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Syria's Creative Resistance

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Bashar al-Assad snores, his head twitching on a large white pillow. Suddenly, he wakes up. “The people want to overthrow me!” he screams, the pompom on his nightcap bouncing. 
A military officer approaches, pats him on the head and whispers gently, as if comforting a toddler: “Don’t worry, my dear Mr. President, nobody wants to bring you down. Go back to sleep.” 
“But I dreamed that the people don’t love me anymore!”
“We all love you, Mr. President”, says the officer, “but you have to rest. Tomorrow is Friday and we have a lot of work to do!”
Bashar lies back on his pillow and dozes off.
“Sleep…sleep…let nothing disturb your dreams”, the officer croons: “You will see how we deal with terrorists, Salafis and conspirators. We’ll get rid of them for you…”

But Bashar’s nightmare becomes reality. From beneath the wooden stage two actors emerge, their faces swathed in keffiyas. With gleaming eyes, they swing hand puppets from side to side. “How beautiful is freedom!” they chant to the beat of a drum.

There were only a few of us in the audience. Sworn to secrecy, we squatted on the floor of a dark stage at the back of a Beirut theatre on a cold November evening.

Since the Syrian uprising began, Beirut has seen Syrian dissident artists flock to the city in search of refuge, taking over the few alternative pubs where food and drinks are affordable. Listening in on their gatherings, it was fascinating to notice that their heated conversations, instead of being only gloomy as one would expect, were peppered with political jokes and punch lines from the satirical slogans, songs, and videos circulating all over Syria and on the Internet.

After my initial encounters, I decided to seek out some of the creative minds contributing to the uprising – in Lebanon as well as Syria – and asked some of my new Syrian friends to introduce me to this world. It is a world that came into being more than a year ago but which receives scant attention from the international media because it is mainly expressed in Arabic.

One day I received a phone call, and was invited to witness the making of the play.

The actors decided to hide their identities during performances, after being detained during the March of Intellectuals and Artists that was held in Damascus on 13 July 2011. Grotesque wooden puppets, created by a famed Syrian artist, have taken their place. Jamil (not his real name), the play’s director, had smuggled them into Lebanon, garbed in wigs and big moustaches. The performance was not going to be put on live, but rather recorded and uploaded onto the Internet.

“Even outside of Syria, we’re not safe from regime thugs,” the actors said, then pointed at the puppets now scattered lifelessly on the floor: “We’re terrorists and trouble-makers. Don’t you see our weapons?”

A young woman from Damascus continued to work on the décor, pinning a golden frame to a picture of Hafez al-Assad. Once an almost sacred icon, now ripe for ridicule.

Only a few weeks after it was posted on YouTube, the play – Top Goon: Diaries of a Little Dictator – had received tens of thousands of views. It is just one of a wealth of satirical dramas, jokes, chants, graffiti slogans, videos, songs, and dances that have proliferated since Syrians began to rise up against the rule of the Assads.

Ill-fated attempts by the international community to chart a way out of the current impasse and a rising death toll have led to growing despair, pushing the essentially civil uprising over the brink and into the abyss of armed conflict. This conflict has overshadowed how the revolutionary spirit has nurtured the satire and wit for which the country is famous, and imbued daily life with an unprecedented outburst of creative expression.

For decades, Syrians would do no more than whisper. “Even walls have ears,” was a popular saying. Political jokes were kept within trusted circles and people were forced to bow to the iconography of their leader, a cult celebrated in schools, public spaces, cultural productions and the media. As the uprising evolved, the state media, sticking with the delusional narrative that all protesters are armed terrorists, has lost its grip on most of the public. A powerful counter-culture unlocked minds, drawing on popular tradition and skilfully exploiting the tools of modern communications technology.

I set out for Damascus from Lebanon in April 2012. On the Syrian side of the border, we passed Zabadani, a resort town nestled into idyllic green hills, where fierce fighting was taking place. It was here that the simplest and most sardonic slogan of the revolution was dreamt up, eventually spreading to songs and walls across the country. “We don’t love you!” might sound harmless to outsiders, but it strikes a lethal blow to the cult of the leader built on the idea that the Syrian people are children who adore their fatherly leader. Minhibbak (We love you) was a line that Syrians had to repeat over and over again: an order to love. Today, supporters of the uprising are making fun of it, calling groups loyal to the regime the minhibbakjiyeh: the ‘We-Love-Yous’. Challenging the cult of the leader has always been a highly subversive act and Syrians often chose to do it with humour.

One day in the mid-nineties, while living with my aunt in Damascus for a year, I accompanied a cousin to a school march. The pupils were chanting, “Hafiz al-Assad, the eternal leader!” when suddenly a group of older pupils started bleating, “Ha-a-a-fiz al-A-a-a-ssad, the e-e-e-ternal le-e-e-ader,” then dissolved in giggles. My cousin froze in horror, and when I saw her face I realized the seriousness of what they had done. The young men were lucky. Their little performance went unnoticed, and for a few minutes they had successfully ridiculed both the leader and themselves.

It was schoolchildren in Deraa, probably the same age as the bleating, cackling kids I saw twenty years earlier, who were tortured for spraying subversive graffiti on walls, and whose enraged families unleashed the uprising when they took to the streets in protest.

“It is the unthinkable that people now think, say and do”, writer Hassan Abbas told me. If one seeks to learn about Syria, it is always good to talk to him first, as he is the country’s walking encyclopedia.

Abbas was surprised by how forcefully Syrians emerged as a people: “It is not the elite artists or intellectuals who form the avant-garde, but the ordinary people.” He compared them to Aladdin, who was trapped, tiny and insignificant, in the magic lamp, only to swell into a giant after being released. For the first time Syrians are getting to know their own geography, he remarked. Maps of Syria used to be prohibited for security reasons and libraries would import maps from Jordan or Lebanon, instead. “I consider myself an expert on Syria”, he said, “But suddenly places are springing up out of nowhere and we’re hearing dialects that we never knew about. Now it’s the simple people in the country, whom everyone considered illiterates, who are giving us an education. Look at Kfar Nibl.” 

Kfar Nibl, a village in northern Syria near Idlib, was entirely unknown until sarcasm and wit put it on the map. Kfar Nibl has become a trademark for the best and funniest slogans, shared and disseminated by activists and fans. When the Arab League monitors arrived in Damascus and took up residence at the Sheraton Hotel, a picture was passed around showing a group of villagers holding a banner that read: The people of Kfar Nibl demand the building of 5-star hotels, so that we can attract the Arab monitors to visit us!

Such high-spirited defiance did not go unpunished, however. Security forces invaded the village several times, but the slogans continue.

Crushing non-violent resistance was a deliberate move, Abbas argued, it was an attempt to force people into taking up arms against a military Goliath: “Why was it the peaceful activists who were detained and tortured?” He believes that the regime’s worst enemy is people gathering peacefully in public space.

Day by day, protests move closer from the suburbs to the centre of Damascus, but the protesters have not yet managed to occupy the capital’s major squares. In April 2011, protesters at Abbasiyeen Square were received with heavy gunfire. Protesters at the central squares in Homs and Hama met the same fate.

“Because this public space was destroyed early on, it was transmuted from the physical to the cultural and spiritual sphere and dispersed all over Syria like droplets of water”, explained Abbas, naming formerly sleepy villages where protests on the streets and squares continued to spring up. “We don’t have a collective space, but at least we have our collective dance.”

The brio with which Syrians revived traditional music and dance is not only a thorn in the side of the authorities. Ultra-radical Sunni cleric Adnan al-Arour, who fled his hometown Hama in the 1980s to exile in Saudi Arabia, uses religious satellite channels to incite against Shia and Alawites. But he is also determined to prevent protesters from chanting and dancing on the grounds that such activities are haram, or religiously prohibited. He called upon Abdel-Baset Sarrout to stop singing and mingling with women in public.

Sarrout, called the ‘nightingale of the revolution’ by his fans and a ‘Salafist emir’ by the regime, is actually the goalkeeper for a Homs soccer team. His rise to fame began when he led demonstrating crowds in Homs, singing from the shoulders of protesters at the front of the crowd. The documentary Waer (Rough) shot by Syrian filmmaker Samira (not her real name) is a compelling account of his story.

Samira met me in the street. “Let’s just walk,” she said. “I’ve never enjoyed it so much.” Detained for months by the security services, she has found it hard to recover. When al-Arabiyya broadcast her film in November and she was confined to a cell, entire streets in Homs were deserted as people headed home to their TV sets. One of her earliest decisions was to film in Homs, sensing somehow that the city with its sectarian divisions would become a contested battleground. People had this strong desire to identify with someone, Samira said, and from the most complex of all places emerged this voice, expressing what they felt.

"Being of Bedouin origin Sarrout has natural self-confidence, and he spends quite some time in front of the mirror," Samira laughed, "Women adore him like Brad Pitt and men strive to be like him."

Sarrout, targeted several times by regime forces, is now in hiding and makes occasional appearances to lend his support to the protests. In an early December broadcast on a programme featuring al-Arour, on a channel also owned by him, Sarrout phoned in. Arguing that song was the weapon of the unarmed, he proceeded to sing live on the show, ignoring the cleric. He also teamed up with prominent Alawite actress Fadia Suleiman until she was forced to flee the country.

Syrians have been gagged for so long, Samira explained, that popular culture is subversive on every level: "It breaks with the Stalinist culture that the Baath Party imposed on the country, and ridicules the elite culture on show at the Damascus Opera, so removed from people’s lives. Lastly, when people shout 'God is great' while dancing and singing, they also defy Islamism and Salafism, because none of this is allowed in strict religious interpretation."  

In Damascus, home of the political and security establishment, dissenters are forced into hiding. I visited Sami (name changed) and a group of activists in an apartment lit with neon lamps and thick with cigarette smoke. We sat on mattresses and sipped tea. Sami calls himself a "freelancer for the revolution." The reason he gives for joining the uprising is simple and precise: "We don’t want to be bullshitted anymore." He stubbed out his cigarette, lit another and apologized that he couldn’t open the window to let in fresh air. "We don’t want the neighbours to overhear our conversation, right?"

"Uninspired, reactionary, and without vision" is how Sami described the regime’s propaganda machine: "They don’t have anything meaningful to say, this is why they are imitating the revolution." He laughed, remembering how once, the shabiha, while they emulated the revolutionary slogan "Freedom forever, even against your will Bashar!’ shouted "Shabiha forever, even against your will Bashar!"

Internet-savvy, long haired, familiar with Western subculture and casually mentioning his girlfriend, he embodies the prototype of the handsome, modern and secular Arab revolutionary that adorned the covers of Western magazines last year, before elections in Tunisia and Egypt brought Islamic beards back to the front pages. Islamists don’t particularly scare him.

"What’s the difference?" he asked, "When people are forced to kiss Bashar al-Assad’s picture and recite La illaha illa Bashar (There’s no God but Bashar) isn’t that a religious cult just like the Islamists’ unquestioned worship of God?"

In Sami’s opinion the leader’s cult has become so ingrained that the authorities don’t know how to deal with the fact that the uprising is largely a popular one: "They always need to nail down dark personalities that stir people from abroad. This is how figures like al-Arour gain significance in the first place."

The group wants to stir up central Damascus, where life continues at an almost normal pace. They mobilized for several strikes, often in vain. Sami was the one who disabled bank machines in Damascus’ upmarket neighbourhoods when residents ignored a general strike called for by the protesters. He produced plain plastic cards resembling credit cards, coated them with superglue and stuck them into the machines’ slots. Amused, he recalled how bank clerks with red faces desperately tried to pull them out of the machines, cursing the cards with the crudest insults.

I walked into a quiet neighbourhood tucked behind the busy Baghdad Street, where I paid a visit to the atelier of Youssef Abdelke. He welcomed me through a small wooden door, which like so many of the city’s tiny entrances, conceals a spacious and beautiful Ottoman courtyard house covered in black and white tiles. Abdelke is one of the country’s most prominent painters and a co-founder of the Art and Freedom Facebook page.

Hibiscus tea was boiling on the stove and he offered me some, doves cooing in the courtyard. His hair pulled back into a ponytail had turned snow-white. After being detained for leftist political activities under Hafez al-Assad, he spent twenty-four years living in exile in Paris. Since his return to Syria in 2008, authorities have prevented him from travelling, not by imposing the formal travel ban that is wielded against many from the political opposition, but by the equally common and effective method of stalling the renewal of his passport. In order to get it, he would have to visit the internal security to settle "old issues."

"Are you crazy?" he shouted, when I asked if it might not be worth it, then burst out laughing: "At my age I’m not going to audition at state security as if I was the criminal and they were the patriots." He seems at peace. To find freedom in exile is an illusion, he believes: "It’s more of a political statement to be silent in Syria than to speak out abroad." He is far from silent himself, however. His group invites artists to submit works that give expression to the uprising. He also took the initiative to found an independent union of artists. Any artistic production has to be submitted for clearance to national cultural institutions that operate under the culture ministry and are staffed with personnel close to the circles of power. While painters often managed to evade censorship in the past, as they were not gathered under a specialised body comparable to the powerful cinema and theatre institutions, the culture ministry has resumed pre-censoring exhibitions since the uprising began: We have returned to the spirit of the 1980s, when exhibitions were prohibited after the Hama massacre. Abdelke didn’t expect to be showing his work in Damascus anytime soon. Instead, it is touring Paris, Beirut and Cairo, while the artist remains behind.

Unlike Abdelke, Firas (name changed) is a man leading a double life. I met him on Jabal Qasioun, the mountain that looms over Damascus and offers spectacular views of the city. Where families used to escape the sweltering heat of the city, most of the former picnic huts have been torn down. The only venue spared was a fancy restaurant at the summit, the property of business tycoon and regime crony Mohammad al-Khouly. We roamed along the row of dimly lit cafés that replaced the huts and which used to cater to Gulf visitors coming to pick up Iraqi women thrown into prostitution by war and poverty. Now they are almost empty. We finally settled on a tiger skin sofa. Surrounded by plastic palm trees illuminated in pink, a huge TV screen blared Lebanese pop songs above our heads.

"Yes, here nobody will recognize me." Satisfied, Firas nodded and ordered strawberry milkshakes. One of the few popular television stars who made the decision to side with the uprising, he has come to harbour a distaste for the official cultural productions that made his name and which continue to be churned out despite the unrest.

In recent years, Syria became known for its lavish drama series; part-funded by Gulf monarchies, they were so successful that they managed to supplant Egyptian productions, which had dominated television screens across the region for decades. Syrian television actors rose to stardom and attracted huge numbers of adoring fans. Since the uprising began, many of them have chosen to remain silent, if not to defend the regime. "After some actors signed a petition against the assault on Deraa, they were threatened. Most are now scared shitless," said Firas.

Syrian drama started out relatively low budget and was therefore shot on location, not in studios. Authenticity has become its trademark, but now most locations are inaccessible, and some Gulf countries refuse to buy Syrian productions.  Even so, said Firas, "they still try to project an image that all is fine." Firas first quit all his television projects, but recently picked up work again to avoid the security radar: "If you say no too many times you raise suspicion." I inquired why he didn’t out himself to the public as a supporter of the uprising. "And then what?" he countered, "Being in the spotlight and losing the chance to contribute anything meaningful?"

Instead, he chose to shoot clandestine documentaries that are broadcast on Arab satellite channels. "If our society is ever to heal, we need proper documentation of better quality than shaky videos on YouTube." The wind blew, and down below the white and green lights of Damascus flickered. He took a deep breath: "It’s good to look down from above. The city has become an Orwellian nightmare."

Protesters in Orwellian Damascus have had to resort to a creative use of the Internet. Where it was too risky to take to the streets, home videos emerged as a medium to replace demonstrations. An inspiring precedent was created by women in Damascus in May 2011, when they started to upload "home sit-ins," wearing black sunglasses and holding scarves in front of their faces as they chanted for a civil state and democracy.

In a gathering of artists, I talked to Loay (name changed), a playwright who had filmed such sit-ins. The guests suddenly began arguing about armament. Contradictions arose and voices grew louder. Loay paused, peeking out from the terrace on the street to check whether passersby might be listening. "We should safeguard the civic soul of this revolution," he remarked, "and I believe that women will be the leaders in that."

He pointed out that it was young women who recently took their protest to the heart of political and business establishments. On April 10, 2012, the day that the ceasefire negotiated through Kofi Annan’s initiative was supposed to come into effect, 34-year-old Rima Dali poured white paint on her red dress in front of the parliament, holding up a sign that read: Stop the killing. We want a homeland for all Syrians. A few days later, four young women sprawled like corpses on the floor of Damascino Mall while upper-class shoppers tripped around them.

"What they are doing is very smart," explained Loay. "Since the regime depicts protesters as murderous terrorists, it is difficult to punish people for demanding an end to violence and a nation for all."

Hardly out of prison, Rima Dali busied herself again organizing a whole campaign. "We have to do everything we can to show that the Syrian people want a political solution," she told me on Skype. "The revolution is being hijacked by so many different actors who have an interest in fuelling conflict. If the initiative has given us anything, it is a bit of space to revive non-violent activism. We cannot let this opportunity pass, too."

Back in Beirut, close to the bus station where the cabs and buses from Syria pull in, I joined Mustafa Haid in a backdoor café: a favourite hangout for Syrian activists. A human rights researcher who had been banned from travelling for several years, he now spends any spare time he has surfing the Internet for new creative output and recording it in his notebook: "If we don’t archive all these expressions, they will be forgotten." Cycling through clips he demonstrates how the credibility of the official narrative has been slowly eroded, with almost every piece of state propaganda meeting immediate ridicule in home video format. When the first massive protest emerged in Midan, state television reported seriously that people took to the street in order to thank God for the rainfall. Haid shows me a weather forecast video that appeared on the Internet a few days later, showing rainclouds over Damascus, with the headline: Important news. The people of Midan thank God for the rain, while Al-Jazeera insists on describing them as pro-democracy protesters!

With home videos, citizens have also defied official propaganda depicting protesters as armed gangs and terrorists. Haid made a note of the first, very simple home video of the uprising, which appeared in March 2011. It shows a small boy, standing blindfolded and handcuffed on a sofa in his living room while a voice intones: “We captured the armed gangs.” The camera pans from the child to an assortment of weapons spread out at his feet: plastic guns and 25 lira coins.

Another early video, this one from Homs, shows three men with the common requisites of an armed terrorist group: keffeyas, Kalashnikovs, and beards. A voice orders them to reveal their weapons: one thrusts a zucchini towards the camera, the second an eggplant, while the third reveals an ammunition belt filled with okra strapped around his waist.

Admitting with a grin that Syrians are obsessed with food, Haid shows me one of his favourites. It is an early video, a response to an official television broadcast in which an alleged eye-witness described how terrorists were stuffing 500 lira notes and drugs into kebab sandwiches and using them as bribes to make people protest. Two young men from Hama promptly uploaded a fake cooking show called, Eat and Protest! Speaking into a cucumber instead of a microphone, the chef announces the dish of the day: "the 500 lira kebab." He runs through the ingredients: "First we slice open the bread and stuff it with kebab (low-fat, of course, so it doesn’t soak the money). Today, we’ll be using the dynamite-flavoured pills, which are especially suitable for suicide attacks. We crush them up, so the protesters can’t taste them. Then we carefully sprinkle the powder on the kebab so it can’t be seen. Wrap the money tightly around the sandwich. Bon appetit. If you want to know how delicious and effective this sandwich is, you can ask the 500,000 people who took to the streets in Hama just to get hold of one."

For Haid, what is underway is more than a mere uprising: "Dictatorships play on fear, and create almost sacred taboos. This is why these forms of expression are truly revolutionary: they desecrate the symbols of power," he said.

As biting dissent has stripped the regime of whatever legitimacy it once enjoyed, he bitterly admits, it is now naked violence and the higher stakes of international politics that keep it standing. He finds wisdom in an entry on a Facebook page: The regime is gone, but how do we get rid of it?


برلمان بأياد خارجية في السعودية

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لا تريد السلطة في السعودية لشعبها أن يتطلع إلى الأفق ولا أن ينظر إلى الشعوب المتحررة من حوله، وهي  تصادر الحريات في الداخل وفي الخارج وتغيب الكلمة وتغتال الأحلام بالسجن والرصاص. وتلفق التهم ضد كل من يرفع صوته عالياً مطالباً بالحرية والكرامة.

تمكنت وزارة الداخلية في السعودية من أن تخفي قضية المطالبين بالإصلاح والتغيير بإشغال شعبها بشخوص القضية ومذاهبهم، بدلاً من أن تسعى لتلبية تلك المطالب أو أن تطرحها على طاولة النقاش،وكانت تهمة الخيانة والعمالة حاضرة وسهلة يسيرة وخصوصاً ضد طائفة الشيعة في المنطقة الشرقية والمعزولين قهراً ثقافياً واجتماعياً عن بقية أبناء وطنهم ومجتمعهم.وصدّق أغلب أطياف المجتمع تلك التهم والتلفيقات دونما أدنى تحقق،ذلك لأن بعض فئات الشعب السعودي مأزوم بجرحه الطائفي الذي أسسته نظرة الدولة الأحادية للمجتمع، لقد أُسقط المطالبون بالحرية والعدالة في بئر الخيانة والعمالة فضاعت نتيجة لذلك أصل القضية التي كانوا يحملونها معهم.

في حين كان الأجدر في ظل الغيمة السوداء التي اجتاحت شخوص الحراك المطلبي في القطيف أن تُطرح أسئلة عقلانية وأن يتم الإجابة عليها بكل موضوعية بدلاً من الذهاب بتلك الإتهامات إلى أبعد من مداها الطبيعي، ولنأخذ مثالاً على ذلك: لو افترضنا أن الشارع الشيعي في المنطقة الشرقية طالب ببرلمان منتخب (وقد طالب بذلك فعلاً)، فأي ضير لأهل السنة وفي بقية مناطق المملكة في ذلك إذا ما تحقق هذا المطلب لكافة أبناء الشعب؟ الشيعة لا يمثلون أكثر من ١٠٪ من كافة الشعب السعودي، ولو افترضنا أنهم سيمثلون أنفسهم في ذلك البرلمان على أساس طائفي، فأي تأثير سيكون لهذه الفئة القليلة على هذا البرلمان؟ ولكن من ناحية أخرى أي فائدة سيجنيها المجتمع السعودي من وجود تمثيل شعبي يقوم بمهمة الدفاع عن حقوق المواطنين ويساهم في درء المفاسد ومحاسبة المسؤولين بدلاًَ من إطلاق أيديهم بدون محاسبة؟ وما الذي يضير الحكومة من تمثيل شعبي منتخب إذا كانت تلك الحكومة تحب لشعبها التطوير والتقدم؟ بل إن النهوض بالشعب للمشاركة في الحياة السياسية هو من مهام الدولة الواعية والتي تسير على خطى التنمية البشرية الحقيقية.

وعلى مثله فقس بقية الشعارات وبقية المطالب المرفوعة في القطيف أو في غيرها من المناطق والتي أُريد لها أن تختفي خلف ملصقات التهم الجاهزة، والتي حَجبت رؤيتَها مشاعر الخيانة والعمالة، وتوسعت الهوة بين أبناء الوطن الواحد وأُدخل المجتمع في دائرة المهاترات التي لم تبرد نارها إلى يومنا هذا.

المطالبة بتمثيل شعبي منتخب ومحاكم عادلة معلنة وإلغاء التوقيف التعسفي وإطلاق الحريات وتجريم التمييز الطائفي كلها مطالب تخدم كافة الشعب وليس طائفة بعينها،وكلها تصب في هدف واحد هو السير نحو دولة الشعب ودولة القانون،وهو مطلب الجميع وليس مطلب طائفة دون أخرى.لم يكن في تلك المطالب ما يزعزع أمن البلاد ولم يكن في تلك الشعارات ما يستدعي أن نتهم من يرفعها ويرفع صوته بها هنا أو هناك بأنه مدفوع بأيادٍ خارجية وعميل يهدف الخراب والفساد للبلاد!

الشعب السعودي أحوج ما يكون اليوم لأن يعيش التقارب بين أبنائه وبحاجة ماسة إلى التأمل والتروي وعدم الاندفاع في تصديق التلفيقات عن أي مكون من مكونات مجتمعه، والنظر إلى الأمور بهدوء أكثر، بعيداً عن النزعة الطائفية أو القبلية والتي تذهب بالأمور إلى غير حقيقتها وتسير بالأحداث في اتجاه لا يصب في صالح الوطن على الإطلاق.

وما لم يستوعب أي شعب أن المطلب الحق لا هوية له ولا انتماء فلن يتمكن من أن يخطو خطوة واحدة نحو التنمية والتغيير.والإلتفات إلى شخوص أي قضية يضيع قيمتها ويخفي الحقيقة وراء غبار النعرات والطائفيات.وفي المقابل متى ما استطاع أي مجتمع أن ينظر إلى القيم بغض النظر عن الأشخاص كان أقرب إلى التطوير وتحقيق العدالة.

لقد نجحت وزارة الداخلية في السعودية في أن تقصي كل الساعين نحو التطوير السياسي ومن جميع الطوائف والإنتماءات بأن شدت انتباه الناس إلى شخوصهم وألصقت بهم التهم، ولم تناقش تلك المطالب أو تسمح لأحد أن يقوم بالحديث عنها أصلاً .لقد تمكنت من محاربة الأشخاص و تجييش الرأي العام في محاربتهم، لتحارب بالنتيجة أصل الفكرة والموضوع ويذوب المطلب في دوامة الهياج المستعر تجاه الخائنين.

كل الأحداث القريبة والبعيدة أثبتت أن وزارة الداخلية في السعودية تعمل على سلب الشعب حق الكلمة والذي يعني بمؤداه سلب قدرته على تمثيل نفسه ومن ثم سلبه القدرة على محاسبة المسؤول،فلماذا لا نستنتج في أجواء كهذه بأن النظام لا يريد أن يُحاسب بدلاً من أن نصدق أن هناك من يريد الفتنة والخراب ومن أبناء هذا الوطن ناسين ومتناسين كل تلك الحقائق؟

لا بد لأي مجتمع يعيش الاختلاف فيما بين مكوناته أن يتعامل على أساس إنساني وحسب لا على أساس طائفي أو قبلي أو عشائري، ذلك لأن الطائفية نار تلتهم مشاريع التنمية والتطوير وتضعف من إرادة الشعب وتجعله مشغولاً بأخطاء بعضه البعض، متحيناً لفرصة الانتقام والتنكيل،وإذا كان الشعب كل الشعب يريد فعلاً أن يطور نفسه وأن يحقق دولة القانون والنظام،فلن يتحقق ذلك في أجواء التخوين وتصديق الإفتراءات، إنه يتحقق فقط إذا اجتمعت كلمة الشعب على مطلب واحد..

إن من يطالب بدولة القانون والدستور إنما يطالب بصورة عملية بأن تتم محاسبة كل خائن، والذين يرفعون أعناقهم بالهتاف في ساحات القطيف يقولون تعالوا لنحارب كل الخونة من أي طائفة كان وإلى أي حزب أو قبيل انتمى بإرادة الشعب، وإرادة الشعب لا تكون إلا تحت قبة البرلمان.

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Crowds cheer as a blow-up doll of Iranian President Ahmadinejad gets raped/sodomized with a nuke by a dungeon master

Gay Pride San Francisco 2011

Words Are Not Enough

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During the past two weeks, the United States and the European Union released their annual human rights and progress reports, respectively, on Israel. Each one substantially criticized the state of minority rights in the country. The US State Department called the "institutional and societal discrimination" against Arab citizens of Israel one of the country's top three most significant human rights issues of 2011, and the EU stressed that "progress on the situation of the Arab minority was limited."

While the acknowledgment of discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel is welcome, these words alone are not an adequate response to the urgency of a rapidly deteriorating human rights situation. While these super-powered friends of Israel are recognizing the "right" wrongs, and saying the right things about the degradation of the rule of law in Israel, words and recognition in oft-neglected reports are insufficient, at best.

It may come as a surprise that the yearly US State Department "Report on Human Rights Practices" in Israel has, for nearly a decade, noted the "institutional, legal and societal discrimination" faced by Israel's Arab citizens. In the last two years, discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel has rightfully taken center stage, with the State Department calling it a "principal human rights problem" in 2010, and now, one of the three top rights issues in the country in 2011.

It may also be news that in February 2011, for the first time, the EU urged Israel "to increase efforts to address the economic and social situation of the Arab minority, to enhance their integration in Israeli society, and protect their rights." Or that in December 2011, as reported in Ha’aretz, an internal EU report concluded that the Arab minority in Israel was a "core issue, not second tier to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." Or that in mid-May 2012, as part of the European Neighborhood Policy Progress Report on Israel, the EU voiced particular concern about the ongoing trend of "an unprecedented number of potentially discriminatory or even anti-democratic bills being tabled in the Knesset," saying that the bills "tend to antagonize relations with the Arab minority."

Both the EU and the US noted the persistence of deep socioeconomic disparities between Arab citizens and their Jewish counterparts, with the Americans going so far as to recognize that such disparity is often the result of indirect discrimination, such as conditioning social and economic benefits on military service, from which Arab citizens are exempt.

The reports also reflect serious concern about the human rights challenges facing the Arab Bedouin in the Negev. The EU highlighted the government-approved Prawer Plan, which aims to forcibly displace tens of thousands of Arab Bedouin from their ancestral land, noting that the plan was "criticized for the limited consultation of representatives of unrecognized Bedouin villages -- which would be the most vulnerable in the event of relocation." 

The US State Department’s analysis of the challenges facing the Arab Bedouin community has remained largely unchanged for the past ten years, regularly concluding that the Arab Bedouin population is the country's "most disadvantaged." This year, the State Department was able to point to a legal victory by Adalah in June 2011 in which the Supreme Court ruled that "the Water Tribunal should provide basic access to water for persons living in unrecognized villages." Notably, however, the Water Tribunal (an Israeli court sitting as an arbiter on conflicts over access to water in the Negev) has subsequently refused to implement the decision.

By this time next year, if current trends continue and the US and the EU continue to rely on words alone, more discriminatory and racist legislation will have been enacted, legal victories upholding Palestinian citizens' rights will go unimplemented, and the socioeconomic conditions of Palestinian citizens of Israel will only have worsened.

Racism is being normalized among the Israeli public, and legitimized in Israeli politics. The favored "words-on, hands-off" approach of the international community may actually be facilitating, if not contributing to, this troubling reality. If the ultimate goal of exposing human rights violations is to protect people from rights abuses, the US and the EU must speak out publicly at the highest levels, and must initiate a proactive strategy to change Israel's policies.  

Taken alone, strong rhetoric on human rights and equality is at best acquiescence to discrimination, oppression and inequality, and at worst, serves as fuel for continuing such unjust policies. If the Israeli government knows that the world is content to simply note concern about human rights violations, it will continue to actively pursue the dangerous policies and practices against the Palestinian minority (not to mention Palestinians living under Occupation). True democracy and the respect of human rights cannot survive on words alone.

[Originally published in Ha’aretz English Edition on 1 June 2012.]

خلّصونا من المخلّصين

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 ["خلّصونا من المخلّصين: عن أوربا واليونانيين" لسلاڤو جيجاك نشرت في “لندن ريڤيو أوف بوكس” في ٢٥ آيار، ٢٠١٢. ترجمة سنان أنطون]
تخيل مشهداً من فلم سوداوي يصور مجتمعنا في المستقبل القريب. دوريات حرّاس بزي موحد في شوارع شبه مقفرة تبحث في الليل عن المهاجرين والمجرمين والمشردين. يهجمون بوحشية ضد من يعثرون عليه. ما قد يبدو صورة خيالية من هوليوود هو حقيقة في اليونان اليوم. ففي الليل يدور أعضاء حزب الفجر الذهبي الفاشي- الذي فاز بسبعة بالمئة من الأصوات في الدورة الأخيرة من الانتخابات والذي يقال إنه يحظى بدعم خمسين بالمئة من شرطة أثينا- الذين نصبوا أنفسهم حراساً، مرتدين ثياباً سوداء ويعتدون بالضرب على كل من يعثرون عليه من المهاجرين الأفغان والباكستانيين والجزائريين. إذاً هذه هي الطريقة التي يتم بها الدفاع عن أوربا في ربيع ٢٠١٢.

والمشكلة في الدفاع عن الحضارة الأوربية ضد المهاجرين، هي أن ضراوة الدفاع هي نفسها التهديد الأخطر على “الحضارة” من أي عدد من المسلمين. فما حاجة أوربا إلى أعداء إذا كان هؤلاء هم الأصدقاء الذين يدافعون عنها؟ قبل مئة سنة أجاد جي كي جسترتون التعبير عن المأزق الذي واجه منتقدي الدين حين كتب: “ ينتهي الأمر بالرجال الذين يبدأون بمحاربة الكنيسة من أجل الحرية والإنسانية إلى التضحية بالحرية والإنسانية لكي يحاربوا الكنيسة. . . لم يهدم العلمانيون أشياء مقدسة، بل هدموا أشياء علمانية.” إن الكثير من المحاربين الليبراليين يتوقون لمحاربة التطرف اللاديمقراطي إلى درجة أنهم يتخلصون من الحرية والديمقراطية في سبيل محاربة الإرهاب. إذا كان “الإرهابيون” على استعداد لتخريب هذا العالم من أجل حبهم لعالم آخر، فإن هؤلاء الذين يحاربون الإرهاب عندنا مستعدون لتخريب الديمقراطية من أجل كراهيتهم للمسلمين. والبعض منهم يعشق الكرامة الإنسانية لدرجة أنهم مستعدون لشرعنة التعذيب كي يدافعوا عنها. فهي قبل للعملية التي يبدأ بها المدافعون المتطرفون عن الدين بمهاجمة الثقافة العلمانية، ثم ينتهي الأمر بهم إلى التضحية بمعتقداتهم في توقهم لمحو أي مظهر من مظاهر العلمانية التي يكرهونها.

لكن أولئك الذين يهاجمون المهاجرين في اليونان ليسوا التهديد الأساسي، بل نتاج جانبي للتهديد الحقيقي وهو سياسات التقشف التي سببت معضلة اليونان. سيتم إجراء الجولة التالية من الانتخابات في اليونان في السابع عشر من حزيران. وتنذرنا المؤسسة الأوربية بأن هذه الانتخابات حاسمة: لا مصير اليونان وحدها، بل مصير أوروبا كلها على المحك. يقولون إن واحدة من النتيجتين، وهي النتيجة الصحيحة، ستسمح باستمرار عملية إصلاح الاقتصاد عن طريق التقشف، وهي مؤلمة ولكنها ضرورية. والبديل، إذا فاز حزب سيريزا “اليساري المتطرف” سيكون تصويتاً للفوضى ونهاية العالم (الأوربي) كما نعرفه.

إن المتشائمين على حق، لكن ليس للأسباب التي يريدونها. يشتكي منتقدو ترتيباتنا الديمقراطية الحالية من أن الانتخابات لا تقدم خياراً حقيقياً. بل إن ما نحصل عليه هو اختيار من بين حزب من وسط اليمين، وحزب من وسط اليسار لا يوجد أيما فرق بين برامجهما. في السابع عشر من حزيران سيكون هناك خيار حقيقي: المؤسسة (“باسوك” و”الديمقراطية الجديدة”) على جانب، وسيريزا على الجانب الآخر. وكما هو الحال كلما كان هناك خيار حقيقي فإن المؤسسة مذعورة. يقولون بأن الفوضى والفقر والعنف سيحل إذا ما أخفق الناس في الاختيار الصحيح. فاحتمال انتصار حزب سيريزا سيبعث أمواج الذعر في الأسواق العالمية. هذا هو موسم الشخصنة الأيديولوجية: فالأسواق تتحدث كأنها بشر، معبرة عن “قلقها” لما سيحدث إذا فشلت الانتخابات في انتاج حكومة بتفويض البقاء مع برنامج التقشف المالي وإعادة الهيكلة للاتحاد الأوربي وصندوق النقد الدولي. لا وقت لدى المواطن اليوناني للقلق من هذه الاحتمالات فلديه ما يكفيه من مخاوف في حياته اليومية التي وصلت بؤساً لم تشهده أوربا منذ عقود.

وتوقعات مثل هذه تحقق نفسها بنفسها.  فتؤدى إلى الرعب وتنتج ما تحذّر منه بالضبط. إذا فاز سيريزا فستأمل المؤسسة الأوربية أن نُلقَّن درساً ونعرف بالضبط ما يحدث عندما تكون هناك محاولة لتعطيل حلقة التواطؤ المتبادل بين تكنوقراطية بروكسل وشعبوية معاداة المهاجرين. ولهذا السبب أوضح ألكسس تسيبراز، زعيم سيريزا، في مقابلة أجريت مؤخراً بأن أولوياته في حال فوز سيريزا هي مواجهة الرعب “سيتغلب الناس على الرعب. لن يستسلموا ولن يتم ابتزازهم.” أمام سيريزا مهمة شبه مستحيلة. فصوتهم ليس صوت اليسار المتطرف ”المجنون”، بل صوت العقل إذ يعلو ضد جنون أيديولوجيا السوق. وقد تخلوا عن تخوف اليسار من استلام السلطة باستعدادهم للإمساك بزمام الأمور. لديهم الشجاعة لترتيب الفوضى التي خلقها الآخرون. عليهم أن يمارسوا مزيجاً قوياً من المبدأية والعملية، ومن الالتزام الديمقراطي والاستعداد للتصرف بسرعة وبحزم عند الحاجة. ولكي تكون لديهم أدنى فرصة للنجاح سيحتاجون إلى تضامن أوربي. وهذا لا يعني معاملة شريفة من قبل كل بلد أوربي فحسب، بل مزيداً من الأفكار الخلاقة مثل تشجيع السياحة التضامنية هذا الصيف.

كتب ت س إليوت في “ملاحظات من أجل تعريف الثقافات” بأن هناك لحظات يكون فيها الخيار الوحيد هو بين الهرطقة وعدم الإيمان؛ أي حينما تكون الطريقة الوحيدة لإبقاء الدين حياً هي القيام بانشقاق طائفي. وهذا هو وضع أوربا اليوم. فالهرطقة الجديدة، والتي يمثلها في هذه اللحظة سيريزا، هي الشيء الوحيد الذي يمكن أن ينقذ ما يستحق الانقاذ من التجربة الأوربية: الديمقراطية، والثقة بالشعب، والتضامن المتكافئ. . . إلخ. أما إذا تم التغلب بالمناورة على سيريزا فسينتهي بنا الأمر في أوربا بـ”قيم آسيوية” وهذا لا علاقة له بآسيا بالطبع، بل بميل الرأسمالية المعاصرة لتعليق الديمقراطية.

التناقض الذي يعمل بموجبه “التصويت الحر” في المجتمعات الديمقراطية هو كالآتي: المرء حر في الاختيار بشرط أن يختار الخيار الصحيح. ولهذا فعند اختيار الاختيار الخاطئ (كما حدث عندما رفضت إيرلندا الدستور الأوربي) فيتم التعامل مع الخيار كخطأ. وتطالب المؤسسة فوراً بإعادة العملية “الديمقراطية” لكي يتم تصحيح الخطأ. عندما اقترح جورج بابندريو، رئيس الوزراء آنذاك، إجراء استفتاء حول صفقة الإتحاد الأوربي في نهاية العام الماضي، تم رفض الاستفتاء بحد ذاته كخيار باطل.

هناك روايتان رئيسيتان حول الأزمة اليونانية في الإعلام: الرواية الألمانية - الأوربية (اليونان عديمو المسؤولية و كسالى، يبذرون ويتهربون من الضرائب) والرواية اليونانية (سيادتنا القومية موضع تهديد من قبل الليبرالية الجديدة التي تفرضها بروكسل). عندما أضحى من المستحيل تجاهل محنة الشعب اليوناني، ظهرت رواية ثالثة: يتم تمثيل اليونانيين على أنهم ضحايا بحاجة إلى معونة كما لو أن حرباً أو كارثة طبيعية قد ضربت البلد. ومع أن الروايات الثلاث غير حقيقية، إلا أن الثالثة هي الأكثر إثارة للتقزز. اليونانيون ليسوا ضحايا. إنهم في حرب ضد المؤسسة الاقتصادية الأوربية وما يحتاجونه هو التضامن معهم في نضالهم، لأنه نضالنا نحن أيضاً.

ليست اليونان استثناء، بل إنها أرض الاختبار الرئيسية لنموذج اقتصادي اجتماعي جديد، لا حدود لامكانيات تطبيقه: تكنوقراطية منزوعة السياسة تسمح للصيارفة والخبراء الآخرين بتحطيم الديمقراطية. بتخليص اليونان ممّن يسمون مخلّصيها، فإننا نخلّص أوربا من نفسها.

When Protector Turned Killer

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Back in January, Faiz Fathi Jfara of Bani Walid asked a simple question, “I just need an answer from NATO: why did you destroy my home and kill my family?” NATO refuses to answer him.

NATO went to war in Libya to protect civilians through a U.N. mandate (Resolution 1973). Given legitimacy by the U.N. Human Rights Council and by the International Criminal Court, NATO began its ten thousand sorties. It quickly exceeded the U.N. mandate, moving for regime change using immense violence. All attempts to find a peaceful solution were blocked. The African Union's high-level panel was prevented from entering Libya as the NATO barrage began.

Several influential countries, including Russia and China, have asked for an evaluation of Resolution 1973 since late last year. They want to know if NATO exceeded its mandate.

A report by independent Arab human rights groups in January 2012 and a report by the U.N. Human Rights Council (2 March 2012) have been largely ignored. Both show that the proposition that Muammar Qadhafi's forces were conducting genocide was grossly exaggerated, and both called for an open investigation of NATO's aerial bombardment. The U.N. report found that crimes against humanity and war crimes had been committed by the Qadhafi regime and by the rebels. It also found evidence of potential war crimes by NATO.

The saviours' kill rate

The second finding is stark. If NATO went into the conflict with its “responsibility to protect” (R2P) civilians, what was the civilian casualty rate as a result of NATO's bombardment? Would the U.N. Security Council sanction further NATO “humanitarian interventions” if the kill rate from the saviours is higher than or equals that of the violence in the first place?

When the Human Rights Council began its investigations, NATO's legal adviser Peter Olson wrote a sharp letter to the commission's chair:

We would be concerned if ‘NATO incidents' were included in the commission's report as on a par with those which the commission may ultimately conclude did violate law or constitute crimes. We note in this regard that the commission's mandate is to discuss ‘the facts and circumstance of ... violations [of law] and ... crimes perpetrated.' We would accordingly request that, in the event the commission elects to include a discussion of NATO actions in Libya, its report clearly state that NATO did not deliberately target civilians and did not commit war crimes in Libya.

NATO was eager to prejudge the investigation — it would not allow the investigation to take up issues of war crimes by NATO.

On March 25, The New York Times' C.J. Chivers wrote a strongly worded essay, “NATO's Secrecy Stance,” which revisited a story that Mr. Chivers had written about the 8 August 2011 NATO bombardment of Majer (a village between Misrata and Tripoli). It is clear that at least 34 civilians died in that attack. It is a test case for NATO's refusal to allow any public scrutiny.

NATO claims that it has already carried out a review of this case. Mr. Chivers is right to note that this raises an issue fundamental to democratic societies, namely, civilian control over the military. If the public and the political authorities are not allowed access to the evidence and provide oversight over the NATO command, the idea of civilian control of the military is violated.

Five days later, The New York Times editorial (“NATO's Duty”) followed Mr. Chivers, noting that NATO “has shown little interest in investigating credible independent claims of civilian fatalities.” This is strong language from an editorial board that has otherwise been quite comfortable with the idea of NATO's “humanitarian interventions.”

The next day (March 31), NATO's spokesperson Oana Langescu responded that NATO has already done its investigation, and if the Libyan authorities decide to open an inquiry then “NATO will cooperate.” There is no indication that the threadbare Libyan government is going to question its saviours. On May 2, the Libyan government passed Law no. 38 which gives blanket amnesty to the rebels. Such a protection implicitly extends to NATO. Seven thousand pro-Qadhafi detainees sit in Libyan prisons. They have not been afforded habeas corpus. Among them is Saif al-Islam. An International Criminal Court warrant languishes. The U.S. war crimes chief, Steven Rapp, joined the Libyans in refusing the ICC request for Qadhafi. “We certainly would like to see the Libyans provide a fair and appropriate justice at the national level,” he said on 6 June. When the ICC was created in 1998, both the U.S. and Qadhafi's Libya opposed it. During the rush to war, the ICC was very useful to build propaganda against the Qadhafi regime. Now it is to be set aside. Libya shows how “human rights” is used as a pretext for war making and is not taken seriously when conflict ends.

Failure to acknowledge

A Human Rights Watch report entitled Unacknowledged Deaths: Civilian Casualties in NATO's Air Campaign in Libya released on May 14 revisits the theme of an investigation. When HRW was doing its work, it wrote to NATO requesting answers to some of its questions. NATO's Richard Froh (Deputy Secretary General of Operations) responded on March 1 that NATO had already answered the U.N.'s Commission of Inquiry (which it actually had not) and that HRW should see those “detailed comments to the Commission, which we understand will be published in full as part of that report. We encourage you to consider these comments when drafting your own report.” It was a brush off. Because NATO refused to cooperate, HRW could only look at eight sites (out of ten thousand sorties). From this limited sample, HRW verified the killing of 72 civilians, with half of them under the age of 18. NATO's silence led HRW to conclude, “NATO has failed to acknowledge these casualties or to examine how and why they occurred.”

The scandal here is that NATO, a military alliance, refuses any civilian oversight of its actions. It operated under a U.N. mandate and yet refuses to allow a U.N. evaluation of its actions. NATO, in other words, operates as a rogue military entity, outside the bounds of the prejudices of democratic society. The various human rights reports simply underlie the necessity of a formal and independent evaluation of NATO's actions in Libya.

[This article was originally published in The Hindu.]

Last Week on Jadaliyya (June 4-10)

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This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes the most read articles and most recent videos. Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series. 

 


 


 

 
 

Egypt Media Roundup (June 11)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.]  

“Abouel Fotouh: Boycotting elections could facilitate fraud”
Former presidential candidate Abd El-Moneim Abou al-Fotouh says his campaign will decide between backing Mohamed Morsy and invalidating votes for the run-off.

“Brotherhood lawyer: 1.5 million military, police personnel listed as voters in first round”
Abdel Moneim Abdel Maqsoud, legal adviser to Mohamed Morsy’s campaign, says the number of military and police voting in the run-off will double.

“Egypt's army ends deadlock on constituent assembly”
SCAF announces that the Parliament will meet June 12 to elect a new Constituent Assembly.

“The need for self-criticism after the first round”
Ashraf El-Sherif explores the reasons behind failures of different groups during the first round of the presidential elections.

“FJP, Nour reject Shafiq’s accusations of killing demonstrators”
The Freedom and Justice Party and Al-Nour Party rejected Ahmed Shafiq’s allegations that they were involved in killing protesters during on February 2, 2011

“Update: SCAF to set Constituent Assembly criteria if parties fail to agree”
SCAF says it will issue a new constitutional declaration if he Parliament fails to set the criteria for the formation of the Constituent Assembly.

“Egypt secret police files shine light on murky world”
More than a year after state security offices were stormed, the fate of personal files that activists found inside is still unknown.

“The History of Violence”
Salama Moussa says the history of violence is in Egypt is an important concern that voters have going into the presidential elections.

“Updated: Broad satisfaction over Egypt's Constituent Assembly deal”
Agreement is reached over the composition of the new Constituent Assembly, which will be divided equally between Islamists and non-Islamists.

“Shafiq country: Why Morsi lost Egypt's Delta”
Gregg Carlstrom investigates the reason behind Ahmed Shafiq’s popularity in Sharqiya governorate, the birthplace of his opponent – Mohamed Morsi.

“Sore Losers”
Wael Eskander says Hamdeen Sabahy and Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh contesting election results does not mean they are unable to face electoral defeat.

“What do Egyptians expect from justice?”
Results from a survey show that Egyptians are keenly interested in the trials of former regime officials and expect more than just “guilty” verdicts.

“The Strategic Direction of the Egyptian Revolution”
Tarek Osman says the Egyptian Revolution would either succumb to populism or see some of its leaders put the foundations for sustainable and lasting change.

“Brotherhood presidential candidate Mursi attempts to mollify women's fears
Mohamed Morsi says he would not change laws on women’s rights if he becomes president.

“BREAKING: Court to assess Disenfranchisement Law on 14 June”
The Egyptian Constitutional Court has scheduled a hearing for the Disenfranchisement Law aimed at preventing former regime officials from running in the presidential elections.

“Giza court acquits 13 policemen on charges of killing protesters”
The Giza Criminal Court finds thirteen policemen not guilty of killing protesters in the neighborhoods of Imbaba and Kerdasa on Jan 28-29, 2011.

“Six injured in Monufiya after fight over Ahmed Shafiq poster”
A fight erupts between families after an attempt to display a poster of presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq.

“ElBaradei: The real battle is to write constitution, cancel election”
Mohamed ElBaradei says he supports the protesters in Tahrir Square and will hold a meeting with the revolutionary youth.

“South Sinai police organize protest after attack”
Police in South Sinai walk out on a protest after an attack that leaves one officer dead and several injured.

“Debates around the second round of the Egyptian presidential elections”
Café Thawra criticizes the decision of the Revolutionary Socialists to back Mohamed Morsy in the presidential run-off.

 

In Arabic:

“ننجو أو نهلك جميعـًا”
Ibrahim El-Hodeiby says that consensus between the Muslim Brotherhood and the other political forces needs to be reached so that the country would not fall in the hands of the former regime.

“إجهاض ثورة «العوانس والمطلقات» بسؤال «إيه إللي نزلهن التحرير؟!» عيب!”
Amina Khairy talks about recent cases of harassment against women protesters in Cairo.

“رفعت السعيد: الثورات العربية «وراءها جهات خارجية» تسعى لـ«نشر الفوضى»”
The Head of Tagammu Party says foreign forces tried to spread chaos during the Arab Uprising; calls on Egyptians not to boycott the elections.

“مشروع قانون «إخواني» لزيادة رواتب ضباط الجيش 400٪”
The Freedom and Justice Party has proposed a law to restructure and increase 4-fold salaries of military officers.

"اللجان القانونية لحملات د.أبوالفتوح وصباحيّ وعليّ: مليون صوت باطلة ولجنة تصويتية تصل الأصوات فيها إلى 81 ألف من أصل 43 ألف فقط يحقّ لهم الحق وزيادة ما يقرب من 50%"
The campaigns of Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh, Khalid Ali, and Hamdeen Sabahy issue a joint statement on violations of the first round of elections.

“مفاجأة: «المفوضين» توصي ببطلان إحالة العليا للانتخابات «العزل» للدستورية”
The Committee of delegations of the Constitutional Court Law of Disenfranchisement might revoke the decision of the Supreme Electoral Commission not to implement it.

“سلامٌ على خالد”
Amr Hadi commemorates two years of the death of Khalid Said.

“ساويرس: يجب احترام الانتخابات وأرفض المجلس الرئاسى.. وتأييد الأقباط لشفيق بسبب مدنية الدولة”
Egyptian businessman Naguib Sawiris says the results of the presidential elections should be respected.

“خذلته النيابة في جمع الدلائل... وأهمل هو شهادات الشهود ودفاتر التسليح: هذا ما اطمئنت له عقيدة أحمد رفعت!”
Lawyer Hoda Nasrallah says mistakes of the prosecution led to the disappointing outcome of the Hosni Mubarak trial.

“مذكرة إخوانية تتهم الشاطر بعرقلة التوافق مع القوى الوطنية”
Leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood accuse Khairat El-Shater of obstructing consensus negotiations with other political forces.

 

Recent Jadaliyya articles on Egypt:

Roundtable: The Presidential Poll, Unpacked

Protests in Tahrir; Drones in Turkey's Skies

On Mubarak's Trial, Presidential Elections, and the Return to Tahrir: An Interview with Sharif Abdel Kouddous

Tahrir Protests Continue (Photos and Video)

Beejo and Oum Loubna: About Mubarak (In both Arabic and English)

Saeeds of Revolution: De-Mythologizing Khaled Saeed

The Missing Ikhwan and An Electorate Split in Three

حيرة واشنطن بين شفيق ومرسي


Hizballah, Development, and the Political Economy of Pain: For Syria, What is "Left" (Part 3-Final)

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[This is a third part in a series under the title of "For Syria, What is Left?" The first two parts can be accessed (1) here and (2) here. Arabic Translations can be found (1) here and (2) here.] 

The enormity of the unfolding tragedy in Syria will dwarf the content of the analysis below. I have been waiting for the right time to complete this series, but matters kept getting worse, and we are now looking into the abyss. But this is not an article about what is happening in Syria today; rather, it is about some of the discursive battles among parts of the political "Left" on the question of the Syrian uprising and its implications. I would like to submit my apologies in advance regarding what may seem like cold calculations to some readers. My position regarding the brutality of the Syrian regime historically and today, as well as the sentiment behind the uprisings and, later, some of its deeply problematic turns, has been made clear in previous writings (here and elsewhere), especially regarding my opposition to foreign military intervention. I will not dwell on these matters below. Also, there will be no mention of names (which, admittedly, comes at the expense of this piece’s credibility, but not its tenor).

In the first two parts of this series, I focused on the questions of principles and resistance in combating imperialism. This third part focuses on the political economy of pain regarding two concrete questions: Hizballah and "development." In short, where do, or should, those on the political-economic left stand in relation to both Hizballah's stance on the Syrian uprising as well as the question of political-economic development in Syria?

One way to discuss these questions is through the prism of leftist concerns, including social justice, imperialism, and social empowerment. However, the debates and daily discussions—whether in our living rooms and communities or the hard, electronic, and audio-visual press—suggest that divisions run deep among those who consider themselves on the left. These divisions are solid, and convictions often slip from leftist to nationalist or even communal. At other times, the question is more about whose pain is in view, often to the exclusion of the pain of others across time and space.

Ultimately, amidst the constellation of the fog of war, ideology, and complex regional and international relations, a comprehensive assessment of pain incurred across both time and space is lacking. A broader historical assessment of pain incurred is often washed off by the enormity of the blood being spilled here and now. But history has its own way of judging, and it is mostly concerned with the long-winded tallies. It is on this basis that this article is written.

Before commencing, a short comment on the word “pain” as it is used in this article. “Pain” is not an essential part of the leftist lexicon, but the manner in which the debate often proceeds has referenced pain as a common language/currency. For example, the structural pain of exploited workers or occupied peoples over time; the pain of mourning families; the pain resulting from death and destruction; etc. It matters little whether or not these terms are acceptable. For they have become salient, and the dominant currency of many debates.

[Image from unknown archive]

Not All Leftist Values are Equal

After at least thirty-thousand deaths (some say many more) in Syria, this discussion may seem academic or akin to pontification, but it is not. More than an occasion to understand the contradictions among leftists (self-styled and putative), or the prioritization of values/principles among them, this discussion has real implications for consequential alliances, political positions, networking, and agenda setting—both now and in the future. Furthermore, the implications are not confined to the Syrian situation. They also apply to the evolving meaning of terms like “left,” “liberal,” “nationalist,” and “imperialist” in reference to new movements, unlikely alliances, and changing modes of opposition and resistance—locally, regionally, and globally. 

Today, many seem to claim to be a leftist of sort. They claim to be for social justice, against imperial domination (or the hegemony of global political and economic structures), and so on. But upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that being “left” has also become fashionable for the (a) socially-minded “bourgeoisie” or upper classes (who appeal to amorphous conceptions of social justice based on essentially liberal grounds) as well as the (b) ultra nationalists (who speak and prioritize the language of anti-imperialism from an uncritical nationalist, as opposed to a political-economic or class perspective in relation to capital and various forms of exploitation).

[Chemnitz Karl Marx Monument. Image by Gravitat-Off]

When “left” is viewed as everything, it actually ends up amounting to very little. This “everything is left and everyone is leftist” approach in part characterizes what has been happening to the left in a post-industrialized world, and what in part explains the decline of the left in the past several decades.. In other words, who are we, what do we believe in, and what defines our struggle (i.e., the contours of membership, principles, and action) are questions to which answers have become so radically different among supposed adherents to leftist principles. But, to make a very long story (dissertation long) extremely short, “left” is not everything, and distinctions can be made among the values of the “left” to avoid flattening this category. On the one hand, the prioritization of “leftist” principles, struggles, and action is important. On the other hand, this prioritization cannot happen in a discursive or contextual vacuum. It must be based in practice in order to avoid naive, hypocritical, and/or oppressive dogmatism. For example,  the triumph of the working classes (don’t hold your breath) does not give a carte blanche to the ostensible leadership of this new classless collective, nor is it the end of “politics” or “privilege.” More practically, prioritizing the bigger culprit is the sound approach, but not in all cases and without attention to detail.

I am not in a position—nor do I have the space—to unpack all facets of these claims at this point. As it is, this article is way too long. I will nevertheless unpack them in a longer study in the future. In addressing “prioritization,” however, I would like to emphasize the issues of modes of exploitation in reference to three sets of tension: (1) rights (individual versus collective); (2) locale (local, regional, and global); and (3) spheres (political, social, economic, and cultural). Though all these levels of analysis are important, and certainly most are important to most human beings, the order of importance differs. And that, to an extent, differentiates one’s politics sufficiently to merit, receive, or adopt the label of “leftist” or otherwise. 

To illustrate the point—even if somewhat crudely within the limited space offered here—many of those on the left prioritize economics over politics as the principal source of exploitation. However, they differ regarding the extent to which politics and strategy is relevant to the very question of economic exploitation; i.e. regarding the utility of politics/strategy in reducing exploitation. Second, most leftists (and one has to be careful here) prioritize collective rights over individual rights as a first principle. Nevertheless, they differ on the extent to which the “collective” is defined and delimited: is it all of humanity, a country, group, or region? Third, most leftists prioritize systemic and usually global levels of analysis over local ones, as the principal starting point of analysis, and thus diagnosis as well as potential action. This is because local dynamics are usually viewed as dependent on global structures. Though many leftists do differ on the question of exactly when and how the local merits independent/immediate treatment. Finally, at least for now, most leftists do not separate local forms of exploitation from global ones, and tend to prioritize their political positions based on the need to oppose the bigger and more systematic culprit. However, they differ on the question of thresholds of pain, where local exploitation/oppression might temporarily trump the global one. This was messily illustrated in the two cases of the US war on Iraq in 2003 (where nearly all leftists opposed it) and the Libya/Ben Ghazi moment (when there was something of a debate as to where to stand vis-à-vis external intervention).

The Syrian Case: The Left on Hizballah and Development

Thanks to the Syrian uprising, one is now forced to descend from the clouds of liberal pontification to the ground of real and concrete case-study treatment. More than a year into the uprising, where do those on the left stand? Where should they stand, and why? In part, I have stated unequivocally my position several times both here on Jadaliyya and elsewhere, which is illustrated primarily in my dual opposition to the Syrian regime and to international intervention (see “The Idiot’s Guide to Fighting Dictatorship While Opposing Foreign Intervention in Syria” here). Logically as well as politically, and despite the horrendous pain incurred inside Syria, this position entails the prioritization of opposition to international intervention. However, this position does not absolve the Syrian regime from condemnation based on the same anti-imperialist principles. This position was articulated in the first part of this series in a maximalist form regarding the brutality of the Syrian regime, both now and during the past decades. Furthermore, the Syrian regime’s enabling role in relation to resistance-to-imperialism cannot be considered the sole source of such resistance, especially under the current circumstances. This position, and its justification, was articulated in the second part of this series. In this third and final part, I will address the more concrete questions of the Left’s position on Hizballah and political-economic development in relation to the Syrian case.

Hizballah, Imperialism, and the Political Economy of Pain

The question revolves around how to interpret or judge Hizballah’s supportive stance vis-à-vis the Syrian regime from the Left (even if this support has somewhat subsided recently). Should those on the left who prioritize resistance to imperialism and Israel’s policies abandon their support for Hizballah’s resistance function because of its stance towards the Syrian regime? It should be clear that we are always talking about Hizballah’s resistance function here, not its social or economic stances inside Lebanon, as the latter are patently non-revolutionary to say the least.

For many, the answer is a no-brainer, especially among those who saw in Hizballah’s position a deep betrayal of its own values regarding oppression and exploitation, and also among previous supporters of Hizballah’s resistance function who grew literally disgusted with its current stance—whether or not parts of the opposition have gone astray.

[Hizballah supporters gather to listen to Hizballah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, during a ceremony, in the southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, Friday, May 11, 2012, to mark the end of reconstruction of buildings destroyed during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. He said his militant group has weapons that can accurately hit targets throughout Israel. AP Photo by Bilal Hussein]

 

Having spent some time in Beirut (a world unto itself) and other parts of the Arab world during the past year, the cacophony of views coming from the very same leftist circles is astounding. Some supporters of Hizballah on the left have now abandoned them or disengaged, while others have not budged, or intensified their support almost unconditionally. There are other variations to be sure. 

Those who prioritized the here and now—especially in relation to Syria—have disengaged Hizballah. For them, Hizballah has forever fallen from grace. And those who prioritized the longer view in relation to the entire region and its external relations, and despite the pain incurred in Syria, have intensified their stance. For them, Hizballah’s resistance function can never be diminished.

These are essentially a priori positions and not principled ones. One can imagine a scenario where abandoning support for Hizballah is not necessarily a betrayal of anti-imperialism. Similarly, one can more easily imagine a scenario in which the support of Hizballah’s resistance function is not necessarily an abandonment of the plight of Syrians. 

The problem is partly empirical and contingent on behavior. It is a “do you privilege God or good?” sort of issue. Clearly, a non-dogmatic approach should privilege the good, not God. But the difficulty arises in the real world when privileging the good does not shield you physically against real enemies who care about neither. (If this seems confusing, probably due to my articulation, and/or space constraint, ignore it for now and revisit).

Not only is there no simple answer, but there really is no simple way to approach the issue. All the parts involved are contested when it comes to the Hizballah-Syria question. Worse, the pain that is in sight for some on the left is not the same as the pain that others on the left observe (whether it is political, social, economic, or physical—as in the number of dead, injured, imprisoned, or tortured). And even where it is similar, questions of measurement come into play: if we agree to observe the pain on all sides, how do we measure which pain should define our stance now? 

Metrics for Judgment: Problematizing the Salient Simplicity  

In dealing with the Syria question during the past fifteen months—whether it is through discussions, debates, submission, or analysis related to Jadaliyya, whether it is the dozens of conferences I have attended on Syria in the United States, Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, or—most importantly—whether it is the thick network of personal and familial relations throughout, it is unmistakable how intensely everyone feels about (and analyzes) both the nature and extent of the pain they focus on. I am here referring to differentials among people and institutions that have always opposed US policy in the region and its allies (from Arab dictatorships generally, and the GCC states in particular, to the apartheid state of Israel). 

Above and beyond the vitriol of neoconservative voices in the United States, as well as that of the fumigating nationalists in the region (often hiding behind leftist language), it is more than evident that the Syrian uprising has become akin to a leftist identity crisis of sorts, requiring anyone interested in making sense of the left to pause for a quick assessment of metrics for judgment—lest one thinks that their left is all there is. Admittedly, the word leftist is used loosely here, as it refers to self-identified leftists. The assessment below is surely my own, and discussion is welcome.

In consideration of metrics, we should look at what exactly we are trying to measure. The list and questions below are naturally loaded, but not necessarily exhaustive. First, the question of horizons in time and space varies when it comes to surveying the political economy of pain, and the question of Hizballah in general.

What are the boundaries of the battle zone in reference to pain when it comes to imperialism and oppression? Is it local (i.e., Syria)? Is it regional (i.e., Saudi and Qatari reactionary politics)? Does it relate to Israel’s expansionism? What about US hegemony or—as of late—domination? Is it global and political-economic? Were the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and NATO “intervention” in Libya in 2011 local, regional, or global affairs?

And what is the time frame and nature of pain? How many have been killed in Syria since March 2011 (mostly by the regime)? How many did the Syrian regime kill in Hama in 1982? How many have the “revolutionaries” killed? How many did the United States kill in neighboring Iraq in 1991 and between 2003 and 2011? What is the real extent of structural devastation unleashed by the United States on Iraq during the years of sanctions after 1991 and in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003? How many Arabs has Israel killed and dispossessed since 1948? What is the structural and human cost of US support for more than a dozen Arab (and Iranian, before 1979) dictatorships for at least the past six decades? What is the structural and human cost of Israel’s occupation and apartheid policies during the last six decades? Current killing, deplorable as it is, does not take place in a vacuum. Additionally, though killing on all sides is to be condemned, there is a reason why some ways to stop the killing (e.g., external military intervention) might not be cost-effective and might, as we have seen in Libya, increase the killing by ten or twenty-fold. 

The opposite of calculation is gut reaction. Viscerally speaking, why should the mother of a dead Syrian son killed by Syrian regime forces give a damn about any political economy of pain? The same goes for an Iraqi, Lebanese, or Palestinian mother, father, son, daughter, brother, sister, friend, or comrade in relation to all the above. They probably should not or cannot care, but observers and practitioners in the real world do not have the same luxury of focusing exclusively on the pain of some. To illustrate the point crudely, how are we supposed to react to the pain of the mother of a Nazi officer who was killed in an aggressively brutal battle to take over Europe and annihilate an entire people? To what extent do we give precedence to individual pain? And what is the alternative?

Thus, there is no avoiding of the big picture, of structure, of the cumulative and often invisible effects of decades of a particular phenomenon/trajectory, lest we are either naive or racist/exclusionary.

How else would you explain to someone who asks, “why are you opposed to the US or NATO efforts to create a humanitarian corridor in Syria?”  Where do you start, with a discussion of intentions, with history, or with precedents?  

Metrics for Dummies: One has to look for the bigger monster when considering the political economy of pain—the one that wreaks the most havoc on collectivities in time and space. Step two is never to absolve the little monsters. It is all ugly, but it is not all equally devastating.

Hizballah and Syria

Even if we assume complete knowledge and access, there are differing calculations and answers to the proceeding, which determine one’s stance. In this case, let us consider the stance towards Hizballah’s position vis-à-vis the Syrian regime. It is perhaps fair to dismiss those who do not consider at all the pain of others, but it is not easy to dismiss those who do, even if they come up with different answers. Therefore, we must prioritize, make distinctions, and at times we must be able to go beyond “what is Left” by understanding the relationship and potential trade-offs between our humanity and our politics. 

To make a long story short, it depends on what pain or struggle one privileges, and how they are measured within leftist circles.

Leftist supporters of Hizballah point to the big picture, in time and space, and Hizballah’s role in it—namely, its anti-imperialist resistance—but usually not much else. Hizballah’s resistance function vis-à-vis Israel has arguably been the only one in six decades that posed a formidable defense so far, one that shook the putatively “invincible” aura of the Israeli military machine. This, of course, is by the admission of Israeli generals, among other detractors. One could argue that the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah effectively stemmed the tide of Israeli expansion, at least for some time. The fact that all has been quiet on the Israel-Lebanon front since 2006 is not a function of Hizballah’s irrelevance, as some would like to opine. Rather, it is principally a function Hizballah’s deterrence. Without inflating the role of Hizballah, it is noteworthy that this force is invariably considered when pundits and policy-wonks write about, or call for, a strike on Iran or Syria—and surely on Lebanon. Detractors of Hizballah in the region, and especially in Lebanon, discount such considerations when discussing, for instance, the infamous “Hizballah arms” question and consistently ridicule their resistance function of late, citing the events of May 2008 and their current stance vis-à-vis the Syrian regime. Whatever the merits of this critique (especially the group’s stance on Syria), it is not mutually exclusive to the question of deterrence and actual resistance function. In a perfect world, political position should not undermine analysis.

Many disagree with the deterrence thesis, but this is where the question of metrics comes in: horizon and scope, time and space, and local versus regional and international battles. There really is no clear-cut answer in the general sense. But from an anti-imperialist leftist perspective, it is very difficult to disregard the role of Hizballah to both the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict as well as  the question of US hegemony and its conservative alliances in the region. Surely, Hizballah’s allies are no prize in terms of political-economic (or, in the case of Iran, socially progressive) agendas. But the powers amassed on the other side, including the United States, Israel, and conservative Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and their minions, have arguably been much more damaging over the past six decades. The leadership in Syria and Iran can change, but the global political-economic system that is supported by the other camp is here to stay. This should not be lost on those on the left, and it should not be considered as simply another detail. 

 

[Hizballah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah speaks via a TV screen from a secret location, during a ceremony, in the southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, Friday, May 11, 2012, to mark the end of reconstruction of buildings destroyed during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. AP Photo by Bilal Hussein]

Most importantly, this formulation and prioritization of culprits should not let the brutality and neoliberalism of the Syrian regime (now and during the past two decades at least) off the hook. And neither should Hizballah be considered infallible or sacred, for the sake of real resistance, both now and in the future. Does Hizballah’s support for the Syrian regime trump all the above? That is the question for leftist supporters of Hizballah who were let down by Hizballah’s Syria stance.

For the left, beyond emotional and/or knee-jerk reactions, it is prudent to start with rejecting the thesis that the Syrian regime and Hizballah are the same thing, (i.e., that they are equally responsible for whatever atrocities the regime committed). Hizballah’s support of the Syrian regime from the very beginning—when the uprising was clearly local and overwhelmingly indigenous—was deplorable on the basis of the same outright principles that made Hizballah soar in the face of exploitation and aggression. However, this support was clearly politically motivated. This does not absolve Hizballah. In fact, the complicity factor/thesis is not based on intent or desire on the part of Hizballah, but rather on political expediency/loyalty, and some say necessity: from Hizballah’s perspective (at least that of its leadership), it supported the Syrian regime because it had to, both politically and militarily, and for many reasons, not least of which is the instrumental role the Syrian regime played in Hizballah’s ability to fight Israel in the latter’s war on Lebanon/Hizballah in Summer 2006. 

This question of intent and the internalization of the Syrian regime’s actions by Hizballah’s leadership has become more extant as of late due to the subsiding intensity with which Hizballah has repeated its support for the Syrian regime. Moreover, much chatter has been taking place to the effect that the direction the Syrian regime is taking is becoming doubly harmful for Hizballah: first, because it supported the regime by risking its credibility as a “resistance” movement (from the beginning of the uprising); second, by having the turmoil and killing in Syria overflow into Lebanon, where Hizballah is literally on top, and can only lose from a disruption of the socio-political order. Neither of these observations are lost on Hizballah—or Iran.

It remains to be seen when Hizballah’s discourse toward Syria might change, at least explicitly. The increasing number of horrific massacres and an impending complete breakdown of order in Syria will harden some positions and dilute others. One also has to account for the possibility that Hizballah might be drawn (or actively “lured”) into the conflict by provocation. At that point, all bets would be off regarding the discussion above. There are various actors/forces—local, regional, and international—that would love to defame Hizballah by igniting the Lebanese front, or by dragging Hizballah into the Syrian quagmire as a full-fledged fighting force. If this happens in the absence of direct and ascertainable Israeli and western military involvement, Hizballah’s active intervention in Syria on the side of the regime would prove to be fatal. In the event of an Israeli and/or western military intervention in Syria, Hizballah’s active involvement in Syria would be supported throughout much of the region, at least among the left.

In any case, based on the proceeding, and without belaboring the point further, it is not in the interest of those on the left to equate Hizballah and its resistance function with the Syrian regime at this point. Only under changing circumstances would this logic become defunct, based on the same principles and calculations herein. 

Finally, I tried to argue this point on principle. But it is also important to note the attempts of the Saudi-US alliance, strongly supported by Israel and Qatar, to beat down not only Hizballah, but the notion of resistance to the same imperial and hegemonic policies that have prevailed in the region and devastated its peoples for decades. To be sure, Syria's authoritarianism was not supported by the western portion of this alliance, but it was surely supported heavily, if intermittently, by Arab Gulf oil money since the 1970s. Ultimately, the question is less about the source of funding and much more about what is being done with most of the funding. The majority of the funding and allocation of resources in Syria has been spent on policing its own society or looting it, whereas clearly much of the funding the Hizballah received from Iran or elsewhere--despite less disciplined allocation as a function of its changing class base--has been spent on its fighting force and weapons that are predominantly used in fighting Israel. Many, however, are trying to drag Hizballah in full force into the Lebanese quagmire so as to change the above formula.

Development, Exploitation, and the Political Economy of Pain

For the past sixteen years, I have been both researching and teaching Syria’s political economy, focusing on the shift over the past thee decades in regime alliances from labor to business, and the implications for Syria’s political economy. No other contradiction surpasses the one that exists between the state’s professed political-economic principles and its actual policies, regarding matters that concern the left: social justice, equity, class, empowerment, exploitation, labor, peasantry, and so on, especially since 1986. The regime’s political-economic policies of the last two decades created a powerful new nexus between the political and economic elite, and succeeded in gradually disenfranchising the populist/mass social base which the regime purported to exist in the 1960s and most of the 1970s (my complete analytical narrative of Syria's political economy can be found here).

When the public sector began to falter in the early 1980s, “Arab Gulf” aid dwindled after the oil bust around the same time, and as pressure mounted as a result of the regime’s economic policies that marginalized large sections of the petit bourgeoisie in Syria (connected as they are to the traditional suq quarters with Islamist leanings), the Syrian regime began to unofficially marginalize labor in favor of an unofficial and informal boost to select business interests. Such shifts in policy grew more intense and more formal for nearly two decades until 2005, when President Bashar Asad announced the establishment of the “Social Market Economy,” a dubious mix of market and state-centered economic policies. This new formula reflected more than a change in economic policy that deepened the economic marginalization of most Syrians. More significantly for the topic at hand, it also reflected a maturing change in the social structure of Syria and the regime’s own socioeconomic standing and, thus natural social alliances. The “Social Market Economy” cemented the marriage between the political and economic elite in Syria and consigned any version of socialism—no matter how diluted—to the dustbins of history, in what was supposedly the most leftist regime in the region.

[A motorcyclist passes in front of a picture of Syrian President Bashar Assad displayed on an advert for a construction site with an Arabic writing that reads :"together we build," in Damascus, Syria, Monday, May 23, 2011. AP Photo]


Even if slower and gentler compared to Egypt’s neoliberalism, the trajectory of the regime’s essentially neoliberal policies gradually destroyed the social safety nets created in the 1960s and 1970s, irreversibly compromised labor laws and rights, and shifted the allocation of resources and the entire structure of incentives regarding development towards (rent-seeking) business interests. In sectoral terms, the shares of trade, service, and tourism in the national economy grew at the expense of industry, manufacturing, and agriculture, dramatically reducing the added value that the economy desperately needed. Concomitantly, not only did poverty increase substantially between 1991 and 2005, but so did unemployment and the size of the hyper-vulnerable informal sector. Worse still, the demand for low-skilled labor increased at the expense of the demand for high-skilled labor as a result of the sectoral shift and allocation of resources, leaving Syria bereft of the kind of creative and productive ingenuity as a result of a brain-drain at two levels: from the public to the private sector, and then, as a result of very poor working conditions, from the private sector to elsewhere outside Syria.

[Market in downtown Damascus. Image by author]
 

The countryside and small towns were also effected, if not devastated, by the systematic neglect of agriculture, leading to very high levels of social discontent, which we now see all over our TV screens. Arguably, the final blow to Syria’s semblance of social justice came between 2005 and 2010, when the government gradually reduced or eliminated various food and gas subsidies, leaving the majority of Syrians in dire conditions in terms of making ends meet, and leaving many with literally nowhere to go for subsistence. This became the case generally throughout Syria, with the exception of Damascus and Aleppo where citizens benefited from the presence of the “state,” as well as the proliferation of state-business networks and their corollary non-productive business ventures. It is noteworthy that these two metropolitan cities were also propped up financially, and in terms of real estate, by the inflow of capital(ists) from Iraq after 2003.

In sum, both the productive base of the Syrian economy and any semblance of social justice was nearly decimated by the regime’s economic alliances with capital and the ensuing economic and developmental policies.

The political economy of pain scorecard of the Syrian regime in relation to development and exploitation is poor and, in some areas, reprehensible. Furthermore, it is a fundamental blow to virtually every leftist sentiment as it highlights how the political elite unequivocally championed the cause of the usurpers against a growing army of disenfranchised and increasingly malnourished social sectors (forget about poverty statistics and unemployment).

Leftist politics had no place in Syria for decades, and one can argue that this took place at the expense of creating a stronger social front against Israeli expansion, US domination, and conservative Arab Gulf complicity. If only the regime cared a bit more about the left before the earth fell underneath . . . 

[Statue of Hafiz al-Asad in downtown Damasus. Image by author.]

Conclusion?

There really is none, unfortunately. The plight of the left in the region continues, but the left is here to stay, so long as certain processes and systems of exploitation are at work. The tragedy of the Syrian people is too painful, as the brutality of the Syrian regime is enmeshed in regional and global contradictions that render the situation almost hopeless. It characterizes a situation where the lesser evil is also impossible to support, in and for itself. No matter the arguments about problematic external ploys, the primary responsibility for all this mayhem lies squarely on the Syrian regime, and, contrary to the rather myopic view, the responsibility started at least three decades before the Der`a protests in March 2011.

The Syrian regime had many choices regarding building a better state and better relations with society. Whatever else was at play (from a desire to resist or support resistance), it did not take any of these choices for the vivid purpose of perpetuating its own interests over those of resistance, Palestine, anti-imperialism or any other value on earth. Where the interest of the regime coincided with popular interests locally and regionally (i.e., resistance, etc.), they were pursued, but mainly through proxy (i.e., by enabling resistance via Hizballah rather than engaging in it directly). When these interests collided, anti-imperialism was thrown out the window in favor of self-preservation. Having said that, it is completely short-sighted and uninformed to reduce Syria's anti-imperialist role to zero or to a facade. Without the support of Syria to groups fighting various version of imperialism and domination (e.g., the expansion of Israel's apartheid state), the political map of the region would have appeared quite different today. Maximalist narratives on both sides r are almost irreversibly uncalibrated.

At this point, however, the Syrian regime destroyed its ability to contribute to anything besides its own survival, and in the ugliest of manners. Hence, the importance of separating the question of resistance from the question of the survival of the Syrian regime. Leftists can do this now and prepare for the coming struggle, or they can do it later. The only factor that might revive the regime's fortunes is direct military intervention by the US, NATO, Israel, and their minions. As for Hizballah, one factor that can certainly affect its real (not perceived) standing, is if it is dragged into an ugly civil strife, or war, in Lebanon, even if unfairly provoked by its detractors--this is HIzballah's challenge. In fact, this logic is clearly not lost on Hizballah. The shift in its discourse regarding the gruesome killing in Syria and the dramatic reduction in its "discursive" support of the regime is not a whimsical one, provided everything else remains constant (e.g., in the absence of direct foreign intervention). A close look at the speeches of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah over the past 4 months is indicative, though it must not be exaggerated.

On the question of development and leftist concerns, the Syrian regime's scorecard constitutes a monumental travesty, and a very old one at that, considering it started abandoning labor in the mid 1980s. The rest is an ugly history of creeping rent-seeking by regime officials and their "private" business cronies, executing the ugliest sides of crony capitalism and neoliberalism under the firm and supportive control of an authoritarian regime. The disenfranchising economic policies of the past two decades are in large measure what brought social discontent to the streets in 2011, even if this discontent wouldn't have expressed itself this early absent the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings. Gradually crushing the economic opportunities of the masses, as well as their dignity, in favor of amassing capital in the pockets of top business interests is an act of cowardice for a regime that talks that anti-imperialist talk. These were choices governed by the primacy of self-preservation over everything else. Hence, this is the prism through which leftists should regard the Syrian regime, now and yesterday. 

Suddenly, just like some American officials and publics who acted like terrorism started on September 11, 2001, some self-styled leftists assumed that March 2011 is the start of the problem in Syria, where we begin comparing the ugliness of "both parties" as the uprising rages. This "liberal" approach to analysis (i.e., let's look at both parties now, and ignore structure, power relations, and history)  is rejected by some of the same forces that subscribe to it. The behavior and policies of the of the Syrian regime created both the monstrosity we observe on all sides (with the regime being responsible by far for the biggest share) and the opportunity for reactionary actors, states, and designs outside and inside Syrian to wreak havoc with Syria's ability to play any productive role in the region in the future. 

One might say “where to go?” but there are those inside Syria who will not be waiting for us to answer the question. They are truly independent of any outside influence and truly heroic. The question is whether they are still as relevant as they were at the outset of the uprising. The debate on the left will go on.

In the mean time, all eyes are on the breaking point in Syria, whether they look  towards an unexpected turn of events, or towards full-fledged civil war after the continued breakdown of the little remaining semblance of order and state control. Daily and systematic violence and confrontations have reached Damascus in full force, and there does not seem to be any way back.

Electoral Violations Mar Egypt's Presidential Runoff

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The first day of Egypt's presidential runoff has seen substantive reports of electoral violations on both sides of the divisive race.

The supporters of Mubarak-era premier Ahmed Shafiq and the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Mursi have both found themselves accused of trying to garner votes in underhand ways.

Reported practices range from outright vote-buying and herding citizens to polling stations, to violating bans on promoting candidates on polling day and arranging votes for military and police personnel.

Less than a hour after polling stations opened on Saturday, the first reports of violations were already emerging.

The Shehab Centre for Human Rights claimed to have witnessed the use of "rotating papers" by Shafiq supporters in Alexandria. 

Rotating papers is a means of vote-buying, wherein voters entering a polling station are handed ballots by one side pre-marked to elect their favoured candidate. The voter uses the marked paper in the ballot, and on exiting hands to the vote-rigger an empty ballot taken from within the statio, presenting it as proof for payment.

The practice was used extensively in Mubarak-era legislative elections by the then ruling National Democratic Party.

Meanwhile, a source at the Supreme Council for Presidential Elections (SPEC) told Ahram's Arabic portal that judges supervising polling stations in two districts -- Mosqi in Cairo, and Sharqiya province - had discovered voting cards marked for Mursi when they opened envelopes containing what they thought were fresh ballots.

Ahmad Sarhan, spokesperson for Shafiq's campaign, said that voting cards coming from the state press are appearing at voting stations already marked.

"There is obvious infiltration of the press," Sarhan told Ahram Online.

Reports multiplied as Saturday wore on.

In Suez, Shafiq campaign coordinator Mohamed El-Bukhari filed a report against a judge at a polling station, accusing him of leaving his post for prayers and delegating the task of distributing voting cards to an official from Mursi's campaign.

"He didn't close the station in his absence. That gave Mursi's delegate a chance to mark the voting cards," he told Ahram's Arabic language news website, calling the judge's behavior "suspicious."

The Muslim Brotherhood made their share of accusations too.

The organisation's website, Ikhwan Online, cited reports by the Mursi campaign of vote-buying in the Giza district of Mit Okba, where the price for a vote for Shafiq was alleged at LE50.

The report claimed that three women were seen registering the name of people who promised to vote for Shafiq near Yousef El-Sebaii school, and handing out payment after they exited the polling station.

Another report by a Mursi delegate, also reported by Ikhwan Online, claimed two police guards were seen voting at a polling station in the Upper Egypt governorate of Assiut. 

The report gave the names of the guards as Mefrih Wahba Saad Wahba and Awad Samir Awad.

Dina Zakariya, media spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, told Ahram Online that violations by Shafiq supporters were being reported nationwide.

She said these included breaking silence on campaigning, intimidating Mursi supporters and even resorting to violence. Zakariya claimed "Shafiq-related" thugs attacked Brotherhood supporters in the city of Mansoura, capital of Dakaliya province.

Violence as a whole, however, was relatively minor. The head of the One World monitoring centre, Maged Sorour, told Ahram Online that, while clashes did take place, none led to serious injuries or fatalities.

The center, which has published four reports so far says both campaigns systematically broke the last minute ban on campaigning and advertisied their respective candidates close to polling stations.

Their Arabic-language findings can be found here

[Developed in partnership with Ahram Online.]

 

SCAF Expands Its Power with Constitutional Amendments

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As vote counting got underway in the second and final round of Egypt's presidential election, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) issued amendments to the Constitutional Declaration that will limit the powers of the coming president and expand the military's role, notably giving it a heavy influence over the writing of the country's next constitution.

The amended Article 60 gives the SCAF the power to potentially appoint a Constituent Assembly to write the next constitution if the current assembly fails to complete its mandate. The current assembly was elected by a Parliament that was dissolved last week by court order. The Constituent Assembly is required to complete its work within three months and then put its draft to a popular referendum.

The seven provisions added to the declaration issued by the SCAF last March were announced on Sunday in the Official Gazette. An official told state-run MENA news agency Sunday night that SCAF will give details about the content of the document at 9:30 am on Monday.

The SCAF, the president, the prime minister, the Supreme Judicial Council, or one-fifth of the Constituent Assembly have the right to contest any clause issued by the Constituent Assembly if “it is in opposition to the goals of the revolution or its basic principles… or the common principles of Egypt’s past constitutions.”

The assembly would have to revisit the contested clause or clauses within 15 days, and if the contention holds the Supreme Constitutional Court should have the final word.

The SCAF’s new authority over the Constituent Assembly and its decisions follow a long stream of deliberations over constitution writing, whereby Islamist forces tried twice and failed to control the process by convening predominantly Islamist assemblies.

In a further empowerment of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), an amended Article 30 rules that the newly elected president shall swear in before the judicial body. The Constitutional Declaration previously said that the president would take office in front of Parliament.

Last Thursday, the SCC issued two critical rulings that dealt a blow to Islamist forces as it deemed the Parliamentary Elections Law unconstitutional, leading to the dissolution of Parliament. The same day, the court ruled the Political Isolation Law issued by Parliament unconstitutional, keeping Ahmed Shafiq in the race.

Shafiq, a former air force commander and toppled President Hosni Mubarak's last prime minister, is widely viewed as the SCAF's preferred candidate. He is competing against the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsy.

The amended Article 56 gives the SCAF the right to assume the responsibilities of Parliament until a new one is elected. The previous interim constitution allowed the SCAF to issue and overrule legislation.

Article 53 of the amended Constitutional Declaration gives the SCAF the upper hand in running the armed forces, while the elected president can only decide to go to war after its approval. The president can also, with the approval of the SCAF, call on the armed forces to contribute to rule of law and security operations in the country alongside the police if need be.

The amendment to Article 53 retroactively provides constitutional grounds for the recent expansion of the military's power to arrest civilians. Last week, the Justice Ministry issued a decree that military police and military intelligence are allowed to arrest civilians for even minor crimes. Human rights groups had raised questions about the constitutionality of the decree.

Earlier on Sunday, Saad al-Katatny, the former speaker of the dissolved Parliament, rejected the idea of a complementary constitutional declaration and the decision to dissolve Parliament, which he deemed unconstitutional, in a meeting with military Chief of Staff Sami Anan. The Muslim Brotherhood wrote on its official Twitter account, "As far as we are concerned, the supplemental Constitutional Declaration released by the SCAF is null and unconstitutional."

Heba Morayef, a researcher with Human Rights Watch, wrote that while many expected the new constitutional amendments to spell out the powers of the president, these amendments instead expand military powers, "rendering meaningless the June 30 'handover.'" 

[This article originally appeared in Egypt Independent.]

O.I.L. Media Roundup (18 June)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Occupation, Intervention, and Law and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the O.I.L. Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each biweekly roundup to OIL@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every other week]

News

"Guantanamo Defense Lawyers Seek National Broadcasts of Cole Trial", Carol Rosenberg
Abd al Rahim al Nashiri's defense lawyers have asked the military commissions judge, Army Col. James L. Pohl, to provide video feeds currently reserved for closed-circuit broadcasts to C-SPAN, FOX, CNN, ABC, NBC, and CBS.

"Medics: Israeli Forces Shell North Gaza, 2 Killed", Palestine Center
A reposting from Maan, describes several recent bombings in the Gaza strip by the Israeli Defense Forces, including several eyewitness reports of the assaults.

"Four ICC Staff Members Detained in Libya", Gentian Zyberi
On 7 June, the Libyan government detained four members of a delegation sent by the International Criminal Court to meet with Saif Gaddafi, including Gaddafi's ICC-appointed lawyer, accusing the delegation of attempting to pass “dangerous documents” to Gaddafi, the son of the former Libyan leader. 

"Supreme Court Denies Appeals to Seven Gitmo Detainees and Jose Padilla", Joe Wolverton, II
The Supreme Court has rejected the appeals of cases against the United States filed by seven different detainees at Guantanamo Bay, thus upholding the decisions of the lower courts, including one by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that the burden of proof falls on the defendant to demonstrate the falsehood of information provided by the government.

 

"FIFA Wants Action on Hunger Striking Player", Palestine Center
FIFA President Sepp Blatter has "expressed grave concern" regarding the case of hunger striking Palestinian footballer Mahmoud Sarsak, asking the Israeli Football Association to intervene and calling Sarsak and other Palestinian footballers' incarceration an "injustice".

"Women and Children Rounded Up as Israel expels Africans", AFP/Al-Akhbar
An Israeli committee within the Knesset has approved drafts of legislation designed to more than double the maximum penalty for Israelis who assist illegal immigrants. Meanwhile, an Israeli court has ruled that about 1,500 migrants from South Sudan are no longer at risk for deportation. This ruling appears to have cleared the way for a slew of mass arrests of African migrants slated for deportation last week, with most of the arrests being migrants of South Sudanese origin.

 

"CIA Declines Lawmakers' Request for Information on Leaks", Chris Strohm
Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), the head of a US House Intelligence Committee panel on leaks of classified data, tells Bloomberg Businessweek that the CIA has refused to respond to the panel's request for information about the disclosure of classified information, including the recent disclosure of information about a recent foiled Al-Qaeda bomb plot. Strohm writes of Congressional anger over recent leaks of classified information and the efforts of Dianne Feinstein and others to pass legislation that will prevent future leaks and launch an investigation. Charlie Savage of the New York Times writes of the legal difficulties inherent in successfully prosecuting a “leak case”. 


Blogs

"Limits on Sovereignty and Collective Security", Rosa Brooks
In two guest posts for IntLawGirrls, Brooks discusses two recent trends that stand to challenge the capability of the United Nations' collective security structure—and international law in general—to “constrain the use of force”. The first post, linked above, discusses the first trend, what Brooks calls “a changing of normative understandings”, while the second discusses changing warfare technologies.

"The ICC Must Consider Fair Trial Concerns in Determining Libya's Application to Prosecute Saif al-Islam Gaddafi Nationally", Jonathan O'Donohue and Sophie Rigney
Argues that the ICC's mission to “bring the hope of justice where impunity exists” requires it to ensure that a national justice system of Libya will respect Saif Gaddafi's right to a fair trial before deferring to Libya's national proceedings—particularly given that Gaddafi faces the death penalty. This argument rebukes recent statements of the ICC Prosecutor that the fairness of Libya's trial proceedings stood irrelevant to the process of considering Libya's challenge to the Gaddafi cases admissibility.

"Readings: The Canonical National Security Law Speeches of Obama Administration Senior Officials and General Counsels", Kenneth Anderson
Lawfare posts a list of links to speeches given by members of the Obama Administration addressing the Administration's approach to national security and counterterrorism, with a bent towards remarks addressing the legality thereof.

"OTP Responds to Libya's Admissibility Challenge", Kevin Jon Heller
Writing for Opinio Juris, Heller analyzes the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC's response to Libya's challenge to the admissibility of the cases against Saif Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi. Heller singles the response out as important due to its affirmation that states can prosecute international crimes as “ordinary crimes” without violating any principles set out in the Rome Statute and its explanation of why absence of due process in a national prosecution does not automatically make a case part of the ICC's jurisdiction.

"'Crowing' About Iran Sanctions Should Stop", Daniel Joyner
In a guest post on the European Journal of International Law's blog, Joyner presents a “comprehensive” view of the United States' sanctions program against Iran, arguing that it has not brought Iran to the negotiating table and will not end Iran's uraniam enrichment activities. Joyner writes that instead of “crowing” about the sanctions' supposed success, a “sober re-evaluation of the West's mishandling of the dispute with Iran...” is needed.


Commentary

"The Legal Fog Between War and Peace", John Fabian Witt
Writing for the New York Times, Witt points out the argument over the legality of the United States' targeted killings program boils down to the question of whether the United States is at war or not. While Witt finds no easy answers to the question, he argues for a “third way between the longstanding models of war and peace”, which can be accomplished by rethinking the government's ability to regulate the targeting process and addressing the “problem of executive branch power”.

"The Court Retreats on Habeas", New York Times
Addressing the Supreme Court's rejection of seven habeas cases involving Guantanamo Bay detainees, this editorial concludes that “the Roberts court has no interest in ensuring meaningful habeas review for foreign prisoners”. Such decisions from the court, its argued, going against statements the Court has made in cases such as Boumediene, and serve to undermine the court's authority. 

"What Would Augustine Do? The President, Drones, and Just War Theory", David Luban
Asking what President Obama may have learned from St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and other theorists behind the concept of “just war” often used by the White House to justify the United States' targeted killings program, Luban finds “a messy mix of insights and errors” from Augustine and Aquinas as well as Obama.

Reports

"Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted", Pew Research Center
In a survey of attitudes towards the Obama Administration worldwide, the Pew Center finds a widespread feeling that the United States acts unilaterally and without regard for the interests of other countries, as well as significant opposition to drone strikes and targeted killings worldwide. The survey finds that residents of Muslim countries are particularly opposed to the United States' counterterrorism efforts, but that Americans approve overwhelmingly of the drone campaign. 

"Eyes on Israeli Military Court: A Collection of Impressions", Addameer
Addameer's booklet contains a series of the impressions of Addameer volunteers and associates who visited Israeli military courts in the occupied territories, in an effort to provide an insight into the inner workers of the “Kafka-esque” court.

"The NSEERS Effect: A Decade of Racial Profiling, Fear, and Secrecy" Rights Working Group
Rights Working Group reports on the Obama Administration's handling of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, a program launched in the wake of 9/11 for the purposes of registering non-citizens visiting the United States. The program has long-since been discredited as an egregious example of racial profiling, and this report documents the ways in which individuals and families from Muslim countries have been harmed by NSEERS, recommending the full dismantling of the program and the discarding of data collected by the program.

Conference Compendium

"International Law in the Next Two Decades: Form or Substance?” 5-7 July, 2012; Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law; Wellington, New Zealand; Register here

International Law in a Multipolar World”, 3-6 April 2013; American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C.; Register and submit a paper here.

The Political Economy of International Organizations”; 7-9 February, 2013; University of Mannheim and Heidelberg, Germany; Register/submit a paper here.

Public Service, Competitive Examination and the Principle of Equality”, 14 June, 2012; Beirut, Lebanon, Universite Saint-Joseph.


On Jadaliyya

"القدس تحت حكم تركيا الفتاة", Issam Nassar 


"Briefing Note: Adalah's Representation of Arab Knesset Members—Protecting the Right to Political Participation
", Adalah

"Israel and Palestine: International Law Updates", Sharon Weill

"On Legal Advocacy and Legitimation of Control", Hassan Jabareen

 

"جدار الفصل العنصري: خنق في الهوة وخلق للهوية", Fadi Assli

 

"Words Are Not Enough", Rina Rosenberg

"Reflections on a Silenced HIstory: The PCP and Internationalism", Musa Budeiri 

 

English Text of SCAF Amended Egypt Constitutional Declaration

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The new addendum to the 30 March, 2011 military-authored Constitutional Declaration was released late Sunday by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in the official state gazette, which publishes any new constitutional or legislative documents when they are issued.

The following amendments will apply immediately:

- Article 30: In situation that parliament is dissolved the president will be vowed into office in front of High Constitutional Court's General Assembly.

Article 53: The incumbent SCAF members are responsible for deciding on all issues related to the armed forces including appointing its leaders and extending the terms in office of the aforesaid leaders.  The current head of the SCAF is to act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and minister of defense until a new constitution is drafted.  

Article 53/1: The president can only declare war after the approval of the SCAF.

Article 53/2: If the country faces internal unrest which requires the intervention of the armed forces, the president can issue a decision to commission the armed forces – with the approval of the SCAF - to maintain security and defend public properties. Current Egyptian law stipulates the powers of the armed forces and its authorities in cases where the military can use force, arrest or detain.

- Article 56 B: The SCAF will assume the authorities set out in sub-article 1 of Article 56 as written in the 30 March 2011 Constitutional Declaration until a new parliament is elected.

Article 60 B:  If the constituent assembly encounters an obstacle that would prevent it from completing its work, the SCAF within a week  will form a new constituent assembly- to author a new constitution within three months from the day of the new assembly's formation. The newly drafted constitution will be put forward after fifteen days of the day it is completed, for approval by the people through a national referendum. The parliamentary elections will take place one month from the day the new constitution is approved by the national referendum.

Article 60 B1: If the president, the head of SCAF, the prime minister, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary or a fifth of the constituent assembly find that the new constitution contains an article or more which conflict with the revolution's goals and its main principles or which conflict with any principle agreed upon in all of Egypt's former constitutions, any of the aforementioned bodies may demand that the constituent assembly revises this specific article within fifteen days. Should the constituent assembly object to revising the contentious article, the article will be referred to the High Constitutional Court (HCC) which will then be obliged to give its verdict within seven days. The HCC's decision is final and will be published in the official gazette within three days from the date of issuance.

Article 38 of the 30 March, 2011 Constitutional Declaration will be replaced with: "The parliamentary elections will be conducted in accordance to the law."

[This is not an official judicial translation. Developed in partnership with Ahram Online.]

Shafiq's Campaign Claims Candidate is Winning Egypt President Runoff with Fifty-Two Percent

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In an electric atmosphere, members of Ahmed Shafiq’s campaign have said that their candidate is leading the race, frustrated with what they referred to as “facade” results of Mursi’s winning.

“We’ve spotted massive violations from Mursi’s campaign, and according to our counting our candidate is leading with fifty-one to fifty-two percent,” said Ahmed Sarhan, spokesman of Ahmed Shafiq’s campaign.

Sarhan further said that Mursi’s campaign should drop all their allegations of vote-rigging against Shafiq accusing the Brotherhood candidate of "spreading lies about the results of the vote all along.”

Moreover, Sarhan added that final results are not to be announced before all the violations had been verified and all appeals examined by the Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC).

Meanwhile, the media coordinator of Shafiq’s campaign told Ahram Online, "Mursi’s campaign are spreading fake news of victory in order to be able to claim vote-rigging when Shafiq wins,”

The presidential runoffs have witnessed a tight competition between Ahmed Shafiq and his rival, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Mursi, while indications so far put Mursi in the lead - 51.74 percent to 48.25 percent - with ninety-nine percent of votes reported according to the campaign of the Brotherhood leading figure.

[Developed in partnership with Ahram Online.]

Egypt’s SCAF Forms National Defence Council Without Revealing its Duties

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Egypt's ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has formed a National Defence Council, as announced on Thursday, 14 June, in the official state gazette, which publishes any new constitutional or legislative documents when they are issued.

The formation of the council was not publicised by the SCAF.

The SCAF, however, has yet to provide a description of the tasks that are or shall be assigned to the newly-constructed body, which does not have a precedent in recent Egyptian political history.

The announcement of the National Defence Council came two days before the SCAF abruptly introduced an addendum to the military-authored March 2011 Constitutional Declaration, which, critics say, gives the military council unfettered powers and diminishes the role of the new president.

The National Defence Council Will Include the Following People:

The President (Head of the National Defence Council)

The Parliamentary Speaker

The Head of the Cabinet of Ministers

The Foreign Minister

The Defence Minister

The Military Production Minister

The Interior Minister

The Finance Minister

The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces

The Director of Egyptian General Intelligence

The Chief Naval Commander

The Air Force Commander

The Commander of Air Defence Forces

The Assistant Defence Minister

The Chief of the Operations Authority of the Armed Forces

The Chief of the Military Judiciary

The Director of Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance 

[Developed in partnership with Ahram Online.]


Al-Masry Al-Youm's Count: Morsy Wins Presidency with 51.13 Percent of Poll

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According to Al-Masry Al-Youm's count, the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsy garnered 51.13 percent of the vote, securing the post of the president, after a fierce runoff that pushed former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq out of the race with a slim difference.

Morsy gathered 12,322,549 votes, while Shafiq got 12,201,549, or 48.87 percent of the vote.

Morsy consolidated gains in most Upper Egyptian cities and villages where he led in the first round of the presidential race. Shafiq came in first in most of the Delta cities where he also established himself in the first round of the polls. Morsy secured the first position in eighteen governorates out of twenty-seven, including Giza, Alexandria, Beheira, Minya, Assiut, Fayoum, Qena, Matrouh, North and South Sinai. Shafiq finished first in nine governorates, including Cairo, Port Said, Sharqiya, Monufiya and Luxor.

In Cairo, home of 6.5 million voters, Shafiq finished first with 56 percent of the vote. Giza, which follows Cairo in terms of voters' weight with 4.3 million voters, put Morsy in the lead at 60 percent.

Morsy got the highest percentage in one place with eighty percent of the vote in Matrouh going to him.

There were reportedly 24,965,772 valid votes.

Turnout was approximately 49.7 percent of the 50,524,933 eligible voters nationwide, a surge from the first round of the presidential election in which the turnout was at 46.42 percent. The highest turnout was witnessed in the two Delta governorates of Sharqiya and Qalyubiya, while the lowest turnout was in the two Upper Egyptian governorates of Qena and Aswan.

Official results are to be announced by the Presidential Elections Commission on Thursday, after it looks into appeals to the vote counting process throughout the week.

Morsy's initial win follows a set of constitutional amendments that further empower the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has been carrying out the executive functions of the state since 12 February 2011. Morsy's victory also follows the recent dissolution of Parliament, where his party held the majority of seats, after the Supreme Constitutional Court struck down the law governing the parliamentary elections.

[Edited translation from Al-Masry Al-Youm. This article originally appeared in Egypt Independent.]

War by Other Means Against the Palestinians in Israel

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 “Politics is the continuation of war by other means,” Michel Foucault wrote in “Society Must Be Defended” (2003), reversing Clausewitz’s well-worn dictum. Foucault’s point is that there is a continuous battle of sorts that takes place in times of peace, and the public space that hosts civil society, with all its depth, substance, and methods of influence, is the ultimate field of battle. Foucault asserts the importance of replacing the juridical discourse with the discourse of war. According to him, the law and official political agreements are imbued with violence and the modern ”achievements” of establishing governmental political institutions only serve to obscure a continuous infrastructure of war that is inherent to such institutions. Utilizing this interpretation, I hope to show how the war waged on Palestinians in Israel rages on. 

The 1948 war has not ended for Palestinians from within the borders of Israel established by the 1949 armistice (the so-called Green Line). The establishment of Israel and the cease-fire agreements with neighboring Arab countries set the stage for “the continuation of war by other means” through the imposition of Israeli law over the Palestinian population. This war that started with Zionist settlement in the pre-state era lies within the system of Israeli citizenship.

Following the establishment of the Israeli state, this war was waged through the enactment of legislation to enable the conquest of as much Palestinian land as possible; attempts to forbid Palestinian internally displaced persons (IDPs) from returning to their homes even as they remained in Israel; and the deportation of residents of some villages even after the armistice. One such case of the latter is the villages of Iqrit and Biram. This war has been quite explicit: from 1948-66, Palestinian-populated areas were governed through a military government inside Israel.   After the military government ended, the implementation of policies discriminating against Palestinian citizens in the political, social, and economic fields continued. Among other Israeli ambitions, this “war” sought the Judaization of entirely or predominantly Arab areas. Since 2000, following the start of the second intifada, these practices have only escalated, and there has been an unprecedented pursuit of aggressive legislation targeting Palestinian citizens of Israel. 

Most academic literature that examines Palestinian citizens’ collective activism and organization attributes their activity to reaction against state policy. However, if we analyze the dynamic of the relationship between the Israeli state and its Palestinians citizens, starting in the mid-nineties after the Oslo agreement, we notice a central shift in this dynamic. Israeli's policy toward Palestinian citizens took on much more reactive character. This is due to a shift in political discourse among Palestinians in Israel, taking place on two main levels. First, the events of the Nakba, the Palestinian catastrophe that coincided with the foundation of Israel, have become front and center in Palestinian political discourse. Until the mid-nineties, any discussion of the Nakba was depressed in the public sphere. Second, Palestinians have expanded efforts to challenge the Jewish identity of the state and to demand that it become a state for all of its citizens.

If Israel has succeeded, to a certain extent, to portray the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank as ”terrorists,” it has had no such success in conjuring the same image of the Palestinians in Israel, who operate within the framework of limited citizenship to challenge the Jewish hegemony. This brings us back to politics as war, and helps us understand the war by Israel against its own citizens, waged through a variety of arms and even during times of peace, to silence the political discourse that heightens Palestinian history and Nakba in proposing solutions for the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

Over the last two decades, the Palestinians in Israel have organized to advocate the right of Palestinian refugees and IDPs to return to their displaced villages and towns. Activists have worked to rebuild the Palestinian collective memory associated with the Nakba. In 1998, ADRID- Association for the Defense of the Rights of the Internally Displaced in Israel collaborated with the High Follow-up Committee (HFC) to organize the ”March of the Return” in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Nakba. Since then, every year on Israel’s Independence Day, this march highlights the other side of the independence of Israel: the Nakba (disaster) of the Palestinian people. Among the march’s participants are ADRID, the HFC, members of certain political parties, NGOs, and independent citizens. 

The commemoration of the Nakba has become a fulcrum of Palestinian discourse in Israel, and the return of IDPs and refugees has become a central issue since 1998. This development followed a multigenerational absence of collective action or any discourse claiming the right of return for refugees. As a response to this shift in discourse, in 2011, Israel enacted the “Nakba Law,” which limits funding for any organization that commemorates the Nakba. This law illustrates the serious fear the Israeli state has of the revival of discussion of the Nakba and Palestinian history. The Nakba Law followed the “Ensuring Rejection of the Right of Return Law- 2001,” passed by the Knesset to disallow the return of refugees to areas located within the borders of Israel, except by approval of an absolute majority of Knesset members. While it is true that the 2001 law concurred with the entry of the Israeli government into negotiations with Palestinian Authority (PA) on a permanent solution, it is important to understand this legislation in the context of the overarching Israeli reaction to the shift in the Palestinian discourse in Israel.

The reactive Israeli state policy is also conspicuous in the escalation in the frequency and force of political persecution of Palestinian leadership in Israel, showing concern and anxiety about the new discourse that rejects the Jewish identity of the State. In its last two terms, the Knesset has enacted laws restricting the rights of Palestinian citizens and consolidating the Jewish character of the state. 

One salient question this raises is: why now? Some would attribute this uptick in legalistic repression to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the Israeli demand that it be recognized internationally as a Jewish state; I tend to agree with this view, but it is not sufficient on its own. I believe it is important to see these practices in the broader context of the historic and evolving relationship between Palestinians citizens and the State of Israel. Before the emergence of the National Democratic Alliance party in the mid-nineties, there was no political discourse calling for the transformation of Israel into a state of all of its citizens. That trend has changed. If we review documents issued in the last several years by any of several Palestinian organizations, we find a clear image of what Palestinians in Israel expect of their relationship with the State of Israel. We find that these documents reject the exclusive Jewish character of the state and demand democracy and equality.  

The Knesset responded to this shift as it did to the revival of discourse about the Nakba: by attacking civil society. Most of its fire has been aimed at Palestinian NGOs—especially those trying to break the taboo (i.e., the legal prohibition) of challenging the Jewish identity of the state—but there has also been an attack on some Jewish NGOs for equal rights and anti-occupation advocacy as well, though those attacks take on a different character. This concentrated attack attempts to withhold funding from associations or research centers that publicly challenge the Jewish character of state. 

Instead of acknowledging the the reality of the Nakba and trying to resolve the conflict on the basis of historical reconciliation and democratization, we are witnessing an ongoing attempt by Israel to silence the history of the Palestinian Nakba.

To refer back to Foucault, this policy of Israel to exclude and discriminate, bind and gag, constitutes the continuation of the war on the Palestinian citizens who managed to remain in Israel. Israel wages this war to get them to accept its authority and recognize the state as Jewish, a character the majority of Palestinians have rejected since the state’s establishment in 1948. This rejection has come to be the focus of the collective discourse, and manifests as raised voices in the battle over history and truth, over their presence (existence?) in their homeland, and the demand of the right of return of refugees.

Despite the ever-increasing effort of the Israeli government to restrict the ability of Palestinians to discuss their history freely, they continue to make new strides. On the sixty-fourth anniversary of the Nakba led by the High Follow-up Committee, Palestinians all over Israel participated in a general strike to commemorate Nakba Day. Such a move has never happened before, and it signals that the important issues of the Nakba and the right of return among Palestinians in Israel continue to penetrate Israeli political society.

Last Week on Jadaliyya (June 11-17)

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This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes the most read articles. Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series. 


 


 

Egypt Media Roundup (June 18)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.]  

“Morsy declares victory in Egypt's presidential runoff, Shafiq objects”
According to Mohamed Morsi’s campaign he won by 52.5% over Ahmed Shafiq who got 47% of the votes.

“Live Updates 2: Egypt presidential runoffs enter final day”
Second day of voting comes to an end amid electoral violations across the country.

“In Minya, diesel queues are longer than elections queues”
Low electoral turnout persists for a second day in the Minya.

“Live updates: Polls close after a election day with low turnout, scattered violations”
First day of elections comes to an end amid fraud allegations, conspiracy theories, and few scuffles.

“SCAF to amend Constitutional Declaration to gain legislative, financial powers”
The new declaration will give the military council the right to approve the state budget.

“Why I’m voting”
Sarah El Sirgany says she prefers the Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi winning the elections over Ahmed Shafiq.

“Lawyers Syndicate: Run-off turnout not exceeding 15%”
Lawyers’ Syndicate Committee for monitoring the elections says turnout in Cairo is as low as 5-7%.

“US defense secretary Panetta calls Egypt's Tantawi”
US Secretary of Defense expresses concerns to Field Marshal Tantawi about Egypt’s stagnant transition.

“Morsi Campaign Hails April 6 Movement’s Endorsement of Morsi as Wise Decision”
6 April movement endorses Mohamed Morsi after concessions of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Constituent Assembly.

“Brotherhood challenges court's dissolution of Parliament”
The Muslim Brotherhood says dissolution of an elected Parliament can only happen through a popular referendum.

“Hamas denies reports of members entering Egypt to sow chaos”
Hamas denies accusations by Egyptian security forces that members of Al-Qassem Brigade crossed the border in order to foment violence in Egypt.

“We got tricked because we dared to dream”
Abdel-Rahman Hussein reflects on the divisive environment in Egypt just before the second round of elections.

“Electoral violations mar Egypt's presidential runoff”
Supporters of both candidates Ahmed Shafiq and Mohamed Morsi are accused of electoral violations.

“Before You Vote in the Second Round”
Alaa Al Aswany says he will boycott the second round of presidential elections because he believes it is rigged.

“People's Assembly receives dissolution order from SCAF”
The military council sends an official notification disbanding the parliament and barring the MPs from the parliamentary building.

“Official: The 100 members of Egypt's revamped Constituent Assembly”
The Parliament releases the names of the members of the new Constituent Assembly.

“National Security Agency demands information on foreigners”
NSA is inspecting hotels and rented apartments, demanding names of foreigners who are staying across governorates.

“Rights advocates: Military arrest powers worrying”
Human rights activists say new decree granting the military the right to arrest civilians under criminal law is illegal.

“SCAF holds emergency meeting to issue complementary constitutional declaration”
The military council starts drafting a new constitutional declaration to outline the standards for the formation of a new Constituent Assembly.

 

In Arabic:

“الكتاتني يكشف: التقيت بعنان ظهر اليوم وأبلغته رفضنا حل البرلمان أو صدور إعلان دستوري مكمل”
Parliament Speaker Saad El-Katatny met with member of SCAF Sami Anan to discuss the dissolution of the Parliament.

“أكبر غلط”
Fahmy Howeidy argues against the runoff being framed as a battle between a religious and a civil state.

“الشرطة العسكرية تمارس «الضبطية القضائية» وتنشر كمائن بالميادين الكبرى”
Military police deploys at major location in Cairo, implementing the new decree granting it the right to arrest civilians under criminal law.

“مسيرة من مصطفى محمود للتحرير ضد الفلول والضبطية القضائية.. والمئات يمزقون لافتات شفيق ويدوسون عليها بالأحذية”
Hundreds march to Tahrir march against presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq and a new law giving military arrest powers.

“لقبض علي سيدة كتبت علي الاستمارة لا للفلول ولا للدلدول”
A voter gets arrested after invalidating her vote, writing “no to leftovers, no to puppets.”

«الشاطر» لكاتب أمريكي: الثورة القادمة ستكون «أقل سلمية وأكثر عنفاً» إذا فاز شفيق”
Muslim Brotherhood leader Khairat El-Shater warns that if Ahmed Shafiq wins, there would be a violent revolution in Egypt.

"بوابة الأهرام" تنشر 5 احتمالات تعلنها لجنة الرئاسة غدا أبرزها: التأجيل أو سحب شفيق”
Hatem Bagato says that there are five scenarios for the upcoming presidential runoff.

“محمود أمين أهم من حسنى مبارك”
Wael Qandil writes that the public attention should be focused on the deteriorating condition of the hunger striker Mahmoud Amin, instead of the imprisoned Hosni Mubarak.

“معتصمون.. مضربون.. ولا نأكل البالوظون”
Nawara Negm is asking why the Egyptian public and political figures failed to feel compassion with the hunger strikers protesting military arrests.

 

Recent Jadaliyya articles on Egypt:

First Day of Presidential Runoffs Reflects Egypt’s Troubled Transition

Many Egyptians Skip the Polls, Out of Hopelessness or Protest

A Fork in The Road for Egypt's Political Forces: Who Will They Choose?

Mursi, Shafiq or Boycott: A Voters Guide to Egypt's Presidential Runoff

A Third Bloc?

The Constitutional Court Rulings and Counter-Revolution in Egypt: An Interview with Lina Attalah

The Troubled Revolutionary Path in Egypt: A Return to the Basics

SCAF Assumes Parliament Powers, Right to Elect Constituent Assembly: Legal Experts

Experts: Court Rulings Constitute a Blow to Civilian Forces

The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest, and Social Change in Egypt

The Revolution's Barometer

ماذا بعد انتخابات الرئاسة؟

واحد مننا.. واحد يشبه برنامجه        

Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (June 19)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

Regional and International Perspectives

Exclusive: Arab states arm rebels as UN talks of Syrian civil war Justin Vela exposes the roles of Saudi Arabia and Qatar in providing the rebels with weapons amid fear of a civil war, in The Independent.

Saudi Clerics Funnel Cash to Syrian Rebels Through Terror Group Jonathan Schanzer and Steven Miller on donations to the rebels in Syria made by "The Revival of Islamic Heritage Society of Kuwait", a group considered as a terrorist entity by the United States and United Nations, in The Weekly Standard.

Iran and Saudi Arabia tensions threaten to erupt after Saudi authorities execute four Iranians for drug trafficking Robert Tait examines the escalating tensions between the two Gulf states, in The Independent.

Repression in Bahrain

Medics on Trial in Bahrain A Physicians for Human Rights list of the doctors who have been sentenced, acquitted, released, or still on trial in Bahrain.

Bahrain court quashes doctors' convictions Martin Chulov writes on the verdicts against Bahraini doctors for treating injured protesters, in The Guardian.

Bahrain Court Upholds Convictions of 9 Doctors Kareem Fahim reports on the verdicts against Bahraini doctors, in The New York Times.

Facing prison for treating Bahrain's wounded A statement by Rula Saffar, a Bahraini doctor who is expecting a fifteen-year sentence for treating injured protesters.

Bahraini boy describes arrest and detention An interview with Ali Hasan, the eleven-year old boy who spent a month in police custody in Bahrain, on Al-Jazeera English.  

Crisis in Yemen

Senior Commander in South Yemen is Assassinated Laura Kasinof on the assassination of Major General Salim Ali Qatn in Aden, in The New York Times.

Another al-Qaeda stronghold 'falls' in Yemen A news report on Yemeni army's capture of Shuqra following its reclaim of Zinjibar and Jaar, on Al-Jazeera English.

Al-Qaeda in Yemen loses battles, but not the war Hashem Ahelbarra analyzes Yemen's recent victory in taking over Zinjibar and Jaar, on Al-Jazeera English.

Yemeni army drives fighters from Zinjibar A news report on the Yemeni army's reclaim of Zinjibar and Jaar occupied by Ansar al-Sharia since 2011, on Al-Jazeera English.

Al Qaeda's best friend Glenn Greenwald comments on Ibrahim Mothana's New York Times article in Salon.

How Drones Help Al Qaeda Ibrahim Mothana writes on the increasing Anti-American sentiments in Yemen due to drone strikes that have been taking place since 2009, in The New York Times.

Yemenis say al Qaeda gave town security, at a cost Khaled Abdallah and Mohammed Mukhashaf talk to residents in Jaar, on Reuters.

Saudi-Yemeni Border: A LIne in the Sand Joumana Farhat offers an excellent article on the role of Saudi Arabia in Yemen and an emerging protest movement in Yemen against the Taif and Jeddah border agreements between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, in Al-Akhbar English.

Death of Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud: Obituaries, Succession and Commentaries

Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdulziz al-Saud: Hardline heir to the Saudi throne
David McKittirick writes an obituary in The Independent.

Defense Minister New Heir to Throne in Saudi Arabia Neil MacFarquhar on Prince Salman as an heir, and the question of succession in the Kingdom.

Call for action against abusive posts on Nayef Habib Toumi reports on some Kuwaiti lawmakers' calls for the punishments of bloggers who posted insulting comments on Prince Nayef, on Gulfnews.

Saudi Arabia appoints new Crown Prince A news report on the announcement of Prince Salman as the successor to King Abdullah.

Saudi heir apparent Prince Nayef dead The announcement of Prince Nayef's death on Al-Jazeera English.

Obituary: Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud An obituary on BBC.

Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, Saudi Crown Prince Who Led Crackdown on Al Qaeda, Dies at 78 Neil MacFarquhar in The New York Times.

Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, Saudi crown prince and interior minister, dies T. Rees Shapiro in The Washington Post.

Saudi king seeks successor as crown prince buried Angus McDowall describes the funeral of Prince Nayef and the question of succession, in Reuters.

Saudi Prince Salman seen as likely heir to throne Angus McDowall reflects on Prince Salman's power and politics.

Nayef's conservative policies to outlive him Gregg Carlstrom writes an informed article on the legacy of Prince Nayef, on Al-Jazeera English.

Prince Nayef dead As'ad AbuKhalil analyzes the succession struggle among the Saudi royal family, in al-Akhbar English.

Policy and Reports

Saudi women urged to flout driving ban A news report on Saudi female activists' call for women to drive their cars on the first anniversary of the Women2Drive campaign, on Gulf News.

Saudi arrests liberal activist A news report on the arrest of Raef Badawi, a founder of a liberal network that called for a "Day of Liberalism" in the kingdom on May 7.

Kuwait emir suspends parliament A news report on Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah's decree to suspend the parliament for one month.

Saudi wants to buy more tanks from Germany: paper A news report on Saudi Arabia's intention to buy 600 to 800 Leopard battle tanks from Germany.

Qatar criticized over migrant worker 'abuse' A report by Al-Jazeera English on the latest report by Human Rights Watch on the treatment of migrant workers in Qatar.

Cover-up campaign hits Gulf Streets Jenifer Fenton on public awareness campaigns in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, on Al-Jazeera English.

Iran and Saudi jockey for OPEC position Nicole Johnston reports on the election of a new secretary general for OPEC, on Al-Jazeera English.

Hunger striker promised case review Awad Mustafa writes on a British businessman who was jailed in Dubai after checks he wrote bounced, in The National.

Human Rights Watch

Building a Better World Cup: Protecting Migrant Workers in Qatar Ahead of FIFA 2022 HRW's report on the abuses faced by migrant construction workers in Qatar.

Bahrain: Court Upholds Convictions of Medics A statement on the verdicts against Bahraini doctors accused of treating injured protesters.

Oman: Assault on Freedom of Speech An article on the crackdown on activists and protesters in Oman.

Culture

Hassn Sharif: Converting Consumerism into Art Roy Dib on the Emirati artist who documents Dubai's modern history through his art.

Oman: Constructing Authenticity Leah Caldwell writes on architectural regulations and plans in Muscat, in Al-Akhbar English.

Media

Media's Deafening Silence on US Drone Wars Antony Loewenstein on the complicity of most Western media with the Obama administration in their coverage of the drone strikes in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen.

Bahrain Social Media Crackdown Threat for 'Irresponsible Use' Anissa Haddadi reports on new laws to curb the use of social media in Bahrain, in International Business Times.

The XY Factor: Saudi Arabian talent show Buraydah's Got Talent bans singing. And women.
Loveday Morris writes on the muted version of the Got Talent franchise in Saudi Arabia, in The Independent.


Arabic

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