Keith P. Feldman, A Shadow over Palestine: The Imperial Life of Race in America. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015.

In July 2014, at the height of the most recent Israeli military assault upon Gaza, a major rally was held in New York City—in defense of Israel. “United We Stand with Israel” attracted major figures in city, state, and national politics, the large majority of them progressive Democrats, who offered fiery speeches affirming Israel’s right to self-defense and recommitting to the sacredness of the “special relationship” between the United States and Israel. One of the most resounding rhetorical turns came from Brooklyn Congressman Hakeem Jeffries. “We know that Israel lives in a very tough neighborhood,” Jeffries told the crowd, adding: “There are certain realities to that…because the only thing that neighbors respect in a tough neighborhood is strength.” In bringing his speech to a conclusion, Jeffries declared: “Israel is here to stay and it will remain…Israel today, Israel tomorrow, Israel forever.”[1]

The last sentence of Jeffries’ speech uncannily echoes the famous exhortation of Alabama Governor George Wallace in the summer of 1963, thrown into the teeth of the US civil rights movement’s struggle to end legal segregation:“In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.” Thanks in part to this bizarre echo, Jeffries’ speech provides a revealing snapshot of the vexed relationship between US racial politics and the representation of Israel-Palestine in the US context. What are the forces and contexts underwriting a situation in which a progressive African-American politician echoes the rhetoric of one of the most overtly racist figures of twentieth-century American history in order to support a military assault on an occupied and imprisoned population? More broadly, what are the circumstances by which the general public in the United States has come to view issues related to Israel-Palestine as “local, not foreign policy, matters,” as Edward Said put it in 2000?[2]

Amidst this strange set of interconnections, Keith P. Feldman’s brilliant new book, A Shadow over Palestine: The Imperial Life of Race in America, provides a timely intervention. It is a book that deserves to be read by anyone wishing to better understand what Feldman calls “the present entanglement of the United States, Israel, and Palestine.” His efforts “to tell a better story” about this set of entanglements derives from a desire to revisit the recent history underlying this “special relationship,” “not only to recall the texture of its legitimation and the alibis for how things have become as they are but also to listen closely and remember those modes of critique, imagination, and relation envisioning how things might have become otherwise.” A Shadow over Palestine thus marks itself as different from other analyses of our cultural and political present, in that it not only tells the story of how things came to be, but also succeeds at the much more difficult task of recalling possibilities from the past and bringing them into the present, in order to imagine alternatives that could help create a different future. An important part of this work involves undoing the dominant narrative that “reduces a heterogeneous historical field of affiliations to Israel and Palestine to expressions of Black anti-Semitism or Jewish racism, which then become the linchpin in a narrative of the tragedy of Black radicalism’s dissolution of the civil rights promise.”

Feldman sets off on his investigation by identifying “a conjuncture (roughly 1960 to 1985) when struggles over hegemony in the United States became entangled with transformed relations of rule in Israel and Palestine.” This is a period, as he notes, when “desegregation and state violence went hand in hand.” In his persuasive account, during this period the United States increasingly “drew on material linkages to Israel as a military, economic, and geopolitical partner”; meanwhile, US imperial culture more broadly turned to Zionism “as a symbolic storehouse for the hegemonic articulation of liberal freedom and colonial violence.” Many of the tropes drawn from this symbolic storehouse, which continue to resonate today, can be traced to this period—for example, the identification of the state of Israel as “‘an outpost of the free world’ in a ‘particularly dangerous neighborhood,’” as invoked by Jeffries.

But Feldman makes the important point that during this period, US imperial culture was also forced to contend “with transnational narratives of Palestinian liberation that figured resistance movements both real and imagined.” One of the book’s most significant contributions involves revisiting and recalling these narratives. This happens most notably in the second chapter, “Black Power’s Palestine: Permanent War and the Global Freedom Struggle”; for example, the chapter opens with an article on Palestine written by members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in August 1967, which draws closely upon a pamphlet produced by the Palestine Research Center in Beirut. This article, Feldman suggests, “was part of a broad swath of post-civil rights cultural production, one that animated the Black freedom struggle’s international horizon through a complex and sustained engagement with Palestine.” Such culture work on the part of the Black Power movement “diverged from the tradition of Afro-diasporic Zionism that informed liberal and radical Black politics alike.” It also involved an explicitly transnational set of commitments. Feldman cites the work of David Graham Du Bois, the son of Shirley Graham Du Bois and stepson of W. E. B. Du Bois, as an embodiment of this set of possibilities within the Black Power movement; he focuses both on Du Bois’s work as editor of the Black Panther Intercommunal News Service and on his largely neglected novel, …And Bid Him Sing, set in Cairo, where Du Bois lived and worked for many years.

Thus, “Israel and Palestine entered and became sedimented in debates about purportedly ‘domestic’ US concerns” both through material and imaginative links to Israel and Zionism that strengthened US hegemony, but also through transnational connections to Palestine by the Black Power movement and others that challenged this hegemony. This second point is especially crucial, since from our current vantage point it is all too easy to see the effects of the first set of connections today without seeking to trace the possibilities afforded by the latter. One result of these conflicting sets of commitments is that the discourse around Israel-Palestine in the US continues to be driven by struggles between incommensurable comparisons:

Zionism is akin to movements for national liberation, or like diasporic political movements like Pan-Africanism, or an extension of Western civilization, or a special kind of colonialism, or a form of racism. The Israeli state is the last righteous response to Nazism, or Nazism’s tragic dopplegänger, or part of the third world, or an extension of the first….American ghettoes are like Warsaw’s, or like Palestinian refugee camps, or like prisons, or like occupied territory. The topological landscape of Israel and Palestine is like California’s, or vice versa, and cities like Los Angeles are like Tel Aviv, or like the battle-scarred West Bank or West Beirut. Israeli “sabras” are like Western Europeans or American pioneers, while Palestinians are like African Americans, or Native Americans, or Jews; Jews are like white people or African Americans; and African Americans are like Jews.

As Feldman notes, the “stark discrepancies and contradictions” between these various sets of comparisons suggest that they cannot all be “true.” But this doesn’t mean giving up on the act of comparison itself—although, he insists, such comparisons always constitute political acts. Indeed, he sees each of these comparisons as “provid[ing] a translational bridge from one context to another.”

The book’s prologue, for example, opens with James Baldwin in the midst of a trip to Israel-Palestine in 1961, and subsequently follows Baldwin’s shifting perspective over the next decade. In 1961, the Israeli settler colonial-state building project had the effect of confirming Baldwin’s own commitment to exile. “If this was what home meant for modernity’s others,” Feldman writes, “Baldwin will have none of it.” A decade later, in a “rap on race” with Margaret Mead, Baldwin’s comparative framework has shifted: “You have got to remember,” he tells Mead, “…that I have been, in America, an Arab at the hands of the Jews.” Mead summarily dismisses Baldwin’s “imperfectly realized analogies,” accusing him of racism in the process. It is a silencing that Feldman sees as “foretell[ing] precisely the attenuated scope of the dawning US commonsense interpretations about Israel and Palestine.” As he notes, part of the work of US imperial culture is precisely to “regulate what counts as proper knowledge, casting some forms of knowledge as truth and others as aberrational, subjective, or fictitious.” In the current discourse on Israel-Palestine, it is clear which sets of comparisons have been afforded the status of truth and which have been dismissed as aberrational. In this context, Feldman insists that struggles around formulations like those expressed by Baldwin in his “‘imperfectly realized analogies’—as if there could be any other kind” have in fact been central to the formation of this discourse; accordingly, “Remembering them, and listening to their affective complexity, is at the core of this book.”

A Shadow over Palestine pursues its conjunctural analysis in part by focusing closely on a number of individual figures such as Baldwin and David Graham Du Bois. These figures provide Feldman with the opportunity to concretize certain aspects of the conjuncture that he investigates. For example, in the book’s first chapter, “Specters of Genocide: Cold War Exceptions and the Contradictions of Liberalism,” Daniel Patrick Moynihan presents a useful figure for telling the story of how Cold War liberalism combined anti-Communism and liberal racism (best embodied by Moynihan’s “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action” [1965], popularly known as the Moynihan Report) into support for the state of Israel. This support culminated in Moynihan’s efforts, as UN Ambassador, to repeal the resolution declaring Zionism a form of racism, a resolution that according to Moynihan “reeked of the totalitarian mind, stank of the totalitarian state.” In the third chapter, “Jewish Conversions: Color Blindness, Anti-Imperialism, and Jewish National Liberation,” Norman Podhoretz provides another such useful figure, embodying the process by which “the suturing of political Zionism and American Jewishness” was effected “in the crucible of late-1960s and early-1970s racial justice struggles.” Podhoretz’s 1963 essay “My Negro Problem—and Ours,” a direct response to Baldwin’s “Letter from a Region in My Mind,” is a key text here.

The most important of the book’s figures is Edward Said, whose work is at the center of the fourth chapter, “Arab American Awakening: Edward Said, Area Studies, and Palestine’s Contrapuntal Futures.” Picking up on Said’s concept of contrapuntalism, Feldman addresses his body of work in general, and Orientalism in particular, as emerging from within “a social and intellectual history of a nascent Arab American studies”; this contextual reading suggests that Orientalism“should be read contrapuntally, locating the text within the ‘overlapping experiences and intertwined histories’ of US imperial culture.” Feldman convincingly traces the beginnings of Orientalism to “The Arab Portrayed,” an essay that Said published in 1968, marking both the start of Said’s public engagement with the question of Palestine (following what he described as the “thunderbolt” of 1967) and also the beginning of his connection to the Association of Arab American University Graduates (AAUG). Feldman’s “symptomatic” reading thus provides a historical grounding for the production of Orientalism, a text often read without much of a context, “as part of a growing transnational analysis of race and empire by scholars of Arab descent in the United States.” This allows for a fresh look at Said’s work, alongside and in conversation with the work of other pioneering scholars and activists within the AAUG. At the same time, Feldman shows a keen understanding of the power of Said’s radical humanist vision, and the place of Palestine within this larger vision: “In Said’s hands, the idea of Palestine served as a catalyst for a contrapuntal mode of being in the world.” The chapter ends by crediting Said’s work with a double move that also, I think, marks A Shadow over Palestine itself:

It refused the positivist pretense that, if one simply mobilized enough facts about Palestine that the enduring myths of Eurocentrism would be shattered, even as it refused, from another angle, a hegemonic post-structuralism….This double move was all the more pressing in a conjuncture whose contradictions were mediated by the intensified absenting of the Palestinian from “history and actuality” (quoting Said).

The momentum of this double move carries Feldman into his final chapter, “Moving toward Home: Women of Color Feminisms and the Lebanon Conjuncture,” and towards the final key figure in his book, June Jordan. The title of the chapter comes from Jordan’s 1982 poem “Moving towards Home,” in which she declares: “I was born a Black woman / And now / I am become a Palestinian / against the relentless laughter of evil.” The poem is one of a series of texts that Jordan wrote in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, texts that Feldman sees as speaking to “the shifting relationship between the post-civil rights United States and postoccupation Israel and Palestine.” As with Said’s Orientalism, he places Jordan’s work within a larger cultural and historical context, that of debates within second-wave feminism and the emergence of “a different kind of feminist antiracism,” embodied by Jordan’s writings on “life after Lebanon” (the title of an essay she published in 1983).

Said had once declared that “America’s Last Taboo,” the “narrative that has no permission to appear,” was the narrative of the oppression of the Palestinians by Israel. This taboo, as Feldman points out, exercised (and, in many ways, continues to exercise) its power over progressive political movements: he discerns its power in the absence of Arab, Arab American, and Palestinian voices from feminist anthologies and from organizations such as the National Women’s Studies Association (NWSA) during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as in the “quasi-mandated silence” imposed during a major nuclear disarmament rally in New York City in June 1982, in which speakers agreed not to mention the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In Jordan’s post-Lebanon writings, that taboo begins to give way, and the possibility of a specifically feminist anti-racism with a new and different notion of solidarity was thereby opened. In the book’s epilogue, Feldman finds in the work of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement a final breaching of America’s Last Taboo. Given the history he has set out, it is no coincidence that many of those who have initiated and supported BDS are the intellectual and political descendants of the scholar-activists of the previous generation that constituted groups like the AAUG and the NSWA.[3] In this way, A Shadow over Palestine offers an exhilarating reconstruction of “this breach’s notable, if often obscured, historical prefigurations.”

If the book has weaknesses—and no project as ambitious as Feldman’s could be without its weak points—these say more about some of the intellectual problems of our time than they do about particular shortcomings on the part of Feldman’s thinking. Indeed, one could credit A Shadow over Palestine with making visible a number of theoretical and political dilemmas that mark our own particular conjuncture. The first has to do with this very notion of “conjuncture” itself—more specifically, the tension between thinking the interconnections between US imperial culture and Israel-Palestine conjuncturally, as compared to the more standard chronological process of cultural history. Feldman’s book explicitly declares itself to be involved with this sort of conjunctural analysis, and he does some brilliant work in this direction. But there is a tension between these parts of the book, when Feldman’s writing attempts to capture the spirit of moments as they arise—moments related, for example, to the 1967 war and to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon—and the somewhat more plodding work required by conventional cultural history. This is not to say that the archival moments of Feldman’s book—for example, the painstaking documentation of discussions at the national conventions of the AAUG, or of the ins and outs of debates in feminist academic journals and anthologies during the 1970s and 1980s—are without value. But such fine-grained work sometimes seems to prevent Feldman from working out some of his potentially more interesting conclusions. For example, Feldman ends his reading of June Jordan’s work with one of his most poetic passages:

The horizon of heterogeneity uncontained, the refusal to submit to the deadening enclosures of a new militarism, the willingness to forge links of relation through longtime commitments to solidarity and transformations: these are the capacious possibilities animated by life after Lebanon.

They are possibilities that endure.

With that sentence, chapter five comes, somewhat frustratingly, to a close, though one yearns to hear more about these possibilities. Indeed, one might willingly exchange some of the more detailed passages documenting debates at the NWSA conventions for a more extended reading out of these possibilities from both the content, but also the form, of Jordan’s poetry and essays.

A related problem—which, again, is more our problem than Feldman’s—has to do with the question of the relationship between politics and culture in our moment. “Culture work,” the term favored by Feldman to describe the larger web of texts that he addresses, already marks an important advance, suggesting as it does not only that cultural texts do certain kinds of political “work,” but also that, like other forms of labor, they have a materiality that needs to be reckoned with. A Shadow over Palestine does a brilliant job of analyzing the role played by cultural work in the second half of the twentieth century in creating and upholding US empire, including support for Israel’s settler colonial project in Palestine. In this, as in other ways, it is a resolutely Saidian book. One reason why Said’s Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism have been so influential is that the brilliance of his readings and the rigor of his arguments have the power to convince even the most skeptical readers of the crucial role played by culture in the development, implementation, and upholding of imperialism. (I remember hearing a literature professor at Columbia, a long-time critic of Said, declare, a few years after Culture and Imperialism was published, “Well, he’s right about Mansfield Park, of course.”)

The problem arises, however, when one attempts to reverse the formulation. If it is, at least in part thanks to Said’s work, now impossible to imagine imperialism without taking into account its cultural component, it is equally true that simply attacking imperial culture—or, indeed, creating and supporting anti-imperial culture—will not necessary make a dent in the actual practice of imperialism.[4] The particular brilliance of Said’s work involved the unraveling of the larger system that he named Orientalism as it worked itself out in texts of individual genius (a term that he never abjured). The perpetual criticism is that his work does not offer anything like an equal amount of attention to texts from “the other side,” those written by the victims of imperial culture as part of the struggle for decolonization. This is not really a fair criticism, but it is certainly true that readers drawn to Said’s resolutely anti-imperial politics often have a hard time reconciling his political stance with his not-unambivalent but very real admiration for figures such as Conrad, Kipling, and Flaubert.

In this sense, it is interesting that Feldman’s most Saidian textual analysis in A Shadow over Palestine comes in his encounter with Saul Bellow’s novel Mr. Sammler’s Planet. He approaches the novel amidst a discussion of the writings of Podhoretz, Nathan Glazer, and Meir Kahane, noting that Sammler is often seen as “a watershed text in [Bellow’s] own political trajectory toward neoconservatism”; its particular importance, for his argument, is the fact that the novel “thematizes the anxious nexus of racial, national, and sexual conversions that defined the early years of the post-civil rights era.” But in his fine close reading, Feldman also brings out the novel’s ambiguities, not just at the level of plot but at the level of form: for example, the narrator’s deeply ambivalent reaction when his Israeli son-in-law beats an African-American thief, despite the fact that Sammler himself had called for this violent intervention. This is not to say that Bellow’s novel is not a watershed text in the development of a particular post-civil-rights strand of neoconservatism; it is simply to repeat the old saw of Marxist literary criticism, that one can often draw deep historical lessons from the most reactionary of novels (as Marx himself noted in praising the work of Balzac, the royalist, over that of Zola, the socialist, despite his political sympathies with the latter and political contempt for the former).

When Feldman turns to literary texts that offer more liberating visions, his readings are somewhat less rich, tending more towards plot summary and a discussion of their reception rather than close readings at the level of form. Of course, the mere fact that Feldman calls for renewed attention to a largely forgotten novel such as David Graham Du Bois’s …And Bid Him Sing is laudable. But one would love to see a reading of Du Bois’s work precisely as a novel, rather than as an artifact of a particular moment in the development of an internationalist tendency in the Black Power movement. Similarly, Jordan’s powerful poetry calls out for a deeper reading, the sort of reading that could address a poem such as “Apologies to All the People in Lebanon” as both a rigorous exercise in dramatic irony and also a reflection back upon the long poetic tradition of apologia. One particularly longs for a richer engagement with the work of James Baldwin, who appears both at the beginning and the end of the book. Feldman notes that during his sojourn in Israel-Palestine in 1961, Baldwin was carrying two unfinished manuscripts with him: one would become “Letter from a Region in My Mind” (and subsequently, The Fire Next Time); the other became the novel Another Country. Could one read the traces of the entanglement of the United States, Israel, and Palestine out of Baldwin’s novel, even if they might not be immediately visible in its content? Feldman has given us both the occasion and the methodology to do so.

In the end, even these criticisms resound to Feldman’s credit. A Shadow over Palestine makes the reader hungry for more work in this direction; one can only hope that the efforts begun here will be carried forward, by Feldman and by others.[5] “Preoccupations of Palestine and Israel in the United States have produced a vexing history of shadows,” Feldman writes in the book’s final pages. A shadow is what remains after something has seemingly passed from the scene, like the grotesque shadow of George Wallace falling very palpably upon the “United We Stand with Israel” rally last summer. But a shadow can also be a prefiguration of that which has not yet entered the scene, that which is about to arrive. The story told by A Shadow over Palestine has the potential to help us to bring into existence the less vexing, and more just, history yet to come.

[This article was first published onSCTIW Review.]

NOTES

[1] See Philip Weiss, “‘Israel Today, Israel Tomorrow, Israel Forever,’ Rep. Hakeem Jeffries Says at New York Rally,”Mondoweiss, 30 July 2014.

[2] See Edward Said, “Palestinians under Siege,”London Review of Books, Vol. 22, No. 24 (14 December 2000). Feldman quotes Said in an interview discussing A Shadow over Palestine: see “New Texts Out Now: Keith P. Feldman, A Shadow over Palestine: The Imperial Life of Race in America,”Jadaliyya, 3 June 2015.

[3] Fred Moten, in an address to the American Studies Association in support of a BDS resolution subsequently endorsed by the ASA, nicely encapsulates this overlapping history: “I am speaking for the boycott, in solidarity with the Palestinians, because I am committed to the insurgent alternative, whose refreshment is (in) the anti-national international. The terms of that commitment are nothing more than another way of saying that I am committed to the black radical tradition.” See Moten, “The New International of Insurgent Feeling,”PACBI (7 November 2009). See also the “Black Solidarity Statement with Palestine” released in August 2015.

[4] For a discussion of precisely this point, see Bruce Robbins, Mary Louise Pratt, Jonathan Arac, R. Radhakrishnan, and Edward Said, “Edward Said’s Culture and Imperialism: A Symposium,” Social Text 40 (Autumn 1994): 1-24.

[5] Feldman’s work joins other important recent texts by scholars and activists moving in the same direction. For three of many possible examples, see: Black Feminist Think Tank, “Black Feminism Is: Reflections on the Black Feminist Think Tank Symposium,”Jadaliyya, 19 April 2015; Robin D. G. Kelley, “Another Freedom Summer,”Journal of Palestine Studies 44 (2014/15); and Vijay Prashad, ed., Letter to Palestine: Writers Respond to War and Occupation (New York: Verso, 2015). 

August 26, 2015 marked the first anniversary of Israel's offensive on the Gaza Strip, during which 2,219 Palestinians were killed. However, a large part of the story is left untold. Over half of those killed were refugees who were displaced from their homes in Yafa, Salama, Isdud, and many other villages and towns, as a result of and following the Nakba in 1948. The majority of those killed lived in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip within a 30 mile (50 km) radius of their homes of origin. A total of 1,236 refugees were killed during the 2014 offensive, including at least 309 children

[Click to download]

This data visualization visually represents the untold story of Gaza's refugees. Created by Visualizing Palestine in collaboration with four Palestinian human rights organizations, Al-Haq, the Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights, the Palestine Centre for Human Rights, and Al-Dameer Association for Human Rights, who launched a joint campaign to document Israel's attacks during the 2014 offensive against the Gaza Strip. 

There are 1.3 million refugees residing in Gaza who are spread over eight refugee camps, making up almost three quarters of the total population. Since the Nakba in 1948, there has been no true accountability for the myriad of human rights abuses committed by Israel. The denial of justice that refugees have experienced can only be remedied in one way: for refugees to exercise their right of return.

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating about Islam and reflects a wide variety of opinions and approaches. It does not reflect the views of the Critical Currents in Islam page or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to cci@jadaliyya.com by Saturday night of every week.]
 

Arts & Culture

The Magical Headspace of Muslim Artist Noor al-Mosawi
Toronto based photographer, Noor al-Mosawi, turns the camera in on herself in a series of self portraits that explore topics of self-care and stability in a world of rapid change. 

“I still think in Arabic and write, speak in Turkish”
Today’s Zaman columnist, author and Qur’an translator, Ali Bulaç, reflects on his childhood in Mardin, Turkey, and the deep relations between Muslims and Christians, as well as the political events that left a mark on his work.  
 

Science & Scholarship

Oldest Qurans republished in print and digital formats
Research Center for Islamic History, Arts, and Culture (IRCICA) publishes facsimiles of some of the oldest Qurans for the first time. Publications are both in print and digital.

Could this Quran fragment really be older than Muhammad?
Carbon dating on “world’s oldest Qur’an” held in Birmingham, England suggests that it might predate the prophet Muhammad. The dating suggests a date between 568 CE and 645 CE, while the prophet is said to have lived between 570 CE and 632 CE.

Muslim Leaders Call for Climate Change Action
Muslim Scholars from more than 20 countries gathered together in Istanbul to call for a decrease in greenhouse gas emissions.
 

Rethinking Muslim (Political) Theologies

An Extraordinary Scholar Redefined Islam
Noah Feldman remembers the incredible career of Shahab Ahmed (1967-2015), professor of Islamic Studies at Harvard University, through a discussion of Ahmed’s soon to be published work, “What is Islam?”.

My madrassa classmate hated politics. Then he joined the Islamic State.
Professor Ebrahim Moosa of Notre Dame reflects on his time spent at the Deoband seminary in India, the political-theological stakes of interpretation, and the need for “humane alternative” to groups like ISIS.

ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape
Interrogating ISIS’s practice of sex slavery, Rukmini Callamachi gives first-hand accounts of Yazidi women in sex slavery in the Islamic State and the practices of theological legitimation that ISIS uses to sustain them.

The Truth About Islam and Sex Slavery History Is More Complicated Than You Think
Professor Kecia Ali of Boston University writes in response to debates about ISIS’s so called “theology of rape” by interrogating the way Muslim scholars have negotiated this issue over time, suggesting there is complex relationship between “canonical texts” and human behavior.

Sisi left without a prayer in Egyptian mosques
Prayers for the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi have been prohibited by the Egyptian Ministry of Religious Endowments in what looks like an attempt to discredit Sisi’s legitimacy.
 

The Politics of Minority/Majority Relations

Ahmed Mohamed, Liberal Rhetoric and Obama Administration Propaganda
Obama’s words of support for Ahmed stand in sharp contrast to the violence that his administration has unleashed on brown and black and Muslim and poor people domestically and abroad

Coptic Church unhappy Egyptian Christians are joining Salafist-linked party Some Egyptian Copts have started joining the Nour Party against the wishes of Pope Tawadros II of the Coptic Orthodox Church. This has produced tensions on both sides concerning the Nour Party’s political and religious project.

Kuwait's Sunnis question fellow Shiites' loyalties Situation grows more tense as some Kuwaitis blame parliamentarian Abdul Hamid Dashti’s visit to Lebanon in order to accept condolences after the June 26 As-Sadiq Mosque bombing as reason for increase in sectarian rhetoric.

One year later, struggle continues for Yazidis
In Iraq, Yazidis remained internally displaced due to ISIS oppression, with many fleeing Iraq and heading toward Europe.

Ben Carson says no Muslim should ever become president
GOP Presidential candidate states that he does not think that a Muslim should be allowed to become President of the United States. Carson’s statements have provoked condemnation as well as support from concerned voters. 

Islam is just as European as Christianity
Haroon Moghul speaks out against what many European conservatives have marked as an intrusion of Muslims into Europe. Attempting to overcome this mischaracterization and Islamophobia, Moghul points to a deeply rooted history of Muslim presence in European life as Europeans.

[Editorial Note: This is not a "Best of," only a roundup of significant pieces. See here for an introduction to this roundup series]

English Articles 

Trolling ISIS How an Internet scam could stymie ISIS’s online recruiters. (18 July, 2015) Aki Peritz provides an insight into how to challenge  ISIS’s recruiting system.

'I'm Not a Butcher': An Interview with Islamic State's Architect of Death (16 July, 2015) Christoph Reuter interviews Abu Abdullah who was, for one and a half years, responsible for organizing Islamic State's suicide bombings in Baghdad. He is one of the organization's rare leading figures to be captured alive. The interview conducted in a high-security prison in Baghdad. 

Tribal massacre victims forced to negotiate with IS ( 22 July, 2015) A year after a deadly attack by the Islamic State, tribesmen in Syria's Deir ez-Zor are trying to bring civilians back to their homes.

The Islamic State's secret recruiting ground in Turkey ( 23 July, 2015) Bombers from two separate incidents have hailed from Adiyaman province.

A Personal War: America’s Marxist Allies Against ISIS ( 24 July, 2015) Matt Bradley and Joe Parkinson report on the PKK and its Syrian affiliate, the People’s Defense Units, or YPG, and the alliance between these Kurdish forces and the U.S.against ISIS.

How to think about Islamic State ( 24 July, 2015) According to Pankaj Mishra, the “Islamic State is often called ‘medieval’ but is in fact very modern – a horrific expression of a widespread frustration with a globalised western model that promises freedom and prosperity to all, but fails to deliver”

Turkey stages first airstrikes on Islamic State in Syria ( 25 July, 2015) Turkish warplanes pounded Islamic State targets in Syria for the first time on Friday, with President Tayyip Erdogan promising more decisive action against both the jihadists and Kurdish militants.

Coalition must seek a common goal in Syria (27 July, 2015) As the anti-ISIS coalition now turns attention to Syria, Hassan Hassan claims that the way to defeat the them starts in Aleppo. 

Turkey and U.S. plan to create Syria ‘safe zone’ free of ISIS  (27 July, 2015) “The plan would significantly intensify American and Turkish military action against Islamic State militants in the country.”

Abductions hurt U.S. bid to train Anti-ISIS rebels in Syria (30 July, 2015) Problems with recruitment, screening, dismissals and desertions haunt the US bid to train anti-ISIS rebels in Syria.

Syrian Kurds fear territorial gains are at risk after Turkish action (30 July, 2015) “Turkey’s formal entry into Syria’s war and its renewed attacks on the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has alarmed Syrian Kurds battling ISIL.” 

US moves to quash reports on Syria trainees captured by al-Nusra (30 July, 2015) US denies reports that Syrian US-trained rebels have been captured by al-Nusra, and emphasizes that these rebels must focus on pushing out ISIS.

Islamic State group threatens to kill Croat in Egypt (5 August 2015) An Islamic State affiliate released a video Wednesday Aug. 5, 2015 threatening to kill a Croatian hostage if Egyptian authorities do not release "Muslim women" held in prison within 48 hours, a day before the country plans to unveil a highly promoted new extension of the Suez Canal.

Turkey's Islamic State sleeper cells (6 August 2015) A former lawmaker says the Islamic State has more potent live bomb capacity than the PKK through its sleeper cells in Turkey.

IMU Declares It Is Now Part Of The Islamic State (6 August 2015) The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is not only allied to the Islamic State (IS) group, it now considers itself part of it.

Sickening video reveals Isis’s new method of execution: Ten prisoners made to kneel above bombs that have been buried in the ground  (10 August 2015) ISIS militants bury bombs in the ground before blowing up their prisoners. The Khorasan killings were filmed in an unknown location in Afghanistan. The video claims the ten prisoners had committed acts of 'apostasy.'

Newlyweds Are Accused of Planning to Join ISIS (11 August 2015)  “A newlywed Mississippi couple who were arrested on the way to the airport for a trip to Syria to join the Islamic State” 

U.S. Sidelines Its $500M Syrian Rebel Army (11 August 2015) The Obama administration has itself a new proxy force to fight ISIS, but not the rebel army it’s committed half a billion dollars to assemble.

Why Turkey Is Fighting the Kurds Who Are Fighting ISIS (12 August 2015) Sarah Almukhtar and Tim Wallace report on why "Turkey is more actively targeting Kurdish insurgents with the P.K.K. than it is fighters with the Islamic State".

Assad support not enough to keep Alawites in Syria (13 August 2015) Alawites feel like they are fighting a losing battle, and have been forced to flee Syria as ISIS continues to gain control of more territory in Syria. 

ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape (13 August 2015) Claiming the Quran’s support, the Islamic State codifies sex slavery in conquered regions of Iraq and Syria and uses the practice as a recruiting tool.

Purported ISIS militants post list of 1,400 U.S. 'targets'  (13 August 2015) A group calling itself the Islamic State Hacking Division posted online a purported list of names and contacts for Americans it refers to as "targets," according to officials.

ISIS Throws Gay Men From Roof In Syria, Releases Photos And Recording Of Execution: Video (15 August 2015) Erica Pishdadian reports on the execution of two men suspected of being gay by ISIS.

Government airstrikes on market in Syria kill more than 80 (16 August 2015) While the Assad regime has murdered countless civilians through airstrikes on rebel-controlled areas, the attack on Douma is uncommon and the area is classified as a stronghold for the Islamic State army.

Nusra and ISIS targeting, assassinating local Palestinian leaders in Yarmouk (17 August 2015) The Jafra Foundation speaks about Syrian civil war and the overlooked impact on Palestinian refugees in Syria. 

Beheaded Syrian scholar refused to lead Isis to hidden Palmyra antiquities (19 August 2015)  Khaled al-Assad, a Syrian scholar, was murdered by Islamic State militants because he refused to reveal where valuable artifacts had been moved for safekeeping.

Group: ISIS beheads expert who refused to reveal location of valuable antiquities (20 August 2015) Don Melvin, Ralph Ellis and Salma Abdelaziz report on the murder of Khaled al-As'ad at the hands of ISIS in Palmyra.

Archaeologist's Execution Highlights Risks to History's Guardians (20 August 2015) Mark Strauss writes about the brutal death of Khaled al-Asaad at the hands of ISIS and argues that his death is “a reminder that archaeologists can find themselves on war's front lines, protecting artifacts”.

The 70s Porno Makeover for Pro-ISIS Warlord (22 August 2015) Alex Rowell writes about the detention of Lebanon’s ISIS-supporting jihadist warlord, Ahmad al-Assir, who was arrested after two years on the run at Beirut airport. 

In Syria, potential ally’s Islamist ties challenge U.S. (25 August 2015) In Syria, the government, the Islamic State and an array of insurgents are fighting a complex civil war.

Photos: ISIS terrorist blown up Baal Shamin Temple (25 August 2015) “New photos appeared on social media show ISIS terrorist blown up Baal Shamin temple dating back to the 3rd century AD in Palmyra.”

ISIS Damages Temple of Baal in Palmyra (30 August 2015) As the Islamic State has seized more and more territory in Iraq and Syria, it has destroyed a number of historic sites that have enormous cultural value to Syria’s past.

Russia Puts Boots on the Ground in Syria (1 September  2015) “The numbers are small, but Moscow may be looking at its own version of mission creep in the treacherous Middle East." 

U.S. launches secret drone campaign to hunt Islamic State leaders in Syria (1 September  2015) According to U.S. officials, the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) are flying drones over Syria in a collaboration responsible for several recent strikes against senior Islamic State operatives. 

Vladimir Putin confirms Russian military involvement in Syria's civil war  (4 September  2015) Russian president talks of desire for "international coalition" to fight terrorism and extremism and does not rule out possibility of direct military intervention in Syria. 

U.S. warns Russia over military support for Assad (5 September  2015) Secretary of State John Kerry warns Russia that a move in Syria could lead to a confrontation with the U.S.-led coalition.

Britain 'moving closer' to military action in Syria (7 September  2015) A senior government minister has signalled Britain is moving closer to military action in war-torn Syria, as Syria's foreign ministry accuses Britain and France of a 'colonialist' agenda.

Exclusive: 50 Spies Say ISIS Intelligence Was Cooked (9 September  2015) “More than 50 intelligence analysts working out of the U.S. military’s Central Command have formally complained that their reports on ISIS and al Qaeda’s branch in Syria were being inappropriately altered by senior officials, The Daily Beast has learned.” 

Blasted to bits: Now ISIS blows up three 2,000-year-old tomb towers in Palmyra (10 September  2015) Satellite images show that ISIS has blown up three ancient tower tombs in Palmyra. Syrian antiquities chief says that the tombs were best preserved and most beautiful. This tragic event comes after the destruction of Baal Shamin shrine and the Temple of Bel. 

Angelina Jolie is wrong - Islamic State's use of rape is horrible but familiar (10 September  2015) Joan Smith writes that ISIS leaders would like us to think it is the most frightening terror organisation that’s ever existed, but they are by no means the first group of men to use mass rape as a deliberate policy.

Russia calls on US to co-operate with its military in Syria (11 September  2015) This article reports about Kremlin strategy in Syria and the recent Russian call on the US to co-operate with its military in Syria against ISIS. 

Daesh leaders face trial after Coalition Air Raid (14 September  2015) On 6 September, an ISIS meeting took place in the Islamic court building of Daesh which was formerly the Finance Directorate building of Raqqa. The meeting included some of the most prominent leaders of Daesh in Syria with leaders who came from Iraq.

One in five Syrians say Islamic State is a good thing, poll says(15 September  2015) “A recent survey of 1,365 Syrians from all 14 governorates of the country found some surprising  attitudes. Consider this: A fifth of those interviewed said the Islamic State ... is a positive influence on the country. And 82 percent said that they believe the Islamic State was created by the United States and its allies." 

Are the U.S. and Russia now on the same page about Syria? (15 September  2015) While Putin moves decisively on Syria, the U.S. is holding his coat, says Aaron Miller.

Our High-Priced Mercenaries in Syria (17 September  2015) The cost of all U.S. military operations against the Islamic State has reached over four billion dollars. 

After ISIS Killed His Friends, This Guy Founded a Security Firm to Kill ISIS (18 September  2015)  In the two years since his last conversation with VICE, VanDyke has seen two of his close friends, James Foley and Steven Sutloff, murdered. He has set up his own private security firm, Sons of Liberty International (SOLI), an organization that is actively fighting ISIS in Iraq, and he's kickstarted humanitarian projects and trained hundreds of Iraqi militiamen.

U.S. Begins Military Talks With Russia on Syria (18 September  2015) “Given divisions between Moscow and Washington, it’s hard to see how you turn convergence on tactical military issues into a collective and viable political strategy to stabilize Syria and end the war.”

Villages abandoned as Syrians flee northern Aleppo (18 September  2015) Mohammed al-Khatieb reports that "the northern countryside of Aleppo has been emptied as thousands fled to surrounding areas following the intensification of the Islamic State attacks in August."

The Arabic version of this article can be found here:هجمات"داعش" علىريفحلب... نزوحجديدللسكّان 

In Syria, many families face a terrible dilemma (20 September  2015) Hassan Hassan on the consequences of the U.S.-led campaign in Syria and how the negative economic effects of coalition airstrikes strengthen ISIL.

100 US-trained fighters enter Aleppo to fight ISIS (21 September  2015) Waves of newly trained rebels will operate in northern Aleppo to join the fight against ISIL.

Syria confirms receipt of Russian jets to target ISIS (22 September  2015) “Air force takes delivery of fighter planes and reconnaissance aircraft, and US officials say Moscow plans to send 2,000 personnel to airbase near Latakia.”

Syrian army uses new Russian jets to strike Islamic State: monitor (24 September  2015) Syrian government forces used newly arrived Russian warplanes to bombard Islamic State insurgents in Aleppo province in northern Syria.

Finding Obama’s missing Syrian fighters (27 September  2015) The Pentagon’s efforts to clarify allegations about U.S.-trained fighters who defected to an al Qaeda affiliate shows just how confused Washington really is.

ISIS wages war: Hundreds of jihadis desert the terror group for rival factions after becoming disillusioned when their pay was cut (29 September  2015) Hundreds of jihadis are leaving Islamic State for other extremist organisations after being forced to take a pay cut of almost £200 by chiefs, it was claimed on Sep. 28, 2015.

An Arabic related article can be found here:مقاتلو“الدولةالإسلامية” يتوجهونإلى“منظماتأخرى” 

Meet the American Vigilantes Who Are Fighting ISIS (30 September  2015) A ragtag group of fighters from America and Europe have joined the fight against extremists in Syria. But with little training and no clear leadership, do they know what they’re doing?

Policy and Reports

David Cameron’s fatal mistakes on Syria and ISIS (22 July, 2015)Chris Doyle argues that Cameron’s approach on Syria is aggressive, ill thought-out and based on misguided surface-level assessment of the issue. 

No Turkish Safe Zone in Syria (30 July, 2015) The intensification of Turkish military action against the self-proclaimed Islamic State does not equate to an established “safe zone” in Syria, Yezid Sayigh reports.

U.S. shoots down idea of Syria safe zone (28 July, 2015) Josh Rogin argues that after the US and Turkey claim to forge an ISIS-free zone together, there is no safe zone in Syria. 

An Intensified Approach to Combatting the Islamic State (6 August 2015) “CNAS CEO Michèle Flournoy and President Richard Fontaine have authored a new policy brief arguing that “current efforts to counter ISIS are not adequate to the task” and that American efforts thus far “convey a sense of creeping incrementalism. The authors make 11 recommendations for actions the United States and its partners should take to make their efforts to counter and ultimately destroy the Islamic State more effective.”

Governing The Caliphate: The Islamic State Picture  (21 August 2015) “This article builds a picture of Islamic State governance based on a review of thousands of the group’s videos and communiqués, released by its so-called ministry of media via the group’s official online channels.”

Between ISIS and a failed state: The saga of Libyan Islamists (August 2015) (PDF Format) “Libya’s diverse Islamist actors played a substantial role in the 2011 armed revolution against Moammar Gadhafi and the subsequent collapse of Libya’s democratization process into armed conflict. The advances of ISIS in Libya and the breakdown of Brotherhood electoral activism in neighboring Egypt, however, present an ideological and recruitment challenge to Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi factions” 

The Other Foreign Fighters An Open-Source (August 2015) In this report,  Nathan Patin shed light on understudied phenomenon, that is the American citizens (roughly 150-200) who travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight against the Islamic State.

Focusing on ISIS’ Sexual Violence Misses the Bigger Picture (26 August 2015) Ariel Ahram criticizes the focus on the abuse of women in ISIS’s territory, which  distracts from the larger picture.

A provocative article says the Islamic State is a mystery. Here’s why that’s wrong. (27 August 2015) Costantino Pischedda criticizes labeling the Islamic State as a unique mystery and argues that existing theories on insurgency and terrorism can help us understanding the phenomenon

The Islamic State’s Game in Egypt (30 August 2015) The Islamic State claimed responsibility for last week’s car bomb attack near the national security building in downtown Cairo. The Islamic State seeks to send a strong message to the Egyptian government that, despite the recently-passed terror act, armed resistance to President Sisi’s secular government will continue with full power.

The Strategy Behind the Islamic State’s Destruction of Ancient Sites  (31 August 2015) “As it expanded across Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State destroyed many archaeological sites, looting them for profit and damaging some to gain attention. This week, activists and government officials said that the Islamic State had blown up Palmyra's Temple of Baalshamin, one of the smaller but best-preserved structures at the ancient Roman site.” 

How to Destroy Islamic State (and How Not to) (September  2015) (PDF Format) Michael Doran, Michael Pregent, Eric B. Brown & Peter Rough provide lay out "five rules that, if adhered to, can supplant Obama’s fallacies with a deeper understanding of Middle East realities"

“We Will Conquer Your Rome:” A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West"(September  2015) (PDF Format) In this report, Robin Simcox examines which “countries were most commonly targeted; the age; nationality; background; terrorist training and combat experience of the perpetrators; relevance of the Internet; which sectors are most commonly targeted for attack; and assesses the extent to which the Islamic State directed, assisted or simply just inspired these plots.” 

The long arm of British law (13 September  2015) In the long war against ISIL, the media campaign is as important as the military one.

Turkey, the Kurds and the Fight Against Islamic State (14 September  2015) In this report, Cale Salih asserts that “while Turkish cooperation is undeniably valuable for the anti-IS coalition, a policy that traded participation against IS for the breakdown of the PKK-Turkey peace process would risk the spill-over of that conflict into northern Syria, weakening one of the coalition’s only effective non-Islamist partners on the ground in northern Syria (the YPG), and making it ever more difficult for the coalition to pull together a coordinated fight against IS”. 

Why Isis fights (17 September  2015) This New Guardian report says apocalypse is a big motivation for ISIS fighters.

It's time to rethink Syria (25 September  2015) Philip Gordon provides his insight into the dramatic developments that have shaped the tragic trajectory of the conflict in Syria.

Russian troops in Syria could end up helping Isis, report claims (25 September  2015) Analysts say involvement ‘underlines contradictions of Kremlin’ as troops are in areas where they are likely to fight groups opposed to Isis

Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors (25 September  2015) (PDF Format) “This report offers a first (and very provisional) insight into the stories of the IS defectors – a new phenomenon that will grow in size and importance as the conflict in Syria and Iraq continues. It provides a compilation of the 58 cases of public defection; a summary of what their testimonies tell us about their reasons for joining and leaving IS;and an assessment of the defectors’ role and potential, as well as recommendations for how their voices can be amplified.”
 

Economy and Agriculture

Is ISIL running out of oil? (19 July, 2015) "Fighters may lost Iraq's Beiji refinery, but they still control a number of oil wells and continue to exploit them."

Iraq's Economy Battered by Islamic State War, Low Oil Prices (18 August, 2015) As the country battles the Islamic State group on the ground, it faces massive budget deficits brought on by the lowest global oil prices in six-and-a-half years. 

What Syrian antiquities reveal about Islamic State’s billion-dollar economy (25 August, 2015) The Islamic State's pursuit of Syrian antiquities doesn't point to economic weakness but rather the diversity of ways that the group can raise big money.

Inside the financial structure of the Islamic State (28 August, 2015) “The “Islamic State" has managed to build a murderous empire through both criminal enterprise and implementing traditional Islamic eco­nomic concepts and systems”.

Islamic State: Where does jihadist group get its support? (1 September, 2014) To understand how the Islamic State economy functions is to delve into a murky world of middlemen and shady business dealings, in which "loyal ideologues" on differing sides spot business opportunities and pounce upon them.

The ISIS Economy: Crushing Taxes and High Unemployment (2 September,  2015) “Only the air people breathe is not taxed,” says Abu Mujahed, adding that the cost of utilities like water and electricity has soared under ISIS rule. Activists say ISIS’s economic persecution is a deliberate tactic to force people to capitulate and support the extremists. 

Officials deny Syria oil field captured by ISIS  (8 September, 2015) “Syria government officials have denied that ISIS fighters captured an oil field which a monitoring group reported had been seized from government forces.”

A similar news article can be found in Arabic here:«داعش» يسيطرعلىأجزاءمنحقلجزلالنفطيالسوري

Documentaries, Special Reports, and Other Media

Living with IS 'nothing but pain, rape and war' (14 July, 2015) Three Yazidi girls who were held captive by Islamic State (IS) group told schoolchildren in the UK of their experiences. One explained that living with IS was "nothing but pain, rape, and war." 

The Yazidi women held as sex slaves by IS (15 July, 2015) It is almost a year since thousands of Yazidis fled to Mount Sinjar, in northern Iraq, as Islamic State fighters entered their villages. This video sheds lights on the stories of three survivors.

Victims of ISIL attack in Turkey in personal stories (21 July, 2015) These photos share stories of the victims of the Suruc massacre.

IS Uses Chemical Weapons in Syrian Attack (22 July, 2015) Islamic State militants have added a new weapon in their arsenal of fear: chemical weapons. VOA Kurdish service reporter Zana Omer was on the scene within hours of a recent attack in Hasakah, Syria, and has details of the subsequent investigation, in this report narrated by Miguel Amaya. 

The Girls Who Fled To Syria: Groomed By The Islamic State (1 August, 2015) “In February 2015, three teenage schoolgirls left the comfort of their homes in East London and traveled to Syria to join the self-styled Islamic State (IS). Around 60 women and girls are thought to have made the same journey from Britain...VICE News gained intimate access to the father of one girl, Amira, and joined him as he dealt with the press and parliament to find out what it's like for those left behind by the tragic choices of their loved ones.” 

مهربونيساعدونأيزيدياتعلىالفرارمنتنظيم"الدولةالإسلامية"  (August 18, 2015) Hundreds of Yazidi women captured by IS have been freed thanks to an international network of smugglers run by the businessman. 

Archaeologist Works To Track The Islamic State's War On Culture (31 August, 2015) “NPR's Robert Siegel talks to archaeologist Michael Danti, who is tracking the cultural heritage sites and artifacts in Palmyra, Syria, that may soon be lost forever at the hands of ISIS.”

New ISIS in Sinai video documents use of advanced weaponry (2 September,  2015) A new video released by “State of Sinai”, the peninsula’s “Islamic State”-affiliated militant group, documents a number of sophisticated operations on Egyptian army targets and appears to show the group’s capacity to move with alarming freedom through areas of North Sinai.

Al-Qaida, the Islamic State, and the future of the global jihadi movement (16 September, 2015) On Wednesday, September 16, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, ambassador-at-large and coordinator for counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department, for a conversation on the current state of al-Qaida and what the rise of the Islamic State means for the future of the global jihadist movement. Ambassador Kaidanow was joined in the discussion by Brookings scholars Daniel Byman of the Center for Middle East Policy, whose new book ‘Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know’ ”

Inside the Islamic State kidnap machine (22 September, 2015) Kidnapping generated $25m for Islamic State last year, according to one US intelligence estimate. It's also a powerful propaganda tool. The business relies on spies, informers, kidnappers, jailers and negotiators who arrange the deals when a captive is released. Syrian journalist Omar Al-Maqdud went to meet some of those who have been involved.

An Arabic related article can be found here: وثائقيبيبيسي: صناعةالخطفلدىتنظيمالدولةالإسلامية  

The ISIS apocalypse: The history, strategy, and doomsday vision of the Islamic State (22 September, 2015) In his newly-released book, “The ISIS Apocalypse” (St. Martin’s Press, 2015), Will McCants examines the Islamic State’s tactics and goals, and the many ways in which it is more ruthless, more apocalyptic, and more devoted to state-building than any of its predecessors or current competitors.”

Inside The Islamic State's Apocalyptic Beliefs  (26 September, 2015) An interview with Will McCants, who is director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution think tank, on the apocalyptic views of the Islamic State and hese views have shaped the growth of the Islamic State. 

Conflict Antiquities Symposium (29 September, 2015) “In the context of ongoing destruction and looting of cultural heritage in the Middle East, an event titled “Conflict Antiquities: Forging a Public/Private Response to Save the Endangered Patrimony of Iraq and Syria” was held by the U.S. Department of State and The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City on September 29, 2015 amid the United Nations General Assembly week.”

Tracing The Origins Of The Islamic State (30 September, 2015) “Host Renee Montagne talks with Washington Post reporter Joby Warrick about his new book, "Black Flags," on the origins of the Islamic State.”

Maps

ISIS-Linked Regional Activity: August 2015 ISIS increased its terrorism campaigns in Egypt and Saudi Arabia in August 2015, demonstrating its ability to penetrate well-protected cities and strike government targets. ISIS also increased its operational presence in Yemen, taking advantage of AQAP's focus on fighting the al-Houthis. ISIS-linked activity in Tunisia and Indonesia suggests that they represent new growth areas for ISIS's global campaign. The confirmed death of Mullah Omar will likely enhance ISIS's outreach efforts globally as well as accelerate its local campaign in Afghanistan. 

ISIS-Linked Regional Activity: September 2015 ISIS has established robust ground campaigns in Libya, Egypt, and Afghanistan. ISIS also continues to expand outward, as reflected in its new activity in Bangladesh and Russia's Caucasus. ISIS may increase its activity in the Near Abroad in order to compensate for anticipated losses in Syria due to Russian intervention. ISIS will also seek to pressure Russia and possibly Iran over the next month as they escalate activity in Syria and Iraq.

Arabic:

كيفصُنعتداعش؟ | أربعدقائقمعجلبيرأشقر

(2 July, 2015) Gilbert Achcar provides his insight into how ISIS was formed.

بالصور..داعشيضع 7 شروطصارمةلخروجالمرأةمنبيتها

(16 July, 2015) This article discusses recent Da'ash signboards in Libya that police women's appearance in public places.

لبنان: تراجععددمسلحي«داعش» و«النصرة» إلى 700

(22 July, 2015) This article states that ISIS and al-Nusra Front lost many fighters in Lebanon who escaped from the eastern Lebanese-Syrian border area after Hezbollah tightened siege on the Syrian side of Tmrkzhma areas, and colliding Lebanese army from the Lebanese side.

صورةمسربةمنمبايعةلداعش.. تكشفهويةالزعيموالأميرالشرعي

(23 July, 2015) A new collection of photos that documents Alambayaat to Da'ash in southern Damascus reveals the true identity of one of Da'ash's leaders who was released by the Syrian regime in March 2012 from Sednaya prison.  

داعشيشنحملاتتفتيشعلىمقاهيالإنترنتفيالرقة

(24 July, 2015) ISIS launches a new campaign that restricts Internet use in the public and private spaces of Al-Raqqah.

خالدالأسعدشهيداعلىمذبحتدمر: آثاروداعشونظام

(26 August 2015) Syria Untold reports on the reaction of Syrians following the execution of Khaled al-As'ad at the hands of ISIS in Palmyra and how they perceive the relationship between ISIS, the Syrian regime and archaeology.

المقاتلاتالتركيةتقصفلأولمرةأهدافالتنظيم"الدولةالإسلامية" فيسوريا

(29 August 2015) Turkish jets took part in U.S.-led coalition airstrikes and hit ISIS targets in Syria.

شابيغامربحياتهلتصويرجهادييتنظيم"الدولةالإسلامية" فيالرقة

(4 September  2015) A Syrian activist that use the fake name "Abu Sham Al-Raqqah" on social media risks his life while documenting ISIS in Al-Raqqah.

“مجموعةالموت” انشقتعن“داعش” ونفذتاغتيالًافيحماة 

(6 September  2015) A violent group that names itself "the secret death group" executed an explosion in Hama city on Sept 5th. The group is speculated to be a split off ISIS. 

فرنساتستبعدالتدخلالبريفيسورياوتقررإرسالطائراتاستطلاع

(7 September  2015) François Hollande, president of France, announced that his country will send reconnaissance planes over Syria against ISIS.

جنانسبيةداعشتعودإلىكردستان

(8 September  2015) A young Yazidi woman, Jinan Badl, who was an ISIS Sabbieh, refused an asylum from France and decided to go back to Kurdistan. 

“داعش” يقفعاجزاً أمامعاصفةغباريةتضربالرقة 

(9 September  2015) Raqqa is Being Slaughtered website criticizes the ways in which ISIS respond it to the recent sandstorm that affected Syria.

تنَظيمُ الدّولةِالإسلامِيّة، بورتريهذاتي: ماذانجدُ في“دابق”، مجلَّةِ الدولةِ الإسلاميّة؟

(17 September  2015) Louise Plun discusses the meanings of concepts that ISIS uses in its ideology and recruitment strategies.

تنظيم"الدولةالاسلامية" يدعواللاجئينإلىالهجرةللمناطقالتييسيطرعليها

(19 September  2015) ISIS published a series of video clips urges Muslims to stop migration to Europe, calling them to move to the "Caliphate State".

تقرير: الجنودالروسيرفضونإرسالهمللقتالفيسوريا

(24 September  2015) According to a lawyer, a group of Russian soldiers refused to obey military orders to go to Syria to take part in the fighting there.

الهروبمنحكم"الدولةالإسلامية" فيسوريا

(24 September  2015) BBC interview a young Syrian man who has recently left ISIS-controlled Al-Raqqa city. He shares insights about ISIS governing.

An English version of this article can be found here: Migrant crisis: Fleeing life under Islamic State in Syria 

وزارةالدفاعالروسية: سفنحربيةروسيةستجريتدريباتشرقالمتوسط

(24 September  2015) Syrian army use for the first time Russian drones. 

 مستشارةالأسدلـCNN: روسيالاتملكتاريخااستعماريا.. وكانعليكمالاستماعلنافي 2011

(29 September  2015) In an interview with CNN’s Hala Gorani, Syrian official Bouthaina Shaaban says Syria is ready to work with the U.S., but warns against any "act of aggression” by the U.S.

An English related article can be found here: CNN's Hala Gorani speaks to Assad adviser about Obama's ISIS speech, strategy

انفوغرافيكيوضحلباستنظيم“داعش” ودلالتهحسباللونوالشكلمنإعدادفريقي“الرقةتذبحبصمت” و“صوتوصورة”

(29 September  2015)

This infographic shows the meanings of ISIS clothes according to color and style.

Books and Publications 

The Islamic State's (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine: Dabiq “All of the issues of the Islamic State's glossy propaganda magazine 'Dabiq,' named after a key site in Muslim apocalypse mythology can be found here.”

Or you can download the last issue (Issue 11) from here:  Islamic State (ISIS) Magazine: Dabiq- The Laws of All or the Laws of Men-  (Issue 11)  (PDF file)

“The eleventh issue of the Islamic State’s propaganda magazine is called From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions. Al-Ahzab refers to a battle in the Quran between a coalition of Meccan tribes and the nascent forces of Islam. ISIS attacks al-Qaeda and castigates the Taliban for concealing the death of Mullah Omar. ISIS also accuses the Shiite messiah (Mahdi) of being the dajjal (devil) in league with the Jews. More is directed at women, who are urged to have children and care for their jihadi husbands. ISIS also tout their establishment of gold dinars as currency and boast of having captured a Norwegian and a Chinese hostage, who are offered up for ransom in full page adverts.” 

The Crisis of the Arab State  (11 August  2015) (PDF Format) “The report gives an overview of the discussion, including common themes, areas of consensus, and unique insights, which will serve to illuminate further investigation of these critical concepts, even as the Middle East continues to change and evolve”. 

The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary Evidence(August  2015) In this paper Aymenn al-Tamimi traces the development in Islamic State administration from the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006 until the present day. The paper draws on rare primary sources to explain the growing sophistication in the group’s governance structures. The current bureaucratic system has reached a level of complexity and professionalism that probably makes the Islamic State sustainable, even under containment, provided it maintains control of its strongholds. 

The believer: How an introvert became the leader of the Islamic State (September  2015) William McCants tackles the story of  Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the ruler of the Islamic State or ISIS.

 A free eBook version of this essay is available for download on Amazon

The Arabic version of this article can be found here: المؤمن: كيفأصبحشخصانطوائي، شغفهالدينوكرةالقدم، أبابكرالبغداديزعيمالدولةالإسلامية 

ISIS, Heritage, and the Spectacles of Destruction in the Global Media (September  2015) This paper focuses on ISIS's recent destruction of archaeological heritage in Iraq and its (self-) representation in the global media. It is argued that the Islamic State's destruction of archaeological sites and museums as well as historical monuments and local shrines can be seen as a form of place-based violence that aims to annihilate the local sense of belonging, and the collective sense of memory among local communities, to whom the heritage belongs. 

Perspectives on Terrorism Vol 9, No 4 (2015) Special issue on the Islamic State provides 14 research articles on various aspects of the organization, in addition to an extensive, specially compiled bibliography on IS. 

Mining for Causal Relationships: A Data-Driven Study of the Islamic State This paper presents a data-driven approach to analyzing ISIS using a dataset consisting of 2200 incidents of military activity surrounding ISIS and the forces that oppose it (including Iraqi, Syrian, and the American-led coalition. 

The Palestinian uprising is now entering its fourth week. There appears to be a broad consensus on the genesis of the violence, which has left at least 40 Palestinians and seven Israelis dead since October 1, and more than 1,200 Palestinians injured. How it may develop in the days and weeks ahead is much less clear.

Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, now almost fifty years old, is more entrenched than ever, while even the pretense of a political process aimed at bringing the occupation and the conflict to an end has been effectively abandoned. Political despair has been compounded by economic desperation. In Gaza, two-fifths of the population lives in poverty, and youth unemployment is the world’s highest, at more than 60 percent. In East Jerusalem, the epicenter of the uprising, 75 percent of Palestinians live below the poverty line. Even in the remainder of the West Bank, where donor aid and a credit bubble have sustained the fiction of an economy, fully one in three of those aged 20 to 24 are unemployed. It is no coincidence that, of the 30 Palestinians killed by Israeli forces from October 1–14, nearly two-thirds were between the ages of 18 and 22.

Such travails are not the product of an economic cycle or austerity policies, but rather the result of systematic institutional discrimination by a colonial regime over many decades. In East Jerusalem, which is not only occupied but has also been illegally annexed by Israel, the government and municipal authorities demolish more Palestinian homes on the pretext of a lack of planning permission than they issue permits for new construction; seize land and property for the further expansion of illegal Jewish settlements; and revoke the residency status of entire families. In the remainder of the West Bank, most of it under direct Israeli military rule, similar policies are pursued with even greater brutality.

If political and economic despair created the underlying conditions for revolt, two proximate causes triggered it. First is what Ofer Zalzberg of the International Crisis Group has characterized as the “crumbling status quo” at the Haram al-Sharif compound in Jerusalem, which contains the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock. A growing campaign of incursions by radical settler groups dedicated to demolishing the mosques and replacing them with a Jewish temple, provocative visits by prominent Israeli politicians including serving cabinet ministers, restrictions on access for Muslim worshipers, and the resultant clashes with Israeli security forces have persuaded Palestinians that the most extreme government in Israel’s history is determined to partition the Muslim holy site and Palestinian national symbol. Such fears draw upon experience, as this is precisely what Israel did at Hebron’s Ibrahimi Mosque two decades ago after an American-born settler massacred 29 Palestinian Muslims during dawn prayers. Palestinian concerns are additionally shared by Jordan, which shares custodianship of the Haram and last year felt compelled to withdraw its ambassador to Tel Aviv in protest at Israel’s increasing belligerence on the issue. More recently, tensions came to a head in September as the Muslim feast of Eid al-Adha coincided with the Jewish Rosh Hashanah and Sukkot holidays.

Second is a growing sense of regional and international abandonment, particularly at the official level. The Palestinians are today more isolated and fragmented than at any point since their initial dispossession in 1948. Key Gulf states have sought out Israel as an ally in their proxy conflict with Iran; Egypt’s current rulers consider Palestine a nuisance and Hamas an enemy; Turkey is otherwise preoccupied; and what’s left of Iraq and Syria have neither the capacity nor inclination to exert themselves on the Palestinians’ behalf. There is “a perception that…Palestinians are on their own,” leading Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki explains, and “so they take matters into their own hands.” It is in this respect hardly coincidental that Palestinians have rallied around what is not only a national symbol but also one that continues to resonate in the Arab and broader Muslim worlds.

To this should be added the increasingly barbaric Israeli-Egyptian blockade of the Gaza Strip, which along with the schism between the Fatah and Hamas movements will soon enter its second decade; unprecedented levels of official demonization of Palestinian citizens of Israel; lengthy hunger strikes by Palestinians detained without charge or trial; and regular killings by the Israeli military and settler militias in the West Bank—the last culminating in the late July arson-murder of 18-month-old Ali Dawabsheh and his parents outside Nablus. It speaks volumes that in the current context the latter factors are mere background noise.

A THIRD INTIFADA?

Have the Palestinians finally embarked upon their long-heralded third intifada? That depends upon how one defines the term, and can therefore easily lead to semantic rather than substantive debate. The more pertinent questions concern how sustainable and effective the current revolt is likely to be.

An instructive comparison can be drawn with the first intifada of 1987–93. It too erupted amid growing regional and international indifference. In the mid-1980s, the Arab states were preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq War, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), its leadership languishing in Tunisia, was bereft of influence and ideas. At the November 1987 summit of the Arab League, Palestine was for the first time in the organization’s history absent from the agenda. Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, none other than current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, could barely conceal his glee, telling the UN General Assembly that “the Arab leaders” have “put the Palestinian” issue “on the back burner.” That was December 2. One week later, the occupied territories erupted in a mass nonviolent civil revolt that planted Palestine firmly atop the international agenda, transformed international perceptions of the conflict, and paralyzed Israeli society.

The first intifada (1987-93) marked a fundamental turning point in Western public opinion about the conflict.

The first intifada awoke the world’s conscience to the justice of the Palestinian cause, and crystallized the international consensus for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict—a consensus that still endures. It marked a fundamental turning point in Western public opinion about the conflict. Since then, widespread revulsion at Israel’s massacres in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008-9, 2012, and 2014) has made it one of the world’s least popular states, ranking it alongside Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea. If current regional conditions resemble those that prevailed at the outset of the first intifada, today’s international environment is much more promising: if Palestinians rally behind a coherent program that seeks to activate a dormant international consensus, they can expect to receive broad international support.

Domestically, the situation is more ambiguous. The first intifada began spontaneously, independent of the formal political leadership. The same is true of the present uprising, which has been characterized by self-organizing groups of demonstrators in the West Bank and Gaza and uncoordinated actions by individuals in East Jerusalem and elsewhere. Hamas is not preventing protests in Gaza, but neither is it delighted with them; in the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority is having to walk a fine line between its security commitments to Israel and the United States and its need for domestic legitimacy. Both fear that a popular uprising could challenge the modus vivendi they have established with Israel, or could—with or without encouragement by their rivals— develop into a challenge to their continued rule.

The first intifada caught the PLO by surprise, but the leadership rapidly made a strategic decision to support it, and in the process channeled large amounts of money to the occupied territories to that end. No such strategic decision has been made today by a leadership eager to end the unrest and restore calm, but this, ironically, could be a net benefit. Reliance on PLO largesse helped subordinate the first intifada to the PLO’s political direction, which led it down a painful dead end. The money helped sustain the struggle, but also undermined it.

In other respects, internal conditions are today much worse. The Palestinian national movement in practice no longer exists, and what remains of the Palestinian political system is deeply divided politically and also territorially. At the popular level the Palestinian people are fragmented in ways that would have been difficult to imagine prior to the 1987 uprising; in the intervening decades key communities in Kuwait, Iraq, and now Syria have been functionally eliminated, the diaspora as a whole has been effectively removed from decision-making structures, and the occupied territories transformed into a series of encircled bantustans.

The first intifada benefited from the fact that the official leadership was far away in Tunis, while the grassroots structures of the PLO (unions, political movements) were in place and functional, quickly coalescing to form the institutional backbone of the uprising: the Unified National Command of the Uprising. The situation is now effectively reversed: the official leadership is deeply entrenched inside the West Bank, and is not merely sclerotic and corrupt but actively collaborating with Israel in the form of an efficient security apparatus. It is no accident that it is those areas least susceptible to Palestinian Authority control—East Jerusalem, Hebron, Gaza, and Area C of the West Bank, as well as Palestinian communities within Israel—that have seen the most activism. Meanwhile, Palestinian grassroots structures have been largely hollowed out, primarily by the Palestinian Authority but also by an NGO sector that has absorbed many activists and defanged their agendas.

The leaderless character of this uprising has so far made it difficult for Israel and those Palestinian forces invested in the status quo to impose their control. But the fate of uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world suggests that this feature could soon become a mortal flaw: in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere, a dearth of leadership, organization and effective coordination enabled the entrenched powers to retake the initiative and gradually re-impose their will, or produced political vacuums that devoured their societies. The Palestinian uprising’s potential will depend upon its ability to sustain itself independently of, and perhaps at a later stage in open opposition to, the powers that be. This will require organization and a lot of political savvy.

It’s a serious question whether the infrastructure required to sustain the revolt can develop before it is crushed. In Egypt, activists and revolutionaries saw the fruits of their efforts snatched by the much better organized Muslim Brotherhood, and then the Muslim Brotherhood watched helplessly as its electoral victory was snatched by the machinations of the much more experienced ancien régime.

The first intifada had three essential characteristics that were critical to its initial success. Mass participation: If young people constituted the most dynamic force in the revolt, nonetheless, the entire population, from infants to the elderly, took part. Nonviolence: The uprising consisted overwhelmingly of nonviolent demonstrations, as well as various forms of self-organizing such as alternative schools, tax strikes, and backyard food production. Its symbolic weapon was the stone. Efficacy: The first intifada severely disrupted civilian life inside Israel and isolated Israel abroad. These three elements were an indivisible package: nonviolent tactics won international sympathy and allowed for broad participation, which forced Israel to call up its reserves at great political and financial expense.

None of these aspects are yet present in the current uprising. The “lone wolf” attackers are mainly young people from East Jerusalem; and while there have also been demonstrations in Gaza and the West Bank, most sectors of the population remain passive, if sympathetic, observers. The uprising’s signature weapon has been the knife. The first intifada also featured a wave of knife attacks in Jerusalem and southern Israel, but this occurred in 1990–91, when the intifada was already weakened. What was then a tactic of despair, a reflection of the intifada’s exhaustion, has today been adopted from the outset.

Apart from moral considerations, the knife attacks preclude popular participation and play into Israel’s hands.

Setting aside, for argument’s sake, moral considerations, there are two important tactical issues with the stabbings. First, an uprising centered on knifings precludes most of the population from participating. This sort of violence rarely unhinges an entire society and is therefore unlikely to amount to more than a nuisance for Israel. As of now, reports Haaretz’s defense correspondent, the Israeli army “does not see the need” for drastic measures. Its escalatory responses primarily derive from the political realm, particularly Netanyahu’s need to validate his security credentials and his contention that the status quo can be indefinitely sustained.

Second, the knifings play into Israel’s hands internationally. Whereas the iconic image of the first intifada was the stone versus the Uzi, a juxtaposition that inspired sympathy with and admiration for the Palestinians, the iconic image of the present uprising risks becoming CCTV footage of an Israeli civilian being stabbed in the street and his assailant summarily executed. This has little prospect of generating similarly widespread, unambiguous international public sympathy. It is notable that the major Israeli assaults on Gaza (Cast Lead, Protective Edge) evoked a much harsher international reaction than has Israeli repression in the wake of the stabbings. The Middle East Quartet (the UN, the EU, the United States, and Russia) recently acquiesced in Netanyahu’s request to call off a planned visit, effectively granting Israel a blank check in its dealings with the Palestinians; while US Secretary of State John Kerry has publicly affirmed—as if its survival hangs in the balance—Israel’s “right to defend its existence.”

The more the stabbings come to characterize the uprising as a whole, the harder it will become for Palestinians to pursue an alternative strategy. This is particularly so given prevailing political conditions. During the second intifada, when there was merely competition and rivalry between Fatah and Hamas rather than the formal schism that exists today, Hamas carried out suicide attacks as an expression of what it considered to be the most effective strategy. Fatah then followed suit, but primarily on the basis of internal political considerations: it didn’t want Hamas stealing its thunder. In the context of the division between Fatah and Hamas, political pressures tend toward escalation because violence is still seen as the touchstone of genuine resistance. In the absence of a unified national movement, pulling back from the stabbings and embarking on a potentially more effective, nonviolent course will prove difficult.

“Attempts to break through the fence are the nightmare scenario for the defense establishment.” —Jerusalem Post

Yet, the possibility that the uprising could either compel existing movements toward that unification, or establish new organizations able to exert effective control over events, should not be dismissed out of hand. Over the past several years, President Mahmoud Abbas has been transforming into a Ben Ali rather than a Mubarak: someone whose rule is increasingly personalized, concentrated in a very small group of people rather than a broad sector of the elite. His brazen power grabs—most recently, an unconstitutional attempt to replace the PLO Executive Committee, and ongoing efforts to call a new Fatah General Conference, the sole purpose of which would be to expel loyalists of political rival Mohammed Dahlan—have alienated powerful constituencies. These fissures within the Palestinian elite may lead some of its factions to lend opportunistic support to popular forces in order to expose their rivals in the court of Palestinian public opinion.

If, notwithstanding formidable obstacles, Palestinians are able to unite existing power structures, or effectively act independently of them, there is a real prospect that significant gains might be won.
 

ISRAEL’S NIGHTMARE

As so often, the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip have shown the way. Sizable demonstrations have been taking place daily outside the perimeter fence. The scale of the marches remains small, but they already have Israeli officials in a panic. “The sight of tens of thousands of unarmed Palestinians marching toward the border fence,” reports veteran Israeli journalist Ben Caspit, “is the cause of many a nightmare for the Israeli leadership.” “Attempts to break through the fence,” another senior Israeli analyst observes, “are [the] nightmare scenario for the defense establishment”:

What will happen if thousands of Palestinians march on the fence, knock it down and continue their march into Israel? Will Israel respond with gunfire that will lead to a massacre?

One could similarly point to persistent if generally localized popular mobilizations at key junctures of the West Bank Wall, where demonstrations have been held on a weekly basis for years and could form the basis for broader challenges to the occupation.

The question for Palestinians is, how to make Israel’s “nightmare scenario” materialize. As the fears of Israeli officials testify, mass marches on the Gaza fence have enormous potential—but they cannot succeed on their own. Nonviolence ultimately worked in the American South because it embarrassed the federal government, not least before the international community, and touched the liberal sensibilities—arguably hypocritical, but that’s beside the point—of white public opinion in the North, as black people demanded no less, but also no more, than implementation of laws already in the statute books. Had nonviolent resistance remained confined to the South, local enforcers could have simply killed everyone who was resisting. Similarly, it’s hard to imagine that popular mobilization will succeed in Palestine unless these conditions are fulfilled:

1. Independent organization. Thus far, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have hit upon the strategy of mass nonviolent marches despite Hamas, which has largely restricted its support to calling for escalation everywhere else. This is, paradoxically, a good thing: fairly or unfairly, the marches will command significantly greater global support, particularly in the West, if they are viewed as an authentic resort to mass nonviolent resistance by the people themselves.
2. International legitimacy. The UN Human Rights Council has demanded that Israel “lift, immediately and unconditionally, the blockade on Gaza”; while international human rights organizations agree that the Gaza siege “constitutes a collective punishment imposed in clear violation of…international humanitarian law” (International Committee of the Red Cross) and “must be lifted immediately” (Amnesty International). These declarations can be authoritatively wielded by protesters to defend their campaigns, and form the explicit political basis for an expanded popular campaign against the blockade.
3. International solidarity. The marches cannot succeed without coordination and synchronization with the solidarity movement in the West. Israel’s defenders will present the demonstrations as terrorist hordes attempting to overrun Israel and proclaim ad nauseam Israel’s “right to defend itself.” Insofar as this propaganda takes hold, Israeli forces will be free to carry out a massacre. Mass demonstrations in Gaza will therefore require the solidarity movement to explain and defend the legitimacy of their goals; they will also represent a historic opportunity for the solidarity movement to escalate its commitment by, for example, taking direct action to shut down the United Nations headquarters in New York and Geneva, or that of the European Union in Brussels. Such organizations cannot continue with business as usual until they adopt measures to enforce the unambiguous positions of their own institutions that the Gaza siege is illegal and should be lifted immediately and unconditionally.

If Israel were confronted with mass nonviolent marches on the Gaza fence, the West Bank Wall (ruled illegal by the International Court of Justice) and occupied East Jerusalem, coordinated with large-scale direct action abroad, united under the banner of international legitimacy and determined to end the illegal siege and occupation—if all these conditions held, truly this would be Israel’s nightmare and Palestinian hopes made real.

Decisive defeat has been the fate of many, perhaps most, political movements. Nevertheless, over the past half century, regional and international regressions have repeatedly inspired a revival and reassertion of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. In their darkest moments, Palestinians have mustered the courage, the strength, and the will to keep the torch aflame. If present conditions demand sobriety about the obstacles confronting the struggle for justice in Palestine, the Palestinians’ own record of determination in the face of adversity means the prospects of overcoming these obstacles can by no means be ruled out. If we in the West do our part, this new round of resistance might yet yield a dividend for justice.

And not just for Palestinians. Israel stands at a precipice, with a deranged head of state who thrives on orchestrating national hysteria, barging in on the US Congress and directing bug-eyed stares at the UN General Assembly. Netanyahu in many ways personifies the reality that the occupation has only exacerbated the most egregious features of Israeli society. 

The late Edward W. Said liked to quote the Caribbean poet Aimé Césaire as saying, “There’s room for everyone at the rendezvous of victory.” A victory for nonviolent mass civil disobedience aimed at ending the illegal occupation would be one not only for the Palestinian people and the international community, but also one for Israeli society, placing it on the path to normalcy.

[This article was first published on www.thenation.com on October 25, 2015]

Keith David Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015

America is a comfortable and rich country. We have safe homes….Their homes are in ruins….The moan of a race moves out across the heart of a stricken world.

This emotive call from a Near East Relief (NER) pamphlet to assist destitute Armenians, entitled The Cry of a Million: Exiled Destitute Dying, was published in 1916, but its words resonate across Europe a century later. The mass deportation and genocide of the Armenian community in 1915 helped trigger new ways of thinking about “human rights” and “humanitarianism,” including categorization of the “refugee.” In the context of empire and colonialism, Keith David Watenpaugh traces how the “humanitarian acts” practiced by Western actors in the Eastern Mediterranean in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century shaped an ideology of a humanitarianism based on professionalism—marking a shift away from previously missionary intervention in the region.

The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed a number of humanitarian crises, caused by both men and nature, which were dealt with very differently by the burgeoning international aid community. In 1915, a plague of locusts decimated the lands of the Levant, leading to starvation in Beirut, Jerusalem, and Baghdad. Calls for emergency relief from Baghdad fell on deaf ears, while they were answered generously in Beirut and Jerusalem. Also in 1915, the Rockefeller Foundation commissioned a War Relief Commission report to document the plight of the Armenian people and concluded that “the Armenian communities have been broken up so thoroughly that temporary relief cannot repair the damage.” The Greco-Turkish and Anatolian civil wars led to the expulsion from their homelands of the very refugee communities that American relief agencies were assisting; and the newly established Soviet Union grew hostile to the presence of Western aid workers in the Caucasus.

Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism adds to a growing body of historical literature that examines modern humanitarianism as a unique collection of practices that were contemporaneous to, and informed by, the early twentieth-century ideologies of nationalism and colonialism. It contextualizes the practice of compassion, the disjuncture between the nation state and humanitarian principles, and the creation and manipulation of the humanitarian subject in the context of the birth of an “international community.” In trying to disentangle the “aspirational idealism” of human rights from other forms of social governance, Watenpaugh highlights the inherent weakness of humanitarianism and how it ultimately never escaped the influence of nationalist ideas and agendas. Indeed, going further, he shows how the nation state was strengthened in the very act of subverting humanitarianism, by marshaling its sovereignty and thus ensuring the continued suffering of the stateless and minorities it rejected.

In 1915, Armenians were deported from Ottoman Turkey, enduring death marches, rapes, confinement in concentration camps, and murder. The genocide prompted the first cases of charitable assistance—the American Near East Relief (NER) charitable organization was established in 1915, just after the deportations began—and the first instance of the “humanitarian report.” The dispatches of Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, and testimonies collected by historian Arnold J. Toynbee in the 1916 The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire galvanized much support for the Armenians among the American public. It was the plight of the Armenians, alongside the decimation and displacement caused by the First World War, which also prompted the formation of the first international humanitarian regime for refugees.

Right from the start, humanitarianism was hamstrung by the prioritization of the nascent nation-state system in the wake of the collapse of empire. Distinguishing the Ottoman state’s concerns about the way accepting foreign humanitarian assistance might undermine its sovereignty, Watenpaugh tells us, is critical to understanding how choices were made by both Western humanitarians and the Ottoman state about which groups received assistance and why. And it was the “growing power and organizational capabilities of the Ottoman government and its military” which meant that humanitarian intervention failed to prevent the mass deportations, rape, and massacres of the Armenians. Arguably the humanitarian spirit itself was a nationalist construct, employed only to favorably shape the imagination of the nation providing humanitarian assistance. The helping of Armenia was turned into an “American” obligation, asserting a national heroism and a pride in righting global wrongs. In one poster, a neoclassical Columbia is portrayed with a sword protecting a waifish Armenian child dressed in rags—the secular nation re-imagined in a religious light. Something similar could be said of Turkey’s hospitality to Syrian refugees today. Later, the efforts to assist Armenians scattered across Syria, Lebanon, and Russia in maintaining their cultural distinction and language ran alongside French colonial strategies to foster the political development of non-Arab communities in order to halt the impacts of a swelling pan-Arab nationalism.

Watenpaugh goes so far as to suggest that “the modern state can even welcome the modes of humanitarian action as an adjunct to the act of genocide itself.” He uses as the basis for this argument a War Relief Commission report produced by the Rockefeller Foundation, which concluded that relief to the interior of Anatolia would not be possible at that moment since “[t]he Turks feel that the Armenian communities have been broken up so thoroughly that temporary relief cannot repair the damage.” The clinical reasoning of that sentence resonates with the larger critique of humanitarianism’s inability to prevent suffering.

The formation of the League of Nations in the wake of World War I was a reflection of the growing ideology of “shared humanity,” but this was very much a Western construct. The Nansen passport, the legal document given to refugees to allow them to travel freely, made no provision for the refugees to have any ability to act politically in any arena. It put the onus on the state  by providing them with a “reservoir of controllable workers” who had no political agency or civil rights. Watenpaugh argues that the passports “bear witness to the moral and ethical vacuity (even uselessness) of the interwar refugee regime.” In a damning reflection on the abilities of the international community to effect change, Watenpaugh writes: “The relegation of the problem of the postgenocide Ottoman Armenians to that level after decades of international advocacy on their behalf demonstrates how swiftly a humanitarian emergency can fade from view or become an inconvenient and forgettable problem for humanity.” This is a lose-lose situation for humanity—not important enough for the nation state and lost in the melee of international agendas. He goes on to describe the “substitution of humanitarianism for Politics,” in which “the actual root cause of human suffering...was met with purposeful silence and a formal indifference”.

What is human suffering? Questioning and delineating it became popular in the face of the devastation wrought by war, displacement, human misery, and depravity. Aleppo Rescue Home and Neutral Houses in Istanbul, as well as various orphanages around the Levant such as the one in Aintoura in Lebanon, housed thousands of rescued Armenian women and children, many of them orphans, who had been trafficked in the immediate aftermath of the Armenian genocide. Efforts to rescue this demographic, Watenpaugh argues, signaled that the definition of “suffering” had extended to include the legal status of women and children. For Karen Jeppe, the Danish administrator of the League of Nations Rescue Home in Aleppo, the process of rehabilitation was not just an educational and training process but also a cultural act, in which the rescued would be turned back into “human beings.” The young American aid worker Stanley Kerr similarly viewed his job not just as immediate relief, but also an act of “restorative justice” for the Armenians—the repatriation of Armenians to their homelands under the auspices of a European protectorate. By implication, their suffering could only end once they’d achieved self-determination.

This broadening notion of suffering was influenced heavily by Woodrow Wilson’s ideas about community, and liberal nationalism’s emphasis on the extension of categories of rights to nations and, in the modern sense, ethnicities. This extension had wide implications, not only for the international reach of humanitarianism, but also for obligations towards post-conflict society. The practice of humanitarianism became both a matter of emergency relief and of development to alleviate violations of “human rights.” Watenpaugh avoids too much discussion about the development of human rights discourse, other than to say human rights and humanitarianism have an interwined history that is difficult to disentangle. But he highlights the importance of neutrality, selectivity, and nongovernmentality to the practice of humanitarianism, and how rights abuse (civil, human, or national) figures in the historical conceptualization of human suffering.

If human suffering included cultural denigration and being stripped of dignity, the solution was posited as the nation state and self-determination. But whose job was it to impose this? Watenpaugh’s most interesting reflections on the Armenian situation come in his discussions of reconciling obsessions over ethnicity with restorative justice, and thus reconciling the universal with the particular. He points out that helping rescued and orphaned Armenian children was a problem of humanity in general, but also a specific problem for the Armenian community. The problem of humanity posed by the existence of a denationalized and stateless refugee population would still be a problem for humanity, not at the level of the state, but rather at the nexus of international institutions, philanthropic organizations, and diasporic political parties and civil society groups. It was this debate over the most appropriate form of development that led the NER (which had become the NEF by this stage) to later release a statement of purpose in 1930 calling for a divorce of “rights-based development” from “traditional” humanitarian development—implementing “minimally invasive” projects that would address human security issues but not engage in any actions that might provide opportunities to provide political and social rights (this again may seem as recognition of the primacy of sovereignty). It stated: “People on the field would rather have less money and a statesman like program than large sums for objects that are not carefully thought out.” But this “statesman like program” often precluded addressing root problems of social and economic inequality or political disenfranchisement.

But alongside the belief in preserving ethnicities through the act of self-determination there was a paradoxical racism at the heart of humanitarianism, which resisted the notion of self-determination of different ethnicities. The creation of the humanitarian subject itself was an exercise in homogenization. Decisions about the ethnicity of orphans in the Istanbul Neutral House were made on the basis of observations about their past, such as nursery rhymes and folk songs, but very few of the disputed children were determined to be Muslim. The Christians in Jerusalem and Beirut were more worthy of assistance than the Muslims in Baghdad. The humanitarian attachment of Mabel Evelyn Elliott, the American humanitarian worker assisting Armenian women, was strengthened by her affinity of class and gender to the educated young Armenian women—perhaps unfairly, as Watenpaugh suggests. The Armenians were to be pitied so much precisely because they were being oppressed by Turks and Arabs, and they were consequently unique in the degree to which their cause mattered in Geneva and Washington (efforts to expand the coverage of the Nansen passport to other stateless refugees, including Jewish refugees in Romania and Roma and Hungarians scattered throughout Europe, were generally opposed).

Watenpaugh uses these examples to argue that at the centre of humanitarian logic is the project of “unstrangering the object of humanitarianism”. As part of this project, the humanitarian subject is imagined to be “knowable, even to the point of being envisioned as an extension of the self or community of that subject.” He suggests that the massacres and deportations qualified as genocide, which was a problem for humanity precisely because it entailed the destruction of people “like ourselves.” But extending this logic suggests that humanitarianism can never apply to those “others” who are not “like ourselves” and is thus at its core an indirectly elitist ideology.

Such an argument undermines the project of a shared humanity itself and weighs heavily on the project of an egalitarian humanitarianism, calling into question its very possibility. Racism against minorities, the stateless, and the dispossessed does not easily allow for their protection or assistance. In the early twentieth century, self-determination was heralded as being the end point of suffering, but inherent racism between nations and a failure to place the international community, which then existed in the form of the League of Nations, above state agendas inevitably led to people falling through the gaps. This is a circular argument, which brings no closer solutions for the situation of the displaced and stateless. The failure of the international community to grant Armenia a state, despite much support, is the most obvious example of such a failure. This left two options for such stateless individuals—assimilation or rejection.

Tonight, the most bitter cold of all this winter….Our orphans, old women and men will remain in our compounds….Perhaps by remaining here we can protect the remaining Armenians from massacre….We are in great danger, but not without hope….No matter what happens remember that I am ready to make any sacrifice even death.

These words were written by Stanley Kerr, a twenty-three year old American Near East Relief (NER) official, to his parents back home in Philadelphia. They highlight the individual integrity, selflessness, and belief in humanitarian principles that guided many early Western aid workers offering relief in the Eastern Mediterranean. Unlike previous work on the subject, such as Michael Barnett’s highly critical study on the bureaucratization of humanitarianism, Watenpaugh places personal narratives at the center of his work. It is this struggle to reconcile the personal acts of sacrifice and individual moral belief in humanitarianism with the broader “system of humanitarianism,” often detrimental to its subjects, which forms one of the most valuable paradoxes of the book. How is it that the selfless work of individuals like Kerr and Karen Jeppe, the Danish Director of the Aleppo Rescue Home, can contribute to a broadly ineffective system? How is it possible to extrapolate individual acts of goodness to a system of true egalitarianism? It is a tension that continues to frame much debate in the development world, but it is unlikely to find an optimistic slant in this retelling of earlier humanitarian endeavors.

This begs the question of whether a politics of compassion can exist alongside the state system. The status of Armenian refugees, stateless and without prospect of self-determination, prompted “what has since become a question lying at the heart of modern humanitarianism: who is responsible for displaced and stateless peoples?” The remains the most relevant question to today’s refugee and migrant crisis. But the fundamental paradoxes present at the birth of modern humanitarianism continue to undermine it today. One community suffers at the expense of another. The humanitarian’s ethics of neutrality is in tension with its inherent politicization. The creation of the humanitarian subject is biased. This latter point, as was the case for Armenian refugees being privileged in the American conscience above Russians and Jews, is today helping to delineate between Syrian and other refugees, between classified and non-classified refugees, between refugees and migrants. Ultimately, Watenpaugh, in placing humanitarianism within a historical and intellectual context that explain its connections with other kinds of aspirational idealism, shows us how its flaws are intrinsic and how its tension with the state system and the insecurities of the international community were built into its very architecture. Building a system of humanitarianism that overcomes these flaws will therefore necessarily entail rethinking its relationship to the state and to international governance.

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.] 

Political Rights 

Amnesty International issues call for release of Mahmoud Mohamed
Mohamed was arrested while walking home on the third anniversary of the January 25 revolution for wearing a t-shirt bearing the logo and slogan for the Nation Without Torture campaign and a scarf with a symbol of the 2011 uprising.

Doctors Syndicate requests permission to assess Esraa al-Taweel's condition
The Doctors Syndicate has requested permission to visit detained student Esraa al-Taweel in Qanater Women’s Prison to assess her condition as her family and lawyers argue she is being denied urgently needed medical care.

CairoComix: Excavating the political
Jonathan Guyer writes on the CairoComix Festival, which was held at the American University in Cairo’s Tahrir Campus earlier this month.

NGO claims security canceled event with parliamentary candidates in Mansoura
A panel discussion with parliamentary candidates was cancelled by National Security on Monday, the NGO organizing it claimed.

Hussein Mosque shrine closed to bar Shias from observing Ashura holiday
The Endowments Ministry is closing the shrine in Islamic Cairo’s historic Hussein Mosque from Thursday to Saturday to bar followers of the Shia faith from worshipping there during the festival of Ashura.

Journalist missing after police arrest him in his home
Journalist Hossam al-Deen Seed was arrested in his home and taken to an unknown location on Thursday morning, the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) reported. He was still missing as of Thursday evening.

Witnesses in activist Shaimaa al-Sabbagh’s murder acquitted
An appeals court acquitted thirteen Popular Socialist Alliance Party members on Saturday who had been accused of violating the protest law and threatening national security, according to the party’s Facebook page.

Former agriculture minister referred to court on corruption charges
Helal and other ministry officials are suspected of taking pay-offs in exchange for granting licenses for state land, said a statement issued by the acting prosecutor general.

Alexandria University cancels lecture by Egypt's ex-presidential scientific advisor Heggy
Essam Heggy, ex-Egypt presidential scientific advisor who was slammed last year for questioning an alleged medical breakthrough, said late Friday that Alexandria University canceled a seminar he was supposed to give on planet Mars.

Families still pressing rights council on missing relatives whereabouts
Families of alleged victims of forced disappearance are continuing to approach the National Council for Human Rights for assistance in finding the location of their missing relatives.

Egypt locks up lawyers in Islamist fight
As Egypt cracks down on its Islamist dissidents, many of the country's lawyers are finding themselves on the wrong side of the law as well.

Sisi is not Nasser: Alain Gresh
Al-Masry Al-Youm interviews Alain Gresh, editor of Le Monde Diplomatique.

Bad weather conditions result in five deaths in Alexandria
The Health Ministry stated that five people were killed in Alexandria on Sunday as the coastal city experienced heavy rain and bad weather conditions.

Egypt court to hear Ayman Nour’s passport renewal appeal
Egypt’s State Council Administrative court accepted on Sunday to hear opposition figure Ayman Nour’s appeal against a decision not to renew his passport. 

Hassan Malek’s Arrest

Interior Ministry: Brotherhood leaders plotted to devalue the pound, destroy the nation
Security forces arrested business tycoon Hassan Malek and four other former Brotherhood leaders on Thursday after receiving intelligence that they were planning to smuggle foreign currency abroad through exchange bureaus affiliated with the banned group.

Egypt’s interior ministry accuses Brotherhood Malek of attempting to smuggle foreign currency
Malek, who has kept a low profile since Morsi's ouster, has had his assets frozen since September 2014.

Egypt's prosecution orders fifteen-day detention for Brotherhood businessman Hassan Malek
Malek is accused, along with four others, of amassing foreign currency and smuggling it out of the country in order to "destabilize the price of the US dollar" in Egypt.

Elections

Pro-Sisi list tops polls with first round voter turnout of 26.56 percent
The pro-government For the Love of Egypt electoral list swept the polls in the first round of Egypt’s parliamentary elections, the head of the High Elections Commission Ayman Abbas announced in a press conference on Wednesday evening.

For the Love of Egypt wins majority of expatriate votes
For the Love of Egypt, an electoral list formed in response to President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s plea for a unified front in parliament, gained the majority of Egyptian expatriate votes during the first round of parliamentary elections.

Two officers, Nour Party candidate killed in North Sinai
A roadside bomb targeting an armored vehicle killed two police officers and injured at least nine people on Saturday. Meanwhile, the only parliamentary candidate for the Salafi Nour Party in North Sinai was shot dead on Saturday by unknown assailants in Arish.

Clear winners and dark horses
What was expected and what is surprising about the parliamentary elections results? Mada Masr reports.

After staggering defeat, is it lights out for the Nour Party?
After the party kept a unified front during the many elections and referendums of the past four years, this is the first time youth members have been angered by voting results to the point of threatening to quit an electoral race.

We are ready to collect fines for non-voters if required: Egypt's local planning minister
The Ministry of Local and Administrative Development will collect fines of non-voters if necessary, the minister said on Monday, the second day of the first stage in the parliamentary elections.

Disqualified parliament candidate wins sixty of votes in an Alexandria constituency
A disqualified candidate has won sixty percent of votes in a polling station in Alexandria in Egypt’s parliamentary elections after a committee overseeing the voting failed to remove his name from ballot papers in time.

Egypt slams western media over claims of low turnout in parliamentary elections
Egypt's foreign ministry took another swipe at foreign media outlets over its coverage of the ongoing parliamentary elections that kicked off on Sunday, saying it reflects "another failed attempt to tarnish the country's image".

Preliminary results reveal wide run-off round to take place in parliamentary bid
Preliminary results from the first stage of Egypt's parliamentary elections showed on Tuesday that the majority of the individual seats will witness a run-off round.

Observers report buying votes, other violations in Egypt's parliamentary election
Local observing organizations issued a report stating that the elections saw some violations mostly involving the buying of votes and voters being unable to cast ballots for various reasons.

Egypt's Socialist Popular Alliance fails to win any seats in first election stage
Egypt’s Socialist Popular Alliance Party (SPAP) announced Tuesday that none of its candidates won or made it to the run-offs in the first stage of Egypt’s parliamentary elections.

Islamist Nour Party faces stunning defeat in Egypt, secular coalition emerges victorious: Initial poll results
The Nour Party's defeat contrasts sharply with its strong performance in 2011's parliamentary elections, where it came second to the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of the number of votes and seats.

Runoff between two not four in Agouza and Dokki's 'celebrity constituency'
Ahmed Mortada Mansour and Amr El-Shobaki will compete for the second available seat in the constituency after Abdel-Rehim Ali won the other.

Egypt's elections credible despite minor violations: African Union
The first phase of Egypt's parliamentary elections featured a range of minor violations to be expected in any polling process, the head of the African Union (AU) commission to observe the elections said on Wednesday.

Diehard Mubarak-era figures lose big in first ‎stage of Egypt's parliamentary elections
Dozens of Mubarak-era figures who ran as ‎independents have failed to win seats‎ in the first stage of Egypt's parliamentary ‎elections.

Turnout at 26.5 percent in Egypt elections, four independents secure parliamentary seats in first round
Ahram Online reports the results of the first round of the elections.

Egyptian court rules parliament elections void in Alexandria's El-Raml
The court ordered that re-elections take place within a period of sixty days.

Mapping election runoffs: Parties versus independents
Runoffs in the first round of Egypt's parliamentary elections will take place next week, with 224 candidates representing thirteen different parties  and 212 independent candidates competing to win a total of 218 parliamentary seats.

Despite defamation we will remain in parliamentary race: Egypt's Salafist Nour party
The first round of voting brought disappointing results for members of the Nour party, who claim that they are suffering from a media smear campaign.

Mostakbal Watan emerges from the dark to outstanding election victory
The party ran in the first stage of elections, held 18-19 October, with eighty-eight candidates, managing to secure a niche in the runoffs with fort-eight candidates (sixty percent of the party's total candidates). Six other candidates from Mostakbal Watan’s ranks have guaranteed a victory as part of the For the Love of Egypt list, which observers say is the coalition with the best chances of winning.

MB anti-Nour Party campaign affected party: researcher
The campaigns organized by the Muslim Brotherhood against the Salafi al-Nour Party had a negative effect on the party's popularity ahead of parliamentary elections, said researcher on Islamic movements Kamal Habib in an interview with Al-Masry Al-Youm Wednesday.

Poor election turnout in Egypt might strengthen Sisi's hand: analysis
Lack of interest from voters, even many who support the former general, could be interpreted as a green light to consolidate his own rule.

Egypt loyalists take the lead in parliament elections
A political alliance loyal to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has scooped all 60 list seats up for grabs in the first round of a parliamentary election in which opposition parties were all but absent, official results showed on Wednesday.

Parliament will not last long: Socialist Popular Alliance Party president
Al-Masry Al-Youm interviews Abdel Ghaffar Shokr, president of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party and deputy chairman of the National Council for Human Rights.

Nour Party ready to withdraw from political arena: chairman
The Nour Party is ready to withdraw from the political arena to protect Egypt from collapse and from the dangers threatening other countries in the region, said Nour Party Chairman Younes Makhyoun.

Twenty-four former NDP members win elections
Twenty-four former National Democratic Party (NDP) members won the parliamentary elections in the For the Love of Egypt alliance lists in Upper Egypt and west Delta. 

Egypt's Alexandria braces for fierce battles in parliament election's runoffs
As many as fifty independent candidates hailing from different political camps will be competing for twenty-five individual seats in Egypt's second biggest city that constitutes a population around four million.

Nedaa Masr withdraws from phase two of parliament elections
An electoral alliance has announced it is withdrawing its candidates from the second phase of the House of Representatives' elections slated for November 23, citing several breaches and media biases.

Nour Party withdraws from election in N. Sinai to protest member’s murder
Five parliamentary candidates for the Salafi-led Nour Party in North Sinai announced on Saturday that they were withdrawing their election bids in protest of their colleague's fatal shooting on the same day.

Economy

Hesham Ramez resigns as CBE governor, replaced by Tarek Amer
Al-Masry al-Youm reported that Ramez allegedly lost his temper during a recent Cabinet meeting, calling for the government’s support to provide support to fight currency traders and those who smuggle foreign currency into Egypt.

Workers strike over unpaid bonuses at Egypt's largest textile company
Several thousand workers at the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in Mahalla al-Kubra commenced a partial strike on Wednesday over unpaid bonuses promised by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

Mahalla workers threaten to escalate protests
Workers of the Mahalla Spinning and Weaving Company, who have been on strike for two days, have threatened to escalate protests on Saturday if the ten percent bonus decreed by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is not disbursed.

Can Egypt's new central bank chief calm currency crisis?
Fresh blood at the top has raised hopes of impending change to a monetary policy that has failed to stabilize the pound, has angered importers and become personally associated with Ramez, whose currency controls have starved some businesses of dollars.

Faculty staff salaries to decrease by ten percent
The Finance Ministry and Central Auditing Agency's decision to decrease faculty staff salaries in accordance with the new Civil Service Law has angered university professors.

A thousand pilots out of work
Civilian Pilots' Syndicate Secretary General Ali Roushdy said in a statement on Friday that a thousand pilots are out of work, which equals fifty percent of the total number of pilots. “Whoever wants to become a pilot risks his future,” he said.

Domestic Security

Egypt's official cabinet website hacked
An anonymous hackers group says it took down the official cabinet website in solidarity with pro-Morsi Rabaa sit-in protesters.

Egypt secures 'full control' of North Sinai: Spokesperson
Ahram Online reports.

IS claims blast that wounded four near Egypt pyramids
Four people were wounded on Friday by a bomb planted at a Cairo intersection near the Pyramids, the interior ministry said, and the Islamic State (IS) group claimed it had planted the device.

Egypt to set up ad hoc court for human trafficking: Justice Minister
Egypt will set up an ad hoc court for human trafficking and illegal migration crimes, said Justice Minister Ahmed el Zend.

This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week. It also includes a list of the most read articles and roundups. Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series.

• مقابلة مع الشاعرة العراقية لميعة عباس عمارة
• Political Economy Workshop for Graduate Students/Researchers: Call for Letters of Interest
• Call by Academics for International Solidarity after the Ankara Bombing
• كيف تصبح انتفاضة ثالثة؟
• في نقد ظاهرة النسويّة الإسلامية: الأخوات المسلمات مثالاً
• 'Lines Drawn on an Empty Map': Iraq’s Borders and the Legend of the Artificial State (Part 1)
• Beyond the Exotic in Ottoman Baths
• The Ankara Massacre and the State as a Serial Killer in Erdogan’s Turkey
• Gaza’s Untold Story
• Social Dialogue Under The Gun in Tunisia
   

• Last Week on Jadaliyya (October 12-18)
• Egypt Media Roundup (October 19)
• Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (October 20)
• Palestine Media Roundup (October 8 – 14)
• Critical Currents in Islam Media Roundup (Aug-Sept)
• ISIS in the News: Extensive Media Roundup (August-September 2015)
  
  

• Is This the Third Palestinian Intifada?
• ISIS in the News: Extensive Media Roundup (August-September 2015)
• Filming Revolution
• Critical Currents in Islam Media Roundup (Aug-Sept)
• Gaza’s Untold Story
• Of Shadows and Solidarity
• Palestine Media Roundup (October 8 – 14)
• Political Economy Workshop for Graduate Students/Researchers: Call for Letters of Interest
• Shady El Noshokaty: Colony - Latitude
• Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (October 20)
• Navigating the Law and Misuse of Title VI: A STATUS/الوضع Special Segment
• New Texts Out Now: Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East
• إدواردو غاليانو: المدينة
• Beyond the Exotic in Ottoman Baths
• Egypt Media Roundup (October 19)
• كيف تصبح انتفاضة ثالثة؟
• عظامي قصب النايات
• Last Week on Jadaliyya (October 12-18)
• Ankara's Black Saturday: An Interview with Osman Sahin

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Syria Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to syria@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

Inside Syria

Everyone wrote off the Syrian army. Take another look now The Syrian army, undermanned and under-gunned has moved to the offensive and Russia has involved itself in a long-term operation in Syria.

Overextension by the Kurds will only benefit ISIL Hassan Hassan on the implications of a Kurdish led offensive in Raqqa. ISIL has turned to low-scale attacks in vulnerable or less strategic areas to avoid air attacks.

Going Home: An interview with Tarif al-Sayyed Issa In Syria, “the people who liberate a town are not necessarily best suited to rule it,” says Tarif al-Sayyed Issa. 

Female activist speaks of living nightmare after surviving regime prison After her release, Amal was told she could never return home, as her brothers and uncles would kill her if they were ever to discover her prison experiences.

Syrian rebels decry Russian airstrikes: 'we have not had Isis here in over a year' Residents in areas hit by Russian airstrikes describe widespread destruction of civic buildings and housing while Free Syrian Army largely shelters itself.

U.S. Weaponry Is Turning Syria Into Proxy War With Russia Insurgent commanders say that since Russia began air attacks in support of the Syrian government, they are receiving for the first time bountiful supplies of powerful American-made antitank missiles.

Moderate Syrian Rebels Say They May Not Be Doing Well But Are Very Much Alive Syria’s relatively moderate rebel units continue to their struggle as Russian fighter jets become their latest foe.

Ahrar al-Sham’s apocalyptic vision for Syria and beyond Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement of the Free Men of Syria), one of the largest rebel groups in Syria, is going through a moderate ideological transformation. At least that’s what one would think from the recent spate of PR, suggesting Washington should ally with the group.

Race against the raiders of Syrian antiquities Given the scale of the destruction and trafficking of Syrian antiquities, heritage authorities are trying to save the memory of a whole region 

Back to School in Aleppo’s Basements As students return to classes this month in the rebel-held areas of Aleppo, they won’t be heading back to the classrooms they left last year. Instead, they’ll be receiving lessons in basements and other “secure areas” across the devastated city

For those left in Syria, life among the ruins takes on a ghostly air A recent swing through government-held areas of Syria by a Times correspondent provided ample evidence of the depopulation of a nation now defined by images of bombed-out buildings, rubble-strewn streets and refugees on the move. 

We Syrians are losing our faith in the international community A group of Syrian civil society organizations and actors published this statement in the The Guardian. "While we still demand a political solution that removes Assad from power, the world must act now to stop the slaughter of civilians by his regime and Russia."

Iran's casualties in Syria: Senior commanders and Afghan militiamen In late June, the official Iranian news agency, IRNA, said 400 Iranian nationals had been killed in Syria since the start of the conflict there in 2011.

Bashar al-Assad travels to Russia to thank Putin for Syria airstrikes Syrian president makes first foreign visit since 2011 and says Russian intervention has held back spread of terrorism in region.

Regional and International Perspectives

U.S. is debating ways to shield Syrian civilians A sharp new debate on US air intervention in Syria, while Putin increases pressure on Obama to take action.

The Islamic State isn’t the only group looting Syrian archaeological sites The Islamic State’s damage to Syria archaeological sites has been well-documented, however, attempts to assess the damage has been limited due to the conflict and chaos in Syria since 2011.

Exclusive: shipping traffic to Syria surges as Russia steps up offensive“Cargo includes supplies to bolster the offensive as well as grain and sugar to feed those involved in the deepening conflict.”

Bashar al-Assad finds chilly embrace in Moscow trip Lee and Myers analyze the relationship Bashar Al-Assad has with Vladimir Putin and how Assad will not let the Russians pick the next Syrian president.

Syria conflict: Assad in surprise visit to Moscow Bashar al-Assad visits Moscow on his first overseas trip since 2011. Also, Assad says, “Russia’s involvement in Syria has stopped ‘terrorism’ becoming ‘more widespread and harmful’ in Syria.”

US and Saudis vow to step up war on Assad in defiance of Russia The United States and Saudi Arabia agreed to increase support to Syria’s moderate opposition while seeking a political resolution of the nearly five-year conflict.

'Homeland is racist': artists sneak subversive graffiti on to TV show Street artists say they were asked to add authenticity to scenes of Syrian refugee camp, but took chance to air criticisms of show’s depiction of Muslim world.

Putin shows his realism in Syria A lack of moderate Syrian opposition forces has forced Washington to give tacit consent to Russian intervention. 

Where Russian and American Weapons Have Been Fired in Syria Russian warplanes carried out more than 100 strikes in support of Syrian government troops over the weekend. Insurgent groups have also posted more than two dozen videos in the past few days showing them firing American-made TOW antitank missiles, deepening the impression that a proxy war between the United States and Russia is joining the list of interlocking conflicts in Syria. 

The children among Syria’s ruins Michael Gerson: "When American politicians stir up fear of Syrian refugees, I will think of Abir, a woman living in a plastic tent with her five daughters in the Bekaa Valley. She tells of being driven from place to place by combat, of being shot in the leg by a sniper."

Russia 'reducing air strikes against Syrian rebels' as intervention fails The air strikes appear to have failed to give an advantage to pro-Assad military forces despite daily launches. 

Moderate Syrian Rebels Say They May Not Be Doing Well But Are Very Much Alive Syria’s relatively moderate rebel units continue to their struggle as Russian fighter jets become their latest foe.

Dozens of ISIS sex slaves have killed themselves to escape rape and torture Dozens of Yazidi girls have been driven to suicide by the ISIS fighters who abused them, the people risking their own lives to rescue them have revealed.

'Jihadi John made me tango dance with him and then beat me': Freed Isis hostage describes torture A former Isis hostage held with Alan Henning and James Foley has described how their murderer, “Jihadi John”, forced him to dance the tango as part of a regime of torture and humiliation.

Putin Officials Said to Admit Real Syria Goal Is Far Broader Russian intervention may last as long as a year, official says. Kremlin to back Assad regime's drive to retake key cities.

The Sad Fading Away of the Refugee Crisis Story By Kim Ghattas: What new horror must we see — after the trauma and destruction so well documented over the past four years — to capture the world’s attention and finally end this war in Syria? 

Reality Check: Elizabeth May debates the crisis in Syria and fighting ISIS The Canadian Green Party leader Elizabeth May says it’s Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad who is responsible for a humanitarian crisis that has seen millions of Syrians flee for their lives and bombing ISIS isn’t going to stop the desperate situation.

Canada to withdraw fighter jets from Iraq and Syria New PM Justin Trudeau tells Barack Obama his nation will no longer provide jets for the fight against ISIS.

Policy and Reports

Peacebuilding Defines Our Future Now: A study of Women's Peace Activism in Syria This research sought to understand the women activists’ definitions and priorities of peacebuilding in Syria today; and explore the current forms and characteristics of women activism in peacebuilding, identify the challenges it is facing, and shed light on the available opportunities. It relied on data collected from women activists working in various non-regime controlled as well as regime-controlled areas across Syria. In total, the research collected information from 49 women’s groups, interviews with 35 influential women activists, and 10 focus groups discussions hosting 8-10 activists each.

If we are to help Syria’s people, we must take action Hilary Benn writes: This is the great humanitarian crisis of our age. We need a UN resolution for effective action, safe zones, aid and a post-civil war plan.

Analytical Study about the Leaked Pictures of Torture Victims in Syrian Military Hospitals “The Photographed Holocaust” This study is by the Syrian Network for Human Rights. SNHR notes that this study includes a graphic and violent content for Syrian victims who died under torture in government detention centers. It is worth noting that the leaked images have been edited to reduce its graphic nature. SNHR received the images directly from a Colonel in the Department of Forensic Evidence in the military police, known as “Caesar” and “Mr. Sami.” 

Responding to the crisis in Syria According to UNDP, 75% of Syrians now live in poverty, 55% are unable to access basic necessities and 20% living in active conflict zones face starvation and malnutrition. Nearly 4.1 million registered refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and North Africa. Over 220,000 killed in fighting, with over 1 million injured, and over 12.2 million now need humanitarian assistance.

Who backs whom in the Syrian conflict Russia’s intervention has made the complex pattern of alliances and enmities in Syria still more intricate. The Assad regime and its local opponents are backed to differing degrees and in different configurations by military powers from near and far. 

Syria: US ally’s razing of villages amounts to war crimes A fact-finding mission to northern Syria has uncovered a wave of forced displacement and home demolitions amounting to war crimes carried out by the Autonomous Administration led by the Syrian Kurdish political party Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) controlling the area, said a recent Amnesty International report. The Autonomous Administration is a key ally, on the ground, of the US-led coalition fighting against the armed group calling itself the Islamic State (IS) and known as ISIS in Syria.

What next for Syria? How 15 years of experience with UNSCR 1325 could inform a different approach to the Syrian conflict This year marks 15 years since world leaders passed UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. On Tuesday 13 October, diplomats meet to review and chart ways forward on global efforts to protect and empower women in times of conflict. Given what we have learned from UNSCR 1325, what should we do differently from tomorrow on the Syrian conflict? 

The Educational and Mental Health Needs of Syrian Refugee Children This report examines the experiences and resulting educational and mental health needs of Syrian children living as refugees, drawing on the results of a study conducted in Islahiye camp in southeast Turkey, which assessed children’s levels of trauma and mental health distress. It also reviews intervention programs in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States, and offers recommendations for best practices to address the mental health of this vulnerable child population. Syrian refugee children will likely need ongoing, targeted support to bridge the gaps in their education, attain fluency in the host-country language, and deal with trauma and other mental health symptoms, the authors conclude. 

Refugee crisis: Surge of sympathy for refugees in Britain 'likely to be fleeting,' study says YouGov study suggests any increase in support for refugees is influenced by the perceived generosity of other countries.

Women Are On Front Lines Of Every Battle Zone, But Not In The Way You Think Through four years of horrendous civil war, women have handled local ceasefires, human rights abuses, opened temporary schools, and exposed local officials. 

Jaish al-Sham: An Ahrar al-Sham Offshoot or Something More? Jaish al-Sham is based in northern Syria, and many of its leaders apparently go back and forth between Turkey and Syria. According to leading Jaish al-Sham figure Yamin al-Naser, it has branches in Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, and on the Syrian coast. Naser says Jaish al-Sham already controls “great numbers and deserves being called an army,” specifying that its size is currently at “more than 1,000 fighters who were all recruited from smaller groups.”

5 principles for a responsible internationalist policy on Syria Our response to events in Syria must be built on an understanding of the lessons of history.

Arctic 'doomsday vault' opens to retrieve vital seeds for Syria The Svalbard Global Seed Vault was established in the Arctic as a backup in case of worldwide agricultural calamity. The Syrian civil war has created a need for an "early withdrawal" from the seed vault.

Documentaries, Special Reports, and Other Media.

Syria: Battle for Daria rages as Syrian Army pushes forward Syrian Army troops were seen fighting against militants in Daria, Saturday, as government forces continued to push forward against the Islamic State and other militant groups near Damascus. The Syrian Army reported retaking more than 40 blocks from militants in Daria in the latest assault.

"We had nowhere else to go": Forced displacement and demolitions in northern Syria Film produced by Amnesty International showing the researchers' investigation of the abuses committed by the Autonomous Administration, led by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Syrian Kurdish political party . These abuses include forced displacement, demolition of homes, and the seizure and destruction of property. In some cases, entire villages have been demolished, apparently in retaliation for the perceived support of their Arab or Turkmen residents for the group that calls itself the Islamic State (IS) or other non-state armed groups. 

The World Today - The Refugee Trail: Syria to Europe Tariq Ali looks at the historic flight of refugees, reminds us that migration is nothing new and that it has historically always been linked to war.  

In Photos: The People, Families — and a Cat — Who Battled to Reach Europe Nearly half a million migrants and refugees from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other poor and war-torn countries have traveled to Europe this year in search of safety and a better life. By 2016 that number is expected to reach 1 million. 

‘I have lost my country and my dreams’ Pamela Constable: "Syrians who have fled the brutal war in their country for the United States know that more of their compatriots are coming. And that worries them." 

'ISIS…it was just not my cup of tea': British mum speaks Shukee Begum, a mother of 5 who took her children to Syria to meet her husband, who was fighting with ISIS militants, reveals how she became trapped in ISIS territory after he refused to leave and was kidnapped by smugglers.

We Ask Experts: Has The Situation In Syria Become A Proxy War? Is the situation in Syria already a proxy war, which is generally defined as a conflict between two countries that is fought on third-party soil? 

Why more Syrian refugees are leaving Jordan than arriving In Jordan, there's intense sympathy for the thousands of refugees who have landed there. But it's illegal for most Syrians to work in that nation, and limited food aid doesn't go very far. So refugees are increasingly making the dangerous journey to Europe, or even back home, because they are struggling to survive in countries that neighbor their own. Special correspondent Jane Arraf reports.

Hacker allegedly gave ISIS a 'kill list' of U.S. troops CNN's Brian Todd reports on the arrest of an ISIS hacker who reportedly stole U.S. military members' personal information. 

Dutch outrage over Syria's child brides There are reports that girls as young as 13 from Syria are being allowed to join their husbands in the Netherlands. A number of Dutch politicians have expressed outrage and are calling for an inquiry. Anna Holligan reports. 

Syrian aid worker breaks down: 'Please, end this war!'"What wrong have we done to endure such a bloody, stupid war?! It is enough for us, for God's sake," Zaidoun al-Zoabi says as he breaks down in tears.

Arabic: 

خطة فوريّة لتعليم مليون طفل سوري Ibtisam Azem writes about a new plan in Lebanon to educate Syrian refugee children.

إيران مستعدة لدرس إرسال مقاتلين إلى سورية إذا طلب منها ذلك Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the Chairman for the Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran, states that Iran is ready to send troops to Syria if that was asked.

مدخل غير طائفي لقراءة الحرب في سورية  Sari Hanafi uses the book Ethnicity Without Groups (2004) to analyze the Syrian conflict.

ثلاث قوميات جديدة دخلت التركيبة السكانية في سوريا The Demography of Syria is facing several constant changes. Three main nationalities: Caucasus, Turkestan, and Afghanistan, are main contributors to new demographic changes.

قراءة في أبعاد كلمة الجولاني.. خليل المقداد Khalil al-Miqdad analyzes the new speech of Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the leader and emir of al-Nusra Front. 

في "وادي الذئاب"..اللاجئون السوريون ضحايا مافيات تركية In the Valley of the Wolves, a popular Turkish media franchise, a new episode deals with Syrian refugee as victims of Turkish mafia. 

فنانون ينتقدون طريقة تصوير مسلسل (وطن) الأمريكي للعرب والمسلمين Street artists say they were asked to add authenticity to scenes of Syrian refugee camp, but took chance to air criticisms of show’s depiction of Muslim world.

A related article in English can be found here: 'Homeland is racist': artists sneak subversive graffiti on to TV show

المعارضة السياسيّة والعسكريّة السوريّة تنتج خطوة أولى على طريق توحدّها The Syrian political and military opposition factions have shown, in a first-of-its-kind movement, unity in rejecting Staffan de Mistura’s plan to form committees that would work with both the opposition and the Syrian regime.

An English version of this article can be fund here: Why Syrian opposition rejected the UN's plan for Syria  

سارت عكس النزوح عائدة إلى حلب.. زينة أرحيم: أنتمي لهذه البلاد وناسها.. وغارات روسيا تشجع التشدد CNN interviews Zaina Erhaim who talks about her journalistic work and about life in rebel-held parts of Aleppo.

A related article in English can be found here: Survival in Syria: Children still going to school, people still falling in love 

"موسيقي اليرموك" في ألمانيا: أريد أن أعزف لشعوب العالم مقطوعة الألم السوري Musicians from Yarmouk Camp sang for Syria in Munich, Germany .

"النصرة" جزء من المقاومة السورية؟ Ali Hamade argues that al-Nusra Front can be a part of resistance against Russian aggression in Syria.

تأثير الأزمة السورية على الوضع النفسي للأطفال في الداخل السوري This research by Alia Ahmad highlights the effects of the Syrian crisis on the mental health and behavioral status on children inside Syria.

اللاجئون في الزعتري.. إلى سوريا “وراء در” While winter is approaching, Some Syrian refugees are leaving the Zaatari refugee camp and heading back to Syria. 

رويترز تمنح السيدة غالية الرحال جائزة “المرأة البطلة الثقة” Ms. "Galiah Rahal," director of the Mazya women's center in Idlib won the award for the "heroine trustworthy woman" which is provided by the Reuters news agency.

داعش.. والأعراس المسموحة This article discusses the restrictions that ISIS imposes on local residents in regard to wedding celebrations.  

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Palestine and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Palestine Page Co-Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each roundup to Palestine@jadaliyya.com.]

The Occupation Forces

Euro-Med Monitor Report: Israeli Brutalities Caught On Camera
The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor released this week a new report summarizing their investigations into the recent Israeli human right abuses in the occupied Palestinian Territories.

Israeli Soldiers Kill Two Teens in Hebron
Bashar Nidal al-Jabari, 15 years old and Husam Ismail Jamil al-Jabari, 17 years old were killed this week by Israeli soldiers in Hebron bringing the total number of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces and settlers to nearly fifty.

Israel Destroys Home of Palestinian Convicted of Killing Israeli
Netanyahu's policy of collective punishment continues and houses of Palestinians are being demolished every time a member of the family is accused of "terrorist" act.

Lawyer ‘Shocked’ by Treatment of Palestinian Teenage Detainees
Five teenage boys, ages 14-17, account for the torture they underwent when detained illegally in Israeli detention centers.

In Israel/Palestine, Jewish Attackers are Arrested, Palestinian Suspects are Shot
There is a vast disparity in which the way Israeli forces detain Jewish settlers compared to the unlawful killing of Palestinians, most of them unarmed.

Is Israel Violating the Geneva Convention?
House demolitions have increased since the most recent waves of violence: this is in direct violation of Articles 33, 53 and 17 of the Geneva Conventions.

Israel Using ‘Preventative Arrests’ to Stifle Dissent
The recent unlawful arrests of Palestinian youth are interpreted to be an attempt to quiet any kind of dissent against the Israeli government.

The Valiant Effort to Heal ‘Unimaginable’ Levels of Trauma among Gaza’s Children
Over fifty percent of children in Gaza suffers the most severe forms of post-traumatic stress disorder.

Videos Challenge Israeli Police Account of Shootings
Several videos that have been spread across social media challenge the accuracy of official Israeli accounts of the circumstances in which police have killed Palestinians.

The Anger of Palestine’s ‘Lost’ Generation
The meaning of the current uprising according to Murad Ouda and Issa al-Saifi, two of Mutaz's friends. Mutaz was shot by Israeli forces through the stomach last week.
 

Domestic Politics

The Enablers of Israeli Terrorism
The article compares the remarks of Rabbi Tzvi Hersh Weinreb, prominent rabbi in Orthodox Union, to the Jews’ uprising against the Nazis in the Warsaw Ghetto.

Hamas Avoiding Armed Confrontation with Israel – For Now
Hamas leader, Musa Abu Marzouq, has posted on his social media accounts that armed confrontation with Israel would draw attention away from Jerusalem. Further, in strategic manner, according to Marzouq, rockets from Gaza would immediately label Israeli forces as “innocent”.

Let’s Not Forget That East Jerusalem Palestinians are Stateless
The legal and political troubles of Palestinians in Jerusalem are multi-fold, as they are completely stateless and do not fall under the two-state solution.

The Paradox of Jerusalem
Meron Rapoprt elaborates on the “peculiar situation” of Palestinians living in Jerusalem, Netanyahu’s political stance on Palestinians and his dependence on the Palestinian Authority.

When the Police aren’t Your Protectors, There is No Safety
Since the beginning of the recent waves of violence, police presence has increased around Arab villages and checkpoints. While Israeli citizens feel protected with the increase of a police presence, Palestinians are continually subject to racial profiling and unlawful arrests.

Netanyahu: Israel is Solution, Not Problem, on Temple Mount
Netanyahu rejects France’s UN proposal calling to internationalize holy sites, blaming all violence on the Palestinians and Israel will remain committed to maintaining the status quo.

Israel’s Crackdown on Protesters is Illegal, Costly and Reckless
Using extreme measures by Israeli forces against protesters adds to the escalation of the current situation says Julie M. Norman.

Netanyahu Slammed for Blaming Holocaust on Palestinians
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recent statement in which he blames the Palestinians for the Jews Holocaust evoked angry reactions from both Palestinians and Israeli opposition figures.
 

Foreign Policy 

Why does Sweden want to expel Gaza refugees?
Sweden has just recently denied Palestinians’ right to asylum.

Lauryn Hill, Angela Davis Call for Black-Palestinian Solidarity
A video titled “When I See Them I See Us” used as a solidarity tool for both black Americans and Palestinians as they face unjust police brutality and unlawful killing.

Goldberg Says the Root of the Conflict is the Palestinians’ Anti-Jewish ‘Narrative’
With Jeffrey Goldberg’s new article printed in the Atlantic, Washington, D.C. is again overwhelmed with commentary regarding the conflict – commentary that is wrought by errors and Zionist propaganda.

Thousands of Americans March in Support of Palestine
Over two thousand people took to the streets of New York City and Chicago on Sunday to show their support for Palestine and their disapproval of Israeli apartheid.

The Knife Intifada from an International Law Perspective
The current uprising has raised controversy in the eyes of the international laws regarding the means used by Palestinians to resist the Israeli occupation.

Obama Backs Israel as Five More Palestinians are Killed
The United States continues to blindly support Israel as Obama backs up Israel saying it has the right to "protect its citizens from knife attackers and violence in the streets".

Israeli Lies Will Not Deceive the British Public
The article highlights the latest lies of Israel's Minister of Public Security, Gilad Erdan, published in his article in the Guardian.
 

The Settlements and Settler Violence

Settlers and Palestinians Clash in Hebron
A Palestinian youth was fatally shot in the head by an Israeli settler, as violence continues to escalate among settlers and Palestinians in Hebron; the only city where both live side-by-side.

Two Hundreds Israeli Settlers Attack Palestinian Village with Firebombs
The Palestinian villages of Wad al-Haseen and Wad al-Nasara were attacked by over 200 Israeli settlers with firebombs and stones leaving at least three people injured, while Israeli forces shot live fire at Palestinians.

Extremist Right-Wing Settlers Given Armed Guard to Evict Two Families from Their Homes
Nine Palestinians was forcibly evicted from their homes by Israeli settlers while under the protection of armed Israeli forces.
 

Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions

Ministers approve banning boycotters from entering Israel
The initiative proposed by Bayit Yehudi to deny entry to non-citizens or residents urging a boycott of Israel was approved by the ministers this week.

Outlawing Israel boycott in Europe revealed as key AIPAC goal
David Cronin reveals what has been going on with the trans-Atlantic trade accord while the focus in the past few weeks has been on the ongoing uprising against Israeli apartheid.
 

Economy and Development

Old City, New Problems: Palestinian Merchants Lament Decrease in Tourist Revenue
The economy of Jerusalem is an unlikely victim as escalating violence and increased checkpoints and police presence has been affecting Palestinian-owned businesses.

UN Refugee School in Yarmouk Defenseless Against Barrel Bombs
UNRWA schools have been target as of late by Syrian helicopters’ barrel bombs in the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp.


قوات الاحتلال

معتز...عاد من فرنسا خشية استشهاد شقيقه ليرتقي شهيدا
معتز زواهرة الذي عاد إلى أرض الوطن من فرنسا خشية من استشهاد شقيقه الأسير في سجون الاحتلال الإسرائيلي خلال إضرابه عن الطعام، يرتقي شهيداً.  

32 شهيداً منذ بداية أكتوبر بينهم 7 أطفال وأم
أفادت وزارة الصحة ان عدد الشهداء في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة ارتفع منذ بداية اكتوبر ليصل الى 32 شهيداً، منهم 7 اطفال وأم، وذلك بعد استشهاد شابين برصاص برصاص قوات الاحتلال في القدس المحتلة.

استشهاد 4 في «جمعة الغضب» وإصابة العشرات... وكتائب الأقصى تعلن النفير العام
استشهد 4 فلسطينيين، اثنان في الضفة الغربية واثنان على الحدود الشرقية لقطاع غزة، في «جمعة الغضب» الفلسطينية، وبيانات تعلن انطلاق «الانتفاضة الثالثة» في فلسطين التاريخية

الأسير فادي الدربي... قصة نضال توّجت بالشهادة
شيّع آلاف الفلسطينيين، الشهيد الأسير فادي الدربي (30 عاماً) من سكان مدينة جنين شمالي الضفة الغربية، في مسيرة شعبية ورسمية، بعدما ماطلت سلطات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي في تسليم جثمانه.

قوات الاحتلال تعدم شاباً داخل حاجز قلنديا
استشهد الشاب عمر محمد الفقيه (24 عاما) بعد عملية إعادم نفذتها قوات الاحتلال، داخل حاجز قلنديا العسكري شمال القدس المحتلة، وترك الشاب ملقى لأكثر من نصف ساعة وهو ينزف دون تقديم العلاج الطبي له.

41 شهيداً و5256 إصابة منذ بداية أكتوبر
أكدت طواقم الهلال الأحمر الفلسطيني، أن إجمالي عدد الشهداء وصل 41 شهيداً، بعد استشهاد الشاب فضل القواسمي  برصاص المستوطنين في الخليل، والطفل معتز عويسات في جبل المكبر.

مقتل جندي صهيوني وإصابة 11 في عملية بئر السبع النوعية (فيديو وصور)
قتل جندي صهيوني، وأصيب 11 آخرون، بينهم 4 جنود، في عملية بمحطة الحافلات المركزية ببئر السبع، أعلن عن استشهاد منفذها الشاب مهند العقبي، فيما قتل شخص أرتيري برصاص قوات الاحتلال بعدما ظنوا أنه منفذ ثان.

مركز حقوقي: الاحتلال أعدم الطفلين "الجعبري" بدم بارد
قال المركز الفلسطيني لحقوق الإنسان، إن قوات الاحتلال أعدمت، بدم بارد الطفلين بشار نظام جميل الجعبري (15 عاماً)، وابن عمه حسام إسماعيل جميل الجعبري (17 عاماً)، بينما كانا يحاولان العودة لمنزلهما في منطقة الراس، بالخليل بالتزامن مع مرور مسيرة للمستوطنين.

شهيدان في الخليل وشمال شرق القدس والحصيلة ترتفع ل53 منذ بداية الشهر الجاري
استشهاد شاب برصاص قوات الاحتلال الاسرائيلي، شمال شرق القدس، ومسن في الخليل، جراء استنشاقه الغاز المسيل للدموع، ما يرفع حصيلة الشهداء، منذ بداية تشرين الأول/ أكتوبر الجاري، إلى 53 شهيداً في الضفة وقطاع غزة.
 

السياسة الداخلية 

الفصائل تدعو الى "جمعة الثورة" في الضفة والقطاع
الفصائل الفلسطينية تدعو إلى "جمعة الثورة" في فلسطين وتنظيم تظاهرات في الضفة الغربية المحتلة وقطاع غزة اثر صلاة الجمعة.

سياسة فصل عنصري في القدس وعباس يحذر من حرب دينية شاملة
محمود عباس يحذر من ان الاعتداءات الاسرائيلية الحالية على الشعب الفلسطيني ومقدساته قد تنذر باشعال حرب دينية في العالم كله "ستأكل الاخضر واليابس"، في اول كلمة موجهة للشعب الفلسطيني منذ بدء الاحداث. 

استطلاع: ثلثا الإسرائيليين يؤيدون الانسحاب من أحياء القدس العربية
اظهر استطلاع نشرته صحيفة "معاريف"، ان 66% من اليهود في اسرائيل يؤيدون انسحاب من الاحياء الفلسطينية في القدس الشرقية المحتلة، بينما عارض ذلك 29% .

الإضراب الشامل يعم العيسوية احتجاجاً على اغلاقها
عمّ الإضراب الشامل بلدة العيسوية وسط القدس، تلبية لدعوة القوى الوطنية والدينية في البلدة، احتجاجاً على إجراءات الاحتلال التعسفية بحق البلدة وسكانها، وحصارها العسكري المحكم.

أجهزة السلطة تعتقل 5 مواطنين في الضفة
اعتقلت الأجهزة الأمنية التابعة للسلطة في الضفة الغربية المحتلة، خمسة مواطنين بينهم شقيقان، على خلفية الانتماء السياسي، فيما استدعت مواطنًا واحدًا على الأقل للتحقيق.

 
السياسة الخارجية

نتنياهو يهاجم عباس ويوافق على لقائه بالأردن
نتنياهو يعرب عن موافقته للقاء عباس في الأردن ضمن مبادرة أمريكية وكانت القناة العبرية العاشرة قد كشفت عن فحوى مبادرة أمريكية تهدف لعقد قمة ثلاثية بين عباس ونتنياهو ووزير الخارجية الأمريكي جون كيري.

جمعة غضب أردنية" نصرة لانتفاضة الشعب الفلسطيني
خرج آلاف الأردنيين في مختلف مناطق المملكة بعد صلاة الجمعة للتعبير عن نصرتهم لانتفاضة الشعب الفلسطيني داخل القدس والضفة المحتلتين.

مندوب فلسطين بالأمم المتحدة يطالب مجلس الأمن بوقف “العدوان الإسرائيلي الغاشم”
ممثل دولة فلسطين الدائم لدى الأمم المتحدة، رياض منصور، يطالب مجلس الأمن الدولي بـ “سرعة التدخل لوقف العدوان الغاشم من قبل الاحتلال العسكري الإسرائيلي والمستوطنين المتطرفين ضد الشعب الفلسطيني في الأراضي الفلسطينة المحتلة".

اسرائيل ترفض ايفاد مراقبين دوليين الى القدس
إسرائيل ترفض بشدة مشروع القرار الذي تقدمت به فرنسا إلى مجلس الأمن الدولي القائم على ايفاد مراقبين دوليين إلى الأماكن المقدسة في القدس وبضمنها الحرم القدسي .

"إيسيسكو" تدعو لإرسال قوات دولية إلى القدس
اقترحت المنظمة الإسلامية للتربية والعلوم والثقافة "إيسيسكو"، إرسال قوات دولية إلى مدينة القدس المحتلة؛ في مسعى لتوفير الحماية للمواطنين الفلسطينيين الذين يتعرضون لعدوان منظّم من قوات الاحتلال وعصابات المستوطنين.

كيري يلتقي أبومازن ونتنياهو.. ضغوطات في الأفق
أعلن وزير الخارجية الأمريكي جون كيري، عن نيته الالتقاء برئيس وزراء الاحتلال بنيامين نتنياهو والرئيس محمود عباس خلال الأيام المقبلة، في خطوة تتزامن مع بدء الحراك الرسمي الدولي لمحاولة السيطرة على الأوضاع في الضفة والقدس.

ساس الاسكندفانية تعلق رحلاتها الى اسرائيل
اعلنت شركة ساس للخطوط الجوية الاسكندنافية أنها ستعلق رحلاتها من كوبنهاجن لتل ابيب بسبب فقدان الامن باسرائيل.

كيري: لإسرائيل الحق بالدفاع عن نفسها في كل مكان
وزير الخارجية الأميركي جون كيري الذي تنتظر اسرائيل زيارته لتهدئة الاوضاع يحمّل الفلسطينيين المسؤولية عن العنف، ويدعوهم إلى إيقاف التحريض.

الفلسطينيون يرحبون بالموقف الدولي الداعم لفلسطين والذي يحتم على الفلسطينيين بالمقاطعة
العديد من دول العالم تناصر وتدعم الشعب الفلسطيني ومقاومته للمحتل، حيث خرجت العديد من المظاهرات من مختلف دول العالم نصرة للفلسطينيين والمسجد الاقصى ، وتنديدا بجرائم الاحتلال.

الخارجية الفلسطينية: خطاب نتنياهو تحريضي ومليء بالكذب
اتهمت وزارة الخارجية الفلسطينية، خطاب رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي بنيامين نتنياهو أمام الكونغرس الصهيوني العالمي بـ"التضليل والتحريض على الشعب الفلسطيني وقيادته". حيث وصفت الخارجية الفلسطينية في بيان لها، الخطاب بـ"الأيديولوجي الظلامي"."

 
عنف المستوطنين

المستوطنون يحتفلون باعدام القواسمي بالخليل
مستوطنون يحتفلون في المكان الذي اعدم فيه الشاب فضل القواسمي بعد ان اطلق عليه احد المستوطنين الرصاص، وقد انتشر جنود الاحتلال في كثافة لحمايتهم. 

مستوطن يدهس فتاة فلسطينية شمال الخليل
أصيبت فتاة فلسطينية بجراح في جميع أنحاء جسدها، إثر دهس مستوطن لها بسيارته عند مدخل العروب شمال محافظة الخليل المحتلة.

مواجهات في الخليل ومستوطنون يحاولون اقتحام جنين
اندلاع مواجهات بين عشرات الشبان وقوات الاحتلال الصهيوني، شمال الخليل جنوب الضفة، فيما حاولت مجموعة من المستوطنين، اقتحام بلدة يعبد، جنوب غربي جنين، شمال الضفة المحتلة.

المستوطنون يغلقون مدخل دير استيا ويهاجمون المركبات
هاجم أكثر من 80 مستوطنا المركبات الفلسطينية عند مدخل بلدة دير استيا شمال مدينة سلفيت شمال الضفة الغربية المحتلة ، تحت حراسة قوات الاحتلال، بعد أن أغلقوه بالحجارة والإطارات المشتعلة.
 

قانون

قرار إسرائيلي يضع كل- الشعب الفلسطيني في "خانة المشتبه بهم"
صادقت الحكومة الاسرائيلية على قرار يسمح للشرطة بتفتيش أي فلسطيني جسدياً حتى دون وجود شبهات مسبقة بحمله السلاح، مما يعني ان كل الشعب الفلسطيني صار محل شبهة بحمل السلاح.

الاقتصاد والتنمية

السلطة الفلسطينية تقلّص كميات الغاز المخصصة لغزة
الهيئة العامة للبترول التابعة للسلطة الفلسطينية في رام الله، تقلص كميات الغاز الطبيعي التي يتم توريدها إلى محطات التعبئة في قطاع غزة، من خلال معبر كرم أبو سالم، المعبر التجاري الوحيد للقطاع

تتداخل عدة عوامل في تقرير السيسي مدى احتياجه إلى حزب سياسي؛ فهو - كما يبدو - تلجمه هواجس، وتحفزه طموحات؛ الهواجس تتعلق بمصير الحزب الوطني، الذي تسبب احتكاره للمجال السياسي بنشوب ثورة جماهيرية أطاحت بمبارك، وانتهت بالحزب محترقا. أما طموحه فيذهب به إلى امتلاك آلة للحشد والتعبئة الجماهيرية، تعضد شرعيته المتآكلة، وتضبط إيقاع الحياة السياسية، بعيدا عن اختناقاتها الراهنة، وبما يعينه على مجابهة خصومه السياسيين والحفاظ على هيمنته على المجال السياسي. 

هل يحتاج السيسي حقا لحزب جماهيري؟

خلال الأشهر القليلة الماضية تكثفت عملية لإعادة رسم المجال السياسي بأدوات تدخل سلطوي تراوحت بين التشريع المقيد لحركة القوى السياسية، والمجابهة العنيفة مع الاحتجاجات. وانتهت هذه التدخلات بما يمكننا اعتباره مصادرة كاملة للمجال السياسي. البيئة التي ستدور فيها الانتخابات البرلمانية الحالية يهيمن قطاع الدفاع والأمن وبيروقراطية الدولة عليها. تشي خرائط المتنافسين - قوائم وأفراد  - عن إعادة تدوير ضخمة لقوى النظام القديم. وغالبها كان الأبرز فاعلية ضمن تحالف الثلاثين من يونيو والأشد التزاما باختلاق شرعية للنظام تتمحور حول شخص السيسي. 

والسؤال هو ماذا يتوخى السيسي من جولة انتخابية كهذه؟ تبدأ الإجابة من اكتشاف ما يعتبر من وجهة نظر النظام وقواه الحليفة ضرورات؛ أولها الحاجة إلى التعجيل بإنعاش صورة "الهامش الديمقراطي"، ولو بتطوير شكلاني لمنظومة الممارسة السياسية المحكومة؛ ينفي– أولا - الطابع العسكري عن نظام السيسسي ويستر معالم هيمنة العسكريين الراهنة على مفاصل الدولة وعموم المجال السياسي؛ وثانيا، الاستجابة لمطالب كررها الحلفاء الدوليين للنظام، وخصوصاً الولايات المتحدة، بالالتزام بخارطة الطريق، وهو ما ظل شرطاً – وإن مخففاً - لمنح نظام السيسي الدعم المدني والعسكري. مع ارتفاع موجات النقد الداخلي، على خلفية دعمهم لنظام ينظر إليه باتساع على أنه معاد للحريات، ويصادر المجال السياسي، فضلا عن ممارسته للقمع الواسع. ومن ثم بات عليه دور في رفع هذه الضغوط. لكن يخشى النظام من أن تأتي الاستجابة لمثل هذا الضغط الخارجي بالمزيد من أسباب إرهاق وجوده وإضعاف سيطرته الراهنة على الداخل. تبرز ههنا أهمية إيجاد السيسي لرافعة سياسية جديدة، وأداة تؤلف ولاءات الجماهير من حوله وتدعم سلطته، وتسمح باجراء انتخابات والوفاء باستحقاقات يدفع خارجيا من أجل حصولها.

من هذا المدخل نتفهم رهان السيسي عبر العامين الفائتين على إمكانية دمج قوى الثلاثين من يونيو  في كتلة يبتغي أن توازن قوة خصومه. ذلك الرهان الذي عطلته صراعات أجنحة تحالفه الحاكم، والتي أبرزتها فترة التحضير الطويلة للانتخابات البرلمانية، وكيف بينت أن إيجاد كتلة فاعلة لن يحدث تلقائيا وأن إنجازه تحدي لا يكفي معه مجرد الإشراف البعيد من قبل السيسي على العملية. ونزعم في ذلك أن المعطيات الراهنة تتجه صوب إحياء نموذج الحزب المسيطر، على غرار الوطني، وأن البدائل في هذا المضمار محدودة. جولات التفاوض لتشكيل ما سمي "بالقائمة الوطنية الموحدة" عبر العامين الماضيين أثبتت عدم جدواها، كصيغة لتوحيد الشتات السياسي المتحلق حول السيسي. وبات تدخله المباشر هو الباب الوحيد لإنجاز هدف تشكيل كتلة حزبية يمكنها أن تحصل له شرعية برلمانية، وتعمل (بمعاونة آلتي القمع وشبكات الزبائنية) على معادلة ثقل القواعد الجماهيرية لخصومه والتفوق عليها؛ ولا يحتاج الأمر لتفكير في أن تكوين برلمان لا يهيمن عليه السيسي سيفتح المجال السياسي مرة أخرى، وهو ما لا يريده الرجل، ويتناقض مع المقدمات التي تم التمهيد بها لهذه الانتخابات والتي تؤكد أن العملية برمتها محكومة بهدف تكريس هيمنته السياسية .

خيارات السيسي

لقد خاض التحالف الداعم للسيسي أربعاً من الجولات التفاوضية في سبيل تحقيق رغبة الرجل في جمع شتات الأحزاب الصغيرة¹، لكن فشلها جميعا جعل منها رغبة مؤجلة لما بعد جولة الانتخابات. والناتج منها هو مشهد تتسيده قائمتان منفصلتان، كلاهما مقرب للسيسي، ويعبر بصورة ما عن إرادته الحزبية. هذا بخلاف طيف واسع من موالين تقدموا للتنافس على المقاعد الفردية. والسؤال ماذا سيفعل السيسي بما ستنتجه عملية مختنقةتدور داخل بيت 30 يونيو؟ هل سيمكنه نسج خيوط هذا الطيف المهلهل وفق معطيات الانتخابات والأوزان الجماهيرية التي تبرهن عليها الصناديق؟ أم سيهمل الأمر برمته ليمضي في دور "الرئيس فوق الأحزاب"، الحكم بين أجنحة سلطوية تتنافس ضمن إطار توافقات يونيو؟

لا يمكن الزعم بوجود إجابة حاسمة، لكن في معرض محاولة التنبؤ بمشهد ما بعد هذه الانتخابات نميل إلى أن فرص مناورة السيسي من موقعه الراهن ليست بالكبيرة، وأن القصور الذاتي لخطيئة مصادرة المجال السياسي سيفضي به إلى إحياء المباركية، بصورة تكاد تكون محتومة، حيث استعادة نموذج الحزب المهيمن المساند للرئيس مخرج ترشحه الموارد والفرص متاحة للنظام والتي لا يملك غيرها. 

نحن أمام أحد منتجين؛ إما ديكور لا يزعج أحدا ضمن "مسرحية لإعادة إنتاج نظام مبارك"²، أو ساحة لضجيج سياسي بلا طحين غايته إلهاء الناس والإيحاء بأن السياسة لم تزل حية؟ 

ما يؤكده المشهد الانتخابي الملتبس، أن التصادمات المكتومة بين الجناحين البارزين للنظام واللذين تم تفصيل الإطار الناظم للانتخابات بمقاسهما ستستمر، ولن تنتهي بالضرورة لهيمنة أحدهما؛ سواء الطبقة العسكرية بواجهتها السياسية من قدامى العسكريين؛ وشبكات الزبائنية السياسية التي خلفها الحزب الوطني، بطيفها الواسع من بيروقراطية الدولة وأجهزتها المحلية، ووكلاء المصالح العشائرية والفئوية. الحال لا تبشر بتعددية سياسية حقيقية أو تنافس برامج وتفعيل للأدوات البرلمانية. بل العكس تماما هو المرجح؛ وفي الأخير، فإن تباين المصالح الراهن سيفضي في كل الأحوال لمؤسسة سياسية عرجاء، غايتها توفير الغطاء السياسي لصناعة الاستبداد التي دارت ماكيناتها التشريعية والإجرائية طوال الفترة الماضية. 

أمامنا وفق هذا الترجيح سيناريوهات أربعة محتملة؛ أولها تكوين حزب ائتلافي يجمع الأحزاب الصغيرة في التحالف الراهن المساند لنظام السيسي؛ وثانيها "حزب وطني" معاد تدويره يستثمر قوة البيروقراطية وشبكاتها الزبائنية القديمة يستغني به السيسي عن الأحزاب الأخرى؛ وثالثا حزب للعسكريين يستثمر في رهانات رافقت عزل مرسي، على دور القوات المسلحة، يقود الأحزاب الصغيرة أو يبتلعها؛ وأخيرا حزب من المستقلين.

1. تجمع موحد لأحزاب الموالاة 

جمع الشتات الحزبي الواسع ضمن تحالف الثلاثين من يونيو يلخص أملا لدى السيسي في دمج استثمارات سياسية قديمة، قوامها أربعة عناصر: أولا دوائر النفوذ وشبكات المصالح في نظام مبارك؛ ثانيا كتل حزبية قديمة شكلت المعارضة المستأنسة خلال عقود حكم مبارك؛ وثالثا جملة من أحزاب صغيرة نشأت مع رفع ثورة يناير لتوقعات التغيير وانفتاح المجال السياسي؛ وأخيرا قوى سلفية صاعدة تراوح بين آيديولجيا الإسلام السياسي المطالبة بما تسميه "ثورة إسلامية" على مستوى الخطاب، وبين التوجه البراجماتي لدعم السلطوية الجديدة. 

الصعوبة في هذا السيناريو - كما أسلفنا القول- تكمن في تضاؤل إمكانية دمج الطيف المتناقض حركيا وعقائديا. فأحزابه الموروث غالبها من عهد مبارك، فقدت قواعدها الجماهيرية بعدما سحب البساط منها فريقان خلال السنوات التي أعقبت الثورة وحتى لحظة 3 يوليو الانقلابية، أولهما التيار الإسلامي، بأدائه المحلي الأكثر فاعلية وتأثيرا، وتبنيه لصيغة زبائنية بديلة في تعامله مع الانتخابات؛ وثانيها القوى الحزبية المتولدة عن الحركات الاجتماعية التي برزت أواخر عهد مبارك وظهرت بحيوية وقدرة على اقناع أوساط العمال والطلبة والفلاحين بخطابها المعارض وقدرتها على إظهار قوتها في مواجهة النظام. وهو وجود ترجمته قاعدة تصويت عريضة تجلت من خلال الاستحقاقات التي تلت الثورة.

لانقلاب الحال مع الثلاثين من يونيو، خفتت الأحزاب الليبرالية واليسارية التي نشأت بعد الثورة، وانحسر تأييدها الجماهيري بتعثر المسارات الثورية، وكتمان صوت المطالب الاجتماعية، علاوة على مظاهر الانشقاق والتجمد التي اعترت هذه الأحزاب، بما فيها تلك المتحفظة على ميل السيسي لمصادرة المجال السياسي.³كذلك اختفت الأحزاب الإسلامية خصوصا حزب الحرية والعدالة التابع لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين، وانهارت قوته، تحت وطأة الضربات الأمنية. ورغم موجة القمع الواسع التي شنها النظام ضد الأولين، فإن أحزاب الثلاثين من يونيو لم تستطع ملء الفراغ، وظل نصيبها من الجماهيرية محلا لشك كبير. 

أما قوى المعارضة ^{التقليدية}فقد استمرت في انحدارها؛ وربما المثال الأوضح ههنا هو قوى اليسار الناصري ويمين الوسط الليبرالية التي انتمت بقوة لحراك يونيو، لكنها – وللآن- تمنى بالفشل في أن تحسم مواقعها في توافقات الانتخابات البرلمانية، وضمان حصة معتبرة في البرلمان الجديد. لا يخفى، من جهة أخرى، دور هذه الأحزاب في اختلاق "كاريزما" السيسي، وقد فاتها أن صعوده بخطاب أمني يقوم على ادعاء تعرض الدولة للتهديدات ورفع شعار حمايتها، هو بذاته خصم من وجود الأحزاب ورصيدها الجماهيري. فقد استحال المجال برمته لساحة انتظار "للبطل" جراء ذلك. وللآن لم يزل السيسي يستثمر في هذه الكاريزما المختلقة، بعدما عززها حصوله على ما يقارب المئة في المئة من الأصوات (97.3%) في جولة الانتخابات التي جرت يونيو 2014 بالطريقة الموروثة من أيام مبارك، واعتماده خطاباً صاخباً يستخدم مفردات الإنجاز والمشروعات القومية، مضافا لمفردات الخطاب الأمني المعتمد لغة مكافحة الإرهاب. 

إجمالا، تحقق هذا السيناريو من الصعوبة بمكان؛ فجمع كل هذا الطيف السياسي على اختلاف مصالحه الواضح، وتسعر منافساته لحدود استوجبت أحياناً تدخل السيسي للجمها، يحتاج إطارا لنظم مصالح هذه الفئات ليس منظورا ولا متاحا للسيسي الآن.

2. إحياء "الوطني" 

السيناريو الثاني أقرب لتنويعة جزئية على الأول، ويبتعد عن إشكالية تباين المصالح والتوجهات بين أطراف التحالف. ويتلخص في تبنى السيسي عملية لإحياء الحزب الوطني بصيغة جديدة. ليعيد تطبيق وسائل وتكتيكات الوطني في الهيمنة على المجال الحزبي، ومن ثم على البرلمان. ليس مستبعدا نزوع السيسي لبناء حزب من العناصر الأكثر موالاة، فيما يترك أصحاب الطموحات الذين يخرجون عن الإطار المحدود للممارسة السياسية الذي رسمه السيسي للقيام بدور المعارضة. 

إغواء هذا السيناريو  يكمن في أن شبكات الزبائنية السياسية التي شكلت عماد الحزب الوطني طوال عهد مبارك. لم تزل باقية، وإبقاء دائرة المصالح ذاتها بعلاقاتها الطفيلية مع الدولة ليس صعبا. وقد بينت أنها من التجذر الاجتماعي بمكان، فرغم وقوع ثورة كان أحد محركيها الأساسيين هو الغضب من حجم التفاوت والفساد الاقتصادي الذي يمكن نسبه لهذه الصيغة الزبائنية، بقيت دوائرها حية، بما يؤشر لقدرة لديها في الاستمرار في مواجهة الضغوط الشعبية، والعودة إلى التحلق حول السلطة. 

لا ينسى صناع المجال السياسي الجديد كيف قدمت فئة المحاسيب⁴التي رعاها مبارك الكثير من عناصر حزبه القيادية؛ وكيف ارتبطت أعمالهم بخدمة البنية الاحتكارية للاقتصاد، فيما سعوا لتعضيد هيمنتهم الاقتصادية، عبر توجيه أدوات المال السياسي في نطاق مجتمعات الفقر والهوامش. وقد حصدوا بفضل ذلك مقاعد تمثيل هذه المناطق كمنضوين في الحزب أو كمستقلين. وامتلكوا حضورا برلمانيا مؤثرا سواء بأنفسهم أو عبر نواب يرتبطون بهم مصلحيا. هذا الحضور كان يفوق الأحزاب جميعها، وبان أثره في آخر دورتين برلمانيتين في عهد مبارك. 

ممارسات هذه الفئة المعتمدة على حصاناتها البرلمانية، كانت معادلا موضوعيا للفساد، ولم يزل الطموح يدفعها لاستعادة ميزات هذا الموقع⁵. المتأمل لواقع النظام الاقتصادي ونوعية التشريعات الجديدة التي تحكمه سيدرك أنهم لم يبارحوا موقعهم الاقتصادي المهيمن. 

يعمل هذا السيناريو على الاستفادة من صيغ الماضي الموروثة، يعزز من هذا أن حزبا يضم كوادر الوطني ومحركي شبكاته الزبائنية سيسهم في لجم طموح العسكريين وممثلي بيروقراطية الدولة الأمنية، ويعطل سعيهم الحثيث إلى الهيمنة على المجال الحزبي. كما أنه سيعيد ترسيم مساحات النفوذ التي فقدها رجال الأعمال وصورة علاقتهم بالنظام. طبقة رجال الأعمال في العموم انخرطت في تحالف الثلاثين من يونيو، ورغم هذا لم تزل مواقف النظام منهم متفاوتة. إذ ينظر لبعضهم كمغضوب عليه بسبب طبيعة طموحاته، والدلائل تتعدد في استمرار علاقة قلقة بين هؤلاء والنظام، كنجيب ساويرس، الذي يعلن ميولا سياسية تنأى نسبيا عن مواقع النظام، أو بسبب من علاقاته بالخارج. ويؤثر السيسي – ربما إلى حين- تجميد التعامل مع آخرين من أصحاب النفوذ الاقتصادي والعشائري (رغبة في التخفف من مسئوليات ماضيها الثقيلة) خصوصا من العناصر التي ارتبطت مباشرة بجمال مبارك، والدائرة العليا للحزب الوطني، ومثالهم البارز أحمد عز. فيما قرب بديلا عنهم من الرأسماليين الصاعدين كأحمد أبو هشيمة ممن حفزهم الطموح لتبوؤ مكانة المقصين وشغل مواقعهم القريبة من السلطة. ورغم هذا التفاوت يظل هؤلاء جميعا جزءاً من آلة الزبائنية السياسية، ويبدو خيارهم في القرب النسبي من النظام محسوما، بسبب طبيعة عمليات توزيع المزايا والنفوذ التي تحضر فيها الدولة بقوة.

دمج كوادر الوطني وفاعلي شبكاته القديمة في كيان واحد كمشروع بدأ من بعد نجاح الثورة في إقصاء مبارك ظل متعثرا. فوسطاء العلاقات الزبائنية من بيروقراطية الدولة التي اختلطت بالحزب الوطنى، مضى أبرزهم في محاولة التلون السياسي، وقادت السبل بعضهم إلى التخفي في الأحزاب والقوى السياسية القائمة. والمتأمل لخرائط التحالف الحزبية الراهنة سيتعرف على مداخل ثلاثة استخدمت لتدوير كوادر الوطني القيادية⁶؛ أهمها:

- التدوير عبر أحزاب أسسها فاعلو الحزب الكبار، وخاصة حزب الحركة الوطنية بزعامة شفيق، وحزب مصر بلدي بزعامة أبو حسين. نستطيع القول مطمئنين أن اللاعب الرئيس في "الجبهة المصرية" هو الحزب الوطني القديم، بسبب ضخامة عدد قيادات الوطني السابقة فيه⁷؛

- المدخل الثاني كان التدوير عبر استيعاب المعارضة المتحالفة مع نظام مبارك لبعض من كوادر الوطني المعروف عنها قدرتها على حسم مواقعها الانتخابية بسبب ارتباطاتها العشائرية ونفوذها المناطقي، ومن هذه الأحزاب التي ضمت عناصر الوطني نجد "حزب الوفد" بزعامة السيد البدوي، و"حزب الغد" بزعامة موسى مصطفى، فضلا عن "حزب الجيل" بقيادة ناجي الشهابي؛ 

- والنمط الأخير هو التدوير عبر التعاون مع الكتل الحزبية ممن يعرفون بنواب الخدمات من خلال تمريرهم من باب المستقلين. وهذه ربما تكون الفئة الأكثر تأثيرا؛ فما منحه القانون من نسبة للمستقلين للمنافسة على مقاعد البرلمان يتيح لهؤلاء استعادة مواقعهم. وهؤلاء بنجاحهم ينفتح الباب أمامهم لاحقا للانتساب للأحزاب، وبما يضمن لاحقا مواقع قيادية فيها مقابل الدخول في هيئاتها البرلمانية، كما قد يحفزهم على الانضواء في حزب وطني جديد إذا ما مال السيسي لهذا الخيار. 

لا يخفي العديد من كوادر الوطني شعورهم بالمرارة من تخلي السيسي عنهم، لصالح الأحزاب المنضوية في قائمة في حب مصر والتي يسيطر عليها العسكريون المتقاعدون، وتحظى بعلاقة مباشرة مع أجهزة الاستخبارات والقوات المسلحة. هذا رغم أنهم قدموا له الدعم الواسع لدى انتخابه⁸. 

إن قائمة مصر التي تشكلت من الجبهة وتيار الاستقلال تنافس قائمة في حب مصر في دائرتين على الأقل في نظام القوائم . كما أن حزب الحركة الوطنية بزعامة شفيق قد طرح أكبر عدد من مرشحي دوائر الفردي في مصر. وهو ما يشير لجزء من هذه الميزات التي يملكها فلول الوطني وشبكاته القوية⁹.  لكن في الأخير يتوقف تحقق هذا السيناريو على نتائج اختبار الانتخابات، وإثبات هذه الكتلة قدرتها على حسم مواقعها البرلمانية، يما يقنع السيسي في أن يطرح تأسيس حزب جديد يضمهم.  ولعل من الحوافز التي قد ترجح ميل السيسي لهذه الكتلة واستثمار دوائر الزبائنية المحلية، أن انتخابات المحليات ستأتي خلال أقل من عام من انتخاب مجلس النواب الجديد. وهي ساحة للعب ظلت كوادر الوطني المرتبطة بالبيروقراطية المحلية والعشائر متمكنة فيها. 

3. حزب للعسكريين

لا يمكن القول بأن تحول العسكريين في مصر إلى مكون طبقي وليد اليوم، فطوال عصر مبارك برز السعي إلى تكوين طبقة مركزها الانتماء لمؤسسات قطاع الدفاع والأمن والانضواء في دائرة مصلحية تحوطها حزم من الامتيازات تميزهم عمن سواهم. وصار هذا الأمر الأقرب إلى حقيقة اجتماعية، تسند الطموح السياسي المتصاعد لدى عدد كبير من العسكريين المتقاعدين، وبعضهم من بين القيادة العليا للقوات المسلحة التي كانت فاعلة في الإطاحة بمرسي، وكذلك الأكثر تأثيرا من المنتسبين للأجهزة الاستخبارية¹⁰. وبعكس انضمام كوادر الوطني السابق للأحزاب القائمة، يمثل انضمام العسكريين بشكل كبير لهذه الأحزاب ظاهرة غير مألوفة في الحياة السياسية في مصر. ففي الماضي، فضل العسكريون العمل السياسي من وراء الستار، وقليلهم من ألف الحياة الحزبية، أو آمن بجدواها¹¹.

هذا الحال قد يدفع السيسي لوضع رهاناته على تشكيل حزب للعسكريين، منطلقا من خشيته من استعادة خصومه قدراتهم الحشدية المؤثرة، التي لن يجدي طويلا العمل ضدها بالذراع الأمنية وحدها. فبعض خصومه وأبرزهم جماعة الإخوان المسلمين لا شك تمتعوا بقدرات تنظيمية وقواعد جماهيرية فاعلة، من شأن تحريكها بالوسائل التي اتبعت في عصر مبارك، أن تحرج وصوله لامتلاك كتلة حزبية مهيمنة في البرلمان.

 يدرك أغلب العسكريين من أصحاب الطموح أن السلاح قد رسم ملامح المجال السياسي بتحرك الجيش ضد الرئيس المنتخب في يوليو 2013. ويؤمنون أن النجاح في فرض الاستقرار وإقصاء الخصوم السياسيين، هو ما يرشح استثمار دور أهل السلاح في ساحات الصراع الحزبي. أحد العوامل التي قد تحكم حسابات السيسي يتمثل في إمكان موازنة العسكريين لقدرات أصحاب المال وقدرات بيروقراطية الدولة وشبكاتها المتجذرة في المحليات في اجتذاب الجماهير لصالح السلطة. 

المكون الأمني يتوافق في عمومه على  أن التهديد الأساسي للنظام الجديد يأتي من جماعة الإخوان، وأن إجهاض تحركات الأخيرة، وتوجيه ضربات قوية للتنظيم، ومصادرة موارده، والاستمرار في الملاحقات الأمنية لقياداته ضرورة. لكن البعض بينهم يحاجج بأنه لا سبيل لإنجاز هذا الهدف، عبر أدوات الأمن وحدها، ولا بحملات الإعلام الموجه بالغة التطرف. ثمة من يرون أن إيجاد مكون حزبي قوي، يمكنه أن يهيمن على المؤسسات التمثيلية هو جزء من مهام "تفويض يوليو 2013" . تدفعهم لهذا الطرح الخشية من أن يضطر النظام مستقبلا - تحت الضغوط الدولية والمحلية - إلى إعادة استيعاب الإخوان ضمن الفضاء السياسي، وقفا للتنازع الراهن، أو على الأقل بغية إحالته من المستوى الأمني إلى المستوى السياسي¹². وتتلاقى أصوات هؤلاء مع أصوات تتصاعد من بين رجال الأعمال المؤثرين، حذرت من مغبة الاستمرار في الخط الأمني¹³. 

من هنا يبدو أن وجود كتلة سياسية قوية توازن -إن لم تلجم- الإخوان وخصوم النظام، يدفع بهذا المكون لإقناع السيسي بإنشاء حزب مسيطر. يتفق المعتدلون بين هؤلاء على أنه في حال المصالحة مع الإخوان والقبول بمشاركة ما للإسلاميين، فإن أقصى حصة "تنفيس سياسي" يمكن تركها لمجمل القوى الإسلامية (بما فيها الإخوان) محدودة "بسقف الخُمس"، جريا على المستفاد من دروس عهد مبارك، ونجاح إدارته القمعية للمجال السياسي، على النحو الذي قلص فرص وصول الإخوان والتيار الإسلامي إلى السلطة ضمن هذه النسبة غير الحاكمة. الحرمان من فرص تكوين أي نسب حاكمة يظل هو الملمح الأساسي في نموذج الحزب المسيطر.

ثمة استدراك واجب ههنا، فلا يمكن الجزم حاليا بوجود كتلة واحدة تمثل الطبقة العسكرية بوضوح. ومسعى رموزهم التي تجد في الهيمنة على الفضاء الحزبي متوقف على مدى رضاء السيسي ودعمه لخياراتها. أغلب المجموعات والأحزاب التي يتصدرها العسكريون حسمت وجودها ضمن قائمة في حب مصر، التي تحظى بأوسع الفرص للمنافسة على المقاعد البرلمانية في نظامي القائمة والفردي. لا زال المشهد في هذا السيناريو قلقا، فأصوات بين العسكريين أظهرت نوعاً من المعارضة للسيسي بما سبب الارباك، وكشف عن صورة لعدم توحد العسكريين خلف السيسي. وفي العموم، يظل تحول المحسوبين على الطبقة العسكرية لحزب يقوده السيسي مرتهنا بنفس الشروط التي تحكم سيناريو إحياء الوطني؛ أي انتظار نتائج الانتخابات. كذلك يتوقف على صورة التوازنات التي يود السيسي صنعها بين مختلف القوى الداعمة له، ومدى تخلصه من هاجس استقواء العسكريين في مواجهته لاستنادهما للطبقة والمؤسسة ذاتها لدرجة قد تفضي لنواتج عكسية تقلل من قدرته على الهيمنة والتفرد.

4. حزب المستقلين

تفتح النسب العالية المخصصة لنظام الانتخاب الفردي¹⁴الباب واسعا أمام استعادة أحد أبرز سمات المباركية، وهي هيمنة المستقلين على المجلس النيابي. تلك السمة التي تطورت ملامحها وديناميات إنتاجها في الفضاء الحزبي عبر العقد الأخير من حكم مبارك. المتأمل لما يطرحه السيد البدوي رئيس حزب الوفد سيجد تسيدا للنظرة المتشائمة لدور الأحزاب حتى بين المنضوين في تحالف 30 يونيو، مثل حزب الوفد الذي بالرغم من تحالفه مع قائمة في حب مصر، يتوقع رئيسه حصول المستقلين على ما يفوق 70% من مجمل المقاعد البرلمانية في إشارة واضحة إلى مدى ضعف الأحزاب مجتمعة. كتلة تقارب ثلاثة أرباع المجلس هي بالضرورة كتلة كبيرة من شأن السيطرة عليها أن تبقي الأحزاب جميعها مجرد "أقلية". ولو انتهى الحال لما توقعه البدوي، فنحن باليقين إزاء عنصر اغواء قوي قد يدفع بالسيسي لارتداء ثوب السادات، وتشكيل حزبه الخاص، قفزا فوق حلفائه الحزبيين المتصارعين، وذلك باستخدام أولئك الذين خاضو الانتخابات دون لافتات حزبية. بمثل هذه الخطوة يتحرر نسبيا من ضغوط داعميه الملوحين بفواتير رفعه لمنصب الرئاسة، سواء عسكريين أو بيروقراط، كما سيسحب السيسي الكثير من قوى هاتين الكتلتين، خصوصا المتحكمين في شبكات الزبائنية ممن يتلخص سعيهم السياسي في تلك المبادلة المنفعية مع الدولة. ويبني ما يعبر عن حزب السلطة بعيدا عن الدوائر القديمة، تاركا قوى الثلاثين من يونيو في موقع معارضة مستأنسة، مضمونة الجانب، إذ صنعها على عينه. وليس بمستبعد إن أقدم على خطوة كهذه أن تتفكك الكثير من الأطر الحزبية الراهنة، والتي لا تعدو كونها لافتات مؤقتة لمجموعات مصلحية تحاول الاقتراب من السلطة.

هذه هي السيناريوهات الأربعة التي يمكن أن تدور فيما بعد الانتخابات، وتحقق للسيسي هيمنة على البرلمان، وضبط إيقاع علاقات السلطة التنفيذية والتشريعية ضمن حدود يرسمها هو. تدور ضمن فضاء سياسي منخفض السقوف لحد غير مسبوق، ووفق تلويح بعصا القهر، والتشريعات المقيدة. وكلها تدور تحت عنوان إحياء  المباركية لكن بلافتات جديدة.

Three weeks ago, Russia started to directly intervene in Syria. The proxy war between Russia and Iran on the one hand, and the United States and Saudi Arabia on the other, threatens to turn into an actual war. Having lost control over its “victories” in the last fourteen years, the US would rather keep this a proxy war. Nevertheless, it is not clear how long it can permit Russian galloping in what was once simply and only America’s backyard. Russia, long denied a major role in the Middle East, aggressively inserts itself in the equation. A crony capitalism that has no hope of catching up with the West through peaceful means chooses to raise the stakes.

It is not solely Russia that is pushing the situation towards a total war. Apparently entertaining themselves quite a bit in Yemen, the Saudis and Qataris are eager to join the game in Syria, dragging Turkey along with them. However, they are fooling themselves if they think they will find wedding parties in that country ravaged by the whole world. They will rather encounter a battle-hardened army, not children, brides, and grooms.

Even if the Russian raids are able to decisively cripple ISIS, this will only displace and postpone the crisis. Some are already observing that Russian-hit jihadis are returning to their home countries. These might remain as sleeper cells in the next few months, but they will eventually spread bloodshed throughout the region, most likely starting with Turkey.

While the breakout of the third intifada appears to be a process internal to the Israeli occupation, recent lone wolf attacks express (and reproduce) the overall desperation that stifles the whole region. As the Occupation (and its international allies) has buried or marginalized what remains of left-nationalist and Islamist resistance, only hopeless and suicidal acts can proliferate, definitively marking this phase off from the first two intifadas. Increased regime aggressiveness, as well as the now “leaderless” and ideology-less resistance, seem likely to further push the region into an all-out war, which would be self-destructive on all sides, just like the new phase of the Occupation-Palestinian conflict itself.

The Dawn of “Neo-Fascist” Salafism

It is possible that the current crisis, incited by Russia’s intervention, can be thwarted (through astute diplomacy and perhaps a few threatening moves). At this point, even Putin’s intention does not seem to be a total war, but rather securing a few satisfactory gains in the turbulent region. However, the longer-term trends and sociological dynamics that push the region towards an all-out war are more difficult to counter. If not Russia’s maneuvers today, some other intervention will probably congeal these dynamics into a sustained war. Putin and others might think they are playing chess, but the pieces are not amenable to control.

The most crucial dynamic is Islamism’s global metamorphosis into Salafi-jihadism. With all hopes in Islamic Revolution (as represented by Iran) and Islamic liberalism (as represented by Turkey) exhausted, far-right conservative Islam (Saudi Arabia and its satellites) remains the only working model in the Muslim world. However, as the Gulf regimes are also unable to export their model in any meaningful sense of the term, they are dragged into self-destruction by the only effective, spirited force of leadership in existing Islam—Salafi-jihadis.

Salafi-jihadi mobilization has resulted in the Spanish Civil War of the twenty-first century: the war in Northern Syria (Western Kurdistan or Rojava). In this upside down version of that tragedy, the Salafi-jihadis have drawn the international crowds, more than the left. Nobody in the global mainstream has sustained sympathy for the Marxists and anarchists who join the Kurds to fight them. When fashionable bursts fade out, a few intellectuals protest the neglect of the Kurdish “Rojava revolution,” to no avail. The “end of ideology” hype, that irresponsible celebration of loss of all hope in collective causes, has come to haunt (conservative-cherished) stability and order themselves. Today, unlike during the Spanish Civil War, there isn’t one single idea that would encourage massive numbers of people to risk their lives against fascism. There are local exceptions, like the idea of the Kurdish nation/people/“freedom movement,” which has created the (so far) only platform that has slowed down ISIS on the ground. But none of them match the global aspirations of Salafi-jihadism.

We have not only states and business classes but also intellectuals to thank for this erosion. The Soviet Union and China have squandered humanity’s collective hopes. Business classes (together with their regimes and civil societies) have actively strangled collectivism. But the globally prominent intellectuals of the last four decades have played no secondary role, as they propagated nothing but cynicism and suspicion. While right-wing and centrist intellectuals simply stamped on collective hopes and ideas, many on the left more coolly “deconstructed” them. However, we can also clearly see that they have succeeded in bringing about not the end of ideology as such, but only that of left-wing ideologies. Salafism can obviously energize many people to fight and die for a cause. We do not know, at this point, whether the new right in the West will also be able to amass ideological resources to match its brethren.

The second major dynamic, which reinforces the first, is the birth of a fascistic regime in Turkey. Without the rise of this regime, the Salafi-jihadi revival would remain a restricted force. The new Turkish regime not only supported and armed the warriors, but still enables them today to generalize their war to the whole region, perhaps the whole world. The costs of a fascist regime in one of the imperialist chain’s weak links should not be underestimated. Italy’s and Germany’s semi-failed imperial hopes were among the precipitators of the Second World War. Fascist movements and regimes create crises the resolutions of which cannot remain within the boundaries of single countries. Turkey’s imperial frustrations in Syria promise to be as disastrous, perhaps more so.

When Islamist-turned-fascist mobs chanted their desire to crush the Gezi protesters in 2013, nobody took them very seriously. These mobs, now further encouraged by the rise of ISIS, engage in expanded proto-fascist action in 2015: mass burnings of opposition party buildings, during whichhundreds march with nationalist and Islamist slogans; mass attacks against Kurdish activists and other opposition figures; mass extermination of Kurdish and leftist activists. More recently, these more dedicated activists were joined by larger crowds: thousands of soccer fans chanted in favor of the bloody Ankara massacre during a game in the Turkish town of Konya.

An earlier massacre (in Suruç) had re-ignited the Kurdish civil war, which had been put on hold for a decade. It seems that, by inciting violent mass mobilization in western Turkey too, the regime consciously incites a broader civil war: not just between the regime and the Kurds, but between the regime and all of its opponents. Most of the opposition has so far resisted its invitations, but this is no solution either: the regime and its paramilitaries will kill and destroy with impunity, whether the opposition resorts to arms or not. For this very reason, some leftists have started to call for a civil war. A recent article, for example, has forcefully argued that peace activism (and more broadly, peaceful activism, including civil disobedience) has reached its limits in Turkey. Leftists, however, would certainly lose such a war, given the massive and international mobilization in favor of the regime (not to mention the military and police forces which are also at its disposal). In sum, the regime wants to leave only two real choices to the opposition: silence or civil war. It will use either situation to further militarize the whole Middle East.

It is the confluence between (the failures of) American imperialism, (the possibility of) a fully fascist regime, and (what was once a fringe wing of) the Islamist movement that creates an almost irreversible total war tendency. Salafi-jihadism, which used to be in the minority even among Salafis, was good for only one thing: winning wars against communists and other “evils”. Yet, as Afghanistan showed, Salafi-jihadis could not even militarily hold the territories they won. The rise of Al Qaeda further exacerbated these strengths and weaknesses. Salafi-jihadism seemed to be the ideology of lonely, isolated heroes, rather than of the masses. This is not to say it was insignificant, as it was always a globally effective movement, fueled not only by Islamic texts but also by hyper-modern dynamics, some of them overlapping with the contradictory rise of middle class politics the whole world is witnessing today. Salafi-jihadism is one of the ways in which educated, Western/ized, and qualified people assert their “specialness” when faced with a capitalism that respects them less and less. There is an uncanny resemblance between the “networked,” cell- (rather than mass-) based mobilizing structures of post-1968 anarchism and left-wing communism, and that of Salafi-jihadism (and between some of their recruits as well).

This individualistic, almost anti-authoritarian exclusivity was mitigated after total state collapse in Iraq, as a result of which Salafi-jihadi ranks were joined by top-rank generals. The American invasion in 2003 is the real turning point for the history of Islamism. The failed attempt to redraw the map of the Middle East kicked off dynamics that will perhaps result in the redrawing of the whole world map. When George W. Bush declared he was at war with the “Islamofascists,” there really were none. His putative primary enemy, bin Laden, was of no caliber to either mobilize the masses or build a regime. It is dubious whether he even had the desire to do so. Fascists, if we want to use the word correctly rather than sensationally, are defined by their ability to do both. Fascism is the proper name for the mass-mobilizing and state-building wing of the right; we cannot (or should not) use it for all versions of the fringe right (otherwise, the term would equally apply to Bush himself). Splits from Al Qaeda started to cultivate this ability (and even the desire) only after they were nudged by the Turkish regime and benefited from regime failures in Iraq and Syria. It was only with the rise of Turkey and fall of its neighbors that Salafi-jihadis became mass mobilizers and state builders.

Today, ISIS is not only able to hold territory, but can even build the beginnings of a welfare state. Still, state building capacity does not necessarily imply hegemony (the leadership of Muslims based on their willing consent). Until a certain point, it appeared that ISIS ruled through fear and coercion only. But this was certainly deceptive, as from very early on Iraqi and Turkish leaders celebrated it as the uprising of Sunni Muslims against Shiite Islam. Yet could this really go beyond a vague sympathy based on a shared hatred of the Shia? Wouldn’t the extreme puritanism of the Salafis ultimately turn off the majority of Muslims, especially in Sufi-dominated Turkey?

The pro-ISIS bombing chants in Konya are a solid indicator that this barrier has been broken. The Islamists of Konya, a town associated with Mawlawi Sufism in the Western imagination, have no problem with enemies of Sufism as long as they target the Turkish regime’s enemies. The ideological contours of the emergent fascist-Salafism are not clear for the moment, but it seems certain that the Turks will find a way of synthesizing the European fascist tradition, Anatolian “tolerant” Islam, and Salafi-jihadism. This exact configuration might not travel untransformed to the rest of the Muslim world, but what it promises to Salafi-jihadism is a mass following for the first time in its history.

As significant is ISIS’ ability to organize in a smaller Turkish town called Adıyaman. Like most Anatolian heartland regions, Adıyaman is quite conservative. There is a sizable Alevi minority, as in some other regions. Islamists have never been as strong in this town as they have been in Konya. What is most distinctive about Adıyaman is a Nakshibandi community (Menzil), which has spread to the rest of Turkey from this town. One of the most popular Sufi communities in Turkey, Menzil had such a strong spiritual aura at one point that tons of buses would take alcohol-consuming believers from major Turkish towns to Adıyaman to see its sheikh. It was believed that establishing a spiritual connection (the Sufi rabita) with him through a one-on-one encounter would cleanse the soul, the mind, and the body from alcohol. This reliance on the very person of the Sufi sheikh is the exact kind of belief that Salafis perceive as anti-Islamic idolatry. Moreover, rather than being associated with Islamism or radicalism, Menzil usually appeals to conservatives, fascists, and ex-fascists. The spread of Salafi-jihadism in Adıyaman—a Sufi bastion, which also happens to be an ethnic-nationalist fortress—is indeed quite surprising. Transnationalism and anti-Sufism, almost dictionary-definition components of Salafism, seem to be “sublated” here into a new synthesis, in which particular doses of nationalism and Sufism have become acceptable. If ISIS has been able to organize, popularize, and spread Salafi-jihadism in Adıyaman, then it can do it anywhere else. So-called Turkish Islam (with its alleged toleration and moderation) has not stopped ISIS here, and it won’t stop it elsewhere.

How did neo-fascist Salafism build this ideological appeal in Turkey? Is this sustainable? Turkey has a deep-rooted fascist tradition, inspired directly by European fascism and Nazism (though also loosely based on Islam and other local traditions). Partially because it is the most deeply westernized country in the region, its fascist tradition (even if the ideology of only a minority) towers over any other Middle Eastern counterparts. The relative quietism of the mainstream right-wing nationalist party in the last three decades (as opposed to its successful militancy in the 1960s and 1970s), Salafi-jihadis’ war with the Kurds, and the governing Islamic party’s appeals to nationalist themes have resulted in a flooding of Islamist ranks with Turkish fascists in the last couple of years. While this could turn out to be a contingent amalgamation (just like the apparently solid, but ultimately ephemeral merger of Islamists with liberals in the 2000s), it has already deeply transformed Turkey.Fascists could never come to power in Turkey on their own, but the Islamic regime (and overall Salafization) has allowed the mainstreaming of their cadres, ideas, and methods.

It is still conceivable (if somewhat unlikely) that world powers would quickly intervene and remove ISIS from the map. It is much less likely that they can reverse these sociological dynamics. Salafi-jihadis have not only learned how to engage in serious state building, but are working towards building visions that can energize broad Muslim masses. No longer restricted to the Che Guevaras of Islam, their mass following and leadership signals a thorough cultural and political transformation of the Muslim world.

Since the consolidation of the new fascistic regime in Turkey is a precondition for the longer-term, sustained transformation of Salafi-jihadism into a full-fledged, global fascist movement, the prevention of further regime entrenchment in Turkey is necessary. What can stop the total fascistization of Turkey? Inciting Western mediation is not a fruitful approach. Western governments have produced the current situation. Just like the liberal and conservative West watched the Nazis rise to power (and occasionally cooperated with them), Western governments will work with this regime until it engages in total war. As the Middle Eastern regimes (most specifically, the Turkish) turn more and more murderous, Western leaders will just throw their hands in the air and say, “What can we do?”

That is precisely the point. There is nothing they (as the people who cooperated with and in some cases helped the formation of these regimes) can do. Nothing short of regime changes in the primary world powers would result in meaningful revisions in their Middle Eastern policies. Nevertheless, the consequences of total fascistization are going to be so dire that any action to slow it down should be welcomed. Ultimately, however, we should realize that not much help is going to come from the mainstream West, a persistently major contributor to the trends covered here.

This is not a banal, inward looking point about the need to righteously rely on local rather than “alien” dynamics, since (just like the problem) the solution can be nothing but transnational (with durable local and national roots). It is rather an insistent reminder of the West’s responsibility in creating the situation, as much as of its regimes complete lack of capacity to resolve it (as things stand now).

A Lose-Lose War

If oppositional movements and organizations in the region do not radically revise their orientations and methods, neither war nor peace can be won. An all-out war would be a lose-lose one for everyone. There would only be minor victors. Kurds might be one of them. Thirsty for nationhood for more than a century, they are finally consolidating into a nation. But the nation they would build in such a hell would not see peace and prosperity. Salafi-jihadis would most probably grow in influence and might even build long-lasting states. However, if their Syrian record is any indication, the extremely authoritarian-totalitarian states they would build could create more Islamophobia in the entire world (and possibly even lead to mass conversions of Muslims to other religions, agnosticism, and atheism). Notwithstanding predictions that they will ultimately normalize (just like the Iranian Revolution and nineteenth-century Wahhabism did when they consolidated into states), Salafi-jihadis are much more likely to precipitate the already unfolding collapse of the world order. On that note, even Western power centers would not be able to cherish the re-drawing of the map that would result from an all-out war. Unlike post-World War I, they would not be able to control the outcome. They lost their capacity to control a decade ago.

Re-building hope and collectivism in the years ahead could change the fate of the region, even if the coming total war wrecks the Middle East. We would have just ourselves to blame if Salafi-jihadism singularly remains the soul of a soulless world after the approaching catastrophe. 

“The sidewalk was like a mirror
Now, a sanitation worker collects the bodies of dead people […]
My memories died yesterday
But a tree smiling in Abu Nuwas has enlivened them”
– Iraqi poet Fadhil Abbas. 

This essay examines the ways in which the political circumstances of post-invasion Iraq have shaped the social and spatial realities of Baghdad’s key urban spaces, particularly Abu Nuwas Street. Since its American occupation in 2003, Baghdad has experienced securitization, sectarianism, and privatization undermining the public realm and restricting how people use their public spaces. Other cities in the region have experienced a similar urban situation. In Cairo, Egyptian governments since the time of Gamal Abdul Nasser have adopted a “state of emergency,” with the result that the city is transformed “into a battlefield, in which "national security" and the "war on terrorism" became justifications to control space and bodies” through state security apparatuses and interventions.[1] State-imposed physical security measures have, therefore, appeared: the Egyptian government during the presidency of Hosni Mubarak installed “metal walls” around major squares and sidewalks. These walls physically fragment the public realm of the city, restricting people’s movement and forcing them to “compete for space with cars.” The walls also resulted in the death of protesters during the January Revolution who “found themselves trapped behind the walls and were beaten to death” by the security forces. Both during the revolution and afterwards, the authorities erected blast walls around government buildings and closed off streets around the Tahrir Square. Also, in Cairo, private destinations appropriate the riverbanks of the Nile. Security restrictions by government and private security agents, and lack of official planning efforts to enhance public access to the river, disconnect the public from one of the city’s main assets.[2]

In Beirut, the public realm is shrinking. After the end of the civil war in 1990, state “infrastructure-led urban development” resulted in “real-estate dividends” benefitting the “ruling elites and their partners.” Public access to the city’s seashore has suffered from a “private takeover” in the form of “enclosed, high-end resorts.” Recently, “prominent investors” have fenced-off the Dalieh (a seashore “open access shared space” facing the famous Pigeons’ Rock) “in preparation for a major real estate development.” Also, mobility of city dwellers is “circumscribed through installations of barriers, blockades, checkpoints and the rerouting of traffic flow” mainly to protect the political elites from a “criminalized and differentiated public.”[3] City dwellers modify their movement in relation to certain areas and neighborhoods of the city which they consider receptive (or not) with regard to class, gender, nationality, religion, and/or sect.[4]

The role of public space as a site contested between the people and the authorities has been all the more important in these cities. Protests are the tip of the iceberg. In Baghdad, recent demonstrations against the corruption of the political elites have taken place every Friday in the al-Tahrir Square with protesters displaying banners and chanting slogans provocative to the ruling Islamist parties: “In the name of religion, thieves stole us.” In Beirut, too, activists have launched the YouStink Campaign, and the Martyrs’ Square in Beirut has been its main demonstration site. Before that, many of us witnessed on television and social media Egyptians protesting against Mubarak’s regime in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. 

In order to answer the question I am raising in this essay, I begin by tracing the history of the street since its construction, focusing on the socio-spatial practices of its users. I show how and when the street gained its significant image, which has persisted until the present in the accounts of city dwellers. Also, I identify its decline, which started around the time Saddam Hussein became a president, as a physical space used in ways related to its persistent image as a symbol of Baghdadi cultural and entertainment life in its height during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. I, then, go through the post-invasion (or “Post-Change” as some pro-invasion Iraqi intellectuals would like to call it) events, especially those having an impact on the urban spaces of the city in general and Abu Nuwas Street in particular.
   
Beginnings (1920s-1930s through 1968)

At the time of the construction of the street by the beginning of the 1930s, Baghdad had already been expanding beyond its old city, with new neighborhoods being established such as al-Wazeriya, al-Alwiya, al-Karrada al-Sharqiya, and al-Sa’doun. New types of buildings and facilities accompanied the expansion to fulfill the demands of the nascent state and society, such as airports, bridges, post offices, public-administration buildings, cinemas, and others. New urban elements were introduced, such as public gardens, green areas, and statues, and new laws passed, such as the Road and Building Law no. 44 of 1935.[5]

In continuation of its former status as a green place for the well-off and their summer residences,[6] the state-planned street maintained its upper-class characteristics. A road replaced the dyke along the bank of the Tigris. The remaining area adjacent to the river comprised a sidewalk and parks, whereas the other side of the street was a built-up area. The basic physical configuration of the street has not changed since its construction. Residents from various religious backgrounds (mainly Sunnis, Christians, and Jews) inhabited the upper part of the street close to al-Bab al-Sharqi, al-Battaween, and al-Sa’doun areas, and Shi’ite residents mostly inhabited the lower part close to al-Karrada.[7]

Abu Nuwas Street is an extension of the older, equally celebrated al-Rashid Street in terms both of their physical adjacency and the activities which took place there. If the cafés of al-Rashid Street were a haven for the intelligentsia during daytime then they spent their night on Abu Nuwas Street, drinking and eating masgouf (a Baghdadi delicacy of coal-grilled carp). They spent the evening in chirdagh (a tent on the sand swathes of the river) listening to music, drinking alcohol, and grilling.[8] Families, on the other hand, frequented casinos (not gambling places, but restaurants with occasional entertainment shows) mainly to eat masgouf, attend entertainment shows, and/or enjoy the presence of the river.[9] People crowded the open public spaces of the street, and the parks too. During the 1950s, the street, including its parks, casinos, and chirdagh, became an essential, leisurely destination for city dwellers and its image was strongly associated with the aforementioned leisurely activities.[10]

The Street under Ba’athist Rule (1968-2003)

After the 17 July coup in 1968, the ruling Ba’ath Party became increasingly concerned with security. The area of the Republican Palace across the river from Abu Nuwas Street became heavily policed as officials, including the then president and vice-president, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein respectively, resided in the area, making it more visible for the city dwellers as the regime’s headquarters. In spite of restrictions on civil liberties and political dissent, the 1970s marks a bright juncture in the street’s life for many Baghdadis. People continued to frequent the riverside casinos. In the publicly accessible strip of green areas along the river, individuals, couples, and families used the playgrounds and benches. Men hopped in and out of the bars along the other side of the street which was more active in the evening than daytime.

By the end of the 1970s and beginning of 1980s, the state carried out major projects across the city including two luxurious hotels (Ishtar and Palestine) and a residential project on the street. These projects aimed at reviving an “Arab and Mesopotamian grandeur” for the capital city under Saddam Hussein’s rule.[11] Also, the regime’s headquarters across the river consolidated their periphery by resettling loyal occupants (senior staff of the presidential palace) in the street’s residential project,[12] resulting in the demolition of many modern heritage buildings dating back to the 1930s and 1940s.[13]

The late 1970s and the 1980s mark the beginning of the gradual descent of the “golden days” of Abu Nuwas Street, due to rising police practices of a totalitarian state ruled by Saddam Hussein. “Then came the Iraq-Iran War isolating the street from many of its devoted goers … a list of prohibitions then was imposed,” the Iraqi journalist Baida’ Kareem wrote, “starting with no boating zones, no floating casinos, etc., and other measures controlling practices on land (no partying) and in water (no swimming to the other bank across the street).”[14] By then, the chirdagh had completely disappeared due to the state’s security restrictions. Moreover, in 1994, the state banned alcohol drinking in the street’s casinos, restaurants, and hotels after it launched “al-hamla al-imaniyya” (The Faith Campaign). As a result, alcohol drinking, which had been a main spatial practice for many street users, virtually disappeared, although some users defied the ban secretly. “The street died in the 1990s,” Baida’ Kareem states.

Occupation and Sectarian Violence: The Securitization of Urban Spaces and Sectarian-based Reordering of the City (2003-2007)

Shortly after the occupation of Iraq had begun, violence in Baghdad escalated until the many hotels where Westerners and officials resided, both on Abu Nuwas Street and elsewhere, became a target for the armed resistance. The occupation forces responded by erecting blast walls and razor wire to barricade the hotels, and by closing off the segment of the street where the hotels are located. Checkpoints guarded either end of the closed-off segment. At the same time, the Ba’athist regime’s quarters across the river became a US fortified zone famously known as The Green Zone. The perception of the quarters changed too. One Iraqi boy put it this way: “Saddam house … Now, Bush house.” Moreover, the occupation forces restricted access to the street’s riverbank “lest militants use it to mount attacks on the Green Zone.” In the meantime, the street is still rife with physical security measures constraining people’s practices and movement and preventing them from accessing the river.[15] One Iraqi expressed that Abu-Nuwas turned into “a street for the security forces.” 

The occupation authority (the Coalition Provisional Authority led by Paul Bremer) enforced political interventions which reproduced the sectarian-based inequalities which had existed before the occupation, with dire repercussions on the everyday life of city dwellers. The favoritism toward Sunnis who dominated the high ranks of the pre-invasion Iraqi state disappeared, and a new political power relation ensued in favor of the Shi'ite political parties.[16] The Ba’athist regime had manipulated ethnic and sectarian differences to control rebelling segments of the Iraqi population “in moments of crisis” such as the 1991 Shi'ite uprising.[17] As Damluji clarifies, “Hussein’s national policies did promote differential treatment of Iraqis based on ethno-sectarian identities, with visible impacts on the socio-economic and political status of some Shi’as living in the capital.” But, she continues, “Sunnis and Shi’as in the city continued to reside, socialize, and work in heterogeneous communities and neighborhoods as had historically been the case.”[18] However, during the occupation, and more precisely in the wake of the bombing of the holy Shi’ite al-Askari shrine in February 2006, Baghdad went through a sectarian-based demographic reordering in the form of a forced displacement campaign. Hence, the many previously mixed neighborhoods were homogenized into either Sunni or Shi’ite.

The CPA, headed by Bremer, executed a policy of “de-Ba’athification” of Iraqi society, including the dismantlement of all pre-invasion government entities, among them the ministries and security forces. These orders resulted in the disenfranchisement and political marginalization of many Sunnis who had held official posts before the occupation. The support of disaffected Sunnis for the Iraqi armed resistance increased. In July 2003, the CPA established the Interim Governing Council through an undemocratic process that involved no consultation with a broad spectrum of Iraqi political parties or local community leaders. Members were appointed to the council according to predetermined quotas, categorizing Iraqis along ethnic and sectarian lines and hence reinforcing the role these identities have played in post-invasion politics. The elections to the transitional National Assembly of Iraq, which took place in early 2005, replicated the same differentiations. The assembly was responsible for the establishment of a permanent Iraqi constitution and transitional government. A constitutional committee hastily drafted a constitution under pressure from the USA despite the withdrawal of the Sunni Arab representatives from the committee and the lack of consensus among the parties involved. On the other hand, the Shi’ite political parties dominated the transitional government. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), through its armed militia the Badr Brigade, controlled the Ministry of Interior, and CPA Order Number 91 encouraged its members to enlist in the newly formed Iraqi police. By 2005, Al-Qaeda began targeting not only government forces, largely constituted by Shi’ites, but also Shi’ite civilians. Both Shi’ite and Sunni warring parties “identified vulnerable communities, families, and individual civilian residents in Baghdad according to sectarian identity, and transformed them into targets for politically driven retaliation attacks”.[19] Shortly after the bombing of the Shi'ite shrine in 2006, the strife between Sunni militas and Shi'ite militias supported by government forces escalated, reaching levels unprecedented in the preceding years of the occupation. This included mass forced displacement of residents of hitherto mixed neighborhoods, which eventually turned into homogeneous settlements. Sectarian violence decreased once many neighborhoods became homogenized, as Shi'ite militias consolidated their enormous territorial gains,[20] as well as due to the US “surge” military strategy and the incorporation of previously anti-government and occupation Sunni fighters into the so-called “awakening councils”.[21] The civil strife ended–or stalled–with the Shi'ite political organizations gaining ascendancy in the “political conflict over the right to rule Iraq, to share its resources and to define the meaning of the nationalist projects.”[22] Thereafter, the occupation forces implemented a plan to erect perimeter blast walls around Sunni and Shi'ite neighborhoods, further hardening segregation lines and exacerbating an already restricted mobility of city dwellers.[23]

In August 2009, the Iraqi government decided to lift the walls from all the closed-off streets in Baghdad “without exception” within forty days. This ambitious plan (or, political charade?) never took place, but the government did remove the walls from some commercial areas in central Baghdad to mitigate traffic congestion and facilitate better commercial activity for shops which the walls had isolated. In 2011, the Mayoralty of Baghdad declared that it had “prepared a plan to lift concrete barriers from all areas in the city,” and the official military spokesman of the Baghdad Operation Command had declared a similar plan earlier that year. Concurrently, the government lifted the walls from the Shi'ite al-Sadr City in Baghdad because, according to the same military spokesman, “the City witnessed security stability and considerable collaboration on the part of the community with the security apparatuses.”  

In the meantime, restrictions on mobility still take on a sectarian dimension, although it is less intense than that which resulted from the 2005-07 sectarian violence. Residents of the Sunni neighborhoods, such as al-Adhamiya and al-Ghazaliya, feel unjust treatment by the government because their neighborhoods are still walled in a dominantly Shi'ite city. Getting in and out of the walled Sunni neighborhoods through checkpoints controlled by dominantly Shi'ite personnel potentially entails inconvenience and intimidation. Consequently, Sunni neighborhoods have become an undesirable location to live in.[24] During Shi'ite rituals (i.e. the Mourning of Muharram and the Day of Ashura) or occasions of heightened political and security tension, restrictions get tighter.

With regard to Abu Nuwas Street, the area where it is located turned into a predominantly Shi'ite area in 2006.[25] Mostly low-income Shi'ite families squatted the residential buildings as the former occupants fled for fear of retaliation. Flags, banners, and posters conveying Shi'ite messages and symbols appeared in the post-invasion city as Shi'ite residents could not display such signs under the Ba’athist rule.

[Banners on the fence of a squatted residence in the southern section of Abu Nuwas Street, with inscriptions of “ya Hussein." Another hung on the building’s façade over the entrance inscribed with “ya Abbas.” Photo by Author].

The Reopening and “Redevelopment” of Abu Nuwas Street and Parks (2007-2012)

In November 2007, the occupation forces, in collaboration with the Iraqi government, re-opened the closed-off segments of Abu Nuwas Street and its parks. The US military and USAID provided a two million dollars fund to implement a “facelift” of buildings through Iraqi subcontractors. Shop owners received $2,500 micro grants. The renovation also entailed furnishing the parks with grass areas, footbridges, swings and benches. Several months after its re-opening, the street’s parks were receiving a large number of visitors: young men smoking hookah or sitting on the benches; children playing in the playgrounds while escorted by their parents; and people eating masgouf in the restaurants.[26]
 

[Two girls playing in the swings in the large park of Abu Nuwas Street in January 2014. Photo by Author.]

In November 2012, the Mayoralty of Baghdad launched a redevelopment project for the street which entailed the demolition of “some restaurants and cafés” and the construction of “a service and tourist [riverside] street and another for bicycles in the middle of the gardens.” The mayoralty constructed the two streets inside the park.[27] Some restaurants in the park were also demolished as they “were used in a wrong way” according to an official of the mayoralty, possibly referring to alcohol drinking and prostitution. The Iraqi owner of a carpentry workshop also perceived one of the demolished restaurants in the northern section of the park as a place which housed “improper activities.”[28]


Proliferation of Pseudo-Public Spaces in the City, and Proposed “Investment Projects” on Abu Nuwas Street

In the past few years, there has been a proliferation of pseudo-public destinations in Baghdad, namely, malls and restaurants/cafés. Also, many residential high-rise buildings in the form of housing complexes are under construction at the moment. The Baghdad Investment Commission is the authority responsible for issuing “investment licenses” for and coordinating with investors developing these projects.

The transition from a “centralized economy” to a “market economy” after the invasion, which both chairmen of the National Investment Commission and the Baghdad Investment Commission state as a fact, has opened the Iraqi real estate market for privatization by local and foreign investors. Efforts towards this transition started when Bremer’s CPA imposed “economic reforms” so radical that The Economist described them as a “kind of wish-list that foreign investors and donor agencies dream of for developing markets.” The CPA, through Order Number 37, set “individual and corporate income” taxes at 15 percent maximum. Its Order Number 39 allowed foreign investors 100 percent ownership of Iraqi assets and repatriation of profits, and permitted foreign investment “in all parts of Iraq” and all economic sectors except the natural resources sector. It also prohibited foreign investors from purchasing “the rights of disposal and usufruct private real property” but permitted them to lease or rent properties for no more than fourty years. This order, nevertheless, did not take effect. Regardless, the obligations set by the Paris Club in 2004 to substantially relieve Iraq from its enormous debts required the implementation of an IMF Emergency Post Conflict Assistance Program. One of the program’s main “underpinnings” is “the implementation of key structural reforms to transform Iraq into a market economy.” The IMF expressed in 2005 that the implementation of these “structural benchmarks” is “slower than envisaged” due to security. It stated, nonetheless, that the government’s 2006 program still “maintains a focus on macroeconomic stability, while… advancing Iraq's transition to a market economy.” In the same year, the Iraqi Council of Representatives approved the Investment Law No. 13 (amended in 2010) which repealed CPA Order Number 39. The law itself is no different from the occupation authority’s order, except that now the duration of rent or lease is fifty years maximum instead of forty, and Iraqi and foreign investors are permitted to own lands for the purpose of developing housing projects only. The law also stipulated the establishment of “national”, “region’s” (if applicable), and “governorate” commissions for investment.   

By December 2014, Baghdad Investment Commission had issued investment licenses for seventy “giant residential projects,” which will provide 130,000 residential units, and sixty licenses for “touristic projects.” The commission announced that the residential projects will “contribute to solving the housing crisis which has exacerbated recently,” and that the “touristic projects” aim to compensate for “the lack of touristic and hotel services” in the city. It claims that these projects “fulfill the needs of citizens, who are seeking comfort, recreation, entertainment, and shopping.” The commission, furthermore, conceives of“the phenomenon of commercial malls, which has been spreading,” as “a civilized aspect reflecting contemporary sensibility and urban development.” It ascribes the “widespread proliferation of such commercial malls” to its efforts.

Several malls have opened in the city: most notable are Mansour Mall and Maximall. Several large restaurants have also opened, including four riverside restaurants. Two of the latter are “floating restaurants” located on the street which is also officially called Abu Nuwas and was once the extension of Abu Nuwas Street discussed in this essay.[29] The other two are large restaurants/cafés composed of many gardens, halls, and riverside areas.

The dire security situation, as one manager of a mall expressed, demands searching people entering it. An Iraqi woman shared the same fear saying that “when [Mansour Mall] first opened … We worried that if someone blew up a bomb, there would be a massacre”. Some managers expressed that the “safety” of such places vis-a-vis the “unsafety” of the city’s open public spaces is the reason why people choose to hang out there for leisure and/or shopping. Another Iraqi woman concurred saying: “I can watch my kids playing safely and get whatever I need in the stores.” Another woman yet noted that “malls have not witnessed incidents of harassment of women and girls because most of their goers are families.” However, according to an Iraqi women’s rights activist, “the phenomenon [of sexual harassment of women] is increasing exponentially in public spaces such as gardens and parks."

In the first half of 2014, the Mayoralty of Baghdad, through its investment committee, considered a plan to designate five locations for investment in the riverside part of the street (see map below).[30] Two of these projects seem to have serious repercussions on the public space of the street in case they are implemented: the “floating restaurant” in the northern part of the large park; and the hotel in the whole location of the small park. Such privatization, if it is to take place, will erase important parts of a city with the few remaining riverside public spaces, and could potentially affect the adjacent park areas and the ways in which people currently use them. Men of various age groups use the northern section of the large park mainly for alcohol drinking, despite the inconvenience of prevalent moral codes and occasional raids by the police.[31] Activist groups and other–especially young–groups of men and women use the small park for cultural and entertainment events.[32]
 

[Location map of the proposed investment projects. Map by Author.]

Parallels between Past and Present, and the Introduction of New Urban Realities   

As is evident in one of the main open public spaces of the city, restrictions on the socio-spatial practices of street users which resulted from the policing of space by the Ba’athist regime until 2003, reappeared during the American occupation. Since 2003, very noticeable forms of securitization have existed, resulting in the same old restrictions as well as some new ones. City dwellers are still unable to access the river from Abu Nuwas Street for security reasons, namely, guaranteeing the safety of the fortified Green Zone across the river, a reason identical to that of the Ba’athist regime. Alcohol drinking is another case in point. As a result of the Faith Campaign, the state banned it, and people did it secretly. A rather similar situation is present today. The mayoralty invoked the immorality of alcohol drinking as one of the reasons behind its decision to demolish some restaurants in 2012. Now, this practice does not take place in restaurants. Rather, men of various age groups cautiously practice it in the northern part of the large park, despite security and moral constraints.

What makes the security situation direr still is the sectarian landscape of the post-invasion city. This reality is a recent one which came along with the occupation as a direct result of its political interventions, as demonstrated above. The constraining impacts of securitization of public space unequally affect city dwellers. In general, Sunnis have less leverage in negotiating their right to use and appropriate space. On Abu Nuwas Street, like elsewhere in the city, territory marking takes places along sectarian lines. Flags and banners conveying Shi'ite signs and messages exclude other markings on the street (i.e. Sunni markings).[33]

Despite these restrictive conditions, street users crafted opportunities from below, circumventing the security measures and making the public spaces in the street suitable for their purposes. They appropriate these places through everyday spatial practices, using tactics to lessen the dire effects of security and sectarian measures.[34] Activists, too, have striven to show an image of Baghdad different from that circulated in the media and related to war and violence by holding public events. These collective events (most famous is the “I am Iraqi, I Read” event) aim to convey messages related to love, peace and/or simply having fun.[35]

Therefore, public space in Abu Nuwas Street is contested. The aforementioned public events implicitly counter the political sectarianism and religious extremism ingrained in the reality of post-invasion Iraq.[36] For example, although perceptions of the Colors Festival (held in March, 2015 in the small park of Abu Nuwas Street) varied, some perceived it as being “morally disgusting” or as an act of “on-air prostitution,” “public and explicit insolence,” and others. The governor of Karbala said, commenting on the possibility of holding a similar event in the Shi'ite holy city, “such an event is not innocent, and its purpose is to spoil the youth and waste their energies through imported practices.” References to the ongoing war with ISIS usually accompany such derogatory comments to highlight the “inappropriateness” of the timing and content of such events. 

Although the leisurely socio-spatial practices which took place in the street in the 1950s-1970s era are no longer found today, perceptions about the street are still very much linked to that era. Many people celebrate the street as one for delight and enjoyment devoid of religious and/or sectarian associations and commercial imperatives. But this very celebration has made the street, as Pieri put it, a “contested window”,[37] in the late-1970s major (re)development projects as well as the recent investment plan. Tapping into the already significant symbolism of the street, as well as its location across the river from its headquarters, the Ba’athist regime implemented a number of major developments there. With regard to the recently proposed investment projects, whether these materialize the state’s need to control the practices in the parks’ public spaces, especially those which it perceives to be immoral such as alcohol-drinking or public events, and/or whether economic interests drive them, requires further investigation. In any case, they attest to the absence of any participatory planning practice sponsored by the pre- or post-invasion state. Hence, the absence of a meaningful democratic participation of city dwellers in planning one of the few remaining on-river open public spaces accessible to them. The decision whether or not to implement these projects is left exclusively to the mayor,[38] who, despite public scrutiny which would arise if they are implemented, can take the final decision.

Furthermore, the 2006 investment law has unleashed what appears to be a huge campaign of privatization, defined as the provision of destinations for a select public by private agents. These destinations are privately-owned and -administered spaces of consumption and “aggregation”–most commonly, malls–where the ability to purchase governs access, and where private security ensures predictability, regularity, and orderliness of users and their behaviors to ensure the “flow of commerce.”[39] In Baghdad, similar spaces offer a safer alternative to the traditional spaces of shopping, such as commercial streets, and recreation, such as parks, characterized by what seems to be an endemic lack of security. They also provide a more comfortable haven for women, who frequently suffer sexual harassment in the public spaces of the city. But, as Caldeira shows in the case of São Paulo, the proliferation of “fortified enclaves” creates a new model of spatial segregation, and transforms the quality of life, openness and free circulation, character of public space, and citizens’ participation.[40] In the case of Baghdad, it would be interesting to investigate whether the increasing number of privatized spaces for residence, consumption, leisure, and work is forming another layer of class segregation in addition to the sectarian-based segregation already in place. 

[The main body of this essay os extracted from my master’s thesis entitled Consolidating Socio-Spatial Practices in a Militarized Public Space: The Case of Abu Nuwas Street in Baghdad, which I submitted in September 2014 for the degree of Master of Urban Planning and Policy at the American University of Beirut. I would like to acknowledge the input of my thesis advisor Mona Harb, and of my thesis readers Ahmad Gharbieh and Caecilia Pieri. I would also like to thank Jadaliyya’s Cities Page Editors for their useful comments.]

------------------------------------------------------
[1] Salma Abdouelhossein, “Urbanism of Exception: Reflection on Cairo’s Long Lasting State of Emergency and its Spatial Production” (paper presented at the RC21 International Conference on The Ideal City: between myth and reality. Representations, policies, contradictions and challenges for tomorrow’s urban life, Urbino (Italy), 27-29 August, 2015). Accessed at http://www.rc21.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/D2-Abouelhossein.pdf on October 12, 2015.
[2] Kondolf G.M. et. al., “Connecting Cairo to the Nile: Renewing life and heritage on the river” (IURD Working Paper No. WP-2011-06. Department of Landscape Architecture & Environmental Planning, University of California, Berkeley, 2011). Accessed at http://ced.berkeley.edu/~cairo/CairoFinalReport.pdf on October 10 2015.
[3] Kristin V. Monroe, “Being Mobile in Beirut,” City & Society, 23, no. 1 (2011), 91-111.
[4] Mona Fawaz, Mona Harb, and Ahmad Gharbieh, “Living Beirut's Security Zones: An Investigation of the Modalities and Practice of Urban Security,” City & Society, 24, no. 2 (2012), 173-195.
[5] Khalid al-Sultani, “Ru’ā Mi‘māriya” (Arabic) (Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 2000).
[6]  Abd al-Razzaq al-Hassani, “al-‘Irāq Qadīman wa Ḥadīthan” (Arabic) (Saida: Maṭba‘at al-‘Irfān, 1958), 108.[7] Caecilia Pieri’s remarks for the author (February, 2014).
[8] “أبو نؤاس شارع السمك يقضي الليل وحيداً حالماً بالفرح,” Almada Newspaper, May 18 2012.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Abd al-Razzaq al-Hassani, “al-‘Irāq Qadīman wa Ḥadīthan,” 105.
[11] Caecilia Pieri, “Modernity and its Posts in Constructing an Arab Capital: Baghdad’s Urban Space and Architecture,” Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 42, no. 1-2 (2008), 32-42.
[12] “Abu Nawas Development Project,” ArchNet (source: AKTC). Accessed at http://archnet.org/library/sites/one-site.jsp?site_id=701 on August 31 2013.
[13] Caecilia Pieri, “Sites of Conflict: Baghdad’s Suspended Modernities versus a Fragmented Reality,” in Re-Conceptualizing Boundaries: Urban Design in the Arab World, edited by Robert Saliba (Ashgate, 2015): 199-212.
[14] Baida’ Kareem “أبو نواس: تاريخ في شارع,” Aljadidah News Network, April 19 2009. Accessed at http://aljadidah.com/2009/04/6460/ on August 31 2013.
[15] Yaseen Raad, “Diverse Socio-Spatial Practices in a Militarized Public Space: The Case of Abu Nuwas Street in Baghdad” (paper presented at a conference entitled Radical Increments: Toward New Platforms of Engaging Iraqi Studies, and organized by Muhsin al-Musawi and Yasmeen Hanoosh, Columbia University, April 21-24, 2015).
[16] Mona Damluji, “Securing Democracy in Iraq: Sectarian Politics and Segregation in Baghdad,” Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review 21, no. 2 (2010), 71-87.
[17] Derek Gregory, “The Biopolitics of Baghdad: Counterinsurgency and the Counter-City,” Human Geography 1, (2008), 6-27.
[18] Mona Damluji, “Securing Democracy in Iraq: Sectarian Politics and Segregation in Baghdad.”
[19] Ibid; it should be noted that Damluji’s work cited here has been key to my understanding of the political events and their impacts on the urban reality of post-invasion Baghdad. 
[20] Derek Gregory, “The Biopolitics of Baghdad: Counterinsurgency and the Counter-City.”
[21] The “surge” –officially known as the New Way Forward and declared by Bush in January 2007– has two characteristics different from the one preceding it, Operation Together Forward. The first is the considerable increase in troops (deploying extra 20,000 troops mainly in Baghdad), and the second is the incorporation of the “new counterinsurgency doctrine”. Such doctrine “defines the population as the center of gravity of military operations” (Ibid.). It also aims at prioritizing cultural awareness of American soldiers in relation to the context they operate in, in contrast to the previous counterinsurgency strategy that focused on tactical issues -smart bombs, unmanned vehicles, etc. (ibid.).
[22] Ibid.
[23] Mona Damluji, “Securing Democracy in Iraq: Sectarian Politics and Segregation in Baghdad.”
[24] A taxi driver in Baghdad told me that “no one wants to buy a home in Sunni neighborhoods nowadays” pointing out that living there is inconvenient due to the high security measures in place. 
[25] Also see: Joel Wing, “Columbia University Charts Sectarian Cleansing of Baghdad,” Musings on Iraq, November 19 2009. Accessed at http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2009/11/blog-post.html (on September 2013). Check the strip of Abu Nuwas Street in the Baghdad 2006 map and how it turned into a Shi'ite area while the rest of the al-Karrada district was mixed.
[26] “شارع أبو نؤاس يستعيد المقاهي والمطاعم,” Al-Shorfa.com. April 1 2008. Accessed at http://mawtani.al-shorfa.com/ar/articles/iii/features/2008/04/01/feature-03 on April 30, 2014.
[27] It should be noted that the streets are not for public vehicular access. Rather, they are service roads used by garbage-collection trucks and military vehicles. Also, park users walk on them especially the one in the middle.
[28] Interview conducted by the author with an owner of a carpentry workshop in the northern part of the street (January, 2014).
[29] For photos, see the Facebook page of the Jadriya Floating Restaurant. Accessed at https://www.facebook.com/JadriyaRest/photos/pb.240773886105361.-2207520000.1445192845./250785498437533/?type=3&theater on October 18 2015.
[30] An official document reviewed by the author in June, 2014 at the Directorate of Design of the Mayoralty of Baghdad.
[31] Yaseen Raad, “Diverse Socio-Spatial Practices in a Militarized Public Space: The Case of Abu Nuwas Street in Baghdad.”
[32] Yaseen Raad, “The Production of an Alternative Image through Public Space,” in Logics of Space in the Middle East Today, edited by Mohamed Elshahed and Mona Damluji (Cairobserver, 2015): 24-25.
[33] Yaseen Raad, “Diverse Socio-Spatial Practices in a Militarized Public Space: The Case of Abu Nuwas Street in Baghdad.”
[34] Ibid.
[35] Yaseen Raad, “The Production of an Alternative Image through Public Space.”
[36] Ibid.
[37] Caecilia Pieri’s remarks for the author (September, 2014).
[38] An interview with employees of the Directorate of Design of the Mayoralty of Baghdad (June, 2014).
[39] Steven Flusty, “Building Paranoia,” in Architecture of Fear, edited by Nan Ellin (Princeton Architectural Press, 1997): 47-60.
[40] Teresa P. R. Caldeira, City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.] 
 

Regional and International Relations
Lockheed Martin, Boeing Rally Around Saudi Arabia, Wave off Humanitarian Concerns Lee Fang says that representatives from two major defense contractors whose advanced weaponry is being used in the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen were quick to defend the human rights record of the kingdom. 

Anger at Cameron’s £100,000 trip to honour dead Saudi king
Environmental and human rights groups express outrage that UK taxpayers spent more than £100,000 for David Cameron trip to Saudi Arabia to pay his respects following the death of King Abdullah in January. 

Iran and Saudi Arabia ramp up hostile rhetoric to new levels
Ian Black argues that Riyadh and Tehran have thrown diplomatic niceties to the wind and are attacking each other without restraint over Syria and Yemen.

Iran returns Saudi accusations of cross-border meddling
Iran rejects criticism from Saudi Arabia about Tehran’s intervention in unstable countries in the Middle East.

Saudi says difficult to see role for Iran in Syria peacemaking
The Saudi foreign minister says that Iran’s military role in Syria prevents it from playing a role in peacemaking efforts in the conflict.

Ex-PM of Qatar to invoke diplomatic immunity in UK torture case
A former Qatari prime minister is attempting to use his UK diplomatic immunity to halt a court case in London where he is accused of torturing a British citizen. 

Saudi foreign minister says Russian actions in Syria "very dangerous"
The Saudi foreign minister condemns Russia’s intervention in Syria. 

Qatar says could intervene militarily in Syria but prefers political solution
The Qatari foreign minister suggests that Qatar could intervene militarily following Russia’s intervention in support of the Syrian president. 

Oil prices slip on Chinese demand concerns, weak Saudi exports
Oil prices fell last week due to concerns about the pace of economic growth in China, and signs that global oversupply is curbing Saudi crude exports. 

US 'clock boy' Ahmed Mohamed to move to Qatar Ahmed Mohamed, the fourteen-year old boy from Texas whose teacher mistook his homemade clock for a bomb, will move to Qatar with his family.
 

Reports and Opinions

Saudi court upholds death sentence for Shi'ite cleric
Saudi Arabia’s Supreme Court rejected an appeal against the death sentence passed this year on Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr.  

U.S. Ally Saudi Arabia Prepares to Behead, Crucify Pro-Democracy Protester Ali Mohammed al-Nimr
Amy Goodman and Nermeen Shaikh interview Clive Stafford Smith on Ali Mohammed al-Nimr’s imminent execution. 

2015 hajj stampede deadliest ever as foreign governments put toll at 1,849
A news report on the latest death toll from the Hajj stampede.

Saudi prince avoids charges over alleged sex assaults in LA
Los Angeles prosecutors say that they will not press charges against a Saudi prince accused of sexual assault.

Bahrain charges 24 with trying to set up Islamic State branch in kingdom
Twenty-four people face trial in Bahrain for trying to set up a branch of the Islamic State.
 

Repression in Bahrain

Bahrain's Shi'ite clerics criticize removal of Ashura flags
Senior Shi‘i Bahraini clerics criticized the removal of Ashura banners raised to commemorate the anniversary of the death of Prophet Mohammad’s grandson.

Crisis in Yemen 

Yemen is shattered and peace seems a long way off. The world can’t just watch on
Farea Al-Muslimi and Rafat Al-Akhali assert that the continued conflict in Yemen has led to the death of thousands and is feeding the Islamic State and al-Qa‘ida.

Several Yemeni fishermen killed in Saudi-led strikes: witnesses
At least forty people, including several fishermen, died when Saudi-led coalition strikes hit two Yemeni islands on the Red Sea. 

U.N. plans Yemen peace talks soon, warns of aid obstruction
The United Nations envoy to Yemen was arranging face-to-face negotiations between the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels but warned of a “disastrous humanitarian situation” that has left most of the country in dire need.

Heavy fighting breaks out in Yemen's Taiz city, ICRC says situation 'dire’
At least twenty Houthi fighters died in heavy clashes in Taiz.

Rockets fired by Houthis kill 14 civilians in Yemen: medical sources
Fourteen civilians died in Taiz when shells fired by Houthis and their allies fell on their neighborhoods. 

Sectarian hate takes root as Yemen anti-Houthi forces push on Sanaa
Angus McDowall examines sectarian tension in Yemen.

Drone crashes in Yemeni province of Marib, witnesses, local official say
An unmanned drone crashed in the Wadi Abida area of Marib last week.
 

Migrant Workers

The vanished: the Filipino domestic workers who disappear behind closed doors
Annie Kelly and Hazel Thompson report on Marilyn Restor, who left her family in the Philippines to work for a member of the Saudi ruling family but never returned.

Human Rights

Saudi Arabia Must Not Execute Ali Mohammed Baqir al-Nimr Amnesty International has circulated a petition calling on the Saudi regime not to execute Ali Mohammed al-Nimr.

With the Saudis, the West Should Take No Prisoners
Human Rights Watch’s Adam Coogle reports on Saudi Arabia’s dismal human rights record.

Yemen: Houthis Shell Civilians in Southern City
Human Rights Watch expresses concern over the Houthis’ shelling of neighborhoods in Taiz.

Bahrain: On her birthday, Zainab Al-Khawaja sentenced to one-year in prison on appeal, other cases postponed
The Gulf Center for Human Rights reports on the possibility of Bahraini authorities taking Zainab al-Khawaja into custody to serve her jail sentence.

Saudi Arabia: Human rights defender Dr. Abdulkarim Al-Khodr sentenced to 10 years in prison
The Gulf Center for Human Rights condemns the Saudi authorities’ decision to sentence Abdulkarim al-Khodar to ten years in prison.

Joris Luyendijk, Swimming with Sharks: My Journey into the World of the Bankers. London: Faber & Faber, 2015.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Joris Luyendijk (JL): I wanted to know how bankers can live with themselves. I was a complete outsider to finance when the Guardian approached me in 2011 to do an anthropological investigation into the world of London-based bankers. The idea was to try to open up for our readers a complex field such as finance by asking those Guardian readers working in finance to explain how their world functions. There is a very strictly policed code of silence in the City of London, and yet hundreds of insiders came forward to tell their stories.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

JL: It looks at the world of finance through the eyes of people working there. And guess what: they are not monsters! That is the good news. The bad news: Banks are monstrous organizations. Over the past forty years deregulation, globalization, and new technology have conspired to create a whole range of conflicts of interest in the very architecture of the financial system. The result is perverse incentives: that is, bankers are often rewarded for behavior that is actually damaging to their clients, their own bank, their bank's shareholders, or the taxpayer. The problem is not that bankers are evil; the problem is that banks are structured in such a way that all too often decent actions are punished and indecent yet legal actions are rewarded. Hence the need for structural overhaul rather than vague calls for “cultural change” or nicer bankers.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

JL: I used to work as Middle East correspondent, trying to explain how the world looks from the perspective of a Jewish settlers, Hamas or Hezbollah activists, or Egyptian generals. I had wound up in the Middle East more or less by coincidence; I was studying anthropology and needed a “people” to do fieldwork on. Egypt seemed like a nice place, so I learnt the language and spent a year there. This led to a book that sold well enough in Holland and Belgium to get me a job as correspondent in 1998. After covering the second intifadah, the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, I returned to Amsterdam and got very interested in innovation, particularly in marrying anthropological methods with journalism. The Guardian then brought me over to London for this banking blog.

Comparing the representation of both fields, it sometimes feels as if the way many right-wing people in the West look at Muslims and Arabs mirrors the way many left-wing people look at bankers; both know very little about the group they despise and seem quite comfortable with their ignorance. This then is step one on the way to a better financial system: replace genuine anger with dispassionate insight.

Another parallel is the culture of fear, both in Arab dictatorships and in banks. Talking to a journalist is a sackable offense. The fear in people this engendered and the need for secrecy and anonimization was not unlike, say, Iraq under Saddam, Syria under Assad, and even Egypt under Mubarak.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

JL: Far more voters across the West need to realize just how dangerous the global financial sector has become, how banks took us to the brink of literally unimaginable chaos in 2008, and that the deeper causes of all this have not been taken away. The world of finance in its current form is a clear and present danger and no country is exempt, since the financial sector is now truly global. Bankers I spoke to were hoarding food in September 2008. Some were preparing their children for evacuation to the countryside. The fear ran that deep. And since then? Lots of new rules, lots of promises about cultural change, but almost zero structural reform. We are still stuck with the system that nearly crashed the global economy.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

JL: Understanding the mindset of bankers is enough for now. I am also getting more and more interested in the political side of this: politicians are aware of how dangerous finance is. Why don't they act? One answer seems legal corruption, such as campaign finance and the revolving door, but there is also a kind of prisoner's dilemma. Globalization means that finance now operates globally, but politics only on the national or regional level. As a result, banks can play off countries against each other, threatening to leave if measures come that would make them safer yet less lucrative. And this they do, shamelessly, which raises the question: Can globalization ever be democratic if it shifts the power balance so decisively in favor of the global banks?

J: What methodologies did you use in your research for this book?  

JL: I wrote a piece in the Guardian saying: look, there must be bankers reading this; are you happy with the way we over at the Guardian are covering your industry? If not, come and talk to me. I know you can be fired for talking to me so I'll guarantee your anonymity. Soon enough, volunteers began to come forward, allowing me to interview around two hundred of them over the course of two years.

J: What surprised you most?

JL: Just how many perverse incentives you find in the world of finance. When a risk goes well, the bank and the banker get a big bonus; when the risk does not go well, the shareholder and taxpayer pick up the bill. That's a recipe for disaster. Banks remain too big to fail and as they say in London: Capitalism without the possibility of default is like Catholicism without hell. Or playing Russian Roulette with someone else's head.

It wasn't always like this; until the mid-1980s, the risky part of banking was done in partnerships where management and owners overlapped and the top was personally liable. That created a very different culture, one of “long term greedy”: making money with your bank and your client. These days we have a system of “short term greedy”: making money at the expense of the client and the bank.

Another thing that surprised me is that insiders are well aware of what is wrong, but they feel powerless or just don't care. They also told me: ordinary voters won't understand anyway; all they're interested in are bonuses. I don't agree. I think if you start at the beginning and tell the story of finance though the stories of people working there, you can open up a complex subject like finance to a wide audience. The sales figures of this book in my native Holland prove it. Since its publication in mid-February, the Dutch edition has sold over two hundred thousand copies, or one per minute, 24/7.

Excerpts from Swimming With Sharks: My Journey into the World of the Bankers

Are Master of the Universe types really this self-assured? I was given the opportunity to look behind the façade just once. It started with an email:

“Do you speak to happy bankers at all? Your interviewees all seem so…miserable.”

We met for lunch in a restaurant on Canary Wharf surrounded by hundreds of people dividing their attention between the food on their plate, the person sitting opposite them, and their phone (or phones). He was a salesman aged around forty-five with the rank of director and worked for a megabank in “treasury sales.” To manage its internal cash flows his bank had developed special instruments which the happy banker sold as products to companies and other financial institutions.

We ordered our food and he said that my blog was making him “a little worried. Readers get a distorted picture of finance. There are many happy bankers out there. I love my job and I think treasury is useful, too. We manage and hedge the bank's risks, and help clients manage theirs; who could be against that?”

He shrugged his shoulders: “Some on your blog are so negative about the sector…It's not very kind to say, but they just didn't make it. They get kicked out and then they go complain to the media. It's tough to take, obviously. You had to go while your colleague is still at his desk. Because he was better. Getting sacked at a bank is like getting dumped by a woman who says: ‘It's not me, it's you.’”

The “competitive element” had attracted him to banking and he found the meritocratic culture irresistible, “knowing that those who don't make the grade get cut. I'm the kind of person who wants to swim with sharks and see if I can survive. To feel myself grow when challenged by harsh, achievement-driven standards. Happy bankers are those who don't do it for the money but for the thrill.”

At university he was a dropout but his bank had never even asked him about his qualifications. Nor had he ever encountered racism, sexism, or homophobia. “The simple reason is that people just don't give a fuck who you are. It's what you can do.”

He stopped talking for a moment and, as I caught up on my note-taking, I remember thinking: fascinating, a genuine twenty-five-carat Master of the Universe. Almost everyone in his bank were fine and decent people, he insisted. “Yes, you have the odd evil exception. Why don't banks kick these out? Well, as long as they make money for the banks that's really hard to do.”

With a grin he began to talk about a dinner he had gone to the other day. “People from different walks of life. A woman asked me what I did for a living. Now, I know that some colleagues try to hide they are bankers, but that's not my style. So we were sitting in a group and before me this guy said: ‘I am a surgeon.’ That went down very well with some of the ladies, obviously. When my turn came I said I was a banker. A fierce discussion broke out with people saying, look at that surgeon, now he is doing something useful. And I went: ‘I think banking is just as useful.’ So this woman next to me explodes into a tirade about bankers being parasites and what have you. She really had a go at me, but under the table her hand was riding up the inside of my thigh. It's an irresistible mix for some women; this idea of bankers as rich and evil bad boys.”

That was the happy banker. I sent over a draft version of his words, he removed an anecdote about a failed deal that might be traced back to him but just before I was going to publish his interview he sent me an email. Could I wait?

We agreed to meet again, this time in the aptly named Le Coq d’Argent. It is an expensive roof-terrace bar and restaurant overlooking the former stock exchange in the heart of the old City. A few weeks earlier a banker had committed suicide by jumping from the roof and a high fence had just been installed.

Suicide was not on the happy banker's mind but it was a different person sitting before me. The week before we met he had received “the call.” Only when he was standing outside phoning his wife to say he had been made redundant had he allowed himself to feel something. “Telling her what happened and what this meant for us financially. Only then did I become emotional, when I felt the impact this would have on my family. I went back into the office a few days later, to help a few people out with outstanding stuff, and I could tell they had had a pep talk about having been spared. I remember those, after earlier waves.”

We ordered another coffee—he was no longer a busy man. “Perhaps I already sensed what was coming,” he suggested, referring to our earlier interview. “Maybe the decision had been made already by top management and I had unconsciously picked up on it? Maybe I was mentally preparing myself when talking to you the way I did.”

He said that looking back now he may have fallen victim to the “self-serving idea that we control our fate; as long as you're good, nothing bad can happen to you, and since nothing bad has happened to me, it must mean I am good and therefore safe; that sort of thing. In the same way military men tell themselves that they can't die because they don't make mistakes. But the best soldier can drive over a land mine.”

It had gone exactly as he had thought it would. “My boss called me on my desk and something was up with his voice; could I come down to the first floor? It felt like I was walking up to the firing squad.”

They had given him the bad news right away, just like he knew they would, even using the time-tested formula of “it's not you, it's us.” There were several people of his rank for a shrinking number of positions, they told him. The others had more experience.

They were immensely practical, he said, outlining the procedure in clear steps. And then that was it. He said he was proud of how he had held himself together. “Taking it on the chin, not getting emotional, maintaining a professional approach. In fact my boss said: ‘When my time comes I hope I'll have the presence of mind to take the news like you have.’”

He understood why the bank had blocked his phone and email the moment the meeting with his boss began. “I might go nuts and call clients, send off a string of crazy emails to them, or to the CEO…All the client contracts are in the office, their files…I can see why someone is immediately cordoned off when made redundant; his presence can only be disruptive.”

As he was packing his personal belongings under the watchful eye of a security guard, a colleague who hadn't heard yet came up to him for some business-related issue. “So, I actually had to tell him: ‘Look, I've just been made redundant.’ Then he asked me for help on something; effectively a handover chat.” The happy banker let out a sigh and said in a forgiving voice, “Clumsiness, of course.” A few minutes later he was standing outside with his stuff and a blocked security pass, calling his wife.

He said he was no longer in touch with colleagues, socially. “Going out we'd mainly talk about work; what would be the point? Also, there's this mercenary quality to life in an investment bank. Given how tough things have got in the industry people are careful about bonding; it can be over in a minute.”

We could hear by the noise of the cars beneath that rush hour was approaching and around us on the roof terrace the first few smartly dressed people were filing in for cocktail hour. When I ordered another round of coffees they came with more of those delicious cookies to justify the crazy price.

“Obviously I am really sorry for what happened,” I started out, slightly gingerly. “But you will agree that this is a really interesting laboratory experiment.” I hesitated again but if you want to “swim with the sharks” you should be able to handle a painful question. “Earlier, you said that only the best survive in investment banks. Now you have been let go...”

The look in his eyes nearly made me regret having said anything. “I still do not think investment banking is a terrible environment. It's not for everyone, sure, but it's my natural state. Research shows that the life of a wild animal is mostly suffering: stress and fear and pain. Yet do we believe pets to be happier? I'd rather be the wild animal.”

[Excerpted from Joris Luyendijk, Swimming With Sharks: My Journey into the World of the Bankers, by permission of the author. © 2015 Faber & Faber. For more information, or to purchase this book, click here.]

[مقتطف من كتاب جديد عنوانه"إلى أن قامت الحرب: نساء في الثورة السورية"، سيصدر قريباً لدى "دار رياض نجيب الريس" في بيروت. يستند الكتاب إلى مقابلات أجرتها جمعية "استيقظت" السورية النسوية مع نساء سوريات، وقد سجّل فريق "استيقظت" شهاداتهنّ وسِيرهن في يوميات الثورة. قام الكاتب بصياغة هذه الشهادات والسيَر وكتابتها وإعدادها للنشر].

  ذاتالرداءالأحمروذاتالحجابالأبيض 

في اعتصام "أوقفوا القتل"، قطعت صفاء شارع البرلمان وبيدها شمعة. أوقفت السيارات عند إشارة المرور، وهتفت: "الله سوريا حرية وبس"، ليهتف فوج الشبيحة الذين سبقوا المعتصمين القليلين إلى المكان: "الله سوريا بشار وبس". أوقعها أحدهم أرضاً، فظلت تركله، وتركل الهواء، وهي ملقاة تحت قدميه في عرض الشارع. هاربة، أمام مقهى في شارع العابد ليست متأكدة من اسمه "الروضة"، أعادتها إلى الوراء استغاثة فتاة وحيدة، ذات ثوب أحمر ويضربها شخصان: "كرمى لله يا خالة لا تتركيني". كان الشبان قد اختفوا إذ بدأ الضرب. صفاء إحدى السيدات اللواتي تتحول دماثتهن ووداعتهن إلى "شراسة في الحق" حين يخلّصن بعض الفتيات من قبضة الأمن، متشبثات بهن، مثلما فعلت أمام جامع الحسن في الميدان وجامع الإيمان، وتمنت لو فعلت الشيء ذاته أمام الجامع الأموي، لو كانت هناك إلى جوار الفتاة، ذات النظارة الشمسية وعلم سوريا يدثر كتفيها، لتسحبها من التظاهرة الصغيرة التي اعتبرت إحدى الشرارات الأولى لبدايات الثورة. شبيح أحمر اللحية، وعضلاته كلاعبي كمال الأجسام، أمسك بصفاء قبالة البرلمان ونزع حجابها الأبيض. جرّها، وهو يركلها ويصفعها، إلى سيارة انطلقت إلى فرع تسميه فرع حافظ مخلوف، حيث التعذيب على أشده، وشعر الفتيات المقتلع يغطي الأرض في الممرات وغرف التحقيق. تقاسمت صفاء المنفردة مع هبة التي أسمعها الضابط في التحقيق أنه "حتى في أمريكا هناك رشى وسرقات يا بنتي. الدكتور بشار، سيادة الرئيس، هو الذي عيّن رجال الأمن، والتشكيك بهم تشكيك به". كانت كلتاهما تتيمّمان وتصليان في السر، تلهجان بالأدعية، وتستظهران ما تتذكران من سورة "يس"؛ هبة الطالبة الجامعية التي كانت تنام كثيراً، فتنعس حين تخاف وتغفو في الخطر، وتخدر بنومها أطراف صفاء التي أراحها الإفراج عن رفيقتها الصغيرة، فقد اتسعت فسحة النوم على الأقل، وصار بوسعها أن تمد أطرافها التي ظلت تحتال على طيها وبسطها أياماً، حائرةً كيف ستنام. 

أفرج عن هبة بفردة حذاء واحدة، بعد أن تركت تحت الوسادة سواراً من الصوف، مغزولاً على شكل علم الاستقلال أو علم الثورة، ولفتتها في الخارج كلمة "حلاوة" التي سمعتها بالصدفة، إذ استرجعت على الفور حلاوةَ السجن الأشبهَ بالتراب. كانت قد قرأت فظاعات لا تُنسى في رواية "القوقعة"، واستفادت مما قرأت في التحوط والحذر. سُرق هاتفها في باص الأمن، على الطريق إلى الفرع، وشهدت كيف تحرش عنصر بفتاة كانت تبكي وتتوسل ألا يغتصبوها، فمدّ يده من المقعد الأمامي وقرص رجلها، ثم شد شعرها وانهالت الأكفّ، والفتاة الباكية نسيت كيف تُتلى الفاتحة، في ذاك الهلع الذي زاد عناصر الدورية سعاراً، فبدأوا يعابثونها بفكرة الاغتصاب المروعة حين علموا أنها من حمص. كانت المعتَقلات مرغَمات على التحديق بأرض الباص، وترديد النشيد العربي السوري. ممنوعٌ رفع الرأس. كان الإطراق خيراً من الحملقة بتلك الوجوه البغيضة. المعتقلات لسن سواسية، بعضهن عائدات من سوق الصالحية وعبرن بالصدفة- نائحات أمضين على تعهدات بيض الأوراق وخرجن بعد تدخلات سريعة غامضة، وبعضهن من "المندسات" اللواتي لا يندر بينهن الاعتقاد بأن دورهن قد انتهى، وقد قمن بما عليهن، ويتوجب الآن الرضوخ لإلحاح الأهل بالتوقف عن أية مشاركة في الثورة. أسكت الضابط اللواتي بقين حين بدأن الحكي جميعاً. في لغط الخائفات ذاك وقفت هبة التي إذا خافت ضحكت، كتمت ضحكها لكيلا تشتد الضربات على ظهرها، وهي المحجبة الوحيدة بينهن، الموصومة بـ "أم بقجة"، ترى بزاوية عينها الرقاب التي احمرّت بالصفعات، وكيف تقطع الباكياتُ الممرَّ إلى المهجع حيث أينما التفتن وجدن "يا رب" محفورة في الجدران، وعلى وجوه بعضهن وأذرعهن الخدوش التي تركتها أظافر شبيحات هاجمنْهُنّ أمام البرلمان، وهن يصحن صياح رجال الأمن نفسه: "هاي هي الحرية الليبدكن ياها؟" 

الأب والابنوجسدالأم 

اعتصام آخر من أجل أطفال الحولة أمام المستشفى الإيطالي بدمشق. كان مخترَقاً. اعتُقلت نساء عديدات، إحداهن صفاء التي اعتادت لسكناها في الغوطة أزيز الرصاص. اقتربت من عنصر يطلق النار في الهواء، وقالت: "نحن أهلك وأخواتك"، كررت ما قالته من قبل لعنصر أمن آخر أطلق النار أثناء مأتم في القابون، وأتاها الجواب: "انقلعي وإلا قتلتك!" لم يستجب لصيحاتها أحد من المارة أو أصحاب المحلات. لم تكن لتتخيل قط مقدرتها على مواجهة رجل أمن هكذا. العنصر الذي تعرف إليها في فرع الخطيب تشفّى من معاودتها الاحتجاج، فآذى قدمها وأغرقها بالبصاق. ما رُوعيت بتاتاً. تمادى في تحقيرها تحقيراً مضاعفاً: "أنتم الفلسطينيون خونة، بِعتم أرضكم للصهاينة، وتريدون الآن أن تبيعوا أرضنا أيضاً. لُعن أبوك يا بنت الكلب..." يمطرها بالشتائم، هي جالسة على كرسي، معصوبة العينين ويداها مقيدتان وراء ظهرها، وهو يحوم زاعقاً متوعداً بالضرب وما هو أشنع، ما سمعتْ عنه وما لم تسمعْ. أشدُّ ما آلمها، وأبكاها حين عادت وحدها، أنه شتم أباها المتوفي، المترجم الفلسطيني الذي درست الأدب الإنكليزي بمشورته، وكان زميلاً لتوفيق البجيرمي في كلية الآداب بدمشق. عنه أخذتُ الترجمة التي أعيش من مزاولتها، تقول صفاء، وظللتُ أزاولها بالمراسلة من المنزل. لازمتُ البيت بعد أن أنجبت أولادي. أنهى الإنجاب أربعة أعوام من العمل الرتيب في المراسم بوزارة الخارجية. كان المردود معقولاً، وابنتي المقيمة في الإمارات تزودني بالكتب الأجنبية، وحالياً ترسل إلي كل شهر مبلغاً صغيراً، يكاد لا يغطي شيئاً من أبسط النفقات. أعيش على الكفاف، لكنني سعيدة على الرغم من كل شيء. مثلي مثل الذين خسروا منازلهم وباتوا في العراء، لكنني على الأقل تخلصتُ من قيود زواج مبكر أثقل بفشله على حياتي كلها. كان الانفصال محتماً. كنا قد وصلنا إلى نقطة تبدد فيها معنى الأمل. ثلاثون عاماً من التعاسة وضعتُ لها مختلف الأقنعة، ولا أعلم حقاً كيف مرَّ كل هذا الوقت لأقف الآن على عتبة الخمسين.

تتذكر صفاء كيف أغضى أبوها، وتسارعت خطاه حين رأى مع طفلته رجلين يضربان مراهقاً في حديقة السبكي. لم يجب عن استفسارها "من هؤلاء؟"، فظنت رجلي الأمن من أقرباء الفتى. كذلك لا تنسى رجل أمن آخر تفرّج عليها وهي طالبة إعدادية تُضْرب أمامه في غرفة الإدارة، فقط لأنها قالت بطيش المراهقات "أنا أكره حافظ الأسد"، ومديرة المدرسة تنوب عنه في الضرب إلى أن أمرها "كفى". بعد انصرافه اعتذرت منها المديرة. لقد اضطرت إلى القيام بذلك، لأنه هددها شخصياً. صفاء ترعرعت على الكتمان، فالناس اعتادوا أن يخفِضوا أصواتهم، ويتلفتوا عند الكلام في المحظورات السياسية، ولو حتى داخل منازلهم، كأن المخبرين مبثوثون في الهواء. فكيف ستنسى الحقد الذي ربته المظالم والفقر، وأيُّ وعي تفتح على المأساة منذ البداية؟ لو كنا في عهد حافظ الأسد، تقول، لأبادنا أجمعين منذ البداية، مثلما فعل هو وأخوه رفعت، فأبادا أهالي حماة ودمّرا مدينتهم، أما ابنه فاعتمد الإبادة التدريجية. بمتابعة ما جرى في تونس ومصر وليبيا، مثل سوريين كثيرين، ترقبت صفاء في السر وصول الموجة إلى سوريا. استبعدت ذلك، مرجِّحة أن السوريين لن يثوروا أبداً. ومثل كثيرين أيضاً، ترى في بشار الأسد شخصية مهزوزة تتفلسف، لكنهم أذيال نظام أبيه الذين رفعوه إلى سدة الحكم، هُم مَن استماتوا في الذود عن مصالحهم، لأن رحيله سيؤذن بنهايتهم أيضاً، فواصلوا القتل وإطلاق أوامر القتل، وعلى يديه وأيديهم تحققت كل الكوابيس، إذ لم يتخيل أحد الانتهاء عند هذه الأشكال المريعة من الموت. لم تصدّقْ ما رأته على شاشة التلفزيون من تهليل وتصفيق لضحكاته البلهاء، في خطابه بمجلس الشعب بعد مقتلة درعا الأولى. أمام ذاك المبنى نفسه ضُربتْ، وتحت قبته شُرّعت التجاوزات، وجرى تعديل الدستور خلال دقائق ليرث الابنُ كرسيَّ أبيه. ربما اعتدنا القمع، تقول صفاء، وعلينا التخلص من هذا الميراث. لن نصل إلى أية نتيجة سريعاً، لن يلمس نبيٌّ أحوالنا بمعجزة. لا أصدق، ولا أستوعب، كيف لنا أن نظلم بعضنا بعضاً بعد كل هذه المحن، ونتحسّر لأن هذه الأهوال لم تقع في عهود استقرار الأسدين، إذ كنا ضعافاً وجبناء. أيامنا مفتوحة على المجهول، وطموحاتي محدودة وقليلة، إذ ما نفع الآمال الكبرى في واقعٍ أعرفه جيداً؟ لو عاد الزمن إلى الوراء لأقدمتُ مرة أخرى على ما قمتُ به خلال الثورة. أعلم أن العدل سيتأخر كثيراً، ولكن ربما علينا مواصلة الصبر، ومواجهة أنفسنا دون تذمر، وقد يأتي أكفّاء لا يهدرون دماء الشهداء سدى.

سُئلت صفاء في فرع الخطيب عن ابنها. "لا بد أنه مع الجيش الكر"، سخر المحقق، متوعداً بأنهم سيجلبونه ويعذبونه أمامها. لم يعرف أحد بما تضمر من ألم. ابنها طالب طب أخّره عن التخرج اعتقاله مرتين، وقد خلع الأهالي لقب "دكتور" على أقرانه من طلبة الطب الذين عملوا في المستشفيات الميدانية في الغوطة. اختفى في إحدى المظاهرات السلمية الأولى في حرستا، حين لم يكن للمسلحين أيُّ أثر؛ تم توقيفه يوماً واحداً. ذهبت أمه تبحث عنه بين الجرحى في المستشفى الوطني، ورأت بأم العين كيف أردى رصاصُ الأمن شاباً شهيداً. اعتُقل ابنها مرة أخرى فيما بعد، ثلاثة أسابيع في فرع فلسطين. زار وأصدقاءه أمَّه، بعد خروجها من اعتقالها الثاني، مهنئين محتفين بسلامتها، وعانقها عناقاً مشتاقاً حاراً. لكنه بعد القطيعة بين أبويه، لم يتفهم وجهة نظر أمه بتاتاً. إنه لا يقبل بظهورها كمطلقة في المجتمع، ويرى أن الأنسب هو بقاؤها منفصلة دون طلاق رسمي. اتصل بأزواج النساء اللواتي يدعمن أمه، وأفهمهم ما معناه "إن أمي خطر على زوجاتكم". إثر هذا التحذير من شاب مستقيم مثله، ازدادت قناعاته تزمتاً في الآونة الأخيرة، بتن يخشين الاحتكاك معها، ورفضنها مصدقاتٍ ما سمعنَ، أو مجاراةً لرفض أزواجهن. ما عدن يرسلن إليها التبرعات التي تأتي من أقرباء لهن خارج البلاد مقتنعين بقضية الثورة. لكن رب العالمين لا يغلق باباً إلا ليفتح غيره، فليسامح الله ابني الذي أساء إلي كثيراً، تقول صفاء. إنه قطعة مني ونسخة عني. صادفته منذ أيام في أحد شوارع مسرابا. اندفعتُ نحوه متلهفة لأحضنه، فأمسك بيدي على الملأ، راجياً: "لا تحرجيني". أنا الملامة لأنني عصيته. 

حين كان المحقّق يسألها عن أسرتها، ربما لم يكن يعلم أن حياتها تلك قد انتهت تقريباً، ولم يبقَ لها أحد. إنها الوحيدة بين إخوتها وأخواتها مَن شاركت في الثورة، شدّت على يدها أختُها التي هُجّرت من داريا. ابنتها طالبة البكالوريا تقيم مع زوجها، كانت ترعاها وتصحبها حتى إلى باص المدرسة، كما لو كانت طفلة، ولو رأت حقاً أحوال مَن تعمل أمها من أجلهم لغيّرت رأيها وازدادت عطفاً. لعلّ البيت الكبير والدافئ، في كنف والدها وعمتها، أعماها مؤقتاً وأنساها الشظف الذي يقاسيه الناس. 

مسَّ قلب صفاء في المحكمة شرطيٌّ شابّ خاطبها "يا أمي"، صعد بها الدرج إلى قاعة المحاكمات في القصر العدلي، معتذراً وهو يضع القيود في يديها، لأن الكاميرات تراقبه. خفّف موقفه من الوقع المهين لتفتيش الشرطية. برجوعها إلى السجن حاولت صفاء بعضاً من المرح، فبدتْ كمَن تستعيد أحلام صباها المسكونة بالأفلام المصرية، كالحلم بالعمل محامية، لتساعد وتفهم أمثال الراقصة "عبدو" التي كانت تُضحك السجينات بالرقص في المهجع؛ نصحتها صفاء بأن تستهدي بالله، وتفتح بقالية عند خروجها، عوضاً عن العمل في الطاحونة الحمراء وملاهي أخرى. 

 فور الخروج من السجن، برائحة المعتقلات التي تغلغلت في ثيابها وجلدها، ذهبت صفاء تعود أمها التي خرجت للتو من العناية الصدرية المشددة. رجتها أمُّها المريضة، مثلما كانت ترجوها دائماً، الكفَّ عما تفعله في الريف، والاعتناء بمظهرها وعدم ارتداء نفس الملابس دائماً. توفيت بعد أيام قليلة، ولامت الابنة نفسها كأنها أحد أسباب ذاك الموت، هي التي حاولت في المعتقل أن تحتوي وتساند المنهارات وتضحك الباكيات، فذلك بالنسبة إليها دورها الطبيعي، غدت بغتة مستنزَفة، وأمامها أيام طوال من الوحدة والنحيب والكآبة البشعة. لكلِّ فعلٍ ضريبته، لقد ابتعدنا عن ذوينا وخسرناهم، ولا بد لنا من بداية. عانيتُ الأمرّين مع زوجي، فهو كرجل شرقي لا يراني نداً له، ولا يجوز لي إبداء رأيي في شيء، تقول صفاء. تفاقمت خلافاتهما تدريجياً، بدءاً من مشاركاتها الأولى في تنظيم مظاهرات صغيرة، فما عاد يصادفها دائماً، مثلما اعتاد في الماضي، عند رجوعه إلى البيت. بدأ يُملي على زوجته صواب السلوك، ويسيء الظن بالنوايا، فالخروج عن رأيه نقيصة لكليهما وعيب مشين. "أرأيت ما ألحقتهِ بنفسكِ وبنا؟" أسمعها موشَّحاً من التوبيخات بعد اعتقالها، وكأن كلَّ مَن اعتُقلت اغتُصبت. الاغتصاب، هذا الهاجس الأفظع، هو ما يتوارد أولاً إلى أذهان معظم الناس حين يُحكى عن اعتقال أية امرأة، لكن صفاء ليست إحدى ضحاياه اللواتي يكتمن رعبهنّ بالتناسي. طلبت مخالعة بالتراضي يستلزم حصولها موافقة الزوجين. رفض الزوج، وأنّب المحامية عندما زارته ليتفاهما، ففي دعوة التفريق يستطيع المماطلة أعواماً، لتظل زوجته لا تدري ما تفعل في هذه الحيرة، والعمر يتقدم والوقت يمضي. القوانين لا تنصف المرأة، والمآسي تتوالى، ولا حب يخفف القليل من شدة وقعها. سُئلت كثيراً عن هذا الانفصال، وما دواعيه الآن. ربما لم أكن الأنثى التي حلم بها، تقول صفاء. ميولها تعاف المكياج والتبرُّج، ولعلها أخطأت بهذا الإهمال الذي لم يطَلْ تدبيرها شؤون المنزل والمطبخ. لم يخدع أي منهما الآخر، ولربما أسعده الارتباط بامرأة أخرى. لكن بعض العلاقات قد تدوم أكثر بالكتمان، وليس من الضروري المصارحة والإفصاح عن كل شيء، حتى لأقرب المقرَّبين.

حدّثتْ إحدى صديقاتها الصغيرات: هل من المعقول أن يرضى الله بممارسة المرأة للجنس مع زوجٍ لا تحبه في علاقة مقرفة للغاية، بينما يتوعدها بالويل إذا مارست الحب مع رجل آخر تحبه؟ أليس هذا بالأمر الغريب؟ حياتي كجسدي ملكي أنا، لا ضرر ولا ضرار، تقول صفاء. ستُغفر الذنوب، إلا الإساءة إلى الآخرين وهتك أعراضهم. لا يغرّ حجابي أحداً ممن يعرفني. لقد وضعته عن قناعة شخصية وأنا في الثامنة والعشرين من عمري. ليس فرضاً أو إكراهاً، وإن تمنّيته لكل النساء. أصلّي ولست بمتعصبة لأحد. لا أتنقّب ولا أرتدي المعطف الطويل، وأدرك معنى أن تحكمنا دولة إسلامية ستكون أولى مهماتها إلغاء أي دور محتمل للمرأة وإقصائها تماماً، وآنذاك سيبدو أي حديث عن المساواة والحقوق ضرباً من العبث. شهدتُ في الغوطة الشرقية بعض المواقف، فما ظننته أقصى ما أستطيع بذله من أجل الثورة لم يرَه المحافظون والمتشددون إلا شقاً لعصا الطاعة الزوجية، لأن مكاني الطبيعي داخل المنزل. في إحدى المرات، شاركت في دورة تمريض في مستشفى ميداني بمسرابا، وكنت أراقب حالة مريض ينتظر نقله إلى مكان آخر للعلاج حين جاء شخص يغضّ طرفه. سألني الخروج من الغرفة لأن ثمة رجالاً يرغبون في الدخول. ظننته يمزح، فأجبتُه: دعهم يدخلون. ثم عاود الطلب نفسه بخروج "الحرمة"، كلّمني كأنني غائبة لم أقُلْ شيئاً. ما هذه المزحة، قلتُ وخرجت. حادثتُ رجلاً آخر في الممر، فظهر بغتة رجل مسلح لامني: "نساء يكلمن رجالاً. اتقوا الله، القذائف تنهمر، وأنتم تكلمون بعضكم بعضاً!". علا صوتي وقد سمّى المرأة "حرمة" أيضاً؛ ذكّرته بالفتيات الأربع من عائلة الترك في حرستا، كيف اعتقلهن الأمن الجوي ليلاً وهنّ بثياب الصلاة، بسبب عمّهم الشهيد حسان الترك، وهنّ لم يكن قد شاركن في أي شيء. كنتُ قد خرجت وامرأة أخرى فقط للاعتصام من أجل الإفراج عنهن، مع عدد كبير من الرجال. في يوم هادئ آخر، دخل رجل آخر إلى ذاك المنزل نفسه الذي صار مستشفى ميدانياً. وجد ثلاث ممرضات يافعات، والغرف خالية من المرضى أو الجرحى، فوبّخهن: "صار المستشفى كالجامعة". ما أخفى رغبته بأن يقتصر كل عمل على الرجال فحسب، لأن وجود المرأة هنا يعيق سير العمل، بل من غير المقبول أساساً أن تعمل، ناسياً في حنقه احتمال وصول المريضات أو جريحات القصف وغارات الميغ. بعد الصبر والاحتجاجات المتكررة، عوملن أخيراً ببعض الاحترام وإن على مضض. كان فرضُهنّ هذه المشيئةَ البسيطة منقوصاً، إذ جُوزيت المرأة أحياناً بالطلاق الذي ازدادت حالاته بعد الثورة، لأن الرجل لم يستطع أن يتقبل فكرة خروجها عن أمره. لقد خسرت، على الرغم من بعض المكاسب المحدودة التي جنتها، ومشاركتها في الثورة تُظهِرُ طبيعة المجتمع جيداً، فقد ظلت محدودة جداً، خصوصاً بعد موجات النزوح الكبيرة في مدن وبلدات ريف دمشق. الرجل يبدي امتنانه على ما تبذله زوجته، لكنه لا يسمح لها أن تقوم بمثل ما يقوم به. يقلقه أن تغادر المنزل، وربما أهانها وضربها، وربما أيّدته نساء أخريات فيما يذهب إليه. لا يزال عملها يحرجه، فهذا جزء من تنشئته. قد يؤثِرُ إجهادَ نفسه في القيام بعملين على السماح لها بالعمل، تقول صفاء. كنتُ ذاهبة برفقة طبيب مسنّ إلى مدرسة نزحتْ إليها عوائل عديدة. على الطريق نادتني سيدة تحمل طفلها الذي لا يتجاوز عمره بضعة أشهر. استوقفتني على استحياء. "ابني مريض"، قالت، "الله يخليك، خذيه أنتِ إلى الطبيب بدلاً عني، فنقابي ليس معي".

**** *****

كانت الجنائز مظاهرات ضخمة أحياناً. ظلت صفاء تخرج في تشييع الشهداء منذ مطلع نيسان 2011، امرأةوحيدة أحياناً بين آلاف المشيّعين في حرستا، فالنساء يلازمن باب الجامع، ممتنعاتٍ عن السير خلف الرجال، ولا تعلم من أين أتى هذا التحريم، وتضييقه على تكريم الشهداء كما ينبغي. الحرستاويات لم يقتدين بالدومانيات الأقرب إلى الرجال، ولا أقصد الشكل، تقول صفاء، بل قوة الإرادة. كانت التظاهرات النسائية في حرستا قليلة جداً، وتخرج عادة بنساء منقَّبات عند حلول الليل. أفتى بعض أئمة المساجد بأن خروجهن خروجٌ عن الشرع، ولا يجوز لهن الكشفُ عن عورة أصواتهن بالهتاف في الشوارع. شاهدها زوجها مرةً في تشييع ليلي، وجاء تأنيبه شديداً، لأنها خالطت الرجال الذين يرى النشاط الثوري حكراً عليهم. لم يسمح لها وجوده في البيت، بعد الإفراج عنها، بأن تستقبل بين المهئنات رجلاً شاركته العمل في الغوطة. يحزّ هذا الموقف في قلبها كلما تذكرت الحديث المقتضب مع ذاك الزائر على عتبة الباب. إنه رجلٌ تقدره بإعجاب، وتراه عصامياً لا يكاد أحد يعرفه، استطاع أن يحافظ على نزاهته واستقامته وهدوئه طوال عشرات الشهور الطويلة المنصرمة.

كرست صفاء وقتها لإغاثة النازحين وأهالي المعتقلين وعوائل الشهداء، توزع التبرعات العينية وسلال الأغذية. المحطَّمون يحتاجون إلى كلمة جميلة أيضاً، كلمة تجنبهم حرج أن يتلقوا ما قد يحسبونه صدقات، في الأقبية والبنايات غير المكتملة والمدارس، فمَن تساعدهم يساعدونها أيضاً، ويزيدون من إيمانها بطيبة الناس ويخففون عنها، إن كانت ثمة راحةٌ ممكنة لأحد. إنهم الآن حياتها، ويؤسفها أن يغترّ بعض المتطوعين أحياناً، وكأنهم ينسبون إلى أنفسهم أفضال المتبرعين، المجهولين غالباً. ولأن حرستا التي عاشت فيها نصف عمرها لا يسكنها الآن غير المقاتلين تقريباً، تبقى صفاء في مكتب جمعية تتبع المجلس المحلي في سقبا، امرأة وحيدة بين جموع الرجال، وبعضهم يعرفون أنها تخلت عن كل شيء من أجلهم، قد تعانقهم وتلثم جباههم كأنها أمهم، فتياناً وكباراً ومسلحين، تطهو لهم وتستغرب كيف لم تتعرف إلى هؤلاء الجميلين من قبل. تسرّها أمومتها، وتفعمها كلما سنحتْ لها فرصة أن تتجلى. شبان مسلحون أتوها بأسطوانة غاز حين عادت إلى منزلها في حرستا لتجده منهوباً خاوياً، فطبختْ لهم وجالستهم وحدها في الشارع، وهم يلقبونها تحبباً "أبو بكر". تراهم طيبين ينقصهم التوجيه، وتبقى مع بعضهم في المنزل نفسه حتى انتصاف الليل، حين يغادرون ليسنح لها في الخلوة خلع الحجاب. عادة لا يتركونها وحدها، بعد انتهاء العمل في المكتب عند السادسة مساء، لكيلا تقتلها الوحدة، تقول. إنهم يحتاجون أمّاً في ظروف هي الأحلك، وأنا أحتاج أبناء لأن الأمومة غريزة وحاجة أيضاً. 

لا تستطيع صفاء أن تنسى ما رأته في ممرات السجن، حيث حركات الذهاب والإياب وتوافد المعتقلين الجدد تزوّد بالأخبار. كانت تلمح في كوة الباب طبيباً شائباً يعبر الممر، ويستكمل أشغال الجلادين بخياطة جراح الشبان المعذَّبين دون تخدير؛ كان، في المطبخ القذر المقابل للمهجع، يخيط الأقدام الجريحة التي أنزفتها السياط، ثم يجبرهم على المشي ذهاباً وإياباً في الممر وهم مضمَّدون، بينما النساء عاجزات، ليس لهن إلا دور المنصِتات إلى المتألمين، كأنهن مذنبات لأنهن لا يُعذَّبن مثلهم، ولطالما سمعن توسلات شبان يرجون الجلادين أن يكتبوا ما شاؤوا، ويأتوهم بالإفادات ليمضوها. للمتهمين بأنهم مسلَّحون العذابُ الأشد. مثلهم كانت ميسون، القادمة من فرع الأمن العسكري، بندوب حديثة مرتفعة في معصميها، مشوَّهة بحروق التعذيب الكهربائية، لأنها ساعدت في تهريب السلاح. لا تنسى صفاء الشبان المقرفصين ساعات طوالاً، مواجهين الحائط في الممر، مصفوفين في رتل تحت عين السجان، مكبَّلين معصوبي الأعين عراة الصدور، وعلى أكتافهم حزوز العصي والأكبال الرباعية التي يُسمع صفير نزولها على اللحم. بذهابها إلى الحمام صباحاً، والذهاب إليه مسموح مرتين يومياً، شاهدتِ الذين كانت قد شاهدتهم الليلة الفائتة وهم لا يزالون على الوضعية نفسها. كان في ظهر أحدهم جرح غائر ينزّ دماً. لمست يده، فأجفلته اللمسة. ربما حسب ذاك الحنو العابر انتهاكاً وشيكاً. 

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Palestine and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Palestine Page Co-Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each roundup to Palestine@jadaliyya.com.]


The Occupation Forces

Hebron Activist Showed Israel’s Crimes to the World
Hashem al-Azzeh, an internationally-known Palestinian activist, was killed by tear gas Wednesday.

Group: Israeli Forces Detain 876 Palestinians in October
Over 800 Palestinians have been detained by Israeli forces since October 1, over 100 of which are children.

Palestine: Woman Dies after Checkpoint Delay
Hoda Darwish, sixty five years old woman, died on her way to the hospital while waiting at a checkpoint.

Israeli Forces Crack Down on Bethlehem During Jewish Holiday
While the Jewish population prepares for a holiday, the military closes roads and checkpoints, preventing hundreds of Palestinians from going to work.

Listen: Killing Palestinian Children Inevitable Outcome of Israeli Policies
According to Defense for Children International – Palestine, since October first, ten children were killed and one hundred have sustained injuries and the numbers are increasing.

Executed: Dania Arsheid, seventeen years old, from Hebron
Another teenager girl, seventeen years old Dania Arsheid, was executed by the Israeli forces at the checkpoint in Hebron.

Let’s not forget: the real drivers behind Palestinian anger
Hugh Lovatt points out what he perceives as the root causes for the current uprising of Palestinians.

Third Palestinian shot, killed after alleged attack in Hebron
Israeli forces kill three young Palestinians in one day; Hammam Said twenty three years old, Shabaan Abu Shkeidem, seventeen years old and Shadi Nabil Abd al-Muti Dweik, twenty two years old.

Israel’s “Executions” of Palestinian Teens Must End, Amnesty Says
As the number of Palestinian killed by Israeli forces rise to sixty one, Amnesty international condemns the "clear pattern" of summary killings carried out by Israel.
 

Domestic Politics

Has Netanyahu’s Revisionism Ended the Use of the Holocaust as Enabler of Israeli Injustice Toward Palestinians?
Marc H. Ellis suggests a different angle to Netanyahu's Holocaust revisionism.

Not in My Name
As Netanyahu’s recent remarks about the Holocaust has spread, Hearst warns of “transfer trauma” and calls upon the Jewish community to hold Netanyahu accountable for lying about their history.

Netanyahu and the Nazification of Palestinians
Netanyahu’s recent remark on the Holocaust is yet another way in which the tragic and terrible event is used to justify Israelis policies and violence against Palestinians.

Asylum Seekers Mourn ‘Lynched’ Eritrean Man
Eritrean asylum seeker, Habtom Zerhum, was shot and killed by Israeli forces when they believed him to be a terrorist.

Mahmoud Abbas Demands International Protection for Palestine
When meeting with US Secretary of State John Kerry, Abbas asked for international protection against Israeli settler violence.

Prime Minister Said to Consider Revoking East Jerusalemites’ Residency Status
Due to recent violence, Netanyahu is considering revoking the residency status of about 80,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem.

Yitzhak Rabin Never Supported Palestinian Statehood
Yakir Adelman exposes a difference side of Yitzah Rabin as opposed to the utilized selective memory of the Israeli "left". 

Israeli Racial Profiling: Guilty of Breathing While Arab
The current situation in Israel and Palestine exposes the real face of Israeli society's racism, one that is directed to everyone that looks like "Arab" not only Palestinians.
 

Foreign Policy 

State Department Slams Netanyahu’s Hitler Story as ‘Inflammatory’ and Against ‘Scholarly Evidence’ Secretary of State John Kerry and John Kirby have both criticized Netanyahu’s recent comments as inflammatory and historically incorrect.

UN Secretary-General Calls on Palestinian, Israeli Leadership to Meet
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon called for a meeting between Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas in order to cease violence and urged the Israeli government restrain from using force as its first option.

Kerry, Abbas Meet as Palestinian-Israeli Unrest Continues
Secretary of State John Kerry met with Mahmoud Abbas to discuss ongoing peace negotiations in the midst of recent wave of violence.

Chinese Envoy Calls for Efforts to Improve Humanitarian Situation in Palestine
Chinese representative to the UN urged Israel to lift the Gaza blockade and called on the international community to assist in rebuilding the Gaza Strip.

Jewish Defense League Mob Attacks Paris Journalists
The Jewish Defense League, a violent radical Zionist group, attacks the offices of Agence France-Presse.

The ANC and Hamas Stand Shoulder to Shoulder against Apartheid in Palestine
The African National Congress shows their unshakable support to the Palestinian cause and signs an agreement with Hamas to open an office in Pretoria.
 

The Settlements and Settler Violence

Jewish Extremist Tries to Stab ‘Rabbi for Human Rights’
A Jewish extremist attacked President of Rabbis for Human Rights, Rabbi Asherman, after he attempted to put out a fire caused by settlers while he was accompanying Palestinians in olive tree groves.

Israeli Settlers Want New York Police Tactics in Jerusalem
Settler groups in occupied Jerusalem are demanding "zero tolerance" policies and stiff penalties to be imposed on any Palestinian defying Israel's orders.
 

Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions

Hundreds of UK Scholars Pledge to Boycott Israeli Universities
This week, a full page advert appeared in the Guardian newspaper listing the names of the academics who pledged to boycott Israeli institutions.

Anti-Israel Activism Criminalized in the Land of Charlie Hebdo and “Free Speech“
The French high court criminalized twelve political activists for advocating sanctions and a boycott against Israel.
 

Economy and Development

Will Palestine Get Its own Currency?
The Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) is currently arguing that they have legal right to establish and control their own currency, instead of depending on Israeli currency.

Palestinians Fired in Retaliation for Protests
Palestinians have been laid off from their jobs in the West Bank due to increase in violence. Man Israeli businesses are taking financial losses rather than continue to employ Palestinians.

Israel, Palestine Both Stand to Lose by Cutting Economic Ties
Many believes that both Palestinians and Israelis have much to lose if Mahmoud Abbas cuts ties with Israeli economy.

Pro-Israel Americans Demand 80 Million Dollars Aid Cuts for Palestine
The Committee on Foreign Affairs unanimously decided to cut its aid to Palestine after pro-Israel lobbyists and Republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen pushed for the resolution.

Olive harvest: Squeezing Gaza’s resources
The latest Israeli attack on Gaza resulted in the razing of one thousand and five hundred acres of land and more than fifty per cent drop in the olive production.
 

قوات الاحتلال

استمرار المواجهات في القدس والضفة ووقوع إصابات
تواصلت المواجهات ضد قوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي، والتي تشهدها محافظة ‏القدس وبقية المحافظات الفلسطينية ‏في الضفة الغربية منذ مطلع الشهر الجاري، حيث أدت إلى ‏وقوع إصابات بالاختناق بالغاز المسيل للدموع وكذلك بجروح ‏بالرصاص المطاطي في صفوف ‏الشبان الفلسطينيين.

منذ بداية اكتوبر، اسرائيل تقتل طفلاً كل 48 ساعة
أعلنت وزارة الصحة ارتفاع حصيلة الشهداء في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة إلى 58 شهيداً، منهم 14 طفلاً، منذ بداية أكتوبر الجاري
وأضافت الوزارة في بيان صحفي، أنه باستشهاد الطفلة دانيا جهاد ارشيد قرب المسجد الإبراهيمي بالخليل، برصاص قوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي، قد ارتفع عدد الشهداء الأطفال إلى 14 شهيداً في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة. 

الاحتلال ينفذ عمليات دهم واقتحام جنوب نابلس
نفذت قوات الاحتلال الصهيوني، عمليات دهم وتفتيش واسعتين في أطراف نابلس وسلفيت شمال الضفة المحتلة بذريعة ملاحقة منفذ عملية الطعن التي استهدفت مستوطناً قرب مفترق مستوطنة "أرئيل" المقامة على أراضي المواطنين في سلفيت.

إسرائيل تقرر استخدام الكلاب لملاحقة راشقي الحجارة.. واعتقالات بالضفةا
لشرطة الإسرائيلية تقرر استخدام الكلاب "المدربة والمؤهلة" لملاحقة راشقي الحجارة والزجاجات الحارقة في مدينة القدس.

إدارة ‘نفحة’ تغلق ثلاثة أقسام بادعاء اكتشاف فتحة للهرب
اشار نادي الأسير الى أن إدارة سجن ‘نفحة’ أقدمت على إغلاق ثلاثة أقسام وهي (10،13،14)، وذلك بعد أن ادّعت اكتشافها لفتحة في أحد الشبابيك، مفسرة وجودها بمحاولة من قبل الأسرى للهرب.

ارتفاع عدد الشهداء منذ بداية الشهر الحالي إلى 61 شهيدا
استشهد ثلاثة شبان فلسطينيين برصاص الاحتلال في مدينة الخليل بالضفة الغربية المحتلة، ونقلت وكالة الأنباء الفلسطينية الرسمية "وفا" أن الشاب اياد روحي جرادات (19 عاما) من بلدة سعير في الخليل، استشهد جراء اطلاق قوات الاحتلال عددا من الأعيرة النارية صوبه على مفترق 'بيت عينون' شمال شرق الخليل.

قوات الاحتلال تعلن اعتقال خمسة فلسطينيين في القدس والخليل بحوزتهم أدوات حادة
أعلنت الشرطة الإسرائيلية إنها اعتقلت خمسة فلسطينيين في مدينتي القدس والخليل، بالضفة الغربية، بعد أن عثرت بحوزتهم على “سكاكين”، وأدوات حادة.

38 إصابة بمواجهات مع الاحتلال بالضفة الغربية
أصابه 38 فلسطينياً بالرصاص الحي والمعدني المغلف بالمطاط في مواجهات متفرقة مع الاحتلال الإسرائيلي في طولكرم ورام الله والخليل.

إطلاق النار واصابة فلسطيني في الخليل بعد محاولته طعن جندي إسرائيلي
اطلق الجيش الاسرائيلي النار الاربعاء على فلسطيني في مدينة الخليل جنوب الضفة الغربية المحتلة واصابه بعد ان حاول طعن جندي إسرائيلي

السياسة الداخلية 

الفصائل الفلسطينية تدعو إلى "يوم غضب" غدا الجمعة
دعت الفصائل الفلسطينية في الضفة الغربية تدعو لاعتبار يوم الجمعة (23-10)، يوم غضب، في كافة مواقع التماس، والخروج في مسيرات من كافة المواقع للرد على جرائم الاحتلال. 

البرغوثي: الانتفاضة تعني ان شعبنا اختار الكفاح
قال الدكتور مصطفى البرغوثي إن الانتفاضة تعني أن الشعب الفلسطيني اختار طريق الكفاح والاعتماد على النفس، ودعا  الى الإسراع في إنهاء الانقسام الداخلي وبناء قيادة موحدة للانتفاضة لضمان استمراريتها وتحقيق أهدافها. 

الاعتداء على امين عام المبادرة الوطنية البرغوثي
تعرض الدكتور مصطفى البرغوثي الامين العام لحركة المبادرة الوطنية مساء اليوم لاعتداء من قبل شخصين في مدينة رام الله ما ادى لأصابته بجراح حيث تم الاعتداء عليه بالة حادة عند تواجده امام منزله في منطقة الطيرة برام الله وأصاباه بجراح في الوجه.
 

السياسة الخارجية

الجامعة العربية: تصريحات نتنياهو عن محرقة اليهود سخيفة ومثار للسخرية
قال نائب الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية السفير، أحمد بن حلي، إن تصريحات رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي، بنيامين نتنياهو، بشأن مزاعمه عن مسؤولية الفلسطينيين عن محرقة اليهود من قبل النازية، “سخيفة ومثار للسخرية، وإهانة لضحايا النازية". 

مجلس الأمن: تجديد المطالبة بحماية دولية للشعب الفلسطيني
طالبت قيادة السلطة الفلسطينية المجتمع الدولي مجدداً بتقديم الحماية الدولية للشعب الفلسطيني. وجاء ذلك على لسان وزير الخارجية الفلسطيني، رياض المالكي، خلال اجتماع عقد في مجلس الأمن الدولي في نيويورك على مستوى وزراء الخارجية.
 
المطالب الفلسطينية والاردنية من كيري لوقف التصعيد والخيارات المطروحة حال الفشل
الرئيس محمود عباس ابو مازن و الملك عبد الله الثاني سيقدمان مطالب فلسطين والاردن من اجل احتواء التصعيد بالأوضاع نتيجة ممارسات الحكومة الاسرائيلية واهمها مواصلة اقتحامات المسجد الاقصى على ايدي المستوطنين المتطرفين بحماية جيش وشرطة الاحتلال.

حماس ترفض تصريحات كيري
اكدت حركة حماس ان تصريحات وزير الخارجية الأمريكي جون كيري التي أعلن فيها التزام نتنياهو "بالسماح للمسلمين بالصلاة في الحرم وغير المسلمين بزيارته"، مرفوضة واعتبرت حماس ان التصريحات هي محاولة أمريكية لإنفاذ نتنياهو وحكومة الاحتلال من أزمتها في مواجهة انتفاضة شعبنا.

مكافحة غزة: مصر تسمح بتهريب المخدرات بكميات كبيرة
قالت شرطة مكافحة المخدرات في قطاع غزة إن السلطات والأجهزة الأمنية المصرية تسمح بتهريب كميات كبيرة من المخدرات الى قطاع غزة.

عريقات: "عباس" سيقدم للجنائية الدولية ملفا جديدا للجرائم الإسرائيلية
أكد أمين سر اللجنة التنفيذية لمنظمة التحرير بفلسطين، صائب عريقات أن الرئيس الفلسطيني محمود عباس سيقدم ملفا جديدا كاملا إلى المدعى العام للمحكمة الجنائية الدولية، يتضمن حالات الإعدامات الميدانية التي تتم ضد أبناء الشعب الفلسطيني.

الرئيس : استمرار الوضع الراهن سيدمر ما تبقى من فرص للسلام
قال الرئيس محمود عباس، إنه قد حان الوقت، لأن يكون لدى قادة إسرائيل شجاعة اتخاذ القرارات الصحيحة والصادقة، قبل فوات الأوان، لجعل حل الدولتين واقعاً ملموساً، فلربما تكون هذه آخر فرصة متاحة لمثل هذا الحل.

عنف المستوطنين

بسبب حالة الرعب: متطرفون يهود يعتدون على شاب يهودي ظنا منهم انه عربيمجموعة من الشبان اليهود قاموا بالاعتداء على يهودي اخر ظنا منهم انه عربي خلال مسيره في القدس الغربية وقاموا بضربه بقضبان الحديد وكعب بندقية مما ادى لإصابته بجروح متوسطة ظنا منهم انه عربي.

مستوطنون يشعلون النار في حقول للزيتون في كفر قدوم
أشعل عدد من مستوطني ‘قدوميم ‘ المقامة عنوة على أراضي المواطنين، بشكل متعمد النار في حقول الزيتون القريبة من المستوطنة ، وأن النيران أتت على عدد من أشجار الزيتون الواقعة بمحاذاة الطريق العام قلقيلية-نابلس.

مستوطنون يهاجمون منازل بجنوب نابلس
هاجم مستوطنو "يتسهار"  بعض منازل قرية مادما جنوب مدينة نابلس شمال الضفة الغربية المحتلة بالحجارة، وقام الاهالي بالتصدي لهجمة المستوطنين، الأمر الذي دفعهم لمغادرة محيط القرية.

مستوطنون يحرقون مركبة ويخطون عبارات عنصرية جنوب القدسأحرقت عصابة من المستوطنين تدعى 'تدفيع الثمن'، مركبة أحد المواطنين، وخطت عبارات عنصرية تدعو لقتل الفلسطينيين في قرية أم طوبا المجاورة لقرية صور باهر جنوب شرق القدس المحتلة.

مستوطنون يعربدون ويهاجمون منازل في سيلة الظهر جنوب جنين
هاجمت مجموعة من المستوطنين من مستوطنة 'حومش' المخلاة جنوب جنين، منزلين بالحجارة والزجاجات الفارغة وسط اعمال عربدة واطلاق نار على المواطنين. 

قانون

نتنياهو ينوي سحب الإقامة من المقدسيين القاطنين خارج جدار الفصل
كشفت تقارير إعلامية إسرائيلية، عن أن رئيس الحكومة الإسرائيلية، بنيامين نتنياهو، طرح خلال جلسة المجلس الوزاري المصغّر (كابينيت)، فكرة سحب الإقامة من المقدسيين الذين يعيشون في أحياء خارج جدار الفصل العنصري كمخيّم شعفاط ومخيّم عناتا.

السجن 11 شهرا لزعيم الحركة الاسلامية في إسرائيل بتهمة التحريض على العنف
اصدرت محكمة إسرائيلية حكما بالسجن 11 شهرا على الشيخ رائد صلاح، زعيم الحركة الاسلامية في الأراضي المحتلة، بتهمة التحريض على العنف. 

الاقتصاد والتنمية 

مقدسيون: لا تتركوا سوق القطانين وحيدا
ناشد التجار في البلدة القديمة بالقدس، الفلسطينيين لإنقاذ الوضع الاقتصادي في أسواق القدس القديمة، ودعوا إلى إحيائها وتكثيف التواصل معها، وعدم تركها لوحدها تواجه مخططات الاحتلال وأذرعه المختلفة. 

عمال النظافة يهددون بالإضراب في أكبر مجمع طبي بغزة
عمال شركات النظافة في مجمع "الشفاء" الطبي، أكبر المجمعات الطبية الحكومية في قطاع غزة، يهددون بالإضراب عن العمل، وذلك لعدم تقاضيهم مستحقاتهم منذ عدة أشهر من حكومة الوفاق الوطني.

واشنطن تقلص مساعداتها المالية للسلطة الفلسطينية
أفاد دبلوماسي أمريكي، بأن الولايات المتحدة خفضت قيمة المساعدة المالية التي تمنحها سنويا للسلطة الفلسطينية، وذلك احتجاجا منها على ما تعتبره “إجراءات غير مفيدة” أقدمت عليها القيادة الفلسطينية.

دفعة جديدة من مواد البناء في غزة
وزير الأشغال العامة والإسكان في قطاع غزة يعلن عن الموافقة على صرفة دفعة جديدة من مواد البناء خاصة بالتشطيبات لعدد (2540) مستفيداً، ليصبح اجمالي عدد المواطنين المستفيدين من مواد البناء (5400) مواطن 

الحركة العالمية لمقاطعة إسرائيل وسحب الإستثمارات منها وفرض العقوبات عليها

343 أكاديمي بريطاني يقررون مقاطعة "اسرائيل" بشكل نهائي
دعا أكاديميون بريطانيون إلى ضرورة مقاطعة (اسرائيل) كونها تنتهك القانون الدولي، وحقوق الإنسان في فلسطين، وكان 343 أكاديمي بريطاني قرروا في بيان صحفي مقاطعة "اسرائيل" بسبب أفعالها اللاإنسانية بحق الفلسطينيين. 

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Maghreb and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Maghreb Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to maghreb@jadaliyya.com by Tuesday night of every week] 

Algeria

Algeria Backs Venezuela on OPEC, Non-OPEC Summit to Boost Prices Algeria supports Venezuela’s pursuit of an equilibrium price at eighty-eight dollars per barrel.

Algeria seeks Chinese help with $2bn port scheme Algeria is planning one of its largest infrastructure projects to develop a new major port to handle thirty-five million tons of goods per year.

Algeria reiterates support for Western Sahara’s right to self-determination As the Secretary General's Personal Envoy to the United Nations Mission in Western Sahara, Christopher Ross seeks a renewal of discussions between Morocco and the Polisario Front.

الحق في تصفح المواقع البورنوغرافية Nafaha Magazine discusses censorship and pornography in Algiera.

Libya

How the west broke Libya and returned it to the hatred of the past Yasmina Khadra analyzes the West’s responsibilities and duties in the Libyan crisis.

Syrie, Libye... quand Sarkozy refait l'histoire Liberation examines Nicolas Sarkozy’s comments about French foreign policy in Libya.

ليبيا: انقسامات عميقة.. وحوار عقيم! Report provides an overview on Libya’s failed attempts to create a coalition government, with the rationale that a solution can only be found through the Libyans, within Libya.  

Mauritania

هل سد الباب في وجه الاستقرار في البلد؟ / محمد محمود ولد بكار Muhammad Mahmoud Oueld Bakar writes on Mauritania’s current position in the world, highlighting decisions successive political regimes have made and their effects on society.

موريتانيا تمنع اللباس التقليدي في مؤسسات التعليم Sahara Media writes skeptically on the Mauritanian government’s banning of traditional clothing in schools.

Mauritania Needs Urgent Food Assistance, Says WFP Head“She called on the international community for support, saying the food assistance program has only half the money needed to continue food distribution for the next six months”

Mauritania: Anti-human trafficking action plan to be validated The Commission for Human Rights and Humanitarian Action in Mauritania is initiating a new plan to address human trafficking in the country.

Morocco

Le CNDH recommande l'égalité successorale et dresse un tableau sombre de la parité A recent National Human Rights Council recommends new reforms in terms of inheritance law and gender discrimination.  

Intervention des forces de l'ordre à la faculté de médecine de Rabat Video shows Moroccan auxiliary forces abusing medical student protesters on strike.

Morocco poised to become a solar superpower with launch of desert mega-project In Ouarzazate, “a complex of four linked solar mega-plants that, alongside hydro and wind, will help provide nearly half of Morocco’s electricity from renewables by 2020 with, it is hoped, some spare to export to Europe.”

"مسيرة الأقصى" بالدار البيضاء تثير غضب يهود مغاربة The Moroccan Jewish community responds to the march in solidarity with the Palestinian people.

Tunisia

تونس .. اختتام أيام قرطاج المسرحية A report on the Theatre Festival of Carthage organized in Tunis, in which about a hundred national and international plays were presented.

En Tunisie, l’« unité nationale » contre la démocratie OrientXXI critiques Tunisia’s  democratization strategy and expresses the necessity of dissensus and debate in the political sphere.

Algérie-Tunisie : L’obligation du permis de travail supprimée pour les ressortissants des deux pays A bilateral agreement between Algeria and Tunisia gives new opportunities for workers of both states in terms of suppressing work permits.

قضية اغتيال شكري بلعيد : تأجيل المحاكمة إلى 1 ديسمبر القادم The trial of Chokri Belaid’s presumed murderers, expected to take place this 30 October 2015, was postponed to 1 December 2015.

Western Sahara

Western Sahara goes to Europe“The underlying complaint by the Western Sahara NGO is that both EU measures fail to distinguish between the sovereign territory of Morocco and Western Sahara, as they should, given that Morocco’s occupation is in breach of the principles of international law and the UN Charter governing the right of self-determination.”

Hillary Clinton, Phosphates and Western Sahara Stephen Zunes discusses Hillary Clinton’s donation for phosphate extraction, and the implications for Morocco’s control over the Western Sahara.

Recent Jadaliyya Articles on the Maghreb

Libya: The Forgotten War of the Tebu and Tuareg Valérie Stocker sheds light on the violence marring southern Libya.

Social Dialogue Under The Gun in Tunisia Ian M. Hartshorn contextualizes the developments with regard to negotiations in Tunisia, looking at the various actors and processes that have led up to the present day.

De-dramatizing Algerian Politics Brahim Rouabah writes on the recent changes in Algeria's political sphere, dispelling dominant notions in media.

Tunisia: The Counter Demographic Transition Khadija Mohsen-Finan interviews researcher Youssef Courbage on the increasing birth rates in Tunisia.

The Ongoing, Steady Gains of Morocco's Islamist Party Dörthe Engelcke examines the mounting successes of Morocco's leading Islamist party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD).

A Statement of Solidarity with Moroccan Historian, Maâti Monjib Activists mobilize in solidarity with Moroccan historian Maâti Monjib, who is wanted for "undermining state security" and has been prevented from leaving the country.

Cairobserver's 5th issue, titled 'University' reflects on architectural education, reform of higher education in Egypt, the evolution of alternative education, the relationship between authorities and university faculty, the representation of university life in Arabic literature and cinema, the development of fine arts education in Egypt, and the relationship between campuses and their surrounding neighborhoods.

For the launch, editors Mohamed El Shahed and Shaimaa Ashour invited some of the writers to discuss their articles with the audience. They were joined by Nabil El Hady, Professor of Architecture at Cairo University; Farida Makar, researcher and lecturer in the history of education at the American University in Cairo; artist, writer and director Ahmed Shawky; and Abeer Rabei, Assistant professor in Political Science department at Cairo University.

The publication launch was followed by a photography exhibition titled "SURPLUS! Housing from the Periphery" curated by Shahed at the Townhouse Gallery. It presents 18 photographs by Anthony Hamboussi curated from “Cairo Ring Road,” a larger project spanning four years composed of 180 photographs of urban and architectural landscapes. The images, captured in peripheral locations, depict the immense scale of excessive residential building activities, high density and often-uninhabited dystopian vistas of housing in contemporary Cairo.

يذكّر اسم مدينة الإسكندرية المصرية خارج الشرق الأوسط بصور منارة المدينة، التي هي إحدى عجائب العالم القديم السبع، أو بمكتبة الإسكندرية القديمة. وترمز كلٌّ من المنارة والمكتبة إلى عصر ذهبيٍّ للثقافة والمعرفة. وإذا ما وضعنا الصرحين التاريخيين جانباً، نرى أن الغرب نظر إلى هذه المدينة الساحلية كواحة للتسامح الديني والثقافي والسياسي، وكملاذ كوزموبوليتاني (عالمي) حقيقي، لكنه يختفي. وتستعيد وسائل الإعلام الناطقة باللغة الإنكليزية اليوم، وعلى نحو متكرر، صوراً مشابهة غامضة عن ماضي الإسكندرية. فالأحاديث عن المدينة تبدأ بوصف كوزموبوليتانية “سابقة” أو “كوزموبوليتانية كانت موجودة مرة”. أما النبرة فهي “نبرة حنين” بشكل متواصل إلى هذه الكوزموبوليتانية المتلاشية، وهو حنين تتم مقارنته مع “صعود السلفية” في الإسكندرية، الهوية الدينية المرتبطة بالمدينة منذ الثورة المصرية في 2011.

حين نفكّر بهذه الخطابات الرائجة عن الإسكندرية، والتي ينشر معظمها “غرباء” عن المدينة، وتبزغ داخل المدينة أيضاً على نحو متقطّع، (1) ينبغي أن نطرح عدة أسئلة كي نفكك هذه التصويرات: هل سبق أن كانت الإسكندرية كوزموبوليتانية، وهل ما تزال هكذا اليوم؟ ولماذا هناك ميل لمجاورة حقبتين تاريخيتين متخيلتين للإسكندرية (“الماضي الكوزموبوليتاني السابق” و”الحاضر السلفي”، على حساب فترات تاريخية أخرى؟ أعالج هذه الأسئلة فاحصاً صور إسكندرية كوزموبوليتانية في الأدب الغربي، ومقارناً هذا الوصف مع استبصارات جمعتُها من فترات مطوّلة من الوقت قضيتها في الإسكندرية منذ ثورة 25 يناير، ومن عمل باحثين آخرين اقترحوا طرقاً بديلة لتعريف الكوزموبوليتانية الإسكندرانية. 

تتسم جماعة كوزموبوليتانية، أو مكان كوزموبوليتاني، بتبادلات ثقافية ذات طابع تعددي، وتسامح وشعور مشترك بالانتماء إلى جماعة كونية، مما يقود غالباً إلى ازدهار الحياة الفكرية والفنية. وتتوضع رؤية كوزموبوليتانية في قلب كثير من الأعمال الأدبية التي غذّت الخيال الغربي حول الإسكندرية، مثل كتاب إي.م. فورستر “الإسكندرية: تاريخ ودليل” (1922)، وأشعار قسطنطين كفافيس (تقريباً من 1891- 1904). وصوّرتْ رواية “رباعية الإسكندرية” (1957- 1960) المشهورة للورانس داريل، على نحو مشابه، حياة الكوزموبوليتيين التي صاغتها بيئتهم، والذين كانوا يتنقلون من حفلات الرقص الجميلة في فندق سيسل إلى حفلات العشاء في الأتوال، ومن قصص الحب في شقق الدبلوماسيين والمفكرين الأوربيين إلى عوالم المتعة في المواخير على شاطئ البحر.

إن القصص الأدبية أرشيف خيالي ويجب ألا تُعدّ أنثروبولوجيا أو علم اجتماع. مع ذلك، عاش المؤلفون الثلاثة في المدينة: كان كفافيس إسكندرانياً من أصل يوناني، وعمل إي.م. فورستر في الإسكندرية مع الصليب الأحمر أثناء الحرب العالمية الأولى، وعاش داريل في المدينة لمدة أربع سنوات في أواخر الأربعينيات. كانوا ضمن هذا الجو. وليست الطريقة التي يصورون بها الإسكندرية خيالية فحسب، بل متعلقة بالسيرة ذاتية أيضاً في بعض النواحي. وقد أغنت هذه الأعمال الأدبية الخيال الغربي عن الإسكندرية (حققت روايات داريل أفضل المبيعات وأعيدت طباعتها عدة مرات)، لكن تصويرها لكوزموبوليتانية الإسكندرية يجب ألا يُعتمد كتمثيل لكيف جرب معظم سكان المدينة المدينة الساحلية، أو على نحو أسوأ، يجب ألا يُنظر إليه على أنه يشمل كل الجماعات التي دعت هذا المكان وطناً.

في الحقيقة، إن العرب (2)، مغيّبون في هذا التصوير الكوزموبوليتاني. ففي رباعية داريل، ما يدعى بـ“الحي العربي” هو مكان القاذورات حيث يعيش أشباه بشر يتضورون جوعاً. ذلك أنّ دارلي، الشخصية المحورية في الرواية، يتنزه في “الشارع المظلم الملطّخ بالعرب”.(3). وحين يسمع العربية، تبدو غير مألوفة، وتُنطق بصوت نشاز مليء بـ “التعنيفات”. بالإضافة إلى الذين أشير إليهم بأنهم “عرب”، تتضمن روايات داريل وصفاً موسّعاً لعاهرات سوريات، استؤجرن ليمتّعْن الدبلوماسيين والمفكرين الأوربيين الفقراء، وأحياناً اتُّهمْنَ بأنهنّ سبب “الأمراض التناسلية” التي تنتقل بسرعة. ما يشار إليه بأنه”كوزموبوليتانية” في هذا السياق إقصائي ضمنياً، ومتأصل في الطرق الاستعمارية في رؤية “الآخر”. إنه موزاييك من المتع الأوربية والطبقية الليبرالية التي تخفي أغلبية عربية تمر أنشطتها دون أن تُلاحَظ، والتي يُحط من قدرها ـ حين يقر بها بشكل وجيز ـ وتوصف بأنها قذرة. إن الكوزموبوليتانية محدودة في مداها، ومحملة بالدلالات الإثنية والطبقية.

[أحد الشوارع المزدحمة في حارة العطارين، الإسكندرية. تصوير محمد قطب.]

[لقطة لمطعم ديليس في الإسكندرية الذي افتتح عام 1922. تصوير محمد قطب.]

ينظر هؤلاء المؤلفون إلى “الكوزموبوليتانية الأوربية” كمتلاشية فيما هم يجربونها. ويرى خالد فهمي  أن الإسكندرية رُبطتْ على الدوام بـ “الخسارة” في الخيال الغربي، واعتُقد أنها في حالة تدهور دورية. ويذكر فهمي كيف أن إي.م. فورستر في كتابه “الإسكندرية: تاريخ ودليل” يحمل مسؤولية هذه الخسارة للفتح “العربي” لهذه المدينة في 682. وتنظر هذه القراءة المتمركزة أوربياً للتاريخ إلى الفتوحات كبداية “ألف عام من الصمت”، ألفية مظلمة يُعتقد أن حكم الخديوي العثماني محمد على باشا (الذي حكم من 1805 إلى 1848 ) قاطعها لمدة وجيزة. أما الفترة الطويلة الممتدة بين 682 و1805 فهي ممحوة من التاريخ، فيما حُطَّ من قدر العهود الفاطمية والأيوبية والمملوكية والعثمانية الأولى على أنها غير ذات صلة. إن ما دعي بالكوزموبوليتانية عادت بالتدريج إلى المدينة ووصلت إلى أوجها أثناء الاحتلال البريطاني لمصر. لهذا السبب، يُذكر النصف الأول من القرن العشرين، إعادة تأهيل المشروع الاستعماري، من أجل التسامح مع اليهود واليونانيين والطليان والأوربيين الآخرين، وينتهي، بحسب هؤلاء الرواة، مع مشروع ناصر السياسي. ففي فيلم وثائقي لهيئة الإذاعة البريطانية (بي بي سي) يعود إلى عام 1977 عنوانه “روح المكان”، يعود داريل إلى المدينة، ويندب الموجة الثانية من الكوزموبوليتانية التي انتهت. ويشير فهمي أن داريل شجب الإسكندرية لأن الحياة الثقافية غادرتْها معبراً عن مخاوفه من “أن ثورة ناصر الاشتراكية القمعية دمرت المدينة”.      

بعد عقود، واصل الصحفيون والكتاب استحضار ما يدعى بالكوزموبوليتانية التي صورها أولئك المؤلفون. لكن اليوم، بدلاً من لوم مشروع ناصر القومي والاشتراكي على فقدان الكوزموبوليتانية، يحمّلون الصعود المفاجئ للسلفية المسؤولية عن ذلك. وتهيمن هذه الثنائية الجديدة على التغطية الغربية للإسكندرية في وسائل الإعلام. ذلك أن جيمس تروب جسّد هذا الخطاب الثنائي في مقالة نشرها في كانون الأول\ديسمبر 2014 في مجلة “فورين بوليسي” بعنوان “المنارة تبهت” يصف فيها الإسكندرية بأنها كانت “مرة القلب الكوزموبوليتاني النابض للعالم العربي، لكنها الآن قاعدة السلفيين المصريين، مقر حركة إسلامية متشددة ربطت ثرواتها برئيس البلاد الأوتوقراطي الجديد”.  وبعد أن درستُ الحركة السلفية (والتي تُعدَّ الدعوة السلفية ممثلها الرئيسي) في الإسكندرية وكتبت عنها في السنوات القليلة الماضية، أستطيع أن أشهد بأن صعود الحزب، والمنظمة الدينية التي خلفه، مثيران للانتباه ومليئان بالتعقيدات في آن. وهما يستحقان بالفعل الانتباه الصحفي والبحثي.  فضلاً عن ذلك، إن وجود الحركة وأهميتها في المدينة يجب ألا يشوّها رؤيتنا للإسكندرية، التي تفور بحركات وديناميات متعددة، وأحياناً تبدو متناقضة ظاهرياً. إن التفكير بالإسكندرية بأنها كانت مرة مدينة كوزموبوليتانية صارت مرتعاً للسلفية اختزالي ومضلل. وكما أشار عمرو علي في محاضرة مؤخراً: “إن إحياء هذه الكوزموبوليتانية السابقة، والإشارة بشكل غير نقدي إليها، فعل واع يتم في ضوء تركيبة ذهنية أمنية”. إن هذه التركيبة الذهنية الأمنية تنظر بهوس إلى مجتمعات الشرق الأوسط من خلال عدسات حركاتها الإسلامية. 

لا شك أن هناك حركة سلفية قوية في الإسكندرية. فالدعوة السلفية، العمود الفقري للحزب السلفي الرئيسي (حزب النور)، تأسست في الإسكندرية في السبعينيات، وجعلت المدينة قاعدة لها منذ ذلك الوقت. وقد فاجأ حزب النور النقاد حين احتل المرتبة الثانيةبعد الإخوان المسلمين في الانتخابات البرلمانية المصرية في 2011 بعد أن حصل على 27٪ من الأصوات. وبعد صيف 2013، قرر حزب النور والدعوة السلفية الوقوف مع حكومة عبد الفتاح السيسي المدعومة من الجيش، فيما عارضا بقوة الإخوان المسلمين. وقد تحدت هذه الاصطفافات السياسية المفاجئة كيف نفهم علاقات السلفيين مع الجيش المصري ومجموعات إسلامية أخرى، ولفتت أيضاً انتباهاً معتبراً إلى الحركة السلفية.

حين يدرس الصحفيون الحركة السلفية يتجولون في شوارع حارات ميامي وأبي سليمان أو المندرة، باحثين عن شخصيات تؤكد فكرة مسبقة عن مدينة صارت سلفية ومتجانسة، وتمدّ في عمر فكرة التدهور الدوري للكوزموبوليتانية الإسكندرانية. (4) يناقشون شظايا من تاريخ الإسكندرية، ويسيرون بتوق في دهاليز فندق سيسل، الذي يجسد هذا الماضي الخيالي ومركز هذا النزوع إلى الحفلات في روايات داريل. وما يزالون ينخرطون في التاريخ بطريقة انتقائية غير مدركين، على الأرجح، للدلالات الإقصائية للرؤية الأدبية الكوزموبوليتانية. 

من الصعب معالجة الخيال الغربي حول الإسكندرية. ذلك أن العودة إلى حوليات الأدب الأوربي قد تكون إدمانية، وطريقة سهلة لإرواء ظمأ الحنين. وكما يقول عمرو علي، إن “العالم الغربي ينظر إلى الإسكندرية بالطريقة التي ينظر بها العالم العربي إلى قرطبة. إنها تلهب الخيال. فالإسكندرية هي مخطط أو برنامج عمل للحضارة الغربية”. (5) إن الاستغراق في الذكريات عن مقاه مليئة بالأوروبيين (والتي حُظر دخولها على المحليين المصريين الذين ليسوا من النخبة على الأرجح)، وعن سائقي تاكسي يتحدثون اليونانية، وبحارة بريطانيين ينزلون في المرفأ من أجل بعض الراحة، يعني تجاهل تاريخ غالبية الإسكندرانيين. وأكيد أن هذا الحنين إلى الكوزموبوليتانية لا يفعل أي شيء كي يضيء وجود حركة دينية كالسلفية التي، فيما هي متأصلة ومشهورة، ليست متجانسة داخلياً ولا مهيمنة في المجتمع. وتأتي إدامة هذه الطرق في تخيل المدينة على حساب محو فترات طويلة من التاريخ، وتنطوي على مجازفة تمجيد الثقافة الأوربية. 

[سينما ريو الإسكندرية. تصوير محمد قطب.]

[سينما ريالتو حيث تقع الكابينا الآن، الإسكندرية. تصوير محمد قطب.]

 يستطيع المرء القول إن الإسكندرية تُظهر اليوم عدداً من السمات الكوزموبوليتانية، هذا إذا فصلنا المصطلح عن الدلالة التي ورثها من أعمال داريل وفوستر وكفافيس. فالإسكندرانيون يواصلون الشعور بأنهم ينتمون إلى جماعة كونية في الوطن، لكن طموحاتهم وإبداعهم يتجاوزون في الوقت نفسه حدود مدينتهم، ويدفعونهم إلى إعادة ابتكار طرق لسكن مدينتهم وتاريخها. وتعاود الإسكندرية إحياء الحياة الفنية في أمكنة القرن العشرين الأولى المهجورة التي أعيد تأهيلها وبعثها من جديد وفُتحت للجميع، مثل الكابينة، والتي هي مكان فني لجماعة يقع في غرفة الكونترول المهجورة لسينما ريالتو المغلقة الآن، أو وكالة بهنا، وهي مركز مخصص للسينما يقع في ما كان مرة مكاتب توزيع الأفلام العائدة لعائلة بهنا. وهناك عدد كبير من الكتاب والمترجمين والباحثين الشبان يدعون الإسكندرية وطناً حتى ولو شعروا لوقت وجيز بخيبة أمل في الأزمة التالية للثورة، ويواجهون غالباً العواقب الوخيمة للتوظيف النادر.

إن مدينة مصر الثانية هي موضع لبارات مخبأة من الصعب العثور عليها (مثل سبيت فاير)، وزوايا المساجد (بعض الحارات مثل باكوس فيها دزينات من الزوايا). ذلك أن الإسكندرية موقع مقاومة. فيها أصوات محلية مكافحة (نادراً ما غطاها الإعلام) والكثير من النشطاء العامين مثل ماهينور المصري، وكلهم يواصلون الاحتجاج من أجل إطلاق سراح السجناء السياسيين والدفاع عن اللاجئين والقتال من أجل المجموعات المحرومة من حق الانتخاب. واليوم، يلتقي في الإسكندرية مهاجرون من أنحاء الشرق الأوسط وأفريقيا جنوب الصحراء الكبرى، ويهدف كثيرون منهم إلى مواصلة طريقهم إلى أوربا، بينما يقرر البعض البقاء. إن المركّب الإثني والثقافي الجديد للمدينة ليس ناجماً عن الهجرة القسرية فحسب، بل أيضاً عن طرق السفر العالمية الجديدة. وقد التقيت مؤخراً بدزينات من المراهقين الأندونيسيين الذين يرتادون مقاهي جديدة في شارع فؤاد، حيث عاش داريل مرة، وهم يعيشون في الحارة ويدرسون في مركز العربي. 

في كتابه الجديد يتحدث سامولي شيلك عن بالغين شبان جاؤوا بالأصل من قرية خارج الإسكندرية، لكنهم إما يعملون في المدينة أو يعيشون في حارة المندرة الشرقية. ومن خلال استقصائه لغموض التزامهم الديني، ولأحلامهم وتطلعاتهم، يحاول استقصاء معنى الكوزموبوليتانية. وفي ضوء هذا العمل الإثنوغرافي يرى الكوزموبوليتانية سيرورة فعل وخيال، متأصلة في “طلاقة الحركة والانتماء إلى العالم”. فالإسكندرانيون هم كوزموبوليتانيون لأنهم “يطمحون إلى جعل الحداثة العالمية لهم، دون أن يصبحوا متجانسين أو مرتبطين بشكل كامل بالمعنى الذي أثارته العولمة”. (6)

إن أحياء الطبقة العليا والسفلى في المدينة، التي تنتشر على الكورنيش وتتنامى في الصحراء، تتاخم بعضها بعضاً على نحو جميل. ذلك أن الإسكندرية توجد خارج الثنائيات المزيفة، دون جيوب طبقية محددة وحدود جغرافية أو تاريخية واضحة. ويعيش الإسكندرانيون في مدينة ساحلية تتسم، بطبيعتها، بحركة الأشخاص والأفكار. وهم فخورون بهويتهم، ومتأصلون في تاريخ كوزموبوليتانية متعددة الطبقات، ويواصلون مد يدهم نحو العالم الذي خارج مدينتهم. وتعيش المدينة صراعاً متواصلاً كي تعرّف هويتها ومستقبلها، وتفهم ماضيها في آن واحد معاً. أما بالنسبة للغرباء، وبعض الموجودين في الداخل (بما أن الحدود دوماً ضبابية)، فإن فهم جوهر المدينة المتغيّر وتجريبه مشروطان برفض الذكريات الاستعمارية حول الكوزموبوليتانية، وتجاوز الرؤى المانوية للتاريخ.

[ترجمه عن الإنجليزيةأسامة إسبر]