, and Marrakech, and met representatives of but did not visit those in Tangier, Beni Mellal, Tetouan and Oujda. There are others in Taza, Al-Hoceima, Nador, Tiznit, Lâayoune, Safi, Lârache. For a list of organizations making up Collectif Autisme Maroc and for other information about autism in Morocco, seehttp://www.collectifautisme.ma/

[4] See Silverman 2011, and especially the Interlude, for an account of the history of autism in the U.S. that discusses caring as technical labor.

[5] The word intégration (or al-idmaj, in Arabic) is a major buzzword across several fields. In this case, it is a key ethical goal, meaning that people with autism should be integrated whenever possible into ordinary environments of education, work, leisure, etc. This is often phrased as an imperative in the language of rights: a right to an education in an ordinary environment, for example. But on the ground, classe intégrée is sometimes something of a misnomer. “It’s like you made a center in the heart of a school,” one mother told me. And in many cases this is true. One association even has classes in a totally abandoned, empty school. In the absence of other classrooms and “typical” students, there cannot be integration. Other associations, however, have had success incorporating students into typical classrooms where they have either “scholarly integration” (studying at more or less the same level as the other students) or “social integration” (simply having the experience of sitting with and interacting with other students).

A Rejoinder to the Response of Lama Abu Odeh: On Jordan, the Hashemite Regime, and the Current Mobilizations

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[This article was written as a rejoinder to Lama Abu Odeh's  response to the author's interview on the history of state formation in Jordan and regime-society relations in the context of the Arab uprisings. Click here to read Lama Abu Odeh's response, and click here to read the original interview with Tariq Tell.]

Lama Abu Odeh begins her response to my two-part interview published in Jadaliyya by congratulating me for offering readers an analysis of Jordan’s socio-political “tapestry,” and of the “shifting trajectory of the country’s political economy,” that is “unsparing in it comprehensiveness and unyielding in its attention to detail.” However, she then proceeds to distort the interview into something it most definitely is not: an attempt to portray the East Bank as some kind of bucolic Merrie Trans-Jordan, a communal idyll disrupted by the intrusion of outsiders in the form of exploitative aghrab. In Abu Odeh’s version, my narrative is allegedly “infused” with “something akin to nativism” and disguises a hidden agenda: I want to lump together all Trans-Jordanians into a catch-all category of victimized, rural “insiders,” the better to contrast them with an “other” that on closer inspection turns out to be the Jordanians of Palestinian origin. At one point, Abu Odeh claims that this “othering” is part of the discursive strategy “of an extreme nativist … one for whom contact with communal other is unusual, unnatural, and despoiling.” My aim, according to her, is to “give legitimacy to the disengagement process undergoing in Jordan towards its Palestinian population.”

Abu Odeh is only able to sustain such a reading of my argument by indulging in a veritable litany of error and misrepresentation, with hardly a sentence not willfully misinterpreted, hardly a quote not taken out of context. Thus it is completely untrue that the “organizing idea” of my analysis is that “Jordan is ruled by a coalition of two political forces whose most distinct quality is their outside status, the Hashemites, a British “imported dynasty”, and what he calls “aghrab” (strangers).” Nor is there anything in the interview that supports “the delineation of the Hashemites as ‘aghrab’ along with the Palestinians.” On any halfway charitable reading of the interview, it is clear that I am using the term aghrab as a shorthand (as I was covering a lot of ground in a limited space) for the urban wing of a composite elite that (I argue) is still divided along lines of kinship, ethnicity, and regional origin. When I then speak of an “expanded elite” that emerged from a complicated process of colonial and post-colonial state building, I do not—at any point—maintain that this social force can be collapsed into Hashemites and aghrab. Instead, I argue quite explicitly that this grouping had important Trans-Jordanian elements, all of which were firmly rooted in the rural social structure of the East Bank. These include tribal shaykhs who accumulated large estates by registering communal lands, peasants who grew rich when land prices soared in Amman or Irbid, and a “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” that turned administrative position into economic gain. Abu Odeh reveals herself to be well aware of this part of my argument when she quotes me arguing that “. . . both individually and as a group, the “aghrab” have long-since forged multifarious links (including financial and marital ties) with elements of the “indigenous” Trans-Jordanian elite.”

Abu Odeh extends her cavalier ways with my words to my treatment of the uneven development of the East Bank, the factor that I maintain lies at the root of the current hirak. Moreover, she starts here by taking a quotation out of context: a truncated sentence (i.e., “. . . rural East Bankers . . . had a subaltern role as compared to the bureaucratic and mercantile aghrab clustered in Amman”) is deployed to support the allegation that I consider all Trans-Jordanians (as an undifferentiated, native, quasi-national, rural group) to have had a “bad deal.” In fact, the full quote does not speak of rural East Bankers in general or of their welfare, but of their subordinate role in a specific context: Jordan’s policy-making coalition (though even in this specific context I flag East Bank exceptions). The original sentence reads as follows:

Matters were compounded by the nature of the policy-making coalition that had attached itself to the monarchy during the mandatory period, one in which rural East Bankers (give or take a few wealthy or well connected shaykhs or Palace favorites) had a subaltern role as compared to the bureaucratic and mercantile aghrab clustered in Amman.

Together with my description of the slant of donor interests, such a claim is offered as an explanation (brief but nevertheless based on history and political economy, and definitely not an argument that “the Hashemites being aghrab themselves, have a thing for other aghrab”) for a secular policy bias against the East Bank hinterlands. Crucially, the latter is nowhere a claim about the generalized “victim status” of East Bankers, but one that identifies very clearly those parts of the East Bank that have suffered—and by default, those areas of Amman and its environs, Irbid, and the Jordan Valley, all of which contain considerable numbers of Trans-Jordanians, that have benefited—from the particular pattern of development. Given my earlier recognition of an “extended” elite with prominent, rural, East Bank elements, I can hardly have cast the process as a conspiratorial “aghrab hijacking” that “siphoned” precious resources to Amman.

Had Abu Odeh engaged more productively with this part of my argument instead of misreporting it, she would have recognized that I in fact do “establish in the analysis a homology of victimhood between the hinterlands of Jordan and the refugee camp suburbs of Amman,” at least a “homology” of popular resistance. I say quite clearly in the interview that “there were larger absolute numbers of poor people in eastern Amman and al-Zarqa.” Given the magnitudes involved, this clearly implies that the greater part of poor Jordanians are of Palestinian origin. Certainly, I also argue that the incidence of poverty was greater in the East Bank hinterlands. However, this is because (as I will explain more fully in the next paragraph) I am trying to explain the upsurge of political contention in these areas that carried over into the present hirak. It is thus by no means true that the inhabitants of eastern Amman are “absented by analysis” from my account of popular contention. In fact, I speak very clearly of a “subterranean current of resistance that has proceeded in tandem (and in some cases even preceded) the troubles in the hinterlands.” I also argue that this everyday resistance has involved “subaltern actors from both sides of the communal divide.”  

It is important to stress here that it was the emphasis of the interview questions that pushed me to focus on popular resistance among the East Bankers. The questions concerned the current hirak and the key social forces that have taken part in it: the public sector workers, the retired servicemen, and the coordinating committees in the governorates. These have all been predominantly Trans-Jordanian. Even the Muslim Brotherhood has tended to send its East Bank activists to the demonstrations. Abu Odeh does not appear to dispute this part of my account, nor does she contest my claim of a shifting geography of protest that has seen an upsurge in political contention in Jordan’s south: “after all the “East Bank hinterland” is in a state of rebellion against the ruling monarchy and has been for some time. Yes, it appears that they are getting a bad deal.” She should then, presumably, agree that the “refugee camp suburbs,” whether in Amman or elsewhere, have been largely tangential to the current mobilizations. No doubt there are good reasons for this: the heavy hand of regime repression, the possibility that refugee camp residents do not fully identify with the Jordanian state or political system, perhaps even the fact that the small enterprises on which they rely have not been as hard hit as the state sector during the current economic slowdown. I am personally unsure of the reasons for the camps current political quiescence, hence my call for more research in my answer to the last question of the interview.

The highlights and corrections enumerated above cause Abu Odeh’s arguments to quickly unravel, leaving nothing to show that I am fixated on “the axis aghrab/East Bankers” as the defining social divide in modern Jordan. However, her own account of the formation of the Jordanian state and of Amman’s “conjoint urbanization” merits its own critique. While such an account may play nicely in progressive debates on migration or multiculturalism in the metropole, it would strike most progressives in Jordan (whether of East Bank or Palestinian origin) as implicitly advancing a disturbing agenda, even if unintentionally.

Abu Odeh’s formulation, that the “state of Jordan as a national entity, was created through colonial fiat by non-East Bankers (Hashemites, Syrians, immigrant Palestinians)” once again distorts what I say as I give pride of place to the British. Moreover, it looks at state formation/state building from an elite perspective. It ignores the role of East Bank tribesmen in defending Abdullah I from Wahhabi attacks in the first years of the Emirate, the role of the Trans-Jordanian National Congresses (1928-1933) in defining the county’s national identity and setting the parameters of its political field, and the role of the rank and file of the military in sustaining the regime after the British departed. It also slights the contribution of ordinary Palestinians–party activists, workers, administrators, doctors, and educators–to Jordan’s social, economic and political development after 1948.

No doubt it is true that, as Abu Odeh claims, “Jordan per country is simply unrecognizable without those non-East Banker populations.” However, it does not follow that “they are Jordan as much as Jordan is them.” Nor would many people today accept that an externally imposed process of regime formation refutes “the presence of a national entity that has an organic insider/native who then is made to suffer the presence and imposition of foreign non-national outsiders.” Surely she does not mean that Trans-Jordan was an empty plot before Abdullah I arrived from the Hijaz? Or that it was an unpopulated frontier (as Laurence Oliphant argued when he proposed setting up Jewish colonies in the Balqa’ in the 1870s)?

Furthermore, in Abu Odeh’s version of historical change, cities seem to count most. She claims that “it is the emergence of a new urbanity in Jordan–an Ammanese urbanity” that “defines the very history of the modern state of Jordan.” For her “Amman is the city that staged the transplantation of the peasantry of both communities” and catalyzed “their transformation into an urbane population.” There is no place in her account, or so it seems, for the different push factors driving the migration of each of the East Bank rural population and Palestinians (many of whom would become Jordanian citizens) to Amman: uneven economic development in the case of the former and Zionist apartheid in the case of the latter. Nor is there room in this urbane “theatre” of harmonious modernity for the assabiyyas that surface regularly at elections, or (as in the last two months) in violent clan conflict in Eastern Amman, for the communal tensions that regularly appear at Faysali-Wihdat football matches, or for a host of other vertical solidarities that are fed—as I maintain—by regime policies and a rent-saturated political economy. More importantly for present purposes, Abu Odeh’s celebration of “the role that Amman has played as the “melting pot” between East Bankers and West Bankers through intermarriage and the comingling of accents and identities,” echoes slogans long since deployed to dilute the Palestinians’ right of return (and implicitly to encourage them to settle permanently on the East Bank). King Hussein first launched the idea of the melting pot – announcing that Jordanians were a people “of diverse roots and origins” – in the early 1990s to combat criticisms (made by both Jordanians of Palestinian origin as well as Trans-Jordanians) that the Wadi `Araba Accords had done nothing to promote the return of Palestinian refugees. While celebrating the signature of the accord, Bill Clinton lauded Jordan for “opening its doors” to “millions of [its] Arab brethren,” and pointedly renewed the pledge made by Eisenhower in 1957 to maintain the integrity of the Hashemite regime. Adnan Abu Odeh quite rightly argues that this signaled a “new regional role for Jordan: the incorporation of Palestinian refugees in the country” (the quote is from his Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom, p.267).

How Jordan treats its citizens of Palestinian origin may well be “dirty,” but it is hardly a “secret.” I myself speak in the interview of the “deficit of rights … that King Abdullah’s Palestinian subjects labor under in parliamentary life and the military,” and there is in fact a considerable literature on Jordan’s gerrymandered elections, and how they discriminate against the urban centers where Jordanians of Palestinian origin are concentrated. The real secret about Jordan–its contours made clear by reams of well documented material on King Hussein’s covert contacts with Israelis–concerns the Hashemite elite’s intimate relationship with the Jewish state. At the very least, this has eased the Israeli occupation of the West Bank by providing a “safety valve,” in the form of an “open bridges” policy that allowed the “soft transfer” of Palestinians across the Jordan River. This has, in turn, eased the strain of maintaining Israel’s hold on the West Bank, and created the demographic basis for a Palestinian majority on the East. The WikiLeaks revelations have brought to light a further twist: some of those who have preached the doctrine of Huquq Manqusa most assiduously have been willing to forego the right to return to Palestine in exchange for a larger share (muhassassah) of power in the Jordanian state (or as Adnan Abu Odeh would have it, the Hashemite Kingdom). In espousing the myth of the “Ammanese melting pot,” while attempting to delegitimize “nativist” claims that Jordan has its own “organic natives/insiders,” Lama Abu Odeh is in danger of aligning herself with this group. An apparently radical critique (that is in fact a misreading) of my interview could end up unintentionally serving a covert Zionism, one that has almost emptied Palestine of its original inhabitants, and now seeks to keep Israel “Jewish” by managing their permanent settlement on the East

[Click here to read the original interview conducted with Tariq Tell. Click here to read the response by Lama Abu Odeh to the interview, for which this current article serves as a rejoinder.]

Materialist Analysis in the Service of a Nationalist Thesis: Response to Interview with Tariq Tell on the Hirak Siyasi in Jordan

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[This article was written as a response to a recently published two-part interview with Tariq Tell on the history of state formation in Jordan and regime-society relations in the context of the Arab uprisings. Click here to read Tariq Tell's rejoinder to this response.]

Political agitation and social dissidence have become daily occurrences in Jordan. Strikes, demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, denunciatory public statements, public property destruction episodes, altercations and violent clashes with the police and baltagiyya, and cabinet turnover: events such as these have become the daily staple of news coming from Jordan.  All of this would qualify as a form of pre-revolutionary ferment, given the background of the Arab Spring, but the consensus term offered to denote the brewing political scene in Jordan is the default one of al-hirak al-siyasi. The judgment seems to be that such acts of dissidence are exactly that, dissidence, with no potential to spread, intensify, and spin into anything like a revolutionary situation. 

The world wonders why.

The two-part interview that Jadaliyya conducted with the Jordanian scholar Tareq Tell offers the readers the opportunity to learn the answer to such a question. Indeed, Tell obliges the Jadaliyya readers by offering a very complicated and comprehensive account, not only of the political parties involved in the Hirak, but of the history of the establishment of the state of Jordan, the nature of the Hashemite monarchy and the historic alliances it has struck to stabilize its rule and achieve its dominance, the various social and communal groupings that make-up Jordan’s demographic tapestry, including their political orientation and the nature of their national identity formation, the dynamics of the urban/rural divide, and the shifting trajectory of the country’s political economy. Tell’s analysis is unsparing in its comprehensiveness and unyielding in its attention to detail. To my knowledge, it is the only account of its kind available in English that manages to explain a great deal to an uninformed audience with words that fill no more than two online pages! This is a great feat, to be sure, and one for which Tareq Tell should be congratulated.

However, there is something seriously amiss with Tell’s analysis. Despite the great care with which Tell uses the objective and neutral scholarly voice in offering his account, something akin to a nativism deflects his analysis, one that echoes the Trans-Jordanian nativism that he attributes to East Bankers when he says, “Trans-Jordanian nativism still looms large in the national imagination of East Bank activists.” Well, it’s not only the national imagination of East Bank activists that is infused with such nativism; it is also perhaps that of East Bank scholars, of the likes of Mr. Tell.

The organizing idea of Tell’s analysis is that Jordan is ruled by a coalition of two political forces whose most distinct quality is their outside status, the Hashemites, a British “imported dynasty”, and what he calls aghrab [strangers]. And who are those aghrab? Well, at first they are described as, “merchants and bureaucrats who filtered into the East Bank during late Ottoman period.” But then, with time they develop into the urban-aghrab defined as “… the descendants of the ‘external elite’ … of Levantine colonial functionaries who collaborated with British rule, as well as the Ammani bourgeoisie that emerged from the waves of migrant and refugee flows into what was once southeast Syria between 1851…and 1991.”  Let us make no mistake; those aghrab may not be confused with the “Jordanians.” Indeed, they are to be contrasted with them—in so far as they belong to the “elite” ruling coalition, Tell proposes that we describe them as “Hashemite [rather] than as Jordanian, clustered around a once-immigrant core whose origins lie in the Hijaz and the urban centers of Greater Syria (Mandatory Palestine in particular).”

But who are the other to those “Hashemite” aghrab? After all, the country is called Jordan, so who has the privilege of being denominated “Jordanian?” Who are the insiders who are being dealt a bad hand by those aghrab clustering around the other aghrab, the Hashemites?

Tell describes them in different ways. Sometimes he calls them “rural East Bankers,” by reference to their economic activity (at least, most recently) combined with their regional location in the East Bank writ large. Other times, they are referred to as the “Trans Jordanian base” of the Hashemites. Yet other times, their victim status is more specifically regionally located in the “East Bank hinterland.”

And what is the nature of the bad deal the insiders are getting from the outsiders? Well, Tell is not short of ways to describe it. One is “… rural East Bankers … had a subaltern role as compared to the bureaucratic and mercantile aghrab clustered in Amman.” Another, “The result was a lasting and entrenched policy bias ….that favored the urban centers of the northwest and the Jordan Valley while neglecting the East Bank hinterlands.” Yet another, “An economic fault line had emerged that ran alongside an older national-regional divide, prominent since mandatory times, between the regime’s rural (or at least once-rural) Trans-Jordanian base, and the urban aghrab.” And in case you still haven’t gotten the point, “they advertized a fissure between the Amman-based elite and the popular base of the monarchy, essentially between the aghrab and once-rural East Bankers now largely transplanted to the military and the bureaucracy.”

At first blush, those claims on Tell’s part are not all that improbable; after all, the “East Bank hinterland” is in a state of rebellion against the ruling monarchy and has been for sometime. Yes, it appears that they are getting a bad deal, but is it really the aghrab that are siphoning off precious resources that should rightfully go to the native hinterlands?  Should one immediately interpret the fact that, historically, Amman has absorbed most of the state’s investment in infrastructure and economic production to be a form of the aghrab hijacking the state and expropriating its resources for their own benefit? What if Amman, in its relationship to its rural environs, is not the exception, but the rule, as such urban to rural patterns of overinvestment to underinvestment seem to hold true in almost every Arab country, as we have been made painfully aware from watching the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria? Frequently, Tell refers to East Bankers as “transplanted peasantry.” What if the vast urbanization of Amman functioned not as a conspiratorial scheme drawing the resources away from the East Bankers to the benefit of the aghrab in Amman, but as the engine the state used to transplant and urbanize the “East Bank peasantry,” whose small agricultural and pastoral economy proved inadequate to sustain them or lift them out of poverty, given the scarcity of rain in Jordan, but especially after the educated children of the peasants (through the implementation of compulsory state education) no longer wished to remain peasants? In other words, what if what moved to Amman was not just investment, but East Bank populations as well, making it the massive urban hub that it is today? In fact, Tell admits just as much when he says that the Hashemites built a Transjordanian base by entering into a “social alliance” with the East Bankers “institutionalized by means of a bloated bureaucracy and an overgrown military… while cementing an authoritarian bargain based on the exchange of political loyalty for public sector jobs and patronage.” It sure does sound like a great deal of state resources were moved to Amman, the capital and the seat of the “bloated bureaucracy and overgrown military,” not to please the agrhab, but the East Bankers themselves!

Tell says nothing as to how exactly the aghrab managed to secure this “policy bias” in their favor and at the cost of East Bankers. Is it that they controlled decision-making positions in the state that allowed them to divert resources to their coffers? If not (and I suspect that Tell is short of evidence to support such a proposition), did the aghrab use East Bank decision-makers as a front for their interests to help them secure this “bias?” Is it that they had the special ear of the king, who consistently made decisions to build up their advantage, even to the disadvantage of the East Bankers? Is it perhaps that the Aghrab controlled the levers of the economy of the state, which they consistently used to pressure the king to submit to their interests? Or is he saying that the Hashemites, being aghrab themselves, have a “thing” for other aghrab, favoring them at every turn, at the expense of the natives?

And how is it that the aghrab managed to preserve this policy bias throughout the shifts of the political economy of the state? Is he saying that they had a prominent position in the economy when it was “dirigiste,” which they were then able to use to secure privileged positions when it turned to neoliberalism? If so, how were they able to do that despite the massive shift in state resources on behalf of East Bankers that occurred as a result of the social alliance mentioned above? Maybe Tell is saying something a little more nuanced than that. Maybe he is saying that an elite aghrab class entered into a partnership with East Bank elites, the latter using their position in the state as decision makers, who promoted their conjoined interests at the cost of the poor of both communities: the East Bank hinterlands and the poor Palestinians living in the camps and East of Amman? If so, then what is the value of insisting on the aghrab as the bad people, without also implicating their East Bank partners? And why not establish in the analysis a homology of victimhood between the hinterlands of Jordan and the refugee camp suburbs of Amman? Or is the fear that if one does so that the whole inside/outside division, that of the aghrab/East Bankers, that is fundamental to Tell’s analysis of the situation, would simply have to be given up?

Still more, is it not equally conceivable that the East Bank state elites, themselves spun into a capitalist class with the neo-liberalizing of the state economy that promoted its own interest, made do without any partnership with the aghrab, and, in fact, in explicit exclusion of them? After all, this is an elite who, having secured for itself the power of the state, were able to transform it into the “goodies” of the economy. Who needs the aghrab when you are so ideally situated? Tell can go ahead and drop the name of Bassem Awadallah, a Palestinian who worked as financial adviser to King Abdullah, and spend precious lines in a short interview discussing Queen Rania (a Palestinian) and her family, and the charges of corruption against them, to suggest the towering presence of Aghrab in the state; but, Awadallah alone can hardly explain an enduring “policy bias” on behalf of the Aghrab, and even Tell himself admits to the tentativeness of the evidence against Queen Rania and her family.

The delineation of the Hashemites as aghrab, along with the Palestinians in Jordan, allows Tell to ignore three towering facts that if recognized would take any bite out of his analysis. The first: the aghrab/East Banker distinction mapping onto an insider/outsider distinction assumes the presence of a national entity that has an organic insider/native, who then is made to suffer the presence and imposition of foreign non-national outsiders. But if the state of Jordan as a national entity was created, as Tell himself describes, through colonial fiat by non-East Bankers (Hashemites, Syrians, immigrant Palestinians) to include them and East Bankers in one national entity, a state called Jordan, and if the presence of these various groupings has continued from the moment of its birth throughout its history, then Jordan as a country is simply unrecognizable without those non-East Banker populations.  They are Jordan, as much as Jordan is them.

Second, Tell ignores the decision by King Abdullah the first to award Jordanian citizenship to the inhabitants of the West Bank in 1949 and to annex it to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan the year after. Attributing the aghrab status to the Hashemites allows Tell, the East Banker, to disavow and dissociate from this decision, as it is one aghrab endowing the status of citizen upon another! Through this double disavowal, both remain aghrab, no matter what, and regardless of the legal niceties of the situation. In fact, this double disavowal allows for a reversal of the meaning of the historic expropriation that has taken place. Instead of Jordan annexing the West Bank to its territory, preempting thereby the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territory that was not under Jewish control in the aftermath of the 1948 war, it was the aghrab who have, in fact, “annexed” the East Bank, creating an everlasting policy bias against the native East Bankers!

Third, the delineation of Amman, where most Palestinians live, as the site of the injustice inflicted on East Bankers, ignores the role that Amman has played as the “melting pot” between East Bankers and West Bankers, through intermarriage and the comingling of accents and identities, and the emergence of a new urbanity in Jordan—an Ammanese urbanity—the history of which defines the very history of the modern state of Jordan.  After all, Amman is the city that staged the transplantation of the peasantry of both communities, as Tareq describes them, and their helped their transformation into an urban population. It is this commingling, intermarriage, and conjoint urbanization, in which an East Banker is not distinguishable from the West Banker, that has forced the Jordanian state, trying to “disengage” from its Palestinian population, to use the family name and the question, “where was your father born?” to create an arbitrary distinction between the two communities, and, in fact, to create them anew as a state policy! Such commingling is only referred to in the most paranoiac fashion in Tell’s analysis. He says “…. both individually and as a group, the 'aghrab’ have long-since forged multifarious links (including financial and marital ties) with elements of the ‘indigenous’ Trans-Jordanian elite.” It is limited to the elites, according to him, and for utilitarian reasons! This is so far from the truth that only an extreme nativist would make such a claim, one for whom contact with the communal other is unusual, unnatural, despoiling, and to be “disengaged” as soon as it takes place!

Towards the very end of the interview, and having repeatedly insisted on the dominant role played by the aghrab in Jordan, Tell calls on historical and anthropological research to be returned “from the hinterlands and used to elucidate the political sociology of the largely Palestinian population of Eastern ‘Greater Amman’ and central Irbid, as well as the political economy of the small enterprise sector that sustains them. Key questions here will concern the factors that kept the vast majority of this group back from the fray during the last two years, and the fate of the traditions of popular resistance that took them into the street so regularly during the 1950s and 1960s.”  Tell wonders why this segment of the Palestinian Jordanian population has not participated in the hirak! Better an afterthought than never! Still, one wonders why Tell wonders of the political absence of this group, having spent his analysis using the axis aghrab/East Banker as the defining one, placing them squarely in the category of the Aghrab! It is only natural that a group absented by analysis would be politically absent. For, after all, how can Tell wonder at their demobilization, when his analysis itself has denied them any sense of entitlement to the state of Jordan per aghrab?

“The dirty secret about Jordan,” an observer noted, “is how it treats its citizens of Palestinian origin.” Through reversing this observation and insisting on the idea of the aghrab mistreating the East Bankers, Tell’s analysis gives legitimacy to the “disengagement” process in Jordan towards its Palestinian population. This is deeply unfortunate, and what it proves in the end is that the real aghrab are East Banker nativists, who insist at every turn, against fact and law, that they are determinedly aghrab to the idea of a state for all its citizens!

[Click here to read the two-part interview this article is in response to. Click here to read the rejoinder by Tariq Tell to this response.]

Sabra and Shatila . . . Thirty Years Later

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" لا يتبخر الدم بل يغوص في الأرض"
"Blood does not evaporate. It sinks into the earth."

                                                    --Talal Salman

جميلة بوحيرد

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[”ملف من الأرشيف“ هي سلسة جديدة تقوم ”جدلية“ بنشرها بالعربية والإنجليزية بالتعاون مع جريدة ”السفير“ اللبنانية. الملفات ستكون لشخصيات أيقونية تركت أثراً عميقاً في الحقل السياسي والثقافي في العالم العربي.]



 

 

الإسم: جميلة
الشهرة: بوحيرد
تاريخ الولادة: 1935
إسم الزوج (ة): جاك فيرجيس
تاريخ الزواج: 1965
الأولاد: مريم/ لياس
الجنسية: الجزائر
الفئة: ناشطة سياسية

جميلة بوحيرد


 - جزائرية. (مناضلة، كانت واحدة من ثلاث جميلات عرفهن التاريخ النضالي الجزائري هي وجميلة بو عزة وجميلة بو باشا).

 - ولدت في العام 1935 في حي القصبة من أب جزائري وأم تونسية في أسرة متوسطة الحال وكانت البنت الوحيدة بين سبع شبان.

-  تلقت علومها في مدرسة فرنسية كانت تجبر الطلاب على غناء نشيد "فرنسا أمنا" في كل صباح الا ان جميلة وبفعل انخراطها في الحياة النضالية منذ أيام الدراسة كانت تغني "الجزائر أمنا" ما دفع الناظر الفرنسي المسؤول في المدرسة الى معاقبتها بشدة.

-  عند اندلاع الثورة الجزائرية عام 1954 انضمت إلى جبهة التحرير الوطني الجزائرية للنضال ضد الاحتلال الفرنسي وكانت في العشرين من عمرها ثم التحقت بصفوف الفدائيين وكانت أولى المتطوعات لزرع القنابل في طريق الاستعمار الفرنسي، ونظراً لبطولاتها أصبحت المطاردة رقم 1.

 - في 26 كانون الثاني 1957 بدأت قصتها النضالية عندما فجرت قنبلة موقوتة في ملهى يتردد عليه الشبان الفرنسيون الذين يؤدون خدمتهم العسكرية في الجزائر وتتالت بعده الانفجارات.

-  في 9 نيسان 1957 اعتقلتها دورية للاحتلال بعد أن أصيبت برصاصة في صدرها وضبطت معها وثائق ورسائل ومبلغ كبير من المال، دلت على إنها كانت صلة الوصل مع قائد فدائيي الجزائر ياسف سعدي.

- بدأت رحلتها القاسية من التعذيب وجملتها الشهيرة التي قالتها آنذاك " أعرف أنكم سوف تحكمون علي بالإعدام لكن لا تنسوا إنكم بقتلي تغتالون تقاليد الحرية في بلدكم ولكنكم لن تمنعوا الجزائر من أن تصبح حرة مستقلة". بعد 3 سنوات من السجن تم ترحيلها إلى فرنسا وقضت هناك مدة ثلاث سنوات.
 - ضربت وأحرقت بالكهرباء في مكان الجرح المصابة به وفي نهديها والعضو التناسلي وأصيبت بنزف شديد أدى إلى انقطاع الحيض وبعجز عن رفع ذراعها اليسرى.

-  في 16 تموز 1957 صدر حكم بإعدامها مع جميلة ابو عزة.

-  دخلت السجن وهي تنشد "جزائرنا" وتردد صوتها في الشوارع.

-  انطلقت التظاهرات الشعبية احتجاجاً على اعتقالها وتطورت قضيتها لتصبح قضية عربية وعالمية.

-  طالب زعماء العالم وفي مقدمهم الرئيس جمال عبد الناصر والرئيس الهندي نهرو، والزعيم السوفياتي فورو شيلوف بالعفو عنها.

-  كان موعد تنفيذ الحكم بالاعدام في 7 آذار 1958 لكنه لم ينفذ وصدر مرسوم في 18 نيسان بتخفيف حكم الإعدام إلى السجن المؤبد.  وكانت تقول: "كنت أفضل الموت على حياة المعتقل، ليتهم أعدموني لاسترحت من العذاب الذي أعانيه الآن."

-  خرجت من السجن في العام 1962 وتزوجت محاميها جاك فيرجيس في العام 1965 وأنجبا ولدين لياس ومريم (متزوجة فؤاد حبوب ولهما طفلة تدعى فاطمة نور (1995)).

-  عملت مع زوجها في تأسيس مجلة تعنى بالثورات القومية الافريقية.

-  انفصلت عن زوجها منذ العام 1991 وهي تعيش بمفردها في الجزائر، تتقاضى راتباً من الدولة وتقوم بنشاطات اجتماعية من وقت إلى آخر.

-  استبعدت عن المشاركة في مواقع السلطة لأنها تزوجت فرنسياً.

-  تقدمت في العام 1962 مع زهرة دريف المناضلة المعروفة بمشروع قانون متطور للأسرة، ونظمت تظاهرة نسوية لتحقيقه. كانت تلك التظاهرة الأولى التي تحصل بعد الاستقلال، لكنها فشلت في تغيير الموقف الرسمي فانكفأت إلى حياتها الخاصة. هذا الإحباط الذي أصابها دفعها إلى أن تصرح في العام 1987 باسم المناضلات الجزائريات: "لقد تم نسيانهن قبل 25 عاماً".

 - قدم المخرج المصري يوسف شاهين عملاً سينمائياً ضخماً بعنوان "جميلة " قامت ببطولته ماجدة ولم تسمح الرقابة المصرية بعرضه على التلفزيون إلا في العام 1998 أي بعد 37 عاماً على إنتاجه.
-  أطلقت صرخة تحث فيها السلطات الجزائرية الاهتمام بها وبالمناضلين والمناضلات من رفاقها بعد أن وصلت لمرحلة عجزت فيها عن تأمين الدواء.

 - نشرت مقالاً في جريدة الوطن الجزائرية عبرت فيها عن معاناتها ولاقت موجة كبيرة من التضامن من كافة شرائح المجتمع.

- في 25 كانون الثاني 2009 بدأت زيارة الى لبنان بدعوة من رئيسة الجمعية اللبنانية لرعاية المعوقين رندة بري، زارت خلالها بلدات بنت جبيل ومارون الراس ومعتقل الخيام وانهت زيارتها بوضع اكليل من الورد على ضريحي الشهيدين هادي نصر الله وعماد مغنية. اختتمت زيارتها في 27 كانون الثاني2009 .

- قالت في معرض زيارتها لمعتقل الخيام : " أشكر الله أني زرت هذه الأماكن لانها أفضل من القصور".

- "أنا ما زلت ثائرة لأن على المراة العربية أن تحمل في يدها اليمنى فأساً لتبني وأن تذرف دمعة في عينها علها تهز رجال الأمة". ( السفير 26 كانون الثاني 2009)

 - توجهت برسالة مفتوحة الى الرئيس الجزائري عبد العزيز بو تفليقة في 9 كانون الاول 2009 طالبته فيها الالتفات الى وضعها المأساوي وطالبت برفع معاشات التقاعد للمجاهدين والمجاهدات السابقين للحصول على عيشة كريمة. 

“From the American People”: Sketches of the US National Security State in Palestine

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“While government sights are set on ‘the enemy,’ ours might be set on them and on how this rush to the intimate structures new sites of imperial governance.” – Ann Stoler[1]

“We have to squeeze these guys.” – Senior State Department official in the wake of the 2006 Hamas parliamentary victory.”[2]

In tracing the historical circuits through which techniques of colonial management have been tested and transmitted, Laleh Khalili has underscored Palestine’s centrality in global counterinsurgency.[3] Under the British Mandate (1917-48), Palestine served as a staging ground for the consolidation of British imperial policing and pacification strategies, and following mandate rule, as a testing ground for Israeli experiments in asymmetric warfare and demographic engineering, not barring considerable US diplomatic and material support. Likewise, Darryl Li has explored the ways in which Palestine has served as a “laboratory” within which various techniques of spatial and population management have been experimented in search of “an optimal balance between maximum [Israeli] control over the territory and minimum responsibility for [the] non-Jewish population.”[4] Moreover, as Li notes, just as laboratory experiments are meant to be replicated elsewhere, Palestine has long served as a testing ground of sorts for other modern-day occupations. US military discourse abounds with references to the Israeli experience with “unconventional warfare” in Palestine, what one US military strategist called Israel’s “combat theater” from which the US has much to learn.[5] In its most recent occupation of Iraq, the US adopted various population control measures and biopolitical technologies used by the Israeli military in the occupied territories, including identity cards and biometric data to track population movements and effectively isolate and undermine resistance to the occupying force.[6]

An asymmetric mode of warfare that saw its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s as an imperial response to national liberation struggles and communist movements, and more recently with the modern occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency is often assumed to be kinetic, or related to outright violence and lethal force, while its “non-kinetic” counterparts are often overlooked. At the center of my inquiry here are the ways in which practices of colonial subjugation and management are being mobilized through the less sensational, seemingly mundane spaces and practices of aid governance. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) offers one site through which to view this articulation.

The Architecture of US Homeland Security in Palestine

Established under President Kennedy with the signing of the US Foreign Assistance Act in 1961, USAID is arguably an early articulation of the shift towards a “population-centric” approach to counterinsurgency as promoted in the 2006 US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24; henceforth, “the Manual”). In contrast to the “enemy-centric” approach, which aims to deter civilians from supporting resistance through a series of punitive measures, this model speaks to a wider and more complex engagement that aims to influence attitudes and alliances within the population at large through various non-kinetic means including economic regeneration, basic service provision and alliance-building through local networks. While lethal violence and brutal force remain central tenets of the counterinsurgency doctrine, the Manual, and the population-central approach more broadly, focus public attention on non-kinetic operations and represent counterinsurgency, in the words of David Kilcullen, as a form of “armed social work.”[7]

The establishment of USAID during the height of the Cold War was not disconnected from Kennedy’s conviction that the US fight against communism would be won in part through a portfolio of capitalist economic development and expressions of “soft power” aimed at “winning the hearts and minds” of the population in regions where the US was waging war. Kennedy translated these core ideas into two longstanding institutional formations: the Peace Corps and the US Agency for International Development.

In recent years USAID has become entwined, in intimate ways, with the US-led so-called “global war on terror” (which Barak Obama renamed “oversees counterinsurgency operations” in 2009). Today the agency’s operational framework is shaped by a combination of laws, policies and domestic and foreign pressures that reflect, foremost, dominant discourses and configurations of power in Washington. Included within this relatively complex legal-security apparatus is Executive Order (EO) 13224, which builds upon longer-standing laws that ban US assistance to and contact with US-designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and individuals, as well as those who “disrupt the Middle East Peace Process.” Issued under President Bush, EO 13224 prohibits material support to and transactions with persons who “commit, threaten to commit or support terrorism” as defined by the US government. Today the U.S Secretary of State includes some 6,000 individuals, groups and entities on its “Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons” (SDN) list, which until 2008 included Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress.[8] Moreover, this list hosts a disproportionate number of Palestinian groups and individuals, including Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyah (HAMAS), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), among others.

To ensure compliance with US “no material assistance” legislation, USAID has instituted a number of oversight measures that include anti-terrorism certification (ATC) or “the paper,” as it is colloquially referred to in Palestine. The paper is a seven-page document that prospective USAID grant awardees must sign in order to be eligible for funding. They must confirm with their signature that they do not have connections to nor do they endorse “terrorist” activity as this definition stands in Washington. Their signature also affirms that they will not provide material support to any individual or entity fitting this designation. In effect, US legislation informs how “aid to the Palestinian people” may be used and by whom.

In line with larger trends in liberal governance towards contracting, responsibility for ensuring compliance with this legislation has been shifted onto the NGOs and private firms receiving USAID monies around the world. Today USAID operates almost exclusively through intermediary bodies, which consist predominately of international and American NGOs and private agencies. Referred to by one municipal worker in Palestine as USAID’s “many arms” these bodies are held responsible for obtaining anti-terrorism certification from potential USAID grantees and for collecting personal information from aid recipients to be screened through US intelligence systems. This practice called “vetting” entails the collection of personal information of potential aid recipients and partners, including their names and other identification information. This information is submitted to USAID Headquarters and from there screened through US databases. Throughout the course of my research on USAID, NGO staffers repeatedly remarked that there is little transparency around the process. As one person recounted, “You enter the data into the system and then it goes into a black hole. You can’t track and you can’t follow up.”

Even if not desired by the agencies themselves, these intermediary bodies effectively serve as conduits through which information about local aid recipients is channeled to both the US and Israeli governments, including in some cases, details as fine as the coordinates for plots of land upon which USAID-funded greenhouses are to be constructed. As one employee of a contracting agency noted, “We do not install anything until the beneficiary has been identified through an application process, passed both technical and social criteria, is vetted by USAID, approved by a local committee…and is approved by COGAT.” COGAT—Israel’s Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories—is the body responsible for implementing Israeli state policy in the occupied territories.

For many Palestinians within this intermediary sphere, their positioning as enforcers of US mandates has situated them in awkward, paradoxical ways—essentially having to police the local organizations and beneficiaries with whom they work while also purportedly being their “partners.” One NGO worker in the health and humanitarian sector remarked that the collection of personal data was highly insulting to recipients and vendors alike, and she felt as if she constantly had to negotiate a contradictory identity as both a Palestinian and a “face” for USAID. She states, “Those of us implementing the projects are negotiating bizarre positions. We are constantly apologizing for having to do work on behalf of USAID.” Another staffer in a mental health organization that had previously received US funds recounted a time during the second intifada when she could not serve beneficiaries with connections to the aforementioned US-designated FTOs. “They are making us police our beneficiaries,” she said. “We are monitoring our people.” In the many exchanges I had with employees in this intermediary sphere, self-policing was a recurring theme. As the director of one organization remarked, “We simply don’t work with every municipality; some are restricted.” She then proceeded to list a range of municipalities in the West Bank including Nablus, Jenin and Ramallah with whom they were prohibited from having relations. Another employee in a US-funded organization said that they had to be very careful in initiating any contact with Hamas while operating in Gaza, which entailed avoiding contact with the entire public sector. A considerable number of beneficiaries were preemptively eliminated. “Our home office in Washington,” he said, “warned us to be very careful.”

Mobility as “Privilege”

Not overlooked by many Palestinians working within these intermediary agencies is the role that western intervention has played in the region historically, and the fact that billions of dollars of western aid, most of it to Israel, has done little to alter the reality of military occupation and indeed much to further entrench it. Especially for the Palestinian generation that has grown up during the second intifada, or those currently living in Gaza, the other dimensions of US aid, namely direct military assistance and other forms of material and diplomatic support to Israel, are not lost in memory. Recent events in the diplomatic theater such as the US opposition to the 2011 Palestinian bid for UN membership and the subsequent termination of funds to UNESCO after it voted to admit Palestine as a member state, or the US position on the Gaza blockade, have stood as stark affirmations of positions already known. These critiques notwithstanding, many middle-class Palestinians have charted opportunities for social (and physical) mobility through employment in foreign aid institutions. As one woman working for a USAID intermediary put it, “People who work with them have a life. They have permits to go into the Israeli areas. They have these cards that allow them to pass any checkpoint. Even the drivers have that. That’s a huge thing. […] You are treated like a human with it.” The irony here of course being that in order for Palestinians to earn the “privilege” to move—that which is internationally understood as a basic human right—they must effectively perform and reproduce US geopolitics on a territory where they yet have borders to call their own.

“It’s Not Negotiating. It’s Subjecting, Being Subjected and Accepting.”[9] 

In 2003, following implementation of the US federally mandated anti-terrorism certification, many Palestinian NGOs and civil society groups undertook a collective decision to boycott USAID. This decision was undertaken in large part to protest what was widely seen as the imposition of a US definition and interpretation of “terrorism” on Palestinian local and national politics. As one interviewee contended, “No group actually wants to use the funds to support terrorism. Rather, this is a battle over principle. Who has the power to define?” Indeed, the ATC is but one material manifestation of dominant US understandings of terror and legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence. For many of those living in Palestine, undertaking a decision to sign the ATC directly sanctions these definitions. Given that USAID is among the largest single-country donors to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, US distinctions and determinations of “terrorist” and “non-terrorist,” and the corresponding aid practices that get woven around these distinctions, have profound material implications for those living in this region. Such conditionality has effectively impeded necessary coordination and exacerbated institutional fragmentation among Palestinian institutions and civil society groups already deeply divided by geopolitical realities. The case of the Bethlehem Governorate stands out as but one example.

In 2005 the US placed a boycott on the Bethlehem Municipality following the results of the Palestinian municipal elections, which yielded a mayor and city council seats to members belonging to groups unfavorable to the US palate. The US subsequently barred all financial and diplomatic transactions with the Bethlehem Municipality but retained relations with its neighbors, Beit Jala and Beit Sahour. Together these three municipalities comprise the Bethlehem Governorate, and given their proximity to one another, collectively share seats on the joint water and sewage council. Following the election results, USAID cut funds to all joint bodies of which the Bethlehem Municipality was a member (this is effectively the same strategy exercised in Gaza following the 2006 parliamentary elections) and proceeded to fund Beit Sahour and Beit Jala independently. “Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour are the owners of the water department, together,” the Mayor of Beit Sahour remarked during an interview conducted in 2010. “Now to get something we must go only as Beit Jala or only as Beit Sahour.” While Bethlehem’s neighbors have seen a number of new infrastructure projects and city services in recent years, including upgrading of roads, libraries and youth programs bearing the slogan, “A Gift from the American People to the Palestinian People,” the Bethlehem Municipality has been forced to seek other funding sources to maintain municipal services and repair deteriorating infrastructure. During an interview with Bethlehem’s mayor conducted in 2011 he noted the municipality was waiting for funds from the French to upgrade the water network. “We’ve had these pipes since the 1950s,” he said. “All the roads around Beit Sahour are open for maintenance. It has destroyed all the asphalt.” The case of the Bethlehem Governorate is indicative of broader process of fragmentation occurring across local, regional and national scales in Palestine.

While local groups have adopted different approaches to USAID in Palestine, there remains a general consensus that if a decision to accept USAID funds is undertaken, one must fundamentally operate within a framework that affords little flexibility in terms of negotiating the security priorities set out by Washington and Tel Aviv. There is however no illusion that USAID is exceptional. As one NGO director put, “It’s not sinister if you know the origin. […] Sometimes when we are discussing internally we say look, you know, these people were very clear from the beginning. Nobody came and said that I am here to support the Palestinian resistance and the plight of the Palestinians and their right for self-determination and for an end to the occupation. No one. No one.” There is no illusion regarding consequences for integrating into the “aid game,” as one NGO worker put it. There isn’t however a unified strategy for how to negotiate it.

Conclusion: A Baroque Occupation

What we are seeing, in effect, is a proliferation of sites and diversity of means through which US political and economic power is being articulated. Alongside its military and diplomatic interventions, the US is simultaneously extending its reach through a host of “development experts,” humanitarian agents and “democracy promoters” charged with filtering, sorting and policing the Palestinian civilian population. While taking a new and perhaps more sophisticated form, these contemporary practices and strategies must not be dissociated from a longer history of counterinsurgency in Palestine. Suppression of the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, Khalili reminds us, ended with a Palestinian nationalist movement that while fragmented was not entirely defeated. The repeated failure to destroy nationalist sentiment over time, as she points out “has been met both by the British and the Israelis [and to which we should add Americans] with a more determined commitment to reproduce—more perfectly—the very techniques that failed.” The desire to perfect these techniques, she suggests, has entailed a “constant refinement and ‘reactivation’ of the processes, of ever-more technologically sophisticated identification methods, of increasingly expansive methods of mapping and controlling territories in three dimensions, of more elaborate recruitment of collaborators, or more baroque punishments of collectives.”[10]

The aid regime that has taken form in recent decades is part and parcel of the refinement and evolution of techniques that Khalili speaks of. The various practices mapped here—collection of personal information, mapping of coordinates of land plots, development of internal policing and reporting systems, intelligence gathering and the forging of alliances and divisions between various social groups—are all part and parcel of ever-more sophisticated methods of identification, mapping, controlling, dividing and making legible this population that has time and time again refused wholesale defeat. These mundane practices of counterinsurgency, often renamed with technical terminology such as “reporting” or “compliance,” have become part and parcel of the daily practices of aid governance displaced from the US state and shot through a host of development and humanitarian forces working on its behalf. What has resulted in this process is a proliferation of sites through the US national security apparatus is being articulated within Palestine encased in ever-more sophisticated modes of control.

Of course these processes are not unfolding on a blank slate and if indeed the ultimate result of counterinsurgency techniques is “the production of the civilian not as collateral but as the central object of war making”[11] then here too is where the struggle to resist such projects is taking shape.

NOTES

[1] Ann Laura Stoler with David Bond, “Refractions off Empire: Untimely Comparisons in Harsh Times,” Radical History Review 95, 2006, p. 98.

[2] David Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell,” Vanity Fair, April 2008.

[3] Laleh Khalili, “The Location of Palestine in Global Counterinsurgencies,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 42, 2010, pp. 413–33.

[4] Darryl Li, “The Gaza Strip as Laboratory: Notes in the Wake of Disengagement,” Journal of Palestine Studies 35, 2006, pp. 38–39.

[5] Thomas H. Henriksen, “The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the United States,” February 2007.

[6] See Derek Gregory, “The Biopolitics of Baghdad: Counterinsurgency and the Counter-City,” Human Geography 1, 2008, pp. 6-27.

[7] See Derek Gregory, “The Rush to the Intimate: Counterinsurgency and the Cultural Turn,” Radical Philosophy 150, 2008, pp. 8-23.

[8] Ma’an, “Matrix of Control,” August 2011.

[9] Statement obtained during an interview in Ramallah conducted in 2010 with a former popular committee member who is now the director of an NGO.

[10] Khalili, “The Location of Palestine in Global Counterinsurgencies” p. 427.

[11] Ibid.


Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (September 18)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]


Repression in Bahrain

To Ban or Not to Ban ... Al-Wifaq A blog entry on the Bahraini government's decision on the future of al-Wifaq, on Religion and Politics in Bahrain.

Crisis in Yemen

Yemen's Numan: Power Must Return to the Popular Will Jomana Farhat interviews Yasin Numan, the Secretary General of the Yemeni Socialist Party, who survived an assassination attempt a few days ago, on Al-Akhbar English.

Yemen says deployment of U.S. Marines is temporary A news report on the Yemeni government's justification for the deployment of U.S. marines, on Reuters.

Arrival of US marines stirs up Yemen politics Jane Ferguson analyzes the repercussion of the deployment of US Marines in Yemen, on Al-Jazeera English.

Yemen protesters storm US embassy - as it happened Matthew Weaver, Brian Whitaker and Tom McCarthy reports on the protests against the anti-Muslim film in Yemen, in The Guardian.

Reports and Opinions

Suspect held over killing of Saudi policeman A news report on the arrest of a man in Qatif suspected of shooting a policeman, on Gulfnews.

Kuwait- Women in Justice, Public Prosecution A news report on the reactions to the Supreme Judicial Council's decision to hire women in judicial posts.

The YouTube Salvation Mona Kareem analyzes reactions to a YouTube video showing an attack on young actors by an unknown man, on Al-Akhbar English.

Economy & Markets

Qatar in Egypt: Buying Foreign Policy Mohamed al-Khouli analyzes the political aspect of Qatar's plan to invest $18bn in Egypt.

Saudi shuts 100 lingerie shops for hiring men A news report on the Saudi authorities' decision to close lingerie shops that hire sales men.

Solar Arabia Summit '12 kicks off as interest in renewable energy swells A news report on the Saudi authorities' investment in renewable energy, on Saudi Gazette.

Saudi Arabia Not at Risk of Being Oil Importer, Analyst Says Wael Mahdi writes on the rebuttal of the recent report by Citigroup Inc. that Saudi Arabia will be an importer of oil by 2030.

Media

Sky News Arabia is a break from stations with slanted coverage Saeed Saeed argues that this new channel "ushers a hitherto rare kind of owner into the Arabic media landscape: a commercial enterprise in territory that is largely, although not wholly, the domain of national governments and political parties," on The National.

Oman sentenced blogger in widening media crackdown A news report on the one-year imprisonment of an Omani journalist and blogger, in The Washington Post.

Twitter entry brings imprisonment and fine Hasan Al Naser writes on the ruling against a young man from Qatif for defamation on Twitter, on Saudi Gazette.


Arabic

Libyan Eastern Tribal Chiefs, Population, and Government (Part 1 of 2)

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On 15 September 2012, the tribal chiefs of Libya’s eastern region held a meeting to announce their solutions to the recent spate of violence, which culminated in the attack on the US consulate on 11 September. Although invitations were extended to government officials at this meeting, the tribes announced a clearly critical stance vis-a-vis the government’s weak politics, at times condemning its performance and thus affirming a new capacity to criticize the Libyan state.

At 10:00 AM, the chiefs and their guests began to arrive at a wedding hall in Benghazi. When I arrived at the meeting, I was surprised to see a half a dozen or so security guards standing at the entrance. I had not seen as many policemen in Benghazi since I had arrived the previous week.

Present at the meetin­­­g were tribal chiefs­­­­ accompanied by their close male relatives, army officers, political activists, government representatives of Benghazi, and a few journalists. My friend and I, along with five to six others, including a reporter, were the only women there.

The declarations announced at this meeting, it would become clear soon after, would impact both the actions of the population and the government itself. The massive protests on 21 September in Benghazi, echoed by protests in Tripoli, Derna, and Zawiya, demonstrated that the position taken at the tribal meeting has deep resonance with the Libyan people and has perhaps emboldened the actions of this emergent peaceful social movement. The demonstrations of 21 September had the same demands, suggesting consensus with and support from the tribes’ position. By the time I left the meeting – nearly five hours later -  I had a clear sense of the social power of these tribal chiefs, the moderation and integrity of their religious convictions, and their ethical posture towards both Libyans and foreign guests in Libya.

This gathering reflected the cradle of social sentiment in Eastern Libya. Indirectly, the tribal chiefs represent political power as well. “Gaddafi knew how to pander to these tribal chiefs. That is how he stayed in power so long.” said Ahmed, a medical student seated at my table. His comment underscored the historically conservative force of tribal society in buttressing the state in Libyan politics. However, as I suggest here, it also holds potential to push against government inaction and for progressive and democratizing change in the new Libya. The messages of these tribal leaders were very positive, reasonable, and spoke on the right side of justice. Those who took to the streets six days later at Benghazi’s massive protests echoed their declarations.  The government’s response to this evidently broad-based consensus has been swift.

One call was central at this meeting: for the sons of the tribes to give up their weapons, abandon the militias, and pledge their allegiance to the Libyan national army. By the end of the meeting, seventeen brigade leaders had complied and stated that their men would join the Libyan national army.

Among the guest speakers were representatives of the regional Benghazi ministries of interior, defense, and military. The GNC, however, did not sponsor the meeting. The banner hanging on the wall behind the stage read: “First National Conference of Wise Men, Political Actors, NGOs from the Eastern District Sponsored by the Tribal Leaders.” The government representatives present were guests of the tribal leaders. Surat al-Fatiha was recited, followed by the national anthem. Next, a series of government officials issued speeches almost identical in content: they expressed their respect for the tribal elders, paid respects to Libya’s martyrs, and laid out a plan to secure the country. They called for a renewal of Libya patriotism and pride, which had dwindled under four decades of tyranny. “Love for our county is part of Islam and we have failed in the trust endowed in us by our martyrs,” one official stated.

Following these statements, the heads of each region (informal chief spokesmen), spoke with varying purpose; some spoke while others had nothing new to say, only taking the stage to ensure each region had the chance to speak on behalf of its tribe. Many regional leaders expressed condemnation of the recent attacks on Sufi shrines.

[Image from 15 September meeting in Benghazi. Image by Andrea Khalil.]

After several hours of statements, a printed declaration was distributed to the audience. The written declaration, a summary of preceding speeches, represents the unified stance of the tribal chiefs. Points one, two, and three indicate the tribes’ condemnation of violence, desecration of Sufi shrines, and of the attack on the US embassy:

1) We condemn the digging up of graves, which recently occurred on Derna and Zaweila, and similar acts that led to several deaths in Zleiten and Rajma and Ajeela. We consider these to be criminal acts against Muslim Libyans who were known throughout the centuries for their moderation and integrity. We call on the public prosecutor to take legal action and issue international arrest warrants against them.

2) We condemn the killings and assassinations and condemn the kidnappings and “disappearances” committed by armed brigades operating outside the control of the military and police. 

3) Convictions provoke the feelings of Muslims who resent the insulting the religion of Islam and the Holy Prophet, peace be upon him, and condemn the aggression suffered by the US consulate in Benghazi, and offer condolences to the families of the victims. We vow to punish perpetrators with a legal punishment and refuse to use this act as a pretext for foreign military intervention in Libya.

Points four to five are direct criticisms of the Libyan government, which they accuse of of supporting the armed “security” brigades and intentionally neglecting the essential formation of a strong army:

4) We condemn the policy pursued by the Transitional Authority through the council and government that is based on supporting battalions at the expense of the army and the police. We demand that the General National Conference and the new interim government to promptly end the chaos under mechanisms to ensure inclusion of armed individuals into the army and the police in accordance with the rules of discipline in force in these institutions and not to grant legitimacy to any armed force outside the army.

5) We condemn the poor performance of the General Staff and the Ministry of Interior, and oppose their support of irregular battalions and the marginalization of the army and police, which hindered these institutions on the performance of their functions in maintaining security and order.

Point six demands the cessation of illegal imprisonment and house searches and also calls for the establishment of the rule of law:

6) We call to end the phenomenon of prisons and illegal detention and demand those in control to identify reasons for the arrested guests and not allow any party whatsoever to arrest and detention outside the limits of the law. We will not tolerate the arrest of a man, or searching of any house, without permission or order of the judicial authorities, or contrary to the requirements of the law.

Point seven calls for the relinquishing of weapons. Seventeen battalions present at the meeting pledged to fulfill this demand:

7) Libyan tribes call on their sons to leave irregular battalions and join the army and police individually and those who refuses must bear on himself the consequences of any act committed by the work of his these battalions.

Points eight and nine calls for good and just governance. They also demand that the government provides security for the people.

8) We call on the government to intensify its good offices to achieve national reconciliation to ensure the safety of the nation and its people.

9) We demand that the National Congress not prejudice the election of the Constituent Committee mechanism of the general public in accordance with the recent amendment by the transitional Board to ensure that the draft constitution reflects the hopes and aspirations of the Libyan people.

The final point calls for banning all remnants of the previous regime:

10) The remnants of the tyrant and symbols of his oppression. The walls and buildings of Alfadeel Abu Omar brigade and the former 7 April brigade being at the top of the list, in the same way we took down the tyrant’s stronghold at Bab al Aziziya. (Document dated: 15 September 2012, Benghazi.)

The priorities raised in this declaration are consistent with Libyan public opinion, as was evident by the collective agreement in the room and by the interviews I have conducted since my arrival. In addition, public opinion polls were recently conducted by a team of researchers under the direction of Dr. Fethi Ali of the University of Benghazi. In this survey one thousand Libyans from all regions were asked various questions, including their priorities over the next twelve months. In response to the question, “which one is your first priority, your second priority, and your third priority,” seventy percent answered that fighting crime and disorder was their first, second, or third priority, with fifty-one percent responding that it was their first priority. Seventy-five percent answered, “Dealing with the members of the previous government” was “no priority at all” and only one percent said it was their first priority.

Puplic opinion is divided with regards to the influence of tribes in Libyan politics. When asked “How important or unimportant do you think tribes will be for the political future of the new Libya?” Fifty-six percent of those surveyed responded “very or quite important” with thirty-four percent saying “entirely unimportant.” Regardless of this ambivalence toward the political relevance of the tribes, the tribal leaders’ call to reduce weapon circulation and bring militias under the rule of law was representative of popular sentiment and encouraged civil society groups to take to the street six days later with the same demand. It is likely the other issues discussed in the tribal meeting similarly hold a deep resonance in the east and across the country.

The opinion polls reveal that the declarations of tribal leaders is representative of the sentiments of the population but the question that remains is to what extent did the tribes’s word prompt the mass demonstrations of 21 September. I would argue that there is not a relation of causality, but of consensus and mutual reinforcement. Although it may be true that “clan-type politics and regionalism” pose a challenge to the democratic transition in Libya, tribal voices, as evidenced here, can also play the positive role of consensus building. These voices can also encourage the youth groups and civil society groups to organize, work together, and take a stand on important issues. With the newfound freedom to criticize the government, tribes and civil society, when speaking in harmony, have the capacity to impact powerful change in Libyan governance. 

[This article is part of a two-part series by the author. The second part will be published this week.]

Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (September 25)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

Reports and Opinions

University Degree a Must to Visit UAE: Report A report on the new requirement stipulating that tourists from South Asian countries should hold a university degree in an attempt to curb illegal labor in the Gulf state, in The Daily Star.

Saudi Sentences Qatif Protesters to Prison, 300 Lashes
A news report on the sentences of three protesters in Qatif, on Al-Akhbar English.

UAE Islamists Admit Forming Military Wing A news report on the banned al-Islah party's plan to topple the regime in the Gulf state, in The News.

Saudis Protest Anti-Islam Film in a Civilized Way Saleh Fareed argues that unlike demonstrators in most countries, protesters in the kingdom did not champaign violence, in the Saudi Gazette.

The Mystery of the Syria Contact Group Vijay Prashad analyzes the absence of Saudi Arabia from the Syria Contact Group meeting in Cairo, in Asia Times.
 
Repression in Bahrain

Dictators Unite for Bahrain Mona Kareem examines the support offered to the Bahraini regime by Arab and Western governments at the meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council, in Al-Akhbar English.

The West Conspires Against Bahrain While Exploiting Syria Ali Mushaima reflects on Western governments' positions on the uprisings in Syria and Bahrain, in Al-Akhbar English.

Bahrain Pledges to Improve Rights Record A news report on the Bahraini regime's promise to implement 158 out of 176 recommendations specified in the new UN report, on Al-Jazeera English.

US Criticizes Bahrain's Slow Pace of Reform Simeon Kerr writes on the US government's call on the Bahraini government to hold its security forces accountable for the harsh measures taken against protesters, and to implement more reforms, in Financial Times.

Crisis in Yemen

A Yemeni Response to Cultural Islamophobia Murad Alazzany analyzes the heterogenous nature of the protests against the film Innocence of Muslims in Yemen, on Al-Jazeera English.

Firebrand Cleric Walks a Fine Line in Yemen Jane Ferguson discerns a shift in the fiery rhetoric of Sheikh Abdul Zindani, a key figure in the Yemeni Salafi movement, on Al-Jazeera English.

Yemen: Twelve Killed in Sectarian Clashes A news report on clashes between Shia tribesmen and ultra-conservative Sunnis in northern Yemen.

Human Rights Watch

Protecting Yemen's Students From Attack A statement by the organization condemning the occupation of schools by soldiers during the 2011-2012 uprising in Yemen.

Bahrain: Act on UN Human Rights Commitments A statement on Bahrain's Universal Periodic Review at the latest meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council.

UN Human Rights Council: Adoption of the Outcome of the Bahrain UPR An assessment of Bahrain's reform records in the country's Universal Periodic Review.

Economy & Markets

Oil Tumbles as Saudis Offer More Supply
Emiko Terazono and Gregory Meyer report on the recent drop in oil prices due to Saudi Arabia's increase of its production, in Financial Times.

Entertainment

Scherzinger Is a Lot of Cash, Nicole Gordon Smart reports on Nicole Scherzinger's exorbitant charge (one million US dollars) for her forty-five minute performance at the Dubai World Trade Center, in The Sun.

Arabic

من الدّولة الكاملة إلى الدّولة المراقبة إلى الانتظار المفتوح

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 من المقرر أن يلقي الرئيس أبو مازن، يوم الخميس المقبل، خطابًا جديدًا أمام الجمعيّة العامة للأمم المتحدة، سيشرح فيه الرواية الفلسطينيّة للصراع الجاري منذ أكثر من مائة عام. سيكون الخطاب هذا العام باهتًا، لأنه يأتي بعد إضاعة عام كامل من الانتظار واستمرار السعي لاستئناف المفاوضات العبثيّة، لأن الخطاب التاريخي، الذي ألقي في العام الماضي، بعث الأمل في نفوس الفلسطينيين، لكنّه جاء نهاية وليس كما كان مفترضًا أن يكون بداية لشق مسار جديد، بعيدًا عن نفق المفاوضات الثنائيّة العبثي المسدود.

لقد سبق خطاب العام الماضي استعدادات ضخمة، سياسيّة وجماهيريّة وإعلاميّة وقانونيّة، كان عنوانها "استحقاق أيلول"، وسط زخم من اعتراف الدول بالدولة الفلسطينيّة، بينما كان "كرسي الدولة" يطوف العالم كله؛ مؤكدًا على الحق الفلسطيني في تقرير المصير.

أما في هذا العام، فستذهب القيادة الفلسطينيّة إلى الأمم المتحدة مترددة، قدمًا إلى الأمام والأخرى إلى الوراء، فهي تعاني من آثار الانقسام، والأزمة الاقتصادية، وفقدان الاتجاه، وآثار "الربيع العربي"، وحائرة بين إلغاء أوسلو، وحل السلطة، واستقالة الرئيس، والدولة الواحدة، وإجراء انتخابات عامة، والعودة إلى المفاوضات، وتتحدث عن التوجه إلى الأمم المتحدة، وكأن الأمر يطرح الآن للمرة الأولى، لذلك بدلًا من الذهاب وفي يدها مشروع قرار لعرضه للتصويت فورًا، تتحدث عن الشروع في صياغة مشروع القرار بعد الخطاب، وعرضه على الدول والكتل الإقليميّة والدوليّة خلال أسابيع؛ ليعرض بعد ذلك للتصويت عليه بعد الانتخابات الرئاسيّة الأميركيّة القادمة حتى لا تصطدم مع الرئيس الأميركي في آخر عهده.

ليس مقبولًا على الإطلاق عدم صياغة مشروع القرار وتأجيل طلب التصويت عليه، بالرغم من مرور عام على السقف الزمني لاستحقاق أيلول، ومرور أعوام على بداية طرح مسألة التدويل التي ابتدأت في العام 2009، خصوصًا حين جاءت حكومة نتنياهو إلى سدة الحكم، واتضح للقاصي والداني، للمتفائل والمتشائم، عدم وجود أفق لحل سياسي مرضٍ أو عادل أو متوازن، على المدى المنظور على الأقل، هذا الموقف يمكن تفسيره، لأن البيت الفلسطيني منقسم على نفسه، وفي وضع سيء للغاية، ولم يتم استغلال الفترة الماضية للاستعداد لمواجهة التداعيات المحتملة لخطوة الاعتراف بالدولة الفلسطينية، خصوصًا لجهة تنفيذ التهديدات الأميركية والإسرائيلية. 

على القيادة الفلسطينيّة حتى تستعيد مصداقيتها التي فقدتها، من خلال تجنب المواجهة في العام الماضي بعدم تفعيل الطلب الذي قدمته إلى مجلس الأمن للحصول على العضويّة الكاملة، بحجة عدم وجود الأصوات التسعة المطلوبة لعرضه للتصويت، ومن خلال عدم الانتقال فورًا إلى الجمعيّة العامة للحصول على العضويّة المراقبة، بالرغم من وجود مطالبة فلسطينيّة وعربيّة ودوليّة بذلك، سواء من دون تقديم الطلب إلى مجلس الأمن أو بالتزامن معه أو بعده؛ أن تفسر، أو أن تعترف بالخطأ الكبير الذي ارتكبته، وتتحمل المسؤوليّة عنه أمام شعبها والعالم كله.

إذا لم تعترف القيادة بالخطأ، فالخشية من أن الأسباب التي أدت إلى إضاعة عام مضى في البحث عن نجاح الجهود المبذولة لاستئناف المفاوضات العقيمة، وهي تجنب المواجهة مع الإدارة الأميركيّة والحكومة الإسرائيليّة، وربما بعض الدول الأوروبيّة؛ لا تزال قائمة، ويمكن أن تؤدي إلى:

إما إلى تأجيل المواجهة مرة أخرى، إلى ما بعد إعطاء فرصة جديدة للرئيس باراك أوباما، إذا فاز بفترة رئاسيّة ثانية، بحجة عدم الاصطدام معه في بداية فترته الثانية، وإضاعة فرصة بحجة أنه سيكون فيها متحررًا من الضغوط والقيود من إسرائيل ومجموعات الضغط المؤيدة لها أثناء فترة رئاسته الأولى.

أو عدم الاصطدام بالرئيس الجديد ميت رومني في فترة رئاسته الأولى، إن فاز، خصوصًا بعد مضيه بعيدًا أثناء حملته الانتخابيّة في دعم إسرائيل، لدرجة إطلاقة تصريحاتٍ عنصريّةً ومعاديّةً للفلسطينيين.

أو المضي قدمًا نحو التوصيت على مشروع القرار، مهما تكن نتيجة الانتخابات الرئاسيّة الأميركيّة، دون تسليحه بمضمون إستراتيجي، حيث يبدو وكأنه محاولة لتحسين فرص استئناف المفاوضات. ويؤكد ذلك تصريحات الرئيس "أبو مازن" وصائب عريقات، وغيرهما، بأن حصول فلسطين على العضويّة المراقبة يساعد على السلام، ويفتح طريق العودة لاستئناف المفاوضات، التي ستكون مفاوضات بين دولة إسرائيل ودولة فلسطين الواقعة تحت الاحتلال.

عن أي سلام يجري الحديث! وما الذي يدعو للعودة إلى مفاوضات أدت إلى كارثة، ويمكن أن تؤدي إلى كارثة أكبر، إذا استؤنفت من دون تغيير الظروف والمبادئ والمرجعيّة والإطار والأطراف التي تجري وتشارك فيها؟ وعن أي مواجهة يجري الحديث، والوضع الفلسطيني لا يسرّ صديقًا؟

إن التدويل إذا نُظِر إليه بوصفه مجرد محاولة فلسطينيّة جديدة لإثبات الجدارة، وحسن السلوك والنوايا، وإنجاح الجهود لاستئناف المفاوضات؛ فسيؤدي في النهاية إلى تقزيم القضيّة الفلسطينيّة، ويساعد على استكمال تهميشها تمهيدًا لتصفيتها. 

فالتدويل ضمن السياق المذكور، سيؤدي إلى صياغة مشرورع قرار ضعيف يحاول أرضاء أميركا والدول الأوروبيّة الكبرى، خصوصًا ألمانيا؛ للحصول على تأييدها أو تحييدها، وذلك من خلال التعهد بأنه الحد الأقصى، وإعادة إنتاج كل التنازلات التي حدثت سابقًا، وإيراد كل العبارات والمضامين التي حملتها "مسيرة السلام" منذ انطلاقها في مؤتمر مدريد للسلام في العام 1991 وحتى الآن.

يمكن أن نرى في مشروع القرار أحاديث عن حل قضيّة اللاجئين على أساس "معايير كلينتون"، أو "حل متفق عليه"، وإعادة إقرار "مبدأ تبادل الأراضي الذي يقسم الضفة الغربية والقدس الشرقية"، وعبارات من نوع "دولة فلسطينيّة مترابطة وقابلة للحياة منزوعة السلاح"، و"تحافظ على أمن وسلامة إسرائيل وتنبذ الإرهاب"، و"تمتنع عن إقامة تحالفات معاديّة لإسرائيل"، و"تلتزم بأفضل العلاقات الطبيعيّة معها".

إذا حصل ذلك، لا سمح الله، تكون الطّامة الكبرى، ويصبح بعدها عدم التوجه للأمم المتحدة أفضل من هكذا توجه.

أهميّة التدويل أنه يجب أن ينطلق من قناعة عميقة باستحالة التوصل إلى إنهاء الاحتلال وإقامة دولة فلسطينيّة مستقلة عاصمتها القدس، مع أو من دون حل القضيّة الفلسطينيّة حلًا عادلًا على أساس القرار 194؛ بالعودة إلى طريق المفاوضات الثنائيّة برعايّة انفراديّة أميركيّة، وفي ظل قيام اللجنة الرباعيّة بدور "شاهد الزور"، بعيدًا عن القانون الدولي وقرارت الأمم المتحدة، وعن الدور الفاعل للمؤسسة الدوليّة والأطراف المؤثرة والمعنيّة بما يجري في المنطقة.

الحصول على العضويّة الكاملة مهم جدًا، والحصول على العضويّة المراقبة مهم أيضًا، ولكنه لن يغير الموقف للمفاوض الفلسطيني، لأن الأمر الحاسم هو ما يجري على الأرض، وهو يبعد حل الدولتين ولا يقرّب حل الدولة الواحدة.

فالأرض الفلسطينيّة المحتلة عام 1967 كانت ولا تزال هي أرض محتلة وفقًا للشرعيّة الدوليّة، وهذا لم يؤد إلى تفاوض مثمر، أو إلى تغيير في الموقف الإسرائيلي. وكذلك، فإن منظمة التحرير حصلت على العضويّة المراقبة منذ العام 1974، ولم يغير هذا الأمرُ الواقعَ على الأرض.

تأسيسًا على ما سبق، لا يمكن أن يؤدي التدويل إلى تغيير الموقف جذريًا، إلا إذا جاء ضمن تصور متكامل وإستراتيجيّة جديدة. إستراتيجيّة جديدة تكرس المكاسب السابقة ومكانة منظمة التحرير، وتؤمن بضرورة تغيير موازين القوى على الأرض، بحيث يصبح الاحتلال مكلفًا لإسرائيل ومن يدعمها؛ عندها يمكن إنهاء الاحتلال الذي من دون إنهائه لا يمكن إقامة دولة مستقلة حقًا، حتى لو بنينا مؤسسات دولة مثاليّة وحصلت على شهادة العالم كله بالجهوزيّة الفلسطينيّة لإقامة الدولة.

يجب أن ترتكز الإستراتيجيّة التي تريد التغيير أساسًا إلى تدويل القضيّة الفلسطينيّة بمختلف أبعادها، وتجميع جميع الموارد والثروات وأوراق الضغط والقوة الفلسطينيّة والعربيّة والدوليّة، وهذا لا يكون إلى بإعادة القضيّة إلى جذورها، بوصفها قضيّة شعب شرّد، وواقع تحت الاحتلال، ويعاني بجميع أجزائه من كل أشكال الاستعمار والاضطهاد والعنصريّة. وهذا يقتضي إحياء القضيّة الفلسطينيّة والمشروع الوطني والمؤسسة الجامعة والقيادة الواحدة على أساس الحقوق الطبيعيّة والتاريخيّة والقانونيّة، وبما يضمن وحدة القضيّة والشعب والأرض، وهذا يتطلب أساسًا التركيز على خطاب الحقوق: حق تقرير المصير؛ وحق والعودة؛ وإنهاء الاحتلال؛ والحقوق المدنية والمعيشيّة لشعبنا داخل إسرائيل والشتات.

إن مثل هذا التفكير الإستراتيجي أصبح متطلبًا وطنيًا، لا مناص منه بعد أن قضت إسرائيل على حل الدولة الفلسطينيّة على حدود 1967، وعلى اتفاق أوسلو الذي تنصلت منه، مع أنها تريد الإبقاء على الالتزامات الفلسطينيّة فيه.

ليس مطلوبًا من الفلسطينيين الإعلان رسميًا عن إلغاء اتفاق أوسلو ردًا على ذلك؛ حتى لا يتحلموا المسؤوليّة عن جريمة ارتكبتها إسرائيل، ولكن عليهم إدراك أنه الجذر الأساسي لما وصلوا إليه، ومن دون تجاوزه عمليًا، خطوة خطوة وصولًا إلى التخلص منه نهائيًا؛ لا يوجد حل عادل أو متوازن أو مرضٍ، بل سيؤدي استمرار السياسة الانتظارية إلى المزيد من الضياع للفلسطينيين وقضيتهم، وصولًا إلى تصفيتها نهائيًا.

جورج حبش

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[”ملف من الأرشيف“ هي سلسة جديدة تقوم ”جدلية“ بنشرها بالعربية والإنجليزية بالتعاون مع جريدة ”السفير“ اللبنانية. الملفات ستكون لشخصيات أيقونية تركت أثراً عميقاً في الحقل السياسي والثقافي في العالم العربي.]

 
 
 

 

الإسم: جورج

الشهرة: حبش

مكان الولادة: اللد

تاريخ الولادة: 1926

تاريخ الوفاة: 2008

اسم الزوجة: هيلدا حبش

تاريخ الزواج: 1961

الاولاد: ميساء/ لمى

الجنسية: فلسطين

الإختصاص: دكتوراه في الطب

الفئة: سياسي

المهن: طبيب - أمين عام الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين  

اللقب: الحكيم  

جورج حبش  

-  فلسطيني.
-  ولد في مدينة اللد في 1926/08/02 لعائلة أرثوذكسية تعمل في التجارة.
-  عمل على تأسيس حركة القوميين العرب عام 1952.
- أنهى دراسته للمرحلتين الابتدائية والثانوية في يافا والقدس ، ثم التحق سنة 1944 بكلية الطب في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت وتخرج فيها طبيب أطفال سنة 1951، وفي أثناء دراسته كان من الناشطين البارزين في المجال السياسي.
 - عاد إلى الأردن بعد التخرج وافتتح عيادة له في أحد المخيمات وكان مع رفيقه وديع حداد يعالجان المرضى مجانا".
-  شارك في تأسيس "كتائب الفداء العربي" التي كانت تدعو إلى الوحدة العربية وتحرير فلسطين. وقامت هذه المجموعة بمحاولة لاغتيال أديب الشيشكلي، وفي أثر ذلك جرى حلها.
-  من مؤسسي "جمعية العروة الوثقى" في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت التي كان الدكتور قسطنطين زريق محركها الأساسي وقد اعتبرت اللجنة التنفيذية لهذه الجمعية نواة "منظمة الشبيبة العربية" التي نشأت سنة 1951 وأصدرت نشرة "الثأر" . وعقدت هذه المنظمة أول مؤتمر لها سنة 1956 برئاسة جورج حبش وانبثق عنه "حركة القوميين العرب" ، وكان أبرز أعضاء الحركة وديع حداد وهاني الهندي وأحمد اليماني وأحمد الخطيب.
- أصدر في الأردن جريدة "الرأي"، لكن غلوب باشا قائد الجيش الأردني يومذاك أقفلها.
-  ترشح للانتخابات النيابية في الأردن في أب 1956 لكنه فشل.
- اتهمت حركة القوميين العرب في الأردن سنة 1957 بالقيام بعدد من التفجيرات، فاضطر إلى التخفي والعيش في السر، وفي سنة 1958 تسلل إلى دمشق، وحكمت عليه المحاكم الأردنية ، غيابياً، بالسجن 33 عاماً.
-  بقي في دمشق طوال فترة الوحدة ، وكانت حركة القوميين العرب في هذه الأثناء قد أيدت بقوة الرئيس جمال عبد الناصر، وتمتع أعضاؤها بالكثير من حرية الحركة وامتيازات السلطة حيث تولى أحد مؤسسيها (هاني الهندي) إحدى الوزارات. 

-  زوجته: هيلدا حبش وهي قريبته تعرف إليها في القدس سنة 1960
-  تـزوج في دمشق في أوائل سنة 1961، وحضر زفافه كل من وديع حداد، والحكم دروزة، واحمد الطوالبة، وتيسير قبعة، وهاني الهندي، ومحسن إبراهيم، وخالد أبو عيشة أول شهيد للجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين.
-  ولدت ابنته البكر "ميساء" في دمشق سنة 1961 وكان في السجن، وولدت ابنته الثانية "لمى" في القدس سنة 1966.
- بعد الانفصال بقي في دمشق، وفي سنة 1964 تحولت قيادة اقليم فلسطين في حركة القوميين العرب التي كان يقودها مع وديع حداد وأحمد اليماني إلى "الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين" من دون الإعلان رسمياً عن قيام هذه الجبهة الذي تأخر إلى سنة 1967 وتألفت هذه الجبهة من 3 مجموعات هي: أبطال العودة، شباب الثأر، جبهة التحرير الفلسطينية (التي كان أسسها أحمد جبريل سنة 1964).
 - فر إلى بيروت سنة 1964 هرباً من الملاحقات في سوريا.
 - تمكن من العودة إلى سوريا بعد حركة 23 شباط 1966 التي حملت قيادة جديدة إلى السلطة في سوريا وأطاحت بقيادة أمين الحافظ وميشال عفلق.
- اعتقل في دمشق سنة 1968 لمدة سبعة أشهر، غير أن وديع حداد نظم عملية خاطفة لإطلاق سراحه، فهاجم القافلة التي كانت تنقله من السجن إلى المحكمة متخفياً مع رجاله بثياب الشرطة العسكرية، وتمكن من إنقاذ رفيقه وتهريبه إلى لبنان، وسافر بعدها إلى القاهرة حيث التقى الرئيس جمال عبد الناصر.
 - تعرضت قيادته في الجبهة الشعبية للصراع وواجه أربعة انشقاقات على النحو التالي : 

• الانشقاق الذي قاده أحمد جبريل في أب 1968 وتمخض عنه استقلاله بتنظيم أطلق عليه اسم "الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين - القيادة العامة ". 

• انشقاق نايف حواتمة في 1969/02/22 وتأسيس "الجبهة الديمقراطية لتحرير فلسطين".

• انشقاق "الجبهة الثورية لتحرير فلسطين" في 1972/03/06 بقيادة عدد من الكوادر أبرزهم "أبو شهاب".

• انشقاق جماعة يقودها أبو نضال مسلمي وهو مسؤول تنظيم الجبهة في غزة، سنة 1994، وهذه المجموعة التي لم تتخذ أي اسم لها تؤيد اتفاق غزة - أريحا أولاً مع بعض التحفظات وتدعو إلى العودة إلى غزة والضفة الغربية.
-  تخلى عن الخط القومي التقليدي الذي عرف به، وأعلن انتماءه وانتماء الجبهة إلى الفكر الماركسي - اللينيني وذلك بعد هزيمة حزيران 1967. وقـام في أثـر هذه المراجعة بجولة في الصين والاتحاد السوفياتـي وكوريا الشماليـة صرح في أثـرها أن النضـال الفلسطيني يجب أن يرتكز إلى "هانوي" عربية تكون عمقه الاستراتيجي . ثم صاغ مع رفيقه وديع حداد شعاراً يقول بمطاردة العدو في كل مكان. وترجم وديع حداد هذا الشعار في عمليات خارجية متلاحقة ضد الطائرات الإسرائيلية، وبرزت فيها أسماء جديدة أشهرها ليلى خالد وأمينة دحبور كمناضلات بارزات في المجال الخارجي.
-  استمرت علاقته بالرئيس جمال عبد الناصر وثيقة جدا" لكنها بدأت بالفتور في تموز 1970 عندما وافق الرئيس عبد الناصر على مشروع روجرز.
-  أسهمت العملية التي قام بها جهاز العمليات الخارجية بقيادة وديع حداد والتي خطفت في سياقها 4 طائرات إلى الأردن عام 1970 في تقديم الحجة للملك حسين لكي يبدأ قتاله ضد الفدائيين، وأسفرت هذه المواجهات التي عرفت بـ "أيلول الأسود" إلى إخراج قوات الفدائيين من عمان.
-  جاء إلى لبنان سنة 1971 بعد انتقال قوات الثورة الفلسطينية إلى الجنوب ومخيمات بيروت.
-  أعلن في 1972/03/14 التوقف عن استراتيجية خطف الطائرات لأنها تتعارض مع تحالفات الجبهة الدولية.
 - رفض سنة 1974 الفكرة التي راحت تروج عن إمكان قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلة على جزء من الأرض الفلسطينية ، لكنه عاد وقبل هذه الفكرة بعد انهيار "جبهة الرفض" سنة 1979.
-  أسهم إسهاماً كبيراً في قيام "جبهة القوى الفلسطينية الرافضة للحلول السلمية" التي تحالفت مع العراق وكانت تضم: "الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين"، "جبهة التحرير العربية"، "جبهة النضال الشعبي الفلسطيني"، "جبهة التحرير الفلسطينية".

 - أعلن انسحاب منظمته من اللجنة التنفيذية لمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية في أيلول 1974 احتجاجاً على الاتجاه السياسي الجديد للمنظمة والذي عرف ببرنامج النقاط العشر الذي أقره المجلس الوطني الفلسطيني العاشر.
-  كان له إسهام بارز في تأسيس "حزب العمل الاشتراكي العربي" في لبنان.
 - حاولت إسرائيل اعتقاله وقتله أكثر من مرة كان أبرز هذه المحاولات عندما قامت باختطاف إحدى الطائرات فور إقلاعها من مطار بيروت متجهة إلى بغداد لاعتقادها أنه كان بين الركاب، وجرت هذه الحادثة في 1973/08/10.
-  أجريت له عملية في الدماغ سنة 1980 في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت.

-  غادر بيروت في أب 1982 مع القوات الفلسطينية وأقام منذ ذلك الحين في دمشق وانضم إلى معارضي ياسر عرفات.
-  كان له شأن في تأسيس جبهة الانقاذ الوطني الفلسطيني المؤلفة من المنظمات المعارضة لقيادة منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية والتي اتخذت دمشق مقراً لها.
-  قام في حزيران 1985 بجولة على الكويت وعدد من دول الخليج في جولة هي الأولى من نوعها في تاريخه السياسي، وهو الذي كان يصف دول الخليج بالرجعية، وكان أعداء الجبهة حسب الشعار: الامبريالية والصهيونية والرجعية.
-  عارض اتفاق عمان بين منظة التحرير الفلسطينية والأردن والذي وقع في شباط 1986 ودعا إلى إلغائه.
 - كان له دورا بارزا في ادارة الانتفاضة الاولى عام 1987.
-  عاد الى عمان عام 1990 بعد غياب عشرين عاما للمشاركة في المؤتمر الشعبي لمساندة العراق اثناء حرب الخليج. 

-  أصيب بجلطة دماغية في تونس في 1992/01/17 نقل في أثرها إلى إحدى مستشفيات باريس. وأثار نقله أزمة سياسية داخلية في فرنسا، استقال في أعقابها ثلاثة مسؤولين هم: الأمين العام لوزارة الخارجية فرانسوا شير، ومدير مكتب وزير الخارجية برنار كيسيدجيان، ومدير مكتب وزير الداخلية كريستيان فيغورو. وحاولت بعض الجهات الفرنسية إصدار مذكرة إلقاء القبض عليه بتهمة الإرهاب.
-  لقبه أنصاره ومناضلو الثورة الفلسطينية بـ "الحكيم".
-  جاء إلى بيروت في 1999/07/26 للمشاركة في حفل تسليم جائزة جمال عبد الناصر التي ينظمها مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية إلى محمد حسنين هيكل، وهي الزيارة الأولى له منذ 1982.
 - رفض دعوة ياسر عرفات إلى الاجتماع معا" في القاهرة في 1999/08/01 وقال ان شرطه لإجراء محادثات معه هو التراجع عن تعديل الميثاق الوطني الفلسطيني. لكن الجبهة الشعبية كانت اتخذت قرارا" بإجراء محادثات مع عرفات وسافر نائبه أبو علي مصطفى إلى القاهرة لهذه الغاية في 1999/07/31.
 - استقال من الأمانة العامة للجبهة الشعبية في 2000/05/01 أثناء عقد المؤتمر العام السادس للجبهة.
-  زار لبنان وقابل الرئيس لحود في 2000/07/03، ثم قابل الرئيس الحص في 2000/07/04. 

 - استنكر الاعتداء الاسرائيلي الذي تعرض له الارشمنديث عطا الله حنا في الاراضي المقدسة عام 2000.
-  قدم رسالة تهنئة بالانتصار في حرب تموز لحزب الله باسم امينه العام السيد حسن نصر الله عام 2006.
-  توفي في 26 كانون الثاني 2008.

مواقف وآراء :

- "هزيمة حزيران 1967 ليست مجرد نكسة عسكرية ، إنها هزيمة أوضاع عربية وهزيمة أنظمة عسكرية وهزيمة بنية معينة للحركة الوطنية العربية". (الهدف1970/06/09 )
- "قررنا وقف عمليات خطف الطائرات لأنها تتعارض مع تحالفاتنا العربية والدولية" .(النهار 1972/03/15)
- "سياسة الأنظمة المستسلمة ستفرز حركات تحرر وطنية جديدة وجذرية، وواجب الثورة الفلسطينية هو التحالف مع هذه القوى وليس مع الانظمة المنهارة". (الهدف 1974/08/03)
- "إعلان إنهاء الحرب مع إسرائيل خيانة صارخة ومنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية سارت في الخط السعودي - المصري". (النهار 1974/10/26)
- "ندعو السوفيات إلى مراجعة موقفهم الخاطئ المتمثل في اعترافهم بالكيان الصهيوني". (1975/05/16)
- "إذا كانت سوريا تعمل من أجل الحصول على بعض المساندة للدخول في التسوية فإن الجماهير ستلعن النظام السوري كما تلعن الآن النظام المصري". (1975/09/10)
- "منظمة التحرير وجبهة الرفض متحدتان في المعركة في لبنان ، ووجود الفلسطينيين في لبنان لم يؤثر في سيادة البلد". (1976/01/22)
- "ليست لنا أية علاقة بالقرار 425 وهو لا يخصنا كثورة". (إلى الإمام 1978/06/16)
- "نلتقي مع سوريا على محاربة نهج السادات" جاء ذلك في تصريح في أول زيارة له إلى دمشق منذ عشر سنوات". (النهار 1978/09/22)
- "الخط السياسي لمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية مهد الطريق ووفر الغطاء للسادات". (1979/05/10)
- "بما أن السادات وعد الشعب المصري بالرفاهية وربط ذلك باستسلام مصر وبالتعاون الاقتصادي مع إسرائيل لذا يجب نزع هذه الأوهام وحرمانه من الثلاثين ملايين دولار ... يجب وضع مصر في المستوى نفسه الذي نضع فيه إسرائيل والولايات المتحدة". (أفريكازي 1979/05/14)

- "إن مشروع الحكم الذاتي هو أسوأ الحلول التصفوية المطروحة للقضية الفلسطينية". (الأنباء 1979/06/14)
- "لا للدولة الفلسطينية إذا كانت ستقوم وثمنها استمرار بقاء إسرائيل". (الأنباء 1979/06/14)
-  "أسجل تأييدنا المطلق للخميني من زاوية عدائه للأمبريالية الأميركية والصهيونية . ولكن لننتظر التجربة". (السفير 1979/07/09)

- "إن أي نظام عربي يحيك الدسائس والمؤامرات ضد الثورة الإسلامية في إيران هو خائن خارج على إرادة العب العربي". (1980/05/03)
- "إن معركة بيروت أثبتت أن شعبنا الفلسطيني واللبناني وجماهيرنا العربية تختزن من الطاقات ما يكفي لدحر الهجمة الأميركية الشرسة". (1982/12/16)
- "العمل الفلسطيني في سوريا لا يمكن أن يكون على ما كان عليه في لبنان ، لأن أمن سوريا هام". (المستقبل 1983/08/13)
- "نرفض العودة المسلحة إلى لبنان بالأخطاء والتجاوزات السابقة. إذ أن أي وجود فلسطيني مسلح يجب أن يكون تحت إمرة القوى الوطنية اللبنانية". (1984/02/26)
- "إن هذا الذي يجري في بيروت (الحرب على المخيمات) على يد قوات حركة "أمل" لا يمكن أن يكون قد تم بدون ضوء أخضر سوري". (الرأي العام 1985/06/11 )

- "وجودنا المسلح وحقنا في قتال إسرائيل مطلبنا الوحيد في لبنان". (الشراع 1986/04/21)
- "نرفض وقف المعركة ضد إسرائيل من أجل حماية جنوب لبنان".
- "لا نستطيع قول لا لحل دولي تعمل له صديقتنا الكبرى موسكو".
(النهار العربي والدولي 1987/01/26)
-  "من حقنا أن نقاتل إسرائيل من الحدود العربية كلها وسنناضل لفتحها أمامنا".
(الأسبوع العربي 1988/02/15)

- "إن حل القضية الفلسطينية من كافة جوانبها لن يتحقق إلا من خلال عقد المؤتمر الدولي للسلام والاعتراف بالدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة وعودة الفلسطينيين الى ديارهم". (1989/02/11)
- "إن هجرة اليهود تضع الأمة العربية شعوباً وحكومات أمام تحد كبير وخطير يستوجب خطوات تتناسب وأبعاده، وأناشد الرئيس السوفياتي وقف هجرة اليهود السوفيات إلى الأراضي المحتلة". (الحياة 1990/04/09)
- "نحن نسعى إلى إحباط التسوية الراهنة وإفشالها لأننا نرى فيها تسوية لا تنسجم مع حقوق شعبنا المشروعة بل تسوية تستهدف الإجهاز على تلك الحقوق".
(الحياة 1993/03/19)
- " إن خطوة اتفاق غزة - أريحا تفوق نتائج معاهدة كمب دايفيد."
)النهار 1993/12/18)

- "كارلوس مناضل أممي التحق بصفوف الجبهة من منطلق قناعاته الثورية وشعبنا سيحفظ له هذا الجميل ولكل المناضلين الشرفاء من أمثاله، وتهمة الإرهاب لا تخيفنا".
(الوسط 1994/11/21)
- "على الفلسطينيين ألا يتدخلوا في الشؤون الداخلية اللبنانية وفي هذه المرحلة لا كفاح مسلحاً فلسطينياً من لبنان نريد دعماً لنضالنا المسلح من أجل العودة".
(السفير 1999/07/28)
 - قال في بيان أصدره في 2002/01/17 إن اعتقال أحمد سعدات الأمين العام للجبهة الشعبية يشكل فاتحة لخطوات أخرى تستهدف تدمير منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية كأئتلاف وطني وستقود تدريجياً لاجهاض الانتفاضة.

Jadaliyya's New (and super user-friendly) iPad App is Here!

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Finally, after months of tweaking to incorporate all pages, sections, and sidebars, we are happy to announce the new Jadaliyya iPad App! And, آًكيد, it's free, and includes our expanded Arabic section or, as Fouad Ajami says, عarabic section.

Previously, you had to access Jadaliyya via the tiny iPhone App on the iPad. Not only is the App in full resolution today, but it actually covers all Jadaliyya content and pages, divided into rows of pages that you can flick through. 

Once you land on a page/post, and finish, just flick to the left with your finger to get to the next post, or click the drop-down menu above to go to another page/section altogether. You can easily share content with others from within the app on any page.

We have to be honest: we really like it, and we use it! The toughest part was to wait (from July) for its official launch while we fixed glitches and refined utility. Please do email us at info@jadaliyya.com if you notice something funny or if you have recommendations for adding features to the next update.

You can also access Jadaliyya's Vimeo, YouTube, and Twitter accounts for videos, announcements, and commentary. Big thanks go to Khalid, our IT guru, for seeing it through completion.

Go to the App by clicking here in case you did not see the button above or you prefer text links.

Enjoy.

Jad Team
 


 

iPad App Screenshots 

          

          

إدوارد سعيد: الثقافة وطن ومقاومة

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عرَّف قاموس وبستر المقاومة بأنها فعل المقاومة أو المعارضة أو القدرة على أي منهما، ولأن الفعل –أي فعل- إنساني لا يتأتى واقعاً دون مسير قيمية متخيلة له تحدد فضاءه المؤدى و نتائجه المرغوبة، ويمثل تمظهراً أداتياً للقيمة المحددة، وكذلك لأن التعريف القيمي للوجود الإنساني (فرداً أو/و جمعاً) ينتجه الإدراك الثقافي للذات، تغدو المقاومة فعلا ثقافياً بإمتياز.


 وكما ذهب البعض من المنظرين –على غير قلة- إلى وصف السياسة "بأنها في جوهرها خطاب ثقافي، أي أنها مجموعة متكاملة من الرموز والمعاني التي نشترك في معرفتها جميعاً، يعاد تشكيلها وإعادة ترتيبها على الدوام فيما يعرف بالخطاب السياسي"، أي أن السياسة و المقاومة هما في النهاية بنيتين ثقافيتين متوازيتين لا تنفصلان -كما يدعي الخطاب النيوليبرالي المعولم-، ولا يمكن الإبقاء على أحداهما دون الأخرى، أو فرض أبجديات محددة من إحداهما.

 وهذا بالضبط ما يمكن من خلاله جعل المقاومة الثقافة قادرة على أن تكون خطاباً مضاداً، يقوم على تحويل المواجهة بين الواقع كما إصطنعه المستعمِر وقيام المستعمَر بدحض هذا الواقع و هدمه، وبالتالي فالمقاومة هي أحد أهم وسائل التغيير الثقافي و السياسي وإدراك الذات و الآخر و المحيط.

وهو بالضبط ما يجعل المقاوم مثقفاً ويفرض على الثقافة أن تصبح مقاومة في مواضع مقابلة السلطة والقهر والظلم والإستعمار، عن طريق تفكيك البنية الخطابية التي تنتجها تلك الثقافة للتمكن من تخيل الآخر، ومن ثم في مراحل سيطرتها عليه، تفرض عليه أدوات تخيله وإدراكه لذاته وبالتالي ينتهي الأمر به مجرد مرآة للمستعمر، لا يملك تحديد ذاته و تعريفها من دونه.

لا تنفصل المقاومة في إرث سعيد عن المثقف، بل تكاد تكون وجهه الأقدر على تحديد دوره إتجاه ذاته وعالمه ، ولنا في سعيد نفسه أعظم مثال، فهو الذي عاش بين فضائين متباينين في آن: (مثقف أكاديمي) و(منفي فلسطيني عن وطنه)، وكان لهذا البون بين الفضائين وإجتماعهما الحدي في تجربة سعيد العامل الأساس الذي شكل نص هويته ونص كتاباته. تلك النصوص التي لا يمكن تطبيق منطق زميله هومي بابا فيما أسماه "الثقافة الهجينة" ، أو "الفضاء الثالث" ، وهو ما لا ينطبق على مثقفنا إذ أنه لم ينفصل عن الفضائين البينيين معاً إنما دمجهما بما لا يخل بأي منهما معاً أو على حدة. إذ أن حالة الحوار بين هاذين الفضائين النظيرين والمتفارقين هي ما أكسبت هويته قوتها الدافعة وتأثيرها الفكري المنتج، لقد صاغ المنفى مفاهيم سعيد فيما يتعلق بالثقافة والفكر والأدب فكانت "نزعة الاحتفاء بعالم الحس" و"نزعة العالم الدنيوي" و"روح الهواية" هي ما يراه لزاماً فكرياً يمكنه من تحرير فكرة المكان الأدبي من قيد المنفى بالمنطق النصي في الخطاب، والتخلص من ثبوتية وعليائية الصلابة الأكاديمية:

"المثقف يمثل رسالة فردية، طاقة لا تنضب، قدرة تلين لتشتبك بوصفها صوتاً ملتزماً واضح المعالم وجدير بالاعتراف به، مع عدد كبير من القضايا التي تتصل في نهاية الأمر بالتنوير و التحرر و الحرية".

إن جل مايحتاجه المثقف ليمس القيمة الحرة في البنية الثقافية ويحررها –بحسب سعيد- نزعتان "نزعة الإحتفاء بعالم الحس" و"نزعة الإحتفاء بعالم الدنيا" ، وهي عناصر تجعل للنص كجزء من الخطاب مكانه في العالم المحسوس إذ يتمثله ويدركه الخطاب، يحس ويلمس ويوصف، ومنه ينطلق المثقف لتفكيك مناطق الحلول و التجاوز السلطوي فيه، ومن هنا كانت أهمية المقاومة الثقافية في التعامل مع الثقافة الرسمية كجزء من عوامل تشكيل الخطاب السياسي الرسمي، أي أن المثقف/المقاوم يجب أن يتحرك بين نبراسين:
1.الهواية، إذ تتيح له فضاءاً حراً لا هرمياً ، يبتعد به عن الصلابة.
2.الصدق في الإلتزام بالقضايا المتعلقة بتحرير القيم المطلقة، وبالتالي:

"الحقيقة الأساسية لدي، فيما أعتقد، هي أن المثقف فرد وهب ملكة تمثيل أو تجسيد رسالة أو رؤية أو فلسفة أو رأي أو موقف (من شيء ما)، مع الإفصاح عن ذلك لجمهور ما. وهذا دور له تأثيره القوي، ولا يمكن أن يؤديه المرء مالم يتوفر لديه إحساس بأنه شخص من شأنه أن يقوم علناً بإثارة أسئلة محرجة، و التصدي لجمود الفكر التقليدي والفكر اليقيني الجازم القائم على التسليم من غير تمحيص...، ومالم يكن من الصعب على الحكومات تحييدهم بضمهم إليها... ، ومالم يكن مبرر وجوده هو تمثيل ما دأبت الثقافة السائدة على نسيانه أو حجبه عن الأنظار، سواء كان أشخاصاً أو قضايا. بقوم المثقف بهذا كله مستندا إلى أساس من الكليات و المباديء العالمية التي تصدق على البشر أجمع  [ولا يمكن استحواذها باسم الحقيقة المطلقة: الكاتب“]

وبالتالي فعلى المثقف أن يقوم ببناء وعي نقدي يرفض ويفكك ويعري ويحلل الخطاب السلطوي وتمثيلاته، ليس هذا فحسب بل يتغلب على صعوبة التداول، بجعل الفكرة ممكنة ومتاحة ومدركة "الشروط الواجب إستيفائها لتكون المعرفة ممكنة" عن طريق الطعن في "سيادة المنهج التقليدي الثابت"، ومن ثم كانت عبقرية قراءة سعيد للخطاب الإستعماري من منطلقه الثقافي والمعرفي، فيما عرف بالقراءة الطباقية، وهي قراءة مستوحاة من مفهوم يعود إلى موسيقى كنسية غربية ظهرت في القرون الوسطى عرفت باسم لاتيني يعني "النغمة مقابل النغمة" أو "النغمة ضد النغمة"، وصارت تعرف اليوم باسم الطباق الموسيقي أو "تصاحب الألحان المتقابلة"، إذ تأثر سعيد بعازف البيانو جلين جولد.

بعبارات أخرى، الوعي بتراكبية النص تقودنا لقراءته قراءة طباقية، تفكك دواخل النص وما يتوارى خلفه، فندرك الألحان أو الأصوات والمعاني التي تصاحب اللحن/المعنى/الصوت الإستعماري السلطوي، ويمكن بها كشف متضادات العلاقة وتذرر و طمس أو حتى إستحواذ القيمة حينها.

والقراءة الطباقية تنتج من جمع بين الفكرة الدالة المتكررة (الموتيف) والصفة الفارقة (الإختلاف)، وهما الأساس لأقامة علاقة طباقية بين السرد الاستعماري ومنظور ما بعد الاستعمار. وبهذا ينشأ سرد يحتوي على نقطة دفينة في مقابل كل نقطة معلقة (سائد/متنحي أو عليا/دنيا)، ونتمكن من النزول من سطح النص إلى أعماقه بحثا عن وجود الآخر الواقع تحت سلطة خطاب و تخيل الأاقوى، وبالتالي تفشي النزعة الإستبعادية النافية في الثقافة المعتمدة، بل وأكثر من ذلك يكشف و يستشرف مواضع مرآوية المستعمَر والمستعمر في أدب المابعد كولونيالي، والخلط التحرري القائم على استعارة منطق الأقوى لتعريف الذات.

لذا فمن الضرورة أن يكتسب الوعي النقدي فاعلية ذاتية بانفصاله عن الثقافة السائدة وحلوله في موضع مناوئ مستقل يمكنه من الشروع في "اكتشاف وتعليل مغزى العبارات التي تتألف منها النصوص" تلك النصوص التي عادة ما تكون حجر الأساس في تخيل و إدراك الآخر.

فمن معالم المثقف المقاوم لدى سعيد قدرته على الإطاحة بثبوتية وصلابه وتعالي الثقافة عن العالم الآني المحسوس، فالمفهوم السعيدي المحتفي بعالم الدنيا يطعن على السلطة المقيدة المعنية بالجزئي الصلب في الخطاب الأكاديمي ببنية الهيراركية المتعالية، ممهدا الطريق إلى فكرة الاحتفاء بعالم الحس (وفي أدبيات أخرى : القراءة العلمانية) حيث لا يكون النص الأدبي مجرد حلقة جديدة تحل في موقع محدد ومتعالي عن الواقع، إنما هو مرتبط بعالم المادة والأشياء بما يتضمنه من روابط ثقافية و سياسية و إجتماعية وسلطوية بين محتويات مصوصه. وبذلك يكشف سعيد عن علاقات النسب التي يكون فيها النص طرفاً، ويعري كذلك علاقات الإنتساب أو الممالأة التي يدخل النص نفسه فيها.

وبهذا يتمكن المثقف من الرد النصوصي على نص السلطة الاستعمارية المعتمد حيث أن "الخنوع الذليل للسلطة في عالم اليوم هو واحد من أفدح الأخطار التي تحيق بالحياة الفكرية التي يراد لها أن تكون مفعمة بالنشاط ومراعية للمثل الأخلاقية العليا" وذلك عن طريق الوعي المجتمعي وعقل نقدي مقابل السلطة ومؤسساتها المعرفية و الخطابية وبالتالي السياسية.

فالمثقف/المقاوم ينبغي أن يمثل "... التحرر و التنوير، ولكن ليس بوصفهما مفهومين تجريديين أو إلهين يتعين على البشر عبادتهما على الرغم من إنقطاع صلتهما بالحياة و البون الشاسع الذي يفصلهما عن البشر. أما تمثيلات المثقف – الأفكار التي يوم بتمثيلها وكيفية تقديمه هذه التمثيلات لجمهور ما- فإنها ترتبط بتجارب أو خبرات تقع على نحو مستمر في داخل مجتمع ما، ويجب أن تظل جزءاً لا يتجزأ من هذه الخبرات: خبرات الفقراء، المحرومين من حقوقهم، من لا صوت لهم، المحرومين من التمثيل ، من لا حول لهم ولا قوة".

النص في نظر إدوارد سعيد منتج ثقافي له تفاصيله المكانية الملموسة و المحسوسة ، فهو ليس بناءاً خاملاً بل له تاريخه الإجتماعي و السياسي والثقافي أي أن له وجوده المادي "المتشابك مع ظروف وزمان ومكان ومجتمع" وهو ما ينتج عنه "قدر من الاتصال المباشر بين المؤلفين ووسيلة التواصل اللغوي حين يكون من موجودات العالم"، وعلى عكس ما ذهب إليه البنيوين و الواقعيون، يرى سعيد أن النص هو جزء من العالم الذي تشكل منه أو أستنبط منه. وعندما يتورط النص في علاقة ممالأة مع التاريخ والثقافة والمجتمع فإنه يتخلص حتماً من قيد ما يسمى بالأدب الأوروبي المعتمد ويرجع إلى نسيج ثقافته، وبالتالي فإن "إعادة إنشاء شبكات الممالأة تؤدي لإبراز الخيوط التي تربط النص بالمجتمع والمؤلف والثقافة أي تحويل النص إلى شيء محسوس"، وتعزيز مادية النص هو مفتاح باب قراءة الأدب الإنجليزي مثلاً بشكل طباقي للتيقن من مدى مشاركة تلك النصوص في تنفيذ مشروع سياسي متسع وكاسح، عن طريق إعمال الخيال الخطابي المدرك للآخر وعلاقة الذات منه ، وبالتالي قراءة هوياتية: هوية المجتمعات الخاضعة للإستعمار ، وهوية ثقافة الإمبراطورية الاستعمارية، وهو ما يمكن تطبيقه على الحالة الفلسطينية، وتمثلات الفلسطيني بعد أوسلو مثلاً.

فالقراءة الطباقية مثلا تسلط الضوء على المساحات الفارغة في المكان الآخروي في الخطاب الإمبريالي فانتيجا لجين أوستن تصف إستغلال المساحات الواسعة من سطح الكرة الأرضية بإضفاء حضور على تلك الغيابات أو "الفضاءات النائية، التي قد يكون بعضها غير معروف"، وعلى هذا فتلك ليست مجرد إشارة إلى "روح المغامرة التجارية التي تدفع المرء لحيازة أراض وبسط سيطرته عليها فيما وراء البحار من أجل تحويلها إلى مصدر للثروة في الإقليم الذي جاء منه. كما أنها ليست واحدة من الإشارات الكثيرة التي تشهد على وجود حس تاريخي ينضج بسلوكيات قويمة وأخلاق كريمة بل يضم كذلك صراعات بين أفكار، ومنازعات مع فرنسا في عهد نابليون ومعرفة بتغيرات إقتصادية واجتماعية مزلزلة كانت تقع في حقبة ثورية من حقب تاريخ العالم".

ومن النماذج الأخرى للقراءة الطباقية التي ذكرها سعيد في كتابه "الثقافة و الإمبريالية" ، أوبرا “عايدة” لفيردي والتي يكاد يكون فيها الإرتباط تاماً بين الأعراف الثقافية والأعراف السياسية ، فأوبرا “عايدة” تثير أسئلة مركبة عن "علاقتها باللحظة التاريخية والثقافية الغربية التي كتبت فيها" ، وأسئلة كذلك عن تفردها و"موضوعها وإطارها الزماني والمكاني وفخامتها ومؤثراتها البصرية والصوتية التي تلهب العواطف على نحو غريب، وموسيقاها المتطورة إلى حد الإفراط والوضع الأسري المقيد الذي تصوره، وإختلافها عن بقية نماذج فيردي"، فسعيد يطالب بقراءة أوبرا “عايدة” قراءة طباقية لأنها تجسد "سلطان النسخة الأوروبية من تاريخ مصر في لحظة من لحظات تاريخها في القرن العشرين، وهو تاريخ يجعل من القاهرة في السنوات 1869 إلى 1871 موقعاً ملائماً إلى حد غير إعتيادي" إذ أن القراءة الطباقية لتلك الأوبرا تمكننا من الكشف عن "بنية الإحالة و الاتجاهات العقلية في النص وشبكة علاقات المملأة والروابط والقرارات وعلاقات التعاون والتواطؤ، وكلها يمكن قراءتها بوصفها السبب في مجموعة من الملامح المفزعة التي جاء نص الأوبرا البصري والموسيقي متسماً بها" فقصة أوبرا “عايدة” التي تدور حول بطل مصري يقهر الإثيوبيين ولكنه يتهم بالخيانة ويحكم عليه بالإعدام، تستحضر في الذهن التنافس بين القوى الامبريالية في الشرق الأوسط. لقد شجعت بريطانيا تحركات الخديوي إسماعيل في شرق أفريقيا، إذ رأتها الوسيلة المناسبة لعرقلة المشروعين الإيطالي والفرنسي في الصومال وإثيوبيا. ولذا فمن وجهة نظر فرنسية نجد أن أوبرا عايدة "تصور الأخطار التي يمكن أن تترتب على نجاح الخطة المصرية في إثيوبيا"، لذا فهي تعري وتوضح مدى ممالأتها للخطاب الإستعماري و تجردها عن العالم الذي خلقها.

ولنا في رواية ألبير كامو "الغريب" مثال آخر ، إذ يرى سعيد أنها "ترتبط من وجهة نظر تاريخية بعلاقة ممالأة أو تبعية للمشروع الإستعماري الفرنسي نفسه.. وكذلك معارضة استقلال الجزائر معارضة سافرة". إذ ينبغي النظر إلى الرواية "بوصفها عنصراً من العناصر التي تندرج في جغرافية الجزائر كما شكلتها فرنسا بطريقة منهجية منظمة".
إن المقاومة عملية ذات شقين:
1.إسترداد الأرض المغتصبة .
2.المقاومة الأيديولوجية، والذي يتكون من "إصرار على رؤية تاريخ المجتمع كاملاً متسقاً غير منقوص ثم البحث عن نهج بديل في رؤية التاريخ البشري... يقوم على إزالة الحواجز بين الثقافات وأخيراً الدخول إلى الخطاب الأوروبي والغربي من أجل الاختلاط به، والعمل على إحداث تحولات فيه ودفعه إلى الاعتراف بالتاريخ المهمش أو المقموع أو المنسي".

أي أن المقاومة الثقافية هي عمل مزدوج ، ليس تحرراً ذاتياً فقط، إنما هو أيضاً إدراك للهوية الذاتية، ومحددات القيمة فيها، وهنا لا بد لنا أن نشير لتأثر إدوارد سعيد بفرانز فانون إذ يقول:
"إن الجهد الذي يبذله البشر من أجل اقتناص الذات والتدقيق في عناصرها ، وكذلك التوتر الدائم الذي تسببه لهم حريتهم، هما العاملان اللذان من خلالهما يتمكنون من خلق الظروف المثالية في عالم إنساني".

ولعل تلك السطور تعري في ذاتنا العربية عموماً ، والفلسطينية خصوصاً الحاجة الملحة والضرورية والحيوية لنرى تمثلاتنا الثقافية الذاتية في خطابنا العربي و الفلسطيني، وإلى أي درجة وصلت من المرآوية الصهيونية باعتبارها علاقة (مستعمِر و مشتعمَر)، ينطبق عليها ما إنطبق على غيرها، وإلى أين ستذهب بنا تلك السياسيات الثقافية الغير مقاومة، إلى أي حد سردنا هو علاقة ممالأة فاضحة للإسرائيلي؟


“Rescue Benghazi Friday”: Peaceful Crowds Fill the Streets of Benghazi (Part 2 of 2)

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[The following is part two of a two-part piece. Part one was posted Tuesday, 25 September.]

Peaceful crowds are mushrooming in Benghazi and in other cities as a direct challenge to Libyan government’s weak politics. The small group of people that attacked the US Embassy in Benghazi has prompted large crowds of peaceful protesters to fill the streets. The attack that killed Ambassador Chris Stevens touched the heart of Benghazi, whose civil society rejects harming foreign guests and friends. Only two days following a meeting of Eastern tribe leaders held on 15 September, activists met to organize a massive peaceful protest called “Rescue Benghazi Friday” to be held on 21 September. At this protest, Libyans voiced their rejection of the violent groups that killed foreigners, as well as locals, and pressured the government to disband them.

Well-Organized, Leaderless Crowds

The demonstration was organized by a leaderless group of thirty to forty activists, with no dominant political affiliations or ties to NGOs. It was a well-organized, carefully thought-out demonstration that sought to draw the biggest and most peaceful crowds possible. It was a publicized event, as illustrated with the points expressed on their flyer below, in addition to posters and banners around Benghazi announcing the time, date, and location of the demonstration. Social media was buzzing with news of the protest. Prior to the demonstration, the group pre-organized its own security protection, with about twenty to thirty police and ambulances in the event of a violent disruption by one of the militias. As a result of this outreach, over 30,000 peaceful protesters marched from Benghazi’s Tibesti Hotel to the Al-Keesh Square, synchronized with auxiliary demonstrations held in Tripoli, Derna, Zawiya, and other parts of the country. 

During the organizational meeting, the itinerary of the demonstration was also pre-determined. It was decided that the demonstration would start at the Tibesti Hotel at five in the evening, and the protesters would walk three kilometers to Al-Keesh Square, which is adjacent to a military base that was confiscated by Benghazi citizens during the revolution. Since Qaddafi’s fall, the base has become the informal headquarters of various militias, including the radical Ansar al-Sharia brigade. The protestors intended to peacefully confront these brigades and demand their evacuation. 

[Image from "Rescue Benghazi Friday" demonstration on 21 September. Image by Mohamed Almugherbi and Mohamed Alzawwam]

The Demands

The movement’s central demand is for the government to immediately collect weapons and to dissolve the armed security brigades that operate outside of official mandates. Protestors gave the government an ultimatum: if by Monday, 24 September, the GNC has not initiated a response to these demands, Benghazi’s population will go on strike, shutting down the city’s few institutions that do exist. 

During and preceding the demonstration, a flyer was also circulated to underline the goals of the protests:

1) That the government issue a law criminalizing weapons

2) That the government withdraw all authority given to militias

3) The eviction of militias (kataib) from all government buildings and institutions 

4) That Benghazi come under the rule of Libyan army and police with government support.

Peaceful Intent of Protests

All measures were taken to avoid conflict and violence. To this end, on 20 September, the group met and spoke to Ansar al-Sharia, the militia suspected of carrying out the attack on the US Consulate. They told Ansar-al Sharia that they should disarm and join the national army. The discussion also clarified that Ansar al-Sharia has the right to demonstrate and voice their views, but that they should not organize a counter-protest at the same time and place, in order to avoid conflict. Protesters emphasized the desire to establish a society inclusive of all Libyans. They announced their aim to avoid violence or hate-speech against militias and prevented participants from provoking or insulting members of the Ansar al-Sharia or any other brigade. During the demonstration, one protester attempted to confront the few members of Ansar al-Sharia who came to the demonstration. He said to them: “We hate you, go away!,” however, the group of protesters prevented him from pursuing the Ansar al-Sharia members any further. 

One demonstrator echoed this goal of non-violence when she emphasized: “We went out against all kataib, not against a katiba in particular. We want all kataib to go under the National Libyan army. So, they listened, and were not there and did not disturb the demonstration.” As a symbol of the peaceful intentions of the crowds, and in celebration of World Peace Day, the protesters wore white t-shirts and white headscarves.

[Image from "Rescue Benghazi Friday" demonstration on 21 September. Image by Amel Besekri]

The Struggle for National Unity

This protest reflects the seed of a new, peaceful social movement emerging in Benghazi. It is likely to spread as it is now working with the tribal leaders and continuing to pressure the government. There is a conviction among many that what happens in Benghazi happens in all of Libya. The outpouring of solidarity embodied this expression across Libya on the day of protest. One protester said, “If Benghazi is safe, all Libya is safe. If Benghazi is violent, all Libya has a problem. Benghazi is the face of Libya.”

There is a small number who voiced their support for the brigades, positing, “You want to rescue Benghazi from whom? These are the people who saved Benghazi from Qaddafi.” Some citizens also voiced their support of Ansar al-Sharia in particular, arguing that “they are real Muslims” and they “want to protect us.” 

Unfortunately, there was violence. Late on 21 September, after women and children had returned to their homes, many men stayed and attacked the military base where the kataib are based. Ansar al-Sharia had evacuated the area in anticipation of the demonstration. The men proceeded to the Al Jala’ hospital, previously under the control of the Ansar al-Sharia brigade. The men effectively succeeded at pushing them out and gaining control of the hospital. They then continued on and went to the Hawari militia (katiba of Rafallah Ashati) and asked them to empty the place, but they shot at them, killing four unarmed civilians and wounding scores, according to a witness and numerous media reports.

The Government’s Response to Peaceful Crowds of Benghazi

Some members of the government attended the demonstration. GNC members Ibrahim Sahed, Salih Jaouda, and Suleiman Zoubi marched with the crowd and expressed their support. Ibrahim Sahed spoke to the female protestors directly: “Thank you for protesting. See how you, women, are allowed to be out on the streets with the men. You are free, thank you for going on to the streets, thank you…” The protesters responded to this support by reiterating their demands. In the words of one protester, “Don’t just sit on your seats and do nothing.”

In response to the shooting late on 21 September, four members of the government made a statement on Libyan television. The statement was issued on the same day by President Mohamed Al Mgarief, the ministers of interior and defense, and the spokesman of the local council of Benghazi. They stated their support for the crowd’s confrontation with the Ansar al-Sharia militia. However, they defended Rafallah Ashati’s militia, which allegedly shot and killed the unarmed protesters. The officials declared the legality of this militia and stated that it is under government control. 

The problem is twofold. First, the population had never heard of the government’s legalization of this militia. Secondly, if indeed the militia is under government control, this means the government must answer to the crimes committed by this brigade. For months it has engaged in arbitrary arrests, disappearances, kidnapping, and killings of supposed Gaddafi loyalists. They have kidnapped people and until now these people have not been found. As a result, in the eyes of the protesters, the government made two mistakes: firstly, to not announce sooner that it was in control of this militia, and the second, to basically claim responsibility for the crimes carried out by them. 

[Image from "Rescue Benghazi Friday" demonstration on 21 September. Image by Amel Besekri]

Results of Crowd Action

The pressure applied by this peaceful crowd quickly yielded results. On 22 September, the Libyan army responded to their demands by occupying the kataib’s barracks and prohibiting the return of any militias. 

On the evening of 22 September, the Libyan President Mohamed Al Magarief and Prime Minister Mustafa Abushagur held a press conference at the Benghazi airport and were asked if they gave orders to shoot at protesters. They responded that they do not know the identity of the shooters nor which brigade they belong to. 

Political activists told Libyan media sources that this is a golden opportunity for the Libyan government to end the instability caused by militias in Benghazi and to collect weapons. The government has answered the demands of the protesters to a large extent. In the press conference of 22 September, the president vowed to implement the demands of the protests. He promised to: 1) establish military, government check points inside Benghazi, 2) give orders to the military to take control of all militias, preparing them for a merger with the national army, 3) disband all militias that are not under government control, and, finally, issue a call for self-control and non-violence. In short, the social pressure has had a swift and positive impact.

The significance of these protests for Libyan society cannot be understated. After the attacks on the US Embassy, Libyan society has responded and clearly demanded that the government act on their behalf to secure the city. This is a sign that civil society is awake, has peaceful intentions, and demands control over extremist groups. These crowds of protesters, and the protests immediately following the US Ambassador’s death, cannot be called “pro-American” protests by any means. They are pro-Libyan protests. The values that are being put forward, in harmony with the statement issued by the Eastern region tribal chiefs, are coherent with the values of any democratic society. These social groups are banding together calling for non-violence, inclusivity, tolerance, and good governance. These values echo a statement issued on 21 September by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the occasion of the Tunisian Foreign Minister’s visit to Washington. Clinton summarized “the shared principles of all democracies – a commitment to nonviolence, to tolerance, and inclusivity for all people, and to upholding the rule of law.” The rising protest movement in Benghazi that is now working in cooperation with the tribal elders of the Eastern region of Libya is calling for their government to uphold exactly these principles. Their written and spoken statements, in addition to their actions, echo this desire for a peaceful, tolerant, and law-abiding society. 

George Habash: A Profile From the Archives

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[”A Profile from the Archives“ is a new series published by Jadaliyya in both Arabic and English in cooperation with the Lebanese newspaper, Assafir. These profiles will feature iconic figures who left indelible marks in the politics and culture of the Middle East and North Africa.]

Name: George

Known as: Habash

Date of birth: 1926

Date of death: 2008

Name of wife: Hilda Habash

Date of marriage: 1961

Children: Maysa/Luma

Nationality: Palestine

Academic degree: PhD in medicine

Category: Politician

Profession: Doctor- Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Nickname: Al-Hakeem


George Habash

  • Palestinian
  • Born in the city of Lid on 2 August 1926 from an orthodox family that worked in trade.
  • Worked to found the Pan Arab Nationalists movement in 1952.
  • Finished his primary and high school in Java and Jerusalem, joined the College of Medicine at the American University of Beirut (AUB) in 1944. He graduated as a pediatrician in 1951. He was a political activist during his studies.
  • Returned to Jordan after graduation and opened his own clinic in one of the camps. He used to treat patients, along with his friend Wadee Haddad, for free.
  • Took part in founding "The Arab Fida'a Brigades" which called for Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine. This group tried to assassinate Adeeb Al-Shaishakly and was dissolved as a result.
  • One of the founders of "Alurwa Alwuthqa" group at AUB, which was motivated by Prof. Qustantine Zuraiq. The executive committee of this group was considered the nucleus of "Al-Shabiba Al-Arabiya" organization that came to existence in 1951 and issued "Al-Tha'ar" periodical. This organization held its first conference in 1956 under the chairmanship of George Habash. The "The Arab Nationalists" movement emerged from this conference. Some of the prominent figures of this movement are Wadee Haddad, Hani Al-Hindi, and Ahmad Al-Khateeb.
  • Published "Al-Ray" newspaper in Jordan but Glob Pasha, the Jordanian army commander then, closed it.
  • Ran in the parliamentary elections in Jordan in August 1956, but did not win.
  • "The Arab Nationalists" were accused of carrying out several bombings in Jordan in 1957. He was forced to go into hiding. He fled to Damascus in 1958. The Jordanian courts issued default judgment sentencing him to thirty-three years in prison.
  • Stayed in Damascus during the time of unity between Syrian and Egypt. The "Arab Nationalists" strongly supported President Gamal Abdul Naser at that time. One of its founders, Hani Al-Hindi, held a ministerial post and members of the group enjoyed a lot of power and freedom to move.
  • Met his wife, Hilda Habash, a relative of his, in 1960 in Jerusalem.
  • Married in Damascus early 1961. Among the guests in his wedding were: Wadee Haddad, Al-Hakam Darwaza, Ahmad Al-Tawalba, Tayseer Qubba'a, Hani Al-Hindi, Muhsin Ebrahim, and Khalid Abu Aisha, the first martyr of the PFLP.
  • His first daughter, Maysa, was born in Damascus in 1961, when he was in prison. His second daughter, Luma, was born in Jerusalem In 1966.
  • After the secession of Syria from the union, he stayed In Damascus. In 1964, the leadership of the province in Palestine of "The Arab Nationalists," which he assumed with Wadee Haddad and Ahmad Yamani, was transferred to the PFLP. The official declaration of the establishment of the front was delayed to 1967. The front consisted of 3 groups: Abtal Al-Awda, Shabab Al-Thaar, and the Palestinian Liberation Front (established by Ahmad Jebril in 1964).
  • Fled Syrian persecution to Beirut In 1964.
  • Returned to Syria after the 23rd of February movement in 1966, which brought a new command to power in Syria, and toppled President Amin Al-Hafith and Michelle Aflaq.
  • Was arrested in Damascus in 1968 for seven months. Wadee Haddad organized an operation to rescue him; he and his men dressed as policemen, attacked the convoy carrying him from prison to the court, and managed to rescue his friend and smuggle him to Lebanon. He travelled later to Cairo where he met with President Nasser.
  • His leadership of the PFLP faced conflicts and four defections:
    • The defection led by Ahmad Jibril in August 1968, which produced "The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-The General Command."
    • The defection of Nayef Hawatmeh on 22 February 1972, and the establishment of "The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine."
    • The defection of the "Revolutionary Front for The Liberation of Palestine" on 6 March 1972, under the leadership of several cadres including "Abu Shehab."
    • The defection of a group led by Abu Nidal Musallami, the front's official in Gaza in 1994. This group did not take another name and was for the Gaza-Jericho first agreement with some reservations and called for the return to Gaza and the west bank.
  • He deserted the traditional pan-Arab Ideology and announced that he and the front follow Marxist-Leninist ideology after the 1967 defeat. Following this announcement, he made a tour in China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. He made a statement in which he said that Arab struggle should be based on an Arab "Hanoi" to be its strategic dimension. He, along with his friend Wadee Haddad, came up with a slogan saying that the enemy should be tracked everywhere. Haddad translated this slogan in the form of consecutive operations against Israeli planes. New names emerged among the people who carried out such operations like Layla Khalid and Amina Dahbour.
  • He kept strong ties with President Nasser, until July 1970 when President Nasser accepted the Rogers plan.
  • The operation carried out by the foreign operations apparatus under the leadership of Wadee Haddad, in which four planes were hijacked in 1970, gave the pretext to King Hussein to start his battle against the Fedayeen. The clashes were known later as "Black September" and led to the departure of Palestinian Fedayeen from Amman.
  • Moved to Beirut in 1971 after the forces of the Palestinian revolution relocated in the South and the camps of Beirut.
  • Announced on 13 March 1972, the strategy of hijacking airplanes was halted because it conflicted with the International Alliances of the Front.
  • Rejected in 1974 the idea of establishing an independent Palestinian state on part of the Palestinian land.
  • He made a crucial contribution in establishing "The Anti-Peace Settlements Palestinian Powers Front," which allied with Iraq and included the PFLP, the Arab Liberation Front, the Popular Palestinian Struggle Front, and the Palestinian Liberation Front.
  • Announced the withdrawal of his organization from the executive committee of the PLO in protest against the new political course of the organization, which was known as the "ten points" plan and was endorsed by the tenth National Palestinian Council.
  • Played a significant role in establishing the "Arab Socialist Workers Party" in Lebanon.
  • Israel tried to kidnap and kill him several times. A plane was hijacked on 10 August 1973, at the time of takeoff from Beirut to Baghdad because the Israelis thought he was among the passengers. 
  • He had brain surgery in AUB in 1980.
  • He left Beirut in August 1982 with the Palestinian forces. He stayed in Damascus since then and joined the opposition of Yasir Arafat.
  • He took part in establishing the Palestinian National Salvation Front based in Damascus, which included several organizations opposing the leadership of the PLO.
  • He made a tour in the Gulf states in June 1985, the first in his political history. He used to call the Gulf States regressive. The enemies of the Front were according to the slogan: Imperialism, Zionism, and Regression.
  • He opposed the Amman agreement between the PLO and Jordan signed in February 1986 and called for its annulment.
  • Had a significant role in leading the First Intifada in 1987.
  • Returned to Amman in 1990 after twenty years of absence to take part in the popular conference to support Iraq during the Gulf War.
  • He had a stroke in Tunisia on 17 January 1992. He was taken to a hospital in France which stirred a national political furor and forced three officials to resign: The secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Francois Scheer, the office manager of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Kessedjian, and the office manager of the Minister of Interior, Christian Figuru. Accused of terrorism, few French apparatuses tried to issue an arrest warrant against Habash.
  • His supporters and Palestinian revolution fighters called him "Al-Hakeem" (the wise man).
  • He came to Beirut on 26 July 1999, to take part in the celebration of granting the Gamal Abdul Nasder award to Muhammad Hassanein Haikal, by the center for Arab Unity Studies. This was his first visit since 1982.
  • Rejected Yassir Arafat call to meet with him in Cairo on 1 August 1999. He said that his condition to hold negotiations with him is to undo the amendment of the Palestinian National charter. But the PFLP had already made a decision to hold negotiations with Arafat and sent Habash's deputy, Abu Ali Mustafa to Cairo on 31 July 1999 for this purpose.
  • Resigned from the secretariat general of the PFLP on 1 May 1 2000 during the sixth conference of the front.
  • Visited Lebanon and met with President Lahoud on 3 July 2000. He also met with former PM Al-Hes on 4 July 2000.
  • He denounced the Israeli aggression against Archbishop Atallah in the holy land in 2000.
  • He sent a letter to Hasan Nasrallah, the secretary General of Hizbullah, congratulating him on the victory of 2006.
  • He died on 26 January 2008.


Stands and Views

  • "The defeat of 1967 is not just a military setback, it is a defeat of Arab situations, and a defeat of military regimes, and also an intentional defeat to the Arab nationalistic movement." Al-Hadaf 6 September 1970.
  • "We decided to stop hijacking airplanes because it contradicts our Arab and international alliances." Al-Nahar 15 March 1972.
  • "The policies of the surrendering regimes will produce a new rooted national liberation movement. The duty of the Palestinian revolution is to ally with these forces and not with the falling regimes." Al-Hadaf 3 March 1974.
  • "Declaring the end of war with Israel is a flagrant treason and the PLO has moved along the Saudi-Egyptian path." Al-Nahar 26 October 1974.
  • "We call on the Soviets to reconsider their wrongful stance of recognizing the Zionist entity." 16 May 1975.
  • "If Syria Is working to get some support to join the settlement process, then the masses will curse the Syrian regime just like they are cursing the Egyptian regime now." 10 September 1975.
  • "The PLO and the front of rejection are unified in the battle in Lebanon. The presence of the Palestinians has not affected the sovereignty of the country." 22 January 1976.
  • "We have no relationship with resolution 242. It is irrelevant to us as a revolution." Ela Al-Amam 16 June 16 1978.
  • "We agree with Syria on fighting Sadat's path." A statement made on his first visit to Syria after ten years. Al-Nahar 22 September 1978.
  • "The political approach of the PLO paved the way and provided cover for Sadat." Al-Nahar 5 October 1979.
  • "Since Sadat promised the Egyptian people prosperity and linked to the surrender of Egypt and the economic cooperation with Israel, then we should deprive him from these illusions of millions of dollars...Egypt should be put on the same level of Israel and the USA." Africazy 14 May 1979.
  • "Autonomy is the worst solution to end the Palestinian cause." Al-Anba'a 14 June 1979.
  • "No to the Palestinian state if the price will be the continuation of the existence of Israel." Al-Anba'a 14 June 1979.
  • "I announce our full support of Imam Khomeni based on his animosity to American imperialism and Israel, but let's wait and see." Al-Safeer 9 July 1979.
  • "Any Arab regime that conspires against the Islamic Revolution in Iran is working against the will of the Arab people." 3 May 1980.
  • "The battle of Beirut proved that out Palestinian and Lebanese people have enough resilience to defeat the vicious American aggression." 16 December 16 1982.
  • "The Palestinian work in Syria cannot be similar to how it was in Lebanon because the security of Syria is important." Al-Mustaqbal 13 August 1983.
  • "We refuse the military return to Lebanon with the same mistakes of the past. The Palestinian military presence has to be under the command of the Lebanese national forces." 2 February 1984.
  • "What is happening in Beirut (the war on the camps) by the troops of Amal could not have been done without a Syrian green light." 11 June 1985.
  • "Our military presence and our right to fight Israel is the only demand we have In Lebanon." Al-Shiraa 21 April 1986.
  • "We refuse to stop the fight against Israel to protect South of Lebanon."
  • "We cannot say no to a solution our big friend is Moscow is working on." Al-Nahar Al-Arabi and Al-Dawli 26 January 1987.
  • "It is our right to fight Israel across all Arab borders and we will fight to open all of them for us." Al-Usboo Al-Arabi 15 February 1988.
  • "The solution of all aspects of the Palestinian cause cannot be achieved unless we have an international peace convention to recognize the independent Palestinian state and the return of Palestinians to their homeland." 11 February 1989.
  • "The immigration of Jews places the people and regimes of the Arab nation under a big and serious challenge that needs steps proportional to these dimensions. I call on the Soviet President to stop the immigration of the Soviet Jews to the occupied territories." Al-Hayat 9 April 1990.
  • "We seek to abort the current settlement because we see it as a settlement that does not line with the legitimate rights of our people. Instead, we see it as a settlement aimed at depriving us from these rights." Al-Hayat 19 March 1993.
  • "The Gaza-Jericho agreement surpassed the results of Camp David." Al-Nahar 18 December 1993.
  • "Carlos is a global fighter who joined the Front out of his revolutionary convictions and our people will remember this favor for him and for all the decent fighters like him. The accusation of terrorism does not intimidate us."  Al-Wasat 21 November 1994.
  • "Palestinians should not interfere in Lebanese internal affairs. In this stage there should be no Palestinian military struggle based in Lebanon, we want support for our armed struggle to return." Al-Safeer 28 July 1999.
  • He said in a statement issued on 17 January 2002 that the arrest of Ahmad Sa'adat, the secretary general of the PFLP, is a prelude to other steps aimed at destroying the PLO as a national coalition and will gradually lead to the abortion of the Intifada.
     

[This article was translated from the Arabic by Ali Adeeb AlnaemiClick here for the Arabic text.]

Syria Media Roundup (September 27)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

 Regional and International Perspectives

Barbarians Arrive as UN Judges Syria Vijay Prashad says the status quo will persist in Syria, because those who voiced the need for a united stance to solve the crisis are sidelined by the UN Security Council.

A Regional Solution for Syria Kayhan Barzegar argues that “more proximity between Iran and Egypt can be the key as to solving the Syrian crisis in a regional context.”

On Syria’s Southern Border, Proof of the World’s Failures Hassan Hassan visits Syrian refugee camps in Jordan and says “the current circumstances in which refugees live - in official camps, with families or in tents - are an easy recipe for fatal illness.”

Europe is abandoning Syria’s refugees Syrian refugees are now trying to reach Europe by sea departing from Turkey, which has allegedly resulted in Europe fortifying its borders.

The Mystery of the Syria Contact Group
Vijay Prashad says “the road to peace in Syria might go through the Contact Group. But it requires Saudi Arabia involvement to make it credible.”

Imperialism and the Left

The West Conspires Against Bahrain While Exploiting Syria
Ali Mushaima outlines “six important facts to consider regarding the Western position on Syria and Bahrain, and the future of the peoples and regimes of both countries – amid Western duplicity and double standards.”

Syrian Narratives

Syrie: Autopsie d’un massacre France 2 reconstructs the Houla “massacre” based on the accounts of witnesses of the event and the testimonies of the journalists and rights organization who covered its aftermath.

When Were the Minorities Oppressed? Michel Kilo says “the regime was caught off-guard by the people’s unity during their latest uprising, it found no viable investment to utilize other than the disunity it had sown and the fracture it had instigated, and so the first thing the regime bargained on was sectarianism.”

Free Syria Army will Shift its Headquarters from Turkey to Syria Patrick McDonnell says Colonel Riad Assad’s announcement “has obvious symbolic importance,” but he is skeptical about the “significance it would have on the battlefield in Syria.”

Syrian Conflict Makes Palestinians Into Both Refugees and Combatants Nicholas Blanford on the developments in Syria and how they further fragmented the Palestinian stance inside the country.

In Syria’s Continuing Tragedy, Dignity is the Latest Victim Rym Ghazal tells the story of a dental student from Syria who is now working as a maid for a Lebanese family, to show how the experience affected her life beyond the trauma of physical displacement.

Syrians on Hunger Strike Sarah el Sirgany on Syrian women’s hunger strike, its disappointing reception in Egypt and unintended consequences.

Syrian Women on Hunger Strike in Cairo The article outlines some of the demands of these women.

The foreign fighters joining the war against Bashar al-Assad Ghaith Abdul-Ahad on the escalating ideological tensions between the foreign jihadis and the secular portion of the Syrian rebels

The Dictator of Damascus David Lesch writes that “somewhere along the road, Assad lost his way. He either convinced himself, or was convinced by sycophants, that his well-being was synonymous with the well-being of the country, and that his brutal response to the protests was a necessary response.”

Among the Alawites Nir Rosen’s extensive reporting on the Alawite communities last April leads him to think that a “Lebanese solution for Syria, in which different areas have different outside backers, may be the end result, but it is nobody’s goal.”

History Repeats Itself as Tragedy Tom Blanton uses a 1982 Pentagon memo on Hama to argue that “the long roots of the current civil war are clearly visible in this 30-year-old analysis.”

Inside Syria

Syria’s Civil War: How Saying the Wrong Thing Can Get You Tortured Ghaith Abdul-Ahad tells the story of a man who confounded a Syrian rebel checkpoint with an army checkpoint in Aleppo, an incident reflecting the constant frontline shifts.

Having Tea with the Enemy on the Syrian Border In the FSA-controlled town of Jibata al-Khashab, Rita from Syria is hosted by a pro-regime family who says it has “welcomed numerous Syrian dissidents fleeing from the oppression of the regime and some wounded FSA fighters.”

Saudi millions and special forces expertise turn Syria's rebels into a fighting force  Ruth Sherlock reporting from Idlib province, visits one of the many training camps receiving foreign money and support from foreign military advisers.

A Day in the Life of Damascus, A City at War One day before another major blast in Damascus, Phil Sands writes about the first day of relative calmness in the capital since July.

In Damascus, Syria, Life is Disappearing from the Streets

In Syria, Aleppo residents grapple with hardship, uncertainties The author says “Aleppo has become an exhausted expanse of bread lines, fuel shortages, inflated prices, panicked families and abrupt Syrian military bombardment.”

A First Step Towards Dialogue in Syria Marah Mashi on the National Conference to Save Syria held in Damascus by regime opponents and “regime-supporting nations.” 

Arabic:

حوار خاص على قناة الميادين 
This is the transcript of Al-Mayadin Channel's dialogue with Dr. Haitham Mannaa on the National Conference to Save Syria that was held in Damascus.

هل حسم المسيحيون أمرهم مع النظام؟! 
Haytham Khouri writes about the stance of Syrian Christians on the revolution in the country. 

تسوية تاريخية.. نعم ولكن 
Hussein Al Awdat writes about the importance of dialogue and reaching a settlement between the opposition and the regime in Syria. 

الشعب السوري يستحق الحياة ايضا
And Al-Bari Atwan writes about the international community's stance on the struggle in Syria, while analyzing the present and the future of the situation in the country. 

اعتقال قياديي المعارضة السورية الداخلية 
Al-Quds on the Syrian regime's detention of leading Syrian opposition member Abd Al-Aziz Al-Khayer of the National Coordination Council for the Forces of Democratic Change and one of his colleagues while they were visiting Beijing. 

قراءة في كواليس المعارضات السوريّة
Al-Adab Magazine on the Syrian opposition.

تصدير الأزمة: لبنان في حسابات النظام السوري
And Al-Wahhab Badrkhan writes about the effect of the Syrian struggle on neighboring countries: Lebanon, most particularly. 

نشطاء الإغاثة في حلب بين الإعتقال ونقص الموارد
Rasha Rami writes about the troubles and hardships that face Rescue activists in Syria's second biggest city: Aleppo. 

بانتظار الحقيقة
An Anonymous author writes about Syria's 4th Armoured Division, which has been known for its extreme loyalty to the Assad regime. 

في مسألة التحالفات ونقد السياسات الوطنية
Ammar Dyoub writes about the creation of a union or treaty among the forces of the revolution and opposition members in Syria. 

سوريا: لا للحوار نعم للمنتصر

Maghreb Media Roundup (September 27)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Wednesday night of every week.]

Algeria

Répression du 17 octobre 1961 : « un crime contre l’humanité » selon Jean-Luc Einaudi New web documentary "A Night Forgotten" examines the repressed accounts of violence towards peacefully protesting Algerians on October 7, 1961.

La guerre du feu en version algérienne Kamel Daoud discusses the inefficacy of self-immolation in Algerian protests, in addition to other manifestations of "fire" in Algerian politics.

Algeria: Calls for Anti-US Protests Fall on Deaf Ears Salah Ziad examines social media reactions to anti-film protests.

Libya

Libyans Rise up Against Militias' Dominance Yasmine Ryan conducts interviews with Libyans who planned and participated in the demonstration against extremist militias.

Fanatic Groups and Swimming Against the Current Nagi Barakat discusses the conditions which allowed for extremist groups for rise in Libya.

Unarmed People Power Drums Libya's Jihadists out of Benghazi Chris Stephen reflects on his observance of the 21 September Benghazi protests.

Mauritania

Mauritania: March to Commemorate the Passing of Rights Activist  "Do Not Interfere with my Citizenship" marched on 27 September in honor of anti-racism activist Lamine Mangane, who was killed by authorities in a protest one year ago.  

Mauritania: Dreaming about the Fall of the Military State Ahmed Ould Jedou explores the impact of the Feb25 movement and wider demands for reform.

Morocco

Violences policières : le ministre marocain de la Justice reconnaît "plusieurs cas d'abus" Mustapha Ramid admits to the unjustified use of force against protestors, but maintains that some protestors also engaged in violence.

Une culture des droits de l’homme se développe au Maroc, mais il en faut plus pour éradiquer la torture et les mauvais traitements Official statement of UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan E. Méndez, following his visit to Morocco.

Lecture dans la déclaration de Méndez Mounir Bensalah identifies problematic elements in Méndez' UN statement.

Morocco: Brutality Against the February 20 Movement Joseph Charlton examines the proliferating unlawful detention of Feb20 activists.

Tunisia

Rachid Ghannouchi: Re-imagining Tunisia Ghannouchi discusses Tunisia's leading issues, including the controversies surrounding freedom of religion and expression (video).

The Term "Complementary" Replaced with "Equality" in Controversial Article Afifta Ltifi examines the motives behind the selective rescission of the term complementary.

Tunisia's Salafist Emergence Puts New Players on Political Stage Ghassan Ben Khalifah discusses perceptions and misperceptions of Salafaists in Tunisian media and social narratives.

“Tunisia Is so Far from Being on the Right Path to Build a Democracy” Lina Ben Mhenni discusses the rape of a Tunisian women by three policeman and the MOI's unapologetic reactions.

Tunisia Media Dispute Drags On Houda Trablesi reports on the sustained protests against the political media appointments.

Arabic

الوضع بين الأغلبية الحاكمة والمعارضة في موريتانيا
Aljazeera examines renewed confrontations between Mauritania's ruling party and the leading opposition.

ولد الناجم يروى تفاصيل “مذبحة الدعاة” فى مالي | #موريتانيا أخبار
More details regarding the killing of Mauritanian soldiers in Mali emerge.

جمعية "قضاة موريتانيا" تلتقي الرئيس وتقدم له مطالبها لإصلاح القضاء
Mauritania's Association of Judges presents a series of proposed reforms to the president, including judicial screening and review of relevant constitutional statues.

...ختان البنات.. آفة تجتاح فتيات موريتاني
Sakina Asnep discusses female circumcision practices in Mauritania, which still occur at a rate of seventy percent, according to official statistics.

تقرير حول معتقلي حركة 20 فبراير القابعين في السجون المغربية
Moroccan organization tracks conditions of six detained Feb20 activists.

Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb

“Rescue Benghazi Friday”: Peaceful Crowds Fill the Streets of Benghazi (Part 2 of 2)
Libyan Eastern Tribal Chiefs, Population, and Government (Part 1 of 2)
Ghazi Gheblawi on Social Media and the Libyan Uprising
Djamila Bouhired: A Profile From the Archives
NYC Event: Translating the Maghreb after the Arab Spring (NYC, 23 September 2012)
جميلة بوحيرد
Notes on Inequalities in Autism Activism and Care in Morocco
Libya Recap: Snapshots from Social Media

Nasser Weddady on Youth Protests in Mauritania and Social Media

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[This post is part of an ongoing Profile of a Contemporary Conduit series on Jadaliyya that seeks to highlight prominent voices in and from the Middle East and North Africa.]

Jadaliyya: What do you think are the most gratifying aspects of Tweeting and Twitter?

Nasser Weddady: The most gratifying aspect of Twitter for me is to get work done! The platform is a superb networking tool allowing users - if used right- to build new contacts all over the globe. So, more than once, I have managed to leverage these relationships to achieve concrete objectives offline in the real world. Beyond networking, Twitter is becoming an increasingly effective tool to track some of the emerging trends among Mideast youth and Muslim Diasporas around the world. Additionally, Twitter’s nature as an echo chamber allows users to shape public discussions as well as media trends. 

J: What are some of the political/social/cultural limits you’ve encountered using the platform?

NW: Twitter’s word limit makes it difficult for verbose users to communicate complex and abstract ideas. Even users who are very good speakers of “Twitterese” (the art of packing complex ideas into 140 characters) will sooner or later run into the challenge of having to either forgo certain conversations, or flood their followers with disjointed ideas. In terms of topics, Twitter increasingly mirrors all the major ideological and political fault lines in my area of interest-- the Middle East and North Africa. The most pronounced, and at times virulent, are the irreconcilable differences between pro-regime users and dissidents all over the region. Interestingly, there is also more ideological warfare being waged between the different shades of Islamist currents and their secular opponents.

J: In your experience and use of Twitter, do you feel it helps mobilize or disorganize? Focus or crowd? Is it manageable or noisy? Can it help persuade and mobilize or does it turn everyone into a voyeur and spectator?

NW: I believe Twitter is a tool, and like any tool, if the user does not have a strategy to achieve concrete objectives, it will simply generate noise. Activists have managed to leverage twitter to project their voices and impose themselves in the larger debate about the region to compensate for their quasi-exclusion before the era of uprisings. In terms of mobilization, that too is a function of users’ credibility. If users develop a reputation of providing reliable analysis, info, and data, that will automatically increase their chances of influencing/shaping outcomes.

Politicians and media pundits are increasingly turning to Twitter with the thought that their omnipresence in media will generate big followers counts for them. Their assumption is that their own self-perceived brand will automatically translate into clout.  Interestingly, that is a fundamental misunderstanding about the concept of real influence in shaping debates and outcomes online and offline. Ultimately, the impact of Twitter is very much a function of its users; if the users do not follow a carefully thought strategy, the results will be just an endless stream of consciousness. Plainly spoken, the content of one’s Tweet stream is what ultimately defines how much of an impact they can have. 

J: How has Twitter helped your cause or hindered your cause? Does Twitter turn activists into armchair activists (“slacktivists”)?

NW: Twitter has helped my work as it has allowed me to continue building contacts and networks spanning the entire region and beyond. It also allowed me to tap into multiple scenes and communities which generate invaluable data to understand the context of the news cycle.

I happen to be one of those who believe that social media platforms are invaluable to generate attention to regions and topics that mainstream media does not or cannot cover. With time, I find myself less interested in debating the finer points of that topic; it is a moot point by now given how much global engagement the Arab uprisings created between private citizens, previously unable to engage in direct citizen-to-citizen relationships with MENA natives. Conversely, social media platforms have allowed MENA natives to join the global community in ways that were impossible before: exchanging ideas and values and getting in sync with the rest of the world. I take the view that in the long run, that is a much more valuable strategic impact than tactical day-to-day topical uses.

J: How do you manage criticism, personal attacks, and hostility, online and offline?

NW: I believe that criticism is part of the exercise of being in the public arena. It is a healthy thing that makes social media much more vibrant than traditional media. Pundits, news commentators are much more accessible and therefore “criticizable” than they were before in print and broadcast media. This can be a good way to keep them in touch with reality, and prevent them from dissolving into mere soundbite machines. In terms of managing hostility online, I make a point of remaining respectful and upbeat, using humor, and exercising restraint. But, there is always the block button. I tend to ignore hostility and shouting matches because it’s often a terrible waste of valuable time and positive energy.

J: What role has Twitter played in youth protests in Mauritania?

NW: From my experience, I have worked on using Twitter to connect Mauritanian users with their fellow Arab activists to transfer expertise and knowledge in terms of cyber-activism. The nucleus of the Mauritanian “Twitteratis” is now the engine shaping the discussions about Mauritania and increasingly the conflict in Mali. Mauritania experts both in media and think tanks are beginning to rely on Mauritanian users to keep tabs on the country’s ongoing crisis. Simply put, Mauritanian Twitter users are in many ways replicating the traditional patterns of other MENA twitter users: collective thinking, strategizing, and communicating with the external world and their activist peers.

[Nasser Weddady blogs at Dekhnstan and tweets at @weddady.]

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