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New Texts Out Now: Natalya Vince, Saintly Grandmothers: Youth Reception and Reinterpretation of the National Past in Contemporary Algeria

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Natalya Vince, “Saintly Grandmothers: Youth Reception and Reinterpretation of the National Past in Contemporary Algeria.”The Journal of North African Studies, 18:1 (2013).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this article?

Natalya Vince (NV): The Algerian War of Independence (1954-62), or at least a selective and glorified version of the war, has played a key role in both the formation of Algerian national identity and the legitimization of political elites. For the past fifty years, museums, monuments, school textbooks, national holidays, and political speeches have constantly reminded Algerians that independence was won through the sacrifice of “one and a half million martyrs” in a struggle fought “by the people, for the people” and in which there was “one sole hero, the people.” In this narrative, the old colonial power, France, provides a useful scarecrow, a handy “other” against which “we” can be defined. At the same time, nearly half the population of Algeria today is under the age of twenty-four. Within and beyond the borders of Algeria, this youthful majority is often depicted as disinterested in these tired old tales of the past, instead looking across the Mediterranean Sea to migrate to Europe, particularly to France.

This article was motivated by the desire to step away from these familiar descriptions of, on the one hand, an omnipresent, rigid national narrative and, on the other hand, disaffected and indifferent younger generations. It was also motivated by a desire to write a post-independence story in which France was not center stage, either as eternal enemy or object of desire. Instead, I was interested in how young people understand the history of the War of Independence, what they think about the way in which history is taught, and how their perceptions of the past are shaped by a range of local, national, and transnational influences, from grandmothers’ stories to school textbooks to scenes of war in present-day Iraq.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the article address?

NV: The article draws upon literatures about the role of narratives of the past in nation building, but it takes a distinctly “bottom up” approach. Instead of looking at what the state would like to transmit—and there are already a number of excellent studies on this in the Algerian context—it seeks to explore what has been transmitted. As Eric Hobsbawm underlines in Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality (1990), “the view from below, i.e. the nation as seen…by the ordinary persons…is exceedingly difficult to discover”—not least because of the vast practical challenges this imposes in terms of how to conduct a representative survey of the whole population. This article is only a case study with inevitable limits, carried out amongst ninety-five trainee teachers at the Ecole normale supérieure (ENS) in Bouzareah, Algiers in 2007, with some supplementary research at the University of Algiers. I hope that more studies of the reception of the past among other groups will follow this article, to complement or challenge its findings!

Algerian history is often posited as “exceptional,” a case apart. Yet when trying to unpack students’ responses to questions, I found publications on history, memory, and power relations in other contexts provided very useful frameworks. For example, Hue-Tam Ho Tai’s work on late socialist Vietnam helped me think about how political debate takes place in regimes that are neither totalitarian nor entirely democratic (and Algeria certainly could be described as such) through hidden meanings, allusions, and rumours which need to be decoded. James C. Scott’s work on hidden transcripts was also an important influence here. The work of Shahid Amin on event and metaphor in the history of Indian nationalism was also useful in helping me think about how individuals can simultaneously reproduce national myths (as “metaphors” of collective purpose and noble intentions) and undermine these very same myths through the episodes they recount (“events”) drawn from the lived experiences of their grandparents. I don’t make systematic comparisons in my work—for one thing, I don’t have the depth of knowledge to do so—but I do think it is important to use comparisons as a way to break down the discourses of exceptionalism that are so common to national histories.

Finally, the article seeks to contribute to debates about how post-independence Algerian history is written. The main tendency in the past two decades—and not least since the publication of Benjamin Stora’s path-breaking La Gangrène et l’oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d’Algérie [Gangrene and Forgetting: The Memory of the Algerian War] in 1991—has been to write the history of post-independent Algeria in a post-colonial idiom, seeking to understand the present through exploring the traces and traumas of 132 years of colonization and seven and a half years of a bloody war of decolonization, and in turn analyzing how present concerns—such as violence, Islamism, and women’s rights—might shape our research priorities when we re-read the past. The article concludes by arguing for “the need to go beyond exploring the how the present can be understood through the colonial past and vice versa. Instead, we might turn our attention to how the past is read through a series of more recent pasts, considering not only how the echoes of a seminal event or period reverberate in the present, but also how these echoes are refracted through a series of filters firmly located in a post-independence history.”

J: How does your work connect to and/or depart from your previous research?

NV: My main area of research, before I began to be interested in questions of generational transmission, was oral histories of women who participated in the War of Independence, following their trajectories into the post-independence period. This explains in part why my case study on student reception particularly focuses on how students perceive women who participated in the anti-colonial struggle. But this is not the only reason why I chose to focus on perceptions of women during the war. In the state-promoted national narrative of resistance, the role of women (including in bomb networks and in providing logistical support in rural areas) is both glorified—this is, after all, evidence of the mass popular support for the independence struggle—and marginalized—reduced to a few photos in school textbooks or a small corner in a museum, mentioned but not, unlike other parts of the national past, extensively elaborated upon. I was interested in how students would construct a narrative of the past when there was not an obvious, existing framework in which to locate it. The gendered approach does not just tell us what students think about women who fought in the war; it also gives insights into what happens when individuals are asked to locate memories of the past when there is not a pre-established shape, order, or meaning readily available.

J: Who do you hope will read this article, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

NV: I hope that as many people as possible will read this article! I’d like to think that it will contribute to the developing field of post-independence Algerian history. In a survey that historian Malika Rahal carried out amongst colleagues at ten Algerian universities in 2011-12, there were no doctoral students in any history departments working on anytopic dealing with post-independence Algeria. In the international research context, the growing interest and the increasingly abundant number of publications on the colonial period and decolonisation has not been matched by similar output on the post-independence period. It is for this reason that Rahal has established a trilingual (English, Arabic, French) research blog, Textures du temps, in which contributors explore topic areas and methodological issues associated with writing post-independence history, breaking away from the familiar prisms of trauma, violence, and Algerian exceptionalism.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

NV: I’m currently writing a monograph, contracted to Manchester University Press, provisionally entitled Our Fighting Sisters: Nation, Memory, and Gender in Algeria, 1954-2012. In the literature on gender and nationalism, Algeria is often depicted as the “classic” example of nationalism gone bad for women: that is, women participate en masse in the struggle for independence, only to be “sent back to the kitchen” once freedom from colonial rule is won. Using oral history, I’m trying to provide an alternative perspective, looking at how female veterans of the war participated in or viewed post-independence nation and state-building, as well as how they construct their own history in the present.

I have also stayed in contact with colleagues and students at the ENS and the University of Algiers. One of the things that emerged when I was carrying out interviews with students was that they were really interested in exploring the relationship between history and memory. Since 2010, with funding from the British Academy, we have held a number of workshops in Portsmouth, Algiers, and Dakar—with colleagues and students from the University of Portsmouth, the ENS, the University of Algiers, and the University of Dakar—on history and memory, and in particular, the methodology of oral history. One of the outputs of this project will be a collaboratively-written, online, open access oral history manual in French, Arabic, and English. The production of this is being coordinated in large part by our current intake of students into the University of Portsmouth MA Francophone Africa, a postgraduate course that focuses on the study of the history, politics, and society of those vast areas of the African continent that were previously under French colonial rule and that are today referred to through the generic term “Francophone Africa.”

Excerpt from “Saintly Grandmothers: Youth Reception and Reinterpretation of the National Past in Contemporary Algeria”

The survey consisted of interviews and questionnaires with ninety-five trainee teachers studying all five humanities subjects taught at the ENS in Bouzaréah (History-Geography, English, French, Philosophy, and Arabic Literature). There was a particular focus on history students (sixty-one out of ninety-five interviewees) as this is the group which will play a crucial role in transmitting knowledge about the past to primary and secondary school children. Becoming a teacher in Algeria is not a career path which carries notable social capital or a particularly attractive salary. Within the hierarchy of academic subject areas, history is far from possessing an enviable status. As James McDougall underlines, although the close relationship between historical legitimacy and political power generates “a consistently pressing preoccupation with the representation of the past” in the public sphere, with debates relayed through a vociferous independent press, “History as an intellectual discipline and profession…has a decidedly subordinate social status.”[1] Many of the history students whom I interviewed had not chosen to study history. In the complex system of university admissions in Algeria, students make a number of choices. For many of interviewees, history was ranked very low (or was absent from) their list of options. However, due to a combination of lower baccalaureate average, a lack of personal ties to a well-placed “contact” who could use his/her influence to get a student on a “better” course and, perhaps most significantly, limited French language skills—the compulsory education system in Algeria is entirely Arabicized, but prestigious scientific subjects remain taught in French at university level—many students were allocated history.

This explains the sociological profile of history students, and indeed students of other subjects in this study: they are overwhelmingly from less affluent, rural areas. Chlef and Tipaza (both west of Algiers), Médéa (south of Algiers) and Bouira (south of Algiers in Kabylia) were the most common wilāyāt (departments) of origin, together accounting for more than a third of all students. Only two students were from Algiers, despite this being where the ENS is based. In rural areas of the “interior,” the penetration of the French language during the colonial period was far less pronounced and students’ parents were less likely to have received a French-language education in the first years of independence before Arabicization. Terrorist activity during the 1990s—which was a major problem in places like Bouira—particularly targeted French language teaching and teachers. In short, it is far less probable that the French language would be part of these students’ cultural capital and this has a determining effect on their higher education options. Students are also slightly more likely to be female at the ENS. Whilst across all forms of higher education in Algeria in 2007, sixty percent of students were female, of the ninety-five students that I interviewed, sixty-two were women and thirty-three men (sixty-five percent). Teaching is considered a “safe” profession for women, bringing them into contact with relatively few men—reassuring for more conservative families who are nevertheless prepared to accept that their daughters leave home to go to university.

This sociological profile is significant because it suggests that, far from reflecting an intellectual, and usually social, elite actively engaged in historiographical controversies, these students represent in many ways an “average” young Algerian, more likely to be from a background which is socio-economically modest, socially conservative and (with the obvious exception of students studying French as a subject) largely non-Francophone, with a somewhat above average knowledge of and interest in debates about the past.

Forty-one students were orally interviewed in French, Arabic and English in small groups of two to eight in a mixture of contexts, both through teacher introduction and through seeking out students in communal areas such as the canteen and library. Teachers were not present in oral interviews and there were no perceptible differences between the responses of students with a teacher introduction or those who were sought out independently by a peer. I also carried out fifty-four written questionnaires in Arabic with final year history students in class time (with the teacher present), using the same questions as in oral interviews.[2] The questionnaire was divided into four parts. Part one elicited basic biographical information about age, subject of study, town and region of origin, and what the student had chosen to study and why. Part two contained ten open-ended questions which explored knowledge and perceptions: images of the War of Independence, images of women in the war, names of female combatants that students knew, what students thought happened to women after 1962, what students’ sources of information were, and what their opinions were on the political, social and financial advantages which officially-recognised veterans enjoy in Algeria today. Part three contained six open and closed questions addressing the teaching of history: what students enjoyed at school and what they did not enjoy, what they would like to know more about, what they thought of the teaching methods used. Part four consisted of five opened-ended questions and focused specifically on women’s status and rights, presenting students with two short extracts of founding texts which discuss women: the 1962 Tripoli programme and the 1976 National Charter. The former can be found on the Algerian president’s official website, as can the Constitution of 1976 which was based on the National Charter. Students were elicited to analyse the meaning of the texts and reflect upon the ways in which they felt—or did not feel—that the mujahidat [female veterans of the war of independence] were a model for Algerian women today. Following transcription, student responses were then coded and the key themes analyzed.

NOTES

[1] McDougall, J., 2006. “Martydom and Destiny : The Inscription and Imagination of Algerian History.” In: U. Makdisi and P. A. Silverstein, eds. Memory and Violence in the Middle East and North Africa. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 50—72, p. 61.

[2] With thanks to Aissa Boussiga and Saadia Oubakka for their assistance in translation at various stages in the project.

[Excerpted from “Saintly Grandmothers: Youth Reception and Reinterpretation of the National Past in Contemporary Algeria,” by Natalya Vince, by permission of the author. © 2013 Taylor & Francis. For more information, or to order a copy of this issue, click here. If you would like to read the text in full, and do not have institutional access or a personal subscription to the Journal of North African Studies, please contact the author directly at natalya.vince@port.ac.uk.]


New Texts Out Now: Sally K. Gallagher, Making Do in Damascus

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Sally K. Gallagher,Making Do in Damascus: Navigating a Generation of Change in Family and Work. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2012.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Sally Gallagher (SG): I have had a long interest in gender and economic development, and had the opportunity to begin a study of the effects of participating in an income-generating project for women in Damascus just as it was getting started. This was a really great opportunity to watch change in the making, rather than go in after the fact and ask people: how is your life different? Slowly I was able to begin building contacts among networks of women across social classes, and was able to then address broader questions about how religion, gender, and social class work together.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does it address?

SG: The main question the book addresses is how women draw on, and in some cases are able to reshape, gender ideals to make a life for themselves over a generation of economic and technological change. There has always been interest within sociology in how people’s individuality and free choice is both constrained by their society and how people also use their values, resources, and personal connections to change society. That question is at the heart of this book—how do women’s material and social resources shape the ways they are limited by, but also draw on, recast, and creatively use ideals around gender (for example, what it means to be a good daughter, wife, and mother) to make a space for their lives?

Between 1992 and 2011 I traveled to Damascus ten times, typically staying from one to four months, spending innumerable hours talking, shopping, drinking tea, preparing meals, and visiting women and their families across the city. This style of research allowed me to address questions of personal experience, identity, and meaning in a much more fine-tuned way than would have been possible with a larger social survey even if it had been possible at the time to obtain the required permissions or obtained an adequate response rate in communities unaccustomed to survey research.

Since I started visiting in Syria in 1992, a lot has changed; talking with women as these changes were happening—as many of them graduated from high school and went on to university, to work part time, to marry and have children—the book is able to explore the ways in which women are limited, but also able to turn those limitations to their advantage.

J: What methodologies did you use in the writing of this book?

SG: The methodology I used in Making Do in Damascus was a combination of looking at state policies and practices around the economy, education, marriage, and women’s employment as the context for understanding personal conversations with a core set of women. I tried to regularly meet with this core set of women during each of my trips to Damascus  (along with many other conversations with men and women with whom I  visited over the years).

I met women in a variety of ways. Most often I was introduced through neighbors and friends of friends, gradually entering into networks of loosely connected families in different areas of the city. Because my interest was to understand the intersections of resources and the practice of work and family ideals, I gradually focused my visiting and observations on three groups of women—those whose resources were quite limited; those whose resources were modest but adequate for most day to day needs; and those whose resources were more than adequate—in families with elite connections, businesses, or high level occupations. Most of the poorer women with whom I visited were employed or friends with women employed in two craft projects. These women worked at home or in a central workshop, making cross-stitch garments, pillow covers, purses, and other small items for sale. Gradually, through the informal networks of friends and neighbors in several neighborhoods, I became introduced to women whose resources were more moderate, living in middle-income households. Young women in these families attended university, waited for marriage, worked as teachers or in offices, or cared for younger siblings at home.

My introduction to women at the upper end of Damascus’ class structure was enhanced by my status as a Fulbright visiting scholar affiliated with the American Cultural Center. Beginning with those connections, I was introduced to women whose husbands worked in government ministries, owned significant enterprises, were instrumental in establishing new technologies or trade, held positions in the government themselves, were philanthropists, or occupied other positions of social or cultural influence. Periodic guest lectures to students at the American Language Center provided entre into other households at the upper end of Damascene society.

Overall, this method of locating families was something of an intentional snowball sample—it was systematic in terms of making an effort to connect in a focused way to sets of families in different social locations, developed through expanding networks of acquaintances into a relatively stable set of women with whom I regularly visited, bounded by a larger group of women with whom I had periodic but less focused interactions, and copious amounts of field notes based on occasional or one time observations and interactions.

Because the length of visits, the expectation that I visit frequently meant that I spent whole afternoons, evenings, and sometimes entire days with particular families; it quickly became apparent that my “sample” could not expand indefinitely. In the end, I focused on twenty-eight households distributed relatively evenly across three different levels of society. These represent the core of a somewhat larger group of fifty-four women with whom I periodically visited, and hundreds of other conversations and observations that provide background to the analysis.

I mostly visited women at home, but also spent hours with them shopping, talking in parks, visiting other relatives, eating with a group of friends in a restaurant, or when practicable in their places of employment. Early in the fieldwork, I began with a set of general questions about women’s work and family life, and from there let conversations range over the topics and issues women raised—answering, as well as asking, questions during visits that typically lasted several hours. During subsequent visits conversations generally picked up where they left off, with questions revolving around the central concerns women expressed during the previous visit.

In all cases, I was introduced as a visiting professor who was collecting stories for a book on how women managed work and family life, and as a friend or neighbor with whom women could talk freely without concern that information would be passed on to the mukhabarat or security police. My son, who was three during my first trip to Syria, came along on numerous visits, allowing conversations to naturally flow towards discussions of the difficulties women face in combining paid work with family life. Visits involved not only discussion of work and family issues, but drinking tea, socializing, and helping to prepare or share in an occasional meal. In general, early discussions focused on family structure, work history, education, sources and amount of income and exchange, and the place of gender ideals in shaping women's employment decisions and relations with kin. Later discussions revolved around a broader range of topics, including dimensions of kin and friendship support and obligation, gender strategies, and the role of education in women's employment decisions.

This style of qualitative research, of course, has both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, focusing on women in different social locations over a period of almost twenty years allows me to trace women’s narratives of gender, work and family in detail through significant life transitions. At the same time, it is important not to overgeneralize based on a relatively small cross section of a large and diverse population. Clearly these women’s accounts of their education, employment and family lives cannot be taken as representative of the perspectives of women in Damascus overall, let alone of women in different ethnic or religious communities in Syria. Still, while caution is always warranted in generalizing about women in a city of several million, the finely textured quality of the narratives I collected provide a nuanced portrait of how gender dependency schemas are both a resource and constraint in the construction of gender identity within and across these specific communities of women.

J: How does this work connect to and/or depart from your previous research and writing?

SG: Much of my research has focused on how family, gender, and religion connect. Some of the same themes that I explore in Making Do in Damascus are also present in my book on American Evangelical families (Evangelical Identity and Gendered Family Life). In both books, I consider how popular ideals advocated by religious leaders translate into ordinary family life, and how a changing economy reshapes which of those ideals make sense and are used to create a sense of identity and a life for oneself.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

SG: I would like a lot of different people to read this book. Because I’m a professor, I hope what I write will be useful to students and will add to academic discussions around theories of social change, identity, religion, and gender. But the book is about real people—not just theory in the abstract—and the stories and struggles that are at the heart of it should appeal to a much wider readership. At least I hope it will, certainly because there remains so much misunderstanding about Islam, Syria, and women’s lives in the region more generally.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

SG: The project I’m working on now is a book that explores how men and women make their way into different types of religious congregations. A lot of social science takes the perspective that choosing a religion is like shopping—you pick one that fits your taste from a wide and diverse market. I believe that’s only partly true—that religious identity is more than looking for a place where you like the music or have a network or there’s a great kids program. I’m also interested in how gender shapes that process and choice, and the book is based on interviews I conducted over several years with men and women in the process of becoming connected with three very different local congregations.

Excerpts from Making Do in Damascus: Navigating a Generation of Change in Family and Work           

Su’ad leaves for work at six thirty, walking ten blocks through congested streets to the micro-bus stop. It is already starting to get warm by the time she arrives at work an hour later, just in time to help open the workshop. When we met, she had been working in the shop for two years, doing cross stitch and designing clothing and other small items that will eventually be sold in a shop in the old city and to the international community via a number of fairs and cultural displays. This job pays well—her salary has increased gradually with her responsibilities—and is much more acceptable to her family than working in the shirt making factory down the street. Yet she feels increasing pressure from her family to stop working outside their home. Her brother has become more vocal in his objections to her independence and in a loud argument last week struck her and threatened to disown her if she failed to comply and quit her job. “He says it is ruining my chances for marriage. He says he hears rumors that I have been talking with men on the micro-bus. He tells my father he should compel me to stay home.”

As do many other working class Palestinians, Su’ad lives with her family in a refugee camp on the edge of Damascus. To call this thriving residential and business community a “camp” conjures images of dusty tents and hastily constructed temporary shelters. Yet this area of Damascus is indistinguishable from other working and middle class sections of the city. In place of tents, multi-level apartment buildings, busy shops, galleries, schools and businesses branch off of the two main roads that make up the center of the area. Su’ad’s family has lived here for three generations. She is the second oldest of eight children, her grandmother gave birth to ten; she hopes to marry and have two or three.

When she was in tenth grade, Su’ad had hoped to go to college. But her grandfather became ill and she was asked to take on more responsibilities for younger siblings so that her mother would be free to take care of him. After a time, she fell behind in her studies and eventually dropped out of school before taking the baccalaureate exams that determine one’s course of study at the university. “I could go back and take the examinations and God willing I would do well enough to go to the university, but it is too difficult. I have to study and work in the shop, and the commute is so long. I don’t return home until late and then we must visit our relatives. It is too much. And now my older brother is compelling me to stay home. You must stay home!’ he says. He shouts, he threatens. My mother says he is trying to take care of me. To make sure I do not ruin my chances for a good marriage. I cannot even lift a finger without his permission.”

*****

The city of Damascus is like a gray wave running up the side of Mount Qasayoun. Khadija lives half way up this mountain in the area known as Muhajareen—“the immigrants”—named for the waves of rural immigrants who came to Damascus over the past forty years looking for work. Housing was cheaper, for a time, in Muhajareen, and the area literally expanded up the hillside until the rock face was too near vertical to build. The view from Khadija’s balcony is stunning. In the summer it is somewhat cooler than in the confines of the city below, and we sit and drink tea and eat freshly cut apples and apricots and talk for hours.

Khadija is thirty-three now. When we first met she was eighteen. She was a top student in high school and had done well enough on her baccalaureate examination to enter the medical program at the University of Damascus. Although her family had limited resources (two sons were already working in the Gulf saving for marriage and sending bits of money home), her parents had enough to cover the cost of her books and supplies. Because the university itself was free to any student who qualified and agreed to work for the government for four years on completion of their degree, Khadija was delighted to attend. Her older brother was a student and accompanied her on the micro-bus each way. His company made it difficult for her to meet young men. But that would not matter. By the time she was fifteen her parents had already been receiving regular requests from suitors who were known to the family. Widening the marriage pool to strangers at the university would hardly be necessary.

At age twenty, the pressure was mounting for Khadija to accept one of these offers of marriage. “They said, ‘Why should you study? Here is a good man. His family are relatives of ours from the village. He has a good job and will support you. Why should you bother yourself with studying?’ But I said, ‘No, I like to study, I like medicine.’ But they kept asking. It was like a dripping faucet. It made me crazy! ‘When will you marry? Why don’t you marry? What is wrong with Muhammad? What is wrong with Husam? What’s wrong with Kareem? His is a good family. Why bother yourself studying?’ Eventually I gave in. Bassam is a good man. He is kind to me. He never raises his voice. We are very happy!” 

Khadija gave birth to a girl the year after she married. Eighteen months later, she gave birth to a son. She is hoping not to be pregnant again for a couple of years, and is thinking about taking contraceptives but is concerned about rumors she has heard that they make it very hard to conceive again. For now, however, she says, “It is enough! I love my children—Amal and Ahmad are a gift from God! But I get so tired! Bassam works so much and is never home. He is at the video shop from nine until two in the afternoon. He buys groceries and bread for me on the way home and relaxes while I make lunch. After he naps, he goes back to work from five thirty until almost ten. Then we eat and go to visit either his parents or my parents. We have no car and with the children it is exhausting!”

*****

Below Mount Qasayoun, where the city begins to flatten and spread toward the horizon is the area known as Abu Rumaneh. The embassy district. The high rent zone. The elite shopping and dining places. Here, in a penthouse apartment reached by a glass and marble lined elevator, is the home of Madam Ghaliya, wife of a high-ranking government official, daughter of a major export family. She just turned forty-five and is beginning to take German language classes to supplement the French she learned while in school in Lebanon. Her four children are nearly grown—one son is doing mandatory military service; a second is starting his career as a dentist; the third is studying in Ft. Lauderdale; and her only daughter is hoping to travel to Germany to visit relatives before starting the foreign language and literature program at the University.

I arrive at nine in the evening for a women’s munaqisha—a discussion group that meets twice a month. Madam Ghaliya’s cook has prepared a table full of delicacies for the women to enjoy, including a wide range of Middle Eastern hors d’oeurves, imported chocolates, and pastries from the local French bakery. Her friends arrive in ones or twos, their drivers parking their cars on the street below, or arranging to come back to pick them up when the meeting is over. Removing the dark “trench coats” and head scarves that mark their public status as conservative Muslim women, they reveal stylish suits, leather slacks, sequined sweaters, spiked heels, and jewelry worthy of royalty. These women are the Syrian equivalent. They are not just wealthy, they are “Shami”—members of families that have lived in Damascus for generations. Damascenes of the upper class. They take seriously their noblesse oblige and although this particular group began as a religious study where a woman taught them the meaning of the Qur’an, tonight they are meeting to talk about a cultural exhibition that will raise money for a local orphanage.

Three hours later as the meeting winds down, the women sip thick unsweetened coffee in gold and blue demitasse cups, smoke, and talk of husbands. They trade jokes in rapid succession: “My husband is gone so much, he is never at home when I am at home. In the morning, I see him and ask, ‘Who are you?’”; “My husband watches the first ten minutes of a movie, then falls asleep and wakes when it ends and asks ‘What happened?’”; “When my husband watches television, he goes like this (blinking her eyes in rhythm as her thumb pumps an imaginary remote control)!” “My husband thinks I’ve gone out to visit a relative. I told him, I’m going out to see my friends. He said ‘No!’ So I told him I was going to my sister’s house and came here instead!” The phone rings and Ghaliya says to the woman who had just spoken, “It’s your husband!” The talking abruptly stops until the women realize it’s a joke and burst into relieved laughter. All but the one for whom the joke appears too close for comfort. Ghaliya leans over to me and says, “It is good for us to laugh, but you know all these women are afraid of their husbands.”

*****

Why are these women’s lives so very different? Why are they so very much the same? Is social class what matters? Do material resources and what we do with them determine the outcome of our lives? Or are family, religion, ethnicity, and local culture the factors that make us who we are?

[…]

Syria’s place in international relations, however, is not the main focus of this book. Instead, I focus on a second reason for studying Syria—that is the ways in which the policies of a strong state, a struggling economy, local culture, religion, and family values shape the lives of ordinary women, particularly around questions of gender. For forty years, Syria’s commitments to the Ba’th Socialist Party, for example, opened educational opportunities for women that rivaled those available in the West. Yet relatively few women have been able to translate those opportunities into long-term employment. At the same time, two decades of uneven development and rising prices have made it more and more difficult for families to live on men’s wages alone—opening a host of questions about the appropriateness of women’s employment at a time when families must generate additional income simply in order to stay afloat. Religion as sets of practices, beliefs, and communities also shapes decisions about work and family. So do the subcultural values of individual families. While none of these are unique to Syria, Syria does provide a window through which to observe the intersections of personal identity and local culture, religion, resources, and ideas about gender. The latter is the primary focus of this book.

[Excerpted from Making Do in Damascus: Navigating a Generation of Change in Family and Work, by Sally K. Gallagher, by permission of the author. © 2012 by Syracuse University Press. For more information, or to purchase this book, please click here.]

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(1)

نشر  في 26 يناير2013  على حساب"صفحةالشرطةالمصرية" علىتويتر -وهيصفحةيديرهامجموعةمنضباطالشرطةبعيداًعنالصفحةالرسميةلوزارةالداخلية- رسالةموجّهةلكلمنرئيسالجمهوريةورئيسالوزراءتشيرإلىأنّهماوضعاالشرطةالمصريةأمامالمدفعمعاختبائهما"كالعادة" علىحدوصفالرسالة،ورسالةأخرىموجهةلوزيرالداخليةتتهمهبأنهفدىكرسيهبأرواحأفرادالشرطة. والرسالةالأخيرةموجهةلـ"للمجندينوالضباطوالأفرادالذينيقدمونحياتهمفداءلشعبٍلاينبغيأنتراقلهنقطةماءلانقطةدماء" وذلكأيضاًعلىحدتعبيرالرسالةالتيشملتهاتغريدةعلىحسابصفحةالشرطةالمصرية

(2) 
فيمنطقةكرداسةوأثناءتأديةصلاةالجنازةعلىقتيلالشرطةأحمدالبلكيالذيوقعضحيةأحداثاقتحامسجنبور سعيدالعموميفي 27 يناير 2013،طردالعشراتمنضباطالشرطةوزيرالداخليةوحاولالبعضالاعتداءعليه،كماتمالإعتداءعليهلفظياً،حتىأنّبعضالقنواتالتينقلتمشاهدالحادثةقطعواالصوتعنالفيديو

 (3)
مساعدوزيرالداخليةللعلاقاتالعامةوالإعلاماللواءأسامةإسماعيلعلىقناةالنهارفيبرنامج"آخرالنهار" معالإعلاميخالدصلاح  26 يناير2013 يعترفبأنّالشرطةفيالسويسخرجتعنشعورهاوقامتبالاعتداءعلىالمحالوالمقاهيوالسياراتوتكسيرهاحاملينالذخائروالأسلحةالنارية. يذكرأنّهكانيبررلذلكالفعلبأنّهمخرجواعنشعورهم

 (4)
اعتدتقواتالأمنفي 27 يناير2013 علىأهاليمدينةبور سعيدحينماكانوايشيعونجنازةأحدالشهداء،مماأدىلإصابةأكثرمن 300 منالأهالي،معورودأنباءعنوقوعقتلى معنفيمديرمستشفىبورسعيد،يذكر -بناءًعلىأقوالالشهودومنهمصحفيين- أنالشرطةلمتكتفيفياعتداءهاعلىالقنابلالمسيلةللدموع،والخراطيش،إنمااستخدمتأيضاًالرصاصالحيّ،وهذاأيضاًتوضحهبشكلٍجليالإصابات

ومع محاولة سريعة لتحليل الأحداث الأربعة السابقة يمكن القول بأنّه ومع الحدث رقم (1) و (2) : ثمة حالة حنقٍ وغضب من ضباط الشرطة تجاه لا فقط رئيس الجمهورية ورئيس الوزراء اللذان يمثلان نظاماً حاكماً تجد الشرطة المصرية مشكلة في التعامل معه باعتباره السلطة الجديدة، التي يجب عليها الانصياع لأوامرها بضرورة الحال، ولكنّ أيضاً حالة الحنق هذه طالت وزير الداخلية، وهناك اتهامات موجهة له أنه يفدي كرسيه بأرواح الشرطة.

إنها إذاً إشارة لصفقة ما مبرمة بين وزير الداخلية والنظام الحاكم، وليست هذه هي الإشارة الأولى لوجود مثل هذه صفقة، فمنذ فترة وبعد تولي مرسي الرئاسة والحديث كثير عن وجود صفقة بين الإخوان والداخلية مقتضاها -كما يتردد- حماية النظام الحاكم، مقابل الإبقاء على الداخلية دون إعادة هيكلة أو مساس بسلطاتها وامتيازاته التي هي اعتباطية بالضرورة ولا أصل لها لا في دستورٍ ولا في قانون. 

ليس لدي أي معلومات مؤكدة أو واضحة بشأن مثل هذه صفقة ولكن ومع افتراض وجودها، نستطيع القول أنّ تورّط داخلية أحمد جمال الدين (وزير الداخلية السابق) في العديد من عمليات التعذيب والقتل الناجم عنها، أو القتل المباشر في المظاهرات، وهي العمليات التي رصدتها العديد من منظمات حقوق الإنسان، بالإضافة إلى دورها في أحداث الاتحادية التي سبقت الاستفتاء على الدستور والتي بالإمكان وصف الداخلية فيها بالفشل على أقل تقدير أو التواطؤ كما بدى جلياً في أحداث حصار الشيخ المحلاوي في مسجد القائد إبراهيم [1]. وبعد المطالبات العديدة باستبعاد أحمد جمال الدين من التشكيل الوزاري الجديد الذي حدث بعد الاستفتاء على الدستور، وأخيراً ورود اسمه في تقرير لجنة تقصي الحقائق كأحد المتورطين في أحداث محمد محمود 2011، فكان لابد لمرسي أن يضع حداً لهذا الوزير الذي ورط إدارته في العديد من المآزق. إذاً يقيل مرسي وزير الداخلية، ويستبدله بالحالي، وأيضاً الصفقة تزال مستمرة وهذه المرة الاتهامات بوجودها يشارك في توجيهها صفٌ من الضباط. 

الصفقاتكلهاليستشريرة

 لقد حُمّل مصطلح الصفقة غيرَ معناه وما يشير إليه، وأصبح موسوماً بالعار والخيانة، ففقد معناه الحقيقي وما يترتب عليه، وصار يشير إلى معانٍ أخرى يُكرّس لها في ظل خطابٍ من المفترض أنّه هزم شر هزيمة كأحد أهم نتائج الثورة. 

 فتعريف الصفقة لغة:
الصَّفْقةُ: ضرب اليد عند البيع علامة إِنفاذه. و الصّفقة العقد. والصّفقة الْبيعةُ . ويقال: صَفْقَةٌ رابحةٌ أو خاسرةٌ. وأَعطاه صفقةَ يده أي أعطاه عَهْدَه. [2] والصفقة فقهاً من صَفْق وهو ضرب اليد على اليد في البيع علامة على إجرائه. [3] 
إذاً فلا يحمل معنى مصطلح الصفقة كما رأينا أي شبهة خيانة، فالصفقة مقايضة في تعريفها الأوّلي في معاجم الاقتصاد أي تقديم شيءٍ مقابل شيء، وهي كما تبدو عملية غاية في الحيوية من حيث أننا نستعملها يومياً وبصورةٍ طبيعية وعلى عدّة مستويات، في معظم معاملاتنا الحياتية، فالجلوس في المقهى صفقة، واستخدام الأتوبيس صفقة... إلخ. 

 إذاً فلا صحة في وسم "الصفقة" بالخيانة ، وخصوصاً في مجال العمل السياسي، وعندما نعلم أن بعض تعريفات السياسة هي "فن تحقيق الممكن في إطار العدالة"، وحيث أن الفن هو كل عملٍ متقن، والممكن هو المستطاع، والمتيسّر فيقال: أمكن الأمر أي سهل وتيسر وصار مستطاعاً [4].  وفيما يتيسّر لتحقيق الممكن عقد الصفقات، وأيضا إذا كان تعريف السياسة: "القدرة على التفاوض" ، والتفاوض يعني عقد الصفقات، والتنازل عن شيء مقابل تنازل الطرف الآخر عن شيء، وإعطاء شيء مقابل شيء... وهكذا. فهي إذاً اتفاقٌ بين طرفين. [5]

ولكنيبقىمعمنتعقدالصفقةوبأيّنتائج؟ 
 
كما ذكرنا في تعريف مصطلح الصفقة في اللغة، فيقال صفقة خاسرة أو رابحة، فإنه من الممكن أن تكون بعض الصفقات خاسرة لأحد الأطراف، وربما تكون خاسرة لكليهما. وفي استكمالنا الحديثَ عن صفقة مبرمة بين الإخوان والداخلية، ففي اعتقادي بناءً على إقالة وزير الداخلية السابق أحمد جمال الدين فإن المرحلة الأولى من الصفقة قد فشلت فشلاً ذريعاً، وأن الطرف الآخر في الصفقة قد أدرك خسارته أخيراً ولكن بعد تورط، ثمّ يصرّ أن يعيد إنتاج الصفقة مرة أخرى في مرحلتها الثانية ولكن مع وزير داخلية آخر يبدو من خلال الحَدَثين (1) و (2) أنه ملتزم ببنود الصفقة، وأنّ ذلك يغضب ضباط داخليته.

 في الحدثين (3) و (4) ما يشير إلى أنّ ضباط الداخلية بعيدين كل البعد عن الصفقة والالتزام بها، إما ذلك أو أنّهم وجدوها ببساطة صفقة تأتي عليهم، وأن نتائجها عكسية، كأنّ لسان الحال: "التزمنا بضبط النّفس ففقدنا هيبتنا وأرواحنا"، وفي اعتقادي أن فقد الهيبة لدى أفراد البوليس أكثر أهمية وحساسية من فقد الأرواح، فأحيانا ما نسمع عن قتيل من الشرطة في وقت "تأديته لواجبه الوطني" مثل محاولة إلقاء القبض على تشكيل عصابي أو مجموعة لصوص إلخ، لكننا في المقابل لا نرى مثل هذه الانتفاضات، أو ما يسمى "الخروج عن الشعور"، بل تستخدم مثل هذه الحالات في تلميع صورة الشرطة المصرية الحامية لحمى الأوطان، وذلك على العكس مما حصل أخيراً، في حين أنه كان من الممكن ترديد نفس الحديث عن تأدية الواجب، وحماية الوطن، في حادثة اقتحام سجن بور سعيد، أو حتى في حماية أيٍّ من المنشآت والمباني، وفي كل الأحوال هي حماية وتأدية للواجب، لكن الحادث هنا مختلف، إنها في الأصل معركة بين فصيلين، أحدهما كان خاضعاً للسلطة المطلقة التي تمتع بها الفصيل الآخر وفرضها بالصورة الأجلى والأقصى، ثمّ تمرّد عليها، وقرر أنه سيخوض ضدها/السلطة معركة أظهرت له قوّته وإمكانية هزيمة هذه السلطة وفصيلها المسيطر/الشرطة شر هزيمة كما حدث في 28 يناير، أو كما يقول العيسوي وزير الداخلية الأسبق: "الشرطة انتقلت إلى رحمة الله يوم 28 يناير".[6]

بالضرورة فقدت الشرطة هيبتها للأبد في الشارع، ولدى أفراد المجتمع المصري، وليس لذلك علاقة بأي صفقات، وهذا كما أظن هو ما لا يستوعبه ضباط الشرطة المنتفضين على وزيرهم، ففي الأغلب كانت المؤسسة بأفرادها تظن أنّ المعارك اللاحقة لـ28 يناير كفيلة بإعادة الهيبة المستلبة، وإعادة إحكام سيطرتهم على الشارع، ويبدو أنّهم كانوا يحمّلون أحداث محمد محمود 2011 آمالاً كبيرة، وأن قائد المعركة أحمد جمال الدين -وزير الداخلية السابق ورئيس قطاع الأمن العام في فترة أحداث محمد محمود- سيعوّضهم ما سلبته الجماهير، إذاً فـ"جدع يا باشا".. فكما هو واضح ترجم الملازم أول محمّد الشناوي ما يفكّر فيه زملاؤه بقنصه لعيون المتظاهرين (الفصيل الثاني/العدو الذي سلبه الهيبة) وهو الفعل المتعمّد الذي يبتعد كل البعد عن الدور والواجب الذي وُظّف بناءً عليه في إحدى وزارات الدولة.

إنّ الشناوي بالفعل كان يتعامل مع عدو، وهو في أقصى حالات الاستنفار هو وزملاؤه وعساكرهم الذي عقّب أحدهم في حماس شديد: "جدع يا باشا"[7]. إذاً فإعادة الهيبة مرتبطة ارتباطاً وثيقاً بالانتقام، وأن يكون وزير داخلية الانتقام، وإعادة الهيبة و "جدع يا باشا" هو العيسوي صاحب الرؤية تجاه الشرطة التي تتلخص فيما
ذكره بوضوح: "الشرطة انتقلت إلى رحمة الله في 28 يناير" فهذا مخيّب للآمال.

افتراض الصفقة يستدعي أنّ الإخوان كانوا على علمٍ بما يدور في أروقة الداخلية، فكان استدعاء جمال الدّين وزيراً للداخلية هي بداية جيّدة لصفقة ينالها الرضا من الطرفين، لكنّ جمال الدين كان مخيباً لآمال الإخوان، على الرّغم من أنّه كان جد مناسب لأفراد البوليس الذين وجدوا في ظلّه مناخاً مهيأً لإعادة إنتاج هيبتهم المسلوبة وربما بصورة أكثر وحشية، تسببت في أكثر من 200 حالة تعذيب أفضى بعضها للموت وتضمنت حالات اعتداء جنسي على نساء وأطفال وشيوخ، وغيرها من حالات التعذيب في الشارع، والقتل المباشر. 

 الآن لم يعد أحمد جمال الدين وزير الداخلية، وثمة وزير جديد ضباطه غير راضين عنه، وليس فقط في شريحة الضباط صغار السن، بل يبدو أيضاً أن عدم الرضا يصل لشرائح أكبر في الداخلية مثل مساعده لشؤون العلاقات العامة والإعلام أسامة إسماعيل والذي من الممكن أن يُفسّر تبريره لهمجية الشرطة في بورسعيد بأنّه محاولة فاشلة لتهدئة الرّأي العام، ولكن أيضاً يمكن أن يُفسر بأنّه تأييد ومؤازرة لحالة الغضب والتمرّد هذه والتي طالت الوزير نفسه.

 القبيلةلاتعقدالصفقات ... الشرطةتكافحالشّعب: 

إنّه إذاً وفي كل الأحوال إن كانت ثمّة صفقة بالفعل -وهو ما لا تؤكده أيّ معلومة لديّ- فهي تعد واحدة من أغبى الصفقات في التّاريخ، وهي الصفقة التي يخدع فيها طرفيها أنفسهما مع سبق الإصرار والترصّد، ويتجاهل كلا الطرفين أنّ التغير الذي حصل على إثر الثورة قد طال بنية المجتمع؛ الخطاب الأمني الذي كان مسيطراً عليه و فيه؛ وأنّه لم تعد هناك أي فرصة لنجاح أي محاولات لأن تعود الشرطة لما كانت عليه قبل الثّورة، إنها محاولة إحياء الموتى، التي لا مفر ستفشل في كل مرة، ولن تؤدّي في النّهاية إلا لزيادة الغضب الشعبي، وتحوّله لعنف في علاقة طردية، تمر البلاد بصورة في صوره التي أرى أنّها ليست أشدّها فإن لم يبادر النظام الحاكم بانتهاز الفرصة المواتية الآن أكثر من أي وقتٍ آخر بإصداره قرارات فورية وحاسمة تكون بداية حقيقية لهيكلة وتطهير جذري لهذا الجهاز الفاشل الذي لا يكتفي بتوريط البلاد في حالة فوضى وحرب أهلية بل بذلك أيضاً يورّط القائمين على رأس هذا النظام مع شعبهم، فإما الإسراع بالتعامل مع فشل وفاشية وهمجية وبلطجة الداخلية أو أن السوء سيطال النظام الحاكم بصور أكثر غضباً وعنفاً، فممارسات الشرطة لا تدع أي مجال للشك لكل ذي بصيرة أنها لا تنوي سلاماً لهذه البلد، وأنّ الرؤية التي يمكن تلخيصها في "عليّ وعلى أعدائي" هي ما يرى من خلاله أفراد الشرطة، وما يتعاملون ويفعلون بناءً عليه، وأنّ كل من تسبب، ويتسبب في فقدانهم ما يزعمون أنه الهيبة فإنّ نيران غضبهم المتمثلة في الهمجية وفوضى البلطجة ستناله، وإن كان وزيرهم. إنها مرحلة خطيرة في تطوّر هذه العقلية (عقلية الضابط الحذاء) يقوده الضباط الأصغر سنّاً متأثرين لا شك بالجو العام الذي غيّرت وبدلت فيه الثورة، فلا لعق لأحذية الأكابر ما لم يرجعوا المسلوب، وسندهس العبيد الذين تمرّدوا، وهي أيضاً وكما يسمّيها دكتور أسامة القفاش العقلية القبلية [8] التي يمتاز بها الضباط الأصغر سنّاً! 

ولا يمكننا بأي حالٍ من الأحوال أن نغض الطرف -كمثال- عن قصيدة طالب أكاديمية الشرطة المثالي أيمن محمود حبلص التي يتوعّد فيها الشّعب: "ضباط الشرطة أسيادك... وأبو دبورة وشورت وكاب هيخلوا عيشة أهلك هباب" [9] كتلخيص نموذجي عن هذه العقلية التي يُروّج أن الإخوان يحاولون عقد الصفقات مع أصحابها، أو -وكما هو واضح دون ترويج- لا يسعون في سبيل التعامل معها وفق مقتضياتٍ موضوعية فرضتها لحظة تاريخية تؤكّد على أنّ مفرخة هذه العقلية لابد من إعادة هيكلتها بالشّكل الذي يوحي بتدميرها وإعادة بنائها من جديد، وفق عقيدة جديدة، ومنهج مغاير ينتج عقلية مغايرة تكافح الجريمة لا الشّعب.. والله أعلم.  

هوامش 

[1] شهادة مصورة للمصور الصحفي عمرو صلاح الدين

[2] معجم الوسيط  

[3] معجم المصطلحات الفقهية

[4] المعجم الغني، ومعجم اللغة العربية المعاصر

[5] القاموس10 .. الصفقة ومعناها- دكتور أسامة القفاش

[6] http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/496948 

[7]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QbPCl3Wuvx4    

[8] عن القانون والقبلية- دكتور أسامة القفاش.

 [9] 

 [10]بلإمكان أيضاً الرجوع لمقالة محمد بلال: أغبى صفقة في التّاريخ

 

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"ya khabibi ya lelelli"

آخر الأخبار الفنية الواردة عن فرق النفخ البلقانية تؤكد أن “الفتاة المصرية” (“مصرلو” بالتركية) ما زالت تحافظ على شعبيتها الأكيدة وحضورها الراسخ في مهرجانات الشارع.

عام 1994، استعاد تارانتينو في 'بالب فيكشن' لحناً صنع أمجاد عازف الغيتار الأميركي ديك دايل الذي حوّل "مصرلو" إلى أيقونة ما عرف في الستينيّات بروك الركمجة (Surf Rock).

 دايل (1937) ،المنحدر من عائلة لبنانية، صرّح في غير مناسبة أنه سمع اللحن من أعمامه الذين كانوا يعزفونه على العود في السهرات العائلية. الأغنية التي حملها المهاجرون اليونان إلى الولايات المتحدة إبتداءً من الثلاثينيّات، أنِسَتْ إليها جالياتٌ عربية و أرمنية و بلقانية وعزفتها كذلك فرقُ موسيقى الأعراس اليهودية (Klezmer). وبالإضافة إلى توزيعاته “الكلاسيكية”، اتخذ اللحن أشكالاً موسيقية لا تحصى وتناوبت على أدائه أصوات بلغات مختلفة، حتى دخل مجال القداسة فتحول إلى صلاة يهودية بصوت أحد حاخامات نيويورك في الخمسينات.

نالت مصرلو بطبيعة الحال نصيبها من حروب الهوية المستعرة بلا هوادة على يوتيوب بين يونان وأتراك إذ حرّكت ، شأنها شأن السياسة والبقلاوة، مشاعر الطرفين القومية. تزعم الرواية التركية أن مؤلف الأغنية هو أستاذ العود إبراهيم أفندي المصري (1879-1948)، أو أفرام ليفي الحلبي المولد والذي عاش قبل حلوله اسطنبول سنوات في القاهرة فلقّب بالمصري. المصادر اليونانية تؤكد أن مصرلو هي أغنية مجهولة المؤلف من مدينة سميرنا، المرفأ العثماني الكوسموبوليتي (إزمير حالياً) وقد سجلها للمرة الأولى اليوناني الإسطنبولي المولد تيتوس ديميتريادس (1897؟-1971) عام 1927 في أثينا. وعلى العموم، ما من ثابت في قضية مصرلو سوى افتتان مؤلفها بفتاة مصرية ذات جمالٍ “ساحر” و “إكزوتيكي” (magiki, ksotiki) تزيد من إكزوتيكيته جملة “أخ يا خبيبي أخ يا للالي” لتكتمل بذلك نكهة الأغنية الإستشراقية.

مستخدمو اليوتيوب الأتراك، قللوا، في موقفٍ لافت، من أهمية تعدد الروايات عن أصل مصرلو واختلاط نسبها، إذ تبقى برأيهم نتاجاً لثقافة موسيقية عثمانية، أي أنها لا تنتمي إلى لغتها أو هوية مغنيها الأول بل إلى المكان الذي خرجت منه والذي أتاح إختلاط ثقافاته إبداع لحن خالدٍ عابرٍ للثقافات. 

[أغنية مصرلو]

"دموع الحب"

ظلّ طربوش عبد الوهاب يقض مضجع القيّمين على الثقافة في تركيا حتى صدر عام 1948 قرارٌ بمنع الأفلام المصرية بحجة إفساد الذوق العام. سبق ذلك القرار عشر سنوات من شعبية ساحقة طرب خلالها الأتراك لأغاني أفلام عبد الوهاب وذرفوا دموعاً كثيرة مع ليلى مراد ويوسف وهبي. وتروي المصادر التركية أن فيلم “دموع الحب” (1938) أقام الدنيا و لم يقعدها فزحف أهل اسطنبول “زرافاتٍ و وحداناً” في طقسٍ ماطر لحضور الفيلم. ولا يزال ماثلاً في الذاكرة التركية صوت المغني الكبير حافظ برهان الذي “استعار” لحن “سهرت منه الليالي” في أغنية سماها تيمناً باسم الفيلم (Askin gozyaslari).

أتاتورك، الحالم ببناء دولة قومية حديثة موحدّة العرق واللغة والدين، أراد قطعاً كاملاً (ودامياً) مع الماضي العثماني “المتخلف” فَكَرِه كل ما يمت إلى “الشرق” بصلة. ورغم أن الدولة الناشئة ورثت عن الإمبراطورية العثمانية تقاليد موسيقية لجماعات ثقافية مختلفة، عزمت الكمالية على اختراع هوية موسيقية “نقيّة” قومية للأمة التركية المُتخيّلة تكون فيها الموسيقى الغربية مثالاً منشوداً للتحضّر الفني، شأنه في ذلك شأن منظّر القومية التركية الكردي الأصل ضياء غوك ألب (1876-1924) الذي قرّر أن الموسيقى القومية التركية يجب أن تكون توليفاً بين الفولكلور الأناضولي الأصيل والموسيقى الغربية.

حوّلت مؤسسات الدولة الموسيقى إلى أداة سلطوية فعمدت إلى تتريك الفلكلور وتوحيد لهجاته وكتابة كلمات تركية للأغاني المنتمية من إلى جماعات ثقافية أخرى وروّجت للموسيقى الغربية عبر المعاهد الموسيقية الرسمية. هكذا عاش الأتراك عقوداً تصرفت خلالها السلطة كشرطة للموسيقى فارضة أذواقها الغربية على المجتمع، بل وصل الأمر إلى أن أنزلت بمواطنيها قصاصاً فنياً قضى بمنع الموسيقى التركية نفسها على الإذاعة لمدة عشرين شهراً عام 1935 واستبدالها بأنواع مختلفة من الموسيقى الغربية، فكان أن عاند المزاج الشعبي القرار وهجر المستمعون الإذاعة الرسمية إلى الإذاعة المصرية الناشئة.

الكمالية رأت في الأفلام المصرية تهديداً لمشروعها الثقافي فلم تطق الطرابيش العثمانية والأنغام الشرقية والعواطف “المهرقة”، غير أن اقتباس الأغاني المصرية شهد ازدهاراً بعد قرار المنع الذي لم يُثن العديد من الفنانين الأتراك عن الاستماع إلى جيرانهم العرب. عام 1961 مثلاً، غنّى “باشا” الأغنية التركية زكي موران “زنوبة” من ألحان فريد الأطرش (1956) بعد خمس سنوات من غناء صباح لها في فيلم “إزاي أنساك”. 'Zennube' عبرت إسطنبول إلى البلقان فأدّاها المقدوني الغجري محرم سربزوفسكي والألباني عبد الهادي شكودرا.

عرب عرب!

من سيارات التاكسي والميكروباصات (Dolmus) تصاعد نوعٌ موسيقى حاكى الموسيقى العربية (والمصرية خصوصاً) فأُطلق عليه إستهزاءً إسم “الأرابسك”. درجت منذ أواخر الستينيّات في اسطنبول أغانٍ عاطفية حملت كميةً فائضة من مشاعر اللوعة والغربة والحسرة والحب المستحيل. مغني الأرابسك اليائس، القابع منبوذاً في زاويته بحسب كلمات الأغنية، يشعل سيجارة تلو الأخرى، يشرب أنهاراً من الراكي ليذرف بحراً من الدموع، ويلعن مصيره المشؤوم، فتتكرر في معظم الأغاني عبارة “القدر الظالم” (zalim felek) ليعلن المطرب في النهاية عجزه المطلق عن تغيير ما كتب له.

الأرابسك الذي تذوقته في البداية طبقات دنيا وتحديداً مهاجرون ريفيون فقراء من القرى الأناضولية إلى أطراف المدينة ومدنها العشوائية (Gecekondu)، رأى البعض فيه تعبيراً عن غربة المهمشين العاجزين عن اللحاق بركب الحياة المدينية الحديثة. وبغض النظر عن أي تحليلٍ سوسيولوجي، أجمعت النخب الثقافية التركية بمختلف أهوائها على إدانة الأرابسك. الكماليون ذوو الأذواق الغربية هالهم ما سمعوه من موسيقى عربية وعواطف شرقية متخلفة تتناقض مع الحداثة المنشودة، بينما احتقر اليسار فيه الاستسلام للقدر والعجز واصفاً إياه بـ 'أفيون الشعب'. بشكلٍ عام، أنِفَتْ الطبقة الوسطى التركية من هذا النوع الموسيقي الذي ارتبط في خيالها الجمعي بالكباريهات الشعبية والأجواء “الرخيصة” (Demi monde) فتحوّل إلى رمز الإنحطاط و التخلف. ورغم منعه التام في وسائل الإعلام التي احتكرتها الدولة حتى أوائل التسعينات، أعاد الأرابسك إلى الواجهة نقاشاً حاميا حول الهوية التركية. الموسيقى الهجينة التي جمعت عناصر تركية وكردية وعربية تحولت في الثمانينات إلى ما يشبه قضية رأي عام، ولفتت إنتباه أكاديميين وباحثين هرعوا من أوروبا لدراستها، كان أشهرهم مارتن ستوكس، الوافد من جامعة أوكسفورد، والذي أمضى ردحاً من حياته متنقلًا بين مواصلات اسطنبول كرمى لعيون الأرابسك.

وفي معرض الحديث عن الهجنة، قد تكون تجربة المغني الكردي إبراهيم طاتلي سس “حبيب الجماهير” من أربيل إلى كوسوفو، مدخلاً صالحاً لفهم الأرابسك. الرجل الذي ملأ سماء المدينة بصوتٍ “ظالمِ الحُسن” وشغل ناسها بحياته الصاخبة، هو في الأساس مهاجر أورفلي من جنوب شرق تركيا. وأورفة، كجارتها حلب، معروفة تاريخياً بتراثها الموسيقي وأصواتها الحسنة واختلاط سكانها من عرب وأكراد والأتراك. حمل طاتلي سس إلى اسطنبول مزاجاً موسيقياً أورفلياً تداخلت فيه تقاليد موسيقية عديدة. وأطرب محبيه بصوت هو أقرب إثنياً إلى الأصوات الحلبية منه إلى الحناجر الكردية (كشيفان بروير أو جيوان حاجو مثلاً). بهذا المزاج، أحب، من لُقّب بامبراطور الأرابسك، غناء الألحان الشعبية العربية من الدلعونا إلى “بسك تيجي حارتنا” وصولاً إلى “شيلي يا سميرة شيلي”. ولم يوفر مناسبة تلفزيونية لغناء “يا ليل يا عين” على طريقة صباح فخري. أثناء منع الغناء بالكردية، “هرَّب” طاتلي سس العديد من الألحان الفولكلورية الكردية بكلمات تركية فاتهم بـ “سرقة” الفلكور الكردي وتتريكه، بل إن رئيس حزب العمال الكردستاني، ومن ورائه نخبٌ يسارية كردية، أدلى بدلوه في نقاش الأرابسك متهماً طاتلي سس بالعمالة للسلطة وإفراغ الموسيقى الكردية من مضمونها الثوري.

طاتلي سس “زيلو” Zelo (اسم فتاة كردية) والأغنية من فولكلور منطقة كيليس على الحدود السورية التركية.

التفكير الموسيقي المؤدلج لم يتنبّه إلى دور طاتلي سس كوسيط ثقافي عفوي تقاطعت في أغانيه دون إشهار أو تنظير أكثرمن ثقافة موسيقية ساهمت في إعادة تشكيل الذوق العام التركي. وساطة طاتلي سس ذهبت أيضاً في اتجاه العالم العربي. على سبيل المثال لا الحصر، لحن أغنية “ميل يا قمر” لميادة الحناوي (1987) هو نسخة طبق الأصل عن أغنية طاتلي سس “يللا شوفير” (1985) المأخوذة بدورها عن لحن كردي قديم غناه المطرب الكردي الإيراني حسن زيرك. بالمقابل، فإن ما “اقترضه” طاتلي سس من الموسيقى العربية “يسترده” اليوم منه مطربون عرب كُثرعبر أدائهم العديد من ألحانه.

وإذا كان الأرابسك قد صنف بموسيقى المهمشين، فإن التحولات التي طرأت على المجتمع التركي في التسعينات مع سياسات الرئيس أوزال الليبرالية غيرت الموقع الإجتماعي لهذا النوع الموسيقي. إذ أدت رياح العولمة وتحرير السوق إلى صعود طبقات اجتماعية جديدة وتغيير في تركيبة الطبقة الوسطى وأذواقها فبات الأرابسك الذي تطوّرت أشكاله وتخلى أخيراً عن 'ميوله الإنتحارية' أكثر الأنواع شعبية في تركيا. لكنه يبقى مهما تعددت تأويلاته دلالة على أفول المشروع الثقافي الكمالي وتقبّل الأتراك عموماً للبعد “الشرقي” في هويتهم.

زمان الوصل

بعد انقطاع دام سبعين عاماً، عاد كرنفال الصوم اليوناني “بقلاهوراني” إلى اسطنبول. لسنتين على التوالي، إحتلّت الحفلة التنكرية الراقصة وسط المدينة “باي أوغلو” والذي شهد عام 1955 اعتداءً أليماً على أقليات المدينة. ترافقت عودة المهرجان مع تأسيس ثلاث فرق موسيقية محلية تعمل على إحياء تراث يونان المدينة.

والحال أن نخب اسطنبول الثقافية تعيش حنيناً جارفاً إلى الماضي العثماني المتعدد في مدينة أفرغتها السياسات الكمالية من أقلياتها غير المسلمة. الخطاب الموسيقي المصنوع في اسطنبول اليوم تسوده أدبيات “التسامح” و”الصداقة بين الشعوب” والغزل الصريح بماضي اسطنبول “الكوزموبوليتي”. باختصار، ثمة صحوة لضمير موسيقي ما، رغبة شديدة في وصل ما انقطع، وإشهارٌ للمسكوت عنه في تاريخ تركيا الموسيقي.

كان تأسيس شركة كالان (kalan.com) عام 1991 مؤشراً مهماً على إعادة إكتشاف تركيا لهوياتها الموسيقية المقهورة. يكتب مؤسس كالان حسن صالتِك، الملقب بأنثربولوجي الموسيقى التركية، رواية موسيقية تهدم الهوية القومية الكمالية وتعيد اختراع تركيا كمكان تقاسمته هويات عديدة. وقد شاءت المصادفة التاريخية أن يكون الرجل مولوداً في درسيم (تونجيلي الحالية) القرية الكردية العلوية التي قصفتها ابنة أتاتورك بالتبني شخصياً إبان عصيانها عام 1937. ورغم مثول صالتك غير مرة أمام المحاكم التركية بسبب كلمة “كردستان”، الواردة في بعض الأغاني، استفاد صاحب كالان من الانفتاح النسبي الذي أبدته السلطة السياسية في سعيها لتحسين صورة تركيا الديموقراطية أمام الإتحاد الأوروبي.

عبر أبحاث أرشيفية و ميدانية، تُحيي كالان تراث مختلف الجماعات الأناضولية من أكراد (بلغات الكرمنجي والزازا) وأرمن وسريان وعلويين وغجر ويهود ولاز (سكان منطقة البحر الأسود) ناهيك عن “الربتيكو”، موسيقى يونان تركيا الذين جرى ترحيلهم أثناء التبادل السكاني المفجع بين البلدين عام 1923. كاتالوغ الشركة حافلٌ بأنواع مختلفة من الملذات الموسيقية، يبقى أكثرها شعبية فرقة الأغاني الشقيقة (Kardes Turkuler) العاكفة على تجديد الفولكلور التركي و المعروفة بخيالها الموسيقي المبهر. (والتوركو Turku هي تحديداً الأغنية الفولكلورية).

 

 [.فرقة Kardes Turkuler “حبة العنب الأسود” Kara uzum habbesi فولكلور كردي تركي من أورفة]

لقاء مع عبد الرحمن منصور الذي جعل من 25 يناير تاريخاً نتذكره

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عبد الرحمن منصور هو الناشط في الفضاء الألكتروني الذي حدد تاريخ 25 يناير موعداً للثورة المصرية. وقد جاء وقت الحديث معه.

في يونيو 2010، اقترح عبد الرحمن منصور، البالغ من العمر حينئذ 23 عاماً، على وائل غنيم إنشاء صفحة على الفيسبوك وحملة لمناهضة التعذيب تكريماً لخالد سعيد، ذلك الشاب السكندري الذي قتله الشرطة. وكان الاثنان قد عملا معاً كمديرين (أدمنز) لصفحة محمد البرادعي على الفيس بوك، وكانا على استعداد لتصعيد حملتهما الألكترونية لمستويات أعلى. وشكل المزيج المتمثل في قدرة منصور على التواصل مع الشباب العرب على الإنترنت ومهارات غنيم في التسويق الألكتروني نموذجاً ناجحاً. وقد نجحت صفحة "كلنا خالد سعيد"في صناعة التاريخ؛ كونها الصفحة التي عززت الحركة الشبابية، وأطلقت شرارة الثورة في مصر من بعد تونس.

فكر عبد الرحمن منصور في تحويل يوم عيد الشرطة في 25 يناير إلى حدث على الفيسبوك باسم "ثورة شعب مصر"، ولكن غنيم الذي رأى أن الصفحة تمثل حملة سلمية لمناهضة التعذيب وليست حركة ثورية لم يستحسن الفكرة. وبشيء من الإقناع، وافق غيم على الفكرة متخوفاً. وما كان لأحد أن يتصور أن هذه الدعوة ستكون شرارة لثورة حقيقة، وستؤدي إلى إنهاء فترة حكم مبارك البالغة 30 عاماً. واجتذبت هذه الدعوة العديد من الحركات والمجموعات التي تكاتفت لتحقيق هذا. وتبقى الحقيقة أن عبد الرحمن منصور هو الناشط الذي حدد يوم 25 يناير وجعله يوماً خالداً في التاريخ.

وعلى عكس ظهور شريكه وائل غنيم في ضجة إعلامية دولية، بقيت شخصية عبد الرحمن منصور متجاهلة أو غائبة بشكل شبه كلي. وفيما صعد نجم وائل غنيم باعتباره رمزاً بطوليّاً للثورة، وحاز على جوائز وألقى خطابات وعقد صفقة لكتاب عن الثورة بالملايين، بقي منصور مجهولاً، على الأقل في الصحافة الغربية. فما الذي يفسر هذا الاحتفاء بأحد مديري الصفحة والتغافل عن الآخر؟

التفسير الأول هو أن غنيم مدعوم بمؤسسة جوجل العملاقة حيث يعمل، وكذلك طلاقته في الإنجليزية، في حين أن منصور، الذي يصغر غنيم بسبعة أعوام، أكثر ارتباطاً وراحة في الحديث بالعربية. وقد قلل غنيم من دور منصور في كتابه Revolution 2.0، على الأرجح من أجل حمايته. ولكنه ما لبث أن كتب مقالاً على الفيس بوك باللغة العربية عنوانه "مصري اسمه عبدالرحمن منصور" وأوضح حقيقة دوره الكامل في إدارة الصفحة. أما التفسير الثاني فهو أنه في 17 يناير، تم استدعاء منصور لأداء الخدمة العسكرية الإجبارية، ومن ثم كان حبيساً في ثكنات الجيش ولم يكن له أي قدرة على الدخول إلى وسائل الاتصالات. ومع ذلك فكر أصدقاؤه أنه من غير العدل أن يحظى غنيم وحده بكل الفضل في إدارة صفحة كلنا خالد سعيد. وفي يوم 21 فبراير 2011، ظهر شادي الغزالي حرب؛ ممثل حزب الجبهة الديمقراطية وعضو ائتلاف شباب الثورة، في البرنامج ذائع الصيت "العاشرة مساء" في حوار مباشر على الهواء كشف عن هوية عبد الرحمن منصور باعتباره المدير الثاني للصفحة. وشرح أن النشطاء لم يقدموا على هذه الخطوة قبل ذلك لعدم رغبتهم في المخاطرة بأمن منصور أثناء خدمته العسكرية. وقد التقطت بعض الوسائل الإعلامية مثل الجزيرة والأهرام أون لاينهذه القصة الخبرية وأصبح عبد الرحمن بطلا شعبيّاً بين شباب الفيسبوكفي مصر والعالم العربي. وتم إنشاء صفحتين على الأقل على الفيسبوك تكريماً له مثل "عبد الرحمن منصور"، "كلنا عبد الرحمن منصور".

وأخيراً حظي منصور الذي بقي بعيداً عن الأضواء حتى بعد إنهائه فترة خدمته العسكرية بظهور إعلامي مناسب في 3 ديسمبر 2012، وذلك عند ظهوره في برنامج يسري فودة "آخر كلام". وفسر منصور ظهوره قائلاً إن ما جعله يتخذ قرار الحديث الآن، هو أنه بعد انتخاب أول رئيس منتخب بعد الثورة، فلا زلنا نشهد نفس الديكتاتورية والطغيان الذي عانينا منه قبل الثورة، ودعا رفاقه إلى التظاهر ضد استئثار محمد مرسي بالسلطة.

منذ أن كان في السابعة عشر، انخرط منصور في بعض مبادرات الإعلام الجديد العربية الرائدة، فهو يعيش في الفضاء الإلكتروني. "بالنسبة لي، فالإنترنت والتكنولوجيا، مثل الماء، فهي جزء من كل شيء أقوم به في حياتي". كانت وظيفته الأولى عام 2004، في موقع برنامج الداعية المشهور عمرو خالد. ثم أكمل مسيرته ليصبح واحداً من مؤسسي ويكيليكس بالعربية. وفي نفس الوقت كان مدوناً ومشاركاً نشطاً في الفعالية السنوية النسوية "كلنا ليلى". كما عمل مراسلاً إليكترونياً لمواقع الجزيرة والعربية.

يتنوع نشاط عبد الرحمن منصور بسلاسة بين العالمين الافتراضي والحقيقي، ومع ذلك يبقى نشاطه الافتراضي أكثر صدى وقوة وسعة. شارك منصور في أول مظاهرة في الشارع عام 2003 بصحبة والديه، عضوي الإخوان المسلمين، وذلك للاحتجاج على الغزو الأمريكي للعراق. وفي عام 2005، عام الانتخابات البرلمانية والرئاسية، التحق منصور بحركة كفاية، وبدأ نشاطه الأول في معارضة نظام مبارك فيما كان يخطو خطواته الأولى في جامعة المنصورة؛ حيث قام مع بعض أصدقائه بعمل مجلة سياسية ساخرة أطلقوا عليها "أولاد البلد". في ذلك الحين، كان عضواً نشطاً في الإخوان المسلمين، ولكنه انفصل عنها لخلافات في الآراء. ويشرح ذلك قائلا ً"لا يمكنني أن أحدد سبباً واحداً لتركي الجماعة، هناك أسباب عديدة؛ فقد أردتُ أن أكون جزءً من حركة أوسع، شيء ما أكبر من الجماعة، أردت أن أستمر في العمل السياسي، دون أن يكون من الضروري الانتماء لحزب واحد أو منظمة واحدة."

وكانت خبرة عبد الرحمن منصور الأولى مع حملات مناهضة التعذيب في العام 2008، عندما قضى مواطن مصري حرقاً نتيجة التعذيب في شها التابعة لمحافظة الدقهلية. ومن هنا كان اهتمامه بمتابعة قضايا التعذيب، ومحاولة القيام بفعل حيال ذلك. وفي العام نفسه، ألقي القبض عليه أثناء قيامه بأخذ بعض الصور في الانتخابات المحلية. وفي 2010، وبعد أن أصبح ناشطاً ألكترونيّاً على درجة جيدة من الخبرة في الإعلام المجتمعي، التحق منصور بفريق مديري صفحة البرادعي على الفيس بوك، وفي يونيو من العام نفسه، حدثت واقعة خالد سعيد، وما تلاها من أحداث.

في هذا اللقاء الحصري لجدلية، يتحدث عما يعني له أن يكون قائدًا شاباً في عصر الإعلام المجتمعي، وإيجابيات وسلبيات عدم الكشف عن هويته، وأفكاره، والتحديات التي تواجه بناء مصر الجديدة.

[نشرت هذه المقالة للمرة الأولى على جدليةباللغة الإنجليزيةوترجمها إلى العربية محمد العربي.]

Zaha Hadid: Black Square, White Cube, and the Twenty-First Century Museum

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The staircase of Zaha Hadid Architects’ recently opened Eli and Edythe Broad Art Museum at Michigan State University in East Lansing is sleek and straightforward. Its intention is functional; its design is simple (as simple as a contorted, suspended mass can be). A departure from the use of a traditional grand stairway as a means of announcing the authority of an American cultural institution, its narrow path cuts through three distinct levels of sensory experience, as each floor of the museum has been configured to showcase a varied permanent collection.  

Positioned as the building’s spine, the birch and black staircase urges visitors to follow the dynamic energy of piercing lines that begin at the base of the museum and are carried through sloping walls and ceilings. These lines are also seen in carefully divided windows, which are positioned so that views of the outside are mediated by a sense of forward motion.

                                                       [Image by Paul Warchol (2012). Copyright the photographer. Courtesy of Zaha Hadid Architects.]

                                                        [Image by Paul Warchol (2012). Copyright the photographer. Courtesy of Zaha Hadid Architects.]

This emphasis on movement brings to mind Ahmad Hamid’s description of the “economy in principle of time and space” of Islamic architecture. In lieu of grandiose focal points where one lingers, such minimalist practicality can be understood in reference to the Arabic saying “Those who dance on the stairs,” which cautions against remaining in a state of limbo (Hassan Fathy and Continuity in Islamic Arts and Architecture, The American University in Cairo Press, 2010).

The London-based firm that is led by Hadid has labored over every detail: exit signs in the shape of parallelograms reference the outer frame of the structure; long, thin light fixtures defy spatial boundaries as they pass through rooms.

                                                          [Image by Iwan Baan (2012). Copyright the photographer. Courtesy of Zaha Hadid Architects.]

                                                          [Image by Iwan Baan (2012). Copyright the photographer. Courtesy of Zaha Hadid Architects.]

While the focus of the Broad Art Museum is a revolving display of art spanning centuries and continents, Hadid first considers the local context. Working from the existing plan of the campus, the building’s form was developed through the expansion of nearby pathways. As the architect reveals in a catalogue that was published to coincide with its inaguration in November, the intersections of pedestrian and cyclist trails were extended then folded into the three-dimensionality of the structure, thus definitions of space were established in relation to a series of meeting points. Hadid has also honored the flow of these patterns with the option of entering from opposite sides of the site.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         [Image by Paul Warchol (2012). Copyright the photographer. Courtesy of Zaha Hadid Architects.]

                                   [Image by Paul Warchol (2012). Copyright the photographer. Courtesy of Zaha Hadid Architects.]

Views of the university are most dramatic from a large open hall on the ground floor that is enveloped by floor-to-ceiling windows. A corresponding area above, which connects three second-floor galleries, includes an interior wall of glass, providing an elevated vantage point. At the edge of this eastern wing of the museum, where its uniformity breaks in two, the outer wall of a courtyard is only a few feet high, exposing an indoor-outdoor area that transitions into the rest of the campus.

                                                        [Image by Paul Warchol (2012). Copyright the photographer. Courtesy of Zaha Hadid Architects.] 

The exterior shell of the building is dressed in long steel plates that filter light into galleries at different directions. This metallic casing emphasizes geometric masses that are pieced together like a three-dimensional puzzle in some sort of gravitational feat. With its Futurist angles, the “radically abstract object” (as it is referred to by Zaha Hadid Architects partner Patrik Schumacher) has a sculptural appearance.

                                                             [Image by Paul Warchol. Copyright the photographer. Courtesy of Zaha Hadid Architects.]

“The story of the museum has changed a great deal—it is no longer just a collection of rooms that connect sequentially as in a palace,” writes Hadid. In the US, however, a conservative streak continues to dominate the institutional prototype. American museums have been slow to abandon traditional layouts, maintaining palatial environments and the postwar white cube galleries that were first scrutinized by artist and critic Brian O’Doherty in a series of 1976 essays for Art Forum. In such static arenas, O’Doherty warns, certain political and economic variables are inevitably in effect when art is seperated from the outside world in tomb-like settings. Although he identifies the implementation of the white cube with the rise of Modernism (specifically certain types of modernist painting and “transcendental” architecture), Frank Lloyd Wright’s Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in New York (1959) was one of the first examples to go beyond such rigid framing (see Victoria Newhouse’s Towards a New Museum, Monacelli Press: 2007).

Comprised of a large inverted spiral with adjoining rooms and a smaller rotunda that branch out from minor platforms between sloping floors, Wright’s circular design allows viewers to take in numerous displays at once. With the momentum of ascending and descending bodies, its cavernous center releases the “spectator” from a one-to-one ratio of viewing or interaction and the confinements of an enclosed gallery. As the curved nature of this area presents a challenge to the exhibiting of two-dimensional works, curators have often been inspired to confront long-standing art world edicts in shows that cogently use its open format. Despite containing windowless walls and a highly aestheticized leitmotif (classic components of the white cube according to O’Doherty), the New York edifice revolutionized the museum archetype.

As Wright’s final project, the Guggenheim incorporates many of the principles that motivated his work; its inspection of spatial concepts and their potential impact on existing social orders is of primary importance. In the dozens of Prairie style homes that he built during the first decades of the twentieth century, this fading of boundaries was executed through lines that were carried from the natural environment of a specific site, such as the grasslands of the American Midwest, throughout exterior frames. This fusion was maintained in the opening up of domestic interiors by doing away with the boxed-in arrangement of Victorian parlors. In corporate structures, such as the Johnson Wax headquarters in Racine, Wisconsin (1936-39), the architect created large communal workrooms that include custom furniture and expansive celings that he likened to the sky. Although he had hoped that the Guggenheim Foundation would choose a location other than Manhattan (which he felt was overdeveloped), he continued to call for “organic architecture,” in which every element of a building is visually and physically connected to its surroundings.

In 1992, Hadid was invited to design the Guggenheim exhibition The Great Utopia: The Russian and Soviet Avant-Garde, 1915-1932. Well-versed in Suprematism and Constructivism—two seminal twentieth-century art movements that have greatly influenced her practice—she utilized Wright’s reversed ziggurat to highlight the avant-garde’s reorganizing of space through color, form, volume, and material. With a complex system of displays, she transformed the museum’s interior into an extension of the featured art. On the second floor of the main rotunda a series of bright red display screens cut through its winding ramp, emphasizing alternating depths of perception. In the Guggenheim’s side galleries, paintings were hung on freestanding glass panels that were situated throughout the room, giving the illusion of floating compositions; platforms were positioned on the floor or attached to walls at angles so that overlapping lines and shapes of artworks seemed to travel past picture planes and flat surfaces. If corners and flush walls are emblematic of the limitations of the gallery setting and its privileging of certain constructs, Hadid reminded viewers of the radical ways in which Kazimir Malevich and his contemporaries opposed heiarchical territories through individual works and their historic group shows. The painter’s breakthrough “Black Square” was placed in an upper corner of a room as it had been in The Last Futurist Exhibition of Paintings 0.10’ (1915), its perched orientation in reference to the Russian tradition of hanging religious icons in homes.

                                                                         [Kazimir Malevich's "Black Square" (1915). State Russian Museum, Saint Petersburg. Image via Wikimedia Commons.]  

By identifying a series of limited shapes and colors through a “non-objective” art that is independent of “any aesthetic considerations of beauty, experience or mood,” Malevich advocated a move towards infinite space where new collective phenomena can arise. Complementing this consideration of the pictorial, are Vladimir Tatlin’s Constructivist reliefs, which break free of the picture plane by contrasting the tactile qualities of wood, metal, and glass as masses that seem to come together in levitated forms. Through the avant-garde, the dissolving of lines of Suprematism and the like-minded application of volume and movement of Constructivism were employed in stage design, architecture, graphic design, photography, and cinema.

The immediate (and most obvious) link between Wright and the Soviet modernists is the use of the spiral as the ultimate representation of uninterrupted space and time. The historical intersections are far greater, however, as both were part of a larger modernist current, the ideals of which were applied at length in the Bauhaus but never fully realized past early experiments.

Commenting on the 1979 Museum of Modern Art exhibition Transformations in Modern Architecture, Ada Louise Huxtable describes the “youthful revolutionaries” who had become “elder statesman” with the repositioning of early twentieth-century architecture as a “purified” form of “aesthetic exercises” (On Architecture: Collected Reflections on a Century of Change, Walker Publishing: 2008). While Huxtable was clearly wary of post-modern developments, which she referred to as “aesthetic dandyism,” she was also reluctant to concede that the modernist “dream” could have been brought to fruition. For the critic, despite modern architecture’s progressive stance, the severity of the postwar reality was too great for any built form to contend with.

Huxtable was correct: the modernist project was never completed, in part because artists and “tastemakers” alike eventually dismissed it across disciplines. Amidst her sharp observations, however, she hints at exactly what went wrong, the “tastemakers” were in fact propagating the standards of the establishment(s). As it sought to supplant aesthetics that were in the service of power, Modernism faced overwhelming opposition wherever it was set to dethrone the status quo. Although in the visual arts its two central branches, figuration and abstraction, were initially socially-engaged and determined by radical politics, they were quickly commandeered as part of a bitter standoff between global superpowers, particularly during the Cold War.

Theory and art criticism had a significant role in downplaying the impact and promise of the modernist undertaking. In architecture, Huxtable points to the diluted terms that came to define the International Style, specifically as it appeared in an eponymous publication by historian Henry-Russell Hitchcock and architect and curator Philip Johnson. In this “manual on style” that was released alongside Hitchcock and Johnson’s 1932 MoMA venture Modern Architecture, the austere aesthetics of the pinnacle movement were seperated from visionary underpinnings. Such theoretical reframing would prove to be devastating.

At a time when “aesthetic dandyism” was in its prime, Hadid was one of the few (globally visible) architects to insist that the modernist project deserved further exploration (see Detlef Mertin’s “The Modernity of Zaha Hadid,” Zaha Hadid, Guggenheim Museum Publications: 2006).

Four decades after Wright’s sole museum was completed, the American art world witnessed a second coming; in 2003, Hadid inaugurated the Lois and Richard Rosenthal Center for Contemporary Art in Cincinnati, her first US building.

Also known as the Contemporary Arts Center, the museum was founded in 1939 and was one of the first American institutions to exhibit contemporary art, albeit without a permanent collection. This move against acquiring works intentionally distinguishes the Rosenthal Center from the innumerable museums that assume the inflated roles of cultural custodians, alternatively allowing it to concentrate on a programming platform that engages a wide audience.

Located in the heart of Cincinnati’s arts district, the Rosenthal Center emerges from the urban fabric of its site. The sidewalk of its corner lot continues under a glass front that contains the museum’s entrance, traveling through the span of the ground floor to the edge of the building where it becomes a back wall. Fastening the edifice to the city’s tectonic makeup, Hadid refers to this prominent detail as an “urban carpet.” From street-level views, the structural seam directs the eye through a series of mammoth blocks that are stacked as fragments. On the side of the museum where these rectangular masses differ in length and seem to drift into the skyline, a single unit takes on the appearance of Malevich’s "Black Square," hovering above a Cincinnati intersection as additional shapes dance around it.

                                                 [Image by Roland Halbe (2003). Copyright the photographer. Courtesy of the Lois and Richard Rosenthal                                   Center for Contemporary Art.]

The building is a Suprematist composition applied to a lived reality, demonstrating the modernist understanding of infinity more effectively than Malevich’s canvases or his architectural mockup "Alpha" (1920), a plaster sculpture that visualizes the physical relationships of his orthogonal “non-objects.” In the Rosenthal Center, this concept is grounded then expanded from its theoretical beginnings only to be propelled upward and outward, back into space.

Malevich’s fascination with aerial photography forged his original interest in the organization of the world according to a sequence of basic shapes and colors that he recognized in all things. The system that would result from such organization would be one of collective production, of a unity that would cast off the “chaotic forms” that blocked “creativity’s path.” Although his experiments mostly manifested in visual culture, he was not exclusively concerned with the realm of art that had fallen prey to the whims of the academy or patrons. On the contrary, he was chiefly interested in how this path could lead to the greater development of life, which he argued is “based on the economics of subsistence and of movement in general, whence stem politics, rights and liberty” (K.S. Malevich: Essays on Art 1915-1933, Vol. I, Rapp and Whiting: 1968).

First published in 1920, Malevich’s essay “The Question of Imitative Art” proclaims, “At the essence of the new arts lies not representation but creative construction: raising ourselves by means of constructions we achieve the highest natural development in all humanity.” As many Suprematist artists had aligned themselves with the 1917 revolution, Malevich also contends that while new levels of achievement can be reached through “the creative building of life’s forms,” only political struggle can succeed in overhauling “the old world.”

                                                                                                     [Kazimir Malevich "Supremus no. 56" (1916). Image via wikimedia commons.]

Hadid builds with the advantage of a technology that has finally caught up with her otherworldly designs. She also has the benefit of historical perspective and was able to pinpoint early on where the Russian social experiment (and Modernism in general) was unable to follow through with “creative building.” Hadid “quickly disposed of these seemingly inviolate architectural principles and translated the warped and anti-gravitational space of Russian avant-garde painting and sculpture into her own unique architectural language,” writes Patrik Schumacher (“The Russian Avant Garde—A Glimpse Back into the Future,” Zaha Hadid and Suprematism, Hatje Cantz: 2012). She not only brought the concept of infinity down to earth—she pried open Suprematist compositions to allow the internal flow of energy and movement. The Rosenthal Center’s irregularly shaped galleries of various widths and heights encourage a broad spectrum of art and multi-perspective viewing; the museum experience is never a monotonous endeavor. Within the interior of the structure, which appears to be in constant motion and in continual exchange with the outside, she stretched the limits of interactions that might arise between visitors, featured art, and the city.

More recently, Hadid’s firm has set its sights on other unresolved territories, exploring nature’s forms through several projects. While the outlines of organic shapes are visible in such designs, their endpoints clearly tie into the architect’s evolving, non-static bodies. The Eli and Edythe Broad Art Museum arrives closest to Wright’s notion of “indigenous” architecture that is possible in a place like Michigan where the landscape has been changed by merciless “development,” industrialization, “redevelopment” and consequent socioeconomic crises. Rather than ignoring these factors by sealing off the museum from its environment, Hadid provides adjacent communities with a way to move forward.

Remembering Chokri Belaid

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A Figure from the Revolutionary Left Assassinated

Chokri Belaid, the heavily mediatized leader of the Popular Front (Jabha Chaabya), was shot several times early Wednesday morning at his home in Menzah 6. The charismatic figure of the revolutionary left was shot with two to four bullets; the government is saying it was three.

He was quickly transported to the Ennasr clinic, but the doctors could not save him, and his death was confirmed later in the morning. Chokri Belaid was the target of a number of attacks due to his virulent opposition to the current government’s policies and his regular denouncement of the heightening level of political violence.

An Isolated Act for the Government; the Authorities’ Guilty Indulgence for Hamma Hammami

Authorities, on behalf of Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, speak of an individual acting alone, whom the police previously warned against. An investigation will explain whether this was an isolated act or an operation commissioned by the highest of levels. The government, which Chokri Belaid highly criticized, has a high interest in elucidating this incident before it implicates the party in power.

Hamma Hammami, the other leader of the Popular Front and companion of Chokri Belaid, believes that the murder was "planned and executed by professionals." According to him, responsibility lays with the government, who has until now, demonstrated a "guilty indulgence towards violence."

Below are images from a demonstration that took place in Tunis, on 6 February 2013, along Habib Bourguiba Avenue.


[A number of youth went out to demonstrate along Habib Bourgiba Avenue. Image by Amine Boufaied.] 


[A number of youth went out to demonstrate along Habib Bourgiba Avenue. Image by Amine Boufaied.]


[Emotions ran high on Habib Bourguiba Avenue. Image by Malek Khadhraoui.]


[Citizens went out on the streets to express their anger follow
ing Chokri Belaid's assassination. Paper reads: "Today, Chokri has left. Tomorrow, it will be you. So, where are you?" Image by Amine Boufaied.]


[Paper reads: "Today Chokri . . . tomorrow who?" Image by Malek Khadhraoui.]


[As the day progressed, crowds grew bigger. Image by Amine Boufaied.]


[As the day progressed, crowds grew bigger. Image by Amine Boufaied.]


[As the crowds grew, so did the amount of security forces. Image by Amine Boufaied.]


[Demonstration continues along Habib Bourguiba Avenue. Image by Amine Boufaied.]


[Aside from some flags from Chokri Belaid's political party, only the Tunisian flag was waved. Image by Amine Boufaied.]


[During Chokri Belaid's funeral procession, security forces used tear gas bombs against the crowds. Image by Kais Zriba.]
 


[During Chokri Belaid's funeral procession, security forces used tear gas bombs against the crowds. Image by Kais Zriba.]


[Toward the end of the demonstration, multiple instances of police beating beaten protesters were witnessed and documented. Image by Kais Zriba.]
 

[Toward the end of the demonstration, multiple instances of police beating beaten protesters were witnessed and documented. Image by Kais Zriba.]
 

[During the afternoon, clashes between police and protesters intensified and moved to Paris Street. Image by Amine Boufaied.]
 


[During the afternoon, clashes between police and protesters intensified and moved to Paris Street. Image by Amine Boufaied.]


[Barracades on fire in the downtown area of the city. Image by Amine Boufaied.]
 

[A tank drives around the area. Image by Amine Boufaied.]
 

[The above text is an English translation of "Chokri Belaid abattu de plusieurs balles devant son domicile," followed by images taken during a demonstration along Habib Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis on 6 February. The article was translated by Samia Errazzouki. Both the text and images were originally published on Nawaat.] 

Baki 7our Mansour on Algeria, Mali, and Social Media

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[This post is part of an ongoing Profile of a Contemporary Conduit series on Jadaliyya that seeks to highlight distinct voices primarily in and from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia.] 

Jadaliyya (J): What motivated you to start blogging 

Baki 7our Mansour (B7M): At the end of 2009, I started tweeting and my first real interventions were during what was called "the football war" between Egypt and Algeria. We then reached a pinnacle, in both countries, regarding the political use of football. And after that, the Arab revolutions started, and I quite immediately supported the changes in Tunisia and Egypt. Solidarity with oppressed Arab people overcomes the irritation born from football events.

But Twitter has its own shortcomings, which are related to its technical architecture and  inseparable with the real-time use that it is made of. On the one hand, it is difficult to access one's own tweets, and on the other hand, the published information may become outdated very quickly (see example here). I then felt the need to express my ideas in a more continuous and durable way. To divert a famous Latin proverb, "tweets fly and blog posts remain," as long as your hosting account is still functioning.

Jadaliyya: What topics/themes do you cover and why?

B7M: Different themes on Algerian politics or on geopolitical events in the Sahel, and a few articles related to social networks. In fact, my areas of interest are much more diverse, but I limit myself to these issues to avoid the risk of dispersion.

As to why my interest in the secret services? Because they represent the main part of the deep state. The dark corridors of power are more significant than the political theater offered in the media. My interest in the garagouz politics is weak. Garagouz are Arabic puppets. A good illustration of these are the mute and useless members of parliament when they raise their hands at the vote. The Algerian puppeteers are in the shadows and stay unknown to the public. How can one not be curious?

Why my focus on Jihadist movements in the Sahel? Well, the Arab and Muslim world has been shaken for decades by an ideological war. There is on the one side a peaceful Islam–serene and tolerant, with its customs and traditions. And on the other side, there is an alienating branch of Islam–aggressive and intolerant. The main battle here takes place between peace and war. This is a war within the Arab and Muslim sphere, between warriors and moderates. You can guess who is winning as long as the moderates do not react firmly to violent speech and acts.

Let me be clear, I have no problem with Tablighis, Wahhabis, Salafis, as long as they are peaceful. For me, they constitute a sort of Islamic orthodoxy--other religions also have people who choose to live their faith in a singular way.

But the use of violence is totally unacceptable. The  violent use of Islam for political ends should definitely be rejected. As a proverb cited by my grandmother, “The ember is felt only by the burned one.” One cannot revoke his own life course, and it is clear that what happened in Algeria –  especially in the 90s – affects my writings on this subject. Do not underestimate the extremists and their totalitarian ideology. Do not make the common mistake of complacency toward violence, including harassment and violent speech. And do not antagonize the Muslims who are peaceful. These are my guidelines on this issue.

Jadaliyya: How has your blogging evolved since you initially began writing?

B7M: It is bilingual French-English, but as most readers of the blog are French speaking, I opted more and more for fast and easy writing in French. Any blogger writes to be read and recognized as a respected voice. I try to give another point of view. It is clear that the major news sites are guided by their own economic constraints, and many new websites run after the buzz with catchy titles, including the right keywords for the Google bots to reap the maximuma amount of visits and earn some advertising money. I am not in that group; I sometimes approach taboo issues like the harkis, the auxiliaries of the French army, or the people missing from the civil war of the 90s. And even if I do, I do not always have enough time to perfect an article, I force myself to publish because it is often a relief to deliver it to the public view.

Jadaliyya: In your 6 November post about Ansar Al-Dine, you compared the blunder of a military solution to the Malian crisis to previous military failures in dealing with the Taliban in Afghanistan. What benefits do you think would come of continuing the negotiation process with local Islamists like Ansar Al-Dine, and do you think that the process could come with any drawbacks?

B7M: Unfortunately, the main leaders of Ansar Al-Dine betrayed the peace process with their offensive in southern Mali. Neither the local jihadists, nor the Malian government were up to the urgent challenges. In the short term, weapons talk, but there is no doubt that one day or another, there will be a return to the negotiating table.

Globally speaking, jihadists live to make war, as this is substantial to their ideas. When they settle, build state institutions, and respect their neighbors and international law, we do not call them jihadists. Instead, they take a name of their own. Just have a look at Saudi Arabian history for an example of that.

There was a hope that the Tuareg leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, would be the credible interlocutor for achieving a convergence of views with Bamako. In the rebuilding of the Republic of Mali, within a probable federal framework taking into account local specificities, a compromise was expected with the application of a soft sharia in the Kidal region – something in accordance with universal principles. But I do not think this will happen with the actual leaders of Ansar Al-Dine. They betrayed an agreement signed in Algiers on 21 December, stipulating an end to hostile activities. Before the ink had dried on the paper, they were already on their all-wheel-drive vehicles, preparing the war campaign. These leaders seem permanently disqualified. Who can guarantee that they would respect their own signature in a future agreement?

The discussion with the radical Islamists will resume one day or the other. No wave of aerial bombardment is going to eradicate their ideology. They will stay in the Malian landscape no matter what happens on the ground. A few weeks ago, I heard Jean Amécourt, a former ambassador of France in Afghanistan, saying that in order to solve the Afghan crisis, it is necessary to go through a negotiation with the Taliban. An intra-Afghan dialogue with the Taliban was held in Chantilly Castle near Paris. Even though this idea angered some thinkers rooted in old ideas, the solution to the crisis in Mali will be through discussion. Who knows, maybe it will also be in the elegant salons of Chantilly Castle.

Jadaliyya: Regarding France/Mali, you have tweeted, “as the saying goes 'a state/country has no friends, only interests.'" What interests of France are at stake in Mali, and how and why has this resulted in French pressure to pursue a military solution to the Malian crisis?

B7M: Yes, I do remember this tweet. It was a reply to a Malian tweep who was overconfident in the friendship between France and Mali. General de Gaulle and other diplomats, from Lord Palmerston in the eighteenth century to Kissinger in the 70s, had made this and similar statements.

As a world power and sort of peacekeeper in this part of the world, France has a significant military presence in the Sahelian-Saharan part of Africa. Now this region risks a new sequence of the domino theory.  A Mali controlled by jihadists is a big threat for its neighbors, especially Niger and Mauritania. If unstopped and undefeated, the international jihadist fighters will launch another war sooner or later. The fire would inevitably spread elsewhere. The sooner the fire is under control, the better.

Regarding French interests, the visible part is the company Areva. It runs uranium mines in Niger. Uranium is then transported to the port of Cotonou in Benin, and, once processed, gives nuclear fuel used in power plants. As for the invisible part, we do not know the region's potential in hosting rare earths, oil, gas, precious metals, and others commodities. And then there is the geo-strategic factor. An example to illustrate this point is that a pipeline project between Nigeria and Europe, through Niger and Algeria, has been postponed until the situation becomes more stable. But let us not confine "interests" to only its materialistic aspects. In today's interconnected world, what happens to Gao and Kidal can have consequences in New York , Paris, or Algiers.

"A state has no friends, only interests." With friendship, we are in the irrational and emotional, while with interests we are in the more rational field. Fortunately, the former "friends" of Gaddafi did not get involved in the Libyan conflict. Somehow, countries are more comfortable and the future is much more predictable knowing that interests prevail over the emotional.

Jadaliyya: In another blog post, you write, “Le progrès ne s'importe pas par containers” to Algeria. What steps must Algeria take to reach what you would consider real progress? What mistakes has the Algerian state made in that regard in the past?

B7M: Not just containers are imported. Skills and know-how come from abroad, via Chinese workers, Indian engineers, and European consultants. The lack of knowledge inside the country - coupled with the predation of corruption - explains the soaring inflation of infrastructure budgets. The cost per kilometer of a highway is higher in Algeria than in Europe for a lower quality. The future Great Mosque of Algiers is planned to be more expensive than the Burj al-Khalifa Tower in Dubai. Despite hundreds of billions of dollars of public investment, Algeria has no big companies in the field of construction or in the industry, apart from the oil behemoth. Sonatrach.

Algeria should invest more in human assets. This country is like a machine on which maintenance is not carried out properly. When malfunctions and deficiencies appear, the managers just get used to it with time. Abnormal becomes the new normal.

Of course, the state builds a lot. But what is the purpose of socioeconomic organizations that do not achieve their primary missions? Sclerotic and corrupt administrations, hospitals which do not treat patients in good conditions, universities that produce untrained graduates . . . What is the meaning of these inaugurations of inefficient public facilities? The Algerian state likes to invest in concrete but not in people.

Training and knowledge accumulation is the weak point of Algeria. So the first step of progress should be to renovate the education system and get it back to its initial mission. Invest and believe in people.

[Baki 7our Mansour tweets at @7our and blogs at Un regard averti sur l'Algérie et le Monde.]


Syria Media Roundup (February 7)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

Regional and International Perspectives

The Syrian Regime Bravely Condemns the Israeli Airstrike on Syria
Bassam Haddad’s satirical piece on the regional response to Israel’s airstrike. 

Cross-Talk: Syria Exploited Joshua Landis, Rafif Joujeti and Alon Liel discuss the latest developments in Syria, following the Israeli airstrike.

Israel in Syria Asad AbuKhalil says the Syrian regime is now finding itself between a rock and a hard place, because “the Syrian army, which has by and large remained loyal to the regime, could face major defections in protest against this regime reluctance.”

Netanyahu, Lapid and SyriaMazal Mualem says “anyone who kept track of the prime minister’s announcements last week, even before the assault in Syria, can easily identify the connection Netanyahu makes between Assad’s loss of control in Syria and a possible solution to his own personal political headache.”

Declarations du Chef de la Coalition Nationale Syrienne a MunichIgnace Leverrier translates to French Ahmed Moazz Al Khatib’s message to Sergei Lavrov whom he met last week. 

Turkey Steps Up its Criticism of Israel Turkey also criticized the Syrian regime for not retaliating against Israel.

The Rise of Syria’s Kurds Heiko Wimmen and Muzehher Selcuk on accusations leveled against the Democratic Union Party (PYD) by the armed Syrian opposition and Turkey, who view the PYD as a mouthpiece of the Syrian regime and an organization advancing the Kurdistan Workers Party`s (PKK) interests in the region.   

Influx of Syrian Refugees Neither Boom Nor Bust Lebanese Market Hassan Chakrani uses a preliminary survey from the IMF to challenge the prevailing narrative wanting that Syrian refugees have been a burden on the Lebanese economy.

Lebanon’s Sunnis Feel Threatened Following Arsal’s AmbushElie Hajj writes about the climate of mistrust within the Lebanese military as a result of the ambush. 

Syrian Jihadist Groups Take Conflict to Lebanon Jean Aziz says the recent attack in Lebanon’s Arsal reveal a dangerous escalation in violence between the Lebanese army and anti-regime extremist groups operating in Syria.

Suicide Bombing Connected to Turkish Policies on Syria, Iran
Cengiz Candar explores the many scenarios discussed by “terror experts.”

Syria is Not Iraq Shadi Hamid is in favor of a US intervention in Syria and says that “in due time, the Obama administration's inability or unwillingness to act may be remembered as one of the great strategic and moral blunders of recent decades.”  

Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camps Becoming Refugee City, according to Mona al-Omari

Syrian Narratives

Two Years of Meta-Narratives: How Not to Cover Syria
Ella Wind and Audrey Ann Lavallée write a satire profiling the (counter) productive types of contributors who have written about the crisis.

Assad’s Scorched-Earth Policy Precludes Real Negotiations
Robin Yassin-Kassab argues that “Mr Al Khatib and the NC, who have made efforts to reach out to regime soldiers and minority groups, should do more to address those who are tied to the regime not by ideology but by fear of the future

Uprising’s First Druze Defector Declared DeadMarlin Dick reports on the death of Khaldoun Zeineddine, the leader of the Sultan Pasha al-Atrash Battalion of the Free Syrian Army

Al-Khatib’s Negotiation Proposal: A Crisis of Leadership? Karl Sharro says “this makeshift approach to leadership will continue to squander the sacrifices of the Syrian people if not rectified urgently.”

Syria’s Secular Revolution Lives OnOmar Hossino on the various anti-sectarian elements of the revolution, found among religious leaders, grassroots movements, Sharia courts and militant groups.

Piecing Together Accounts of a Massacre in SyriaLiam Stack uses various journalists` first-hand accounts of the events, and suggests that many of the victims were from rebel-held areas.

Quiq River- The River of Martyrs Free Syrian Translators offer an English version of an All4Syria entry that uses various maps and pictures to make sense of what happened to the people found dead in Quiq River.

Paths to Change: Peaceful vs Violent Martin Shaw on the effectiveness of peaceful resistance.

Syria’s Activists: Politics of Anger Vicken Cheterian says “the idea that the west will accept a protracted conflict in order to weaken Syria as a state, exhaust it as a society, and reduce its ability to play a role in the region, is now widespread among the opposition. It is another bleak signal in a conflict without end.”

Medicine as Weapon of War in Syria Saleyha Ahsan on the difficulty doctors face in reaching zones affected by the Syrian crisis.

Inside Syria
 

Oneness of God and Plurality of Syria Rita From Syria says “Salamiyeh has been politically active for decades, but since the beginning of the current uprising it has played a special role. Its demonstrations led by secular parties were critical in exposing the regime's accusations of the revolution as being driven by Salafist elements or as a foreign conspiracy.

Trying to Live and Work in Ravaged Homs
Lina Sinjab reports from a devastated but seemingly quieter city.

Syria Rebel Raids Expose Secrets of Once-Feared Military Martin Chulov sends an interesting first-hand account of an army officer who was asked by the regime in 2007 not to retaliate against an Israeli military airstrike, and he implies that the same scenario repeated itself last week.

Syria Considers Taking Up Dialogue with OppositionAntoun Issa says the regime “may be receptive to opposition leader Moaz al-Khatib’s offer for dialogue earlier in the week.”

Activist Trip to Liberated Syria
A group of Syrian Americans visit an internal camp, where Syrians speak about the harsh conditions they face there.

Syria: The Former English Teacher Turned Aleppo’s Female SniperRuth Sherlock’s sensationalist profile of a woman sniper now called “Guevara”

Arts and Social Media

The First Daraya Local Council Press Conference Free Syrian Translators provide English subtitles for this press conference held on January 31, which addressed the local and national military and humanitarian situation

From Aleppo, An Artifact of a Calmer AgeSusan Stamberg reports on woven skull caps, “a single object, of silk and silver, speaks of what once was — and might, someday, be again.”

New Texts Out Now: Sally K. Gallagher, Making Do in Damascus Sally Gallagher says “the main question the book addresses is how women draw on, and in some cases are able to reshape, gender ideals to make a life for themselves over a generation of economic and technological change.

Social Media Buzz: Massacres, Finger Pointing and Russian Backlash Mohammed Sergie’s weekly entry on Syria topics circulating widely on social media platforms.

Tammam Azzam’s Kiss: An Unromantic Commentary on the Syrian Conflict Jonathan Jones suggests that by using Gustav Klimt paintaing, Azzam “invokes one of the most universal works of art to try and touch international hearts that are OK with ignoring his country's pain.”

Syrian Drama Takes Crisis Nadjat Anzour`s new series called “Under the Nation`s Sky,” addresses the consequences of the Syrian crisis on the people.

I am Syria publishes its “Syria lesson toolkit” for teachers to talk about the conflict with their students “without having to feel like you are an expert,” in an initiative to promote “Foreign policy education.”

Sunday Times Tells Freelance Journalist to Stop Sending Photographs From Syria Policy Deputy Foreign Editor Graeme Paterson said “this is because it could be seen as encouragement go out and take unnecessary risks in the future.”

Les Revolutionnaires ne Manquent pas en Syrie de Motifs d’Optimisme Ignace Leverrier translates twenty-five of the one hundred things for which Syrians must be optimistic about, as outlined in the All4syria blog.

A Film that Foretold the Downfall of the Baathist ConceitsHassan Hassan remembers the life and works of filmmaker Omar Amiralay, who passed away shortly before the mass protests in Syria.

Policy and Reports

Month-by-Month Summary of Developments in Syria (Updated)
A report from theInternational Crisis Group

The Syrian Islamic Front: A New Extremist Force Aaron Y. Zelin writes about this new extremist group that emerged in December and complicates “Washington's efforts to find rebel factions that align with U.S. interests”

Misery Beyond the War Zone: Life for Syrian Refugees and Displaced Populations in Lebanon
A special report prepared by Doctors without Borders

Arabic

المعارضة السورية وامتحان مبادرة الخطيب
Al-Quds on the attack of the Syrian opposition on the initiative of Muath Al-Khatib.

اسرائيل و سوريا و المعارضة: سر الضربة و أسرار التفاوض
Once again, Sami Kleib writes about what he views as the futile work of the Syrian opposition in the context of geopolitical interests and pressures.

سورية ساحة حروب بالنيابة ومقايضات دولية
Raghda Dergham writes about the Syrian proxy war and the negotiations between Moscow and the U.S to find a solution for the struggle in the country.

النصرة وما أدراك ما النصرة ؟
Michel Kilo writes about the Annusra Front.

لن يعود السوريون إلى زمن الصحف الثلاث
Rashed Issa on the media sector during the rule of Al-Assad and the revolution that will put an end to the regime’s control over information in the country.                                                       

الثورة أو "النصرة"
 
Hazem Saghieh argues that, contrary to the claim of its supporters, Annusra is strengthening the regime rather than weakening it.              

اسرائيل ستندم.. نحن في الانتظار
 
Abdel Bari Atwan writes about the implications of the recent Israeli attack on the research center in Damascus.                                                                                                                        
 
القدر عندما يسخر من الطاغية
Omar Kaddour writes about the discourse of mockery, sarcasm and satire that has prevailed in public when speaking about the Syrian regime and its tyrant.                                                                                                
خطاب الأسد: أنا... أو لا أحد
Samir Al-Hassan presents his analysis of the “strategy” of Al-Assad.                                        

في مشكلات المعارضة السورية
Omar Al-Asad writes about the discrepancy between the official opposition’s positions and strategies and the reality of the situation faced by the people on the ground in Syria. 

الروس يبحرون [1/3]
Yasser Qobelat writes about the Russian role in Syria in a 3-part series of articles. In this one, he refers to the Russian Marine’s presence in Syria.                                                                                          

قاعدة على ساحل أزمة [2/3]
Yasser Qobelat’s second part of the series. Here, he talks about the Soviet strategy in building a strong base for its interventions inside and outside the country, and the special relationship between Syria and Russia after the Soviet establishment of their base in Tartous.                                                                                            

روسيا وسوريا: مهمات واختصاصات [3/3]
Yasser Qobelat’s last article in the series in which he talks about Syrian-Russian relations in general and in the light of the current struggle in the country.                                                                                                              
الناشطون السوريون مختلفون حول مستقبل العلاقة مع إسرائيل
The Damascus Bureau on the polarizing topic among Syrian activists of the future of Israeli-Syrian relations.                                                                                                                                          

مقابلة العماد فهد جاسم الفريج
Recent interview on Syrian national TV with The minister of Defense Fahd Jassem Al-Fareij.                                   

روايات موسيقية من اسطنبول
May Sabbagh writes about the exchange of music and symphonies from Turkey across the Arab borders, reaching the Balkans and even the United States. 

 

Obama's Drone Leaks: New Imminence, Old Tactics

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The Senate Armed Services Committee did not mention drones a single time during Senator Chuck Hagel's confirmation hearings last week. That oversight, however, says a lot more about the politics surrounding the hearings than it does about the enduring salience of drone technology to US national security policy. The Department of Justice's "white paper" obtained by NBC on Monday affirms that.

The paper, drafted for some members of Congress and a less detailed analysis than the official, still unreleased, legal memo, provides the most robust legal analysis of the Obama administration's targeted killing policy to date. Although it makes no mention of any particular target, the white paper is clearly responsive to Anwar Al-Awlaki, the US-born Muslim cleric killed by a US drone strike in Yemen in September 2011. The sixteen-page document explores the lawfulness of killing of a US citizen who is a senior operational leader of Al-Qaeda or an Associated force on foreign soil in an area outside of active hostilities, who poses an imminent threat, and whose capture is not feasible.

The memo is woefully insufficient as a legal analysis. Even its title, "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a US Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or an Associated Force," makes assumptions that merit thorough examination. Who, for example, qualifies as a Senior Operational Leader? Al-Awlaki never commanded any attacks but was a propagandist who arguably inspired them. Is an associated force a group that shares Al Qaeda's ideology or must it be a part of a central command structure? Al-Awlaki's Yemen-based non-state group, Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was developed independently in the south of Yemen and has national goals distinct from the aims of the transnational Al Qaeda network.

The three-pronged test offered by the Justice Department to determine the legality of such a lethal strike is similarly rife with ambiguity. A killing is legal if

"1) an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; 2) capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and 3) the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable laws of war principles."

This iteration confuses the laws governing ongoing hostilities (see number 3) with those that regulate the right to use force (see numbers 1 & 2). Imminence is one element of the law of self defense and has no bearing upon the lawfulness of a target where there is an existing armed conflict. Instead, in ongoing hostilities, the legality of a target is a status-based assessment that distinguishes combatants from civilians. Unless he surrenders, a combatant can be killed regardless of activity. In contrast, a civilian retains his immunity unless he directly participates in hostilities, which is subject to a wholly distinct legal analysis. The point is this: if Al-Awlaki, or another target, is indeed a combatant in the U.S.'s ongoing hostilities authorized by the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), an imminenceanalysis is not relevant at all.

Despite its irrelevance, the white paper discusses imminence at great length. Placing aside this seeming contradiction, and assuming that applicable legal regime is not in controversy, the administration's definition of imminence is cause for concern.

Traditionally, imminence is a temporal requirement that justifies the use of force only where the threat is inevitable beyond a reasonable doubt and no other non-forceful means are available to avert it. The impending attack must be in irreversible motion. DOJ attorneys argue that modern day warfare, characterized by adversarial non-state actors coupled with access to devastating weaponry makes the traditional meaning of imminence inappropriate and anachronistic in dealing with threats posed by Al Qaeda and its associated forces. Therefore, there is no requirement to "have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future."

The administration continues that because Al Qaeda is "continually planning attacks," the relevant temporal element is not the threat posed by the would-be attacker, but rather, the most fortuitous window of opportunity available to the would-be victim to avert the theoretical attack. This flips the meaning of imminence on its head because the temporal element of self defense is no longer responsive to a real and inevitable threat -- it corresponds to a would-be victim's sensibility of the best moment to lethally incapacitate a looming threat. Accordingly, the Obama administration argues, traditional imminence should be supplanted by a probability test that considers the relevant window of opportunity, that has a high likelihood of success, and that sufficiently reduces the probability of future American civilian casualties.

This probability test, however, does not lend itself to a legal analysis, let alone effective oversight. As suggested by its first prong, a high-ranking U.S. official determines the imminent nature of any particular threat. He does so, based on classified information that cannot be judicially reviewed because any "judicial enforcement of such orders would require the Court to supervise inherently predictive judgments by the president and his national security advisors as to when and how to use force against a member of an enemy force..." Even after the killing of Al- Awlaki, the Obama administration invoked the states secrets privilege to dismiss a suit seeking information about what made the U.S.-born cleric an imminent threat. The administration claimed that the case "cannot be litigated without risking or requiring the disclosure of classified and privileged intelligence information that must not be disclosed."

This insistence on secrecy and executive deference is not new. In fact, the Obama administration's redefinition of imminence, or "new imminence," is a continuation of a policy solidified by the Bush administration. In its 2002 National Security Strategy, the Bush administration argued that while

Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat -- most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction -- weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

Based on this concept of "new imminence," the Bush administration attacked Iraq in 2003. Unlike its response to the Obama administration's expansive targeted killing policy, the international community responded to the Iraq War with harsh censure for its abuse of the doctrine of self-defense.

Civilians and governments alike are ostensibly less wary of an administration that touts its respect for the rule of law, thereby muting more fervent criticism. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the administration's targeted killing policy is not limited to U.S. citizens abroad in cooperating states like Yemen and Pakistan. The Obama administration has killed scores of non-citizens in countries that have not approved the use of force by the U.S. in its territory. Thus, while new imminence seems contained by a liberal administration, it poses a risk to the use of force by states.

Consider this example. If new imminence comes to shape the law of self-defense between states and not simply against non-state actors, Iran can legitimately kill Israeli nuclear scientists. Although Iran cannot demonstrate an irreversible Israeli attack, it can show a high probability of a future, though uncertain attack. It can demonstrate that there exists a very likely probability that Israel will strike it, based upon Israel's history of military attacks (i.e., 1982 attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor) together with its intent to strike Iran today (i.e., official Israeli statements), and a capacity to do so (i.e., Although much of its nuclear program remains shrouded in secrecy, experts have estimated Israel has nearly 400 nuclear devices, delivery systems with a range that reaches far beyond Iran. In late 2011, Israel test-fired a Jericho missile capable of reaching Iran. Based upon the U.S.'s redefinition of imminence, Iran can legitimately launch a strike against Israeli nuclear scientists.

An Iranian targeted killing of Israeli scientists deemed critical for a nuclear attack against Iran would be destabilizing not just for Israel, and a conflict-ridden Middle East, but for the entire world. At worst, it has the potential to draw several other state actors into a devastating armed conflict. Absent some form of oversight and continued international regulation of state force, this harrowing possibility can become a real challenge.

We do not have access to the Obama administration's complete legal memo, but we have enough in this leaked white paper to know that it does not bode well for global order and stability. New imminence as defined and exercised by the U.S. is palatable in one instance, namely if we accept that some states, like the U.S., have greater moral authority qualifying them to police the world. In that case, we should forego the law of self-defense and trust that "good" states will use force responsibly.

I, for one, am not that trusting.

[This piece was originally published by The Huffington Post.]

Seule la vérité

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À l’occasion de sa visite à Alger, David Cameron a souligné la détermination du Royaume-Uni à aider l’Algérie dans sa lutte antiterroriste. « Lorsque le terrorisme se développe dans différentes parties du monde, il atteint nos peuples et nos intérêts non seulement dans ces parties du monde, mais également chez nous, dans notre pays », a-t-il déclaré.

Plus de quinze jours après son « coup de gueule » concernant la gestion de l’attaque du site gazier d’Ain Amenas par les militaires algériens, Mr. Cameron rend visite à l’Algérie officielle pour décider de la stratégie sécuritaire à suivre dorénavant. Le Premier ministre britannique est clair : « ce sont nos intérêts britanniques que je viens protéger, avant tout », et si par la même occasion il est possible de conclure quelques affaires juteuses, why not.

Voila qui va « rassurer » ceux qui craignent que les entreprises étrangères – notamment dans le domaine des énergies si nécessaire à nos « amis » du Nord – se fassent rares dans les prochains temps en Algérie. Il faut se pincer pour y croire. Certains soutiennent que les multinationales vont se priver du marché algérien en particulier dans le domaine du gaz et du pétrole, en raison de la récente prise d’otages et de sa gestion pour le moins musclée. Ces entreprises nées pour le profit se risqueraient à quitter le pays parce qu’elles auraient peur pour leurs employés. La visite du Premier ministre britannique estompera cette peur et laissera place à des perspectives heureuses… pour ces entreprises en premier lieu.

Je note que l'Algérie officielle, qui recevait Mister Cameron dans l’urgence, n’a pas jugé nécessaire de rétorquer aux deux articles parus dans le journal britannique The Guardian, lesquels nous présentent, nous, les Algériens, comme un peuple de sauvages dont seule la violence serait le crédo. Des écrits qui, assurément, fleurent bon le racisme colonial. 

Qu’à cela ne tienne, nous n’en sommes pas à la première gifle acceptée par nos autorités et avons depuis longtemps appris à nous défendre sans eux.

Madame Ramdani, Monsieur Black, vous qui nous analysez depuis vos bureaux londoniens, sachez que si la violence fait certes partie de notre histoire, entre autres choses. C'est aussi le cas de tous les pays ou presque, y compris le vôtre. Ce n’est pas parce que vos aïeux ont massacré les Indiens, les Noirs, les Indous, les Aborigènes, et que l’un de vos souverains d’une lointaine époque réprimait les juifs du Royaume pour ne pas avoir à payer ses dettes auprès d’eux, que des journalistes algériens devisent sur votre histoire violente, brutale, voir féroce. Je ne me permets pas pour autant, dans une analyse réductrice et discriminatoire fondée sur de courtes vues historiques, de vous cataloguer arbitrairement comme une bande de sauvages.

C'est un fait, l’Algérie comme tant de pays d’Afrique subît depuis très longtemps la violence venue de toutes parts. Les « civilisateurs » se sont présentés  avec  leurs lots de brutalités coloniales. Les régimes en place actuellement, que vos états « démocratiques » soutiennent depuis toujours, faisant fi de la Liberté, des Droits Humains et de la Justice sociale, se permettent de réprimer, de tuer, de faire disparaître leurs citoyens depuis une cinquantaine d'année. Mais le feraient-ils sans la connivence des dirigeants européens, sans le désintérêt des populations du Nord ?

Oui, la violence fait partie de nos histoires. Des formes de violences diverses, en fait, sont produites et reproduites parce que nos régimes ont de tout temps remplacé les solutions politiques pacifiques par les solutions à court terme (solutions militaires ou/et autoritaires de préférence).

Il y a par contre un temps où la violence utilisée ne peut être remise en cause, et où c’est le temps de lutter pour la libération du pays. Le colonisateur français ne voulait pas écouter les cris des dirigeants nationalistes Algériens et du peuple, n’en faisait qu’à sa tête en réprimant toutes velléités de parole libre. Il utilisait les pires violences à l’encontre des Algériens durant sa longue occupation de 132 années. En vérité, cet intrus colonisateur au passé tout aussi « féroce » que le nôtre n’a fait que semer les graines de la guerre de libération, entamée en novembre 1954 afin de soutenir la lutte politique et diplomatique des Algériens pour leur émancipation. Même si durant cette période beaucoup d’exactions furent commises par tous, cette longue nuit de violence avait été rendue nécessaire pour libérer le pays et son peuple. Elle était légitime.

Madame, Monsieur, journalistes du Nord qui nous caricaturez, sachez que je ne suis ni journaliste, ni anthropologue, ni sociologue et encore moins historien. Je suis un citoyen, engagé diraient certains, militant diraient d’autres, les deux sont justes. Je vis sur la terre d’Afrique, et je m'y active pour que les injustices soient moins nombreuses dans nos vies et moins coûteuses pour l’avenir de nos enfants. Il ne s’agit nullement de dire que vous êtes coupables, même si vous l’êtes. Il ne s’agit pas plus de dire que nos gouvernants le sont, même s’ils le sont. Il ne s’agit encore moins de dire que nous citoyens, actifs et autres, avons notre part de responsabilité, même si nous en avons. Il ne s’agit que de répondre à vos accusations. Car c'est bien d'accusations dont il s'agit.

Je m’élève contre vos lignes mensongères et insultantes, contre votre tendance pernicieuse à réduire nos histoires, notre histoire à une succession de cycles de violences. Vous éludez, sciemment ou inconsciemment, la partie de l'histoire où l'Algérie a construit, enseigné, formé, soigné, produit des écrits, des films. Vous passez systématiquement sous silence (pourquoi donc?), la partie « constructive » de notre histoire, car elle existe ! Cela est pour le moins troublant. C'est pour ainsi-dire de la « triche » vis-à-vis de vos propres lecteurs. En revanche, cela va totalement dans le sens de la politique de Mister Cameron et des Misters de chez nous. Cela légitime la propension des uns et des autres à nous traiter comme des enfants, à bafouer nos droits et à spolier nos richesses.

Il ne s'agit aucunement ici d'un sursaut de ce nationalisme étroit qui a fait tant de mal. Il est plutôt question de dénoncer certains mensonges, de rappeler certains faits, pour que la vérité « médiatique » soit un peu plus vraie. Car quelles que soient les violences qu'ils ont subies à travers l'histoire, il n’en reste pas moins que ces peuples sauront tôt ou tard comme ils l’ont toujours fait, se relever, car ils existent, car ils résistent.

Madame, Monsieur, sachez  que « Vous aurez beau coupé toutes les fleurs, vous n’empêcherez pas l’arrivé du printemps. »

Tires over Tyre: US Ambassador Ruins Ruins

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Touring Tyre on foot can be tiring, to be sure. But whether US Ambassador to Lebanon Maura Connelly was too tired or too busy to get out of her car to survey these marvelous vestiges of antiquity, nothing excuses her regrettable decision to drive a convoy of vehicles over this ancient site, damaging a stone wall in the process.

Ambassador Connelly’s convoy passed near the golden Roman Triumphal Arch through a narrow dirt path that is not designed for cars. Unfortunately, one of the cars in her convoy veered off the “road” and demolished a large section of a supporting stone wall. What has not yet been reported is that to get to this pathway, she also had to drive over a Byzantine roadway. Because the convoy had to wait for a winch to pull the vehicle out of the ditch it had just made, her visit was temporarily delayed. 

The US Embassy, in response to the outcry over this incident, claims that the vehicle collapsed a “modern wall built to shore up the main road” to the ancient Al-Bass site at Sour ruins. However, any archaeologist familiar with this site knows that vehicles are not meant to drive on that small path—and it is not, in any way, the “main road.” In response to the upset, the Embassy released a statement: “Ambassador Connelly expresses the U.S. Embassy’s regret at this incident,” and she is “coordinating with the Ministry of Culture and the Municipality of Tyre to pay for the damages.” 

Ironically, according to statements released after an outpouring of criticism in the Arab and Lebanese media, Connelly claimed she was visiting Tyre to promote cultural heritage, survey project sites under the Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation, and discuss “further ways that the United States may help contribute to the protection of Tyre’s rich cultural heritage.” The humorous—and tragic—juxtaposition of her stated mission with the image of her convoy toppling a wall on such a historic site is providing comedic fodder for several media outlets. 

In the car with Connelly at the time of the incident was the Mayor of Tyre, Hassan Dbouq, who immediately came under criticism in the media for allowing American vehicles to drive over and destroy antiquities. During her visit, according to the Embassy, Connelly also met with the head of the Union of Tyre Region Municipalities, Abdul Mohsen al-Husseini, Dr. Ali Khalil Badawi, Director of Antiquities for South Lebanon with the Ministry of Culture, and members of the Tyre Municipal Council.

To deflect attention away from this unfortunate and easily avoidable damage, the Embassy, in a statement released on 7 February, advertised two ways in which the US Ambassador’s Fund in Lebanon has been used to support archaeological projects and cultural heritage: In 2003, the United States supported the restoration of the funerary complex at the al-Bass Necropolis, including the conservation and cleaning of an ornate Byzantine mosaic. In 2006, the program funded the conservation, protection, and restoration of the first century B.C.E. Mubarakeh Tower in the historic port of Tyre.

US cultural diplomacy and archaeology have always been intimately connected, and archaeology forms a crucial component of the State Department’s diplomatic efforts abroad. American foreign policy looks to archaeologists and anthropologists to promote mutual understanding, protect archaeological sites, and build cultural bridges. Over the past several years, the US has poured millions of dollars into supporting archaeological projects, research centers, and archaeological salvage efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan—the only two countries where US embassies have on-site staff archaeologists. 

For instance, at Mes Aynak in Afghanistan, the US has invested millions of dollars to save the remains of a large Buddhist temple complex before it is to be destroyed by the China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC), as the temple sits on top of a copper mine worth more than $100 billion. Unlike the global outcry against the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban in 2001, the planned demolition of this 2,600-year-old Buddhist hub has failed to attract significant media attention or global outrage.

The articulated intentions of these archaeological efforts and preservation investments by the US in Afghanistan are connected to a clear diplomatic agenda: to show Afghans that the American presence is not just about fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but also about restoring a sense of national identity and pride to a war-torn country, and helping local people reclaim their heritage after years of destruction.

With headlines like “Connelly’s Convoy Violates Tyre’s Antiquities,” allusions to “sexual assault” to describe the convoy’s destruction at Tyre illustrate how this damage is perceived as an attack not just on “stones,” but on “bodies.” As I have written, objects of antiquity, frequently referenced in political and media discourse in terms usually reserved for “bodies,” have become loaded with meaning that goes beyond the material plane and into a moral and even gendered dimension.

One of the websites covering this Tyre story asked: “What would happen to the Lebanese ambassador in the US if his convoy (and he does not have one) were to destroy ruins from the 19th century, or even an old building?” The answer supplied is almost as telling as the question in terms of how the US is perceived in the Arab world: “He/she would have been sent to one of the fifty countries that torture on behalf of the US government around the world.”  

The United States has been suffering for years from a terrible image problem abroad. The ambassador’s unfortunate and easily avoidable photo-op of a US vehicle endangering the past—and further tarnishing the government’s reputation in the present—carries within it another ironic and foreboding image as well. Set behind the demolished wall and the beached vehicle is the Roman Triumphal Arch. It is a timely and grim reminder that the Roman Empire, once triumphal, today lies in nothing but ruins. 

Roundup: News and Analysis from the Publishing World

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[The following is roundup of the latest news and analyses from the publishing world that relates to pedagogy and knowledge production. It was originally published on Tadween Publishing's blog. For more updates, follow Tadween Publishing on Facebook and Twitter.]


Free research! Swartz’s cause lives on
By Eric Zorn (Chicago Tribune)

Eric Zorn reflects on the movement to make academic research free for everyone to read, a cause that Aaron Swartz, who recently committed suicide, devoted his life to.

For New Ideas in Academic Publishing, Look to the Library
By Jennifer Howard (The Chronicle of Higher Education)

Amherst College attempts to make a dent in the publishing world by forming a new publishing operation called Amherst College Press. The press will produce peer-reviewed, digital books while advocating for open access, joining a trend of academic libraries venturing into the publishing industry.

In Book Publishing Today, Size No Longer Matters
By Michael Levin (Huffington Post)

Thanks to changing trends, American books are no longer the mammoth size they used to be, instead they seem to be growing smaller and smaller in order to accommodate a different audience with a shorter attention span.

Amazon: E-book Sales Soared, Print Crawled
By Jim Milliot (Publishers Weekly)

After the closing of the fourth quarter, Amazon announces a rise in digital book sales as print book sales continue to remain dwindle.

How Twitter Gets in the Way of Knowledge
By Dick Wisdom (BuzzFeed)

Twitter has become a useful resource over the years, full of different ideas, languages, and nuggets of knowledge; however, restricted access to Twitter’s database is making it difficult for researchers to tap into the data mine.

Maghreb Media Roundup (February 8)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Thursday night of every week.] 

Algeria

Algeria, Mali: another front in the “Global War on Terror”? Hamza Hamouchene analyzes the French intervention in Mali as a lens through which to critically examine the War on Terror.

What lies beneath: the stifling of regime resistance in Algeria and its consequences Zena Kalli describes pitalls of authoritarian stability in Algeria.

The President, The Establishment: The Only Winners Algeria Solidarity Campaign reports on confusion leading up to the Algerian presidential election.

Mali: il était une fois l’Algerian bashing. Baki 7our Mansour highlights New York Times’ articles which place unfair blame on Algeria for jihadist terrorist acts.

Libya

Libya: Slow Pace of Reforms Harms Rights Human Rights Watch reports on the need to establish stronger rule of law in Libya.

How international media get Libya wrong Nigel Ash reflects on the problems with hasty media reports focusing on a "volatile" Libyan situation

Opinion: Libya’s 2013 General Budget and Future Challenges Khaled Ali Elmariami raises concerns about the state of Libya’s proposed budget for 2013.

Libya vows to improve security Essam Mohamed investigates Libya’s security commitments.

محكمة الجنايات الدولة تطالب ليبيا بتسليم السنوسي The Hague demands that Libya turnover Abdullah Sanusi, intelligence chief under Gaddafi.

Mauritania

Mauritania press freedom tops Arab world Reporters without Borders gives Mauritania highest rating for freedom of the press in the region.

موريتانيا والجزائر تدعمان عملية فرنسية لتصفية ” أمراء الجهاد” Mauritania and Algeria cooperate to France in operatives to destroy jihadist strongholds.

Opposition mauritanienne: Nana Mint Cheikhna une femme en première ligne Jeune Afrique highlights the work of Nana Mint Cheikhna, leader in Mauritania’s opposition party, Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques (RFD.)

Morocco

“Morocco military trial of Sahrawi civilians flawed from the outset” says Amnesty International Amnesty International criticizes Morocco for disregard of human rights in trial of Gdeim Izik political prisoners.

“Signing of new EU- Morocco Fisheries agreement that includes occupied Western Sahara will be flagrant violation of international law” says Khaddad MINURSO Coordinator and Polisario Secretary General Mhamed Khadded highlights breaking of international law in Spain-Morocco fishing deal with bearing on Western Saharan waters.

Women in Morocco: political and religious power Meriem El Haitami describes the lackluster performance of the Moroccan government on women’s rights.

Tunisia

Assassinat de Chokri Belaid : Les photos d’une journée de deuil, qui a mal tourné Photos from a day of mourning in Tunisia after the assassination of opposition leader Chokri Belaid.

La violence politique dans la Tunisie postrévolutionnaire : Vers où ? After the assassination of Chokri Belaid, Mohamed Arbi Nsiri asks what this political violence signals for the future of Tunisia.

Tunisie : Situation toujours tendue au lendemain de l’assassinat de Chokri Belaid Sena Sebouai describes the tense situation in Tunisia after Belaid’s assassination

Chokri Belaid slaying spurs Tunisia government change Mona Ghanmi outlines the Tunisian government’s response to Belaid’s assassination.

Tunisia: Murder Most Foul Yasmine Ryan’s Al Jazeera report exposes Belaid’s murder as part of a trend of political violence.

Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb

Remembering Chokri Belaid

Baki 7our Mansour on Algeria, Mali and social media

HRW Report on Repression and Reform in Morocco and Western Sahara

New Texts Out Now: Natalya Vince, Saintly Grandmothers: Youth Reception and Reinterpretation of the National Past in Contemporary Algeria

Tunisian Opposition Leader, Chokri Belaid, Assassinated

The Very Risky Bet of Hollande in Mali: The Probable Long-Term Disaster

Mohamed Majd

An Update from the Timbuktu Manuscripts Project

لا أسف ولا ندم

On Algerian Civil Society and the Prohibition of Assembly

Algeria, an Immense Bazaar: The Politics and Economic Consequences of Infitah

قراءة في رواية "موظف عادي جداً"لـ فينشيزو تشيرامي

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قد تكون رواية "موظف عادي جدا"، مجرد خلية مجهرية، مستأصلة من نسيج مجتمع إيطالي في مرحلة ما من القرن المنصرم. وقد لا تعني الكثير لقارئ عربي، يخوض نزاعاته الشخصية، إذا صح القول، بعيداً عن رومانسية الثقافة، ووفقاً لما تقتضيه فلسفة البقاء، وتعزيز شروط الأنا، ودفعها باتجاه الأعلى. من هنا، يبرز إلى الواقع، مجتمع ملون بشتى أطياف العنف، كسمة تدبغ سلوك الكثيرين، وتبين مدى التأثير من خلال طريقة الكلام، أو الفعل، الفردي أو الجماعي كأداة وحيدة لتحصيل الحق. يتبين في مقابل ذلك، مدى الضرر الذي تصاب به شرائح هائلة من المجتمع الواحد، وذل بسبب الارهاق النفسي الذي تفرضه متغيرات وتجاذبات على صعيد السياسة والاقتصاد، ومحسوبيات في أجهزة السلطة، والنفوذ والوزارات. وإذا ما نزحنا بعيداً عن المتعة التي توفرها الأعمال الفنية، والتي تلعب في بعض أوجهها دور العقار المخدر، فإن هناك حياة أخرى وحروب من النوع السلس، والسري، تدور دون توقف، داخل مربع البيروقراط. 

ولأن أجزاء العالم لم تعد معزولة عن بعضها البعض، فإن خصائص شخصية ما في عمل درامي أوروبي مثلاً، قد تتقاطع مع شخصية تعيش في عالم عربي، لسبب أن الفردانية التي لم تتعزز في المجتمعات العربية كقيمة إيجابية، يجري العمل عليها في الوقت ذاته، من خلال أنظمة تسعى لمحو مجموعات بشرية، بطريقة أو بأخرى، عبر التأثير سلباً، وبصورة هائلة على الفرد.

 "موظف عادي جدا" (الدار العربية للعلوم- دار شرق غرب، ترجمة وسيم دهمش) هي أول روايات فينشيزو تشيرامي، وهو الكاتب الذي عمل في بداية مشواره كمساعد لبيير باولو بازوليني، ليتعلم بذلك الكثير من أسرار الكتابة السينمائية والمسرحية، بما يتحمله كل شكل كتابي من أبعاد، بحسب ارتباطه بالشاشة المسطحة، أو بالخشبة التي تحمل للمشاهد بعدا إضافيا عن الاعمال التي تسجلها الكاميرا. المخزون السينمائي البصري لتشيرامي، كان لا بد له من أن يترك تأثيرا على سياق الحدث وبلورته داخل الرواية، كما وبناء الإضاءات غير المباشرة على الشخصيات المقتضبة في العمل. فالرواية، التي تحمل إسما أصليا هو "البرجوازي الصغير الصغير"، لا تحمل أية فلسفات في ما هو ميتافيزيقي، مع أن بطلها الموظف جيوفاني فيفالدي، هو الشخصية التي تسلم بالقدرية، لكن وبالندية مع الحياة، دون أن تتداخل في مستويات من هم "أعلى شأنا" منها. وهي لا تخوض في البسيكولوجيا، ولا في السوسيولوجيا، بل تقدم الواقع كما هو، وتبدو وكأنها معزولة إلى حد ما عن كل المؤثرات الخارجية، وكل التفاقمات الداخلية، والتعفن الذي أصاب روح جيوفاني، بسبب روتين العمل، والمنصب غير المتغير، طوال تلك السنوات. وهو تعفن غير فج، يغطى بشغفه الاحتفاء بابنه الوحيد ماريو. الأمر يجعل من الموظف في بادئ الأمر، كائنا ودودا، ومحايدا. لا دراية لديه، بما تركه السيستم الاجتماعي، من خراب نفسي. هذا أحد أسرار الكاتب، الذي ينتقل في المرحلة الثانية، ليكشف لنا جهل جيوفاني بنفسه، وعدم ثقته بها، من خلال التحول الذي على وشك أن يصيب بنية العائلة الصغيرة، والذي يبدو ماريو المحاسب (وهذا شيء عظيم للأب)، مفتاحه الوحيد. جيوفاني، سيسعى إلى توظيف إبنه في الوزارة، بمنصب محاسب، فيما يتقاعد هو بالمقابل. المفروض أن يرسم هذا الوضع الجديد، سكة من نوع آخر، للأب الموظف، الذي يحلم بإصلاح كوخه وصيد السمك، وتحسين سبل العيش من خلال معاش تقاعده. هذا هو أحد خطوط العمل السرية، والتي تشي بأن جيوفاني يعزف على منوال البرجوازي الصغير، بشكل عنيد، بل ويسعى للقفز إلى مستوى معيشي أعلى، يؤسس لأسلوب حياة مختلف لماريو الذي ولد في المدينة، والذي لا يفقه شيئا عن القرية، بخلاف أبيه، الذي يرى في المدينة، المكان المثالي للتحول إلى البرجوازية.

لكن اصطدام جيوفاني، بواقع المحسوبيات عند التقدم للوظيفة، يكشف عن معرفة هشة بالذات، إذ يشترط عليه مرؤوسه الدخول إلى المحفل الماسوني. بذلك، ستكون الوظيفة من نصيب الإبن ماريو. جيوفاني الذي لا يمانع الأمر، يجتهد كي يصبح عضوا ماسونيا. الكاتب، يقدم بذلك حجر الأساس لشخصية جاهزة لامتصاص المحيط بشكل طفيلي، ومثير لشفقة في آن. هذه الحادثة تمثل المرحلة الثانية، من مراحل اطلاعنا على مكامن عالم جيوفاني النفسي. 

أما المرحلة الأولى، فتقدم بصورة عرضية، لكنها صادمة: جيوفاني وإبنه يصطادان السمك، هما غير محترفين، يحفلان بسمكة، يضربها الأب بحجر ثقيل على رأسها سبع مرات، حتى تموت بشكل تام. من شأن هذا المشهد أن يقدم للقارئ فلاشا سريعا عن عنف متأصل داخل الموظف، وجاهز للإنقضاض على العالم. إضافة إلى أن هذه الحادثة بالذات، تشكل العصب الأساس الذي يتم بناء كل حدث لاحق في الرواية، على أساسه. التقاطع ما بين ما هو غير شخصي- أو عام (المجتمع، زملاء الوظيفة، المحفل الماسوني)، وما هو خاص (الحلم بوظيفة موقرة لإبنه، التقاعد، موت الإبن، مرض الزوجة وموتها) يتم على أساس وجود العنف، كإحدى مسلمات شخصية جيوفاني. والعنف أولا يظهر بشكل مخفف، فالكاتب غير معني بتفسير أسبابه، ولا بتقديم العلاجات. وما على الشخصية المصابة بالعنف المزمن، إلا أن تبقى في هذا الحيز، إلى حين تضافر عوامل اجتماعية، شخصية تحديدا، أو سياسية عامة، إما تهدئ، كأنها مردود نفسي إيجابي، أو تثير هذه النفس.

جيوفاني غير معني بتغيير الواقع، فهو لا يبدو كائنا متأملا، ولا ثوريا بالضرورة، لا تعنيه النظم الإجتماعية، ولا الوظيفية، ولا المتغيرات السياسية، على المستوى اليومي. قطار حياته، يسير بشكل مواز مع خط الواقع. فلا يرى في خريطة هذا الواقع المغلق، سوى بؤرة، يستطيع أن يتغذى على أطرافها كمخلوق بكتيري منعزل. لا يحمل رصيدا سوى كونه بيروقراطي عتيق، موظف مخلص، لعالم الوزارات الخفي. هو يريد فقط أن يستقبله هذا الواقع، أن يسمح له بالانداج فيه، أن يصبح جزءا من طبقة "رفيعة". شهادة إبنه المحاسب هي الرافعة التي ستنشله وزوجته، إلى خانة أخرى، إنه في جانب ما يائس، واليأس هو أول الأشكال المبدئية للعنف. 

إن تجاهل جيوفاني لأسباب وضعه الاجتماعي، يعد تنازلا من جانبه. فالمحيط لن يتنازل، عن وقاحته في سبر حياة جيوفاني (مقتل إبنه). ما يخلخل ما بين كفتي ميزان الأخذ (جيوفاني) والعطاء (الحياة ككل). هذه الحياة، المرتهنة بالفساد، لن تنصف جيوفاني الأمين لها. ستتحول ديناميكيتها، أو إيقاعها الجماعي بوجود الزوجة والإبن، إلى إيقاع فردي وبطيء، وخطير بغيابهما. هنا بالتحديد، يتجاوز العمل الأدبي في كليته، الحالة الإيطالية، ليمس الكوني، من خلال الإشارة إلى أن أحلام بائتة كالبورجوازية، لم تعد أساسا نافعا للغة عقل فردي يسعى إلى تحسين حالته الإجتماعية بشرف. فالجريمة العرضية، مثلا، دلالة على إحتمالية عشوائية، غير مضبوطة، مباحة في الشارع، تتيح لنفسها دخول حيوات الآخرين، والمس بأحلامهم غير المؤذية.

مخيلة تشيرامي لصيقة بالواقع، تسير تحت ظله، لكن ذلك لا ينفي مراعاته لنفسه حق الإبداع الذي يعتبر "كريديت" يتمتع به، ولو للحظات طفيفة في العمل، ليخلط ما بين الشعري والهايبو واقعي، إذا صح القول (مشهد انفجار أحد التوابيت في المخزن، جراء انتفاخه بالغاز المنبعث من الجثث المتعفنة، مشهد موت أماليا منفرجة الساقين، ما يضطر السيدة مرغريتا إلى ربطهما بزنار لباس المنزل احتشاما، مشهد الخوري الذي يكره البابا غيرة منه).

هناك خط واحد للسرد، وهو يتشعب لاحقا بين ثلاث شخصيات، كلها جيوفاني. فهناك جيوفاني المنزل، وجيوفاني الوزارة، وجيوفاني المحفل الماسوني. هذا المثلث، يضع الكاتب فيما يشبه، المأزق البنيوي في الرواية، ذلك أن عليه ان يفتش بين الحين والآخر على مفارقات بصرية، من شأنها ان تعطي لكل خط مزايا مختلفة عن الآخر. وهو ينجح في ذلك، وإن أبقى الرواية في المستوى البصري الأفقي الواحد بحكم اعتماده الواقع كمعطى أدبي جاهز. هذه إحدى نقاط الضعف في العمل: عدم التلوين ما بين هو نفسي وما هو مادي. ما بين الداخلي والخارجي. ظل جيوفاني أسير ماديته في العمل، كائنا مسطحا، تافها في بعض الأحيان، وغريزيا. ما شكل أزمة له. وربما إضطر ذلك تشيرامي، إلى أن يضعه داخل قالب درامي شديد القسوة، حزين، محبط وثلاثي الأبعاد (ربما يتوازى مع ثلاثية جيوفاني). فعلى صعيد المنزل، هناك وفاة زوجته. وعلى صعيد الوظيفة، هناك تقاعده. أما بالنسبة إلى خط علاقته بالمحفل الماسوني، فهناك مقتل إبنه. تخترق هذه الخطوط الثلاثة، خط انتقام جيوفاني لإبنه، الذي يعد الذروة المتأخرة في العمل. والذي يجعل من النهاية، مقدمة لرتابة، تشابه الصباحات الآتية، وتعددية التذرع بالوجود. ما يزيد من قوة السرد، هو اللحظة التي يختار فيها تشرامي الحدث، ليجعل منه عقدة كبيرة، تتزاحم داخلها عوامل أو جوانب أو شخصيات من الرواية، فالموت الطازج لماريو، يستتبع سريعا بالقبض على القاتل، وموته بالتالي، ومن ثم موت أماليا زوجة جوفاني. إن هذه الثلاثية في الموت مقصود منها إفراغ جيوفاني. والسخرية من ولائه للشأن العام (أول أيام تقاعده من العمل، هو يوم موت زوجته). هذا الانحسار في الحيز الأشياء المحيطة بحياة جوفاني، يعادل صنفا من أصناف الولادة.

يتحول العمل في الصفحات القليلة الهوسا قسريا بالموت، موت القاتل تحديدا، ذلك أن جيوفاني لم يدفنه جيدا. هنا لا يتخلى السرد عن هيبته ولا يستكين بحكم اقتراب النهاية، لأن في هذا الموت المتذبذب، إيقاعا خفيا يبقي اللحظات الأخيرة من الرواية، متوترة، وشيقة. تشدنا إلى نهاياتها دون أن تستعجلنا، إنه اسلوب يشبه نفخ الأنفاس في رئة غريق، أنفاس متلاحقة لا تتوقف، لذلك فإن حياة الرواية، تستمر إلى آخر رمق ممكن، بالرغم من تورطها بكليشيه الموت كحادثة أخيرة.


Media On Media Roundup (February 11)

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[The "Media On Media Roundup" is an initiative to survey published material in the news and broadcast media that deals with journalism, coverage, or mass communication practices about the region. The items collected here do not reflect the views of the Media Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to media@jadaliyya.com by Friday night of every week.]

Iran Shows Footage of Captured Drone 
Al-Akhbar reports that Iran has revealed decoded footage of a US spy-drone captured over the Islamic Republic, which had earlier been denied by the United States. Meanwhile, Iran's supreme leader rejects negotiations with the United States so long as it continues to impose sanctions on Iran. 

Social Media Firms Move to Capitalize on Popularity in Middle East
Sara Hamdan writes about how the growing presence of social media among users in the Middle East has led to more interest for Facebook, Twitter, and other social media companies to expand their business and form partnerships with Saudi and Egyptian advertising agencies. 

A photo essay in the Washington Post follows a group of disillusioned Egyptian activists hoping to launch a new movement on Facebook "to take the revolution to a new level." 

Palestinian painter Monther Jawabreh talks about his work exhibited at Al-Mahatta gallery in Ramallah. Mr. Jawabreh describes his art as "trying to reflect the human or the hidden side of the masked Palestinian man." 
 
Hamza Mohamed explains the fear that is growing amongst journalists in Mogadishu, Somalia after a senior journalist at the Dalsan radio station was charged with insulting state institutions and sentenced to one year in prison after interviewing a woman allegedly raped by government soldiers.  
 
After doubts arose concerning the space launch of a monkey, a senior official at Iran's space agency confirmed that state media reports of the space launch used images of two different monkeys before and after the flight.  

Malala Yousafzai, the fifteen year-old Pakistani girl who was shot by the Taliban for her activism, appears on camera for the first time after a successful surgery.  
 
Mark Sweney reports on BBC's Radio 4 Today programme's accuracy breach when host John Humphry inaccurately referred to the occupied Golan Heights as being part of Israel. The BBC's editorial standards committee said that the programme "has a good record of being duly accurate and impartial" in its coverage on the Middle East but that Humphry's "devil's advocate" approach was not "a reason for for the lack of clarity over the status of the Golan Heights." 
 
Blogger Ben White reports on the BBC's acknowledgement that Palestinian citizens are not guaranteed equality under Israeli law after White filed a complaint against the original wording of an article written by BBC reporter Tim Whewell on the Negev. 
 
Shooters Need to Get Better at Depicting Arabs
Hussein M. Ibrahim argues for better representation of Arabs and Arabic language in popular games that are often rife with stereotypes.
 
A report published by Abu-Dhabi based media hub twofour54 reveals that reality TV programming is on the rise after many successful Pan-Arab reality shows, citing the global format's "tried, tested, and safe way for television producers to generate ratings and revenue" and their contributions in "putting the Arab world on the global entertainment map." 
 
The program from Al-Jazeera English's Listening Post discusses the recent crackdown on the media ahead of the highly anticipated and polarizing presidential election. Journalists from the Guardian and BBC Persian are interviewed to share their thoughts about this recent round of government intimidation and its repercussions.

Recent Jadaliyya Articles about the Media


This Is a Mass Sexual Assault..We Will Resist (Video)
Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment/Assault highlights the attack on female protesters in Egypt's Tahrir Square on 25 January 2013.

Two Years of Meta-Narratives: How Not to Cover Syria
Audrey Ann Lavallée-Bélanger and Ella Wind discuss writers' different approaches in reporting on Syria in the media and the ways in which they are helping or, more often, not helping the Syrian Revolution.

"May in the Summer" Sundance Review
Roya Rastegar reviews May in the Summer, a film written and directed by Cherian Dabis, which opened the 2013 US Dramatic Competition of the Sundance Film Festival.

Iraq's Hackerspace
A profile of Iraq's Fikra Space, which describes itself as an “open place where people with common interests—often in computers, technology, science, art and anything else—can meet, socialize, share their knowledge, build new things or make use of existing things, make workshops, and collaborate.”

Baki 7our Mansour on Algeria, Mali, and Social Media
An interview with Baki 7our Mansour on Algeria, Mali, and Social Media.

Romancing the Throne: The New York Times and the Endorsement of Authoritarianism in Jordan
Ziad Abu Rish analyzes media coverage, in particular, the New York Times' "positive assessment" of voter turnout and political reform in light of the recent elections held in Jordan.

Mohamed Majd
Moroccan actor Mohamed Majd, who most recently appeared in Noureddine Lakhmari’s latest feature Zero (2012), has passed away at the age of seventy-three.

Syria and the United States: Jadaliyya Co-editor Bassam Haddad on Al-Jazeera's "Empire"
Bassam Haddad on Al-Jazeera's "Empire" with David Pollock, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Juan Cole, professor of Middle East history at the University of Michigan; and Stephen Starr, journalist and author of Revolt in Syria: Eyewitness to the Uprising.

From Maghreb Media Roundup:

Mali: il était une fois l’Algerian Bashing.
Baki 7our Mansour highlights New York Times’ articles which place unfair blame on Algeria for jihadist terrorist acts.

How International Media Get Libya Wrong
Nigel Ash reflects on the problems with hasty media reports focusing on a "volatile" Libyan situation.

Mauritania Press Freedom Tops Arab World

Reporters without Borders gives Mauritania highest rating for freedom of the press in the region.

From Syria Media Roundup:

Social Media Buzz 
"Massacres, Finger Pointing, and Russian Backlash," Mohammed Sergie’s weekly entry on Syria topics, circulating widely on social media platforms. 

Spring 2013 Internships at ASI . . . Now Available!

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The Arab Studies Institute (ASI) is now offering new internship opportunities that involve training and production at various levels in one of ASI’s five organizations: Arab Studies Journal, Jadaliyya, Forum on Arab and Muslim Affairs, Quilting Point, and Tadween Publishing

 

  

 

 

The internships offered are in several areas, but we are particularly looking for the following: 

Area (A):   Research (with writing Skills)
Area (B):   Video Editors (with knowledge of Final Cut Pro)
Area (C):   Graphic Designer/Artist (Mac User with Photoshop skills or equivalent)
Area (D):  Media and Social Media Management and Outreach (e.g., knowledge of Excel, Filemaker Pro, and/or Database Management skills)
Area (E):   Arab Language Copy-Editors/Proofers (with some experience)
Area (F):   English Language Copy-Editors/Proofers (with some experience)
Area (G)   Photo Assistant Editor (with interest in Photography)

[Knowledge of, or proficiency in, Arabic is preferable for some positions only]

ASI is looking for candidates who are self-motivated, prone to collaborative efforts, and eager to develop their skills in a variety of respects. Despite specialization in particular areas, ASI interns will be trained to develop various sets of skills (including writing, type-setting, editing, networking, managing, and/or administrating), especially if they remain on board for more than one term. 

Applicants should apply online by clicking here (or on the button above) and provide the following (Please do not send applications by email):

·      Cover letter (clearly indicating your area of interest and previous expertise) 
·      Resume or CV
·      One recommendation letter and two references (contact information only)
·      Writing sample or portfolio (Optional)

Applications will be accepted on a rolling basis until February 25. Internships involve a fifteen- to twenty-hour workweek, mostly via cyber-space. Location of applicants need not be in Washington DC in most cases but is necessary in some. Incomplete applications will not be considered. Inquiries may be sent to info@ArabStudiesInstitute.org

Egypt Media Roundup (February 11)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.] 

“Muslim Brotherhood want aide as top Egypt cleric”
Mulim Brotherhood member Abdul Rahman al-Bar is the most likely candidate to win the selection for the position of Grand Mufti.

“Clashes mark Friday demonstrations”
Violence erupts in cities across Egypt as protesters demand the resignation of the government.

“Update: One killed, 211 injured in nationwide clashes”
Police forces arrest ninety-three people in cities that witnessed violent clashes on Friday.

“Administrative Court rules to ban YouTube for 30 days”
The court rules in favor of the ban in order to make Google remove a film that insults Prophet Mohamed.

“NGOs’ prison visit rejected”
The interior ministry rejected a requested by human rights organizations to visit the Port Said prison as families of inmates warn of poor conditions.

“State TV presenter interrogated for asking Qandil about torture”
Information minister refers state TV presenter Ahmed Abdel Aziz to interrogations for asking the prime minister on air about the case of the man who was stripped and beaten by the security forces.

“Draft NGOs bill 'more repressive' than Mubarak era law: CIHRS”
According to the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the new draft law restricts NGO work to development and social care.

“Security sources: Egyptian activist tortured to death”
Mohamed El-Gendy was taken to detention center in the desert and tortured for three days.

“Unidentified man attempts assault of Iranian president”
The president if Iran, who arrived in Egypt for the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, was attacked after his visit to the Al-Hussein Mosque.

“Justice Minister's torture comments prompt walkout”
Ahmed Mekky says the current regime is not to blame for torture incidents.

“Egypt's incompetent politics turn citizens against the state”
Issandr Al-Amrani says the dominant discourse of a clash between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular opposition does not explain the recent clashes in Egypt.

“Egypt Conflict Alert”
The lack of consensus between political factions in Egypt is threatening the country’s stability.

“Egypt: A twilight without a new dawn”
Nervana Mahmoud writes that the current wave of violence is due to revolutionary momentum, political instability, and irresponsible leadership.

“Egypt’s static security sector”
The lack of security apparatus reform fuels violence in Egypt.

“In Translation: A president who does not know how to address his people”
A translation of Nawara Negm’s piece on President Morsi’s speech addressing recent violent clashes.

“Morsi's Guns”
Egypt is in crisis but not on the verge of a second revolution.

“Damietta LNG plant idled as Egypt keeps its gas at home”
Liquefied gas plant in Damietta stops working as gas shortages in the country cut exports.

“Mob sex attacks and the everyday reality for street children”
Nelly Ali challenges conspiracy theories about mob sexual harassment, pointing out the horrifying reality in which street children live.

“Guest Post: Why We Don’t Support Egypt’s IMF loan”
An interview with Ahmad Shokr, founder of the initiative “Drop Egypt’s Debt.”

 

In Arabic:

“بالفيديو.. «التحرير» تنشر شهـادتى محمد وزياد.. أصغر معتقلين فى عهد مرسى”
A child tells his story of being detained and tortured after joining a protest in late January.

“النشطاء السياسيون بالإسكندرية يكشفون قصص تعذيبهم بسجن برج العرب"
Activists from Alexandria reveal new evidence of torture of arrested protesters in the Borg Al-Arab prison.

“«مكي»: الطب الشرعي أكد وفاة «الجندي» في حادث سيارة.. و«المصلحة»: التقرير لم يصدر”
Presidential advisor says the coroner’s report indicated that activist Mohamed Al-Gendy died in a car crash.

“والدة قتيل مركز المقطم لـ«الشروق»: أبلغوني بالهاتف أن ابني انتحر”
The mother of the victim of violent methods at a rehabilitation center in Cairo tells her story.

“«النيابة العامة» تنتهى من التصالح مع «حسين سالم» خلال أسابيع”
The General Prosecution is close to reaching a settlement with fugitive businessman Hussein Salam for fifty percent of his assets.

“نوارة نجم تكتب: أيها الإخوة الإسلاميون «طلعتو ديننا»”
Nawara Negm criticizes the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach to politics and says their politics fail because they ignore the people.

“سـياسة فـوق البشـر”
Ibrahim El-Hodeiby criticizes Egyptian politicians who are using incidents of violence and their victims in their political games.

“عاديون وسياسيون”
Wael Gamal says that Egyptian politicians on all sides are removed from the ordinary Egyptian people and their demands.

 

Recent Jadaliyya articles on Egypt:

لقاء مع عبد الرحمن منصور الذي جعل من 25 يناير تاريخاً نتذكره
A translation of Linda Herrera’s story about Abd El-Rahman Mansour and his contribution to the Egyptian Revolution.

روايات موسيقية من اسطنبول
Egyptian culture and cultural products have influenced Turkish artists for decades.

الشرطة تكافح الشعب
Mohamed Eleter writes that there are indications that there is a deal between the new regime and the Ministry of Interior.

The Dignity of Hamada Saber
Paul Sedra criticizes the ridicule of Hamada Saber’s forced denial of being beaten by security forces.

Police Brutality Persists Two Years after Egypt Revolution: Rights Activists
Ahram Online’s summary of recent incidents of violence and torture against protesters.

The Thin Line between Revolution And Sedition
Mohamed Elmasry’s response to Issandr El Amrani’s article on the train tragedy in Egypt that took the lives of dozens of soldiers.

Morsi Mubarak
Khalil Bendib’s caricature of Mohamed Morsi and Hosni Mubarak.

شاهد عيان
Yassin Gaber writes about the recent incident of police stripping and beating a protester in the street. 

Why Did Bulgaria Link Hizballah To The Burgas Bus Blast?

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On Tuesday, 5 February, Bulgarian interior minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov directly accused Hizballah of carrying out the bus bombing in the Black Sea resort of Burgas on 18 July of last year, killing five and injuring another thirty-two Israeli tourists. Although speculations have circulated among local and international media since the attack, it took six months for the Bulgarian secret services to officially declare that the military wing of Hizballah was responsible for the explosion.

Two key phrases should be noted in Tsvetanov’s speech: “There is data showing the financing and connection between Hizballah and the two suspects,” and, “What can be established as a well-grounded assumption is that the two persons whose real identity has been determined belonged to the military wing of Hizballah.” While the statement made by the interior minister sounds quite convincing given the use of expressions like ”data showing” and “well-grounded assumption”, the Bulgarian government didn’t refer to any explicit arguments whatsoever in order to substantiate its assumptions. Nor were any explicit names of perpetrators given during the session of Bulgaria’s National Security Council.

Not surprisingly, then, the otherwise scattered opposition in the EU country unanimously condemned and rejected the report made by the ruling party (GERB), describing it as “lacking any concrete evidence” and “absolutely unjustified.” “The link to Hezbollah has been dictated by external pressure,” said Sergei Stanishev, leader of the Socialist Party, which is the main opposition block in the Bulgarian parliament. The former foreign minister and currently an EU deputy Ivaylo Kalfin warned that “as of today, the threat for the Bulgarian citizens from terrorist attacks is much higher.” The other parties expressed similar concerns across the political spectrum in parliament.

Indeed, the statement not only lacks clear evidence, but also raises some confusion. According to the conclusions of the Bulgarian investigation, three people were involved in the explosion, two of whom had an Australian and Canadian passports. “Both lived in Lebanon between 2006 and 2010 and were part of Hizballah’s military wing,” said Tsvetanov. He didn’t make it clear, however, whether the actual bomber belonged to Hizballah or not. The only comment given in this regard was that the DNA profile of Jacques Philippe Martin (the name on the fake driver’s licence of the suicide attacker) matched that of Ralph William Rico, who was till now considered to be the bomber’s accomplice. Thus, even the identity of the bomber remains unclear. As there was no media present at the Bulgarian government’s announcement, the statement could not be clarified. 

Implications of the Statement

Certainly, the alarming report comes as a move to polish the image of a poor country like Bulgaria on an international level: it opens the way for the European Union to include Hizballah on its list of terrorist organiztions – something the United States and Israel have been insisting on for quite some time. Nevertheless, while the attack was perpetrated on European soil, there is no clear indication that the rest of the EU member states will support the Bulgarian position. Yet, consultations need to be held between representatives of the all twenty-seven members before including Hizballah in its black list, which would automatically render illegal any financial transfer from the EU to Hizballah as a group or to individual members.

The reaction of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, was noticeably reserved given the lack of substantial evidence in the Bulgarian report. A spokesman for EU foreign policy chief highlighted "the need for a reflection over the outcome of the investigation," adding that EU member states “would discuss an appropriate response based on all elements identified by the investigators."

Interestingly, instead of publishing the official Bulgarian statement, the English version of Hizballah’s website cited the statement of the Bulgarian Socialist Party leader Stanishev saying, “The Bulgarian government’s implication of Hizballah in the Burgas bus bombing is poorly founded and imperils the national security,” thereby rejecting the allegations. Shortly after the report was released, concerned about the possible consequences, Bulgarian interior minister hastened to draw a dividing line between the military branch of Hizballah and its political arm. In like manner, the foreign minister Nikolay Mladenov convened a meeting with Arab ambassadors in Sofia to reassure them that Bulgarian policy towards the Arab world has not changed.

Indeed, given the complex dynamics of Middle East politics and Hizballah’s key role as a political actor in Lebanon and, now, Syria, Bulgaria should be wary when making untimely statements of that kind, even if it is keen to improve its stature in Washington. Nevertheless, there is no certainty the EU will brand Hizballah as a terrorist organization unless it receives compelling evidence – not a mere statement issued out of Sofia – that the group is linked to the bus blast.

Bulgaria – A Smokescreen for US-Israel?

The statement released by the Bulgarian government has sparked a great deal of speculation. It marks the end of a hectic three-months in which Tsvetanov, the Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and Mladenov spent a considerable amount of time shuttling between the US and Israel. The high-level visits included meetings with the US President Barack Obama, his chief counterterrorism advisor John Brennan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

This all makes it easy to speculate that the US and Israel have been heavily involved in the investigation and invested in any possible outcome that sought to hasten blame on Hizballah.

The US Congress adopted a declaration in December urging the EU to denounce Hizballah as a terrorist organization and asking Obama to provide all necessary support to Bulgaria to conduct its investigation. As the Bulgarian opposition suspected, it is highly possible that government officials were under considerable pressure from the US and Israel, which are trying to use the bombing as a smokescreen to further complicate the intricacies in the Middle East in view of the current situation in Syria and Lebanon.

Ben Affleck's "Argo": A Movie about a Movie

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Argo. Directed by Ben Affleck. USA, 2012.

1. Suspense and Espionage for a New Era

As the awarding of the Oscars draws near, one is reminded of what is not being said. The kerfuffle around Zero Dark Thirty's representations of torture has been interesting, but no less than the docile reception among reviewers and awards voters regarding the far more competitive of the film's set in West Asia, Ben Affleck's Argo.

At one level, Affleck has created a rousing espionage entertainment for our times. The story is based on the accounts of CIA operative Tony Mendez's smuggling—with the help of a Canadian diplomat—six Americans out of post-revolutionary Iran in midst of the US Embassy "hostage crisis." As the Cold War fades and James Bond grows long in the tooth, nothing could have been timelier for American moviegoers than an exciting tale in which a wily and fearless spy saves US citizens from Muslim fanatics, so it's not surprising that it brought in huge box office revenue. But critical acclaim for this "true story" was also nearly unanimous.

At the time of the storming of the United States Embassy in Tehran in late 1979, six American employees managed to exit the premises unnoticed before Iranian protesters overran the area. The group eventually found refuge in the Canadian Ambassador's residence. Mendez, a specialist in "exfiltration," or removal of individuals from dangerous situations, led an improbable operation in which he was able to smuggle all six of the employees out as they pretended to be a Canadian film crew that was location scouting for a cheesy Middle Eastern-themed science fiction film. As Argo jauntily depicts, initial steps toward actually putting a fake film into production were taken by Hollywood pros (played here by Alan Arkin and John Goodman) in order to facilitate the plot. The Americans made it back to the US and were celebrated upon their arrival by a public caught up in the drama that ABC News dubbed "America Held Hostage." At the time, however, the cathartic event was credited only to the ingenuity of the Canadians, since the CIA's central role in the caper remained classified for nearly two decades.

Affleck's film sets out to bring the CIA's role in the operation out of its obscurity. There's a deep irony in this project that no major reviewer of the film seems to have noticed. Iran experts broadly agree that there is a direct line between the CIA's overthrow of the progressive, nationalist, anti-colonial, and pro-democracy Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953—replaced by the ruthless dictatorial Shah, who remained in power until the 1979 revolution—and the storming of the US Embassy shortly after the Shah was deposed. Media studies experts have also documented that this link was systematically erased in the American public sphere's packaging of the story. (In this vein, Argo begins with an historical montage referring to the Mossadegh coup as precursor so briefly that no one with the bad luck of encountering a long popcorn line will catch it). The immediate cause of the storming of the US Embassy in late 1979 was overwrought protesters' anger over the Shah being given refuge in the United States after the revolution, but for the many Iranians who would not have agreed with the violation of the diplomatic sovereignty of the Embassy, there no doubt remained a creeping sense that the Embassy represented a threat to Iranian sovereignty and that the CIA would try once again to reinstate the Shah as it had done a quarter of a century earlier. Argo not only thrills its American viewers, it also proves that these Iranian suspicions were at least partially correct in that the CIA was active in Iran before, during, and after the revolution.

The emphases of the film include a focus on the character of Mendez, played by Affleck in a beard to cover his familiar square jaw; several sequences mocking Hollywood excess and superficiality; a light touch of 1970s nostalgia invoked via Van Halen songs, tear drop glasses, polyester, and swooshy hairdos; and a strong dose of vociferous and senseless Muslim rage, particularly resonant for 2012 American audiences. Reviews made much of the first three elements. But the ethics of such glib portrayals of irrational Muslim fanaticism were not broached by reviewers in North America.

2. Spoiler Alert: You Have Seen these Endings Before

Among the many reviews by major critics, readers should particularly appreciate the modicum of research done by Anthony Lane of The New Yorker. Not only did Lane correctly point out that the ending of the film drags on forever, adding another turn every time you think the story has finally reached its denouement, he was also perhaps the only major critic who fact checked the event in regard to its unbelievable elements. The most suspenseful moment of the film is a totally fabricated (not to mention preposterous) chase scene in which Iranians in police cars on an airport runway try to chase down a Swiss Air jet carrying Mendez and the six Americans as it takes off. The moment is nothing if not reminiscent of a wagon train outrunning a band of “savages” in a classic John Ford western. It is confusing at first when the successful take off does not inspire any relief. Instead, passengers warn each other not to celebrate too soon. Once the plane clears Iranian airspace, the moment is consecrated with an announcement from the cabin crew that alcohol can now be served, and in a perfect metaphor for the duel American fixation with consumption and self-medication that the Iranian revolution was somehow supposed to have threatened, the escapees finally, cathartically celebrate over the background noises of champagne corks popping and highball glasses clinking.

But of course, this is just one of several moments of culmination in Argo's painfully drawn out ending. Later we are treated to a scene of Mendez showing up at his home for the first time in the entire film to hug his estranged wife and his beloved son, a touching moment, which will no doubt call to mind for more sophisticated viewers Melani McAlister's brilliant reading of the American media's coverage of the "Iran hostage crisis." According to McAlister's analysis, the American media produced a sentimentalizing history by recasting the narrative of American geopolitical entanglements as ruptures in the scene of American domesticity. Argo is more interested in reordering geopolitical history, but this closing moment of familial bliss is an appropriate homage to the way the events were turned into domestic sentimentality in the pathos-ridden American coverage of the time.

3. Benghazi the Movie

Argo was released at a particularly interesting moment. It seemed to comment directly on what became the two major foreign policy talking points in the close presidential contest between Mitt Romney and Barack Obama. In its depiction of Iranians as almost universally guileless and fanatical, it played into the discourse of "red lines" (Netanyahu) and "crippling sanctions" (Romney). Furthermore, the overrunning of the US Embassy had strange resonances with the Benghazi incident that was so incessantly and fatuously parsed by both sides of the presidential debate. Libya at the present moment is, in fact, a country soldiering forward toward a more democratic future, even though it has been stripped of functioning institutions by the abrupt decapitation of an all-powerful regime. Neither campaign, however, showed any willingness to acknowledge this substantial level of chaos and unpredictability on the ground in discussions of the incident, because to do so, would be to acknowledge the absence of American "full spectrum dominance" in the region.

Argo similarly tells a thrilling story that, by erasing historical context, creates the fiction that Americans controlled events in Iran in 1979-80, even though they didn't. Many reviewers praised the performance of Bryan Cranston as Affleck's immediate supervisor at the CIA, but no one has commented on how much he looks and sounds like Richard Crenna in the Rambo movies. As in the Rambo series, Argo puts Americans back in control of one of their greatest losses. And herein lies the truth of the doctrine of American full spectrum dominance. The Palestinian question, the Arab Spring, Syria, Islamism, the Iranian nuclear program, the Iraq occupation aftermath, all seem at first like difficult problems with complicated, multi-faceted, local, regional, and global historical factors,  and a panoply of agents at play. But if ever any of these events seem to spin out of American control, there's a simple solution: whether it's produced in Washington or Hollywood, just make it into a movie, and keep doing it, until everyone is convinced. 

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