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DAM Explores the Unmapped in Their New Album "Dabke on the Moon"

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DAM’s latest album “Dabke on the Moon, released in November 2012, details the lives of prisoners of the occupation. This refers to both prisoners literally detained in Israeli jail cells as well as the millions of Palestinians who move – relatively – more freely, but are still held prisoner in the tight clench of Israeli apartheid. “Dabke on the Moon”is a reflection on Palestine amidst revolutionary change in the region. It pushes the boundaries of traditional hip-hop with a myriad of collaborations on the album that span a broad array of musical genres. The untraditional musical sounds also break social taboos not usually discussed in mainstream music.

The first single, "If I Could Go Back in Time," featuring Amal Murkus, has created an international buzz that has come close to deflecting attention from the other songs on the album. The music video is co-directed by Slingshot Hip Hop director Jacqueline Reem Salloum and DAM’s own Suhel Nafar. UN Women funded the video’s production. The song/video, detailing a young woman’s murder at the hands of her father and brother for attempting to flee an arranged marriage, has both been applauded and criticized. Some believe the song and the video confront domestic violence in a way that empowers Arabs and Muslims by reclaiming the gaze away from Western audiences. However, others have accused “If I Could Go Back in Time” of reinforcing stereotypes of Arab and Muslim men while extracting the violence from the  broader context of domestic tensions afflicting Palestinian families forced to live under systematic oppression. Such circumstances limit access to income, health, education and mobility, thereby shaping the narrative of gendered violence amongst Palestinian families in Israel and the West Bank.

DAM’s Tamer Nafar took time to speak to me about the overall message of hope, defiance and continued resistance featured on Dabke on the Moon. Nafar also responds to critiques of the first single “If I Could Go Back in Time” as well as the larger implications of gender equity in public space and music.

Christina Nesheiwat: DAM is known for politically conscious lyrics and you have explicitly rapped about inequalities between men and women before. What brought the group to write "If I Could Go Back in Time"?

Tamer Nafar: It keeps happening to girls we know. If we don't know the girl, we know the man who did it; it's a small city. It needs to be talked about. Now everyone is talking about the song, whether they like it or not and it is becoming a conversation. I’m glad it is out there. For DAM, we want to talk about injustice without giving a damn who is responsible for it.

CN: Were you worried that by talking about violence against women in a direct way, DAM would perpetuate the stereotype of Arab men or Muslim men (for example, a scene in the video where the Fatiha is recited) being "more violent" than “Western” men?

TN: We write for the victim and I don’t care how others use it, it’s not for them. When people criticize the song because they believe it reinforces negative stereotypes about us in the West, it’s like telling people in Tahrir Square, in the midst of the Arab Spring, don’t go out and protest, so that you aren’t strengthening the stereotype in the West that Arabs live under dictatorships. I want to build my society. I don’t care what other people think.

We were attacked in an article, saying that we are giving fuel to Western propaganda. The funny thing is we wrote the song in Arabic, in Palestine, and the ones criticizing us are sitting in America, writing in English, on an American website, in an American university. 

CN: Were you prepared for these reactions, or were they a surprise?

TN: Every song we write gets reactions, of course we expected it. We are getting amazing responses from young women; they have been stopping us in the streets saying "it’s about time." But a few academics want to focus on the idea of stereotypes.

CN: In the United States there have been instances of media and women’s rights organizations attempting to place “honor” crimes in a different category than domestic violence in an attempt to “other” communities of color. Do you consider what people call “honor” crimes to be a part of domestic violence?

TN: It is violence, murder in the first degree and it should be treated as any other murder. I don’t know who said women have to be responsible for upholding the entire family’s honor. Unfortunately it allows people to classify “honor” killings as a different type of murder.

CN: There is academic work that seeks to link higher percentages of violence against women with highly militarized societies. Do you feel there is a relationship between the Israeli occupation and violence against Palestinian women in their own homes, directly or indirectly?

TN: There is a huge connection directly and indirectly between violence and the occupation, especially as regards Arab-on-Arab violence. Lyd, where I live, is considered one of the biggest crime and drug markets in the Middle East. When Arabs [in Israel] get killed cases are not even opened, no one investigates, and no one is arrested. It’s easier to pull a trigger on another Arab knowing nothing will happen to me. This is general, and it similarly impacts Arab women. Of course when there is occupation, there is poverty, when there is poverty, there is less education. Honor killings happened before the occupation, but the occupation is responsible for increasing the percentages.

CN: What do you think is your role as an artist in ending violence against women?

TN: As an artist my role is to talk about it, do workshops, and do it with women, like Amal Murkus. If one out of five girls can follow Amal and sing, fight back and believe that some men do believe in change, this is important. I’d love to see more female emcees, like Shadia Mansour and Safa Hathoot kickin’ it on stage. We worked on a project with Shadia in London and it was amazing to write, create and perform together …it’s revolutionary to have two sexes doing that. We need more artistic Leila Khalids out there.

CN: Are there any other songs on the new album that address women specifically?

TN: There is a song on the new album called “Ulilo Bin Saffek” featuring an amazing singer, Mouna Hawa. Mouna is giving lessons at the beginning of the song, saying, “When you are talking to your boyfriend on the phone and your dad asks who you are talking to, tell him it’s another girl from class. Don’t think twice, lie.” The message is more or less provocative. When you live in a hypocritical society, it’s okay to lie, you have every right to lie

CN: Can you talk about how the collaboration with the UN Women came about in making the music video for “If I Could Go Back in Time”?

TN: When I wrote the song three and a half years ago, I prepared an offer and sent it to at least ten different organizations, Arab and non-Arab. The UN was the only one to respond. In fact, many organizations ditched their meetings with us. We wrote the song emotionally and we still needed facts and the right information from people who work in that field. When we wrote “Letter from a Prison Cell” we went to Addameer, a prisoner organization and met with them five or six times. The UN helped make the song/video be more realistic, not just provocative.

CN: Earlier you mentioned you do believe there is a relationship between the Israeli occupation and violence against women. Was there ever an intention of including that aspect in the song or video?

TN: The song talks about women who are being victimized by their brothers. After her brother kills her, if we showed him driving home and having to face a border we believe it would have been a very forced scene. It’s typical for a society to blame everything on the outsiders. I think I want to hold the full responsibility as a man and I want to believe I have the power to change it, regardless of the occupation.

CN: What are some other themes DAM wanted to shape on Dabke on the Moon?

TN: One of my favorite songs on the album is “Letter from a Prison Cell.” In terms of composition, it’s an amazing song because it wasn’t created in the traditional style of hip-hop. It is heavily influenced by the classical Arabic genre, featuring Trio Joubran and Bachar Khalifé. They both come from the non-hip hop world so it’s a unique collaboration.

The only song in English on the album is a love story mocking co-existence. They are trying to sell us a lot of co-existence. It’s a story about me getting stuck in an elevator with a beautiful girl and the song is called “Mama I Fell in Love with a Jew.” She is pressing the button for the upper floor and for me, as a Palestinian I can only go down. Yes, we are stuck together, but stop saying we are stuck together, because the occupation is fucking us up, not you.

And “Dabke on the Moon,” – is also the title of the album. It is one of the most optimistic and fun songs to perform, people cannot stop dancing to it.  It documents what we felt when we witnessed the Arab Spring: we are trying to fly a spaceship, but it doesn’t fly because it is overweight. So we have to throw out all the leaders and dictatorships. As soon as we throw them over we can fly and reach the moon and dabke. The title is more creative than the usual. We are used to titles like “Palestine Forever” or “The Right of Return.”

I watched a National Geographic documentary about some sort of new experiment NASA was doing on the moon and the same day I read an article about the tunnels in Gaza and it didn’t feel good. They are reaching to the moon and we are digging tunnels. They are responsible for that because if the US didn’t sponsor Israel, then Israel would not have money to build walls and put Gaza under siege, and maybe we would have the chance to reach the moon instead of digging tunnels. So we fantasized about it and suddenly the Arab Spring came and we said ‘fuck it,’ we can change things, and we want go to the moon. Armstrong went to the moon and he put up the flag, we don’t really like flags and patriotism… We are artists, so we decided to go to the moon and dabke.


Inside Syria: Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad Interview with David Barsamian

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The following interview was conducted by David Barsamian with Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad on 19 November 2012. The interview features an in-depth discussion of the historical and contemporary contexts of the uprising in Syria, as well as the current dynamics inside the country and their concomitant effects on the state, society, and much more. (the full audio version will be made availabe on Jadaliyya shortly)

Click here or below to listen to a preview of the interview or to download the entire interview.

 

 

 

 

New Texts Out Now: Amahl Bishara, Back Stories: US News Production and Palestinian Politics

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Amahl A. Bishara, Back Stories: US News Production and Palestinian Politics. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Amahl Bishara (AB): Back Stories is an ethnography of the production of US news during the second Palestinian Intifada. I started this project in New York City around the beginning of the uprising. I would wake up every morning, and my first step would be to reach for the news. But obviously the news represented only a narrow slice of Palestinian ideas about and experiences of national struggle. I wanted to explore the multiple, complex factors that make it difficult for diverse Palestinian perspectives to be heard in the United States. As an ethnographer, I felt this required that I go beyond an argument about media “bias” to study the practices of journalism.

Looking at those Intifada photographs on the front page of my morning paper, I also realized how much I depended on the journalists who produced this news. I started to think more and more about the people capturing the images—especially since many of these journalists were Palestinians, and since they worked in conditions of grave danger. I knew that Palestinians also worked as fixers and producers for US foreign correspondents, arranging interviews, translating, and helping with reporting. They did this even though they did not control the final narratives of the stories they helped produce. I wanted to learn more about why and how these Palestinian journalists did what they did in such dangerous circumstances. What special skills did this work require? How did their concepts of news values differ from those common in news institutions in the United States?

During an internship with the Committee to Protect Journalists in New York, I began researching how checkpoints affected journalists. I made a documentary about Reuters cameraperson Mazen Dana, who had been injured countless times covering his hometown of Hebron. Then, weeks before I was to depart for my research, US soldiers killed Mazen Dana outside of the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. His camera was on his shoulder. It was often Arab—and even Palestinian—journalists who were doing reporting for US news outlets when it was too dangerous for American journalists to be in the field. I felt that Americans needed to know more about where their news came from, about the debts we all incurred just by reading the news.

Another reason that I wanted to write about journalism was that, especially during the Intifada, news was centrally important to Palestinians in the occupied territories themselves. News was part of their daily—or even hourly!—routines. In the West Bank, I would often meet smart young girls and boys who told me they wanted to be journalists when they grew up. News shaped Palestinians’ views of themselves, for example when they saw themselves or their community represented in a newspaper or on a website. It shaped how they planned public political action. In researching journalism—and in particular US journalism—I knew I’d be talking to people about something they cared about deeply.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does it address?

AB: Because news was such a central part of the Palestinian experience during the second Intifada, an ethnography of news production offers a critical perspective on this uprising, and on the relationship between media and political action. I write about the Israeli violence against civilians, life next to the separation wall, popular protests, graffiti during the second Intifada, and civic life in the Palestinian Authority. I address how people conceived of media’s importance and how they tried to shape media messages.

This book is also a part of the burgeoning anthropological literature on journalism, a literature that has scrutinized a variety of norms and practices of journalism around the globe and that helps us to reflect on the production of knowledge more generally. Back Stories is one of the first studies to focus on fixers and producers, people whose work often goes unrecognized. In looking at the roles of Palestinians in US and other international media organizations, we can explore a larger set of skills and values within the field of journalism. For example, it is difficult to imagine what disinterest means for Palestinian journalists working in their hometowns in the occupied territories. It turns out that Palestinians’ contributions often hinge on their long-term engagement with the issues, with their closeness to the people they are covering. Palestinian journalists are adept at a number of what I call “skills of proximity,” skills gained from being close to an issue, and also skills of drawing close to people and events. For example, they can decipher the sounds of a great variety of weapons during protests or sieges, and they know how to position themselves to take the best photographs during a funeral. An analysis of skills of proximity stresses the inextricability of intellectual and embodied skills.

In a broader sense, Back Stories contributes to conversations about popular political action and transnational public spheres. You might say I’m working on the production side of the transnational public sphere, rather than on the circulation side that is more often studied. While much work has argued that media texts can affect politics and culture, this book demonstrates that the production of news itself can have an influence on politics and culture. Palestinians are deeply aware that even in the rhetorical field, they are operating at a disadvantage. As I argue, even in terms of the circulation of the graffiti written on the separation wall, graffiti written by international solidarity activists often circulates more broadly in US news than that written by Palestinians.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

AB: Of course, I hope that those concerned with contemporary Palestinian society and those interested in anthropology of media and journalism will read it. But since you ask me to think a bit bigger: Anyone who regularly reads, views, or listens to news from abroad might be interested in this book! I would like people to both gain a more nuanced understanding of how news is produced and also to imagine new ways of consuming news and learning about the world. Back Stories asks readers to acknowledge the cooperation at the heart of most international news production. At a time when the United States purportedly has been trying to spread ideas of democracy in the Arab world, it is important to realize that American democracy itself depends on risks taken by non-Americans. US freedom of the press is not “Made in America” in any simple way. It depends on contributions from people with very different biographies, skills, and forms of authority.

In terms of imagining a new way of consuming news, I hope my book encourages people to think, for example, about how a quote might be part of a different conversation entirely than the one into which the foreign correspondent has placed it. I’d like for people to look at a photograph and imagine what might be right beyond its edges. It is very difficult to do this when it comes to topics that are relatively new to us. Still, it can help just to open the possibility of multiple meanings. Perhaps more concretely, this book is also a reminder that political insight can come from many different kinds of people, not just pollsters and policy experts, and that it is incumbent upon us to listen widely if we are to truly deepen our knowledge of our world.

I would also love for journalists to read it, because it would be exciting for us to think together about alternative ways of producing news or acknowledging the labor that goes into news. For Palestinian journalists in particular, I hope this book offers some measure of recognition of their labors and expertise. Finally, my book focuses on a few different Palestinian communities. When Palestinians from these places read it, I hope they find an account that is at once familiar and new. I would be very happy if my book could be the start of many more conversations with the Palestinians about whose ideas and experiences I have written.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

AB: I have begun research on the political and cultural relationship between Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank. Once again, here, I’m interested both in what is spoken—in terms of civic events and mass media—and the ways in which what is spoken is conditioned by material circumstances. I examine rhetoric at demonstrations and in online and satellite media that are known for being able to cross geographic borders. I also analyze some of the factors that condition a separation between these two groups of Palestinians, including infrastructure around the Green Line and permits and regulations.

I am also involved with screening a documentary I made with my husband, Nidal Al-Azraq, Degrees of Incarceration, about the effects of political prison on Aida Refugee Camp, and how Palestinians respond to this crisis with creativity and love. Political imprisonment is an issue that does not go away in Palestine, and it causes no end of anguish. It’s a film that, unfortunately, I expect will stay current for a long time.

J: What does your book suggest about the relationship between violence and the nature of power that journalists hold in narrating stories of conflict?

AB: I examine the many ways in which speech and violence are intertwined, even as Israeli authorities often have had the upper hand in defining what counts as speech and what counts as violence. For decades under Israeli military occupation, the Israeli censor approved every word before it could be published in Palestinian papers in East Jerusalem. In 1994, with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, that system of censorship melted away, and for a few years, Palestinian media seemed to be flourishing. Yet I argue that there cannot be true freedom of expression as long as military occupation continues. Shootings, bombings, and detentions that debilitated all of Palestinian society also impaired Palestinian journalists, and this, in turn, limited freedom of expression. Though they are probably not designed explicitly for this purpose, checkpoints restrict journalistic production. I also analyze graffiti on the separation wall. Even though the wall seems like an unrestricted space for discourse, this is not ultimately the case. Israel’s militarized control of space affects freedom of expression there, too. Looking at the matter from another angle, I examine the Israeli Government Press Office’s decision to rescind press cards of Palestinian journalists near the beginning of the second Intifada. This decision impeded the production of news about the occupied territories, because it inhibited Palestinian journalists’ movement. In a less obvious way, Israeli official talk about whythe cards had been rescinded also harmed Palestinian journalists, because this talk maligned their claims to objectivity. My book suggests that we should not separate official statements from military actions, for they work together. During the Intifada, official statements and military actions compounded to affect Palestinian journalists’ abilities to work.

J: Your book is about news, but it is mainly about the processes of production. What do you have to say about news texts?

AB: A book about news that ignores news texts might, I figured, be disappointing! To point out the ways in which Palestinian narratives are sidelined in US news without making some space for Palestinian perspectives on topics covered in the news would be missing the point. So in my book, I not only trace out the existing routes of knowledge, but also take readers off the beaten path a bit.

Building on methods pioneered in visual anthropology, and the anthropology of media more generally, I translated articles from US news sources into Arabic and then interviewed Palestinians (students, activists, journalists, and community leaders) about these articles. It turned out to be one of the most fun parts of my research. I included some articles that I was pretty sure Palestinians would detest, but I also included some lyrical, evocative articles. My interlocutors were fantastic! For example, a human rights lawyer reading an article about kite flying in Gaza recalled memories of his own childhood and pondered the resourcefulness of Palestinian children in poverty. I was also amazed at how good my interlocutors were at imagining the scenes of news production. One person read an article about a protest and told me that he could tell from the way it was written that the journalist had positioned himself next to the military officer, rather than in the middle of the protest. I found it to be a great way to start a new kind of conversation about media.

J: What part of the book is something you end up discussing in your classes?

Objectivity is an issue that comes up in almost every one of my classes. Although objectivity has been widely critiqued within academia and beyond, it is still a prevailing value through which many people are inclined to evaluate knowledge. I argue in my book that even though objectivity is presumed to be a universal value that works the same way across different fields and different places, in fact this is not the case. I agree with scholars like Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, who argue that objectivity has many different meanings and a complex history. I examine how ideas of objectivity in elite news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hinge on the concept of balance. Approaching the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through this lens of balanced objectivity is problematic because of the deep imbalances between the two sides, and because it erases hierarchies of power and differences of opinion within each side as well. This mode of balanced objectivity also positions the American journalist as the outside, neutral figure in relation to the immoderate Israelis and Palestinians. The political negotiations of the last decades, in which the United States is purportedly the outside, neutral negotiator, implicitly serve as a model for American journalists’ own performance of neutrality. This approach perpetuates hierarchies of power and knowledge that position Palestinian journalists as what I call “epistemic others,” people who are presumed to be impaired in their relationship to knowledge. I explore other methods for thinking about authorship and collaboration, and I also look at how Palestinian journalists themselves think about objectivity and the underlying ethics of their work.

Excerpt from Back Stories: US News Production and Palestinian Politics

[From the Conclusion, “Framing Graffiti: Voice, Materiality, and Violence”]

Journalists arrived early to the Abu Dis demonstration, timed to coincide with the hearings against the separation wall at the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Television crews set up their communication equipment on an empty lot overlooking the wall. A small herd of goats grazed near the satellite dishes where Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei would later speak. Abu Dis was a familiar place for journalists, a place photojournalists based in Jerusalem could reach quickly to snap a photograph and return to their bureaus. In this village turned Jerusalem suburb, the wall truncated a road that had once been called the Jerusalem-Amman Road. When Amman became less accessible, people called it the Jerusalem-Jericho Road, referencing the city about an hour away near the Jordanian border. Now, it did not extend even that far.

The lower part of the wall had been painted a bright white, apparently to clear the way for new graffiti that the day of protests would surely yield. Immediately on the other side of the wall lay the charred metal remains of a bus destroyed in a Palestinian bombing the day before. It had been hauled there by Israeli authorities to make the point that such bombings necessitated the building of the wall. The bus might be regarded as the state’s answer to graffiti, here the medium of the stateless, for it was the state’s version of making things speak. On both sides, then, the stage was set. The journalists were chatting with each other and checking their equipment when a little event took shape. A girl of about twelve years, her long hair pulled back in a ponytail, stood at the barrier with a spray paint canister in hand. The photojournalists assembled around her with their cameras. Deliberately, in large, wavering spray paint handwriting, she wrote “Children Against the Wall” in English on the mammoth structure (Figure 14). When she finished, she turned around to an audience of several photojournalists, greeting them with a glowing smile.


[Photograph by Amahl Bishara.]

Children at the wall were frequent subjects for journalists’ contemplation. It was at this site that New York Times journalist James Bennet had spoken to a twelve-year-old boy who had been illegally crossing the wall wearing a T-shirt emblazoned with the slogan “Future Attack.”[1] It was a passing detail in an article about the toll of the wall on Abu Dis, an area without enough schools, health clinics, and jobs to survive without Jerusalem. The allusion was unclear. Who could say what the T-shirt meant, anyway? Did the boy know what the English writing meant? Was there a graphic of a machine gun or a spaceship on the shirt? Was an attack promised in the future, or was perhaps the future itself attacking in some more existential sense? For some, Palestinian children represent a double threat of demographic shifts and political violence; for others, they represent hopes for a democratic future. The girl’s graffito “Children Against the Wall” hinted at this latter possibility, evoking an orderly constituency unified against the barrier....The girl seemed like a perfect political subject for a liberal public sphere: English-speaking, nonviolent, and (apparently) secular. Dominant narratives about Palestinians in US media might position her graffito in counterpoint with the destroyed bus, suggesting that one side of the wall represented Palestinian aspirations to statehood and freedom of speech, while the other side referenced the dystopic option of violence, of past and future attacks. Yet, the girl’s graffito was an election-style slogan at a time when there were no politically meaningful elections. Even more importantly it was printed not on a traditional democratic medium like a handbill, placard, or button but instead on a wall that enclosed and restricted. The wall was an immense reminder of Israeli unilateralism, of Israel’s disinterest in Palestinian concerns. In the eyes of many Palestinians, the utopic vision of democracy was as unrealistic as the dystopic one was grim.

This moment crystallized three contradictions: between the ideal of freedom of speech and the fact of Palestinians stripped of many political rights; between a girl’s act of expression and the confining separation barrier on which it was written; between the fantasy of plain language producing clear communication with imagined international audiences on the other side of the photographers’ lenses, and the actual difficulties Palestinians have faced in translating their political experiences and aspirations to these audiences. In the next few years, as I watched the separation barrier fill with graffiti, much of them written not by Palestinians but by internationals, I came to see graffiti—and journalists’ photography of graffiti—as exemplifying the problems Palestinians faced in expressing themselves to the amorphous international audiences they sought.

[…]

By the second Intifada, Israeli authorities did not generally arrest youth for writing graffiti. Israel’s system of censorship of Palestinian media, in effect in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1967 to 1994, had long melted away. In fact, the separation barrier Israel built functions as a kind of invitation to discourse. It serves in some places as a prime billboard for graffiti writers. Graffiti on the wall epitomizes Palestinians’ contemporary conundrum regarding free speech. From one perspective there is an atmosphere of apparent permissiveness to Palestinian speech, as discourses of state building flourish and as Israel tries to conceal its role as occupier. As I will argue, though, just as Israel has continued to control actions on the ground, so too does it have final say over Palestinian graffiti through its material practices.

The young girl’s act of graffiti writing in Abu Dis was part of a wide spectrum of practices of writing on the wall, only some of which made the news. Visitors to the separation wall will find protesters’ graffiti in Arabic, English, and other languages; writing commissioned by people who are not in the West Bank[2]; colorful murals done by delegations of solidarity activists; and clever artwork designed to comment on the wall as a structure. Those who venture beyond the wall into the heart of Palestinian communities will find other kinds of graffiti and murals: tributes to activists, lines of poetry, murals of Palestinian history, plainly written political slogans, and celebrations of pilgrims’ return from Mecca.[3] Through photojournalism and other kinds of photography, the medium of graffiti—usually regarded as quintessentially local, grounded in place—has taken on a transnational scope, but, as with other transnational media, this does not mean that Palestinian voices are communicated transparently. In the next few pages I want to examine what made some forms of visible protests more legible than others in the medium of news agency photography, and to explore how some of these graffiti might have seemed to represent Palestinian voices even when they did not. Some messages and forms of protests of Palestinians that are less visible are in fact more attuned to the political circumstances of their creation—but they are harder to represent in Western photojournalism.

[…]

There has been extensive journalistic photography of graffiti on the separation wall, perhaps because it is so often visually compelling and it is easy to capture. News agency photographers often photograph graffiti that will be comprehensible to international audiences: English-language graffiti with a clear message that fits into news narratives. One photograph taken in Abu Dis on February 4, 2004, by Kevin Frayer, an award-winning photographer for the Associated Press, contained a graffito that read, “Peace comes [by] agreement not separation.” The sentence, written in even blue writing, stretches across two panels of what looks like the separation barrier, and between these two panels peer a man and a boy, whose faces are only partially visible. The graffito is a critique of the barrier, and the photograph amplifies this message because we see people apparently trapped behind the wall. Thus the photograph’s strength comes from a poetic relationship between the written message and its formal qualities. Still, both the graffito and the photograph conform to some aspects of the detached, plain-speaking style that liberal modernists have espoused. The graffito’s language of “peace,” “agreement,” and “separation” is abstract; its handwriting is earnest and unadorned; the identity of the speaker is unclear. It is a statement that could aspire to universal truth. Even the people trapped behind the wall look calm and unemotional.

When I examined this photograph, I was sure because of its message and its location that the graffito had been written by an international solidarity activist, and not by a Palestinian. Activists, political tourists, and pilgrims visited Abu Dis often, for the same reasons that journalists did. It was a convenient place from which to see the wall in all of its gray enormity. Moreover, Palestinians’ language in barrier graffiti often took a different tone from this message about peace. By this point, “peace” as a theoretical term had little currency for many Palestinians. As the boy stated in the James Bennet article discussed in the interlude after Chapter One, “Peace is a word that flies in the air.” Instead, for Palestinians, the barrier is often a site for the assertion of rights that push more forcefully back on the wall as a technology of confinement. After the February demonstration [during which the girl wrote “Children against the wall”], I could easily identify the graffiti that had been written by Palestinians. Many of these graffiti were written in both Arabic and English, as though direct translation would lead to the best possible communication. One read “Al-jidar lan yabqa,” translated into English as “The wall will not remain.” Some graffiti used the barrier, which cut Abu Dis off from Jerusalem, to assert a connection to the city and its centrality to Palestinian politics: “Nahnu fi al-Quds ila al-abad,” and in English, “We will be in Jerusalem forever.” Specificity of place was important. Some took advantage of the prominence of the wall to publicize neglected issues like that of prisoners: “Hurriya li-asra al-hurriya,” translated into English as “Freedom for the prisoners of freedom.” Unlike the abstract statement Frayer captured, some of these graffiti are poetic, or they are explicitly written in a Palestinian voice, promising an eternal presence of “we.” These kinds of graffiti were rarely photographed by international journalists.

In perusing my photo archive from Abu Dis, I found that I was right that the “Peace comes by agreement not separation” graffito had been written by internationals: it carried the signature “Ireland for Peace” (Figure 16). Moreover, it shows that the wall at this site was still a temporary, two-meter structure. Had it been the full, completed eight-meter structure, no faces would have been visible on the other side of the wall. Frayer’s message relied on this fortuitous material circumstance. This apparent critique of the barrier relied on the structure’s incompleteness. This is important because it underscores the ways in which what the graffiti writers and the photographer can say depends on the material world. Meaning is not autonomous; it is highly contingent on the physical environment—and this environment is to a great extent shaped by state actors, in this case Israeli authorities.


[Photograph by Amahl Bishara.]

[…]

As though understanding the tenuousness of their acts of resistance, Palestinians wrote graffiti even on surfaces that seemed to have only a peripheral or fleeting place in public view. When construction of the [separation] wall began in Al-Ram just north of Jerusalem, the barrier panels, shaped like elongated upside-down Ts, were lying down on the side of the main road. I noticed that graffiti had been scrawled on a few of the bottoms of these wall panels. One declared furtively, “Al-Quds lana” (Jerusalem is ours). Another attested, “Allahu akbar la ilaha illa Allah” (God is Great, There is no god but God). Riding by in a shared taxicab on my way from Jerusalem to Ramallah, I first thought this graffiti writer had chosen a degrading location for such weighty statements. It was as though she or he was writing on the bottom of a shoe. After all, the surfaces on which these graffiti were written would be underground once the wall was erected.

But construction of the wall in Al-Ram—as elsewhere in the West Bank—was a protracted enterprise. The barrier here was being built lengthwise down the middle of the road, and to build the wall the pavement on one side of the road had been destroyed, forcing two directions of traffic to sidle past each other on the remaining half of the street. Then this side of the road was closed, and cars sloshed through the mud on the other side. The process took months. Palestinians were living amidst a construction site for a project that had been designed without their consent and that would destroy economic, social, and other resources of their communities. For them, the disarray and violence of an extended construction period was further evidence that Israel was building the barrier with no consideration for local residents, to frustrate them and force them to submit to their own powerlessness.

The inconveniences and dangers of construction seemed to be part of the point, belying plainspoken Israeli assertions in the media that the wall was integral to Israeli security. Former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak could declare in a New York Times op-ed, “Israel must embark on unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians and establish a system of security fences. Israel’s very future depends on this.”[4] But according to Louay Abu Shambiya, the boy in the “Future Attack” T-shirt interviewed by James Bennet at the wall in Abu Dis, the wall was there “to make people suffer.”[5] In terms of representational authority, obviously Barak had Abu Shambiya beat. Barak’s statement was authorized by the fact that he had at one time been elected to represent all Israelis. His full op-ed was published in the New York Times. In contrast, Abu Shambiya’s quote—not even a full sentence—was produced in essence because of a gathering of interlopers at the wall, happened upon by a prominent journalist with an ear for evocative quotes….Abu Shambiya was speaking to Bennet because he and others Bennet interviewed that day were crossing the wall to go to school or work. On top of that, Abu Shambiya was a child. Who would take seriously his assertion that the wall was there to make people suffer, alongside Barak’s statement that the wall was there for security, at least if they did not already agree with the child? For Palestinians, though, the process of how Israel constructed the barrier informed how they construed Israeli intentions in building it.

As the cars moved more slowly on Al-Ram’s compromised roads while the wall was being built, I found I had even more time for reading graffiti. The “Jerusalem is ours” graffito was visible for much of this period. Though its visual characteristics and its location would never have attracted the attention of a photojournalist, it turned out that it was presciently well suited to the circumstances of the building of the barrier. It was at eye level of those passengers in dusty taxis. Palestinians’ means of protest express an urgency and local knowledge that exceed that of the eloquent and tidy graffiti written by foreign protesters. They reflect a keen sensitivity to the physical qualities of the barrier and to the processes of building it. Yet, these Palestinian protests were not always as legible to foreign audiences.

NOTES

[1] James Bennet, “Small Town on West Bank Stands as an Epitaph to Dashed Dreams,” New York Times (14 September 2003).

[2] See Send a Message, accessed Nov. 4, 2009. See also Amahl Bishara, “New Media and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Assembling Media Worlds and Cultivating Networks of Care,” Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 3:63-81 (2010) Robert Sauders, “Whose Place Is This Anyway? The Israeli Separation Barrier, International Activists, and Graffiti,” Anthropology News 53 (3):16 (2011) regarding graffiti on the wall and analysis of Send a Message.

[3] A few books have featured Palestinian graffiti (Mia Gröndahl, Gaza Graffiti: Messages of Love and Politics [Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2009]; Zia Krohn and Joyce Lagerweij, Concrete Messages: Street Art on the Israeli-Palestinian Separation Barrier [Årsta, Sweden: Dokument Press, 2010], and a volume of Banksy’s street art contains a section on his graffiti in the occupied territories (Banksy, Banksy: Wall and Piece [London: Century, 2006].

[4] Ehud Barak, “Israel’s Security Requires a Sturdy Fence,” New York Times (14 April 2002).

[5] Bennet, “Small Town.”

[Excerpted from Back Stories: US News Production and Palestinian Politics, by Amahl A. Bishara, by permission of the author. © 2012 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. For more information, or to order the book, click here.]

Tadween Blog Comes To Jadaliyya

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Jadaliyya's sister organization, Tadween Publishing, launched recently (see announcement here). Tadween is a new kind of publishing house that seeks both to produce knowledge and to scrutinize the process of knowledge production. It will produce thoroughly interactive publications in both hard-copy and e-book formats, and its content will be disproportionately geared towards pedagogy and the classroom. 

As part of the new Tadween project, we are happy to announce the discussion forum Tadween Blog, which will feature material related to knowledge production, the publishing world, and the products therefrom. 

 

Jadaliyya will be publishing Tadween Blog posts on its pages starting today. Take a moment to visit Tadween'ssite and check out the new and forthcoming publications, including the Arab Studies Journal, another of Jadaliyya's sister organizations under the umbrella of the Arab Studies Institute, and two forthcoming books, Mediating the Arab Uprisings and Egypt's Parliamentary Elections (2011-2012). 

More soon.

Tadween Publishing Team

 


 

 

TADWEEN EDITORIAL BOARD

Osama Abi-Mershed 

Lila Abu-Lughod

Hussein Agrama 

Madawi Al-Rasheed 

Abdul Rahim Al-Shaikh 

Talal Asad 

Asef Bayat

Wendy Brown

Jason Brownlee

Melani Cammett 

Ahmad Dallal

Rochelle Davis 

Beshara Doumani

Samera Esmeir

Adam Hanieh 

Arang Keshavarzian

Saba Mahmood 

Mahmood Mamdani 

Khalid Medani 

Timothy Mitchell 

Roger Owen

Vijay Prashad

Samah Selim 

Fawwaz Traboulsi

Judith Tucker 

Cihan Tugal 

Lisa Wedeen

 

TADWEEN STAFF

Founding Editor
Bassam Haddad

Arabic Editor
Sinan Antoon

Managing Editor
Nehad Khader

Publications Coordinator
Thomas Sullivan

Copy-Editor
Kaylan Geiger

Special Projects Editor
Allison Brown

 

Morsi's Democracy Devoid of Press and Media Freedoms

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“No one will touch media freedoms. There will be no pens broken, no opinions prevented, no channels or newspapers shut down in my era.”

This confident claim was uttered by Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi soon after his election, and at the time was met with doubt, as no action had yet been taken to prove its credibility. Today it is a representation of one of the most glaring mistruths perpetrated by Morsi towards the people of Egypt.

Freedom of expression and speech are among the most basic and necessary of political human rights. They are enshrined in myriad constitutions, and in articles 19 of both the United National Declaration for Human Rights and the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Following from them are the rights of a free and independent media and press, but unfortunately they are both under serious threat during the presidency of Mohamed Morsi. Free media and the press are hallmarks of a democratic system of governance, but recent events in Egypt suggest they are far from being protected under Islamist rule. A crackdown on the popular press and top television shows as well as presenters has resulted in a severe backlash against the Muslim Brotherhood. It also launched a new cause for Egyptians to demonstrate for, alongside their essential demands for an impartial Constituent Assembly, a fair constitution, the Brotherhood rule's and use of violence, and Morsi’s Presidency in general.

Egypt has a mixture of state-run publications and private newspapers. Egypt’s upper house of Parliament, the Shura Council (which holds an 83% Islamist majority), recently took it upon itself to replace the chief editors of each of the 50 state-owned publications, which include the most-widely distributed newspaper in Egypt, Al-Ahram, as well as several other widely-read ones including Al-Akhbar, Al-Akhbar Al-Youm, and Al-Gomhoreya. The paradigm of having politicians, all of the same political background, select the journalists that shall be reporting on their actions is a slap in the face to any notion of a free press and journalistic integrity. The Shura Council also created a Supreme Council for the Press, meant to oversee and regulate the industry; unsurprisingly it is composed almost entirely of Islamists.

These violations of the principle of the freedom of the press and the freedom of speech in general are not surprising. When a news agency is state-affiliated, it is not unusual for it to be biased towards the state. However, it is the blatant manner in which journalistic integrity has been sacrificed in exchange for perpetuating Mubarak’s propaganda machines in the Morsi-era that has enraged Egypt’s opposition. The Shura Council have not even selected those purely loyal to their party. Any journalist who has a history of obedience is acceptable, as proven with the appointment of Abdel Nasser Salama, who steadfastly backed Mubarak during the Revolution and is now a Brotherhood apologist, as editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram.

For those in the press who operate independently of the state-run newspapers, censorship has taken the form of harassment and criminal charges. The archaic crime of ‘insulting the President’ was most famously used by Mubarak in 2007 against four of the most popular opposition newspaper editors. Unfortunately, it is a crime that is being utilised with great vigour under President Morsi. In October, Tawfik Okasha, an outspoken talk show host and long-time opposition figure was sentenced to four months jail-time for this crime. The proceedings against him showed the extent to which freedom of speech would be violated in order to protect the presidency from criticism; it was claimed: "Morsi is the President of all Egyptians and insulting him is like insulting the whole nation." Islam Afifi, editor-in-chief of independent newspaper Al-Dostor, also faced charges of the same crime. On Tuesday 11 December, in conjunction with massive protests nationwide opposing the constitution, a variety of newspapers refused to print their daily editions, in protest against the continuous violations of their freedoms of speech and expression.

While Egypt’s press censorship is lamentable, the very obvious campaign to harass and discredit its independent television media could arguably be more disastrous for freedom of speech. Egypt’s talk-shows are a hot-bed for support for the opposition, serving as both nightly mouthpieces against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as a platform for chief opposition personalities to promote their political positions.

In November, the privately-owned Dream television channels, which had several anti-Islamist shows, were shut down for a week due to unclear licensing problems. More recently, popular and widely-watched nighttime TV presenter Amr Adeeb was forced to take a break from his show, following a particularly critical program in which he called Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood “failures.”  Starting in December, the frequency and level of government interference with the media and its figures has increased. Another well-known host, Mahmoud Saad, was questioned by police for three hours for the now oft-used charge of ‘insulting the President’ while presenting his program. Khairy Ramadan, presenter of popular show ‘Momken’ announced his resignation on air for not being allowed to interview that night’s guest, the Nasserist former presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi. It later became apparent that government interference forced the television channel’s administration to deny Sabbahi the chance to appear on air.

The tactic of harassing top television personalities, especially using the ‘insulting the presidency’ charge, has become commonplace. It is meant to serve as a warning against others as much as it is meant to damage the reputation of the specific individual charged. The strategy has largely backfired however, because the media has become more aggressive in attempts to secure their independence and defy the crack-down, and because it has enraged protestors who witness the freedom of speech being violated on a weekly basis.

Hazemoun

The list of infringements on the freedom of the press and of the media is long and unfortunately growing longer. These are the tell-tale signs of an autocratic government intent on controlling its country’s media, much like Hosni Mubarak was successful in doing. Morsi’s supporters have been camped outside the Media Production City, home of the largest independent television studios, in attempts to strike fear in the hearts of presenters inside and in the visiting guests outside. The hard-line Islamist leader of the sit-in, Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, had no problems pointing out exactly what drove his demonstrations; on his Facebook page he claimed: “the media has become biased against Islamists.” It is a simple but striking sentiment, because it shows that any form of criticism, insulting, degrading, or otherwise, is not acceptable.

The sheer number of supporters, known as ‘Hazemoun,’ following the name of their leader, and their claims that the media must be ‘cleansed’ has resulted in greater police protection being called to protect the studios. Several members of staff have been reportedly assaulted, while searches of employees are being conducted by the group. Morsi greatly benefits from this indirect pressure against his opponents. While ‘Hazemoun’ are more closely related to the Salafis (the hard-line Islamist faction) than the Brotherhood, their support for political Islam and their calls for violence and intimidation towards the independent liberal media help create an anti-opposition sentiment, particularly among those who do not have access to the satellite subscriptions through which the programs are broadcast. Furthermore, groups like the ‘Hazemoun’ and the Brotherhood’s militia use threats and violence against protestors and journalists alike.

Photojournalist Al-Husseini Abu Deif is the most prominent example of this violence; he died of a birdshot wound sustained on December 5 when Morsi’s supporters attacked demonstrators camped outside the Presidential Palace. The ‘Hazemoun’ and others are not coy about their intentions to instil fear; it was publicly admitted by ‘Hazemoun’ coordinator Gamal Saber that a long-standing threat to ‘storm’ the Media Production City was meant to “scare the corrupt media personnel after they directed their corrupt pens against President Mohamed Morsi and Islamists.” While any accusation that these groups operate for the benefit of Morsi and the Brotherhood are vehemently denied, the Islamist satellite channels alighned with them are quick to accuse opposition television presenters of sedition and libel, and in some bizarre cases, even paganism. These accusations are almost always entirely unfounded, and yet these programs are going completely unchecked.

The more troubling aspect when it comes to Islamist media relations is their range. The state-owned news agencies are now Brotherhood-oriented, and as they require no satellite subscription they are the main news sources for the Egyptian masses. This largely ensures the Brotherhood's propaganda machine in available to every home in the country, an invaluable asset for Morsi, especially in the run-up to the referendum. It is clear that the freedom of speech that President Morsi speaks about is not protected for all citizens, but only those who conform to an Islamist ideology particularly on state media.

The Draft Constitution itself has not safe-guarded the freedoms that the President has vowed to uphold. While Article 45 does set out protections for the freedom of opinion and expressing those opinions, Article 48, the chief press freedoms provision, allows for “the closure or confiscation of media outlets” provided that a court order is obtained. Also, censorship may be permitted “in times of war and public mobilisation.” Article 215 stipulates that the National Media Council, while safeguarding the freedom of the media, shall “establish controls and regulations ensuring the commitment of media to adhere to professional and ethical standards, […] and to observe the values and constructive traditions of society,” leaving the door open for any form of censorship of material not conforming to an Islamist interpretation of ‘values and traditions.’

Following the release of the draft to the public, newspapers went on a one-day strike to protest, among other things, the fact that there is no article prohibiting the arrest of journalists, something that has been a problem in Egypt time and time again. There is also great ambiguity due to the fact that no mention is made of slander, libel, or defamation, while “insulting” human beings and religious messengers is prohibited. How these concerns will translate into reality in the future will be a determining factor in the shaping of Egypt’s democracy.

With the referendum on the Draft Constitution in full sway, protests have somewhat subsided, despite harassment still continuing unabated. The ‘Hazemoun’ eventually ‘suspended’ their Media Production City sit-in so that news channels can operate “without pressure” and so that the movement to say ‘no’ can be countered. Religious propaganda has been issued in order to intimidate people to say ‘yes.’ A controversial sheikh has issued a fatwa claiming that voting ‘no’ to the Draft Constitution and the judiciary’s opposition to the referendum are both haram (prohibited in Islam) which in turn prompted the Ministry of Endowments to issue a statement reiterating to the public that participation in the referendum is not a matter of ‘heaven or hell.’ At least 340 complaints of influencing voters were recorded in just one day ahead of the referendum, and the lack of impartial judicial supervision suggests other irregularities may not have been tallied.

As well as intimidation, violence is still present against voters, the opposition, and the press. On the first of two Saturdays of voting, there were at least 19 different injuries sustained at polling centres, with one fatality by live ammunition. Meanwhile, ‘Hazemoun’ and Islamist supporters first marched towards the headquarters of Hamdeen Sabahi’s opposition party, the Popular Front, before besieging the headquarters of leading opposition party Al-Wafd and attacking it with fireworks and gas canisters. The party’s newspaper, which shares its name, was also besieged, and is just another example of harassment of the press and media. Following the attack, other prominent newspapers reported also receiving threats, including Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan

As the list of cancelled programs and harassed of media figures, journalists, and publications grows, it becomes more and more apparent that democracy is not the end goal of this administration. Famed Egyptian journalist Hani Shukrallah summed up the situation with brutal honesty: “We’ve got an organization that is not interested in democratizing the press, or freeing the press. It’s interested in taking it over.”

Tadween Publishing Roundup: News and Analysis from the Publishing World

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[The following is a roundup of the latest news and analyses from the publishing world that relates to pedagogy and knowledge production. It was originally published on Tadween Publishing's blog. For more updates, follow Tadween Publishing on Facebook and Twitter.] 

How to De-Risk Book Publishing By Steve Rosenbaum (Huffington Post)
As the nature of the publishing world shifts gears, Steve Rosenbaum claims that authors need to re-evaluate the way they approach publishing a book. For starters, social media and public appearances are essential to getting your words, literally, out there.

The Digital Publishing Explosion: INFOGRAPHIC By Dianna Dilworth (GalleyCat/MediaBistro)
3Dissue.com releases an infographic that tracks the rising success of eBooks, stating that the average eBook reader reads 24 books a year in comparison to the 15 books a year read by print readers.

How to Publish Your Book: Guy Kawasaki’s Blueprint By Roger Dooley (Forbes)
A rundown of Guy Kawasaki and Shawn Welch’s book, APE: Author, Publisher, Entrepreneur-How to Publish a Book.

Do online courses spell the end for the traditional university? By Carole Cadwalladr (The Guardian)
In an increasingly globalized world, will higher education shift gears from the university establishment to free courses online?

An online education course correction By Ed Byrne (Technology Spectator)
Ed Byrne counters the article published by The Guardian that claims higher education is shifting to a new avenue by going online, stating that the trend has its flaws and lacks the tangible aspects a university can offer through its classrooms.

Turning a page on books: Inside the evolving publishing industry By Eva Salinas (Financial Post)
In Canada, the changing world of publication is sending publishers back to the drawing board to develop new methods of outreach.

The Battle for Sinai

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Half a million people live in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, bordering Israel and the Gaza Strip. For decades, they have been governed by a strong security paradigm, and the Camp David accords with Israel – underwritten by billions of dollars in US military aid.

The true test of the evolving Egyptian relationship with the US then may lie in Cairo’s ability to control any instability in the peninsula.

Now they are back in the international spotlight because of an increase in militant attacks, arms smuggling and human trafficking.

When Egyptians took to the streets against Hosni Mubarak’s police state in January 2011, the Sinai was no exception. But the insurgency here continued long after his ouster, causing worry among some of Egypt’s powerful backers.

Fault Lines explores the roots of Sinai’s ongoing uprising and, as Egypt’s new leaders vow to crack down on militancy and smuggling, the dangers of following an old script. How did the Sinai Peninsula become a crucible for geopolitical tensions?

              

Egypt’s Draft Constitution in Focus – The Role of the Army [Video]

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[The following video is part of a series of clips produced by the Mosireen collective to promote greater awareness around the draft constitution currently under consideration in national referendum in Egypt. The full series can be accessed by clicking here.]

Political researcher Ibrahim El Houdaiby and Hossam Bahgat, Director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, explain how the draft constitution puts the Army and its extensive industrial activities—estimated to be between twenty-five and forty percent of the Egyptian economy—beyond the scrutiny of elected bodies. If the draft constitution passes, parliament would not have the right to discuss or even be briefed on the details of the military’s budget. El Houdaiby and Bahgat discuss the economic consequences of ring-fencing the military economy from the national budget and its alarming relationship with the question of forced labor and conscription in the constitution. They conclude that the draft constitution grants greater powers to the Army and military institutions than any other Egyptian constitution in history, entrenching the Army deep within the legal system, and striking at the heart of the revolution and widespread calls for a civil state.

In the draft constitution, the National Defense Council is the only body that has the right to know the details of the military budget and to issue military edicts. In a departure from previous constitutions, the majority of the National Defense Council will be made up of people drawn from the military and a minority from civilians, of whom only three will be elected. Consequently, the National Defense Council will be above the reach of parliament and other elected bodies, who will have no right to discuss or even be briefed on the details of the military budget.

El Houdaiby and Bahgat argue that this is designed to shield the military economy and the high-ranking officers who benefit from it from scrutiny, further entrenching an economic system that pushes the majority of Egyptians below the poverty line. They point to the privileging of mandatory conscription in the draft constitution and the deletion of a clause preventing forced labor. They argue that the draft constitution protects a military economy, which thrives on the forced labor of thousands of conscripts in army industries (e.g. food factories) that have very little to do with national defense or military activities.    

In an interesting insight into the writing of the constitution, El Houdaiby describes the combative approach taken by representatives of the Armed Forces in the Constituent Assembly. When it was suggested that an extra elected civilian be included in the National Defense Council, the military representative’s response was quite simply, “for every one of your people, we will put another one of ours”.

El Houdaiby and Bahgat conclude that more than any other constitution in Egyptian history, the current draft constitution puts the Armed Forces and their financial activities in a position of privilege and authority above elected bodies and beyond the will of the people.

For more details please watch the video below (Click “CC” for English subtitles) 

             


Regional and International Players in Syria's Civil War, The Protest Movement In Bahrain: Interviews with Bassam Haddad and Toby Jones

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On Monday, 17 December, during a mass protest in Bahrain, 25 people were arrested, among them prominent human rights activist Yousef al-Muhafedha, who is the acting head of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights.

17 December is recognized unofficially as Martyrs' Day in Bahrain. On that fateful day, in 1994, two young men, Hani Khamis and Hani Al Wasti, were shot and killed during protests demanding the re-instatement of the 1973 Constitution and the release of political prisoners. Last October, the interior ministry banned all public gatherings in Bahrain, but people have been defying the ban. According to some reports, there have been more than 100 protests since the declared ban. For a unpdate about the state of the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain, Malihe Razazan spoke with Professor Toby Jones. He is an associate professor of history and director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University.
 
Earlier this week, Farouq al-Sharaa, the Syrian vice-president, told a Lebanese newspaper that neither the government nor the rebels seeking the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad can win Syria's civil war. This comes at a time when Syria's infrastructure is in ruins after 21 months of war, tens of thousands of people have been killed, and over 525,000 Syrians taken refugee in neighboring countries. According to the United Nations, between 2,000 and 3,000 refugees are crossing into Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq every day, with an additional 2 million people internally displaced. So what is in store for Syria's future and what is the end game of regional and international players involved in Syria's civil war? Khalil Bendib spoke with Professor Bassam Haddad about the complexities of the Syrian crisis.

 

From Yarmouk to Sabra-Shatila: The Guardian's Martin Chulov on Palestinian Refugees Fleeing Syria

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Following the recent bombing of Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in Syria, over 2000 Palestinian residents of the camp have arrived in Lebanon, and the figures are expected to grow in the coming days. The Guardian’s Middle East correspondent, Martin Chulov, spoke with Malihe Razazan about the plight of the Palestinian refugees who have made it to Lebanon. Chulov talked to many of the Palestinas who fled Syria and are now taking refuge in the Sabra-Shatila refugee camp in Beirut.
 

 

 

 

Syria Media Roundup (December 20)

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 [This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]
 

Regional and International Perspectives

A Nation of Pain and Suffering: Syria (Part 3) Vijay Prashad on the ambivalent Western plans for Syria

 

Sectarianism and Civil Conflict in Tripoli Nicholas A. Heras says that “the stresses placed upon the city and its surrounding areas in northern Lebanon is tattering its civil society as the Syrian Civil War worsens.”

 

Turkey Can’t Afford Over Involvement in Syria writes Mohamed Ayoob

 

Syrian Narratives

 

The Triumph and Irrelevance of Meta-Narratives Over Syria: “Rohna Dahiyyah” Bassam Haddad writes “Syria is a game now, played by states, institutions, analysts, activists, journalists, bloggers, tweeters, and artists who are often only remotely connected to the real lives of real people enduring real conditions there.”

 

Inside Syria: Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad Interview with David Barsamian

 

After Assad Falls What Then Haytham Manna argues that “support for al-Nusra can be seen as both a symptom of the drunkenness of anticipated military victory, prematurely proclaimed, and an attempt to further undermine the political solution the UN still seeks.”

 

Story of a Massacre Tells of The Alawites Caught in the Middle Hassan Hassan tries to make sense of what happened in Aqrab on December 9, when 200 people were allegedly killed

Aqrab massacre: different stories Syria Freedom Forever outlines the three stories that have emerged in the aftermath of the events.

Swedes, Jihadis and anti-Missiles in Northern Syria Aaron Lund assesses the recent military developments in Syria.

 

Armed Opposition Takes Yarmouk Refugee Camp Anas Zarzar and Marah Mashi try to make sense of what happened in the Palestinian camp on December 16.

 

Syria’s Unified Armed Opposition: Internal Divisions, External Ties Nasser Charara on rebel groups on the ground, how they operate and how they relate to one another.

 

Exclusive Interview: Syrian VP Farouk Al-Sharaa Proposes Alternative to War an interview by Al-Akhbar

 

Al-Sharaa’s Proposal: Syria’s Last Chance Ibrahim al Amin argues that Sharaa’s“proposal at this moment represents a logical and realistic step towards opening up a space in which such a compromise can be reached.”

 

Stuck in Time Maysaloon says “time has frozen for me, and each day seems like the one before. When I see them all again, will they be the ones who have changed, and I the one who was stuck in time?”

 

Jabhat al-Nusra and the Syrian Opposition’s Failure Hazem al-Amine criticizes the opposition’s condemnation of the US’ recognition of Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist group.

 

Does the Syrian Opposition Want a Political Solution? Mohammed Ballout on Lakhdar Brahimi’s latest diplomatic move to end the Syria crisis

 

Activists Mourn ‘Model’ FSA Officer Marlin Dick on the loss of the “charismatic field commander” Abu Furat, a leading figure of the Tawhid Brigade who ironically rose as a “symbol of sectarian coexistence”

 

Remembering Abu Furat


About the Alawites: On the Margins of Islam, At the Center of Power
Mohammed Sergie and Lara Setrakian provide a quick overview of the modern history of the Alawites in Syria.

 

Syria’s Local Leadership Hassan Hassan uses the case of Deir Ezzor to illustrate the key role that local leaders have played in keeping their communities stable, a positive sign to keep in mind for the post-Assad period.

 

Tribes and tribalism in the Syrian revolution Haian Dukhan historicizes the often disregarded tribal dimension to the Syrian crisis.

 

Jihadis bankroll aid efforts in Syria to win followers

 

Religious Police Patrols Aleppo Countryside Basel Dayoub interviews various members of the opposition who express their opinion on the newly formed religious police allegedly barring women from driving.

 

Inside Syria

 

Was There a Massacre in the Syrian Town of Aqrab? Alex Thomson collected eye-witness accounts in this town near Hama.

 

Aqrab Witness A woman by the name of Umm Ayham recounts what she saw in this 14 minute piece.

Syrian Rebels Cut Off Bashar’s Escape Route Ruth Sherlock, reporting from Latakia province, worries about Alawite families who could become the target of revenge killings.

 

War is raging in Aleppo but in a classroom 40km away, there are grounds for hope Luke Harding visits Qabbasin secondary school

 

Rubble and Despair of War Redefine Syria Jewel C.J. Chivers reports from Aleppo.


Jabhat al Nusra Shows its Bloody Mark on Aleppo
“Aleppo the Battle for Honor” is an hour-long movie made by the organization, which shows its operations in the city.

 

Art and Social Media

 

The Land of Topless Minarets and Headless Little Girls Amal Hanano’s visceral piece on her native Aleppo

 

Tiny Souls The Syrian uprising from the point of view of children, filmed in Zaatri camp

 

Imagined Transcript of Al-Akhbar’s Interview With Syrian VP Farouk Al-Sharaa Karl Sharro satirizes the interview that was oddly not kept Q&A style.

 

The Syrian Conflict: A War Photographer’s Story Narciso Contreras in Aleppo.

 

Treize ans dans les prisons Syriennes. Voyage vers l’inconnu Ignace Leverrier on the publication of those memoirs of the political prisoner Aram Karabet

 

Policy and Reports

Syrian Refugees: Reliance on Camps Creates Few Good Options Refugee International’s policy recommendations for Turkey, Jordan and Iraq 

 

Arabic

 

البديل الاسلامي لن يكون ديمقراطياً

Michel Kilo writes about the need to protect the revolution and reestablish its original democratic and free goals.

 

جبهة النصرة أو الغائب الحاضر في مراكش

Haytham Mannaa writes about the Nusra Front.

 

المهرولون.. قدامى وجدد مع بعض شيوخ .. أسامة الطويل

Osama Atawil writes about the obstacles that are facing the revolution in Syria.

 

قصص النازحين الى وادي خالد تلامس الخيال: مهانة ورشوة قبل الرحيل… وعيش صعب بعده

Najiya Al-Husri recounts the stories of Syrian refugees in the Khaled Valley in Lebanon.

 

أوان الأحزاب السياسية في سورية

Abdel Nasser Al-Ayed argues for the need of the establishment of political parties in Syria today.

 

العسكرة والأسلمة في سورية

Hussam Itani writes about the militarization of the revolution and its appropriation of Islam as an ideology.

 

أدوات "الجزيرة" والتحريض ضد الشعب الكردي

Tarek Hamou writes about Al-Jazeera's latest episode of "Crossfire," which, according to his views, included blatant attacks against the Kurdish population.

 

سـوريـا وثـمـن تفـاهـم واشـنطـن ومـوسـكـو

Sami Kleib writes about the price that Syria has paid as Moscow and Washington have failed to reach an agreed upon solution that would end the violence in the country.

 

إسلاميو «الربيع»: ملامح في السياسة والممارسة

Fayez Sarrah writes about the "Islamists of the Spring" and their political practices in the wake of the uprisings.

 

ثبات وعي السلطات وحركة وعي الشعوب

Mohammad Dibo writes about the discourse of resistance and the effect of the latest Israeli attack on Gaza on the Arab regimes that had adapted that discourse.

 

دروس عربية للثورة السورية

Ammar Dyoub presents some political lessons for the Syrian revolution.

 

ماذا لو لم يُهزَم الأسد؟

Basheer Issa compares the politics of Bashar Al-Assad and his response to the revolution in Syria to his father's.

 

عسكر المعارضة السورية: صراعات داخليّة وارتباطات خارجيّة

Naser Sharara writes about the US' plan to create a centralized commanding body for the Free Syrian Army.

 

عن واشنطن والائتلاف والنصرة
Oraib Al-Rantawi writes about the US' decisions to recognize the National Coalition as the official and legitimate representative of the Syrian people and its subsequent decision to add the Nusra Front to the list of terrorist organizations.

 

مخيم الزعتري ألم وأمل

Into the daily lives of Syrian refugees in Al-Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, as seen through the eyes of the children living there.

 

قولوا نعم للعيش والحرية والعدالة الاجتماعية

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أمي ... أبي ...

 بعد السلام والتحية،

لقد علمت أنكما ستصوتان على مسودة الدستور بالموافقة ولأني أعلم أنكما لا تقفان إلا مع الحق أحببت أن أقص عليكما قصة قصيرة وأن أطلب منكما طلباً بسيطاً:

القصة حدثت في ليلة التنحي، عندما كنا نحتشد بالملايين في ميدان التحرير والشوارع المحيطة به. دخلت الميدان من شارع محمد محمود، وكنت قد خرجت منه مع بعض أصدقائي لكي نتناول وجبة العشاء. كانت الحركة بين الحشود المكتظة صعبة. بحثنا عن مكان قريب من مكبرات الصوت، التي ستذيع خطاب مبارك، الذي كنا ننتظره جميعاً و ندعو الله أن يعلن فيه التنحي.

بينما كنت أمر وسط الحشود، أمسكت بساعدي إمرأة ترتدي عباءة وغطاءً أسود للرأس. بدت على وجهها علامات الشقاء والحزن. حسبتها في البداية تستند علي لتتفادى الوقوع بين تلك الحشود، أو تستمد مني قوة نظراً لضعف جسدها النحيف، إلا أنه عندما وقعت عيناي في عينيها نظرت إلي بتأثر بالغ و قالت لي "إوعوا تنسوا الشهدا اللي ماتوا يا بني ... إوعوا تنسوا اللي ماتو..." وانهمرت في البكاء بينما كانت تكرر كلامها وأنا كنت أحاول أن أفيق من هول الصدمة. 

أحسست، وكأن هذه المرأة الضعيفة اختارتني من بين ملايين المصريين، لتوصيني بوصية أعلم تمام العلم بأنني لست أهلاً لها، أحسست كأنها تحملني مسؤولية أن أكمل مسيرة ابنها الشهيد. ومن أنا حتى أقوى على استكمال مسيرة الشهداء؟

لن أدعي بطولة لم أفعلها ولن أقول إني كنت بطلاً في الميادين، فأنا لست ذلك البطل الذي كان إذا ضربت علينا قنابل الغاز و هربنا إلى الوراء تقدم هو إلى الأمام ليرميها في وجه الشرطة. لم أكن واحداً من أولئك الأبطال الذين رابطوا أمام الداخلية في شارع محمد محمود حتى أعلن العسكر عن موعد تسليم السلطة. بل إنني كنت دائماً شاهد عيان على تلك الأحداث أقف في الصفوف الخلفية. أريد أن أقول لكما الحقيقة التي لم تشاهدانها في محطات التلفزة التي تشتت عقول متابعيها بتناقضاتها الشديدة بين قناة وأخرى.

الحقيقة التي أود أن يعرفها والداي و أن يقفا إلى جانبها هي عن أصدقائي في الميدان. عندما أمسكت بيدي أم الشهيد التي لم أكن أعرفها ولا أعرف حتى إسمها أو حتى إسم إبنها الشهيد ولم أسألها عن ذلك من هول الصدمة. أصدقائي في الميدان كانوا خليطاً من التوجهات الفكرية المختلفة وما كنا نناقش بعضنا في اختلافاتنا داخل التحرير. كنا نتقاسم الطعام كما نتقاسم الخوف بيننا. تعاهدنا أمام الله، أننا ثرنا لهدف واحد و هو "عيش ... حرية ... عدالة اجتماعية" وعاهدنا أم الشهيد في ليلة التنحي أننا لن ننسى ابنها ولن ننسى الشهداء. ولكننا الآن، لم نعد أصدقاء كما كنا. فبعض رفاق الدرب خانوا العهد من أجل السلطة. خدعونا و هتفوا معنا "عيش.. حرية.. عدالة اجتماعية" ولكننا اكتشفنا أن ثورتهم كانت من أجل السلطة و ليست من أجل العيش والحرية والعدالة الاجتماعية.

إن أرادوا اليوم يا أبي أن يعيدوا كتابة التاريخ بزعمهم أنهم من صنعوا الثورة كما يدعون الآن، قل لهم "لا" فإن ابنك كان شاهد عيان على تلك الثورة. وذكرهم بأنهم لم يعلنوا مشاركتهم في يوم 25 يناير وتركوا الشباب لوحده. ذلك الشباب الذي يشوهون صورته الآن، كان يسحل في الشوارع ويعتقل في السادس والسابع والعشرين من يناير. ثم فرض الشعب عليهم الثورة فشاركوا مع الشعب في جمعة الغضب.

إن أرادوا اليوم يا أمي أن يفتروا كذباً في ديباجة مسودة دستورهم وأن يقولوا إن أحداً غير هذا الشباب هو الذي حمى الثورة،  فقولوا لهم "لا" لأن من حمى الثورة هو هذا الشباب العظيم وهذا الشعب العظيم، الذي قاوم وحده تعنت العسكر في إعتصام يوليو حتى وضعوا مبارك في السجن. وقاوم رصاص العسكر وحده في أحداث محمد محمود حتى أعلنوا عن ميعاد لتسليم السلطة. و قاوم بغي العسكر وحده عندما عرى البنات وقتل الشيخ عماد ودهس مينا دانيال تحت المدرعات.

قولوا لهم "لا" لأنهم تجار دين. فكم من مرة استخدموا فيها القرآن في الذكرى الأولى للثورة في الخامس والعشرين من يناير 2012، ليشوشوا على هتاف الشعب "يسقط يسقط حكم العسكر". اليوم يستخدمون الدين أيضا، ليقسمونا لتيارين و يدعوا أن التيار المعارض لهم لا يريد الدين ولا يعرف القيم. بل قولوا لهم إننا نعرف الدين أكثر منهم و ندافع عن دين الله اذ نكشف كذبهم و تضليلهم بإسمه.

قولوا لهم "لا" لأن دستورهم يقسمنا ولا يضمن أن تتحق المطالب التي ثار من أجلها الثوار الحقيقيون، وهي "العيش والحرية والعدالة الاجتماعية". الدستور بالنسبة لهم هو صفقة يحققون بها مطالب الذين خانوا الثورة وثاروا من أجل السلطة. إنها صفقة تحقق مطالب الذين ادعوا أنهم حموا الثورة بينما كانوا يحاولون سرقتها. 

قولوا "لا" لأنهم خدعونا من قبل و قالوا إن "نعم" تضمن الاستقرار وقلتم "نعم" و لم نستقر. ثم قالوا إن الإستقرار سيتحقق بعد البرلمان وعلى الرغم من خيانتهم لدماء شهداء محمد محمود، انتخبنا قوائمهم ولم نر الاستقرار. ثم طالبناهم بتسلم سلطة كاملة من العسكر في الذكرى الأولى للثورة، فرفضوا بل وعلوا صوت القرآن ليشوش على هتافاتنا، بل واشتبكوا معنا ولم نستقر. ثم جاءت الإعادة في الانتخابات بمرشحهم ضد مرشح نظام مبارك، فتحالف الكل معهم وناصرناهم وعاهدونا على أن تكون مشاركة لا مغالبة و عاهدوكم بالنهضة والاستقرار وهاهم اليوم وقد نقضوا كل العهود ولن نستقر.

قولوا "لا" لأنهم عاهدونا أن يعيدوا تشكيل الجمعية التأسيسة، ثم خانوا العهد.

 قولوا "لا" لأننا نسير على خارطة طريق العسكر، التي لم يرغبوا بتغييرها لأنهم يعلمون أن عدد مقاعدهم سيقل وسيكون هناك تمثيل حقيقي لكل أطياف الشعب، لن ترضيه قطعاً جماعاتهم الفاشية لأنهم يريدون السيطرة ويزعمون أنهم أولى بها لأنهم أكثر منا ديناً وأخلاقاً ووطنية.

قولوا "لا" لأن تلك الحشود المليونية التي اجتمعت حول جامعة القاهرة لم نرها تثور ثورتها تلك لإسقاط مبارك أو لتطبيق الشريعة في عهد مبارك، بل كان رواد منصتها يكفرون الثوار لأنهم خرجوا على الحاكم ومنهم من كان يدعونا لاعطاء الفرصة لمبارك ومنهم من يقول عنا اليوم ما كان يقوله أنصار مبارك بأن خيامنا بها خمور ومخدرات و علاقات جنسية كاملة.

قولوا "لا" لأنكم علمتموني أن أقف مع الحق حتى وإن كان الباطل قوياً والحق ضعيفاً وحتى وإن كانت النتيجة النهائية بـ "نعم" فإنني لن أندم اليوم على اختياري، كما ندمت على اختياراتي من قبل. ولكن ثورتنا مستمرة أيا كانت النتيجة حتى تتحقق مطالبنا "عيش ... حرية ... عدالة اجتماعية". أقسم لكما، أن هؤلاء الشباب الثوار الحقيقيون لا يسعون إلى سلطة ولا إلى مجد شخصي. لا تصدقوا أن هناك نخبة تسوقنا. ولا تصدقوا أولئك الذين يبحثون عن دور في شاشات الفضائيات، بل هم من يقود تلك النخبة الرخوة التي تسعى هي الآخرى من أجل مصالحها الخاصة.

قولوا "لا" لأن الشباب هو من أجبر تلك النخبة، التي كانت تميل للمقاطعة، على أن تخوض تلك المعركة وأن يعتمدوا عليكم أنتم في أن تنصروهم. نحن نراهن عليكم أنتم، في حين أن الذين يريدونها "نعم" يراهنون على التقسيم وعلى الطائفية وعلى شعارات دينية كاذبة. 

"أهلنا و عشيرتنا" ليس لنا بعد الله غيركم. خاننا العسكر وخذلنا، وخوننا تجار الدين وأنتم من سيحكم بيننا اليوم. وإن كانوا هم يدعون أنهم يضمنون الجنة لمن سيقول "نعم"، فنحن لا نملك جنة نضمنها وإنما نضمن لكم أن ثورتنا مستمرة من أجلكم.

قولوا "لا" لأن دستورهم باطل أو على الأقل هو شبهة و"من وقع في الشبهات وقع في الحرام". ونحن على يقين بأن الحق سينتصر.

قولوا "لا" لأننا سننتصر.

Maghreb Media Roundup (December 20)

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[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Wednesday night of every week.]

Algeria

Algeria: Hollande Under Pressure Over France's Colonial Past On Algeria Visit Tony Cross discusses the tense political climate surrounding Hollande's current trip to Algeria.

Algerian Workers’ Party Official Denounces Fraud in Elections Mohammad Sharraq reports on the Algerian Worker's Party's conference, in which the secretary general made claims of forgery in the most recent municipal elections as well as previous elections.   

Algérie : 50 ans après, toujours des indigènes In light of Hollande's visit, Aghiles Aït-Larbi reflects on the Algeria's still  'undeveloped' state.

What we talk about when we talk about Arabic Nadia Ghanem discusses Arabic etymology, including the cross-sections between Derja and identity in Algeria.

Libya

The Mess We Left Behind in Libya Foreign Policy piece by Mary Fitzgerald and Umar Khan on Benghazi's enduring security issues.

Libya struggles to renounce violence Alice Fordham discusses unrestrained militia activity.

Opinion: Women’s rights in Libya – a positive viewpoint. Alaa Murabit discusses progress in the arena of women's rights,  challenging recent mainstream proclamations of its decline or plateau.

Libya declares martial law in southern region  Small Jurist report on the closure of Libya's border and enduring security issues.

Youth Employment in Libya: A Structural Solution is needed – PART 3/3 Abdul Raham Al-Ageli discusses youth employment in the context of the Feb 17 revolution.  

Mauritania

Mauritania Opposition Reaffirm Rejection of Mali Military Intervention Anita Hunt curates video and images of the 18 December rally and summarizes the opposition's statements.

Mauritanie : vivre et mourir en esclave El Watan interviews anti-slavery activists and freed slaves.

Mauritanie : Le défilé de “Touche pas à ma nationalité” dispersé par la police Ahmed Jadu reports on the forced dispersal of a "Ne touche pas à ma nationalité" protest on 28 November 2012.

أكجوجت : تعليق الناشط النقابي كريفيت علي نشرة MCM
Allegations of propaganda against an MCM publication. 

Morocco

Félicitations au peuple gauchiste! Mohamed Hamza Hachlaf criticizes Morocco's ineffective and hackneyed leftist movement.

Politics after Abdessalam Yassine Allison McManus describes the nature and socio--political influence of Yasine's Al Adl Wal Ihsane opposition organization and predicts its sustained prominence.

Morocco Jails 8 Activists for ‘Illegal Protest’ Morocco jails Feb20 activists up to six months because of an "unauthorized demonstration" in September.

Moroccans Fear That Flickers of Democracy Are Fading New York Times piece on the "cosmetic changes" of the Benikrane government.

Morocco kicks sub-Saharan Africa migrants out Tamba Jean-Matthew reports on the mistreatment and eviction of over 100 migrants to the Moroccan-Mauritanian border.

الحراك الفبرايري في المغرب على قناة الجزيرة
Aljazeera article on the Feb20 movement as its 2 year anniversary approaches. 

Tunisia

On Tunisia's road to democracy, hope springs eternal Rory McCarthy argues Tunisia remains uninhibited by many of predicted the "islamist threats," and that despite serious economic issues, the nation is still on a progressive path.

L’État et ses devoirs dans la Tunisie postrévolutionnaire Mohamed Arbi Nsiri reflects on events in Siliana and the state's failure to institute economic reforms and promote development.  

Tunisia: Revolutionary decisions and actions, not parades and celebrations! Meriem Dhaouadi examines broken promise of the October elections.

Tunisie : anniversaire amer pour les victimes de la répression de la révolution On the second anniversary of the Tunisian revolution, Theirry Bresillion discusses the disillusionment of families of martyrs.

Western Sahara

Responses to Solving the Western Sahara — What Now Remains Two opposing responses to former Ambassador Gabriel's Op-ed on "resolving" the Western Sahara conflict. (Gabriel is currently a political consultant whose clients include the Government of Morocco).

Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb
Memory Wars and the Messiness of History: An Interview with Jim House on the Commemoration of 17 October 1961
Year Three
Politics after Abdessalam Yassine
Art, Politics, and Critical Citizenry in Morocco: An Interview with Driss Ksikes
من أجل مدنية الحكم في موريتانيا
L’an I de la Révolution tunisienne ou les résurgences d’un passé qui divise
Neither Regret Nor Remorse: Colonial Nostalgia Among French Far Right
From Opposition to Puppet: Morocco’s Party of Justice and Development

 

Egypt's Draft Constitution in Focus: Freedom of Expression

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[The following video is part of a series of clips produced by the Mosireen collective to promote greater awareness around the draft constitution currently under consideration in national referendum in Egypt. The full series can be accessed by clicking here.]

This clip comes in response to a government sponsored television advert claiming that freedom of expression is protected in the draft constitution currently under consideration in a national referendum. The original advert is one of a series of government-sponsored television campaign promoting the draft constitution and known as “know your constitution” (e‘raf destourak) .

In the midst of a demonstration at the Journalists Syndicate, Hani Shukrallah (Editor of Ahram Online), Alaa Al-Attar (member of the board of the Journalists Syndicate) and Khalid Yousef (Assistant Editor in Chief of Al-Shaeb Newspaper) argue that the draft constitution represents a significant step backward for freedom of expression in Egypt. Unlike any previous Egyptian constitution, the draft constitution contains a  clause that would allow the government to shutdown a whole publication for wrongdoing committed by an individual journalist. The draft constitution, they indicate, has failed to reflect their most basic demand, namely an end to the practice of imprisoning journalists in legal cases involving media outlets. They argue that the draft constitution, if passed, will create an environment in which journalists can be intimidated by those in power, thus restricting their ability to deliver accurate information to the public and the free exchange of opinions and debate. Not only would these clauses apply to journalists, but also to writers across the media industry. Under the draft constitution, if someone were to publish a song satirizing the president, he could face charges and imprisonment. 

Khalid Yousef argues that he is not against the draft constitution because of its association with the Muslim Brotherhood, but because it will put the tools of oppression into the hands of any future government, whatever its political persuasion. He argues that even if the draft constitution passes, it is unlikely that it would stand for very long, recalling how the street punished deposed President Hosni Mubarak when he tried to engineer the constitution to pave the way for his son to succeed him.

For more details, please watch the video below (click “CC” for English subtitles).

 

     

The Severed Branches of Local Government

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Sometime in the middle of last March, while I was still living in Cairo, I was working at my desk when I heard a noisy argument outside my window. The street in Zamalek where I lived was home to about a dozen little shops, along with a small café and a cafeteria, and I had long since learned to tune out the shouts and clamors that punctuated the busy working day outside. So I didn’t take much notice of the altercation or the more subdued commotion that followed for the next couple hours. When I headed downstairs and into the street a bit later, I was immediately struck by the brightness of the afternoon sun and by a queasy feeling that something was out of place. The cause of these unexpected sensations, I quickly discovered, lay before me in a pile of logs, neatly stacked next to the curb. Those logs were all that remained of the trees that had formerly lined the entire block.

Two of the neighborhood shopkeepers were standing together across the street, so I wandered over to ask what had happened. Earlier that morning, they explained, a large branch had fallen from one of the trees, damaging the hood and windshield of a car parked on the street. When the car’s owner arrived a short while later, he flew into a rage and demanded compensation from the proprietors of the shops nearest to the car, alleging they were at fault for failing to care for the tree. They argued back and eventually resolved the dispute by paying him a token sum, but once the disgruntled car owner had driven off, they gathered a meeting of the other shopkeepers. The trees, my friends explained, were the property and responsibility of the Governorate of Cairo, but it had been years since the city government had sent anyone to clean or prune them. It had therefore fallen to the small commercial establishments on the street to fill the void of basic municipal services, even in this most affluent neighborhood of the city. The shop owners had loved the trees and enjoyed the canopy of shade they provided. But the day’s events had convinced them that the cost and liability of upkeep were more than they could bear. With some reluctance and an awareness that they were breaking the law, they cut them all down.

I have found myself thinking a great deal about those trees in the months leading up to this week’s referendum on the fiercely contested final draft of Egypt’s new constitution. Since the drafting began, debates have raged over the religious identity this document assigns to the state, over the privileged status it reserves for the military, over the rights it does and does not protect, and over the balance of powers it describes between the different branches of the national government. But despite the breadth and intensity of the struggle over both the text of the draft and the process by which it was written, all sides have overwhelmingly focused on the central state that governs the nation as a whole.

In this context, there has been very little discussion of the seemingly mundane articles dealing with provincial and local government. But as my colleague Mohamed Elshahed recently argued in a fiery posting on his blog Cairobserver, these articles fail to address in any adequate fashion the problems of urban and local governance that affect so many aspects of people’s everyday lives. The issues, of course, extends well beyond the erosion of basic services that led my neighbors to take matters into their own hands and chop down some trees on our block. Indeed, as Elshahed and others have argued, the highly centralized and profoundly undemocratic structures of governance below the national level have played a central role in driving forward a process of rapid, haphazard, and devastatingly uneven urbanization across the country. The corruption, incompetence, and institutionalized impunity of provincial governors and local officials, moreover, played a crucial role in the pillaging of public resources and the unplanned allocation of land in both urban and rural areas under the Mubarak regime.

At its best, the current draft shunts responsibility for defining “the system of local administration” into the future, leaving the task of specifying the powers and responsibilities of these administrative subdivisions to the legislative process. What’s more, article 187 makes no guarantees that the procedures for selecting provincial governors and the heads of other local units will be at all democratic. It merely stipulates, once again, that the law will determine the method of appointment and the jurisdiction of these posts. Some commentators have noted that these articles largely reproduce the institutional structures outlined in Egypt’s previous constitutions and moreover pave the way for a continuation of executive appointments by the central government. To this I would add that the origins of these articles, and the very labeling of local government as “administration,” lie not in one or the other of Egypt’s post-independence constitutions but in the era of British rule. In sketching that forgotten history here, I hope to suggest just how much is at stake.

Following the military invasion of 1882, the British did not consolidate their control over the Egyptian government all at once. Rather, they attached “advisers” to the various ministries in piecemeal fashion, extending their sphere of influence as the permanence of their “veiled protectorate” became more certain. By most accounts, the Ministry of Interior was the last horizon in this contested process of expansion. When Lord Cromer finally succeeded in placing one of his own men in the ministry in 1894, the British swiftly set about implementing a set of organizational reforms, among them a crucial change in the procedures for selecting the mayors and sheikhs of villages. Whereas peasant communities had previously enjoyed at least a nominal right to select their village headmen, all positions from the provincial governors down to the lowliest village sheikhs would thereafter be filled by appointments managed through the hierarchies of the Interior Ministry.

In justifying this dramatic shift, colonial officials offered three main explanations. First, claiming that the local officials had been oriental despots on a village level, they argued that the reorganization would break their power to terrorize the local population by imposing a strict regime of disciplinary surveillance within the ministry. Centralized hierarchy not local accountability, they insisted, would produce a new breed of diligent petty bureaucrats. Second, they specifically argued that politics did not belong in the village, or in the countryside more generally. Alarmed by reports that the fate of the occupation had become a topic of debate in rural areas and that peasants had begun selecting officials on the basis of their anti-British credentials, the British defended their reforms as a necessary measure to protect Egypt's felaheen from the complexities of political struggles they were allegedly too simple-minded to comprehend. Finally, they heralded these changes as a crucial step towards the realization of efficient economic development. In a vision of government best summarized by Cromer’s frequent references to “European head and Egyptian hands” local officials would become mere appendages of a state apparatus organized around a core of European technocratic expertise. The label “administration,” then, came to connote a key feature of a new political order: the mayor was now identified as the “representative of the government in the village” rather than the head of a community with its own specific needs and concerns.

Critical accounts from the months following the promulgation of these measures offer a darker image of what had taken place. Informants writing from across the country to the young khedive Abbas Hilmi II — himself much less pliant towards British rule than his father Tawfiq had been — expressed alarm at what they were witnessing. According to one such observer, seasoned officials with years of experience were losing their posts to “partisans of the English” who more convincingly performed allegiance to their new foreign masters. Far from ensuring precise bureaucratic accountability, the new measures seemed to be inaugurating a regime of layered exploitation wherein “the appointment takes place with utter disregard for the text of the statute and instead according to the sum each individual pays to the provincial governor and his deputy.”

During the years that followed, debate occasionally resurfaced over the issue of administrative appointments. Yet even many of the most fervent Egyptian proponents of popular sovereignty on a national level firmly rejected the idea that the selection of local officials should be democratized. Adhering to the now-established distinction between “politics” and “administration,” they insisted that local elections would threaten the efficient implementation of crucial government programs by exposing these figures to the petty whims of the local population. During one such discussion in 1910 at a meeting of the Egyptian General Assembly — the largely powerless legislative body the British had established in 1883 to “train” Egyptians for parliamentary government sometime in the future — representative Murqus Simaika Bey offered a strikingly pointed rejoinder to this position. “When we object to the appointment of the mayors through popular elections and say that the people do not know how to choose them,” he explained, “we contradict ourselves. How can we demand a constitution and an increase in the number of elected representatives, and now we come along and say that the people are incapable of choosing the virtuous among themselves to serve as the heads of their own villages?”

At the time, this eloquent critique failed to hold sway. And as I have shown elsewhere, the group of conservative landlords who eventually drafted the new constitution a decade later were no more sanguine than Simaika Bey’s colleagues about the political aptitudes of ordinary Egyptians. They did preserve the system of local and provincial councils that had existed with heavily circumscribed authority under the British occupation. But as would be true for all of Egypt’s subsequent constitutions, the drafting committee left the elaboration of the councils’ powers and relationships with the central government up to future legislation. More striking still, none of Egypt’s constitutions from 1923 onwards contain clauses about the selection of provincial governors, city mayors, or village headmen. These, after all, were administrative posts appointed by the executive branch of the central state. Local government thereafter became a coveted tool of national politics.

Throughout the frequent upheavals of the interwar era, each new government sought to establish a reliable base by filling these posts with its own loyalists. At the very least, local officials were usually selected from within the communities they governed in these years. Following the revolution of 1952, the military began to fill positions at the provincial and local levels with officers from its own ranks. And as Zeinab Abul Magd has recently shown, the Mubarak regime retained a growing monopoly over such appointments, often distributing the most important posts as a form of patronage for retired generals.

For over a century, an arrangement designed to strangle political initiative at its roots has continued to shape the state institutions that often wield the most direct influence over people’s daily lives. There is little in the current draft of the new constitution to suggest its authors envisioned a break with this invidious colonial legacy, and it will be some time before we know the outcome of the referendum. But if the current draft does pass, the very vagueness of its provisions does leave open the possibility — however slim — that meaningful change could come through the legislative process and that the severed branches of local democracy might at last be restored.

 

[This article originally appeared in Egypt Independent.]


Exile, Part One

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My mother's mother tongue is not Arabic. This singular fact shaped much of my life and my education in Lebanon. When she moved to Beirut, she had two children, and then me in her belly. She met a student named Maya and thought the name sounded beautiful and strange. She has not lived in the country in which she was born - the country in which her family lives, celebrates holidays, and has grown older - for over three decades now. This fact terrifies me.

Prior to her moving to Lebanon, my father had spent almost fifteen years in the United States, attending universities and later, teaching in them. He is always asking me when I will return home. He is always checking, now that he has a smartphone, if I am eating enough fruit and leafy greens. He wants me here, though he was the first to support me when I came home one day more than ten years ago and announced that I was leaving, not for a job or for school. Just leaving. To act. To write. To love. To do that thing I had seen in American movies all my life in Lebanon: “find myself.” The rest would come later, once I had left. He did not believe that I would last more than six months in New York City, a twenty-year-old with a BA in arts from a Lebanese university. My mother knew better.

When do you internalize the stigma (as self doubt) intended by that hurtful word, “outsider?” At what point do you recognize yourself as part of a “brain drain,” as an expat? When do you stop making fun of those Lebanese Americans and Lebanese Parisians on an airplane, with their strange accents and their even stranger overcompensations? When do you realize that they are probably reading you in the same way? Can your life be exilic when the experience of exile comes by those deceptive six letters, “choice?” If you choose to leave a home, even if the constellation under which that choice was made was coercive, is that exile? What does it mean to live a life that is exilic, when you are leaving a region, a country, families that are pockmarked with all those that have left? If exile is incompleteness, being ill at ease, and melancholic, who can lay claim to it? Why do I, writing now from Beirut, think of Edward Said, writing from New York about Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, and all those other places? He wrote that “it [exile] is the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted."

Is there safety in clarity? Will I be safer, feel more confident, if I insist on the singularity of this, my, exile? If I write the “I”?

Exile is the promise of an always deferred return: Not now. After the PhD is in hand. After the first job. After the book comes out. After tenure. If, and when, I can truly live my live openly and freely in Beirut. When I am ready to have children.

Exile is laughing, loving, and dreaming in Arabic. It is writing in English, each letter tracing the arc of your removal - the distance you are traveling right now, while hunched over a piece of paper writing the beginning of a thought or feeling. It is leaving when the price of labneh is five thousand five hundred liras, and returning to find it is now six thousand liras.

It is constantly justifying why you have not yet returned. It is the gray hair that multiplies on your father's head between one return home and the next. It is new restaurants opening in Hamra, old words that have been resignified with sarcasm, and relatives and friends and exes now married and gone, or gone and returned, or just constantly returning.

Exile is tactile. It is sensuous. It is anticipating a touch, a smell, that never comes. It is a person you no longer know, the taste you can no longer articulate, your favorite childhood juice store that has long been transformed into a store stocked full of clothing made in China. It is longing for language, the impossibility of translation, and relying on others to remember your self five, ten years ago. Before you left. Before. It is the sharp pain that can never be communicated by the word “nostalgia.” It is watching a war unfold and wanting to rush home, the war and the family and the friends together. It is wondering if you are sick or too self-involved for even having these thoughts. It is wanting to double yourself, just to see what your life would have been like had you never decided to join that person, pursue that idea, so far away.

It is never really being here, and never really being there. It is insisting that, given the time actually spent here and there, that you have only really been gone for five, six years. Eight months here, four months there. Two years here, two weeks there. It is time as arithmetic, distance as calculus. It is a life spent in between, on telephones and on email. It is having to explain yourself in both places. It is the shock of dissimulating, so easily, as you step off a plane. It is not being able to imagine a different way of being. It is dreaming of return, planning it. It is finding reasons why not yet. It is writing these words in English, which I probably would be doing had I never left Lebanon---yet it now means something different because when I was twenty I stood before my parents and told them I had to leave. I just had to. It is being estranged from your reason, your plan, for leaving.

Exile, as CLR James stated, is always - even if you do end up returning - a one way trip.

A Battle For Legitimacy: Gauging Kuwait's Electoral Results

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On 1 December, Kuwait held an historic parliamentary election. What was extraordinary about the poll was that it took place despite a boycott by Kuwait’s main opposition groups, who represent a broad ideological spectrum and include many political veterans. As a result, Kuwait witnessed what appears to be the lowest voter turnout in its history. At roughly forty percent, it was neither high nor low enough to definitively support the competing claims about its legitimacy—though that has not stopped both sides from attempting to do so. Moving forward, both the government and the opposition have major obstacles ahead of them as each tries to undermine the other’s claims to moral authority. Importantly, the tactics they will deploy to do so are likely to have profound effects on the country’s political efficacy. With Kuwait representing an experimental approach of gradual democratization—in contrast to either the entrenched authoritarianism or the revolutionary upheavals of other countries in the region—the implications of this political moment likely stretch beyond Kuwait’s own provincial borders.

Just weeks before the election, Kuwait celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of its constitution. The events that marked the occasion might be seen as a metaphor for the country’s larger political communication environment: two competing sides using various forms of symbolism and spectacle to assert themselves as the true guardians of the country’s constitution. First was the government, which has an established authority over the nation’s official political symbols. Exploiting its vast resources, it staged an elaborate public celebration, replete with military planes, a public holiday, and a firework display so excessive it made the Guinness Book of World Records. All of this was an attempt to communicate that the government treasures the constitution and is its true custodian. Not to be outdone, tens of thousands of opposition supporters staged a rally the next day in front of the parliament building protesting the Emir’s modification of the electoral law. They too claimed to be the true protectors of the constitution and the broader interests of the Kuwaiti people. In recent months, opposition protests have intensified to new levels and orange has become part of their own arsenal of symbols—a color widely associated with a popular 2006 youth movement that successfully changed the country’s electoral districts. Instead of fireworks, they have resorted to new media to capture people’s attention, circulating images and videos of police brutality against the demonstrations. The first significant test of this competing pageantry came with the 1 December election, which the opposition urged citizens to boycott.

As mentioned, the actual turnout on election day was low, but not low enough so as to clearly validate the opposition’s position. Nor was it high enough to silence them. With the voting over, the government has moved ahead with the standard procedures for convening the new parliament and appointing a new cabinet of ministers. Meanwhile, opposition members continue to contest the legitimacy of the new parliament. They have staged regular rallies and marches since the results were announced and filed multiple cases with the constitutional court, asking it to invalidate the parliament. The opposition also created a special media team to keep their messages in the spotlight, and even threatened to establish a “shadow parliament” whose main duties will be “to monitor the [elected] parliament and decide how to deal with the National Assembly.” The effectiveness of such tactics remains unclear, but the intent is evident. Having excluded themselves from the formal mechanisms of power due to the boycott, the opposition intends to find other ways to keep pressure on the government or else risk the losing its popular support. This will be a tall order if the new parliament bucks the country’s trend and actually stays in power for a full four-year term, in which case protest fatigue will be a real threat for the opposition. Internal fragmentation is another concern. It is one thing to rally around a singular objective like boycotting polls, and quite another to maintain uneasy political alliances among competing ideologues whose collective goals and means will not be as coherent moving forward. Their primary objectives at the moment have shifted to an annulment of this parliament and a reinstatement of the old voting system. While the opposition will do what it can to ensure the parliament does not stand for a full term, the National Assembly’s actual potential to do so remains heavily dependent on those who actually won the seats.

Many of the fifty faces in the new parliament are little known. There are only a few veterans, three women, and fifteen Shiites (compared to seven Shiites in the previous parliament). Much has been said about what these new MPs will or will not do. However, the only generalizable certainty is that by participating in the elections, these candidates were more pro-government than oppositional. Time will tell if they will stay that way now that they wield parliamentary powers. Certainly, the opposition will be increasingly keen to turn them against the government if the constitutional court does not rule in the opposition’s favor to dismiss the elections as invalid. Perhaps the first real test of the parliament’s “loyalties” will be evident in how it works with the new cabinet—which includes the controversial Finance Minister Mustafa Al Shimali, the subject of a corruption scandal that plagued the 2009 Assembly. With a controversial makeup in both the parliament and the cabinet, a confrontational and vocal opposition, an increasingly fatigued public, and a country in need of fundamental and pressing reforms, this Assembly faces serious challenges with little political experience upon which to draw. In short, the voting may be over, but the battle for legitimacy is as fierce as ever and the stakes continue to grow.

How Thomas Friedman Distorts Realities in Egypt, Pakistan, and India

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In a recent New York Times op-ed, liberal icon Thomas Friedman asks if Egypt— currently in the midst of  street demonstrations, violent repression, and a referendum all surrounding a controversial constitution—will develop into a secular, democratic, modern state—in his words, "the next India"—or an intolerant, Islamist military regime—also in his words, "the next Pakistan.” Both the question and the article are riddled with faulty assumptions and factual omissions.

Pointing to the token appointment of an Indian Muslim to head one of India's domestic intelligence agencies, Friedman claims that India is thus a state that respects diversity, wherein violence is limited to "Muslim extremists.” This, however, is false. Since at least as far back as partition with Pakistan in 1947, Indian Muslims have consistently been viewed and treated as an "other," expected to prove their loyalty to a mostly-Hindu nation-state. They have been depicted as Pakistan sympathizers, a fifth-column, potential terrorists, and a generally unwelcome ethnic minority. This has often reduced Indian Muslims to single, uniform, and self-enclosed community while constructing them as a domestic security threat. Most notably in Kashmir, the Indian state has been responsible for massacres, mass rapes, and draconian legislation to brutalize and contain Muslim areas suspected of seeking to secede. The Indian state has also been complicit in various race riots and mass killings of Indian Muslims, such as the 2002 Gujarat massacre.

Writers such as Gyanendra Pandey have noted that despite the systematic nature of Indian state's violence against its Muslim minority, such violence is always deceptively depicted as an aberration"aberration in the sense that violence is seen as something removed 
from the general run of Indian history: a distorted form, an exceptional moment, 
not the "real" history of India at all." This is a fitting commentary on Friedman's own whitewash of the history of India. This is, of course, not to mention India's short stint as a dictatorship, from 1975-1977, when Indian leader Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency, jailed political opponents, dramatically limited freedom of the press, and began a campaign of forced sterilization against the poor—following a court ruling that she had broken the law during her election.

 Furthermore, there is India's declaration of war against jungle tribes within India itself: peoples that have been dispossessed and robbed of their lands, only to be massacred by helicopter gunships as they try desperately to resist.

 Nevertheless, Friedman somehow manages to ignore these glaring problems in favor of highlighting a token Muslim appointee as proof of Indian cosmopolitanism.



Such omissions are only the beginning of Friedman's absurd musings. He asks if Egypt, under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, might become like Pakistan, opting for strict military rule and intolerance against minorities. In the process of posing and exploring the question, he makes another glaring omission: the role of the United States. 

In both Pakistan and Egypt, US policy has been a major determinant in the outcome of internal power struggles, especially those which concern military-civilian relations. 

Pakistan did not become a militarized (near-failed) state without the active intervention of the United States. A major Cold War ally against the non-aligned India, the United States backed Pakistan with billions of dollars in military aid since its founding in order to contain the alleged threat of communism. This carried over and was intensified during the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan.

The massive and unbalanced aid flow to Pakistan's military establishment has resulted in the weakening of Pakistan's civilian institutions, creating a nuclear military power that can and does ignore the rule of law with the blessing of heavy US support. In the process, the United States has enriched a core of Pakistani military officers who have used the billions of dollars to fund various pet projects, while preventing any serious oversight from the Pakistani civilian government. This continues even as Pakistan's military and intelligence services back al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. There should be no doubt that the United States has underwritten the Pakistani military's domineering, lawless hand in Pakistan's domestic affairs so as to quell any real or alleged threats from other regional powers.

Such a storied history has its parallel in Egypt. Since the 1980's, the United States has provided Egypt's authoritarian regime with billions in military and "development" aid in return for entering into and maintaining its peace agreement with Israel, as well as its unraveling of state-centered economic development strategy which is the root cause of the impoverishment of millions of Egyptians. In this equation, the Egyptian military establishment was required to purchase equipment from US corporations with much of the "development aid" they received. This was on top of its complicity in various Israeli governments’ brutal policies towards the Palestinian population of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Meanwhile, Egypt's popular classes were dramatically affected by skyrocketing food prices and other effects on their ability to meet their basic needs, for which there were no social safety nets under the new “development” measures. Neither the United States nor the Egyptian regime took seriously the grievances of Egypt's public in the face of such economic hardships. In this fashion, the United States has ensured that Egypt, like Pakistan, would be a military regime that enriches military officers and promotes US regional goals, while undermining the rule of law and democracy.



Friedman suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood must learn to create a “culture of inclusion . . . with compromises rather than dictates.” But in the face of US policy, the lesson to be drawn is actually the opposite: subservience to US strategic interests can enrich specific elites, who can in turn help maintain the Brotherhood’s political primacy. The Brotherhood has left intact the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. It has also promised to continue down the path of neoliberalism, forgoing many of the central demands of the Egyptian uprising to shift Egypt's economic development strategy away from the failed dictates of the Washington Consensus and international financial institutions. Furthermore, Morsi’s controversial constitution allows for significant power to remain in the hands of the military, while shielding the presidency itself from any oversight.

When the Brotherhood and its supporters attack opposition demonstrators with bottles and guns, while Morsi consolidates his dictatorial powers, and as both seek to implement an anti-liberal constitution, they are drawing on the lessons of US-Egyptian and US-Pakistani relations: serve US interests (i.e., regional goals), and the United States will serve yours (by political, economic, and military support). Friedman writes as if this was not a lesson forged and taught in the centers of US power and in the messaging of pundits such as himself. The question to pose in the columns of US newspapers with respect to Egypt is not whether the outcome will be more like India or Pakistan. Rather, the question to pose is whether Friedman will ever give up the imperial mantle he so diligently carries as he renders invisible the role of the United States in subverting democracy. Pakistan did not become the Pakistan it is today without the role of the United States. Similarly, US policy is an important factor in the ongoing struggle in Egypt. While there are important lessons for many to learn, so far neither the US empire nor its pundit Thomas Friedman have learned any of them.

Say “Yes” to the Revolution

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Dear Mom and Dad,

I hear you are going to vote “yes” on the draft constitution. But because I know you well, and I know you only stand up for what is right, I would like to tell you a short story and make a small request.

The story took place on the eve of Hosni Mubarak's stepping down, when there were millions of us in Tahrir Square and the surrounding streets. I was going back into the square, having briefly left with my friends to have dinner. It was difficult moving through the crowds. We were looking for somewhere to stand near the microphones to listen to Mubarak’s speech — the speech we were all waiting for, praying he would announce he was stepping down.

While I was moving through the crowds, a woman grabbed my arm. She was wearing a black abeya and a veil. She looked worn out and sad. At first I thought she was leaning on me to avoid being pushed over by the crowd, or to take strength from me given the frailty of her body. But she looked at me deeply and said, "Do not forget the martyrs, my son … do not forget those who died," then she burst into tears. She continued repeating the same sentence, while I was trying to recover from the shock.

I felt this woman chose me from amongst the millions of Egyptians to tell me this. I felt she was holding me responsible for continuing the path that her son began. But alas, I felt I was not strong enough to hold my responsibility.

I will not pretend a heroism I do not possess. I will not claim I was a warrior in the battlefields. When the police threw teargas bombs at us, it was not me who would advance to the front to throw the canister back at them. I am not one of those heroes who stayed steadfast in Mohamed Mahmoud Street until the military announced a date for handing over power. I was always just a backline witness.

But I promise here to tell you the truth you will never watch on TV channels. I promise I will try as hard as I can to dispel the confusion the media creates by making a claim on one channel and its opposite on the other.

The truth I want you, Mom and Dad, to know and uphold is that my companions on the day the martyr’s mother held my hand were a mix of people from diverse intellectual leanings. Despite this, we never discussed our differences. We shared food and fear. And we swore before God that our revolution had one, and only one, aim: "Bread, freedom, and social justice."

On that day, we promised the martyr’s mother we would never forget her son or any other martyr.

The regrettable truth is that the Tahrir-mates are no longer the companions they used to be. Some betrayed us. Power lust led them astray. They deceived us and chanted, "Bread, freedom, social justice." But we discovered that their revolution was for power and not for ideals.

If they try to rewrite history by claiming they led the revolution — as they are doing now — say "no" to them.

Your son was an eyewitness to this revolution. So please remind those who turned their backs on us that they failed to join the 25 January protests. Remind them that they left the youth, whose image they are now trying to tarnish, to be beaten up and arrested in the streets on 26 and 27 January.

The simple truth is that the revolution was imposed on these people. They were forced to join in on 28 January.

If they try to lie in the preamble to their constitution claiming that someone other than the youth protected the revolution, say "no" to them.

Tell them that the people protected the revolution, and that it was the people alone who stood up to the military during the July 2011 Tahrir Square sit-in until they put Mubarak in prison.

It was the people alone who stood against the military’s bullets during the Mohamed Mahmoud battles, until the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was forced to announce a date for the handover of power.

It was them alone who resisted army injustice when it killed Sheikh Emad Effat and crushed Mina Daniel underneath their Armed Personnel Carriers.

Say "no" to them, because they are religion brokers.

Just as on the first anniversary of the revolution they used the Quran in order to drown out the people’s chants against the military, today they are using religion in order to divide us, claiming that the opposition hates religion and knows no moral values.

Tell them that we know religion better than them, and that is why we are exposing their lies and deception in its name.

Say "no" to them because their constitution divides us, and will not realize the demands that genuine revolutionaries rose up for: bread, freedom and social justice.

Their constitution is nothing more than a deal. It suits the needs of those who betrayed the revolution and longed for power. It fulfills the demands of those who claim they protected the revolution while they were trying to steal it from its true creators.

Say "no" because they deceived us before, when they said that "yes" will ensure stability. You said “yes” and there was no stability.

They said the Parliament will bring about stability. So, despite their betrayal of the blood of the Mohamed Mahmoud martyrs, we elected them. Yet there was still no stability.

Then we called on them to take full power from the military on the first anniversary of the revolution. But they refused and clashed with us — and there was still no stability.

Then it was time for the presidential election runoffs. We supported their candidate against the Mubarak regime’s candidate. We stood behind them and made them victorious. In return, they promised us participation and not domination; they promised renaissance and stability. But here we are today: all of the promises have been broken and still — there is no stability.

Say "no" because they promised us they would change the composition of the Constituent Assembly, and broke the promise.

Say "no" because we are still following the military’s transition roadmap. They resist changing it because they know their number of seats in the Assembly will be reduced. Genuine representation for all of Egyptians frightens their fascist organization, which claims it is more religious, principled, and patriotic than us.

Say "no" because we never saw the crowds that gathered outside Cairo University in the Islamists’ "legitimacy and Sharia" rally rise up for the fall of Mubarak, or for the application of Sharia under Mubarak’s rule.

Say "no" because the figures that appeared on their podiums declared the revolutionaries are not Muslims, because they stood against the ruler. Some of them even called on us to give Mubarak a chance. And today they say what Mubarak used to say: that our tents are a house for alcohol, drugs, and sexual relations.

Say "no" because you taught me to stand up for what is right, even when what is wrong is stronger.

If the referendum result is “yes,” I will not regret my choice to vote “no.”

Our revolution continues, whatever the result will be, until we realize our demands for bread, freedom, and social justice.

I swear to you that these young people, the real revolutionaries, seek neither power nor personal glory. Do not believe we are controlled by an elite or by the glory hunters on satellite TVs. It is us who control this feeble elite, which is pursuing its own interests.

Say "no" because it is the youth who forced this elite — which was leaning toward a boycott — to engage in the battle, and rely on you to make us victorious. We are betting on you at a time when those who want a “yes” are betting on division, sectarianism and false religious slogans.

We have no one else but you, our families, after God. The military betrayed us, and the religion brokers disappointed us and declared us traitors.

You are the judge between us. They claim that heaven is reserved for those who say “yes.” We do not possess a heaven to promise you. We can only promise that our revolution will continue for your sake.

Say "no" because their constitution is illegitimate, or doubtful, and "he who chooses to follow a doubtful road chooses what is haram."

Say "no" because we are convinced that what is right will prevail.

Say "no" because we will win.

[The piece originally appeared in Arabic on Jadaliyya, and was translated to English by Sarah Carr. Click here to access the Arabic version. The English translation was published in collaboration with Egypt Independent.]

من القاهرة الجميلة - الجزء الرابع

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 "!جيييكه! جيييكه! جيييكه"

في يوم صدامات قصر الإتحادية، نبضَ زفيرُ المدينة وشهيقها أكثر من مرةٍ، خلال الليلة الدامية، على هدير ذاك الهتاف الهادئ الهامس بالكاد: "جيييكه! جيييكه! جيييكه!" كان ذاك هدير همس جماعي من مجموعةٍ من شباب المتظاهرين، ممن هم بين سن السادسة عشرة والثامنة عشرة؛ ذات سن صديقهم الذي قتلته الداخلية من أسبوعين في شارعه المفضل، شارع محمد محمود، وحرمت وسط البلد من رؤياه ومروره على مقاهيها بين كل مظاهرة والأخرى.

وغيّمت سماء القاهرة في آخر الشهر غيوماً ثقيلة، واكتمل القمر ثم اختفى، وطال اختفاؤه أكثر من المعتاد؛ فلم يهلّ إلا بعد خمسة أيامٍ من الغياب. أما اليوم، فأحس القاهرة كأنها تداوي ظلالها بضوء شمسٍ براقٍ هادئ مستقر، وتمسح رياحها بهواءٍ نظيفٍ بارد قليلا، على أتربة كسر شوارعها وريح الدم الرقيق، من النفضة التي مرت للتو؛ فيَنقى سحاب المدينة وسماؤها، وكأنها تمسح على جراحها من المعركة الفائتة، لتتقوى استعداداً لجروح المعركة القادمة.

[تصوير عمرو الإتربي]

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