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Black Humor Facebook Pages of the Syrian Opposition

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The uprising in Syria has unleashed a wave of dark humor and satire across a range of media, from the clever posters of the Local Coordinating Committee of Kfarnebel, and the short sketches from YouTube series “Freedom and nothing else.” Therefore, it’s not surprising that along with the thousands of Facebook pages for organizing coordinating committees, calling for freedom of imprisoned protesters, and honoring those killed in the uprising, a number of satirical pages for the uprising have sprung up over the last year and a half.

How much resonance these pages have is uncertain. There are some hints such as number of likes, but this is hardly a reliable indicator. The identity of those who have created these pages is similarly unknown. While all the following pages are clearly anti-regime, each one reflects a different viewpoint within the opposition. Some call for secularism, liberalism, or Islamism; some mention standing with or against the Free Syrian Army, Syrian National Council, or other elements of the uprising; and some broadcast news and opinions from local coordinating committees in particular regions. Essentially, an anonymous administrator makes a page which they think people will find to have a funny concept and “like.” The admin can then use the page as a place to advocate for their viewpoint, which may not be reflected specifically in the humor, but in the admin’s comments, shared pictures, and slogans broadcast through the page, some of which may reach tens of thousands of Facebook users.

Homs Tank Washing Service
Created May 2011

 

[“International Homs Tank wash and oil change service.”]

One of the first joke pages of the uprising, here you can find the wide-range of services provided by the tank washing service opened in Homs, responding to the sudden increase in demand for a cheap place to get one’s tank a good scrub-down.

The Cosmic Conspiracy Against Bashar al-Assad
Created June 2011

[“The Cosmic Conspiracy. Coordinating committee for Planet Mars and surrounding areas."]

 This page explains that the leaders of the universe, after seeing the threat posed to them by Bashar al-Assad’s “tact and wise statesmanship,” gathered together in the biggest conspiracy in history to bring down the regime, organizing themselves through the LCC of the planet of Mars.

Freedom for the speakers of Arnoos Square
Created August 2011

[“Free our friend the Arnoos speaker from the detention center.”]

 It usually takes less than a few hours after the arrest of an activist for a Facebook page to pop up demanding freedom for whomever was arrested. Following the murder of firefighter Ibrahim Qashoush in Hama, who first introduced the now imfamous chant “Yalla irhal, ya Bashar!” —"Come on, Bashar, leave" — some activists decided to record the chant in his honor. After hooking up some carefully placed speakers in Arnoos square in Damascus, the chant was heard throughout the square but with no protesters to be found. Soon after the Syrian authorities found the speakers and took them, a Facebook page appeared calling for “Freedom for the speakers of Arnoos Square.”

The man whose chair conspired against him
Created September 2011

[“Chief of the Chairs.”]

After the many conspiracies planted against the Syrian regime, some were especially surprised by that even inanimate objects were in on it. When regime supporter Abdul Massih Al-Shami fell out of his chair at the end of vigorous debate on Al-Jazeera, it didn’t take long for thousands of likes to appear on the page “the man whose chair conspired against him.”

The Zionist Crusader Secular Liberal Leftist Masonic Western Syrian Movement
Created January 2012

[“Ban Ki Moon: ‘The situation in Syria is unacceptable.']

This page represents one of the more controversial political movements of the Syrian uprising, bringing together a number of contradictory conspiracy labels lobbed at the opposition.

The man with the blue flip-flops
Created June 2012

 

[“Bless your hand, Aleppan guy.”]

Among the various notable political figures of the revolution, some Syrians have decided to honor the unknown Aleppan man who in June 2012 ran by and struck a Syrian announcer with his shoe on live TV, while yelling “Syrian media are liars.” The page’s official motto is “the blue flip flop represents me.”

The Chinese Revolution against Chinese Tyranny
Created June 2011

Popular discussions about Syrian politics are famously known for their use of double speak, given strict censorship regulations and speech restrictions in the country. This page makes jabs at such double-speak, using China - incidentally another authoritarian regime - and its politics as a hilarious analogy for the events in Syria. The page organizes supporters of the “Chinese Revolution” from across Chinese cities such as Halab-hai (Aleppo) and Hom-is-ow (Homs) who oppose the tyranny Chinese President Jintao (Al-Assad), son of the previous president Haf-ez. 

The page is especially famous for pulling a number of pranks where they announce a parody news story mocking government conspiracy theories which eventually spreads throughout government Facebook and Twitter networks and sometimes even makes its way into the official regime media. Most recently, official Syrian media announced that the United States was to release a film called “the Epic Fall,” falsely depicting the news of the fall of the Syrian regime. It was reported to be filmed in Hollywood through the use of small-scale models of several areas of Damascus and Qasiyoon mountains. Funding to the tune of $36 million dollars was supposedly provided by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and a number of other Arab countries to the film company, reportedly named “Asaad iz duk reelee” (“Asad is a duck, really”). The state media indicated that they had received the news from “Chinese intelligence agents” (specifically, from Colonel Ishma Songa, the fake name of the “Chinese Revolution” page admin).


Last Week on Jadaliyya (Aug 13-19)

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This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes the most read articles and the latest videos. Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series. 
 


 

مأساة الكتب في مصر

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واقعتان مررت بهما الأسبوع الماضي جعلتاني أتحسر على وضع الكتب والقراءة والثقافة بوجه عام في مصر.

الواقعة الأولى حدثت لي في مكتبة جامعة نيويورك حيث أقضي هذا الصيف في محاولة لكتابة الفصل الأخير من كتاب عن التاريخ الاجتماعي والثقافي لمصر في القرن التاسع عشر. الكتاب يتضمن فصلين عن تاريخ الطب، الأول عن تاريخ مؤسسة القصر العيني، والثاني عن تاريخ الصحة العامة في البلد ككل وليس القاهرة فحسب.

أحد الأسئلة المحورية التي أطرحها في هذا الكتاب هو معرفة موقف المجتمع المصري من الطب الحديث، وتحديدا من تلك الممارسات الطبية التي قد تبدو متعارضة مع الدين والشرع، لذا اهتممت بدراسة قضايا مثل التشريح وفتح الجثث والتطعيم والكشف على الأموات وغيرها من الممارسات الطبية الحديثة.

وللإجابة على هذه الأسئلة ترددت على مدار السنوات الماضية على دار الوثائق القومية علني أجد مادة تاريخية تمكنني من الإجابة على هذا السؤال. ونظرا لغنى دار الوثئق وفرادة مقتنياتها قد تمكنت بالفعل من العثور على وثائق غاية في الأهمية والطرافة عن مواضيع مثل رد فعل الناس على التطعيم ضد الجدري، وإقبالهم على المستشفيات الحديثة أو أحجامهم عنها، وموقفهم من التشريح وفتح الجثث، بالإضافة إلى الخطوات العديدة التي اتخذتها الدولة للارتقاء بالخدمات الصحية في البلد. 

كان ما ينقصني هو التعرف على موقف الأطباء أنفسهم من هذه الممارسات الجديدة. فمن المعروف أن الدفعات الأولى التي دخلت القصر العيني كانت مكونة من خريجي الأزهر، وبالتالي كان لهؤلاء الطلاب خلفية فقهية ودينية لا بأس بها. كان من المهم لي أن أقف على رأي هؤلاء الأطباء فيما كانوا يمارسونه بعد التخرج من قصر العيني، وتحديدا موقفهم من قضايا مثل التشريح وفتح الجثث وعلاقتهم بالموروث الطبي العربي القديم بشكل عام.

 ولكن بالرغم من غنى المادة الأرشيفية التي تحتفظ بها دار الوثائق لم أجد فيها ما يمكنني من الإجابة على هذا الشق من سؤالي البحثي، لذا قررت أن أذهب للمبنى الملاصق، أي دار الكتب، لأبحث فيها عما قد يكون هؤلاء الأطباء الأوائل قد ألفوه من كتب. فمن الباحثين المتخصصين في تاريخ مطبعة بولاق (وأهمهم الدكتورة عايدة نصير) من تمكن من تحديد عنواين أوائل مطبوعات تلك المطبعة الرائدة، ومما يلفت الانتباه أن أكثر من ثلث هذه العنواين كانت في مواضيع طبية. وقد اقتفى هؤلاء الأطباء الجدد أثر الأطباء العرب والفرس في العصور الوسطى ونحتوا عنواين مسجوعة لمؤلفاتهم. فمثلا كان هناك كتاب بعنوان "المنحة في سياسة علم الصحة"(1834)، وآخر بعنوان "مبلغ البراح في فن الجراح" (1835)، وثالث بعنوان "ضياء النيرين في مداواة العينين" (1840)، ومن ضمن هذه الكتب أيضا كتاب بعنوان "روضة النجاح الكبرى في العمليات الجراحية الصغرى" (1843)، وآخر بعنوان "بهجة الرؤساء في أمراض النساء" (1844).

أغلب هذه الكتب كانت مترجمة عن الفرنسية لكن بعضها كُتب أصلا بالعربية، فكتابا "الروضة" والبهجة" آنفا الذكر مثلا ألفهما محمد علي البقلي وحسن الرشيدي، على التوالي، وهما من أهم وأشهر أطباء مصر في القرن التاسع عشر، فالأول كان وكيلا لمدرسة طب قصر العيني والثاني كان مديرا للمستشفى المُلكي (أي المدني، غير العسكري) بالأزبكية.

 وبعد أن حددتُ أكثر من ثلاثين عنوان من هذه العنواين توجهتُ لدار الكتب للاطلاع على هذه الكتب الهامة. ولكن على عكس دار الوثائق، فإن حال دار الكتب لا يسر، وهذا أقل ما يمكن قوله عن هذه المؤسسة الهامة. فخدمة القراء تكاد تكون معدومة، والبيئة التي تساعد على الاطلاع والتفكر غير موجودة. على أن الأهم من هذا وذاك أنني لم أجد سوى النذر البسيط، والبسيط جدا، مما كنت أبحث عنه. فبالرغم من القيمة التاريخية الفريدة لهذه الكتب، التي تعد من أوائل مطبوعات بولاق، أول مطبعة في مصر والتي نفتخر بها ونتشدق، فإن أغلبها كان إما "في الترميم" أو "مش ع الرف"، أو "مش موجود" حسب ما أخبرني به موظفو قاعة الاطلاع.

كان هذا الكلام من سنوات عديدة، وكنت قد فقدت الأمل في العثور على هذه الكتب ومطالعتها مكتفيا بما وجدته من درر في دار الوثائق. لذا كانت دهشتي وحسرتي في نفس الوقت، عندما اكتشفت الأسبوع الماضي أن مكتبة جامعة نيويورك (التي كنت أعمل بها) لديها نسخة ميكروفيليمة لثمانية وتسعين كتابا من أوائل مطبوعات مطبعة بولاق! أما حسرتي فكانت نابعة، بالطبع، من عثوري على هذه الكتب المصرية في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بينما فشلت في العثور عليها في موطنها الأصلي، مصر، والأدهى هو وجودها في مكتبة جامعة نيويورك، التي لا تعد من أهم أو أكبر المكتبات الجامعية في الولايات المتحدة، بينما لم أتمكن من الاطلاع على هذه المطبوعات المصرية الفريدة في دار الكتب المصرية، وهي المكتبة التي طالما تغنينا بماضيها وعراقتها ودور علي مبارك (وزكي جمعة) في تشييدها إلى آخر الاسطوانة المشروخة.

أما دهشتي فكانت، كما قلت، نابعة من العثور على هذه المكتبة في جامعة نيويورك، وهي وإن كانت مكتبة كبيرة إلا أنها لا تتميز بصفة خاصة بأهمية مقتنياتها من الكتب العربية، عكس مكتبة جامعة برينستون مثلا التي تحتوي مكتبتها ذات الخمسة مليون كتاب على نصف مليون كتاب من منطقتنا أغلبها بالعربية، والأخرى بالتركية أو الفارسية أو العبرية. 

وأخذت أحاول معرفة كيف وصلت هذه الكتب لمكتبة جامعة نيويورك. وما اكتشفته كان سببا آخر لحسرتي.

كان من الواضح أن هذا العدد الكبير من الكتب (حوالي مائة كتاب) يشكل مجموعة متكاملة متجانسة، وأنه في الأغلب قد تم شراؤهم دفعة واحدة. وقد صدق حدسي عندما اكتشفت أن في أول كل فيلم من هذه الأفلام الميكروفيلمية إشارة إلى أنه مصور من أصل موجود في مكتبة كلية الدراسات الأفريقية والآسيوية بجامعة لندن (SOAS). عندها زاد فضولي لمعرفة لماذا وكيف ومتى اقتنت تلك الكلية هذه الكتب الغريبة؟ فما الذي يدفع مكتبة بريطانية لاقتناء كتب طبية وعلمية مترجمة للعربية عن أصل فرنسي؟

وسرعان ما أن جاءتني فكرة أخذت أحاول التأكد من صحتها. فمما لفت نظري أن كل هذه الكتب يعود تاريخ نشرها لما قبل عام 1850، إذ أن أقدمها هو كتاب "صناعة صباغة الحرير" وهو أول كتاب طُبع في بولاق (1823)، وأحدثها كتاب "كشف النقاب عن علم الحساب" المطبوع عام 1850. لماذا توقفت مكتبة SOAS عن اقتناء مطبوعات بولاق عام 1850؟ وما سر اهتمامها باقتناء كتاب تتناول كيفية صباغة الحرير مكتوب بالعربية عن أصل طلياني؟

كان حدسي هو أن الإجابة على هذا السؤال تكمن في تاريخ النشر. فما الذي حدث عام 1850 الذي قد يفسر سر وجود هذه المجموعة الفريدة من الكتب في مكتبة جامعة بريطانية في لندن؟

الإجابة في اعتقادي تكمن في حدث وقع في لندن في العام التالي، أي عام 1851، ففي هذا العام عقد في العاصمة البريطانية "المعرض العظيم للمنتجات الصناعية لكل الأمم" (The great exhibition of the works of industry of all nations)، وكان هذا المعرض هو أول معرض صناعي تجاري عالمي، وتلته معارض كثيرة في باريس وستوكهولم وشيكاغو وغيرها من المدن الغربية. وكانت الدول تتباهى في هذه المعارض بتقديم آخر ما لديها من بدع ومبتكرات واختراعات، وكان معرض لندن عام 1851 خصيصا يحتفل بقيمة الصناعة، فبريطانيا كانت في أوج ثورتها الصناعية وكانت تتفاخر بما تقدمه الصناعة والعلم الحديث من آمال ووعود بحل كل مشاكل البشرية. وكان الأمير ألبرت، زوج الملكة فيكتوريا، هو الراعي الرسمي للمعرض، وقد أقيم المعرض في قصر من الزجاج والحديد كان نفسه تحفة معمارية وتكنولوجية وجاء معبرا عن تلك الثقة العميقة فيما يقدمه العلم من آمال للبشرية.

ومن المعروف أن مصر شاركت في هذا المعرض الرائد، وأن جناحها كان يضاهي جناح تركيا في الحجم، وخطر في بالي أن سر وجود أوائل مطبوعات بولاق في مكتبة كلية الدراسات الأفريقية والآسيوية بلندن قد يعود لاشتراك مصر في هذا المعرض، ولإرسالها بهذه الكتب ضمن معروضاتها فيه. وللتأكد من هذه الفكرة أخذت أبحث عن نسخة من الكتالوج الرسمي لهذا المعرض، وبالفعل وجدتُ نسخة رقمية قامت جوجل بمسحه وعرضه على الإنترنت.

وبتصفح الكتالوج وجدت وصفا دقيقا للمعروضات المصرية. كانت المنتجات التي أرسلتها مصر للمعرض الصناعي في لندن عام 1851 معبرة عن الحالة التي وصلت لها الصناعة والعلم في مصر في هذا الوقت، فمن ضمن المعروضات، التي بلغ عددها ثلاثمائة وواحد وتسعين قطعة، نقرأ الوصف التالي :"سكر مكرر من إنتاج معامل إبراهيم باشا"؛ "فوطة بكنار"؛ "قربة من جلد الماعز"؛ "جلد جمل"؛ "سروال من الحرير المقصب"؛ "زعفران"، "قصب سكر"؛ "زيت سمسم"؛ "باسلاء". أما رقم 248 في هذه القائمة من المعروضات المصرية فجاء مؤشرا أمامه الوصف الآتي :"165 كتابا بالتركية والعربية والفارسية، من مطبوعات بولاق".

ذلك إذن هو سر وجود هذه الكتب في لندن. فبانتهاء المعرض بقيت الكتب في لندن ولم تعد مع البعثة المصرية (التي كان يترأسها "اليوزباشي عبد الحميد من الإسكندرية" حسبما يخبرنا الكتالوج الرسمي)، وأغلب الظن أن القائمين على المعرض بحثوا عمن قد يكون مهتما بهذه الكتب فراوا أن جامعة لندن الأجدر بالاحتفاظ بها.

ما يبهر حقا في هذه القصة هو أن مصر عام 1851 عندما قررت الاشتراك في هذه المعرض الصناعي العلمي العالمي رأت أن ما يمكن أن تتباهى به هو هذه الكتب المطبوعة محليا. وبقراءة هذه الكتب نستطيع الوقوف على سر الاعتزاز بها وتضمينها داخل المنتجات المصرية في هذه المعرض. فتلك لم تكن كتب في التاريخ أو اللغة أو التراث، بل كانت أغلبها كتبا طبية حديثة، بل أن أصولها الفرنسية كانت قد كتبت قبل ذلك بسنوات قليلة. وبمعنى آخر فكان الاعتقاد وقتها أن مصر من حقها أن تتباهى بقدرتها على ترجمة آخر ما وصل إليه الطب الحديث، وبنجاحها في طباعة هذه الترجمات في كتب رائعة من حيث الورق والشكل الحروف والتجليد.

على أن أهم ما يبهر في هذه الكتب التي استطعت أخيرا قراءتها هنا في نيويورك هو أمران، الأول هو اللغة العذبة التي استطاع المترجمون المصريون (محمد الهراوي، وسالم قناواتي، ويوحنا عنهوري وغيرهم) أن يصيغوها ويترجموا بها آخر صيحات الطب الحديث إلى العربية. أما الأمر الثاني الذي نستطيع أن نستشفه من المقدمات المسجوعة لهذه الكتب هو الثقة المفرطة في النفس والاعتزاز بما استطاعت مطبعة بولاق ومدرسة الطب البشري من تحقيقه، والتأكيد في كتاب تلو الآخر على أن هذا الجهد الجبار للترجمة ليس مقصودا منه نقل العلم من الغرب للشرق أو اللحاق بركب الحضارة والمدنية، إلى آخر الاسطوانة المشروخة الأخرى عن صراع الحضارات ونقاء الهوية، بل إحياء ما قد اندرس من العلم في مصر والانخراط في البحث العلمي الذي لا يعرف ملة أو دين.

بعد ثلاثة أيام قضيتها في تتبع قصة هذه الكتب وفي قراءتها والتفكر فيما تعبر عنه من لحظة تاريخية مفعمة بالثقة والأمل أخذت اتحسر على حالنا اليوم وحال كتبنا ومكتباتنا. فها أنا أجلس في مكتبة في نيويورك أقرأ كتبا طبية طبعت في مطبعة بولاق بينما فشلت في الاطلاع على هذه الكتب في مكتباتنا في مصر. وبينما أدركت جامعة لندن أهمية هذه الكتب وأتاحتها لغيرها من المكتبات الجامعية (ومن بينها مكتبة جامعة نيويورك) على نسخة ميكروفيلمية، لا توجد لهذه الكتب الفريدة نسخ في موطنها الأصلي.

ثم جاءات الواقعة الثانية التي أشرت إليها في صدر هذا المقال لتزيد من الحسرة على أحوال هذا البلد. فقد جائتني رسالة مقتضبة على الإيميل من الجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة التي أتشرف بالعمل بها تقول إن الكتاب المقرر الذي طلبت استيراده لتدريسه في مادة "التاريخ العربي الحديث" قد تم منعه من قِبل مكتب الرقابة على المطبوعات. وطبعا سبب المنع غير معلن ولا معروف. وطبعا الكتاب لا يوجد فيه ما يسيء لتاريخ العرب من قريب أو بعيد، بل أن هذه الكتاب يعد من أحسن الكتب الدراسية التي تقدم تاريخ المنطقة بشكل سلس للطالب الجامعى المبتدئ، وهو ما حدا بي أن استخدمه في فصولي لمدة عشر سنوات.

ولكن وبغض النظر عن تفاصيل الكتاب وما يحتويه، لم أتمالك نفسي من عقد مقارنة بين وضعنا عام 1851 وبين وضعنا عام 2012. في منتصف القرن التاسع عشر كنا أصحاب حضارة وعلم بحق وحقيق، ذلك عندما انكببنا على العلم ولم نسأل من أين أتى هذا العلم ومن كتبه، وأخذنا نترجم منه ونزيد عليه دون هواجس تتعلق بالهوية والتراث والأمن القومي. أما الآن فبعدما فشلت جامعاتنا ومكتباتنا في الاحتفاظ بالكتب التي ترجمناها وطبعناها ونشرناها، وبعد أن ضيعنا حتى انجازاتنا الماضية في الإقبال على ما تحتويه هذه الكتب من علم، أمسينا مضطرين للذهاب لجامعات ومكتبات الغرب للإطلاع على تلك المطبوعات. ثم نزيد الطين بلة بأن مسّكنا القط مفتاح الكرار وأعطينا مسئولية الحفاظ على الأمن القومي لموظفين متخلفين في مكتب الرقابة على المطبوعات الذين يثبتون في كل يوم مدى جهلهم بأولويات البحث العلمي بل أيضا استهتارهم بالأمن القومي. فللمرة الألف أقول إن الأمن القومي يا سادة لا يتحقق بمنع الكتب بل بإتاحتها.

[نشر للمرة الاولى في "أخبار الأدب" وتعيد جدلية نشره بالاتفاق مع الكاتب]

Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (August 21)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

Reports and Opinions

Embracing Crisis in the Gulf Toby Jones analyzes the influence of the Arab uprisings on the Gulf states and the US position towards them, in Middle East Research and Information Project.

Saudi Arabia opposes .gay internet domain name A news report on Saudi Arabia's opposition of the internet address ending .gay on the ground that it is offensive to some societies.

Exile is Not the Answer to Statelessness! Mona Kareem maintains that exile has made the Emirati activist who has been deported to Thailand, Ahmed Abdul-Khaleq, more outspoken.

Repression in Bahrain

Bahraini activist jailed for three years A news report on the most recent prison sentence of Nabeel Rajab, in Al-Jazeera English.

Teenage boy killed in clash with police in Bahrain A news report on the death of a sixteen-year old youth by the police in Bahrain, on BBC.

Human Rights Watch & Amnesty International

UAE: Stop Harassing Detainees' Lawyers A statement by HRW condemning the crackdown on the lawyers of activists in the Gulf state.

Bahrain: Free Rights Activist Jailed for 'Illegal Gatherings'
A statement by HRW calling for the immediate release of Nabeel Rajab.

'Dark day for justice' in Bahrain as activist receives three-year prison sentence A statement by AI condemning Nabeel Rajab's sentence.

Yemen: Two years on, journalist still behind bars after alleging US cluster bomb use A press release by AI calling upon the Yemeni government to release Abdul Ilah Haydar Shayi'.

Media

Yemen TV: Bringing Back History Jamal Jubran argues that the documentary Leaders Who Shaped Yemen's History "showcases Yemeni figures that made significant contributions to their country's history, figures whose pictures, until shortly before the youth revolution, Yemenis were afraid to display," in Al-Akhbar English.

Ramadan TV Gently Pushes Saudi Boundaries Alessandra Stanley reflects on the implication of a episode in the Saudi program "Hush Hush," which deals with the issue of women's rights to drive, in The New York Times. 


Arabic

An Invisible Nation: The Gulf’s Stateless Communities

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The issue of statelessness in the Gulf is as old as the post-colonial oil states from which they are actively being excluded. Until the 1980s, the status of the Bedoon was not seen as a political issue, with the fledgling governments more concerned with state building functions than with further limiting citizenship rights. The oil bust of the 1980s, however, strained the budgets of the Gulf regimes, who responded by constraining social services and restricting citizenship laws. The brunt of these restrictions largely fell on the stateless population—and in some Gulf states on migrant workers as well—who had been allowed health care and public education. Their intent was to force those seeking Gulf citizenship—particularly the Bedoon—to leave and start their lives as citizens elsewhere. These restrictions only served to exacerbate the numbers of stateless subjects, as few opted to abandon their family ties and communities or their geographic attachments in search for a new home country. 

The 2010 UNCHR statistical book maintains that there are seventy thousand stateless subjects in the Saudi kingdom alone. This surely excludes hundreds of thousands of Mawaleed, a category which includes both those who are born in the country to foreign parents and those children of Saudi women from foreign fathers. In both cases, there is rarely any activism or reporting on statelessness in Saudi Arabia. It is believed that the seventy thousand includes families living in remote areas who are either unaware of documentation procedures or do not care to be registered in the system.

In Bahrain, considering the politicization of naturalization, the oppressed Shia majority understandably opposes the idea of granting citizenship. In the past decade, stateless Bahrainis and “mercenaries” have been naturalized as the state has sought to shift the demographic balance. Bahraini opposition claims that the regime has naturalized up to 120,000 but there are no official numbers. Those naturalized stateless persons are believed to be residents of Bahrain for two generations or children of Bahraini women who are married to foreigners. The “mercenaries” were naturalized after being brought from Yemen, Syria, Pakistan and other countries to work in security forces. The 1994-2001 popular uprising had resulted in the repeal of the State Security Law and the reestablishment of constitutional rule under the new monarch, thus limiting state power. In response, the Prime Minister expanded political naturalization in an attempt to change the demographics of Bahrain to weaken the Shia majority. He felt that he was becoming powerless and, with the support of Saudi Arabia, led the push for naturalization to further strengthen his role through the police and army. Resultantly, the current number of stateless persons in Bahrain does not exceed two thousand, most of whom are children of Bahraini women.

While the struggles of stateless communities in other Gulf countries remain largely undocumented, Qatar presents a slightly different case. Several reports were released for the first time earlier this year about the stateless population there, estimated at three thousand people who belong to one or two tribes. The reports provide accounts from a number of the Bedoon about their living conditions and in which they contrast the Bedoon’s struggle to the ease with which athletes are naturalized in return for their services. The numbers are comparatively smaller but again, little is known about their plight. Few Qatari Bedoon are politically active online and there are no statistics, official or otherwise, on the number of children of Qatari mothers who have not been naturalized. The reports’ criticism centers around Qatar’s increasing role and intervention in regional politics when the small state should be dealing with its own internal problems, including its major violations of human rights against migrant workers and its stateless community.

Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates present the most interesting cases of statelessness in the Gulf. Kuwait has approximately 120,000 Bedoon, the vast majority of whom belong to Arab tribes that had settled in the desert prior to independence. Kuwait does not grant women the right to pass citizenship on to their children, which has greatly exacerbated the problem of statelessness, since many Kuwaiti women have and continue to marry Bedoon men. Instead of attempting to assuage the increasing tension with and the struggles of the Bedoon population, Kuwaiti authorities issued a secret decision in 1986 to gradually strip this community of all its rights. Denied any form of official documentation in the 1990s, the Bedoon lost all access to formal employment, health care, and education.

In 2008, the Bedoon in Kuwait began to organize politically for the first time (following the lead of activists in the United Kingdom—notably, Mohammed Waly Al-Enizi—and in Canada), and have become increasingly active. They started with sit-ins, but participation was low and they were met with significant opposition from the police. With the failure of organized sit-ins, Bedoon activists turned to awareness campaigns about the plight of their community. They started to sponsor lectures that educated Kuwaiti society and media about the Bedoon, focusing on first dismantling all the existing stereotypes on those who are stateless and shedding light on the forms of discrimination they face. It was not until the 2011 uprisings, however, that things really began to change.
 


A group of Bedoon activists, seated in a private home in Ahmadi City, are watching the video of their last demonstration.

Bedoon protests started in February 2011. Tens of Bedoon activists have subsequently been arrested, with some tortured, released, tried, and then acquitted. Kuwaiti authorities have responded recklessly, without any sense of direction or long-term plan. On the one hand, they made big promises to the Bedoon in order to diffuse the tension when their protests garnered significant media attention. On the other hand, they violently cracked down on protesters when the media was preoccupied with other things. Bedoon protests are ongoing nonetheless. They are mostly organized in reaction to official statements and the arrest of activists, or to bring attention to their plight. The protests often take advantage of political opportunities and openings, when the country is going through a political crisis such as the latest court decision to dissolve the parliament for being unconstitutional. The Bedoon have achieved little by way of legal gains. Yet, Kuwaiti society is finally getting to know the reality of Bedoon life and suffering and some Kuwaitis are starting to extend their support. Kuwaiti “Group 29” was able to secure one hundred seats for the highest ranking Bedoon students after having a daily sit-in in front of Kuwait University’s admission office last month.

The struggle of the Bedoon in the United Arab Emirates has recently emerged from the political unrest of the Arab Spring. Until last year, the United Arab Emirates had not only successfully managed to block any information about its stateless communities, but was also actively engaged in removing the Bedoon from their homeland. UAE authorities bought passports from the Comoros and gave its stateless community an ultimatum: either accept these new citizenships, or become illegal residents and detained. Surely this inspired their Kuwaiti counterparts who instead purchased Eritrean, Dominican, and Albanian passports. The United Arab Emirates provides no official statistics on its stateless community but according to a report in the Emirati English-language newspaper The National, they numbered about one hundred thousand four years ago. The actual population is likely double this number, without even including the thousands of children of Emirati mothers who are denied passing citizenship to their children. While the United Arab Emirates has recently claimed to have issued a decision to allow female citizens to pass citizenship to their children, in reality, committees were formed to examine their cases on an individual basis.

In the past few years, when communicating online with stateless men from the United Arab Emirates, I was surprised by how terrified they were of speaking about statelessness or even telling me that they are stateless. Some Emirati artists and bloggers do not openly admit that they are stateless for fear of both being judged according to society’s stereotypes against them and being arrested. Their fears are justified, given that the UAE authorities recently revoked Bedoon activist Ahmed Abdalkhaleq’s travelling document, gave him a Comoros passport instead, and exiled him to Thailand. Abdalkhaeq was one of the UAE5 who were arrested last year for demanding reforms. According to The Economist, he also runs a website about the stateless community in his country. So far, the wave of political arrests in the United Arab Emirates has cost the community fourteen members and stripped several of them of their nationalities.

In Kuwait, there are many blogs and forums that allow the Bedoon to speak of their cause. This year alone witnessed the rise of Kuwaiti activists devoted to the Bedoon, their protests, and their rights. The cyber world, however, seems to have no place for the Emirati activists, who are much more fearful of their security regime. However, just the way the UAE5 encouraged others to speak up, Abdelkhaleq seems to be the one who will set up the way for his community to be active and speak out. Abdelkhaleq is one of the UAE5, but he had received little media attention until his detention and subsequent deportation.

Despite all differences, with Saudi Arabia being the most extreme model and Kuwait being the least oppressive example, the Gulf countries look very much alike in their failed policies when dealing with statelessness. This is a region with corrupt and oppressive authoritarian regimes committing political and economic suicide by refusing to heed calls for change. This invisible nation of stateless communities residing in and around the Gulf is becoming increasingly outspoken. Oppression, forged passports, and exile are all methods that do not seem to work with the Gulf’s stateless community, especially when we consider how thousands of young women and men are denied basic rights and have no means to leave their countries. The Gulf states, with the exception of Bahrain, have so far been able to portray their countries as less in crisis than the rest of the Arab region and thus to hide their internal problems from the light of day. This status quo will not long remain, as minorities and communities like the Bedoon continue to mobilize.

On the Nature of the Hashemite Regime and Jordanian Politics: An Interview with Tariq Tell (Part 1)

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The following is the first installement in a two-part interview on the history and politics of the Jordanian regime. The interview was conducted during the first two weeks of August 2012 with Tariq Tell, a Jordanian scholar and activist. In this first part, Tell discusses the history of the Hashemite regime and Jordanian state formation as well as the broad outlines of the political field that such a history has engendered. In the second part, to be published later this week, Tell discusses the positions of various contemporary socio-political forces towards the Hashemite regime and outlines important areas for much-needed further research on the history and politics of state building and regime-society dynamics in Jordan. 

Ziad Abu-Rish (ZA): Discussions about politics in Jordan tend to view the regime as a cohesive unit. How do you conceptualize the nature of the Hashemite regime? What are its social bases, as well as its internal socio-political or institutional fault lines?

Tariq Tell (TT): Hashemite Jordan is something of a paradox. It was created by colonial fiat as part of the “Sharifian solution” to the post-WWI disorder. It was then consolidated as a separate entity as a result of Britain’s need for secure communications with Iraq, as well as a stable buffer on the eastern frontier of Palestine. The result was a dependent polity—that was based on an imported dynasty that soon lost its historic base in the Hijaz to Ibn Sa`ud—and that was expanded around a colonial security structure. While no more artificial than the other entities that emerged from the post-Ottoman carve up of the Fertile Crescent, the Emirate of Trans-Jordan (1921-46) lacked a center, the kind provided by old imperial capitals, religious centers, or confessional havens such as Damascus, Jerusalem, and Mount Lebanon. At the same time, its economy and administration were dominated by a group that local idiom once cast as aghrab (strangers): merchants and bureaucrats who filtered into the East Bank during late Ottoman period.

Despite these inauspicious beginnings, the regime was able to survive the waning of Britain’s moment in the Middle East, while managing the annexation of Central Palestine after the first Arab-Israeli War (1948). With US support, a “royal military dictatorship” was consolidated after the final departure of the British in 1957. The power of the monarchy rested on the control of the military and was increasingly exercised through the mukhabarat (intelligence services), a department that effectively became the executive arm of the Palace after martial law was imposed in the wake of the June 1967 War. Notwithstanding bouts of harsh repression (most notably during the suppression of the left-leaning and pan-Arab Jordanian National Movement in 1957-59, as well as the dismantling of the PLO’s state within a state in 1970-71), the rough edges of Hashemite autocracy were for the most part artfully disguised by a quasi-constitutional façade, and a modernist discourse that emphasized the regime’s alleged commitment to peacemaking, development, and democracy.

In spite of its origins as an instrument of imperial or neo-colonial control, the Hashemite regime has proven to be unexpectedly resilient. During the 1950s and 1960s, an enforced alliance with the military and the rural middle class allowed the construction–in a similar fashion to the Nasserist or other radical populist regimes–of a cohesive base among the East Bank’s peasant majority. The term “peasant” is a more accurate description than “tribal Trans-Jordanians” or the “Bedouin.” This social alliance–institutionalized by means of a bloated bureaucracy and an overgrown military—allowed King Hussein to see off the pan-Arab and Palestinian challenges to his rule, while cementing an authoritarian bargain based on the exchange of political loyalty for public sector jobs and patronage. The cost, however, was external dependence as outside financial support was necessary to fund the militarized welfare system that guaranteed East Bank livelihoods and the cohesion of the regime. Fortunately for King Hussein (and King Abdullah II after 1999), Jordan’s geopolitical centrality in the Arab east virtually guaranteed a flow of strategic rents and developmental aid, as did its pivotal role in various peace processes and negotiations in the four decades after 1948.

While regional power politics supplied the regime with a flow of aid, the patrimonial methods of the Hashemites—and the corruption and cronyism that accompanied them—brought repeated fiscal crisis and budgetary insecurity. Matters were compounded by the nature of the policy-making coalition that had attached itself to the monarchy during the mandatory period, one in which rural East Bankers (give or take a few wealthy or well connected shaykhs or Palace favorites) had a subaltern role as compared to the bureaucratic and mercantile aghrab clustered in Amman. Together with the emphasis of development agencies and donors on the absorption and settlement of the Palestinian refugees, this produced a widening divergence between the regime’s “ethnic security map” and its development plans. The result was a lasting and entrenched policy bias (only briefly disturbed by the rise of a reformist “populism from above” between 1960-71) that favored the urban centers of the northwest and the Jordan Valley, while neglecting the East Bank hinterlands and the dry grain farming and agro-pastoralism that were once the mainstays of the local economy. By the late 1980s, this cumulative bias had produced a pattern of uneven development in which the South, Mafraq, and Bani Hamida districts as well as the Badiya areas lagged behind the capital on almost every indicator. There were larger absolute numbers of poor people in eastern Amman and al-Zarqa, but the incidence of poverty and its severity was greatest in the Trans-Jordanian heartlands.

An economic fault line had emerged that ran alongside an older national-regional divide, prominent since mandatory times, between the regime’s rural (or at least once-rural) Trans-Jordanian base, and the urban aghrab. The tensions in the monarchy’s social base came into the open once accumulating debt precipitated an exchange rate crisis and IMF-directed structural adjustment in the late 1980s. As the state’s ability to deliver services and support was pegged back, contentious politics migrated to the East Bank hinterland. For the most part, such politics took the form of austerity riots against neoliberal economic retrenchment and prime ministers identified with the Amman elite (notably Zayd al-Rifa`i and Abd al-Karim al-Kabariti). The result was a new geography of popular protest–exemplified by Hayyat Nisan in 1989 and the 1996 bread riots in al-Karak–that seemed to reverse the historical polarities of Jordanian politics. Where King Hussein’s security forces had once battled demonstrators drawn from the populous “mixed” towns of northwest Jordan (and of course the West Bank before 1967), they now confronted rioters hailing from regions that had historically been bastions of loyalty to the monarchy.

While these “troubles in the East Bank hinterlands” were often spectacular, they were easily contained by the regime. Most of the outbreaks are best seen as “signal revolts” aimed at attracting the attention of the Palace rather than contesting its rule. They remained confined to small southern clan communities where the political party opposition—including the Muslim Brotherhood and it’s Islamic Action Front (IAF)—had little mass appeal and failed to either generate nationwide mobilization or derail the march of economic liberalization. However, the “troubles” were nonetheless significant. They advertized a fissure between the Amman-based elite and the popular base of the monarchy, essentially between the aghrab and once-rural East Bankers now largely transplanted to the military and the bureaucracy. It can be argued that the “liberal bargain” promulgated after 1989 was geared towards bridging this divide, as King Hussein tried to use parliamentary (over)representation to redirect state patronage towards the hinterlands. However, this fault line grew wider once the Wadi Arabah Accord with Israel failed to produce a peace dividend, raising instead the specter of permanent Palestinian settlement on the East Bank, and accentuating fears of the “alternative homeland conspiracy” (al-watan al-badil). In this context, seats in the legislature proved a poor palliative once the regime began to fully pursue privatization and neoliberal restructuring of the state after King Abdullah II came to power in 1999.

ZA: Could you offer us a broad outline of the Jordanian political field and an overview of the different elite and non-elite social forces that make up the Jordanian political landscape.

TT: Despite high levels of urbanization and formal educational attainment, the vast majority of Jordan’s population remains a recently transplanted peasantry. In the case of “Jordanians of Palestinian origin,” they were forcibly driven from their land by Zionist apartheid. Much of the population is still in the grip of a rural ideology that was molded and reinvented by colonial and post-colonial state-building, and divided along “tribal,” regional, and communal lines. Regime strategies–most importantly a practice of “dynastic modernism” that has been careful to manage rather than resolve identity-based differences–have worked to entrench these vertical solidarities. Also important, is a political economy dominated by external rents and employment in the public and service sectors (rather than agricultural or industrial production). The result is a segmented and fragmentary political field, populated by communitarian assabiyyas as opposed to social forces organized horizontally along lines of income or class. Working class cohesion is weakened further by labor migration and the presence of an underclass of foreign guest workers. Moreover, the contours of the national community are contested, and the frontiers of the state unsettled. Formal politics in Jordan are still pursued under the umbrella of the 1952 constitution–a document promulgated when Amman was in control of central Palestine. A quarter of a century after King Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank, and nearly two decades after the signature of the Wadi Arabah Peace Accord with Israel, Jordan’s western border has still not been fixed, and the fate of the Palestinian refugees on the East Bank remains uncertain.

The elite is better described as Hashemite rather than Jordanian, clustered around a once immigrant core whose origins lie in the Hijaz and the urban centers of Greater Syria (Mandatory Palestine in particular). Despite a common attachment to a Hashemite dynastic state, it has always been divided along lines of confession, ethnicity, region, or communal origin (Christian or Muslim, Circassian or Arab, Damascene or Nabulsi, Palestinian or Trans-Jordanian), as well as locality or kinship. Notice must also be taken of the divide–largely neglected in the academic mainstream between a rural East Bank nobility that rooted its politics in the local “tribal” order, and the largely urban aghrab. The latter now include the descendents of the “external elite” (the term is Philip Robins’) of Levantine colonial functionaries who collaborated with British rule, as well as the “Ammani” bourgeoisie that emerged from the waves of migrant and refugee flows into what was once southeast Syria between 1851 (when the Ottoman Tanzimat fist began to intrude on the steppe marches of southeast Syria) and 1991. A further layer to the aghrab–one whose long-term implications are still unclear–has been added by the wealthy Iraqis who have settled in western Amman since 2003.

A “nativist” nationalism (the term is Joseph Massad’s) opposed to the wealth and influence of the aghrab, and wedded to the idea that “Jordan is for the Jordanians” has been a staple of East Bank politics since the early 1920s. However, both individually and as a group, the “aghrab” have long-since forged multifarious links (including financial and marital ties) with elements of the “indigenous” Trans-Jordanian elite. The latter include tribal landlords who consolidated large estates in Ottoman times, “peasant investors” made suddenly rich by the land booms that accompanied the inflows of aid and refugees, and a “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” that has managed–whether by acumen or graft–to turn political influence into moneyed wealth and forge business partnerships with the commercial classes. The expanded elite that emerged has been invested in the Hashemites’ Zionist connections since the early 1930s, and today forms the main prop of the otherwise unpopular peace treaty signed by King Hussein in Wadi `Arabah in 1994.

Beyond the elite, the mass of the population (whether Palestinian or Trans-Jordanian in origin) remains deeply hostile to Israel. However, the key social forces are also divided along broadly communal lines–into a predominantly Trans-Jordanian statist assabiyya forged by employment in the military and the public sector, and networks of skilled artisans, sub-contractors, and small traders whose identity politics are more ambiguous or more circumspect. This largely Palestinian petit bourgeoisie dominates social life in eastern Amman and is also influential in Irbid. However, Palestinian sentiment is most apparent, and socio-political solidarity most cohesive, in the refugee camps (in particular those set up after the June 1967 war). While it is tempting to define these groupings as “national classes” (following Michael Mann), it should be stressed that they have for the most part been classes “in” rather than “for” themselves. Each communal bloc is internally segmented along lines of locality and clan (some observers also divide the Palestinians according to the date they settled on the East Bank, distinguishing the 1948 refugees from the 1967 nazihin or even those driven out of Kuwait after the 1991 Gulf War). Combined with well-honed regime policies of cooptation and repression, these intra- and inter-communal divisions have meant that popular mobilization on a national scale has remained limited since 1957. Even at the height of the so-called “Arab Spring,” we have seen nothing comparable to the supra-communal left or pan-Arab-led mobilizations of the Nasserist era.

Oppositional politics have always faced a formidable obstacle as a result of the centrality of the state to the livelihoods of the vast majority of Trans-Jordanians. Historically, this has supplied the regime with what amounts to an East Bank Phalange, ever ready to rally in defense of monarchical rule. One example of this was the assault on demonstrators in Jamal Abdul Nasser Square on 25 March 2011. Independent political organization is also constrained by the defection (at least as far as party politics are concerned) of an urban (and in its majority Palestinian) middle class of “aspiring cosmopolitans.” Since the 1970s, the latter have chosen exit (often literally in the form of migration to the gulf) over voice. Today, they for the most part eschew radical politics in favor of NGO-based activism and the blogosphere—focusing predominantly on pan-Arab, Islamist, or Palestinian issues, or otherwise pursue particular interest-based politics through business networks and professional associations. Since 1993, political activity at the national level has been further hindered further by both the over-representation of traditional bases of support and the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)—or “one man one vote”—electoral laws. These gerrymander elections in favor of the East Bank hinterlands, and provide incentives for voting along extremely narrow lines of kin or clan.

As a result of entrenched vertical schisms at both the elite and mass levels, and because of the regime’s refusal to abandon the “one man, one vote” system, the Jordanian political landscape remains fragmentary even after two decades of (cautious) “liberalization.” On the party political plane, we find: the Muslim Brotherhood alongside more radical Islamist groups (including Hizb al-Tahrir, Salafists, and semi-clandestine Jihadists); diverse Ba`thists and pan-Arabists; the rump of the Jordanian Communist Party; offshoots of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); as well as a variety of “centrist” groupings that amount to little more than the personal followings of regime big men or tribal notables. Only the Brotherhood and its Islamic Action Front (IAF) offshoot have an organized mass following. This is in its vast majority Palestinian and concentrated in eastern Amman, al-Zarqa, and the Irbid qassabah. With deep-rooted ties to the Palace and the mukhabarat, the Brotherhood has historically found it easier to mobilize its supporters for elections (whether for parliament, municipalities, student bodies, or professional associations) than for truly oppositional action in the street. In the case of the latter, an East Bank vanguard is usually necessary to confront security forces that are predominantly Trans-Jordanian.

Petite bourgeois or petty capitalist in its economic outlook, the Muslim Brotherhood has, until the last two years at least, shown little interest in the East Bank hinterlands. It has offered only token opposition to neoliberal reforms, even when allied with ostensibly anti-capitalist party forces on the political left. In the spring of 2010, for example, its leadership turned down calls for support from public sector teachers campaigning for higher wages and a national union. Perhaps as a result, the past five years have seen the migration of oppositional Trans-Jordanian nationalists, labor activists, as well as the more secular or left-leaning youth on both sides of the communal divide to social NGOs and professional organizations. Notable here are the Social Left (al-Yasar al-Ijtima`i), the teachers committees that first appeared in the governorates in 2010, the retired service men’s committees, and Jayyin. In my view, it is these networks and the social forces that they have tried to support (i.e., public sector workers and army veterans) that have played the pivotal role in the current hirak (the local name for the street protests that have become a staple of the Jordanian political scene since the winter of 2011).

Anamorphosis

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Anamorphosis

I.

Nov 19, 2005

Haditha, Al-Anbar Province, Iraq
Kilo Company, Third Battalion, First Marine Division
. . .
Twenty-four unarmed Iraqi civilians
Including:
A seventy-six year old amputee
In a wheelchair
Holding a Qur’an
A mother and child bent over
Six children ranging in age from one to fourteen
. . .

Execution style

II.

December 2005

The U.S. military paid $2,500 (condolence payments) per victim to families of fifteen of the dead Iraqis. A total of $38,000.

III.

“Shoot first, ask questions later” were Sgt. Wuterich’s orders to his men as they searched nearby homes after a roadside bomb attack killed one Marine and injured two others.

IV.

December 21, 2006

Eight marines are charged.

V.

June 17, 2008
Six had their cases dropped and a seventh was found not guilty.

VI.

January 23, 2012

Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich, 31, of Meridien, Connecticut, pleaded guilty to negligent dereliction of duty as the leader of the squad. The manslaughter charges were dropped.

VII.

January 24, 2012

Wuterich was sentenced to a reduction in rank. He received a general discharge under honorable conditions. No jail time.

VIII.

Asked if he would have done anything differently that day, Salinas, one of the witnesses, said: “I would have just utilized my air to just level the house”
Another witness, Dela Cruz, admitted that he urinated on the skull of one of the Iraqis he and Wuterich had shot.

IX.

August 19, 2012

Meridien, Connecticut
Wuterich, who lives in California, returned home to Meridien, Connecticut, for a golf tournament organized by local veterans for his benefit.
“The tournament was organized by veterans groups including the Polish Legion of American Veterans, the American Legion and Marine Corps League Silver City Detachment.
Bill Zelinsky, commander of the Polish Legion Sons Detachment, said combat veterans he’s spoken with don’t find fault with Wuterich’s actions in Haditha.
“Any of the veterans in this club that I spoke to said they would have handled the situation the same way Frank did,” Zelinsky said. “I have to believe he did the right thing.

X.

Haditha, Al-Anbar Province, Iraq
The twenty four corpses are at home
in The Martyrs’ Graveyard
"Graffiti
on a wall in one of the deserted homes
of one of the families reads:
“Democracy assassinated the family that was here.”"*

[Anamorphosis: a distorted projection or drawing that appears normal when viewed from a particular point or with a suitable mirror or lens (OED).]

 * Marjorie Cohn, "The Haditha Massacre: No Justice for Iraqis."

Case Review: Pardoning Protestors against the Disengagement from Gaza

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 HCJ 1213/10, Eyal Nir, et al. v. Speaker of the Knesset, et al 
(decision delivered 23 February 2012)

"Within the Hebrew language's concept of amnesty," wrote former Israeli Supreme Court Justice Haim Cohen, "there has long been an element of free and unrestricted will, even of arbitrariness" (AD 13/60, The Attorney General v. Matanah). The Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the petition against the “Termination of Proceedings and Deletion of Records in the Disengagement Plan 5770-2010” (the "Amnesty Law") demonstrates how right he was.

The Knesset enacted the "Amnesty Law” to pardon anyone who protested against the Disengagement Plan from Gaza in 2005 and against whom criminal charges were brought, and to delete the offenses from the criminal record. The provisions set in the law include the suspension or termination of criminal procedures that had been initiated by the state and the non-implementation or the termination of a sentence in cases of individuals who had already been convicted. The law does not apply to individuals who carried out serious violent offences or to law enforcement officers. The law’s declared purpose is to mend the social rifts that resulted from the Disengagement that, according to its architects, is a "unique" and "traumatic" event in the history of the State of Israel.

The distinction of the group protected by the law (protestors of the disengagement plan who are predominantly Jewish Israeli settlers) from other groups (protestors against all other ideological backdrops) was at the core of the petition filed against the constitutionality of the Amnesty Law. The petitioners contended that this difference signifies a violation of the right to equality and consequently of the freedom of expression of those other groups whose members were not granted a similar exemption from criminal liability. In their view, this law contravenes the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – 1992 and must, therefore, be annulled. The respondents, on their part, claimed that the aforementioned violation is minor in view of the fact that the law is not significantly different from the Attorney General’s policy regarding termination of proceedings and deletion of criminal records relating to that particular group, and that, consequently, its result is predominantly declarative. Be that as it may, claimed the respondents, the objective of the Amnesty Law – the attempt to mend the national and social rift brought on by the disengagement - justifies the violation inherent in it. 

The majority opinion written by Supreme Court Chief Justice, Dorit Beinisch, concluded that there is no constitutional reason for annulling the Amnesty Law. Out of a panel of nine justices, only Justice Salim Joubran, the only Arab Justice, determined that the damage resulting from the law outweighs its benefit and that therefore, the law is unconstitutional. These contradictory views mirror the two Justices' opposing perceptions of the Amnesty Law. These perceptions are already apparent in the first paragraphs of both the minority and majority opinions. Justice Joubran's opinion opened with the principle of equality: "All people are equal before the law. This is true when they come up against civil justice, when they come up against administrative and public justice, and all the more so, when they come up against criminal justice." In contrast, Chief Justice Beinisch's majority opinion opens with a description of the harsh reactions to the Disengagement Plan: "From its inception, the Disengagement Plan was accompanied by a heated public debate which strummed the most sensitive cords of Israeli society and flooded onto the surface exceptionally deep ideological-religious and social tensions that threatened its stability. The protest against the Disengagement Plan spread in all directions and encompassed groups that viewed the possibility of its implementation as a loss of social, national and religious direction. The country was in turmoil. Those were grueling and painful days." These two different prefaces outline the methodology and signal the outcome of each of the opinions, as henceforth described. 
 

The Right to Equality and Freedom of Expression:  Concealed Discrimination 

Both the majority and minority opinions determined that the law provides for selective law enforcement with respect to a distinct political and ideological group and, therefore, its arrangements constitute illegal discrimination which contravenes the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Notably, the two opinions put a different emphasis on the principle of equality and freedom of expression in their analyses. The majority opinion includes only a brief discussion of the violation of the two principles. In contrast, the strength of the minority opinion is in its meticulous analysis of the manner in which the Amnesty Law is incompatible with them, addressing at length the numerous problematic aspects of the law. 

Thus, the majority and minority opinions both found that there does not exist a relevant difference in relation to the group of the Disengagement protesters that justifies an arrangement unique to it and that, therefore, these arrangements are discriminatory. Both opinions further note the destructiveness inherent in selective enforcement of the law to society at large and to the rule of law. The difference between the opinions regarding this issue lies in the extent of the inquiry into the nature of the violation of the discriminatory provisions of the Amnesty Law. The majority opinion does not discuss the harmful effect of the law in depth other than determining that "the result of the law under discussion is grave and inequitable because it sets apart one group in Israeli society and excludes it from the ambit of criminal justice." The opinion does not link the aforementioned general statement regarding the destructiveness of selective law enforcement to the specific destructiveness of the Amnesty Law itself. 

 The minority opinion, on the other hand, does not stop there. It exposes the entirety of the injury embedded in the Amnesty Law. Thus, Justice Joubran rejects the argument that the law is declarative in nature and thus does not violate the right to equality, denying, categorically that this is in fact a declarative law. In addition, in his view, "even laws that are symbolic, and do not generate a direct legal change, should reflect the fundamental values of Israeli constitutional law. A declarative law, by its nature, is a law that shapes the normative-legal framework that governs the law…even if these provisions have no direct effect on one law or another, their overall social importance, or their significant role in legal exegesis cannot be dismissed."

Justice Joubran clarifies the discrimination embedded in the Amnesty Law by stating that the relevant comparable group for the sake of legal analysis, that is the group discriminated against by the law, is composed of "all those who committed offenses for ideological reasons or, at the very least, against the backdrop of deep divisions in the Israeli public." In this way he raises to the surface the self-righteousness underlying the Amnesty Law. Why hail the mending of the national divisions following the Disengagement and not, for example, the healing of the rift between the Jewish public and the Arab public created following the events of October 2000? Justice Joubran further refuses to accept the argument that the protest against the Disengagement is disconnected from other aspects of political protest relating to Israeli-Palestinians relations and the relations of Jews and Arabs within Israel. Therefore, he summarizes that, "I was not convinced by the respondents’ arguments, why offenders who committed crimes of an ideological nature in the context of an attempt to promote an overall Israeli policy that concerns ending Israeli control in parts of the region are not the appropriate comparable group."

Pursuant to his conclusion, Justice Joubran links the violation of the right to equality to the violation of freedom of expression by the Amnesty Law. He translates the true meaning of the violation – the preference of an ideological faction identified with the political right and in particular, with the settlement 'enterprise' – over other ideological factions - and its meaning: "freedom of expression of one receives a higher standing than the freedom of expression of another." In his view, "the constitutional violation at hand is severe, fundamental and profound. It is a violation of the autonomy of a human being facing the law as an individual; it is a violation amounting to degradation due to discrimination on the basis of ideology; and it is a violation of the equal scope of the right to express ideological viewpoints, which undermines the foundations of Israeli democratic discourse and the rule of law itself."

This forthright analysis stands in contrast to the simplistic position expressed in the Chief Justice’s ruling. She does not accept the argument concerning the violation of the freedom of expression. In her view, this is not the purpose of the Amnesty Law, the objective of which is to "contend with a social, national and political traumatic event."

The significant difference between the majority and minority opinions regarding the issue of equality is not purely a legal one; it is a value-based one. The refraining of the majority opinion from inquiring after the nature and scope of the injury of the Amnesty Law conceals the arbitrariness on which it is based. The minority opinion exposes it completely. The difference in the analysis corresponds to the different outcomes of the two opinions. When the justices turn to examine the justification for the said violation, the minority opinion cannot conceive that the benefit of the Amnesty Law outweighs its harm. The opposite conclusion, stated in the majority opinion, is made possible precisely by its presumably conscious refusal to recognize the significance of the violation. 


The Deliberation of the Justification of the Violation: The Art of Distinction

According to the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, a law that contradicts its provisions, (such as the Amnesty Law which violates the right to equality, which in turn, derives from the right of human dignity), is not necessarily unconstitutional. As long as the law is in keeping with the values of the State of Israel; is designated for a worthy purpose; and its harm does not exceed that which is strictly necessary in order to achieve the worthy purpose, it may be justified. 

While Justice Joubran focused on the injury of the law, the lion's share of the Chief Justice's opinion focused on its justification. The central narrative characterizing her opinion is the distinct stature of the Disengagement which "was a unique and exceptional event in its intensity and scope." In fact, the word "unique", in various inflections, appears 36 times in the majority opinion (in contrast with 7 times in the minority opinion). The Disengagement’s depiction as a "critical breaking point", "traumatic", of an intensity that is "exceptional in its scope and significance" and as the cause for "a rupture between various sectors of society" is repeated time after time throughout the opinion. This torrent of dramatic descriptions masks the harsh impact of the law and allows the Chief Justice to conclude that the law conforms to the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, in that it fulfills a worthy purpose, and its harm does not exceed the necessary degree.

Concerning the law’s purpose, the Chief Justice adopts the respondents’ position, which argues that the law aims at reconciliation and unification and, therefore, cannot be said to be of an unworthy aim. This determination is a significant weak point in the ruling. How is a law which attempts to reconcile only one ideological sector fulfilling a worthy purpose? The scale of the protest in the wake of the Disengagement does not justify, from a substantive perspective (as opposed to, perhaps, an economic perspective), different treatment than the one received by other ideological protests. The preference accorded to this protest is an arbitrary act deriving from political preference. Indeed, the purpose of the Amnesty Law is not the true bridging of national divides, which includes reaching out to both sides of the political debate. The true aim of the law is the appeasing of the political right by the government and the Knesset at the expense of the public that chose to express its protest on the basis of a different ideological nature. How can such a selective agenda be found to be "worthy"?

The additional condition of the constitutionality of a law is that the harm it causes does not exceed that which is necessary. According to the Court's jurisprudence, this condition of proportionality encompasses three-sub-tests: firstly, that there is a rational relationship between the law and the purpose for which it is legislated; secondly, that less harmful means which fulfill the purpose of the law to the same extent are not available; and thirdly, that there is an appropriate rationale between the fulfillment of the purpose of the law and the harm caused as a result of it. Both the minority and the majority opinions determine that the law fulfills the first two tests. There is a rational link between the Amnesty Law and the longed for reconciliation (at least in theory, although the two justices doubt the practical effectiveness of amnesty as a means of unification and reconciliation). In addition, there is an agreement that an alternative means, which is less harmful than that of a sweeping amnesty, is not available. In this regard, the respondents claimed that the Attorney General’s policy of the termination of procedures and the cancellation of sentences of persons who protested against the Disengagement is an alternative because, at the end of the day, its outcome is similar to that of the Amnesty Law. This claim was rejected because, in the view of the Justices, it does not effectively fulfill the law’s purpose, as the latter constitutes a public declaration of forgiveness and pardon.

It is the determination as to the third test of proportionality – that the benefit of the law must not exceed its harm - that led to the contradictory outcomes. Justice Joubran contrasts the benefit of the Amnesty Law, the success of which is in doubt, with the severe harm caused by it: beyond the harm inherent in the discrimination of the groups excluded from the law, there is also the ensuing harm which includes the deepening alienation between the groups; the creation of a "'chilling effect" towards ideological stands that were not granted an 'exemption' for protest actions"; and the undermining in the deterrent effect towards "those who hold the 'chosen view'". This analysis leads Justice Joubran to the conclusion that the last condition was not fulfilled. The Chief Justice's assessment of the scope of the violation of the right to equality and the resulting harm is entirely different. As described above, this aspect of the law was not analyzed comprehensively in the first part of her ruling. Accordingly, the Chief Justice's assessment of the harm inherent in the Amnesty Law is narrower. Indeed, she emphasizes elements of the Amnesty Law that limit, according to her, the harm it causes, including inter alia, its essentially declarative nature and the fact that it applies to a small and "normative" group. This lean perception of the harm caused by the Amnesty Law cannot challenge the "glory and splendor" of the Disengagement experience as it was repeatedly depicted in her ruling. In such an equation, the benefit of the Amnesty Law indeed does exceed its damage. Thus ended the affair and the ruling upheld the constitutionality of the Amnesty Law.

"I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion," (Exodus 33:19) so God answers Moses in reply to Moses' pleas to forgive the Children of Israel for the sin of the golden calf. God's considerations are his alone and are not subject to justification or criticism. God is finally reconciled and concludes a covenant with Israel, but not before Moses orders the killing of approximately 3000 of the sinners. This is to teach us that the act of pardoning is forever arbitrary and always comes with a price tag. The Court's presumption of subjecting it to judicial review in the case of the Amnesty Law is thus shattered in the face of this simple truth. 

[This article first appeared in Adalah’s Newsletter , Volume 95, July 2012]


Writing, Revolution, and Change in Syria: An Interview with Nihad Sirees

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It can be said without hesitation that Nihad Sirees is an Aleppine writer, not because he hails from that city and lived there for most of his life, but because the bulk of his writing starts there and orbits in its universe. From Northern Winds to The Girls, and even The Silence and the Roar, which does not belong to any clear time or place but between the lines of which it is not too hard to glean that embattled city. The most well known of all his works, though, was The Silk Market, the memorable television serial that narrated a period of the political history of that city, and through it a chapter of the history of Syria. Sirees witnessed the explosion of the revolution in his country but then concluded that he had to free himself from all the immediate dangers, and that getting some distance would help his writing and his optimism.

Yusuf Akkawi (YA): You are from Aleppo, and you lived there during some of the revolution. What is your interpretation for how late Aleppo joined the revolution?

Nihad Sirees (NS): Who even thought that Syria would revolt against the regime of the al-Asad clan prior to March 2011? In Aleppo or anywhere else. Before the revolution, Bashar al-Assad had a respectable amount of popularity despite the fact that everybody knew Syria was a security state, that corruption and plunder of the country were widespread, and that there was a master plan to transform the economy into a capitalist one. This is to say nothing of the political and party-based monopoly. We in Aleppo knew all too well how a financial clique that was close-to-home, close to the regime, and allied with the security services had its hands all over the economy. Even if they did not own everything, they insisted in being involved in order for any project to get off the ground. But our industrialists, businessmen, and agriculturalists consented to this situation because it was better than the nothing that had prevailed under Hafiz al-Asad. The tremendous economic boom the city experienced before March 2011 can explain the acceptance of the regime by certain segments of Aleppo, including craftsmen and workers. Now, the Syrian people in every city and rural area who had never thought to rebel, even after seeing the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions broadcast on television, even if they felt solidarity with the rights of the Tunisians and the Egyptians, would not abide the shocking violence carried out by the regime from the very beginning, which gradually created a revolutionary response all over Syria. It was violence and humiliation that created this revolutionary mood we are experiencing today. Being a developed city, and as a consequence of its social and economic situation, Aleppo did not get involved with the mobilization right away, until it came to harm. And it would be affected later on as a direct result of what happened in the nearby rural areas. Right now the government is making a big mistake by dealing with the city in this well-known violent manner because the city will no longer care about its losses and instead will rise up against the regime.

YA: Has Aleppo ever truly revolted before?

NS: Aleppo rose up during the late seventies and was hit hard. Such an uprising would not be seen again until the mid-nineties. Therefore, the city is cautious now. In any case, now you can see how Aleppo is embedded in the armed revolution in a big way, and soon we will hear about the large and serious role of the city in the events that are taking place.

YA: Meanwhile, one finds that most of the intellectuals in Aleppo are either silent or have publicly announced their siding with the regime. How do you explain this? More generally, how do you explain this sharp division regarding the Syrian revolution in particular among Arab and Syrian intellectuals?

NS: This goes back to the stalwart “resistant” and progressive and Arab nationalist discourse on the part of the regime, which actually conceals something else. In other words, the existence of two contradictory faces to the regime itself. The regime has two faces, a soft side and a very violent, even murderous, side. Everyone knew about the violence and the humiliation that it practiced against its citizens in the dungeons of the intelligence services and by the army units. However, getting accustomed to forgetting about it allowed people to go on living. You might say that the regime was nice to intellectuals and artists and even tried to get close to them. I was a witness on more than one occasion, and I mean directly, to the extent of their affection for those artists in particular, and intellectuals in general. Furthermore, the regime provided huge subsidies for art, especially television drama, and it became concerned with the interests of artists. So its representatives forged friendships with them. A large proportion of those who work in this sector are close to men of the regime and the security apparatus. Intellectuals in Aleppo are no different from their counterparts in Damascus but as a result of the shrinking cultural and artistic voice of the city, you do not hear their opinions clearly. I understand you are referring to one writer in particular who worked after March 2011 to implement the policies of the regime, a writer for whom the regime had done huge favors and now he had to return them. Generally speaking, this is how the regime functions.

The Superstars of Writing

YA: Were you somehow involved in the revolution? Did you go out to demonstrations? Do you have any personal recollections about them? What do you remember? Any images that particularly affected you?

NS: Of course I did not demonstrate, but I allowed myself to interact with the revolution. Because I am a writer, every scene connected to the revolution inspires and helps me. I try to understand what is happening. Usually, I am with change, big and meaningful change. However, I am afraid of revolutions. Now that does not mean I am against this revolution. It is quite the opposite. But I would have preferred for change to come peacefully, and this is what we were working for when we got involved with civil activism more than ten years ago. Of course we were repressed and some of our possessions were liquidated by the security regime. I am struck, for example, by some of the scenes broadcast by demonstrators (revolutionaries) of their last breath after they have been fatally shot. They are dying calmly. There is always someone asking them to recite the shahadatayn calmly, which is also incredible. I watch in fear as he expires and death, or the threat of death, become inspiration for the revolution and not obstacles to it.

YA: How have your writing habits changed? Have you written about the revolution? Have you come up with topics and ideas for creative writing?

NS: Creative writing is stalled today. Not just for me, but for many other writers. The imagination withdraws to an interest in tangible reality. The superstars of writing today are those who write articles about “the events in Syria” or “the Syrian crisis” and, finally, “the Syrian revolution.” People have come to prefer reading posts on Facebook, the latest breaking news, or even a rumor to reading a story, even if its subject matter is the revolution. People are nervous about the country, about reality itself. They rush to read any article analyzing or interpreting what is going on. The best thing one can do is to be brief, and to cast some light on what is happening. I have written some stories and conducted a few interviews about the revolution, publishing some of them here in Egypt. When I posted one or two of them to Facebook, I noticed that this is not the time for imagination but for analytical and journalistic talk. Moreover, the matter concerns me personally and so my mind is now consumed by the latest news story and by trying to understand what is happening and by predicting what is going to happen much more than literary or artistic creation. 

The Novel of Tyranny

YA: Today, how do you see your literary achievements in the shadow of the revolution? Specifically, how do you view your novel, The Silence and the Roar, which is about tyranny?

NS: I think I contributed, if only in a modest way, to developing an awareness of the reality that prevailed prior to the revolution and the push for change. All of my literary and dramatic works aim to awaken the consciousness of the Arab citizen and the Syrian in particular in order to alert them to the winds of change. From Northern Winds, whose title even refers to the winds of change, all the way up to the most recent television drama I wrote about Gibran Khalil Gibran. Take, for example, the serial entitled The Silk Market. It is not only a nice story whose protagonist is the city of Aleppo and the Aleppine dialect, etc…The program attempted to instill nostalgia for the Syrian democratic past in the fifties. People loved that show because it reminded them of those golden years even as their consciousness would recognize the political reality in which they were living. The same thing can be said about my other works such as Thuraya, which aimed to open up people’s self-awareness and consciousness of others in the construction of modern Syria. Then there is the novel The Silence and the Roar, which I wrote after the program to revitalize a civil society broken down under the weight of the regime. It observes the phenomenon of authoritarianism. I diagnosed it and wondered about its origin. I purposefully made fun of the dictator in order to participate in tearing off his halo of veneration and then to topple him. Publishing that novel was an act surrounded with danger but I was not worried because that is my role as a writer. Some of those who read it knew how bold it was. In fact, a diplomat who knew Arabic well asked me whether the men of the regime even read literature in Syria! But I never sent it to Syrian publishing houses, which I was supposed to do first in order to get official permission, sending it straight away instead to Dar al-Adab (in Beirut), which published it without any hesitation.

YA: The novel makes no reference to any clear place or time. Has the revolution made you think at all about re-writing it?

NS: Tyranny is a historical phenomenon and has no specific homeland. I wrote the novel in 2004 when dozens of Arab, African, and many other countries, including Syria, were languishing under authoritarian rule. In the novel I did not name the country or the city or the dictator, but anyone who read it knew what and whom I was talking about. By not explicitly naming the place I wanted to make it simultaneously more general and more specific. Moreover, I wanted to avoid having the novel banned or confiscated. This is one of the amazing possibilities that literature provides—to say what you want to say in a complex artistic fashion and at the same time using simple tools. Do you mean literally re-write it? Of course, I would not. The novel is a product of its time. But I do want to write a novel like El manuscrito carmesí by the Spanish writer Antonio Gala about Abdallah al-Saghir, the last taifa king of al-Andalus.

YA: There was a clip on the Syrian news service of your reading selections from a novel, which was in fact The Silence and the Roar, but then replaced by another novel. What was that all about?

NS: This novel attracted the interest of cultural circles and publishing houses outside of Syria, particularly in Europe. I was invited last May to the Solothurn Literature Festival in Switzerland, where in one of the sessions I read a few pages from the novel translated into German. Most of the questions for me revolved around authoritarianism and the events in Syria. However, SANA framed the news a bit differently. The broadcast by the Syrian state news agency about my reading reported I had read selections from my novel, State of Passion, which is completely different in subject matter. That novel looks at a situation of female-female love in Aleppo. I think that the news agency, as usual, wanted to say that everything in Syria was fine and that our esteemed writers continue to be interested in matters of love.

Fears

YA: You recently decided to leave the country. Was that under any duress or pressure or personal fears? Did leaving make you freer to write about and deal with the Syrian situation?

NS: I do not demonstrate and I do not take up arms, but I am for fundamental change. I found that life in Syria had become dangerous with this [regime that is acting like a] wounded wolf, and I preferred to live without the immediate pressure of the events. Someone like me needs to be far away in order to offer the best he has in order to serve the process of change. I found myself working for the cause of the Syrian people in a different way, and in different places than, say, the awesome Yassin al-Haj Saleh and Fares al-Helou, to take two examples.

YA: Do you see the revolution proceeding as expected? Or have there been any surprises as far as you can tell?

NS: Before the revolution, I knew as many people did about the violence and humiliation that was going on in the basements of the security services. When they decided to repress the movement for the revitalization of civil society, they carried out simple actions: smashing my car windows, and spraying Samir Nashar’s car windows with acid (Samir is now a member of the executive committee of the Syrian National Council). We said, ma’lesh (no big deal). We were expecting some kind of violence in the event of demonstrations demanding democracy or replacing the governor (as actually happened in Homs at the beginning). But to pull out children’s fingernails because they were messing around by scrawling revolutionary Egyptian slogans that they had seen on television on the walls, then to open fire on the demonstrators, then to unleash tank artillery and fighter jets on ordinary people, and to mutilate dead bodies and to cut off people’s genitals before sending the corpses back to their families—nobody could have imagined this. In the past, the regime carried out violence in a subterranean fashion. But after March 2011 it rose to the surface and the regime started engaging in it out in the streets and in the light of day. All the respect in the world to the mobile phone cameras that scandalized these practices even as the regime refused to own up to it in the beginning, locking up anyone who publicized the fact of the horrifying violence being carried out by the regime. Even though Lavrov criticized the big mistakes that were made by the regime (at the start of the events!) and President al-Assad recognized these very same mistakes, they continue to make them over and over again and nobody is going to stop them, even if it leads to the destruction of the country.

YA: Are there any fears you are particularly aware of today?

NS: Naturally there a lot of fears that anyone with a conscience and a rational mind would have. I see a decimated country where no town or village is spared, and I see the army coming apart and tanks abandoned in the streets, whether they are destroyed or in fine condition, but their soldiers leave them before fleeing. I see how Syrians have been made into refugees who are unwanted by the neighbors who were welcomed into these very same houses that have been abandoned now because their owners have become refugees. And I see how this honorable people are waiting for someone to help them, to offer them a crust of bread or a tent to sleep in. Who could have ever imagined this prior to March 2011? There wasn’t a single person thinking about this. All of this could have been avoided and Syria could have been saved if the regime had a shred of wisdom and had just sent someone to receive the leading shaykhs of Deraa and apologized for the unacceptable behavior of the idiotic arrogant local Baathists and seen that justice was done for those mutilated children.


[This interview was originally published in Arabic in
 al-Safir under the title "Nihad Sirees: I am with fundamental change but I am afraid of revolutions.” It was translated into English by Max Weiss.]

Back to the Table, Egypt and the IMF

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Negotiations between the Egyptian government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have resumed. On Wednesday, the IMF’s managing director, Christine Lagarde, met President Mohamed Morsy and Prime Minister Hesham Qandil in Cairo to discuss a possible US$4.8 billion budget support loan, which the government hopes to secure before the end of the year. For the new government and its creditor-to-be, completing the deal would herald a new phase in the transition, where Egypt confronts its many challenges and sets the economy back on track. But at stake is also Egypt’s economic orientation post-Mubarak.

The IMF has been quite active in the region since the Arab revolts. In Yemen, the Fund approved US$94 million emergency loan earlier this year, making Yemen the first Arab country that has faced a sustained uprising to receive IMF assistance. In Jordan, it has negotiated a standby agreement worth US$2 billion to guard against the impact of rising energy prices and regional unrest. In Morocco, it has offered to protect the country’s liquidity needs in the face of external shocks, particularly from the Eurozone crisis and the global oil market. The IMF is also working with the new governments in Libya and Tunisia. In most cases, financial support is provided to countries with a proven record of free-market reforms or with a leadership willing to implement them in the future.

When asked earlier this month how these programs differ from those of the past, Lagarde responded:

“What I think is different…is we really pay specific attention to the underprivileged, to the poor in those countries. One thing that the IMF has learned as a result of the Arab transition…is that numbers don’t tell the whole story and we have to really examine precisely what is behind the numbers. Who benefits from growth? Who benefits from subsidies? How are the fruits of growth allocated in a particular country?”

These are good questions. They should and are being asked in many parts of the world that have experienced the ravages of neoliberalism. In the Egyptian context, the last agreement with the IMF in 1991 set the stage for a wave of privatization and deregulation. By the end of the decade, over one third of state-owned enterprises were partly or wholly privatized. In the countryside, the government lifted Gamal Abdel Nasser-era tenure rights, exposing rural tenants to the vagaries of the market and the whims of newly empowered landowners. Similar policies were continued in the 2000s under the “government of business” led by Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif and a coterie of Western-educated reformers and businessmen. Over the course of 20 years the result was a massive transfer of wealth into the hands of a well-connected elite and the loss of social protections and secure livelihoods for a large number of Egyptians.

Unfortunately, nothing the IMF has said or done in the past year with regards to Egypt suggests a serious change of course. And perfunctory nods to the poor are not convincing nor do they begin to address Egypt’s myriad social and economic problems.

During loan negotiations earlier this year, the SCAF-appointed cabinet led by former Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri prepared an economic reform program for the IMF (drafted by Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, and the Central Bank) that remained faithful to the policies of the old regime. The focus was on deficit reduction, not generating employment or promoting social equality. In typical neoliberal fashion, the government pledged to raise revenue through strategies like indirect taxation and to cut spending through subsidy reform with no clear safeguards for vulnerable groups.  

The program didn’t seem to elicit any reservations from the IMF; the only sticking point was a requirement for broad political consensus. The open confrontation between the Ganzouri cabinet and the Brotherhood-dominated Parliament at the time eventually brought the negotiations with the Fund to a halt. Now it seems Morsy and his new cabinet, in consultation with the IMF team, are modifying the Ganzouri’s program, according to Finance Minister Momtaz Saeed who served in both cabinets and helped draw up the original plan. Morsy’s economic advisor Abdullah Shehata has dismissed this claim, suggesting the Ganzouri proposal is not a baseline for present deliberations. But there is yet no evidence the government has produced an alternative that is genuinely different. In the absence of an elected parliament that can put the reform program up for public debate, the government may imagine it will be easier to push the reforms through.

To claim the loan is necessary to “bolster the Egyptian economy” is to evade concrete questions through rhetorical shortcuts.

If the budget deficit is prompting the turn to foreign assistance then the government has not sufficiently explored all its options, neither under Ganzouri earlier this year nor under Qandil now. In February, the Drop Egypt’s Debt campaign, which has been consistently critical of the loan negotiations and the proposed reforms, suggested several short-term alternatives to plug the deficit that would not require foreign credit or conditions. Egypt could lift subsidies for energy intensive industries and high-grade gasoline, while continuing to support fuel consumption by the poor. It could levy a tax on dividend payments to stockholders. It could impose a one-time wealth tax on individuals with a net worth above a certain limit, an idea proposed by Hassan Heikal, a chief executive at EFG-Hermes and hardly an economic radical.

If the government’s concern is to improve Egyptians’ productive livelihoods and their ability to meet basic needs then none of the official reform proposals so far pass muster.

The loan is really about boosting investor confidence and attracting foreign capital, a top priority for the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. The government believes the loan will send an encouraging signal to investors at home and abroad that Egypt is once again ready for business. It’s part of a broader plan to restore pre-2011 levels of growth and business activity in hopes that the same free-market policies minus the corruption that plagued the Mubarak regime will solve problems of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, this conservative thinking reproduces the fundamentals of Mubarak-era economic dogma and keeps attention away from structural inequalities that require redistributive solutions—minimum wage legislation, progressive taxation, greater spending on services, and expansionary fiscal policies.

Even if there are no direct conditions spelled out in the new IMF deal, the loan is still a bad idea. It threatens to further circumscribe the terms of debate on the kind of economic change that is possible in Egypt. And it would provide an international stamp of approval for the new government’s conformity to failed economic orthodoxies. Just as Mubarak’s reforms over the years were met with popular agitation so too may those of Egypt’s new rulers should they choose to follow a similar trajectory.

[This article originally appeared in Egypt Independent.]

Ghassan Kanafani: The Symbol of the Palestinian Tragedy

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As I recall the year was 1966. We ran to the Nasr Cinema hall in Gaza City to attend a literary seminar held during a conference for the Union of Palestinian Writers. A surprise would unfold whose beauty far surpassed the conference which came together to elect an executive committee and then adjourned.

The conference MC announced that they had invited the young writer Ghassan Kanafani.

A thin, handsome young man went to the podium to speak in a language that combined dream with reality in an ambiance that was more akin to a dream. He told us about "beautiful" poetry that he received from "the “other side" which had become mysterious Our press censors it because it is now part of the entity that was established over our ruins. Ghassan Kanafani told us that day that he would read the poems he “received” of several of the authors of the Galilee: Mahmoud Darwish, Tawfiq Zayyad, Samih al-Qasim, Fawzi al-Asmar, among others. He began reading:

“In our homeland they speak with sorrow

About a friend who departed and returned in a coffin.”

I later discovered that this brilliant surprise was part of Kanafani’s efforts to present Palestine’s Galilee poets to Arab readers through a book that represented the first and most beautiful portal to these poets, who were forgotten and denied from our books, our press, and our consciousness.

I had not read Ghassan’s stories until the defeat of the 1967 war. My only knowledge of his literature was through reading his more famous (and in my estimation his most important) novel Men in the Sun. It was presented as a serial by Sawt al-Arab, the most popular radio station in the 1960s. Men in the Sun was published when Ghassan was in his mid-20s. While it is true that his life was brief, it was also rich in the literature that he offered. A significant landmark of his literary, journalistic, and political journey was his preoccupation with the broader Palestinian national struggle and all of its demands; as was his persistence in penning short texts regularly. Ghassan’s friends remember his regular visits to Farouq Cafe in central Damascus. And Fadl al-Naqib recounts how he would frequently write and tear up the pages he wrote, aspiring always for something more beautiful and expressive.

Ghassan Kanafani’s tribulations surrounded him on all sides. First, being a refugee which was the greatest and most central tragedy. Then he was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes while still a child. Fadl Shururu recalls that Ghassan would inject himself with insulin from time to time and that he fainted during a conference in Cairo for the Arab Journalists’ Union in 1966. I will always fondly remember Ghassan’s story about his eagerness to hear the opinion of the late Dr. Ihsan Abbas about his story Men in the Sun when the doyen of critics marched rapidly as Ghassan lagged behind to hear his words.

Ghassan wrote the story of the Palestinians who were forced to flee their homelands the year of the nakba, while Emile Habibi wrote the story of those who remained in their country in The Pessoptimist. I once said this in an introduction to an interview I did with Habibi in 1987 for al- Hurriyyah magazine. The late Habibi called me to express his delight with this statement, adding that there was “the third” who elevated the literature of Palestine, referring to Jabra Ibrahim Jabra. Ghassan’s journey stretched from Damascus to Kuwait to Beirut as a writer, a journalist, and an editor of al-Huriyyah and Muhallaq Filastin in Lebanon, and later as founding editor of al-Hadaf. He was editor of al-Hadaf until the car explosion outside his home in Dayiat al-Huzaimiyyah near Beirut on the morning of July 8th 1972.

Between literature and politics

Ghassan Kanafani’s brief life (1936-1972) combined the production of novels, short stories and journalistic pieces with a commitment to direct political action, which has its infinite concerns that burden creativity and limit free expression. The martyred writer answered to this in an interview on a Scandinavian radio station in his final days. The interviewer asked him if he agreed with those who said that his characters’ consciousness surpassed his own. Ghassan responded: “In my political work I defend the organization to which I belong. But in my stories I give my characters the freedom to express their own positions without reservation.” Today when I return to his literary beginnings I can see Ghassan’s early consciousness of the interweaving of two important characteristics in his precise and painful representation of the lives of Palestinians after the nakba: the tragedy of the nakba itself as a central calamity, and the miserable fate of Palestinians as individuals and as a community. Perhaps this early realization influenced Ghassan’s later political and intellectual views as they reflected themselves in his literature, beginning with his first and most important novel Men in the Sun.

As others did before me, I linger at the delicate and sensitive image that he painted of the Palestinian leadership during the year of the nakba, represented in the character of the truck driver Abul Khaizaran who transports the three other protagonists in the water tank of his truck only to find that they died in the desert heat. This awareness would remain with Ghassan Kanafani, an intellect of middle class background.[1] It was also present with a painful eloquence and a captivating expressiveness in one of the most beautiful chapters of Umm Saad, which he wrote after the defeat of 1967 and the rise of volunteerism among Palestinian youth to join the Palestinian resistance movement. The chapter bears the striking title, “Every tent is not the same” and which I still consider to be one of the most beautiful examples of Palestinian prose. It would radiate thereafter in the work of the poet Mahmoud Darwish, particularly in the eloquent and beautiful book In the Presence of Absence. Ghassan was an avid reader and closely followed the works of emerging writers. He noticed the talent of the writer Mahmoud al-Rimawi, later to become one of the most prominent Palestinian writers; so he gave him control of the culture section of al-Hadaf. He then noticed the poems of Ahmad Dahbour so he wrote a column about him in the newspaper, which Dahbour later used on the cover of his third collection of poetry, The Pilot of Wihdaat. The Iraqi filmmaker Qasem Hawal, who long worked with Ghassan Kanafani in the cinema section of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s media office said that the writer came to him with a text by Dr. Edward Said, on which he scribbled "read and discuss.” Even as he knew that Ghassan was more than just a newspaper editor, that he was a laureate, he was still astonished by this gesture. How was it that he gave the cultural section's employees the responsibility to decide whether or not to publish a text by an intellectual of the stature of Said? Qasem Hawal would discover later that Kanafani's gesture was meant to convey that he respected the authority of the section editors and was dedicated to the institution of journalism.

Educated in the Frere school, Ghassan Kanafani came into life in the Diaspora with a fragile grasp on the Arabic language. Because of this, or maybe in spite of it, he toiled to improve his Arabic. He extracted the language’s most beautiful expressions and became one of its most captivating writers. He merged human tragedy with a popular folk sensitivity that understands the spirit of the marginalized, and he remained their loyal companion and has not departed for them despite the destruction of his body that bloody morning.

 

_____________________
[1] His father was a lawyer since the 1920s and sent Ghassan Kanafani to the Frere school in Jaffa .

[This article was written in Arabic and published in al-Hayat and Jadaliyya. It was translated into by Nehad Khader]

Interview With Kuwaiti Filmmakers

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[With a desert to one side and an ocean to another, living in Kuwait can offer very strange experiences. The skies are never blue, approaching a disconcerting beige, and the night bathes in the surrealistic orange glow of street lamps. The ministries and government buildings have the facades of Soviet prisons, and remind one of a Kafka novel when entered. There is that Lynchian feeling of madness hiding behind the wholesome exterior that many wear, and the social customs, especially of the confused youth, are baffling.

Meqdad Al-Kout and Mousaed ‘Moos’ Al-Khaled’s work marinates in this strangeness. Every frame is laden with the specific oddness of Kuwait, each character carrying a secret grotesquery, such as the sexually frustrated engineer of Moaz (Banana) the tribunal of mustachioed smokers at the beginning of Shanab (Moustache) or the depressed and aimless Bo 6illi. The young filmmakers have been extremely prolific, making over 12 short films between them since 2007, displaying a unique visual vocabulary inspired by European auteur attitudes. Their control of tone is a specifically developed skill of theirs, as seen in the assuredness of the short clip from the “shinou ya`ni” youtube series. The duo’s most recent work, a collaboration called Fulan, was shown at the Dubai film festival, and follows happily unproductive Kuwaiti man through his day-to-day.

In this short interview, we get to know what makes the two filmmakers tick, and why deciding to make films in Kuwait is such an interesting endeavor.]

Q: How hard is it for you to do film in Kuwait? What obstacles lie in your way? Considering these obstacles, what keeps you there when you could just as easily move to a place that is more conducive to the work that you do?

Meqdad: I would assume that making a film has its own difficulties and obstacles regardless of the place, but what makes Kuwait extra special is the fact that there is no film industry, no infrastructure, no film schools, and definitely no film culture or history (except for a few attempts by Khaled Al-Sideeq for example).

The only reason I don’t want to start listing the obstacles is because I don’t want to start whining. I believe if you really want to make a film, you will make it regardless of your situation.

The reason why I am still making films here is because the obstacles are interesting! I love making films and in Kuwait, the field is completely untapped. So the obstacles are also a very thrilling challenge and a muse to us.

Moos: I can’t say it’s especially hard or easy to make a film in Kuwait. It depends on the project itself. Some projects take days, some take months and some, well, are never made. The first obstacle that comes to mind is not having financial support in the form of art funds and the like. Making short films doesn’t cost much in Kuwait, but you need a small budget to be able to make a film with better quality using professional equipment and crew.  We also have a very strict/random censorship department that is the epitome of bureaucracy.  Cinema, amongst other arts, is quite neglected by the government and cultural institutions. We have an institution for music and one for theater, but none for cinema.

As for moving somewhere else to pursue acting and filmmaking, well it’s been on my mind for a couple of years now. But I have lived all my life in Kuwait, it’s the place that inspires me the most and it’s where I draw my material from. I’m not sure how am I going to function in the USA or Canada for example. Maybe I’ll never find out, or maybe I will find out and never come back home!

Q: You make a specific point to engage with the Kuwaiti dialect in your films, instead of the more widely spoken dialects, or classical Arabic, or even English. What does the Kuwaiti dialect add to your films? Does the engagement with a specific dialect of Arabic make your films harder to translate?

Meqdad: I try as much as possible to make films about what I know. I grew up in Kuwait and lived here my entire life, so it is only natural that I make films about the people of this country and their dialect with which I am very familiar.  I would say that the Kuwaiti dialect doesn’t add so much to the film as much as it depicts an honest realism and situations. Foreigners might find some things harder to translate, but film is a visual medium that portrays human stories and emotions which all of us share and relate to, no matter what part of the world you are from.

Moos: It gives the work it’s identity I guess. It comes from Kuwait and it’s about people who live here and Kuwaiti society. Sometimes it’s really hard to translate Kuwaiti to English because of the cultural differences. It’s how we mostly communicate here. It’s how we understand each other. Plus I think if you make a Kuwaiti film with Kuwaiti characters communicating in classical Arabic it’ll look really funny. Actually I might do that someday!

[Mousaed Al-Khaled. Photo from author]

Q: To what extent does autobiography factor into your films? What is your main source of inspiration?

Meqdad: I started out when I was young making films about things that happened to me in my life, but then quickly moved to being interested in other people’s stories. The last 3 films I made are inspired by real stories about people outside of my life. I have to say that the challenge of living in Kuwait is an inspiration on its own. For example, a stroll in one of our governmental buildings is enough material for 10 feature films and 2 TV shows, give or take.

Moos: A lot I would say. I draw a lot from my humble experience on this planet. From observing, interacting and reflecting. I get inspired by a lot of things. Mostly films, music and comedy (TV or standup.) I get inspired by hearing people share stories, and also by reading. As John Cleese put it once “I try to be as knowledgeable as I am before I die.”

Q: Your work does not have much of a precedent in Kuwait, and in the Gulf region at large, I would argue. What drove you to make the kinds of films you make? Do you consider an audience who would appreciate it when you are making it?

Meqdad: I guess whatever result comes out in those films is a collective of things I’ve seen or heard in Kuwait, plus the kind of films I like and certain authors. I don’t have a good answer to why am I making these kinds of films instead of doing something else. It could be celestial. I don’t have a specific type of audience in my mind when I make a film. I know eventually this film will be shown to different people from different places and different mentalities, so I try to focus on making it the way I feel it.

Moos: Everyone likes a certain genre or style of filmmaking because they personally connect with it somehow. You learn more from the directors you like and they influence your work because it’s how you get familiar with storytelling tools.

As for the audience, well, we do have them in mind while making the films because without an audience you’ve got nothing. We do hope they like it and we try to be as “clear” as we can.

Q: When I saw your work, and maybe it’s because I know Kuwait, I immediately saw the ‘Kuwaitiness’, whatever that means, of the work. However, your themes and aesthetics do not have a lineage in Kuwait.  Do you deal with accusations of being ‘Westernized’? How do you react to, and deal with these accusations?

Meqdad: I think it is mainly because generally in this region there is no history of visual aesthetics. Poetry and prose have been the dominant form of art since forever. So for us to start portraying our stories with visuals, we end up being influenced by Western artists and their techniques. I haven’t ever been accused of being westernized. I try as much as possible to be honest with showing the Kuwaiti culture as it is, regardless of the visual language that is used to show it.

Moos: True. Definitely westernized (or maybe globalized?) because there is no other alternatives to that when it comes to cinema in Kuwait. All the books on cinema for example come from the USA and Europe (translated to English.) And I try to watch as much films as I can from all over the world. I guess that’s what shapes the image of what cinema is to me. The tools are the same all over the world, but the subject matter here is Kuwaiti.

Q: There seems to be a burgeoning art-film ‘scene’ in Kuwait with similar concerns and approaches. Can you speak a bit about this community? What is your relationship to the elder statesmen of the Kuwaiti cultural scene, such as the writers and actors of the 70’s and 80’s?

Meqdad: Mousaed is one of the few people in Kuwait that share my approach about film, if not the only one. I find it really hard being in any community in Kuwait due to my lack of interest in communities in Kuwait. I do however try to get in touch with artists who share our concerns, namely Thuraya Al-Baqsami whose short story “Winged Sofa” inspired one of my short films. Khalid Al-Sideeq is the renowned Kuwaiti director  of “Bas Ya Bahar” with whom I still keep in touch.

Moos: We have a group that works together on several short films a year. Though we might differ a lot in approach, we share one goal. We rotate our positions according to what is needed in any project. I personally have acted, written, directed, was a production manager, edited and brought food to the set. And almost all the guys in our group have done the same.

As for writers and actors from previous generations, unfortunately we are not in contact with them. Most of them have either quit working or do a project every 3 or 4 years. One well-known Kuwaiti producer, who worked on Hollywood-related projects years ago, still thinks we are kids playing around. He came on Alwatan TV once and during his interview and said “Kuwaiti filmmakers should stop dreaming. There won’t be a cinema industry in Kuwait.”

Amal Dunqul: Spartacus' Last Words

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[Amal Dunqul (1940-1983) was part of what is known as the "sixties generation" of Egyptian poets and one of the most significant (political) poets of modern Arabic literature who remains largely untranslated. Dunqul was born in Upper Egypt, and like many writers, migrated to Cairo from the countryside. He wrote six collections of poetry, apart from dispersed poems which were collected in his Complete Works after he tragically died early due to complications of cancer. He was most well known for his political poems that drew upon ancient stories whether from pre-Islamic lore, or biblical legends from the old and new testaments to speak about the contemporary reality that he lived in. The most famous of these is La Tusalih [Do Not Make Peace] written just before the Camp David peace treaty, in intuitive anticipation of Sadat’s compromising settlement with Israel. 
Spartacus' Last Words, another of his most well-known poems, is from his first collection, al-Buka’ bayna yaday Zarqa’ al-Yamama [Weeping Before Zarqa’ al-Yamama (a legendary woman soothsayer in pre-Islamic Arabic lore)], published in 1969, although the poem was composed earlier around 1962. The poem is divided into four parts that Dunqul titles amzaj (sing. mazj) which are closest to "movements" in the musical sense of the word, giving us the sense of a carefully crafted symphony or operetta of which Spartacus is the narrator. The poet speaks in the voice of the Roman slave Spartacus, who led a failed rebellion against the Roman empire around 70 BC, as he is about to be hanged.
I would like to thank Sinan Antoon and Gaelle Raphael for their invaluable help to me in translating this intricate yet immensely rewarding poem
]

 

Spartacus’ Last Words

Amal Dunqul

 

First Movement

Glory to Satan, god of the winds

Who said no to the face of those who said “yes”

who taught Man to tear apart nothingness

He who said no, thus did not die

And remained a soul eternally in pain

 

Second Movement

I hang from the morning’s gallows

My forehead lowered by death

Because alive, I did not lower it!

 

O My brothers who are crossing the plaza

Heads hung in silence

Descending at evening’s end

Towards Alexander the Great Street:

Do not be ashamed…Raise your eyes to me

Because you are hanging alongside me

On Caesar’s gallows

So raise your eyes to me

Perhaps…if your eyes met with death in mine

The void inside me would smile…because just once,

you raised your head

Sisyphus no longer has the rock on his shoulders

Those born in the slaves’ quarters are carrying it

The sea, like the desert, does not quench thirst

For he who says “no” drinks his fill only of tears

So raise your eyes to the hung revolutionary

Tomorrow you will end up like him

 

Kiss your wives here,

In the middle of the open road

For tomorrow you will end up right here,

It is bitter to bow down

And the spider spins its web of death over men’s necks

 

Kiss your wives then…I left my wife without saying goodbye

Should you see my child, whom I left on my wife’s arms

Without an armTeach him to bow down

Teach him to bow down

God

Did not forgive Satan’s transgression

When he said no

 

The meek and good-natured

Shall inherit the earth

When all is said and done

They shall inherit the earth

Because they

Are not hung!

 

So teach him, then, to bow down

For there is no escape

Dream not of a happy world

For behind every dying Caesar

There is a new one

And behind every dying revolutionary

There are futile sorrows

and a tear in vain

 

Third Movement

O Great Caesar! I have indeed transgressed

I do admit it

Here on my gallows, let me kiss your hand

I kiss the rope

wrapped around my neck

For it is your hand, and your glory

Which compels us to worship you

Let me atone for my transgression

Let me grant you

After my death

My skull

Which you can mould into a cup for your strong wine

And if you do as I wish

Should they ever ask you

about my martyred blood

whether you granted me life just to snatch it away from me?

tell them  he was not resentful towards me when he died

and this cup

made from the bones of his skull

is my absolution

 

My killer!

I have pardoned you

The moment after you were relieved of me

I was relieved of you!

Still if you wish to hang everyone

take my advice:

have mercy on the trees!

Do not cut their trunks

and erect them as gallows

perhaps the spring may come

this year of hunger

you will not smell the fragrance of fruit

on branches

Perhaps the dangerous summer

may pass through our land

You will cross the desert

In search of shades

You will see only the searing afternoon heat and sands

and the fiery thirst between your ribs

O Lord of white tombstones in the twilight

O Caesar of frost!

 

Fourth Movement

My brothers who cross through the square

Bowed down

Descending at evening’s end

Dream not of a happy world

For behind every dying Caesar

There is a new one

And if on the way

you see Hannibal

tell him that I waited for him

at Rome’s rundown gates

While - beneath the Victory Arch

Rome’s patricians awaited

the conqueror of heroes

and the women of Rome

between the gaudy decorations

stayed awaiting the arrival

of the Atlas-headed soldiers crinkled hair

But Hannibal’s soldiers never came

Tell him, then -

I waited for him…

But he did not come!

I waited for him

until I ended up in death’s noose

 

And in the distance

Carthage is in flames

Carthage was the sun’s conscience

and has learned what it means to kneel

the spider is on top of men’s necks

and words are choking

 

My brothers: Carthage the Virgin is in flames

Kiss your wives then…I left my wife without saying goodbye

And should you see my child, whom I left on my wife’s arms

Without an arm

Teach him to bow down

Teach him to bow down

Teach him to bow down

* * *

[Translated from the Arabic by Suneela Mubayi

Tunisian Constitution: Text and Context

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On Wednesday, 8 August, al-Chourouq newspaper published an advance copy of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly’s newly released draft constitution to the public and to the Board for Constitutional Coordination, Composition, and Amendment. The completion of this draft, which will replace the former Tunisian constitution originally written in 1959, is a landmark in Tunisia’s post-Ben Ali political landscape, although the extensive political maneuvering over many of the proposed Constitution’s contents have contributed to a growing sense of dissatisfaction with the Constituent Assembly’s performance and toward government, in general. The draft constitution is expected to undergo debate in the Constituent Assembly during a general session and then passed on for ratification in February 2013, with wider elections envisioned for June 2013. This article explains some of the social and historical currents that have informed the writing of the constitution, along with providing an English translation of the text.

The issuing of this draft marks six months since the National Constituent Assembly began working on the constitution on 13 February 2012. Since then, government actions have often run afoul of public confidence. One long-standing Nawaat poll finds that 70 percent of participants describe the performance of the interim government as “mediocre” or “disappointing.” This fits with the overall outlook Tunisians have of the country, as reflected in recent Pew polling, wherein 78 percent of Tunisians “are dissatisfied with the direction of their country” and 83 percent “say current economic conditions are bad.” Public confidence has further eroded following the government’s decision to extradite former Libyan PM al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmoudi and its controversial removal of Mustafa Kamel Nabli as governor of the Tunisian Central Bank. Popular disenchantment has manifested in the wake of government ineffectiveness in ensuring the availability of basic foodstuffs for Ramadan, as mounting inflation - and perhaps some degree of profiteering - have driven up costs and led to wide-scale protests in the country’s more economically depressed regions, including the symbolic Sidi Bouzid.

However, individual political luminaries enjoy redoubtable approval ratings well above 50 percent, including major figures such as head of the Ennahda Party, Rached al-Ghannouchi, President of the Government and Ghannouchi acolyte Hamadi Jebali, and President of the Constituent Assembly Moustapha ben Jafar. Only Ennahda - frequently, and erroneously, described as the “ruling” party in Tunisia - enjoys a favorability rating of above 50 percent; the other two members of the beleaguered ruling “Troika” - the Congress Party for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol - lag behind at 48 percent and 44 percent, respectively, with others back further still. The discrepancy between public opinion of national and, by extension, governmental performance post-Ben Ali and that of individual personalities and parties has yet to be explained. Public support of Ennahda’s extensive ranks has remained strong while public confidence in the government, as expressed across the political spectrum, has dwindled precipitously. Widespread distrust between liberals, Islamists, and remaining Ben Ali supporters - established long before the election of the Constituent Assembly - has manifested itself along various social fault-lines, which, in turn, were addressed during the National Constituent Assembly’s writing of the draft constitution. The most serious of these issues remain the role of Islam in public life and women’s rights.

Islam in Public Life

Fear of the intrusion of Islamist social and political influence was a prime factor in Ben Ali’s transition from well-liked reformer to hard-handed autocrat during the 1990s. Since he was ousted, conservative Islamists or those acting under that name have distinguished themselves as powerful actors on the social scene, frequently employing violent censure of artistic expression. During a film festival to “support of Tunisians who have been assaulted, threatened, and denounced by persons who consider their artistic creations offensive to Islam” in June 2011, attendees of the controversial film Ni Allah Ni Maître, directed by Nadia al-Fani and originally titled Laïcite, in cha Allah (“Secularism, God Willing”), were attacked with teargas and physical violence by protestors carrying banners of Hizb al-Tahrir, a prominent pan-national Salafist organization. In October of that year, the most polarizing case of establishing the boundaries between empowering creative expression and establishing protected religious boundaries occurred when Nessma TV broadcasted the Franco-Iranian animated film Persepolis, in which God is portrayed figuratively. The film, which Nessma TV dubbed into the Tunisian Arabic dialect, aroused large scale anger from conservative circles and the station’s headquarters near downtown Tunis was attacked by hundreds of protestors. The owner of the station, Nabil Karaoui, was initially brought to court, along with several associates. He was charged with blasphemy, but was convicted early in 2012 with a reduced charge of “spreading information that can disturb the public order” and fined 2400 Tunisian dinars (DT) (1500 USD). The case gained international attention and Islamist groups used it as a rallying cry as far afield as Iraq, who claimed that the film’s dissemination was “planned to provoke the feelings of Muslims and mar the name of Islam”. This June, an installation of “Printemps d’Art” exposition in the suburb of La Marsa, which displayed works depicting confrontational attitudes towards religious conservatism, was also subject to attacks. Pictures of the installation surfaced on Facebook, (mis)identifying some of the artists. The photographer and instigator of the attacks, Mohammad-Ali Bouaziz, was later tried and sentenced to two months in prison or a 1000 DT fine (617 USD) for inciting the confrontations, in which one person was killed and a police station was burned and looted. A similar event, though unmotivated by any particular art exhibition, occurred in Sousse, the country’s third-largest city, a few days thereafter.

The inability of police and security forces to defend themselves and respond to spontaneous situations like the one in La Marsa contrasts markedly with their response to more coordinated protest efforts, such as the those that occurred on Martyr’s Day in April. Government response to the La Marsa attacks was tepid, with the Ministry of the Interior offering condemnations for “all attacks against that which is sacred, which is the case for some of the works on exhibition.” The liberal parties of the Troika - the aforementioned CPR and Ettakatol - maintained a low profile while Ennahda went on the offensive against the art installment. Claims that religiously motivated individuals did not carry out the attacks but, rather, merely “thugs” cannot be discounted. Ghannouchi’s call for protests denouncing the La Marsa art exposition later that same week clearly drew many Muslims who support Ennahda but not necessarily violence into a position which supports the logic of legitimizing violent attacks in response to the state’s failure to protect the “sacred.”

The importance of “provocation” within this logic, as identified by Tunisia commentator Eric Churchill who writes under the name Kefteji, is undoubtedly a main ingredient for section 1.4 of the draft constitution’s preamble, which states:

The state shall be a defender of religion, tasked with the custody of freedom of conscience, the practice of religious creed, protection of the sacred, and guaranteeing impartiality for the role of worship in circulating speech.

This wording leaves space for religious expression under explicit government protection while simultaneously providing cause for restraining speech deemed as violating the protection afforded to the sacred. One example of such robust freedom permitted to the sacred would be Ghannouchi’s recent claim that those who oppose Ennahda are “enemies of Islam.” President of the Republic Moncef al-Marzouki, a renowned human rights defender during the Ben Ali era, has previously urged government leaders to end such instances of takfīr, or accusations attacking individuals’ personal religious positions. Whether speech such as takfīr constitutes “worship” will surely be a question for courts to decide, but it is clear that state-structured “impartiality” toward particular modes of worship and their discourse is dubious. Likewise, the legal proceedings against Nessma TV executive Karaoui, the supposedly “blasphemous” content of his network’s broadcast of Persepolis, the comparatively weak prosecution of both Mohammed-Ali Bouaziz, and those who attacked the screening of Ni Allah ni Maître because of the “provocative” nature of the offending artworks show a pronounced tentativeness toward guaranteeing speech without prior restraint, as provided for by section 2.26 of the draft constitution. “The practice of Prior Restraint over these Freedoms shall not be allowed in any form.”

Ennahda has recently advanced the formal criminalization of “insulting or mocking the sacredness of religion” in the National Constituent Assembly. Punishments include a prison sentence of two years or a two thousand DT (1236 USD) fine, slightly less than the sentence handed down to Karaoui. Examples of the sacred under the law include “God, His prophets, sacred books, the sunna [example] of his final prophet Muhammad, the Kaʿba, mosques, churches, and synagogues.” Prior to both the advancement of this law and the completion of the draft constitution, a sentence was handed down in a case involving the “mocking” of the Prophet Muhammad in the case of Jabeur Mejri. The advancement of this law, especially in the wake of the Mejri case, clearly shows both the societal and legal tension over the place of religion in the Tunisian public sphere and the extent to which one may voice their opinion of sacred “objects”. While the state is tasked with defending religion and the sacred, such strict definition of their constituent parts may infringe upon constitutional rights to unimpeded freedom of expression.

In the political realm, Islamist involvement in government draws on strong support from a variety of ideological standpoints. Ennahda is repeatedly invoked as the face of “moderate political Islam” in the American and British media but party members have at times taken to championing more immoderate policies. The Ennahda leadership - which has been subjecte to extended time in prison and, in Ghannouchi’s case, exile - has stressed the importance of “national reconciliation,” though only after various hardline party talking points flopped. Those talking points included: Ennahda spokeswoman Souad Ibrahim’s contention that single mothers are a “disgrace” to the country, a failed attempt to establish a Saudi-style Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, and an infamous ad-lib delivered by Jebali about the implementation of a “Sixth Caliphate.”

Outside Ennahda’s purview, Salafi-influenced groups have become particularly active. Although their numbers are estimated to be around ten thousand in a country of more than ten million, reports of their extra-legal activity have become very prominent. The most shocking of these reports was the case of the 2011 establishment of a so-called “caliphate” of Sejnane, a sleepy town in the country’s politically and economically marginalized northwest. The movement to implement shariʿa within the town was led by Hichem Merchegui, an al-Qaeda linked interloper who had been sentenced to a 104 year prison term under Ben Ali’s strident anti-Islamist measures and released under the general amnesty announced after the latter’s ouster. The revelation of conditions in Sejnane were startling, and Tunisia’s liberals coined the phrase “Sejnanistan” to refer to particular areas where attempts to impose conservative Islamic interpretations of dress and comportment are especially strong. While this appropriation reflects current events, it also raises questions about Tunisia’s social and economic classes, reinforcing the biases of those from coastal regions toward the interior, who are seen as less educated and socially polished. The northern regions, especially the governorate of Jendouba, are home to large amounts of Salafi activity, some of which includes violent attacks on bars and, worryingly, weapons caches. But some activity has also been charitable in the wake of heavy snows that blanketed the region during the 2011 winter.

Not all Salafi groups have attempted to circumvent legal channels, and some have actively embraced the opportunity to advance their goals through legislation. Various conservative religious groups have rallied in large numbers in major municipal centers to express their support for the increased Islamization of the state throughout Tunisia by means of implementing sharīʿa. In a large rally in May in the historic city of Kairouan, the first Arab-founded city in what is now Tunisia and the country’s fifth largest city by population, members of the group Anṣār al-Sharīʿa and its leader Seif Allah Ben Hassine, better known as Abu Yiadh, convened their second congress to “advocate for the application of God’s sharīʿa in [their] country.” The choice of Kairouan is particularly significant given the city’s religious standing and its historical opposition to state-imposed secularism. The town famously refused to inaugurate a Habib Bourguiba Avenue long after it had become de rigeur in Tunisia to do so because of the aggressively secular president’s antagonism toward Islamists, including his political opponent Saleh Ben Youssef. Abu Yiadh’s commitment to working within legal frameworks has since weakened, as evidenced by his calling for a jihad against the Tunisian government.  Major rallies calling for the implementation of sharīʿa have also been held in the capital outside the National Constituent Assembly’s chambers and in Sfax, Tunisia’s second largest city, although the explicitness of Salafist demonstrators’ calls for implementing sharīʿa is unusually vague in reports from other cities. In late March, a conference was convened in which Islamic scholars from the Tunisian Board for Sharīʿa Sciences called for the Constituent Assembly to approve of sharīʿa as “a primary source” of legislation, but stopped short of calling for it to be the “sole source”. In fact, the most famous example of an Islamist calling for implementation of sharīʿa in Tunisia came not from a Tunisian, but from the Egyptian Ayman al- Zawahari, head of al-Qāʿida.

Attempts to implement sharīʿa through the constitution in sweeping terms, then, enjoyed little explicit public support amongst Tunisians, despite outsized media coverage. Within the framework of writing the constitution, the Salafi-influenced Reform Front - Tunisia’s only Salafist political party - was the sole legislative voice pushing to designate sharīʿa as “the sole source of legislation.” Much of the conversation was built upon the first article of the 1959 constitution, wherein it was stated “Islam is the Religion of State,” but kept silent on the role of sharīʿa in drafting legislation. These circumstances are analogous to the case in Egypt, where the Salafi Nour Party pushed for a wording that made sharīʿa, and not just its principles, but the ultimate measure in drafting legislation. The push to more narrowly define state legislative processes through the implementation of sharīʿa is fraught with difficulty, due especially to the variegated nature of sharīʿa itself. Consensus even amongst religious conservatives in the National Constituent Assembly proved elusive. Ennahda eventually declined to pursue the desired wording, leaving section 1.1 largely unchanged from its 1959 composition and potentially causing a rift between Ennahda and more conservative political actors. The text in the proposed article 1.1 of draft constitution is as follows: "Tunisia is a free state, independent, possessing sovereignty. Islam is its religion, Arabic its language, and the republic its system of government."

The explicit mention of shariʿa in article 1.1 is absent, however, numerous references to the Muslim and Arab loyalties of Tunisia, as favored by conservative groups, were inserted into the Preamble of the Draft Constitution:

Based upon the essentials of its Arabic-Muslim Identity...
Affirming our cultural and civilizational belonging to the community of muslims...
Standing victorious [...] for liberation and justice Movements - at their head, the Palestinian Liberation Movement.

According to section 9.3, these characterizations are not subject to constitutional amendment: "It shall not be possible through constitutional amendment to deviate from Islam in considering it the religion of state."

The characterization of the Tunisian state in such stark terms has angered some in Amazigh circles for the exclusivity granted to the Arabic character of the country. A case could be made that such a characterization conflicts with the text of proposed article 1.32: "The state shall guarantee cultural rights to every citizen."

Women’s Status

Scholars Jane Tchaïcha and Khedija Arfaoui have given a comprehensive treatment of the history of women’s rights in Tunisia, dating back to the Roman era. Tunisia has long been hailed as a relative bastion of women’s rights in the Arab World, mainly due to the implementation of the personal status code by President Habib Bourguiba in 1957.

The personal status code, according to the translation by George Sfeir:

...applies to Muslim Tunisians only, the personal status of Christians being regulated by French law, while Jewish citizens of Tunisia have their own code [...] Polygamy is abolished; divorces may only take place in courts and full consent of both parties is a pre-requisite to marriage. On the other hand, the Islamic law of inheritance is preserved.

For the secular state, such policies were seen as a priority and resulted in the rapid development of society and opportunity. From Tchaïcha and Arfaoui:

From 1956 to the mid 1970s, Tunisian girls and women increasingly took advantage of their new role (Arfaoui 2007). They pursued their education and they entered the workforce in record numbers, birth rates declined and a growing middle class emerged. If hardly less than 5% of children were enrolled in primary school in 1956, by 2003, this figure increased to 98% for both boys and girls; moreover, adult education rose from 16% in 1960 to 74% in 2004. Presently, the number of female students exceeds that of male students in higher education, representing 59% of total tertiary education enrolment in Tunisia in 2008. (p. 218)

Fears that not enough had been done to promote the preservation of women’s gains in the wake of Ben Ali’s ousting quickly attached themselves to the specter of Islamist attempts to defeat the personal status code. One Gallup poll, “After the Arab Uprisings: Women on Rights, Religion, and Rebuilding,” ominously declared, “the rise of Islamist political parties in Tunisia and Egypt has many secular Arab women’s rights activists and Western observers worried that the change women helped ignite has betrayed them.” In Tunisia, though, women remained on the forefront of fighting for rights to religious expression. Official prohibitions on women wearing Islamic clothing such as the niqāb in universities implemented in 1981 under decree 108  - which Ben Ali tried to extend in 2006 to include most forms of veiling - were challenged by groups of young female students demanding the right to veil early in 2012. At the University of Manouba, the intransigence of the dispute closed down the university for more than a month. Tchaïcha and Arfaoui rightly point out the multiplicity of feminism in Tunisia after the fall of Ben Ali. They discuss the role of “Islamist feminism” in shaping a new discourse about what feminism actually means in its Tunisian context, quoting one interview subject as saying, “[Traditional f]eminism has been associated with the foreign, with the western thought, with a certain attitude about women, and it is not welcomed” (224). A dichotomy had developed wherein the bulwark of secular feminism in Tunisia began to lose ground to a type of feminism - often espoused by men and women alike - emphasizing religious freedoms and rights.

Even as doubts about the efficacy of secular models of feminism arose, government attempts to ensure women’s access to public life remained visible. The transitional Tunisian government passed a law in May 2011 mandating that party voting lists alternate between women and men, effectively guaranteeing women half the ticket. Four thousand women declared for candidacy and won approximately one-quarter of the seats in the National Constituent Assembly with Meherzia Laâbidi - an Ennahda candidate perhaps most famous for her salary - installed as its Vice-President. Other women have maintained prominent roles within the government or party structures, as well, including: Nadia Chaabane, head of the Pole party and a passionate feminist in the secular model; Mabrouka M’Barek, head of the Congress for the Republic list and member of the Constitutional Committee; Lobna Jribi, deputy in Ettakatol and staunch proponent of the Open Government initiative. They all represent the secular Tunisian feminist model. According to this Nawaat infographic, women hold three of the 42 positions available within the governmental structure of ministries, with CPR deputy Sihem Badi running the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Ennahda member, Mamia Elbanna, heading the Ministry of the Environment.

Within this political sphere, Islamists began to circulate new models for a woman’s access to religious symbols and her role within society. The most debated of these models was the proposed article 27, which characterized women as “man’s associate” and emphasized her “complementarity” (takāmul) with man. Reaction from secular feminists and the Western press was swift and damning, as it has since been in more liberal circles of the Arab world. Salma Hajri, of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women as quoted in a TunisiaLive piece, said, “I am distraught and worried. Women are not given rights as individuals, only in reference to men.” The public debate spurred massive demonstrations throughout the country on 13 August, Tunisian “Women’s Day,” to support women’s equality with men - a subject that still divides much of Tunisian society.

Are Tunisian women at risk of losing their rights, or of having their rights made contingent to those of men? Is the wording of the proposed article 1.27 in fact a step back from previous iterations of women’s rights statutes in Tunisia? Article 23 of the original personal status code from 1957, taken again from Sfeir’s translation reads:

The husband shall treat his wife with benevolence, live with her on good terms, refrain from causing her harm and, in all those matters envisaged by true maintenance, support her and his children from her in accordance with his circumstances and hers. The wife shall, if she possess any property, contribute to the support of the family. She shall respect her husband in his capacity as head of the family, and, within these prerogatives, obey him in whatever he orders her, and perform her marital duties in conformity with usage and custom.

This wording stood until a 1993 amendment of this article to the following:

"It is incumbent upon each one of the spouses to treat the other with kindness and improve his or her wellbeing (ʿashira), and avoid inflicting harm upon him or her. The two spouses shall undertake married responsibilities according to what custom (al-ʿurf) and common practice (al-ʿāda) require, and help improve  the family’s affairs (shuʾūn). They shall raise children and provide for them (taṣrīf shuʾūnihim), including: education, travel, and financial transactions. It is incumbent upon the husband, in his capacity as the head (raʾīs) of the family, to provide for his wife and children to the extent that his conditions and theirs allow within the scope of the content of payments. It is incumbent upon the wife to contribute to the family’s  expenditures if she has means (māl)."

The wording of the proposed article 1.27 in the new draft constitution reads:

The state shall guarantee the protection of women’s rights and support for their gains, in considering her a true partner with man in building the nation; the role of these two is complimentary within the family. The state shall guarantee the parity (takāfuʾ) of opportunity between the woman and the man while accepting different responsibilities. The state shall guarantee prosecution of every form of violence against women.

The content of these statutes does not differ significantly. They all ascribe a type of “complementarity” between men and women within the space of the family, with both forms of the personal status code making women explicitly subservient to the man, who is “head of the household.” Only the proposed article 1.27 explicitly assigns women a role in building the nation based on “parity.” Perhaps the most objectionable wording of the proposed article 27 is its emphasis on accepting “different responsibilities,” but this does not depart noticeably from the personal status code in classifying a woman’s responsibilities. In each case, these responsibilities are vaguely defined through “custom,” and are specifically tied to her responsibility to contribute funds to familial expenditures, if she is capable. The draft constitution more fully defines the state’s relationship with the family in article 1.21:

The state guarantees the family’s rights the by recognizing them as potentialized, natural, and fundamental for society.The state shall work toward protecting the family, its stability, and allowing it to perform Its role in safeguarding equality between the spouses. The state shall seek to ease the appropriate conditions for marriage; to guarantee a suitable home for every family; and to provide a minimum wage sufficient to support the dignity of its members.

In this article, the government explicitly uses the word “equality” (musāwāh) to define the role of spouses. Additional guarantees to equality are provided for all citizens in article 1.22: "All citizens are equal in rights and responsibilities, and they are equal under the law." This wording is echoed in article 2.22: "Citizens are equal in the rights and responsibilities under the law, without discrimination (tamyīz) in any form."

Given this application of “equality” in other articles of the draft constitution, it is strange that article 28 received approval - nine of twelve votes, with eight of those votes coming from Ennahda members - in using the word “complementarity.” The word is used another time in the Preamble of the draft constitution:

Working toward the establishment of Maghrebian Unity as a step toward the realization of Arab Unity, and toward a complementarity with Islamic Peoples and African Peoples, and cooperation with the People of the world [...]

Juxtaposing familial relations to state level commitments because of the word “complementarity” is surely as academic an exercise as one could imagine, but the choice of words here does not seem indicative of any attempt to weaken the sphere of Tunisia’s sovereignty or its assertion of rights in bilateral and international interactions. It may be, rather, that secular feminists overstate their case by claiming that the proposed article 28 is a step backwards for women’s equality efforts in comparison with the personal status code. Even with the semantic vagaries of proposed article 28, the additional references to equality within the draft constitution should provide ample room to appeal for women’s access to rights and equality under in Tunisia. This is not to say that Tunisian women should cease to defend their rights and freedoms against infringement, but rather, steps should be taken to highlight areas of the constitution that do assert their equality under the law and perhaps pursue bringing the proposed article 28 in line with these sentiments. Efforts could be made, for example, to publicize motions to strip Olympic silver medalist Habiba Ghribi of her citizenship for running in immodest shorts. This is a potential constitutional violation that specifically targets women’s equality in access to athletic activities as set forth in article 1.33: "The state shall seeks to offer the necessary opportunities to practice athletic and physical activities and to offer means for improvement of living and leisure." Similarly, this call violates article 1.6 in its attempt to strip natural-born Tunisians of their citizenship:

The state guarantees to its citizens individual and general freedoms, and presents to them means for a noble Llving. Attempts to strip nationality from them, surrendering them to international authorities, exiling them, or preventing them from returning to their homeland are expressly forbidden.

By acting swiftly to support Habib Ghriba, public officials would be making a strong statement affirming women’s right to make personal choices about clothing and livelihood, and promoting the ways in which the draft constitution protects all Tunisians under the law in equal measure.

Other areas of the draft constitution might also profit from further revision from the Coordination Committee. One of the difficulties in translating Arabic is its use of masculine forms to refer to abstractly referenced individuals or to groups, and several proposed articles leave room for interpretations that do not in and of themselves provide for equality of men and women. Particularly problematic is the use of the words “citizen” (muwāṭin, pl. muwāṭinīn) and “Tunisian” (tūnisī):

Article 1.12

It is incumbent upon citizens maintain the unity of the nation and the defense of its inviolability, abide by its laws, and pay taxes.

Article 1.13

National service is incumbent upon citizens according to the structures and conditions regulated by law.

Article 1.14

A livelihood is a right of every citizen, and the state shall make every effort to guarantee It through appropriate and just circumstances.

Article 1.24

Compulsory national service is incumbent upon every citizen according to the patterns and forms which the law defines.

The word “Tunisian” (tūnisī) also becomes legally problematic when applied to standing as a candidate for President, presented in section 4.46 of the draft constitution.

Article 4.46 (First Opinion)

It shall be stipulated for the male or female candidate (mutarashshiḥ wa mutarashshiḥa) standing for the presidency of the Republic to: be a  voter; not carry a second nationality; be a Muslim born to a Tunisian mother and father; be at least forty (40) years of age.

Article 4.46 (Second Opinion)

Candidacy for the position of the President of the Republic is a right of every man or woman who is Tunisian by birth and whose religion is Islam.

Article 4.46 (Third Opinion)

Candidacy for the position of the President of the Republic is a right of every Tunisian.

Article 4.46 (Fourth Opinion)

Candidacy for the position of the President of the Republic is a right of every citizen carrying Tunisian nationality to the exclusion of all others.

Article 4.46 (Fifth Opinion)

Candidacy for the position of President of the Republic is a right of every Tunisian Muslim born to a Tunisian father, mother, and paternal and maternal grandfathers, to the exclusion of any break in lineage.

Certainly, some of the vagaries will be resolved in later legislation, especially those relating to national service in the armed forces and police in proposed articles 1.13 and 1.24. However, including the feminine muwāṭina in proposed articles 1.12 and 1.14 and tūnisiya as rendered in the first two opinions of proposed article 4.46 would go a long way toward shoring up guarantees of explicit equality between men and women.

Many obstacles besides these stand between the National Constituent Assembly and the completion of a constitution which takes into account secular, religious, and gender concerns. There has been much furor over the proposed Independent Press Authority as provided for by the draft constitution, and continued barriers to press freedom remain entrenched. Despite gains made by journalists after a truly abysmal press climate under Ben Ali, Tunisia still ranked only 134th in the world in press freedom in 2011, according to Reporters Without Borders, and attacks on reporters and activists because of their political views continue. The implementation of a new judiciary, also provided with an independent oversight body by the draft constitution, will test a system which renowned Tunisian jurist Yadh Ben Achour describes as long subject to the political whims of the Tunisian government under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Long hours await the Coordination Committee in the next months and Tunisians will anxiously hang on every change to a draft constitution that attempts to break free of the limitations imposed by previous regimes and, simultaneously, sets the paradigm for writing governing documents in Libya, Egypt, and other states currently in transition in the MENA region.

Maghreb Media Roundup (August 23)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Wednesday night of every week.]

Algeria

Détérioration du pouvoir d’achat des Algériens Hamid Ball discusses the long term implications of inflation, particularly on the purchasing power of Algerians.

Algeria, a country of non-governance Zoubir Zerarga laments Algeria's "non-governance" throughout every significant crises since the revolution.   

Les Incendies En Kabylie Sont Le Fait Du Pouvoir Algerien The president of the Provisional Government of Kabyila alleges that fires in the Kabylia, which have occurred in sync almost every year since 2004, are acts of arson committed by the Algerian military.

L’Algérie, l’exception au printemps arabe? Dr. Abderrahmane Metboul assesses Algeria's recent 'reforms.'


Libya

Hotel Libya: Journalist Relives The Horror Story An anonymous correspondent who was amongst the journalists infamously trapped in Tripoli's Rixos hotel during the revolution reflects on her petrifying experience.

Another advice for the new Libya: Liberate yourself from the curse of oil Hamal Khashoggi suggests that Libya uses its "second chance for development" to avoid the oil curse identified in Farouk al-Qassims 1971 white paper.  

Libya's Minority Berbers Renew Equality Demands Interview with Said Henshir, a founding member of the Libyan Amazigh Youth Assembly.


Mauritania

Mauritania's Date Palms, Cultural Heritage and Means of Survival Mohamed Abderrahmane discusses the effect of drought on one of mauritania's most valued resources as well as measures attempted to sustain date palms viability.

Mauritania: Landslides Leave Residents Homeless Ahmed Jadu examines the destructive ramifications of Mauritania's first heavy rainfall in two years.

#Mauritania: An African Slave-State with International Support Anita Hunt discusses the history of slavery in Mauritania and the contemporary context of its preservation.


Morocco

Morocco: Is the ‘Allegiance Ceremony' a Thing of the Past? Hisham Almiraat discusses opposing views of the annual bay'a or loyalty ceremony.

Le pilote Benkirane est-il dans l'avion ? Face à la crise, le gouvernement navigue à vue Narhis Rerhaye argues that after eight months of political and economic stasis, Moroccans have lost confidence in Benkirane's government.

Mamfakinch Counter Corner: A Response to the Daily Caller Samia Errazzouki challenges the facile assumptions of democratization, identity, and social structures that underpin the Daily Caller's feature of Meriem Bensalah, an elite Moroccan business-woman.

Ou Va Le Maroc Chawqui Lotfi broadly outlines Morocco's contemporary political, economic, and social circumstances, with particular emphasis on the current and potential impact of M20F on these realities.


Tunisia

Tunisian Former Political Prisoners Seek Asylum in Algeria Families of victims tortured under Ben Ali's regime demand compensation.

"Complementary" status for Tunisian women Monica Marks diverges from mainstream analysis of the controversial constitutional amendment, arguing that serious mistranslations have misconstrued its phrasing as an overt rejection of gender equality rather than as (potentially deliberate) ambiguity that could be wielded to stifle women's rights in the future.

Arabic Graffiti on Tunisia’s tallest minaret Tunisian artist El Seed paints a minaret with Quranic calligraphy to demonstrate the coherence of artistic expression and religiosity following recent scuffles between artists, and Salafists, and authorities.

Tunisie: Coup d'Etat à la tête de Dar Assabah Tunisian journalists protest the selection of an ex-police commissioner (and former editor of The Daily) as head of the Dar Assabah media group.

Femmes tunisiennes, maîtresses de leurs corps et de leurs destins Soraya Hajjaji challenges the Western/Islamist dichotomy imposed on Tunisian women. 


Arabic

#موريتانيا‏ في مونغل: مظاهرة احتجاجية على أزمة الماء وتهديد بإعتصام مفتوح
Protestors in Mauritania once again call attention to the government's incapacity to manage water resources.

  الخصوم السياسيين في موريتانيا يناقشون وضع الوطن
Mauritania's ruling and opposition party members offer diverse opinions as to the state of the nation's political crises.  

عبيد أحمد الرقيق : قرارات جريئة دحرجها الانتقالي فهل يصدرها المؤتمرالوطني العام؟!

Obaid Ahmed al-Rageeg pinpoints six issues Libya's GNC must immediately resolve to establish legitimacy and stability.
 

Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb

Tunisian Constitution: Text and Context
Divesting from All Occupations
Abdelilah Benkirane : du chef de gouvernement au simple petit fonctionnaire du Makhzen
The Emergence of Salafism in Tunisia


Syria Media Roundup (August 23)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week] 

 

International and Regional Perspectives

 

Assad’s Kurdish Strategy Joshua Landis on why the Syrian regime wants “to help the PKK to take control of the Kurdish regions of Syria in the North East”

 

Nuri al-Maliki’s Strategy toward Syria and Syrian Kurds Joshua Landis on why Iraq may follow the Syrian regime’s strategy for Syrian Kurdish areas at the risk of angering the leadership of the Iraqi Kurdistan.
 

Syria and Us (Part I) Ibrahim al-Amin on the origins of the uprising and its developments both at the domestic and regional levels

Syria and Us (Part II) Ibrahim al-Amin says Palestinians seem to become “increasingly embroiled in domestic quarrels which ultimately have a confessional or sectarian basis.”

Syria's Sectarian Echoes in Turkey Giorgio Cafiero says “Turkey’s Alawite and Alevi communities across the border have legitimate concerns about the regime’s demise.”

 

Hezbollah Stubborn on Syria Majalla interviews a former Hezbollah fighter who discusses the organization’s stance towards Syria.

 

Lebanon's Growing Syria Crisis Sulome Anderson on the Meqdads, their activities and their connection to Hezbollah.


Mokdad Clan: The Syrian Vendetta
Radwan Mortada on the Mokdad clan’s plot to kidnap Syrians in Lebanon.

Syrians in Lebanon: Bearing the Brunt “Syrians have been subjected to beatings, kidnapping, and killing.”

Leaving Syria: Lebanese Students Need Answers

Can Lebanon resist the sectarian narrative being foisted on Syria? Shane Farrell says although “Lebanon has the potential to explode into a sectarian bloodbath fuelled by developments in Syria, there are many reasons to be hopeful that this will not be the case.”

 

Syrian Narratives

 

The Age of the New Takfiris Ibrahim al-Amin on the absence of a “rational debate” on Syria                             

                

72 Hours with Father Paolo of Syria The Italian priest who lived in Syria for 30 years discusses the direction of the Syria uprising.    
                                                                                            

Kidnapping Festival in Lebanon and Syria As’ad AbuKhalil says the kidnappings of “innocent Syrian workers in Lebanon” reminds him of “the beginning of the sectarian civil war.”

 

Can non-violent resistance and armed rebellion co-exist? Ahmed Souaiaia argues that “the first and most important casualty of the militarization of the Syrian uprising is the non-violent movement.”

 

Fallen analogies Mona Chalabi says the idea of “falling” presidents robs Arabs of agency in the revolutions and stresses “the need for a revolutionised form of pan-Arabism built on a new sense of empowerment is more urgent than ever.”

 

The High Price of Hesitation Christopher Reuter says “trying to manage the transition without overthrowing the regime will not work.”

 

Si Assad tombe, pourra-t-il créer son Etat alaouite ? Marie Kostrz gives five reasons why the creation of an Alawite state is an unlikely scenario.

 

Imperialism and the Left

 

State Department leads interagency team to talk Syria in Turkey On the United States’ attempt to improve the coordination of “non-lethal aid” for Syria.

 

Syrian Australians Demand an End to Foreign Intervention Chris Ray says “only the terminally naïve would recommend the Syrian people risk a repeat of the Libyan triumph.”

 

Turning back the clock on the Arab Spring  Ahmad Barqawi says the legitimate demands of Syrians for democracy were transformed forever by “sectarian drive that the Syrian opposition itself worked so hard to foster among its own supporters.”

 

Realpolitik blurs US red line on Syria Pepe Escobar says the conversation about weapons of mass destruction in Syria is not used as a pretext for an invasion and occupation, but as “a pretext for whatever euphemism the Obama administration comes up with to define ‘kinetic military activity’.”

 

Inside Syria

 

'Rebel army? They're a gang of foreigners' Robert Fisk meets with soldiers and officers from the Syrian army in Aleppo.

 

They Snipe at us Then Run and Hide in Sewers' Robert Fisk meets with Assad generals.

 

'No power can bring down the Syrian regime' Robert Fisk reports from the frontlines in Aleppo’s al Baz

 

Syria's Kurds Quietly Consolidating Benjamin Hiller says the unrest in Syria has enabled Kurds to politically mobilize and rebuild their cultural heritage.

 

Pawns in Syrian Conflict Await an Endgame Jonathan Steele says “discussion among Damascenes no longer centers on whether to support change or stick with the status quo for fear that the alternative to Bashar al-Assad's regime will be worse. The focus is on priorities.”

Latakia: Waiting for the Next Battle Marah Mashi thinks Latakia could be the next site of an important battle.

Damascus Eid: Trying to Keep Smiling

 

La vie sans Bachar Garance Le Caisne’s rosy report on a « liberated region» near Aleppo that witnesses the beginning of democracy.

 

The Air War in Aleppo Justin Vela says “the rebels are winning” in the Northern province of Aleppo.

 

Syrian rebels fight on for Aleppo despite local wariness  Martin Chulov reports a different perspective, writing about the interactions between pro-regime residents and rebel fighters.

 

Two sides of the same coin? Rita says Islamists and secularists share similar principles and ideas about the Syrian regime, arguing that the two groups need “the strength and courage to actively integrate and mix so that we can be rid of the corrosive prejudices which threaten what this revolution stands for.”

 

A Secret Hospital in Syria On Medecins sans Frontiere’s covert work in Syria.

 

Inside a Syrian Rebel City Erin Banco with the FSA in Aleppo’s al-Bab

 

From the Gap to the Firing Squad Richard Spencer draws a profile of a Syrian who left a Gap store in Dubai to become an executioner in Syria

 

Art and Social Media

 

Samer Omran: A Syrian Artist, Not a Politician  Anas Zarzar on the life of Syrian theater director and actor Samer Omran.

 

In Syria, the Soap Opera Is a Casualty of War Omar Adam Sayfo says “in losing the soap opera, the Syrian government has lost one of its most powerful means of spreading ideas and political messages, both within and beyond the country's borders.”

 

Top Syrian Media Host Abandons Assad for the Truth Bastian Berbner on Ola Abbbas’s resignation from her work on Syrian state TV. 

 

Dark Humor Facebook Pages of the Syrian Opposition

 

Policy and Reports

 

Syria Reverts to Statist Policies in the Course of Its Political Uprising Linda Matar on the state of the Syrian economy.

 

From Resilience to Revolt: Making Sense of the Arab Spring  Report issued by the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) on developments in Syria.

                                                                                                                       

Arabic


العيـد في دمشـق: لا مكـان للفـرح إلا تحدّيـاً للواقـع

Tarek Al-Abed writes about the scene on the Damascene streets during the Eid Al-Fitr holiday.

 

المبادرة المصرية في سورية
Abed Al-Bari Atwan writes about the initiative that the newly elected Egyptian President has proposed in order to reach a peaceful political solution in Syria.     

  السعودية وإيران: الخطر الأهم على الربيع السوري
Mohammad Dibo writes about the true threat that Iran and Saudi Arabia pose regarding the Syrian revolution.      

شريط فيديو، أزمة وطن
Ammar Al-Waqaf writes about the incident that changed the Syrian uprisings from being acts that were geared by logic to ones that were based on emotions and instinct.                                                                        

 عن دوامة العنف في سوريا!
Akram Al-Bunni writes about the increase in the military and weaponized rhetoric that the Syrian revolution has adopted and the brutal whirlpool in which the country finds itself.                                                                  

فليُفرَج عن المخطوفين وليعتذر فرزات
Hazem Al-Ameen writes about the mistakes of the revolution and the need to protect it while demanding an apology from Ali Farzat who has been charged with using sectarian rhetoric during the revolution.

An Excerpt from The Penguin's Song by Hassan Daoud

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[Born in the village of Noumairieh in osuthern Lebanon in 1950, Hassan Daoud moved as a child to Beirut, though like so many Lebanese families, his retained strong links to the village and returned there every summer. Daoud was educated in Beirut and studied Arabic literature at university. He embarked on a career as a journalist and worked as a reporter throughout Lebanon’s civil war.  From 1979-1988 he wrote for the daily al-Safir, and then joined the staff of the London-based Arabic newspaper al-Hayat. He has focused on cultural reporting as well as on social issues. He is the editor of the ‘Nawafidh’ cultural supplement of the Beirut daily al-Mustaqbal. His work has appeared in the European and North American press as well. In a 2006 essay in the New York Times magazine, he writes movingly about renovating the family home in Noumairieh, and as in his novels, living spaces are both refuges and places where continuing wars come inside (‘The Last Refugee’, New York Times Magazine, 27 August 2006).

He is the author of two volumes of short stories and eight novels, four of which have already appeared in English translation. (His works have also appeared in French and German translation.)  He is widely respected throughout the Arab world, and his work 180 Sunsets was longlisted for the Arabic Booker Prize. His first novel, Binayat Matild, came out in 1983 (Eng. Trans The House of Mathilde, 1999). Like many of his later novels, it treats the constricted spaces in which individuals and families live, as both effects of and outcomes of the often violent shifts to the political and social order—and the built landscape—of Beirut and of Lebanon over the past several decades. Tracing the minutiae of daily encounters, Daoud provides a profound social and cultural history of his homeland. Mathilde’s apartment becomes a refuge for those fleeing the civil war, in a context where individuals of various backgrounds live together. Daoud’s fiction takes up these histories from the inside out, and often from the social and geographical margins. Family pressures and exclusion from new economic processes are told through the eyes of victims, who are often the elderly or excluded young people. Ayyam za’ida (1990; Eng. translation Borrowed Time, Telegram, 2009) traces the thought processes of a man in his nineties, increasingly rejected and ignored by his family, in a southern Lebanon town. Typically, the spaces in which he and his family live are concrete expressions of changing patterns of sociability and exclusion.

Ghina’ al-Batriq (1998; ‘The Penguin’s Song) is told in the words of a young and physically deformed man whose family has been pushed, literally, to the margins of Beirut; whose aging father has lost his shop in the old downtown, a wound from which he never recovers.  Family disintegration and economic marginality go together, as the young man struggles with his own isolation and inability to make a life, expressed also in unfulfilled sexual longings. The novel’s precise and dispassionate language is typical of Daoud’s minimalist but rich literary voice.  When it came out, this novel was hailed as ‘the best Lebanese novel of 1998’. Like all of Daoud’s novels, it is not an easy read, for these are works that eschew easy exoticism or external description. Rooted firmly in Lebanese society and history, they remind us of the significance of the mundane for lives everywhere.]

 

An Excerpt from The Penguin’s Song

Hassan Daoud

The old mirror they lugged here for me from our old home: why did they not hang it some other way, not like this, so very high above? In that room housing my bed and wardrobe, I had to step back from the mirror—back and further back, just to see my face. Not for very long, since all I needed to do while standing at that distance was to trace the part in my hair with my comb and go over it more firmly, pulling the hair away from the comb’s path and smoothing it above and below. I still comb it this way, parting it from the roots as I first learned to do, or perhaps as I grew accustomed to doing, since I don’t remember my hair looking any other way than this, with a part. In my room, here in our new home, where I both read and sleep, I can peer into the mirror from a normal distance but only if I stand on the bed and hoist myself to match its height. My part is still there, just as it has always been, marching the same route; but the closer I bring my head to the mirror, the more desiccated it looks: the skin is so dry that it is flaking. The hairs around that part have grown coarse, their ends crinkling and frizzing so that from another angle of my head they give the appearance of a thick raised pad.

Nothing about my appearance has changed. Growing a moustache has not helped me to look my age, since very little moustache hair actually appeared and the color, which was already light, bleached with exposure. So my moustache does not stand out from my face and adds nothing to it. No, nothing in my face has changed—not only since its reflection in this same mirror when it last hung in our old home, but also from an earlier time, myself aged thirteen, which was when I began to stare into it as though I had to accustom myself to my own image. I perceived somehow that this was my final image and I would never have another one. Or perhaps the crucial moment is when I began at that same age of thirteen to imagine how my face appeared in the eyes of whoever looked at me and to feel, whenever they were looking at me, that I was seeing myself exactly as they were seeing me.

I see the image of my face alone in that mirror placed so high, floating there without my body beneath it. If I want to see that, it won’t be in the mirror but rather with a gaze downward. I have liked sensing my face and my body looked at separately, as detached parts of me, because that means my face is seen as it is, by and for itself. Indeed, at that age of thirteen I could almost believe that people saw me as I wished to be seen; I could convince myself that they—like me—overlooked whatever they did not like to see in me. But in outsized mirrors, the kind we sit across from in barber shops or find ourselves suddenly, unexpectedly facing in the facades of clothing stores and cinemas, I can’t help but see how my body, puffed out in front, all but assaults my face simply by reaching all the way up to it. In the bus’s rectangular mirror, into which I kept stealing continuous but furtive glances, all day long throughout that school trip, I had to notice how the puffiness began at my lower belly and rose to swell across my chest, forcing my head to hang awkwardly above it. Trying to minimize this blown-up appearance that is mine, I worked to raise my body upward, sitting as if I were standing but only from the midsection up. It tired me out. Sitting there, on the front seat in the bus near the mirror, I knew I was exposing myself to their stares—or to her stare, among the rest of them. But, I thought, the noisy commotion they made would stay in the back and would keep them there, on the bus’s long back seat and in the empty space in front of it. Staying close to the mirror, I could maintain my watch over what was going on behind me. I could keep it all under my gaze, remaining attentive and careful not to be taken unawares by letting go or dozing off, which would expose me even more.

I also thought that by sitting there—and staying near the mirror—I could keep her under my gaze. It was not long, though, before the partygoers singing in the back of the bus attracted her. When she left her seat and rambled back toward them, they began beating the tabla more loudly, the drumbeat celebrating her capture. That’s what they did whenever anyone left his seat to join them. I could see her in the mirror in front of me, standing still with some space separating her from them, as though it was enough to watch them from a distance and enjoy the din they were creating. When she leaned against one of the seats, her back to the mirror, I suddenly thought they would beat the drum louder especially for her, inviting her now to sit on the broad seat they occupied or to stand among their fans in the open space in front of it. But she didn’t; rather, from time to time she twisted around to look behind her, at the first three rows of seats where no one remained seated but me. No, there was no one there but me, looking into the mirror, stealing furtive glances at her. It was as though, when she looked toward where I sat, she was trying to make certain that I was still there, sitting and waiting, staying exactly where I had been a moment before.

Or as if, when she turns to look in my direction, she is trying to make me understand that she apologizes for keeping her distance, or that she is just marking some time, waiting so that when she comes over to me it will look natural, like a mere coincidence as everyone redistributes themselves in the bus once the band in back has grown quiet as they take a break. Or she will make it appear like coming here is just a matter of falling into the seat next to me as the bus shudders or swerves. Or she will seem to be coming deliberately, making it seem as though she has come specially to say a few words that have just come into her mind and that she wants very much to say to someone whose presence, also, has just come into her mind. Or she will come and sit with me, keeping me company, on the pretext—which she will not actually have to explain to anyone—that I am sitting by myself and someone really ought to talk to me.

But the place I had left empty beside me since climbing into the bus remained empty. They did reoccupy other seats, redistributing themselves several times as they rested after singing a set or returning to the bus after little excursions outside. But the seat next to me remained empty. Alone, I stayed in my seat, leaving the proper amount of space clear so that someone could come and sit down if they wanted to do so. Their games would bring them to particular seats that they would soon vacate, only to land on other seats also for a very short time. But I went on sitting in my seat in that place that had become mine. Even though twice I left the bus (just as they did) to take a short walk, I watched myself return to the very same seat, plastering myself to the wall of the bus and the window and leaving the place next to me empty.

It was up to me to get up and go over to them, where they sat at the back of the bus, and to make myself part of their noisy fun. Probably it would have been better for me that way because I could have made them forget my body, not by keeping it distant and hunched over itself but rather by losing it—by making it disappear among the movements and gestures I would extort from it. If I were to clap that is what they would notice, not my pair of tiny hands and the way one flops against the other. If I were to attempt dancing with them they would see my flexing body simply as a series of moves, as if the maneuvers I made were a cloud of dust I would raise to distract their gaze away from me and to occupy her with something other than what she ought not see. I should have been there among them at the back of the bus. But while it was happening, while I was on that school trip, I did not see this until it was already too late. The time in which I could have changed something had already passed. She had stopped looking in that particular direction, that section of the bus where I sat. In fact I couldn’t help but notice—in the mirror—how her attention was now turning entirely to them; how, the more she laughed at what they were doing, the more fully she appeared to have forgotten that only a few moments earlier she had been turning to gaze at me. She forgot, or else she was distracted from looking at me by something else that was going on.

Every time they climbed down from the bus for a little excursion, leaving their tabla behind on the back seat which stretched the width of the bus, I felt as I stared at them—through the windowpane this time, not in the front mirror—as if their only reason for mounting all of that noisy fun was to demonstrate how adept they were at suddenly stopping the clamor and quieting down. Their close huddle would break apart as they moved away from the bus. Four of them grouped together, five, and then three; and there were the last quartet who waited at the door to the bus until their number was complete. Coming back to the bus they would be more scattered and chaotic, looking as though they were rushing to reach the bus fearing it might leave without them.

But, returning to the bus, they will leave behind a couple of walkers dawdling along or trailing their caravan. Through the window I can see one of them walking as slowly as possible next to the girl who accompanies him. And then there’s the one who will appear to me as he turns into the street—for I can see all the way to the head of this street: she will be beside him, walking slowly and lowering her head to study a bit of fauna or a flower she’ll twirl between her palms. I knew it would be her, coming into sight next to him, because she was not among the first group to arrive back at the bus. She comes into sight at the corner, walking at a leisurely pace until she reaches the two steps into the bus. She climbs them slowly, still in no hurry. When we are all on the bus and it moves off, she is not where she was before, inside their little circle, for she has chosen a seat somewhere in the middle, to be alone with him and away from them, and also to keep herself apart from where I sit, another girl altogether now, as if, when she first climbed into the bus, she did not even disclose to me that she had been eagerly awaiting this outing of ours, this trip we would make together. 

[Translated from the Arabic by Marilyn Booth

Portrait of America: Kehinde Wiley at the Jewish Museum

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The gap between propaganda about Palestine in contrast to the reality I know as a Palestinian has made me wary… The most serious failing in political art is that it does not make clear whose side the artwork is on. When such clarity is lacking the benefit defaults to those currently in power.

Samia Halaby (Arab Studies Quarterly, Spring/Summer 1989)

Punctuating several galleries of the Jewish Museum in Manhattan are the vibrant paintings of art world superstar Kehinde Wiley. On display (until July 29) is a selection from the Israeli installment of his ongoing World Stage series—an extensive body of work that was developed by identifying the global interpretations of hip-hop that appear in various cultural contexts. Wiley, who is admired as a postmodern liaison to hip-hop, created these portraits using his signature concept of exaggerating the grandiose visual tropes of European historical painting. Prior to launching this recent series—which has taken the Los Angeles-born painter to India, China, Senegal, and Brazil—most of his portraits were of young black men who were recruited from the commercial thoroughfares of Harlem and downtown Brooklyn.

By instructing his subjects to adopt the theatrics of official portraiture while dressed in “urban” street clothes, Wiley’s work is understood as summoning the perceived signifiers of posturing that have been vital to hip-hop since it first emerged as a concrete subculture through music, dance, fashion, and art in late 1970s New York. Interplaying two foreign, yet seemingly akin, social phenomena, the artist maintains that his primary target is Western art history and its frequent exclusion of black protagonists.

Recently, he has expanded his focus to include young men of color from emerging international hotspots. In the World Stage, he often turns to site-specific imagery for visual references, namely that which signals a dominant narrative—be it the underlying rhetoric of public statues that depict political leaders, or instances of local cultural patrimony that reflect the glaring tensions of symbolic attributions of power. This is combined with bright floral designs that surround his figures as backdrops to the artificiality of mock historical moments, arranging their bodies into the recesses of his settings.

In the artist’s “Israel” paintings, he departs from this focus by steering his use of visual referencing away from such allegories. Instead, his portraits of Ethiopian Jews, Palestinians, and Israeli-born Jews are rendered with patterns, symbols, and compositional details from Jewish ceremonial art. This new element is possibly the most interesting to result from the entire World Stage series. If the conceptual lens that Wiley employs in previous works is applied, then this latest sampling of visuals constitutes the context in which his subjects must negotiate their individual identities. While the politicization of Judaism under the Israeli state is suggested through the use of such patterns and symbols, he also places special emphasis on the ethnicities of his models through prescribed imagery and texts.

A short documentary that is featured alongside these paintings shows his Ethiopian subjects discussing the racial discrimination that they endure as African immigrants. Given that the film is screened to provide background for the exhibition’s visual references, this leads the viewer to conclude that the overarching framework of these compositions is the political positioning of race within Israeli society. It remains uncertain if this is the artist’s actual objective, as he never commits to defining the critical parameters of his critique, in true postmodernist form. Thus, what might be visually provocative steers clear of upsetting the status quo, and conversely facilitates the projection of the status quo without inciting critical debate.

At the Jewish Museum, his large-scale portraits are hung in dark rooms that are spotlighted with atmospheric lighting—an effect that exaggerates the eye-catching, near-florescent palettes that accentuate his figures. This also works to direct the viewer to an emphasis on tonal variations in flesh, as a sort of drama and dimension is added through highlights and shadows that lend to a sculpted sense of realism. These smooth surfaces take on an additional formal function, acting as a place for the eye to rest amidst the dizzying complexity of patterns that have been taken from magnificent historical pieces.

Wiley pairs these canvases with the inspiration for his elaborate designs by selecting a number of examples of religious art from the museum’s collection. These cutouts and tapestries from North Africa, Europe, and Central Asia point to a visual culture that expanded and evolved over centuries (much like the development of Islamic art), as it was carried to various parts of the world through the diaspora. Initially serving to translate the spiritual, this primary aesthetic later provided the foundation for departures into social issues such as notions of identity, especially when introduced to new environments.

The pairing of his contemporary works with such artifacts is telling of the types of connections that the Jewish Museum is actively encouraging. Through a number of recent exhibitions, it has attempted to diversify its audience and expand its emphasis on points of cultural convergence. In its permanent collection, the museum covers a wide range of art and objects that chart the many transformations that have defined the history of Judaica. Ceremonial objects are thus placed within the same broad-spectrum context as modernist painting and contemporary photography and installation. This discursive approach reflects one of the many burdens of operating an institution that remains on the margins of American culture despite being located in a major city-center. Like El Museo del Barrio and the Studio Museum of Harlem, the Jewish museum is thus faced with the task of assuring that particular histories maintain a visible presence as it advocates for today’s artists. To stay relevant, and to compete with larger museums, it must also envision creative ways to impact the future as it engages current trends. “The World Stage: Israel” exhibition seems to have been organized with much of this in mind.

The first painting that the viewer encounters upon entering Wiley’s solo show is “Mahmud Abu Razak” (2011), a portrait of a Palestinian man whom the artist recruited in 2010 while sourcing models in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Lod. Abu Razak is seated with a frozen stare. A red cutout pattern wraps around his upper body, appearing animated as it spreads to the foreground. Set within solid color fields of yellow and green with an inner border of red that is accentuated by the black of an outer frame, Abu Razak is placed against a palette closely resembling the Palestinian flag (with yellow being used in place of white). To sympathizers of Israeli policies, this color scheme can be overlooked as a mere coincidence when read according to the compositional traits that are reserved for “Arab-Israelis.” As the artist’s remaining portraits leave little room for the assertion of a Palestinian political identity, “Arab-Israeli” is the preferred description throughout—a confirmation of the colonial project. Moreover, “The World Stage: Israel” is devoid of any actual mention of Palestine.

[Kehinde Wiley, "Mahmud Abu Razak" (2011). Copyright: Kehinde Wiley. Courtesy of Roberts & Tilton, Culver City, California]

It is not that the Jewish Museum refuses to address the subject of Palestine in its programming. At the same time that it stressed an “elusive reality” in the 2007 exhibition “Dateline Israel: New Photography and Video Art,” the museum glossed over aspects of the occupation in its descriptions of contemporary works. Settlers led everyday lives in the West Bank; the annexation of Palestinian land was shown without question. The massive concrete wall that runs through the Jerusalem suburb of Abu Dis was simply a matter of citizenship, dividing “families and communities into Palestinian and Israeli Arabs.” The ancient olive tree (a long-held symbol of Palestinian culture and heritage) was stripped of its encoded meaning, reconfigured, and appropriated. Palestinians were represented, albeit with a contextualization that asserted the official Israeli storyline.

In “Liberating Blackness and Interrogating Whiteness,” Phyllis J. Jackson describes the absence of narratives as evidence of dominant political discourses within visual culture: “societal and cultural exclusions remind us that the realm of art making is enmeshed in the politics and culture wars at large” (Art/Women/California 1950-2000: Parallels And Intersections, 2002). This is most true of the Palestinian experience and how it is invariably ignored, silenced, or attacked in the mainstream art world.

Many of the themes that were central to “Dateline: Israel” were previously explored in the exhibition “Made in Palestine” (2003), resulting in corresponding images of olive trees, Israeli soldiers, checkpoints, Palestinians in domestic spaces, and sweeping landscapes. As the occupation was anything but normalized in the works of its artists and its accompanying wall texts, “Made in Palestine” marked a pivotal moment—the first time that the American art scene was forced to acknowledge the modern Palestinian narrative. Originating at the Station Museum of Contemporary Art in Houston, it later traveled to several cities in the US, including New York in 2006, where it was hosted well beyond its scheduled closing date. Despite media attacks and political outcries, many credited its overwhelming popularity to its alternative look at the lives of Palestinians. Unfortunately, the show in no way eradicated the prevailing attitudes that were active in trying to curtail it.

The mounting of “The World Stage: Israel” is noteworthy; it is not minor that portraits of Palestinians would be featured so prominently within the setting of a New York museum. Admittedly, it is surprising. However, this initial allure quickly dissipates when studying the semiotic nature of these compositions, which bolster the political dimensions and social constructs that continue to dictate discussions of race and identity in twenty-first century Israel (and America, the master prototype).

Wiley’s paintings of Jewish men are affixed with monikers that include the Ten Commandments in Hebrew, two lions of Judah, and two hands of a Kohen (priest), representing “power and majesty” and “blessing.” The power and majesty that is indicated through these identical anthropomorphic figures is also significant to the visual culture of Ethiopia as a reference to the Solomonic Dynasty, linking the historical ties of his African subjects to the notion of a Jewish homeland.

Depictions of Palestinians are crowned with the same twin lions minus the spiritual blessing. The text that brands their image is a Hebrew translation of Rodney King’s oft-quoted statement from the 1992 Los Angeles “riots,” “Can we all get along?” Each portrait of the exhibition incorporates a different design that has been meticulously copied from a traditional source regardless of the cultural or religious background of the sitter. Two-thirds of these images are of Ethiopian Jews.

The first step in the artist’s scouting of “Israelis” was to find characteristics of a local hip-hop aesthetic. Initially, this manifests in the loose, casual clothing of his figures that is adorned with large, discernable logos and graphics. Without the additional surrounding imagery and titles of each portrait, the viewer would be hard pressed to distinguish these men from other youth who have adopted hip-hop fashion as it has permeated global culture. The exception to this common thread is seen in “Kalkidan Mashasha” (2011), which depicts an Ethiopian hip-hop artist who produces “raw, lyrical raps about his Ethiopian-Israeli Jewish identity.” Mashasha wears a khaki button-up shirt in the vain of the Afro-centric/socially conscious style that was at its peak during the “golden age” of hip-hop in 1980s and 90s America. Such decorated military fatigues worked to generate an aesthetic connection between past class-based revolutionary struggles (think the Cuban Revolution and the Black Power movement) and the concerns of influential rappers. Mashasha is shown adopting this appearance as an expression of his Ethiopian identity.

[Kehinde Wiley, "Kalkidan Mashasha" (2011). Copyright: Kehinde Wiley. Courtesy of Roberts & Tilton, Culver City, California]

Set against an intricate floral and fauna motif, he is depicted before a circular Hebrew emblem that reads, “How sweet is the light, what a delight for the eyes to see the sun.” The emblem is placed within the composition so that it appears as a halo, an obvious reference to the motifs of Christian iconography. On the surface, Wiley’s use of such visual rhetoric recalls a significant lineage within modern and contemporary art that has sought to deconstruct the aura (as theorized by Walter Benjamin) of portraiture in Western art history by removing the iconification of imagery from its religious dimensions or substantiated power structures. A number of his paintings utilize this distinct take on the genre, as halos and blessings are bestowed on Israeli men. None of his icons are Palestinian.

Within the series’ concept, Mashasha is given prominence as an unofficial spokesperson, voicing the experiences of Ethiopian men who embrace the Jewish state but are suspiciously looked upon as outsiders. At the time of the exhibition, this discussion of racial inequality as it pertains to the black communities of Israel could not be more relevant, specifically when official policies and public opinion towards non-Jewish African migrants grow increasingly hostile. Although Mashasha’s status as an outspoken rap artist places him at the center of the exhibition’s theme, it does not go unnoticed that the largest halo in this cast of icons is actually given to the “native-born” Jew of another painting. The man that stands before the golden chart in “Leviathan Zodiac”(2011) exudes swagger with an exaggerated pose. In reading his usage of symbolism, traces of Israel’s fixed racial hierarchy pervade Wiley’s overall representation. Ethiopian Jews struggle for acceptance and power; “native-born” Jews affirm their natural-born power; Palestinians are rendered powerless.

[Kehinde Wiley, "Leviathan Zodiac" (2011). Copyright: Kehinde Wiley. Courtesy of Roberts & Tilton, Culver City, California ]

[Kehinde Wiley, "Abed Al Ashe and Chaled El Awari" (2011). Copyright: Kehine Wiley. Courtesy of Roberts &Tilton, Culver City, California]

Whereas the assignment of Rodney King’s plea to Palestinians might seem superficial, or even naïve, when viewed within the artist’s formulation of visual codes, this statement is quite unsettling. In the double portrait “Abed Al Ashe and Chaled El Awari” (2011), two Palestinian men are shown side by side, their arms extended in a forced handshake. Supporting King’s words, the painting is reminiscent of the media coverage that often accompanies a political agreement between two opposing parties, a minor physical act that is staged and recorded as a monumental moment. Edward Said’s description of the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 comes to mind:

The vulgarities of the White House ceremony, the degrading spectacle of Yasir Arafat thanking everyone for what, in fact, was the suspension of most of his people’s rights, and the fatuous solemnity of Bill Clinton’sperformance—like a twentieth-century Roman emperor shepherding two vassal kings through rituals of reconciliation and obeisance—all these only temporarily obscure the truly astonishing proportions of the Palestinian capitulation. (Peace And Its Discontents, 1996)

 

["Bill Clinton, Yitzhak Rabin, Yasser Arafat at the White House," (1993) Image by Vince Musi]

In interviews, Wiley often stresses his interest in the idea of spectacle. The act of recreating historic European portraiture—with its dramatic poses, lavish textiles, and embossing of regal men with aestheticized power— facilitates the place in which such moments are forged. As the simultaneous director, designer, casting agent, and manager of this stage, the artist retains a strategic role, remaining unscathed and unaffected by the type of “spectacle” that Said identifies. Scenes of “capitulation” not only play out in paintings of Palestinians whose images are muted; they are intensified in his portraits of African American men.

When examined in a contemporary context, the customary signs of antiquated official portraits seem outlandish and silly. Jacque Louis David’s “Napoleon at the Saint Bernard Pass” (1801) stands as one of the most recognized examples of this school of painting. Its reliance on a false sense of drama, manufactured heroism, near mechanical precision, and emphasis on decadence are characteristics that, if approached with seriousness, now border on Kitsch. This is due to decades of work by artists who carefully dismantled the social constructs that are evident in the tradition. European Modernism was very much about chipping away at these forms, turning to non-Western visual cultures for guidance while earth-shattering technology inspired advanced ways of seeing. The figure, more specifically, was the primary target of such investigations; and when not completely taken on formally was transformed along class lines.

Modernism’s arrival to the US in the first part of the twentieth century occurred as ongoing social polarization was coming to the forefront of national discussions. Against the backdrop of avalanching economic disparities, American artists were selective in their application of modernist techniques. The spotlighting of racial inequality became inherent to explorations of class. Thomas Hart Benton, Aaron Douglas, and Yasuo Kuniyoshi were heavily involved in this conversation, utilizing figurative painting to contest the notions of beauty and power that had been part and parcel to Western art for so long. Through work that gave credence to the everyday lives of ordinary Americans, many artists demanded a more populist approach to art. This stood in antithesis to a turn of the century style that was committed to the Grand Manner of European painting with idealized depictions of the elite.

African American artists expanded these critical experiments throughout the twentieth century, engaging their efforts with social movements that proceeded to redefine national culture. As each key moment of modern political determination called for refashioned identities via new forms of collective struggle —from the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s and 30s to the Black Power movement of the 1960s and 70s—each successive era informed the work of artists. At different (and often overlapping) intervals within this long period of revolt, Aaron Douglas, Elizabeth Catlett, Jacob Lawrence, Romare Bearden, Faith Ringgold, Betye Saar, and Barkley L. Hendricks, among others, all rightfully understood that creating art within the framework of American visual culture was a political act in and of itself. In the 1970s, vital cultural nexuses underwent a state of crisis as the fervor of the Black Power movement waned amidst ferocious assaults by government agencies (which included political assassinations and the onslaught of the Prison Industrial Complex). Enter hip-hop as a broadening of this history of struggle with the potential for addressing the nuances of individual and collective identities through a fluid format that is yielding of time and place. A direct descendent of Black Power, many of its facets challenge predominant discourse as affirmations of dissent in the face of the US’ institutional mechanisms of oppression.

Wiley’s relating of the hip-hop aesthetic to the pomp and circumstance of historical portraiture exists in his paintings as something to ridicule—an altering of his American subjects that is palatable for the ruling class of the art establishment. The power that is obtained through the defiant posturing of hip-hop—namely through lyrics that insist on destabilizing the very apparatuses of the US’ ongoing economic segregation—threatens the vested interests of art world powerbrokers (certain gallerists, curators, patrons, and institutions) who benefit directly from this disparity. Interestingly, in his commissioned portraits of major rap artists, larger-than-life personalities seem to determine their own destiny.

Although it is no secret that he coaches his models, what is often overlooked is that the young men of his paintings do not set out to be lampooned in their everyday lives (which the artist essentially trespasses upon in his process of scouting). It is simply taken for granted by most critics, who continue to operate with the colonial assumption that if the black body is to be considered it must be reconfigured and consumed. Ironically, even Wiley is not safe from being typecast. Despite the visible class-lines that are drawn between the artist and his “urban” protagonists—the juxtaposition between ‘high’ and ‘low’ cultures of his paintings, as critics call it—in reviews of his work, it is routinely noted that he benefited from his Ivy League education. Recently, New York Magazine referred to him as “a bootstrapper from South Central who talks like a Yale professor (much of the time)” (“The New Art World Rulebook,” April 25, 2012).

A decade ago, Jackson’s assessment of the American art world also included the following critique of a developing strand of contemporary artists and art world professionals:

Far too many suffer from a serious form of cultural amnesia that allows them to depoliticize the historical transformation of our society and its artistic communities. They slip dangerously close to embracing the normalizing ideologies and elitist aesthetic arguments that originally catalyzed a generation to wage war against the image-makers and their images. It is not merely petty arguments over who makes the prettiest pictures. It is a tense struggle for power to define the beautiful, the good, the worthy in art—and by extension in life. (Art/Women/California, 2002)

Wiley’s compositions of African American men differ in that they do not reflect signs of full-fledged cultural amnesia. Instead, he frequently alludes to such historical transformations.

An observable connection is to the paintings of seminal artist Barkley L. Hendricks, whose 1960s and 70s portraits reflect the direct social impact of the Black Power movement on American culture. Hendricks’ figures are shown in confident casual poses, standing or sitting as though they were informally asked to pose for a photograph. This photographic quality is significant since, in the process of composing his paintings, he regularly utilizes a camera as a “mechanical sketchbook.” Realized in painting form, snapshot-like images become striking meditations on the convergence of culture and politics that is embodied in the poise of his models. Through considered uses of color, traces of classical realism, and imposing compositional design, he accentuates the signifiers with which black, white, and Latino men and women announce their individuality, pointing to a heightened understanding of social agency that is applied to the public realm. At the time of creating these works, his elevation of “snap-shots” of American life was groundbreaking in contemporary art. This was principally important to artists of color who were unconvinced that the image should remain a sanctified form through which racial and class-based hierarchies are reproduced as socializing agents on behalf of those in power.

Hendricks’ 1969 portrait “Lawdy Mama” exemplifies the measured ways in which he approaches his figures. Giving attention to a conscious use of fashion as a component of their identity, he highlights the posture with which they pose. Noting minor gestures, he identifies the type of individual boldness that was crucial to the emergence of hip-hop just a few years later. The self-assured woman whom he renders with the likeness of a Byzantine icon in “Lawdy Mama” captures the defiant, near confrontational, confidence that was paramount to liberation struggles, an attitude that was often channeled as an act of solidarity among aligned political movements. The power she exudes is not from the artist’s placing of her figure within the setting of a religious icon; this marked perception and beauty is an aspect that is independently cultivated by his subjects rather than projected onto them. And in painting their images alongside a number of self-portraits, Hendricks places himself within this discussion.

[Barkleu L. Hendricks, "Lawdy Mama" (1969). Copyright: Barkley L. Hendricks. Courtesy of the artist and Jack Shainman Gallery, New York.]

Examining “Mahmud Abu Razak” and “Lawdy Mama” demonstrates the frequent associations of Wiley’s methodical development of imagery to the concept and formal details of Hendricks’ portraits. Both subjects are presented looking directly at the viewer, their bodies shown in similar poses that are situated in golden semi-circle archways. Yet as images that rely on identity-icon paradigms to suggest multiple levels of meaning, they occupy opposite ends of the spectrum.

Questions of social agency arise when viewing Wiley’s portraits. At what point does the body become a basis for propagating elitist aesthetic arguments, as Jackson proposes? Judging from the positive reception to his paintings in the mainstream, cultural amnesia has as much to do with satiated viewers as it does with contemporary artists. Normalizing ideologies are reinforced when such representations betray their subjects and figures are turned into props (or objects).

A similar discussion on the role of art is taking place in the Arab world where buoying instances of uprising are surrounded by the omnipresent forces of co-option. Many cultural practitioners are calling for an increased focus on formalism as they publically bemoan references to the political in the work of Arab artists who exhibit on the fringes of fickle movements. What is unacknowledged, however, is that calls for formalist approaches devoid of the political are often accompanied by the uniform positions of class, privilege, and power that are constitutive to influencing artistic practices in market-driven art scenes. And in urging a new course, what then of the work of Palestinian artists who, as a result of the political and socioeconomic devastation that has been inflicted by the Israeli state and many Arab host-countries, have rarely had access to the psychic spaces to consider otherwise?

Just as Palestinian youth have found hip-hop to be an adaptable form that can transmit their realities (the importance of which Wiley completely ignores), a new generation of contemporary artists seeks to maximize the plasticity of postmodernism; most potently in conveying and challenging their political condition(s). The work of Jerusalem-based conceptual artist Raeda Saadeh is a perfect example, which often engages visual components of Western cultural history to subvert rudimentary notions of gender, the erasure of collective narratives, and the obstruction of political license. In a series of recent photographs, Saadeh elucidates the impact of the occupation by placing herself within compositions that are reenacted from European paintings and the fictionalized dilemmas of children’s folktales, adding a layer of complexity to the feminist critiques that inform her practice:

I often play the character of a woman living in a world that attacks her values, her love, and her spirit every single day. She is in a state of occupation. Her world could be in Palestine, where I live, or elsewhere… She may be weighed down by oppression, but she is filled with ambition; she is saner than she should be and yet she is also a little mad… And every move she makes, every act, exhibits an awareness of her environment while simultaneously being an act of revolt against social conditions. (Arab Photography Now, 2011)

In the 2007 work “Mona Lisa,” Saadeh has photographed herself as Leonardo da Vinci’s celebrated muse against the landscape of her native Palestine. Donned in a custom-made costume, she smiles wryly at the viewer. Scattered along this terraced terrain are pockets of Israeli settlements, hinting at the theme of this performance. As a Palestinian woman, she empathizes with this sixteenth-century Italian personality who appears physically confined to her surroundings but equally aloof. Both women attempt to go beyond the bounds of an imposed condition, if only in their minds. The artist’s critique of the occupation, which is not exclusive to land or a national reality, thus becomes intertwined with the constant sidelining of her being.

[Raeda Saadeh, "Mona Lisa" (2007). Copyright: Raeda Saadeh. Courtesy of Rose Issa Projects, London]

Several critics have referred to Saadeh as “Jerusalem’s Cindy Sherman” perhaps without realizing the ways in which such blanket comparisons essentially overlook her work (and her emphasis on addressing the situation in Palestine) with an association that deems it secondary to more visible narratives. A more appropriate observation is that Saadeh, like a growing number of artists, has found particular artistic approaches to reveal shared experiences among seemingly distant communities, despite the imposition of national, social, or cultural borders (which are fundamentally constructed and always subject to change).

Edward Said illustrates the concurrent states of occupation and revolt that are passed on to generations of Palestinians in an essay accompanying a series of documentary photographs by Jean Mohr:

I have never met a Palestinian who is tired enough of being Palestinian to give up entirely. Most of us still rally to our cause, even though a mixture of skepticism and fatigue (after all, how long can you go on losing?) breaks in whenever a new campaign gets under way… There is a notable stubbornness to these feelings that cannot be discounted. It derives from a sense of accumulated Palestinian history that is at once too public and too engraved in our current situation to be rolled back or ignored. Today, there are very few of us who can avoid the fate of every Palestinian, which is to be both there, and yet not be accounted for politically. (After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives, 1999)

Elements of what Said describes can be seen in the paintings of American artist Richard E. Lewis, whose portraits possess a reflective mood that is drawn from his subjects and the spaces over which they preside. As sitters are asked to pose within these domains with minimal interference on the part of the artist, his paintings are built around the body language of his models. Often depicted as warm and pronounced domestic settings, these interiors are neither the cold, bare Paddington studio of Lucian Freud nor the frenzied (enveloping) rooms of Henri Matisse. The majority of Lewis’ paintings are of his family and friends from periods that are split between New York and his native Detroit. A similar air of skepticism and fatigue is apparent in a portrait of his sisters, “Kim and Tonya Watching T.V.” (1997). Appearing at once guarded and at ease, they are unfazed by the slow passage of time that is involved with posing for a painting—in the same way that the quiet of this setting is undisturbed by the indistinguishable nature of the exterior world through an open window. In giving equal prominence to the surroundings of figures, he depicts spaces in which vivid lives are led in spite of the magnitude of an accumulated history that spills into the future.

 

[Richard E. Lewis, "Kim and Tonya Watching T.V." (1997). Copyright: Richard E. Lewis. Courtesy of the artist]]

 

[Richard E. Lewis, "James and Kelly" (1996). Copyright Richard E. Lewis. Courtesy of the artist]]

“James and Kelly” (1996), a double portrait that was painted during his residency at the Studio Museum of Harlem, depicts the artist James Reynolds and Kelly, his partner. The couple is seated before a wall that divided the painter’s studio from that of the late sculptor Michael Richards (who is shown in the background). This blocked space gives way to a composition that is anchored by the bold hues of vintage chairs that regularly appear in his paintings. A floral wall hanging and a white Virgin Mary figurine are additional relics from a small collection of personal items, which take on various roles as they adapt in meaning to the presence of different protagonists. Although James and Kelly are brought into a realm that is familiar to the artist and dotted with such items, they occupy a separate moment, one that is detached from the room and solely defined by the intensity of their awareness of each other. Wearing their own clothes, they seem to adopt the fashion of a bygone era of Harlem. In depicting this aspect with a painterly treatment of line and color, Lewis allows the confidence of the two men to take over the portrait, much like in the work of Hendricks. The pattern of the cloth in the mid section of the painting comes alive amidst this exchange, leaning towards them as though mirroring their intimacy.

Firmly planted in the politics of representation that feed the American art scene, Wiley is recognized as a prominent figure of the loosely defined “post-black” movement. Thelma Golden, the Studio Museum of Harlem’s director and head curator, is credited with coining the term with artist Glenn Ligon in the late 1990s after noticing a trend among established and emerging African American artists. A unifying point for many of this subcategory is that they resent and reject the art world’s penchant for categorization. This resentment is often directed at the efforts of their predecessors as much as it is towards the establishment. In undermining such identity affirming imagery while referencing the racial hostilities of Western visual culture, post-black demands a new postmodern approach to the exploration of black identity, one in which definitions are pushed to such extremes that they enter the paradoxical with the aim of making them obsolete.

A counterintuitive consequence of this approach is the formation of a new set of hegemonic standards altogether via the privileging of limited voices (and narratives) over others, and a presumed entitlement that forgoes any accountability in the securing of racist caricatures, stereotypes, and superficial understandings of identity. Champions of the this type of art often fall back on the so-called upward mobilization of African Americans over the past three decades, arguing that the identity-driven art that was influenced by the Black Power movement is no longer relevant. The mainstream art world is eager to chime in, citing lucrative careers such as Wiley’s (whose paintings sit comfortably in the six-figure price range) as evidence of social progress. In stark contrast, from 1970 to 2005, the US prison population increased by 700 percent with the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimating that 1 in 3 black men can expect to be incarcerated during their lifetime. Today, people of color are “disproportionately incarcerated, policed, and sentenced to death at significantly higher rates than their white counterparts” (“The 10 Most Disturbing Facts About Racial Inequality in the US Criminal Justice System,” AlterNet, March 2012).

During the Harlem Renaissance, Langston Hughes warned against attempting to fit into the mold of “American standardization,” which offered the following bribe to artists: “Be stereotyped, don’t go too far, don’t shatter our illusions about you, don’t amuse us too seriously. We will pay you” (The Nation, 1926).   

August Culture

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Jadaliyya's second summer bouquet features an essay by the new co-editor of the Culture Page, Maymanah Farhat, fiction from Lebanon, poetry from Egypt, a remembrance of the great Ghassan Kanafani, and an interview with two Kuwaiti filmmakers.

Mayymanah Farhat, "Portrait of America: Kehinde Wiley at the Jewish Museum" 

Marilyn Booth, "An excerpt from Hassan Daoud's "The Penguin's Song""

Suneela Mubayi, "Amal Dunqul's "Spartacus' Last Words""

Faisal Hamadah,  "Interview with Two Kuwaiti Filmmakers"

Rasim Al-Madhoun, "Ghassan Kanafani: The Symbol of the Palestinian Tragedy"

All previous culture posts can be accessed here. Tell us what you think. For questions, comments, or submissions, email us at culture@jadaliyya.com.

عندما يصبح تسييس القضاء ضمانة لاستقلاله: أفكار حول التجربة المصرية 1967-2012

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أين اختفى قضاة "التيار الاستقلالي" في مصر اليوم؟ سؤال محير يراود أذهان أكثر من متابع للشأن القضائي المصري في الوقت الحاضر. فالمفارقة الغريبة هي أن القضاة الذين صنعوا الحدث القضائي والسياسي عامي 2005 و2006 عندما تحدوا من خلال نادي قضاة مصر نظام حسني مبارك في أوج سلطته باتوا اليوم، بعد سقوط هذا النظام، شبه غائبين عن الساحة القضائية. القضاة الأفراد ما زالوا هنا طبعاً، على الأقل سياسيا: فالمستشار حسام الغرياني ترأس مجلس القضاء الأعلى وهو اليوم يترأس اللجنة المكلفة إعداد الدستور والمستشار هشام البسطويسي كان مرشحاً ملحوظاً لرئاسة الجمهورية والمستشار محمود الخضيري عضو فاعل في المجلس النيابي الجديد، الخ. إلا أن التيار نفسه قد اضمحل قضائياً أمام السيطرة المتجددة للتيار المنافس، المعروف سابقاً بمهادنته لنظام مبارك، على نادي القضاة بالكامل منذ عام 2009 حتى اليوم، مع تجدد فوزه في انتخابات النادي الأخيرة بعد الثورة. ويدفع تبعثر القضاة "الاستقلاليين" إلى التساؤل عن مدى وجود تيار جماعي بهذا الاسم في القضاء المصري: فهل اقتصرت أحداث 2005 وسواها على مبادرة بعض القضاة الثائرين على تقاليد مهنتهم وممارسات النظام فقط، فشكلوا ظاهرة جماعية ظرفية محصورة لا غير، أم أنهم جزء من تحرك قضائي أوسع وأكثر قدماً، يمكن توقع انتعاشه مجدداً في المستقبل القريب؟ نسترجع في هذا المقال بشكل خاطف بعض محطات التاريخ القضائي المصري المعاصر للتذكير أولاً بجذور تحرك 2005 الفكرية والتنظيمية، وثانياً لعرض فرضية بحثية تسمح ربما بتفسير تخبطات هذا التحرك الجماعي الذي يقوى أمام الاستبداد ويضمحل – أو يزداد اضمحلالاً - مع سقوط أبرز رموزه. إذا كانت قوة نظام مبارك غير كافية لتفسير تغيرات وهج معارضيه القضائيين، فما هو العامل التحليلي الآخر الذي يسمح بذلك؟ وإذا كان سقوط حسني مبارك لا يتعارض – بغرابة - مع انتعاش التيار القضائي الذي كان يهادنه لا بل يدعمه حسب اتهام التيار "الاستقلالي"، فأليس على الباحث أن يعيد التفكير في العلاقة السببية بين هيمنة السلطة التنفيذية وازدهار أو انتكاس معارضتها أو موالاتها القضائيتين، وأن يبحث في مكان غير العلاقة مع السلطة السياسية عن مصادر شرعية وفعالية الكلمة والحركة القضائية؟

من 1969 إلى 2006: مواسم الهجرة إلى الصمت

من المثير للاهتمام أن نرى القضاة الذين اتُهِموا عام 2005 بانتهاك التقاليد القضائية عبر احتلال المساحات الإعلامية والاحتجاجية يحاولون ابراز تراث قضائي مواز ومختلف يضفي شرعية قضائية على ما قاموا به، تضاف الى الشرعية السياسية التي لطالما نعموا بها بمواجهة النظام الاستبدادي. وتراث قضاة 2005 هو تراث "الرفاعية"، نسبة الى المستشار يحيى الرفاعي الذي طبعت نضالاته وصداماته مع النظام مسيرة القضاء المصري "الاستقلالي" منذ الستينات حتى أواخر الثمانينات. ولا يتردد شيوخ قضاة 2005 بربط تحركهم رمزياً بعمل الرفاعي القضائي، رجوعاً لما يعرف "بمذبحة القضاة" عام 1969، حين تعرضت مجموعة من القضاة المصريين ومن بينهم الرفاعي نفسه للاضطهاد والعزل على يد جمال عبد الناصر بعد رفضهم الانضمام إلى "الاتحاد الاشتراكي العربي" وبعد اتخاذهم مواقف نقدية علنية ومكتوبة ربطوا فيها هزيمة 1967 بغياب الديمقراطية داخلياً، لا سيما عبر رئيس نادي القضاة حينها القاضي ممتاز نصار. وقد دفع هؤلاء ثمن هذا الخروج الأول عن "تقاليد" الصمت القضائي بضع سنوات، إلى حين تمت إعادة بعضهم في السبعينيات ضمن أجواء الابتعاد عن السياسات الناصرية التي طبعت سنوات حكم السادات. وقد شكلت مذبحة القضاة هذه مدعاة "للهجرة" القضائية الأولى للقضاة "الاستقلاليين" كما ترسمها الذاكرة الجماعية لهؤلاء التي بنيت حول نمطية الهجرات المتكررة والدورية - كل عشرين عاما تقريبا - تبعاً لكل انتفاضة قضائية، وبشكل يذكر بالثنائية الدورية "انتفاضة قضائية – انكفاء قضائي" التي تميز أيضاً الذاكرة القضائية التونسية الحديثة، علماً أن حراك القضاء التونسي وانكفاءه غالباً ما تزامنا مع حراك القضاء المصري وانكفائه (انتفاضة وقمع القضاة الشبان عام 1985، انتفاضة وقمع مكتب جمعية القضاة التونسيين عام 2005): فهل يعكس هذا التزامن آثار انتشار أفكار أو قواعد قضائية على الصعيد العربي أو الدولي في هذه الفترات؟  وبالفعل، فإن الحلقة التالية من المسلسل الاستقلالي المصري كما يراه ويرويه القضاة والناشطون بدأت تتكون في بداية الثمانينيات حول المستشار الرفاعي نفسه، الذي شكل محركاً قضائياً نشطاً من داخل نادي القضاة الذي ترأسه عامي 1985-1986 و1989-1990، وقد أصبح النادي يحتضن آنذاك الحراك الاستقلالي بشكل يؤكد ترسيخ تسييسه- بالمعنى العلمي للكلمة - بعد إقفال كل المساحات الأخرى أمام القضاة، إلى جانب وظيفته الخدماتية التي لطالما حاولت السلطة أسره فيها. وتوج هذا الحراك الاستقلالي الثاني بحدث مهم لم يلق شهرة "مذبحة القضاة" بالرغم من طابعه التجديدي والاستثنائي ألا وهو: مؤتمر العدالة المصري عام 1986. وتميز هذا المؤتمر أولاً بحجمه الضخم (قدمت خلاله حوالى 110 ورقة)، وبطبيعة المشاركة فيه وشموليتها ثانياً، عبر الدور المهم الذي لعبه محامون وجامعيون وإداريون وسياسيون معارضون في أعماله إلى جانب القضاة، وثالثاً، بتنوع وجرأة المسائل التي طرحت فيه إذ تناولت الأوراق المقدمة مختلف المواضيع التي تهم المرفق القضائي، من أكثرها تقنية (بطء المحاكمات ودور الخبراء إلخ...) إلى أكثرها تسييساً (استقلالية القضاء، المحاكم الاستثنائية، الخ.). وأكثر ما طبع الذاكرة في هذا المؤتمر المواجهة المفاجئة والمدوية التي حصلت خلاله بين القاضي والحاكم، عبر واقعة ما زال القضاة المصريون المنتمون للتيار "الاستقلالي" يروونها اليوم بشيء من الاعتزاز: فيما كان الرئيس حسني مبارك يحضر شخصياً افتتاح المؤتمر، طالبه رئيس النادي يحيى الرفاعي أثناء إلقاء كلمته برفع حالة الطوارئ والحد من دور المحاكم الاستثنائية، مما أثار لاحقاً حفيظة وغضب الرئيس الذي اكتشف فجأة، بعد بضع سنوات من توليه الحكم، "أن هناك جسماً داخل هيكل الدولة المصرية يسمى الجسم القضائي يستعصي على الفهم من ناحيته، ويستعصي أيضاً على السيطرة". وقد أطلقت هذه المواجهة موسم الهجرة القضائية الثاني إذ سرعان ما ضيقت السلطة على هؤلاء القضاة "الاستقلاليين" نهاية الثمانينيات، دافعة بعضهم إلى ترك البلاد في إطار الإعارات القضائية إلى دول أخرى، مع حمل آخرين إلى حصر أنشطتهم العامة. ويمكن هنا مقارنة أساليب قمع جمال عبد الناصر الصاعقة (العزل التام من القضاء) بأساليب القمع التي انتهجها مبارك والتي كانت أقل قسوة من دون أن تكون بالضرورة أقل "فعالية"، إذ استبدلت القوة بالإبعاد الصامت المقونن (إعارة إلى دولة عربية أخرى مع شروط مهنية مغرية). وامتدت الهجرة الثانية إلى نهاية التسعينيات عندما بدأ قضاة، وفي طليعتهم محمود مكي وهشام البسطويسي وزكريا عبد العزيز، بالمشاركة بندوات ومحاضرات أعادت تدريجياً طرح مسألة استقلالية القضاء على بساط البحث في المساحة العامة (ولو بعيداً عن الاعلام في مرحلة أولى) بعد عشر سنوات من الانكفاء.

الانتفاضة القضائية الثالثة :قضاة "الاستقلال" ضد من؟

قيل الكثير حول تحرك القضاة المصريين عام 2005-2006 بشأن مسألة الإشراف القضائي على الانتخابات، إلا أنه نادراً ما تم الرجوع إلى ما قبل هذه المرحلة لرسم معالم نشوء هذا التحرك، كأنما القضاة قد اجتمعوا وقرروا فجأة، على خلفية إهانة قاض في الإسكندرية بداية 2005 أو على خلفية إشرافهم على الانتخابات النيابية أو على الاستفتاء الدستوري الذي جرى في العام نفسه، إشعال مواجهة لا مثيل لها في تاريخ القضاء المصري مع السلطة. إذا كان من الواضح أن كتابة القصة ابتداء من ربيع 2005 يحرمنا من العوامل التي تسمح بفهم ظروف تكوين التحركات المهنية القضائية، فلا مجال هنا للدخول في تفاصيل ولادة الجيل الثالث من التيار "الاستقلالي" نهاية التسعينيات. كان مثلاً لترابط الأجيال القضائية ونقل التراث القضائي المشاكس دور أساسي في هذا المجال، من خلال التأثير الفكري والمهني الذي استمر بعض القضاة كيحيى الرفاعي في ممارسته حتى بعد تقاعدهم تجاه قضاة أصغر منهم سناً. كما أنه كان لبعض الفاعلين غير القضائيين، كالمركز العربي لاستقلال القضاء والمحاماة الذي تأسس عام 1997 من ضمن المجهود الهادف إلى استنهاض الخطاب الاستقلالي، دور في تقديم مساحات وموارد لم يكن القضاة "الاستقلاليون" يمتلكونها خلال فترة غيابهم عن النادي، مما سمح لهم بتطوير قدراتهم وصولاً الى استرجاع إدارة النادي عام 2001. ولكن لهذه العوامل تعقيداتها نعرضها في مناسبة أخرى. نكتفي هنا بالإشارة أولاً إلى ضرورة دراسة تحرك 2005 وغيره من الأحداث القضائية ضمن التاريخ القضائي الطويل أو على الأقل المتوسط دون الاكتفاء بالعلاقات السببية البسيطة والمباشرة، وثانياً إلى ضرورة توسيع القراءة المرتكزة على الثنائية التصادمية "قضاة استقلاليين / سلطة تنفيذية" لإدخال عوامل وفاعلين آخرين غالباً ما يتم تجاهلهم في معادلة القضاء المصري والعربي، كقضاة "تيار الحكومة" (كما يحب قضاة التيار "الاستقلالي" تسميتهم بهدف تجريدهم من مشروعيتهم وصهرهم بالسلطة التنفيذية التي يعدونهم ممثلين لها)، أو جمعيات المجتمع المدني المعنية بالشأن القضائي. وبالفعل، فإن دراسة فترات "الهجرة" كالتي امتدت من 1990 إلى 2001 مثلا (سنة استرجاع قضاة التيار "الاستقلالي" مجلس إدارة النادي) تظهر أن ما تصفه الرواية الاستقلالية بفترات ركود أو تبعية لا تستحق التأريخ هي حقيقة فترات يسيطر عليها قضاة آخرون، لا شك أن لبعضهم صلات قوية أو مشبوهة مع الحكومة، إلا أن لغالبيتهم بكل بساطة نظرة مختلفة للمهنة القضائية، لأدبياتها وتقاليدها ووسائل عملها، يمكن نعتها بالمحافظة أو التقليدية أو الحيادية، من دون ان يكون بالإمكان اختزالها بالتبعية للسلطة التنفيذية. وهنا يظهر لنا أن التمييز القائم بين "قضاة استقلاليين" و"قضاة حكومة" هو من إنتاج القضاة "الاستقلاليين" أنفسهم الذين ابتكروا هذه التسميات – وهذا من حقهم - في خضم معاركهم الشجاعة مع السلطة المصرية من باب زيادة مشروعية تحركاتهم غير التقليدية، فاعتمدها بعض الباحثين والصحفيين مباشرة متجاهلين ظروف إنتاجها واستعمالها، وهو خطأ يتحملون هم مسؤوليته التحليلية لا القضاة الغارقون في صراعاتهم المصيرية. فلهذه التسميات – عندما تتحول الى مفاهيم تحليلية - مفاعيل مغرضة على قراءة الواقع القضائي، إذ يصعب عبرها أن نفهم مثلا كل الانقسامات الحادة التي تشهدها الساحة القضائية المصرية، أو لماذا يختار القضاة المصريون في نادي القضاة بعد الثورة ممثلي تيار "التبعية" للحكومة – التي أسقطتها الثورة - على حساب قضاة الاستقلال. وكما يقول بكلمات أخرى المستشار حسام الغرياني نفسه، وهو يعد أحد "حكماء" تيار الاستقلال وقد ترأس مجلس القضاء الأعلى في فترة (يوليو 2011- يوليو 2012) قبل تقاعده، فإن القضاة غير المنتمين للتيار الاستقلالي ليسوا بالضرورة أقل استقلالاً، هم فقط قضاة لا يجهدون خارج محاكمهم لإعطاء هذا الاستقلال كل أبعاده (السياسية).

من هنا يظهر جلياً أن المفهوم الأساسي لقراءة التحولات والثوابت القضائية المصرية ليس مفهوم الاستقلال – الذي يبقى شعاراً نضالياً أكثر مما هو مفهوم تحليلي – بل هو مفهوم التسييس، أو بالأحرى البعد السياسي للعمل القضائي. فيكون بذلك قضاة "تيار الحكومة" قد اصابوا في تشخيصهم لحراك قضاة "تيار الاستقلال" عندما نعتوه بالمسيّس، وإن أخطأوا في الاتهام. فعبر رفضهم لمحاولات السلطة أسر القضاة في تقنيات القانون والمحاكمة وإبعادهم عن الشأن العام حتى عندما يكون للقضاة دور مباشر فيه (في حال الانتخابات مثلا)، وعبر إصرارهم على إعطاء القضاء مكانته في فلسفة النظام السياسية، وعبر ابتكارهم لوسائل تعبير وتحرك غير مسبوقة قضائياً اعتقدت السلطة أنهم لن يتجرؤا على اعتمادها، فجر ما يعرف بقضاة "الاستقلال" كل معايير العمل القضائي التقليدية، ما أثار ذعر زملائهم القضاة غير المستعدين لخوض هذه الغمار، أكثر ربما مما أخاف السلطة الحاكمة نفسها. فمن غير المستغرب إذا أن يأتي رفض هذا المنهج القضائي الذي يمكن وصفه بما بعد الحداثي من داخل القضاء قبل أن يأتي من السلطة التنفيذية، مما يساهم في تفسير استمرار تهميش قضاة "تيار الاستقلال" حتى مع تحولات النظام السياسي الحالية بعد الثورة. لا يعني كل هذا تحييد السلطة التنفيذية عما يصيب القضاء والقضاة خاصة في الأنظمة الاستبدادية كالتي كانت تحكم مصر وتونس، فممارسات السلطة جد واضحة في هذا المجال، إن عبر التضييق المالي على نادي القضاة عندما كان يسيطر عليه قضاة الاستقلال، أو عبر تقديم امتيازات للقضاة مقابل صمتهم و انكفائهم في محاكمهم، أو عبر الاعتماد على المحاكم الاستثنائية، وغيرها من الممارسات الهادفة إلى تحييد القضاة والحد من قدراتهم الرقابية. قد تسمح فقط هذه الفرضية، إن صحت، بفتح آفاق جديدة للدراسات الاجتماعية المهتمة بالقضاء العربي، فلا تكون مهووسة بسياسات الأنظمة القمعية العمودية لا غير، بل تغدو أكثر حساسية لتحولات التيارات والأفكار داخل المجتمعات المهنية القانونية عامة والقضائية خاصة بحد ذاتها، كما لعلاقات القضاة الأفقية مع مهن وتيارات وتحركات أخرى في مجتمعاتهم. فالمستقبل القضائي يقرأ ربما ليس على أفواه حكام مصر الجدد إلى أي جهة انتموا، بل عبر تصرفات رئيس نادي القضاة الحالي، أحمد الزند، خصم التيار الاستقلالي الأول في السنوات الأخيرة وهازمه على أساس احترام التقاليد القضائية. فنراه اليوم يدعو إلى الإضراب ويخاطب السياسيين في الصحف ويدخل في مشادات إعلامية غير مسبوقة دون أي حرج بين أكثر زملائه. فبغض النظر عن مضمون تحركاته ومواقفه وتقييمها، ألا يشكل هذا الخروج عن التقاليد القضائية الصامتة – بالرغم من انزلاقاته ومبالغاته الحالية والتي لا علاقة لإشكاليتنا بها - أهم انتصارات قضاة 2005 وأهم ما يتركونه للجيل الرابع من "التيار الاستقلالي": ساحة قضائية بدأت تسقط فيها الممنوعات القضائية المفروضة سياسياً من كل الجهات؟

*يعد رسالة دكتوراه في سوسيولوجيا القانون

 على خلفية مسألة الإشراف القضائي الفعلي على الانتخابات. أنظر مثلا أعمال الباحثة Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron  حول محطة 2005 القضائية (بالفرنسية). 

 إن الأجوبة التي تريد إقفال النقاش عبر حجة أن النظام المصري لم يسقط سوى ظاهرياً عام 2011، ما يفسر استمرار كسوف التيار المسمى بالاستقلالي، غير مقنعة: فلماذا يكون لهذا السقوط الظاهري، بغض النظر عن حقيقته، آثار مدوية على المشهد السياسي المصري، فيما المشهد القضائي يبقى غير معني به تقريبا؟ و يتقدم آخرون بفرضية ثانية تفسر تراجع وهج التيار "الأستقلالي" عبر وصول الاسلاميين – الذين يتعاطف معهم جزء مهم من القضاة "الاستقلاليين" -  إلى السلطة في مصر، فلا يرغب قضاة هذا التيار  بإزعاج حلفائهم السياسيين. لا مكان هنا لمناقشة هذه الفرضية بالتفصيل، إلا أننا نكتفي بالإشارة إلى إن كسوف التيار الإستقلالي في النادي بدأ قبل الثورة بسنتين أو ثلاث عندما كان التيار الإسلامي ما زال مقموعا، ما يجعل هذه الفرضية غير كافية على الإطلاق لتفسير مسيرة "الاستقلاليين" القضائية.

 يشكل هذا المقال جزء بسيطاً من بحث ميداني أوسع تقوم به "المفكرة القانونية" حول التطور المقارن للقضائين التونسي والمصري في علاقتهما مع النظامين الاستبدادين في البلدين قبل وبعد الثورة. ومصدر معلومات المقال، بالإضافة إلى بعض المراجع القليلة حول الموضوع، عدد من المقابلات المطولة والمفتوحة مع فاعلين قضائيين وناشطين حقوقيين في مصر.

 أنظر : Botiveau B., 1997, “Nasser et les magistrats égyptiens : l’affrontement de 1969 et le débat sur la souveraineté de la loi”, in L’Etat de droit dans le monde arabe, Mahiou A. (éd.), Paris, CNRS-Éd., pp. 395-402, و: نصار م.، 1974، معركة العدالة في مصر، القاهرة، دار الشروق، أو للإطلاع على وجهة نظر مختلفة : إمام ع.، 1976، مذبحة القضاء، القاهرة، مدبولي.

 الكلمة للمحامي ناصر أمين، مدير المركز العربي لاستقلال القضاء و المحاماة .

 لعرض أكثر تفصيلا لأعمال هذا المؤتمر، أنظر : Bulletin du CEDEJ, 20 (2), 1986.

 مقابلة مع السيد ناصر أمين.

 و لا تكفي هنا العودة فقط إلى حكم المحكمة الدستورية عام 2000، الذي فرض مبدأ "قاض على كل صندوق" في مسألة الإشراف على الإنتخابات.

 ضمن مداخلة له في مؤتمر حقوقي في مكتبة الاسكندرية، 30 أيار 2012.

 و مفهوم التسييس لا يستعمل هنا طبعا بمعنى التحزب لجهة سياسية أو لأخرى، إنما بمعنى التعامل مع إشكاليات القضاء كإشكاليات عامة تخص كل فئات المجتمع و يصح بالتالي التصدي لها من قبل القضاة في المساحات العامة خارج مساحة المحاكمة الضيقة.  

 [ نشر هذا المقال للمرة الاولى على "المفكرة القانونية" وجدلية تعيد نشره بالاتفاق مع المجلة.]

 

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