On 30 April, 2012, Israeli ambassador to the United States Michael Oren gave a speech at George Washington University’s Elliott School for International Affairs. Michael Oren served in the IDF during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, served again as the IDF spokesman during Israel’s brutal assault on Lebanon in 2006, and was the media relations officer during the massacre of over 1,200 Palestinians in Gaza in 2008-2009. Now, as the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Oren continues to fill the role of whitewashing Israel’s war crimes and illegal occupation—be it in US news stations churches, or universities. 

But the close relationship between Israel and the American public (particularly the Christian community) that Oren speaks of in the video below was recently challenged by a CBS special. Oren was deliberate in mentioning his and his wife’s [alleged] Sunday ritual of going to churches to speak to congregations, most recently an African American church to which they were welcomed. However, as we saw in Bob Simon’s interview, Oren’s storytelling is only loose and free when he is in control of the conversation; attempts to present the Palestinian perspective are categorically denied and censored. 

On 8 February, 2010, students at the University of California-Irvine interrupted his speech, protesting his propaganda justifying Israeli atrocities. Though these students left the auditorium peacefully, they were arrested, tried, convicted of misdemeanors, and sentenced to community service and a three-year probation period for exercising their right to free speech. Since the actions by these students, now commonly referred to as the “Irvine 11,” activists across the country have made it a point to walk out, protest, or in some manner disrupt the visits of Michael Oren, IDF soldiers, and others to American university campuses—sending a clear message to their universities that war criminals are not welcome. 

Several months ago, George Washington University hosted a speaker from the IDF on campus. A university event publicist shared the news of the event on Twitter, declaring that it was open and that students were encouraged to attend. 

Yet, upon overhearing an Arabic-speaking student approaching the door, two Israeli security guards communicated to each other in Hebrew that this student should not be allowed to enter. No evidence that registration was required was shown to the student and her peers; instead, the door was shut in their faces and campus police were called to the scene to have them removed on the assumption that they may protest, although no evidence of this other than the ethnicity of a few members of the group was given. Despite reporting this incident to the relevant authorities, no apology or explanation was given to the students involved. University administrators at the scene admitted that, according to protocol and the lack of a registration or legitimate filtering mechanism, the students should have been allowed to attend. 

This incident caused increased trepidation in many of the organizers for this week’s walkout, who were unsure if they would even be allowed to enter, or, given the Irvine 11 case, if they could be prosecuted. Nevertheless, students continued with their plans with the strong conviction that Michael Oren and Israel’s narrative should not go unchallenged. 

The walkout and protest in the video below were organized and attended by students and activists from the DC area, with representatives from Georgetown University, George Washington University, Howard University, American University and Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP). Since the walkout, Haaretz and the Jerusalem Post have both reported the action, as well as coverage of the walkout on C-SPAN's online boradcast of the event.

[The following interview with Jadaliyya Co-Editor Sinan Antoon was conducted by Nahrain Al-Musawi and originally published in Al-Akhbar English on 2 May 2012.]

Sinan Antoon is an Iraqi-born novelist, poet, translator, filmmaker, and professor. His 2003 widely translated novel I’jaam is a fictional prison memoir. The book is ironic and haunting as it reflects the absurdities of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime, futile attempts to escape censorship, and prisoners going mad as a final act of revolt.

Antoon returned to Baghdad in 2003 and filmed About Baghdad, documenting the exhilaration and despair of Iraqis experiencing the fall of the Baathist regime and then the US occupation. He produced two collections of Arabic poetry, which have also been translated into English.

His most recent project is a translation of Mahmoud Darwish’s In the Presence of Absence (2011). Antoon has been at home in the US for decades, so when once asked about the distinction of being an Arab-American writer, he replied, “It’s not easy being a barbarian in Rome. The Romans rarely listen, but the barbarian has to keep it real.”

In this interview, Antoon discusses the distinction of being a barbarian, “an outsider, a stranger,” in the US, as well as the trope of closure that frames the recent US withdrawal from Iraq, sectarianism discourse, and the unique quality of spatial fragmentation and division that now characterizes Baghdad – once Antoon’s home.

Nahrain al-Mousawi (NM): When and how did you leave Iraq? Can you talk about that experience a little bit?

Sinan Antoon (SA): I was supposed to leave Iraq in August 1990 to continue my studies abroad, but Saddam invaded Kuwait on August 2 and there was a travel ban. I survived the war and left in April 1991 after the war was over and the travel ban was lifted. I had always wanted to leave. Living under an authoritarian regime isn’t fun, especially for an aspiring writer who wasn’t willing to write in praise of the leader and his wars. (Some of those who made their names praising Saddam and his wars are running around now posing as patriotic anti-imperialists).

So I took the bus from Baghdad to Amman like thousands of Iraqis did and would do throughout the 1990s and later. I was happy to escape, but I shed a few tears as the bus drove away. I knew that I was leaving some irretrievable parts of my self and my life behind. I stayed in Amman for a few months and then was able to come to the US to do my graduate studies. I worked and did an MA in Arab Studies at Georgetown, then went on to get a doctorate in Arabic literature at Harvard.

NM: You have discussed the US withdrawal in terms of the productive political trope of closure. Can you discuss what effects the US withdrawal has had, if any?

SA: I have been stunned by the way Iraq has almost disappeared from public discourse in the US. The way in which the withdrawal narrative was packaged and sold to the American public sealed that fictitious “closure.” The discursive curtain is down (not that it was ever fully up anyway) and there isn’t much to discuss or bother about. The simplistic narrative goes as follows: “We” went there and tried to help build a democracy, but it didn’t work out for x reason. The x, of course, is usually some variation on an Orientalist myth. There is no serious debate about the war and no realization of the extent of its tragic effects on Iraqis and their future. Most importantly, there is no reckoning or recognition of the crime. The collective amnesia is horrendous. The architects of the war publish books and appear on TV shows as if nothing had happened.

As for the effects in Iraq, the damage is already done. The country has one of the most corrupt and dysfunctional regimes in the world. The US Embassy in Baghdad is the biggest in the world and the US is still a major player in Iraq.

NM: When did you last visit Iraq? How was it to go back?

SA: I visited Baghdad in July 2003, three months after the invasion. I was part of a team to produce and direct a documentary about post-Saddam Iraq (About Baghdad). Throughout the years I had kept abreast of Iraq’s news on a daily basis and was in contact with friends and relatives who had stayed. So I thought I had a good idea of what the genocidal sanctions had done to every aspect of life in Iraq. I knew that the country would be different after all those years, but I was still shocked and saddened. Baghdad was shabby and exhausted. To quote one of the Baghdadis we interviewed: “dictatorship and occupation had killed its soul.”

The trip was devoted to filming, as I said, so we spent everyday going around Baghdad and interviewing Iraqis from various backgrounds. There was still some hope back then. The massive sectarian violence and the suicide bombings had not started, so many people were still optimistic that Iraqis could perhaps clinch a new life despite everything, but history went in a different direction, as it usually does!

NM: What do you think of the state of academia in Iraq, particularly since so many academics have been targeted?

SA: The Iraqi educational system was already devastated by the genocidal embargo imposed by the US and the UN between 1990 and 2003. Many academics left the country in the 1990s due to economic hardship. The violent chaos unleashed and caused by the occupation has been equally devastating. Hundreds of academics have been assassinated and the sectarian parties hold sway over student unions and interfere in all matters. Two facts crystallize the situation in Iraq: There are almost 20,000 fake degrees/diplomas in the country now and some of the most prominent members of the political elite have fake degrees. None of this is to belittle how destructive the legacy of Saddam’s regime was, but the corruption and ignorance of the current regime is stunning and the US is responsible, primarily, because it created the post-Saddam political arena and populated it with its allies.

NM: Discussions of sectarianism usually pose it as a given, an absolute that is unaffected by history and politics. It has become a "scare" word in itself. What do you think of discussions of sectarianism in Iraq?

SA: I think it’s important to understand how we arrived at this point. Reactions to the subject range from total denial that sectarianism ever existed and attributing it solely to the 2003 war and invasion, to claiming that the Iraqi state was born with sectarianism as one of its many congenital defects. And there are of course those who subscribe to ahistorical narratives and project current sectarian identities back onto pre-modern history. Any discussion within this space will not do justice to the subject. The important question is how and when did sect become a primary political identity. The 1991 uprising against Saddam’s regime and the way it was portrayed in the regime’s propaganda in coded sectarian language and by international media at the time was an important moment. The regime’s tactics and policies during the 1990s further eroded and weakened the sectarian layers in society. The exodus of the middle class during the 1990’s is an important factor too. But I do think that the political system created by the US occupation in 2003 and the institutionalization of sectarian identities, particularly in that infamous Governing Council, populated by diaspora parties who nurtured their sectarianism in exile, was a turning point. The head of the Iraqi Communist Party was included in that council as a Shia.

There is sectarianism in Iraq today, of course, but there is also a growing sense of disgust in many Iraqis at sectarian discourse and sectarian attitudes and how it has been deployed by political parties and the regime itself. It will take some time and much effort to uproot sectarianism, but Iraqis have symbols and moments in their collective past that can be deployed to re-imagine and build a non-sectarian Iraq.

NM: How has literature been influenced by the series of uprisings in the Arab and African-Arab world, the so-called Arab Spring?

SA: I think it is still too early to see the effects of these uprising on literature. Works written hastily in response are probably not going to be of high literary value. But these dramatic events have and will inspire every citizen, and writers will try to narrate and represent these times. I think certain genres will dominate for obvious reasons, such as memoirs.

NM: How have the uprisings affected you and your work?

SA: Despite recent setbacks, what the “people” achieved already is monumental. I am in awe of the courage and resilience of men and women in Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and elsewhere as they face death to make and change history. I have written a few poems inspired by the revolts, but most of the time it is too monumental and visceral to grasp and represent. Moreover, they are ongoing processes and we still need time to comprehend and understand their effects. Like millions around the world, I am inspired.

NM: You have discussed the effect of spatial fragmentation on Iraq and its cities in your short piece “A Barbarian in Rome.” You write at one point about the speed of this spatial fragmentation, "Children will not know their city." What effect do you think this urban prism will have on the memories and orientation of its residents? Enforcing this sense of always being "out of place," perhaps?

SA: I think the material and spatial destruction brought about by the occupation and its political regime has yet to be grasped and understood. The Baghdad that once existed, in which its inhabitants could move around and experience the city relatively freely no longer exists. It is a thicket of concrete walls and one’s movement is always punctuated and blocked by checkpoints. More importantly, there has been an ethnic-sectarian redistribution of the population because of the sectarian civil war. There is mixing and overlap, of course, but those growing up in the city now will experience Baghdad in fragments and their interaction with other Baghdadis is relatively overdetermined by this new spacial division. Yes, many people express this heightened feeling of alienation in their hometown.

NM: Apart from the history of Europe's barbarians, and their centuries of contact with Rome, can you explain the title of your short piece A Barbarian in Rome, a war-time fictional diary, and how it applies to you as author?

SA: When living in a big city in the US in the age of its permanent wars, it is hard not to think of Rome. Being from Iraq and living in the US while it was occupying Iraq, together with the way most of the population deals with the wars its army and country is conducting abroad, i.e. total oblivion, the figure I found myself inhabiting was that of a barbarian in Rome. To me, it was the most meaningful way of filtering the torrent of the imperial discourse and the ignorant and racist questions and comments one confronts. The barbarian is the one who always feels like an outsider, a stranger, and who has to observe the Romans obliterating his original home, his people, and plundering what remains of his culture.

NM: Where do you imagine yourself living?

SA: I wish I were a cloud. I mean that. Or a bird, so I could opt out of all of this, this history of our species.

NM: If you could live anywhere, where would you live?

SA: Paris.

NM: Is there a novel or other project in the works?

SA: I am putting the final touches on a third novel entitled Ya Maryam in Arabic. It is about two generations of an Iraqi family in Baghdad and how dictatorships, wars, and sectarian violence tears the family apart in so many ways and obliterates their sense of belonging, especially for minorities. To leave or not to leave Iraq, that is the central question of the novel. I plan to return to Iraq next year to film another documentary about life 10 years after [the] 2003 [invasion].

 Algeria

"Algeria, Morocco sign education pact" Morocco and Algeria co-ordinate textbook writing and a new exchange program that hopes to foster unity between the two countries. 

"Algerian parties try to lure voters" Fears of low voter turnout have led to parties trying to appeal to seemingly apathetic voters.

"Malgré l'existence du ministère délégué à la condition féminine"  Conference regarding women’s rights concludes that in Algeria, not enough is done for women to protect them from violence or the effects of violence.

"Algeria introduces security plan for legislative elections" The security plan put in place for upcoming elections include security checkpoints and 60,000 extra security officers.   

"Another Take on ‘The Malian Crisis as seen from Algeria’" A critique and counter-narrative to popular assumptions on Algeria's foreign policy.

"ADIEU LA TOUR D’IVOIRE !" The Université Hassiba Ben Bouali de Chlef  celebrates French-language Algerian literature in an event designed to attract academics as well as the general public.

Libya

"Libya: Assessing Berber Prospects" Six months after revolt, Imazighen across North Africa trying to gain footholds in politics after marginalization continues.

"Was a Libyan Oil Man's Death in Vienna Connected with Connection Probes?"  In-depth article analyzing the recent death of the former Libyan Oil Minister, and his place within the former Gaddafi regime.

"OPINION: Change has Stopped in Libya, Why and Who is Responsible— By Nagi Barakat" Article discussing the lack of leadership in the government in Libya, and how this has stagnated true change.

"Revolutionizing opportunism and flaunting hypocrisy - criticism of self-serving activists through and post revolution "A critique of "self-serving" activists throughout and in the post revolution.

“مسح أسماء القذافي وبن على من الخرائط الموريتانية" Nouakchott changes street named titled after Gaddafi and Ben Ali to express solidarity with Libya and Tunisia.

Mauritania

"Q&A with Mike Golden: Tackling malnutrition in Mauritania" Nutrition expert interviewed by UNICEF, discusses the issue of malnutrition in Mauritania.

"Mauritania: President of the anti-slavery movement arrested " Opposition group president arrested after protests outside of the presidency.

"Mauritania Determined To Tackle Terrorism" President of Mauritania determined to tackle terrorism in the Maghreb region, specifically Al Qaeda in the Maghreb.  

Morocco

"Young Moroccans Keep Arab Spring Spirit Alive" Continued pressure on the Moroccan government ongoing, kept alive in part by women’s rights movements.

"هل يمكن أن يتم الإصلاح في المغرب دون ثورة ؟ – [#MamCast - Episode 2]" Video discussing ways of changing in Morocco through reform or revolution.

"مسيرة نسائية ببني بوعياش ضد الإعتقال السياسي" Women march in protest against polticial arrests and harsh sentences in Al Hoceima.

"Morocco: is Bassima Elhakawi preparing to suspend the agenda of equality between men and women?" Minister of Solidarity and Family may put a hold on equal rights agenda set forth by new Islamist government.

"Morocco launches new strategy to fight AIDS" New plan hopes to curtail AIDS and mortality rate by 60% over a four-year period.

"Differences emerge within Morocco coalition" Government officials under fire after showing lack of unity in new coalition government.

“الكاتب محمد برادة: الربيع العربي أخرجني من حالة يأس" Interview with novelist Mohamed Berrada on his works and his recent success at the Mediterranean Fez Festival.

Tunisia

"How a 5-year-old Foreign Film Sparked a Free Speech Fight in Tunisia" Chief of popular Tunisian television channel on trial for airing French short film Persepolis tests freedom of the arts and expression in new Tunisia.

"تونس: هل انتهت الثورة بصعود الإسلاميين؟" (Opinion) Thoughts on the Islamist party’s power in Tunisia, and the ongoing battle for freedom of expression in light of contradictions.

"In Tunisia after Arab Spring Islamists new freedoms create new divide" One year after the Arab Spring, Tunisia searches for an identity to embrace, though stands divided on what identity to pursue.

"Arab Spring reveals paradox" (Opinion) Lack of individual leaders allowed groups to unite under unified goals.

"No Sharia in Tunisia, is it a game changer?" Analysis of the decision by Tunisian government to not include sharia provisions in the constitution, and the effect on the country.

"Tunisia shapes constitutional anti-corruption measures" Roundtable of government officials and NGO meet to discuss anti-corruption measures in the new constitution.

'Tunisia: Clashes Over Future of State Television" Protestors demand government response to a network's alleged ties with the Ben Ali regime.

Western Sahara

"Western Sahara: Confidence Building Programme Helps Families Reconnect" Interview detailing the confidence building program to bring families marred by conflict together, and the effects on Western Sahara.

Recent Jadaliyya articles on the Maghreb

Internet Censorship, Human Rights, and Democracy in Tunisia: Julian Assange Interviews Moncef Marzouki

Ezzedine Errousi, a Moroccan Prisoner of Conscience, Released: 134 Days on Hunger Strike

Another Take on 'The Malian Crisis as Seen from Algeria'

El Haqed: Examining Morocco's Judicial Reform in 2012

On April 27th, around the Jadaliyya Co-Sponsored Conference at Lund University ("Contesting Narratives, Location Power"), I sat down for an extensive interview with Haytham Manna`, one of the icons of the independent Syrian opposition and a leading founder of the National Coordinating Body for Democratic Change (in Syria). The interview was long and candid, and addressed several topics, including the current impasse in Syria, the stages and transformation of the uprising, the questions of international intervention and of resistance, the Syrian National Council and its relations with other opposition groups and the Arab Gulf States and beyond, and the relationship between Syria and Hizballah.

Below you will find the second part of the 4-part interview. This segment addresses intervention, resistance, transformation of the Syrian uprising, and the question of exit. The first part can be found here.

على المدوّنة ذاتها، أسفل صورة علياء المهدي العارية، حضرت صورة صديقٍ لها، في الفكرة كما في الموقف، عارٍ هو أيضاً، وتلك صورةٌ لم يتوقف عندها أحد، إن بالإتهام أو بالتحية.في الفيديو ذاته، إلى جانب السيدة المنقبة التي كانت تتلقى هراوات العسكر وأحذيتهم، وُجد شابٌ يتلقى الضرب ذاته، حتى أن جندياً قفز فوقه بكامل قوته، واستمر ضربه بعدما همد جسم الفتاة في أوجاعه، لكن صورته ذابت في صورتها. 

من هي "المرأة" التي يتم الدفاع عنها؟

هي الأم والأخت والزوجة والإبنة، أولاً، لا المواطنة التي تثور لأجل حقها بالحياة الكريمة في بلدها. انتصر الناشطون والمواطنون للسيدة المنقبة، لأنها تلقت القمع طبعاً، لكن، أساساً، لأن القمع أنتج عريّاً لم يتمكن المجتمع من هضمه. ضُربت كثيرات قبلها، وتمت جرجرتهن من شعورهن، أمام الكاميرات، ووقفت كثيرات في مواجهة العسكر، في صور لافتة القوة، لكن العريّ هو الذي أخرج الفعل عن سياقه، واستدعى الدفاع عن "المرأة". 

وعندما خرجت التظاهرة النسائية للانتصار للمرأة، قلن إن النساء خطٌّ أحمر. خط أحمر، بمعنى أن قمعهن بهويتهن الجنسية تحديداً، هو خط أحمر. وكانت لكل سيدة مشاركة في التظاهرة كلمة تقولها للكاميرات، تضع التظاهرة في سياق الوعي الثوري وتقدّمه على مجتمعه، فسعى الشبّان لنصرتهن، من خلال إقامة حلقة بالأيدي حولهن، من باب ممارسة "المسؤولية" بالحماية. حماية الأم، والأخت، والزوجة، والإبنة. وقد قيل ذلك كثيراً، أحياناً على ألسنتهن، وغالباً على ألسنتهم.

أما علياء المهدي فقد وجدت أيضاً من ينتصر لها، في مواجهة المنتقدين تحديداً، وبغض النظر عن الإطار الذي حدّدته لعريها، على مدوّنتها. قلّة انتصرت لقضيتها، وواجهت المجتمع بجسمها، أما أكثرية الأصوات الجماهيرية المدافعة فلم تنتصر لقضيتها، كون قضيتها مرتبكة بالعري.. سعى المدافعون "الجماهيريون" إلى دحض حجج المتهجّمين، ومنهم ثوار كثرٌ، بالقول إن عريها شخصي ولا يعني فجور الثورة، وإن المبادرين إلى التكفير لا يعرفون للحياة سبيلاً إلا بالتكفير، وإن التركيز عليها إنما يكشف عاهة اجتماعية وقصوراً فكرياً، ... مع أن علياء المهدي لم تموّه أسباب الصورة، وكان إطار عريها شديد الوضوح.

فقد كتبت:

"حاكموا الموديلز العراة الذين عملوا في كلية الفنون الجميلة حتى أوائل السبعينيات، وأخفوا كتب الفن وكسّروا التماثيل العارية الأثرية، ثم اخلعوا ملابسكم وانظروا إلى أنفسكم في المرآة، وأحرقوا أجسادكم التي تحتقرونها لتتخلصوا من عقدكم الجنسية إلى الأبد، قبل أن توجهوا إليّ إهاناتكم العنصرية أو تنكروا حريتي في التعبير".

وكانت بذلك تستبق الحملة ضدها، ما يعني أنها تحكي عن "حريتي في التعبير" كإمرأة، كحرّة.

وفي موقع آخر، تابعت المواجهة ذاتها:

"كنت أجلس مع حبيبي في ميدان التحرير، وأضع ذراعي حول كتفه، فطلب مني رجل بوقاحة أن أحرك ذراعي وقال لنا: ماينفعش كده، والناس تعلق علينا. وعندما لم أسمع كلامه، وقلت له أنه ليس من حقه أن يطلب مني هذا الطلب، أتى بآخرين ليضربونا". ومرة أخرى، "كنت أجلس بجانب حبيبي نشاهد فيديو على تليفونه، ونستمع مع أصدقائنا إلى أغاني الثورة، وكنت أرتدي فستان على الركبة، وتذمرت سيدة منقبة وطلب رجل منا أن نغيّر جلستنا. وكانوا يفتحون علينا الخيام التي نبات بها، ويتعاركون معنا إذا لم نفصل بين الرجال و"الحريم"، كما يسمون النساء". وختمت بقول شديد الدقة: "مصر تحتاج إلى ثورة إجتماعية".

لم يناقش أحد مضمون العري الذي اقترحته، فالعين قد شلّت أمام الصورة المباشرة، فقد انتصب فيها جسدٌ عار وجب التطهّر منه.

 مصر، والدول العربية كلها، "تحتاج إلى ثورة اجتماعية".

يسجّل لمصر - الثورة أنها فتحت النقاش حول المرأة وجسدها، إن عبر تجربتي العري الإختياري والعري القسري، أو في تجربة كشوف العذرية، والمحاكمة القضائية التي أنتجت منعاً لممارسة الجيش له.

ولكن، في تلك التجربة الأخيرة مثلاً، اتضح أولاً أننا نعيش في دولٍ تحتاج إلى حكمٍ قضائي ليُمنع دسّ الأصابع عنوةً في أجساد النساء. وتلك مصيبة. ومع أن الحكم القضائي إيجابي ويدعو للتفاؤل، فإن أحداً لم يطرح المسألة من باب أن العذرية حريةٌ شخصية، والتخلّص منها خيار خاص، ووجودها أو غيابها لا يمليان أي موقف عام.

صحيح أن تلك الفكرة لا تشبه "المجتمع"، لكن غيابها عن المجتمع هو تحديداً ما أنتج كشوف العذرية، التي ثار المجتمع نفسه ضدها. فقد ثار صوناً لصورة "الأم والأخت والزوجة والإبنة"، ضمن "القواعد المرعية الإجراء"، وليس انتصاراً لحرية الفرد في التصرّف بجسمه. ولكون جسم المرأة ملكية عامة، مُنعت كشوف العذرية، في خطوة تصون العذرية التي يتحكم بها "المجتمع"، بدلاً من صون حق المرأة باستعادة جسمها. 

لماذا؟ لأن النساء، في نهاية كل مطاف، لسن أكثر من "شرف" المجتمع.

منذ أربعين عاماً، كانت بنات مصر ونساؤها يتمشيّن في شوارعها - وفي أكثر شوارعها شعبيةً - مرتديات الـ"ميني جوب". وكانت البطلات السينمائيات يحتسين الخمر ويدخّن السجائر، أمام الجماهير المولعة بهن. وكانت الراقصة تحية كاريوكا، بطلة المعارك النقابية، من دون خشية توجيه إهانة لها على أساس مهنتها. وكان الحبّ الذي تغنيه أم كلثوم، ويطرب له رجالها ونساؤها، ينتصر للـ"قبلة إن كانت بين حبيبين"، فـ"ياخدها بدال الواحدة ألوف ولا يخشى للناس كلام". وكان، وكان، وكان...

وكان يُتوقع من مشهدٍ كهذا أن يؤدي بنا إلى عصرٍ يقول بالحرية الشخصية التامة، في عمق معانيها، بعد التمرّس في القشور. إلا أن ما تلاه من حكم بالقمع السياسي والفكري والاجتماعي، قد قام على زرع الخوف من الفرد وحريته، وإرساء منطق القوة في صياغة العلاقات الاجتماعية، والسياسية، والفكرية.

 الخوف من الحرية، وقمعها بتسلسل القوّة. 

كيف؟ توقف الفقر عن كونه تحدياً يجب إلغاؤه، ليضحي حالاً تفرض على الناس للسيطرة عليهم به. والفقر، يجرّ وراءه الجهل. ارتفعت نسبة الأمية في مصر، حتى فاقت نسبتها ثلث الشعب. وللتخلص من إمكانية ثورة الضعيف ضد الفقر والأمية، أخرج رجال الدين من عماماتهم الحلّ السحري: الآخرة. الآخرة، وما يرافقها من غطاء للرأس، تُحكم الحجاب على العقل. ولكي يسود الحجاب، تمت إدانة السفور. وفي مواجهة السفور، بات كل فردٍ صاحب فتوى. ومع الفتوى، حلّ التكفير. فلو كانت الجنة متاحة لكل الناس، لكان الناس قد توحّدوا في حال ما. العداوات زرعت في كل بيت، وباتت المحجبة كافرة مقارنة بالمنقبة، والسافرة عورة المجتمع. أما الرجل المفقّر والمجهّل فاستعاد القوامة على النساء، كأضعف الإيمان. فليظلم قليلاً، وهو يتلقى الظلم كثيراً. وتحالف رجال الدين مع رجال السلطة ورجال المال، وأرسيت قواعد دولة يتكاثر عدد النائمين على محطات المترو فيها بشكل خيالي، ويتضاعف عددهم من عام إلى آخر، حتى بات العيش عشوائياً، والمدينة عشوائية، والحرية تهمة بعيدة المنال، والحقد، كل الحقد، على من يدّعيها فردياً لنفسه، يُقتل، باسم آخر قوة ممنوحة إلي.

وهكذا، بات الفقر واقعاً، والجهل فقهاً، والحرية كفراً، والقوة شرعاً. تلك حال يجوز التوحّد عليها، لأنها تعمي الفرد عن الإمكانيات الأخرى.سادت الحال على السواد الأعظم من شعب فقير، وتفشّت العدوى بين الأقل فقراً، والأقل جهلاً، فبقيت قلة منهم تتذكر المطلب الأساسي، بينما موّه كثيرون الحرية، بحيث تتلاءم مع ألوان "الشعب". أما "الأغنياء" فلهم كوكبهم، "يمارسون" فيه حرياتهم كاملة، ويخرجون على المجتمع بالخطاب المحافظ الذي يضمن لهم بقاء الثروات في "الأنتوراج بتاعنا".. ويوماً بعد يوم، باتت العودة عن مكتسبات زمنٍ سابق، خياراً خاصاً، تجوز الشهادة لأجله!

وهكذا، أغدقت القدسية على المعادلة، وأضحى الفرد المهزوم في مجتمعه، جزءاً من آلة تخدم الإله طمعاً بآخرةٍ وردية. هي آلة، كل جزء صغير فيها إله صغير، يحتفي بقمعه، ويتوق إلى ممارسته.ولكن، هل تكون الثورة ضد "قمعي"، وتتوقف عند "ممارستي" للقمع؟ ففي المعادلة القائمة، تظهر الحرية المطلقة وحشية، مخيفة، لا بل هي كفرٌ. والقوة تبدأ من زندي، فبيتي، وصورتي، وشارعي، لتضحي ديناً جارفاً لكل ما يثير فيّ أي ذرّة تردّد.

واليوم، عندما يتحرّك الشعب للمطالبة بحريته التي تتخذ شكل عدالة إقتصادية وتمثيلية، فهو يحمل معه وفي داخل كل فرد منه، منظومة القمع الكاملة تلك: منهم من تبنّاها، ومنهم من طرح إمكانية مساءلتها، وقلة ثارت تماماً عليها، لكن الوعي إلى وجودها ليس عاماً. وبدا ذلك جلياً في صفحات دعم الثورات العربية (وليس المصرية)، على "فايسبوك"، إذ لا تطلق شعاراً إلا "بحمد الله"، ولا تنتصر لشهيد إلا بـ"لا إله إلا الله"، ولا تهتّ حاكماً إلا بـ"قلّة الرجولة" و"الإعاقة" و"الإلحاد". والتهمة وصف لفئة مهمّشة أو مقموعة إجتماعياً، أما الفخر فمصدره الدائم قيمٌ محافظة جداً، دينية، و"أخلاقية".

ثورات العرب الجارية راهناً لا تطرح على نفسها تلك الأسئلة. ثورة مصر، تواجه السؤال الصعب. هل ستقوم الثورة ضد جزءٍ من الظلم، متسلّحة بجزءٍ أكثر تجذراً منه، بحيث لا يخاف المواطن من تغييرٍ آت، إذ يأمن لثباتٍ مستمر فيه؟

ومع ذلك، ثار الناشطون ضد اتهام "إسلاميّ" للمدوّن علاء عبد الفتاح بأنه "شاذ"، لكن أحداً منهم لم يقل أن "الشذوذ" اسمه مثلية، وهي واقع، وليست تهمة. أتى الرفض للتهمة، وتوجّب نفيها، تماماً كما جسم علياء المهدي تهمة "واجبنا كثوار" أن ننفي معانيها كيفما أتت، وتماماً كما عري الفتاة المنقبة تهمة "واجبنا كثوار" أن نثبتها على الحاكم العسكري.

هناك شيء ما في أفق الثورات ينتقص من ثوريّتها، كونها تحتفي بالإنسان كما هو. وهو، بعد أربعين عاماً من القمع، بات صنيعته. الثورة، إن لم تهزّ المنزل وأسسه، كيف تصنع التغيير؟

هل ستتطلب إزالة صورة حسني مبارك عن الجدار، المحافظة على الأصفر الباهت الذي يحيط بها؟ عندما خرجت حملة ترويجية بإعلان يضع فم شيخ الأزهر على فم بابا روما، "انهارت" المرجعية المسيحية صوناً لشرف المقام الديني، في حين اكتفت مشيخة الأزهر بتجاهل الموضوع، كونه "غير ذي أهمية". تلك كانت خطوة لافتة في ثوريتها، ضمن مجتمعات "بلعت" الظلم كله، وغصّت برسوم كاريكاتورية تهزأ من نبي، فخرجت تصيح بوضوح: "إلا رسول الله". كان بوسع المشيخة أن تنتفض ذوداً عن "الإسلام"، إلا أن الشيخ الصوفي أحمد الطيّب أخرج الصورة من سياق المجتمع المحافظ، وقرأها بعين المعنى: هل تقول شيئاً يستأهل النقاش؟ لا يهم موقع الفم على الفم، ولا يهمّ العري. مضمون صورة علياء المهدي كان يطرح موضوعاً شديد الأهمية للنقاش، ولكنه لم يستدعه. العري "أكبر" من أن تهضمه العين. العري أقوى من المجتمع.

ينتظر المرء عمراً، ويهرم، على حد قول الرجل التونسي، لكي يحظى بحياة أقل رداءة، على كافة المستويات، ولكي يقوى على هضم كل الممنوعات، لا بل طحنها. وعندما تحلّ لحظة الثورة، يكون الطموح كبيراً، والخشية بحجمه. ماذا لو أتى الطموح محافظاً، على سلم اجتماعي أرساه الفساد؟

كل الدلالات تقول بتأرجحٍ على تلك الحافة اليوم، تأرجحٌ تصنعه مبادرات فردية تتذكّر الحق الأساسي بالحرية، وتسعى إلى آخر رمق للتذكير به، والدفاع عنه.

وهو تأرجح تمكن قراءته بعين ثورية، فهو ابن لحظة انتفاض على عقود من التجهيل والتعتيم المنهجي والمموّل. وهو، في مصر وحدها، قد بات مرئياً، ثاقباً للعين، طارحاً التحدّي على الذات. لكن غيابه عن التجارب العربية الأخرى يبقى مرعباً، علماً أنه تأرجحٌ يمكن أن يُعِين مجلساً عسكرياً على سرقة الثورة من معناها. وهو تأرجحٌ يمكن أن ينتج رئيساً، يشبه "اللي فات"، تستقر صورته، مبتسماً وحده، في إطار جديد، على حائطٍ يحتفي بإصفراره.

[نشر هذا المقال بالإتفاق مع مجلة ”بدايات“ الفصلية.]

Egypt’s landmark presidential race looks to be headed to a decisive run-off round between Mohamed Mursi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, and Ahmed Shafiq, a veteran loyalist to the regime of ousted president Hosni Mubarak and with strong ties to the military. While it was highly expected that Mursi would make it to the second round, or even win the first round, because of the firm support of millions of Muslim Brotherhood members and other Islamist elements, the same was not true for Shafiq. Expectations were that Amr Moussa, Egypt’s most prominent foreign minister in the last three decades and a symbol of liberalism, was the one who would be able to beat Mursi. It was dismal to liberals that Moussa came fifth, after Mursi, Shafiq, the leftist Hamdeen Sabbahi and the liberal Islamist Abdel Moneim Abul-Fotouh.

Shafiq’s strong performance was not, however, a surprise to all. In fact, according to Gamal Abdel-Gawad, a political analyst with Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) and a one time member of Gamal Mubarak's Policies Secretariat, in the last few weeks preceding the presidential election it was clear that Shafiq’s popularity was on the rise.

“Shafiq introduced himself as a man capable of restoring stability and security to Egypt after one and half years of turbulent events and this struck a strong chord with many ordinary citizens,” said Abdel-Gawad. He indicated that a recent poll conducted by ACPSS found that many ordinary citizens are tired of “the irresponsible behaviour of the revolutionary youth movements that toppled Mubarak, and the dismal performance of Islamist forces in parliament in the last few months.”

“Many citizens believe that instead of joining political life and competing for seats in parliament in a peaceful way, the young revolutionary movements opted for violent trouble on the street, first in the form of staging million-man protests at Tahrir Square or in the form of attempts to storm the buildings of the interior ministry, parliament and ministry of defence, or by raising the slogan “Down with military rule,” said Abdel-Gawad.

Agreeing with Abdel-Gawad, prominent lawyer Ragaie Attia said: “The irresponsibility of these revolutionary youth movements led the vast majority of citizens to seek shelter in a man with a strong personality and who can stand up to these anarchistic elements and contain Islamists. and for them former prime minister Shafiq was this man.”

“Shafiq is half military and half civilian and by no means can be considered a feloul (a Mubarak regime remnant),” argued Attia. According to him, the feloul are the remnants of Mubarak’s defunct ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and Shafiq was not a member of the NDP. “Shafiq is a statesman who can impose discipline and this is what many Egyptians liked about him.”

At the same time, said Attia, the dismal performance of Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist forces in parliament led many Egyptians to strongly believe that Shafiq could be a counterweight to them. “Egyptians saw how Islamists used their majority in parliament to tailor laws to serve their personal interests and political ends in the form of promoting for Mursi and launching hostile campaigns against Shafiq,” said Attia, adding “but these attacks played into Shafiq’s election campaign instead of harming it.”

Preliminary results of the first round of the presidential race show that Mursi lost to Shafiq in the most densely populated governorates in the Nile Delta region, which has been a Brotherhood stronghold for years. Shafiq won in the governorates of Sharqiya (Mursi’s birthplace), Gharbiya, Daqahliyya and Menoufiya, and he came second after leftist candidate Sagbahi and before Amr Moussa in several other governorates. Attia believes that “This was a kind of collective punishment for the Muslim Brotherhood.” “The message was that the Brotherhood has become very arrogant and only cares about its own interests and for these two reasons citizens voted for Shafiq to direct a strong blow to the group,” said Attia.

Others believe that the strong performance of Shafiq comes from the support of NDP remnants in several governorates, especially in the Nile Delta. In Gharbiya governorate, where Shafiq came first and Mursi came a dismal fifth, it is no secret that several former NDP figures who lost seats in the last parliamentary elections to Brotherhood candidates decided to retaliate using strong familial and tribal connections to beat Mursi. The same is true in other governorates. Sources also believe that several elements of the former state security apparatus joined hands with NDP stalwarts to turn people against Mursi and in support of Shafiq.

Attia, however, does not believe that the support of the remnants of the NDP was a major factor in the end. “I think citizens voted for Shafiq more because of hate of the Muslim Brotherhood than because of the influence of the NDP,” argued Attia, adding “Do not forget that hundreds of families of police officers and military people who faced campaigns of hate and recrimination from the Islamist-dominated parliament in the last four months have pushed them to vote for Shafiq as their best choice.” Many have strong fears that the Muslim Brotherhood aims to infiltrate the army and police and turn them into militias for the group.

In addition to ordinary citizens, the diehards of the NDP, the families of police and military men, Copts also are presumed to have had a big hand in pushing Shafiq to second place. Several semi-official figures put the number of Copts in Egypt at a range between ten and fifteen million. To Abdel-Gawwad, this is a big bloc that can radically change the results of any election. “I think the results of any election would change completely if just five million — or even three million — Copts decided to turn out and cast their votes for a certain candidate,” argued Abdel-Gawwad.

Rami, a Coptic bookseller at Ramses Street in Cairo, said “Christians in general and Copts in particular were highly divided among Shafiq and Moussa." He indicated that “the instructions of the Orthodox Church’s priests and bishops were clear: you have to vote either for Shafiq or Moussa.” Rami added: “I can surely say that at least eighty percent of Copts voted for Shafiq although Moussa was another very good choice.”

According to him, “most Copts came to the conclusion that Moussa as a president of Egypt would be a weak man who could never be able to stand up to a cunning group like the Muslim Brotherhood.” “By contrast," argued Rami, ”Shafiq is a man with a strong personality, half-military and has always been an open critic of the Muslim Brotherhood and this is what most Copts liked about him.”

Now with the battle lines clear, Rami and many Copts assure that they will turn out by the millions to vote for Shafiq in the second round. 

[Developed in partnership with Ahram Online.]

After seen as one of the frontfronners in Egypt's presidential race, with many expecting that he would make the runoff, Abdel Moneim Abul-Fotouh's poor showing in the as yet unfinalised results placing him in fourth place has contradicted the expectations of both observers and analysts.

The failure to secure enough votes to make it to the runoffs is a surprise given that his campaign was seen to represent a cross-section of the Egyptian political powers from extreme left to extreme right in what Abul-Fotouh called the project of "Strong Egypt."

Many people had expressed doubts about Abul-Fotouh and his ability to unite everybody from liberals to Islamists, from leftists to Salafists, considering this to be political manipulation rather than a sincere attempt to end polarisation in Egypt.

Abul-Fotouh’s Islamist background and long membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, the endorsement from Islamist parties like Al-Nour Partyand Al-Wasat Party, as well as his alleged appeal to sections of the youth of the Brotherhood, prompted a number of observers to believe that he would take a significant number of votes that would otherwise go to Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Mursi. But this did not happen.

Although the Salafist Al-Nour Party and the Salafist Calling as well Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya and its political arm declared their support to Abul-Fotouh's presidential campaign, according to observers the rank-and-file of these parties were not behind the leadership's decision. Several preferred Mursi over Abul-Fotouh as Mursi is more conservative, and Abul-Fotouh had main comments with regard to freedom of worship and women’s rights than run contrary to Salafist beliefs.

The Brotherhood and allied Salafist sheikhs targeted Abul-Fotouh accusing him of defying the orders and rules of Islam, in op-eds published in the Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice newspaper, the Brotherhood website, as well as in speeches at the electoral rallies Mursi.

Many Salafists had supported presidential candidate Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu-Ismail before he was excluded from the presidential race on the basis that his mother had acquired American citizenship. Many of these Abu-Ismail supporters did not vote for Abul-Fotouh, some preferring Mursi for his conservatism, and others boycotting the vote entirely believing the elections to be a sham after what they perceive as the unfair exclusion of their candidate.

Abu Ismail himself refused to reveal last week who he would vote for but according to news reports he voted for Abul-Fotouh.

When Abul-Fotouh lost Alexandria and Imbaba, both seen as Salafist strongholds, to rival presidential candidate Nasserist Hamdeen Sabbahi, it became clear which way the results overall would go. 

On the other hand, the endorsements from Salafist parties many liberals, Christians and pro-revolutionaries who might otherwise have voted for him, fearful that he was more Islamist and less liberal than they had thought. This pushed many towards Sabbahi who saw a huge surge in his popularity in the two weeks prior to the polls.

Abul-Fotouh's illustrious past in the Brotherhood worked against him for those who fear the Brotherhood, and for those disappointed by the performance of the Brotherhood's political arm the Freedom and Justice Party in parliament.

The presidential debate between Abul-Fotouh and Amr Moussa also impacted negatively on his popularity, with both candidates failing to satisfy. Many undecided voters were disappointed with Abul-Fotouh's performance and believed that he came off more as an Islamist candidate. His defensiveness towards Amr Moussa also worked against his attempt to present himself as a strong presidential candidate.

A question frequently asked of Abul-Fotouh was whether he would be capable of being the candidate that would unite disparate forces and political trends. According to the election results, the answer is no. 

[Developed in partnership with Ahram Online.]

During revolutionary times, remarkable social, cultural and economic changes occur. Each phase potentially carries new surprises as a reflection of these emerging changes.

The emergence of Nasserist candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi in third place, so far, behind the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, Mohamed Mursi and Mubarak-era Ahmed Shafiq reveals the significant portion of Egyptians thirsty for social justice.

After Islamists – the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists – successfully campaigned for a 'yes' vote in a referendum on the constitutional declaration in March 2011, and then swept the parliamentary elections later in the year, the Islamists managed to win only on average forty-two percent of votes in the presidential elections. This forty-two percent, a significant decline from Islamists' successes over the past year, is divided between the Brotherhood candidate, Mursi and the moderate Islamist candidate, Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh who was expelled from the Brotherhood.

Moreover the difference in votes won by Mursi and by Sabbahi is not significant.

"Sabbahi has succeeded in portraying himself as one of the people, and so many Egyptians voted for him, even though his campaign was small and under-resourced," Emad Gad, political analyst and member of parliament told Ahram Online.

The core message of Sabbahi's campaign is social justice and a good life for all Egyptians. In a country in which forty percent of the population live on less than two dollars a day, these messages resonate.

“My campaign is for all Egyptians and especially a campaign for the poor and the alleviation of the struggle between the classes,” Sabbahi repeated in different press conferences. Sabbahi also promised a rise in salaries for most working citizens if he won the presidential elections. "Many of middle class citizens, the poor, workers and peasants voted for Sabbahi," Gamal Fahmy, a Nasserist columnist told Ahram Online.

It is not only economic reasons that lie behind the support for Sabbahi. For many, Sabbahi was the only viable candidate who was neither feloul (a 'remnant' from the former regime) nor Islamist. Some Egyptians fear Islamist control over the presidency and the parliament and what the impact would be for personal freedoms. Meanwhile, others who voted for the Islamists in the parliamentary elections have been disillusioned by their poor performance.

Sabbahi was also a safe resort for those who refused to vote for remnants of the old regime.

In the marathon five-hour televised presidential debate between Abul-Fotouh and former foreign minister under Mubarak, Amr Moussa, both candidates failed to impress, leaving many voters disappointed. This worked in Sabbahi's favor as well. For some voters the debate revealed that Abul-Fotouh was more of an Islamic candidate than a revolutionary liberal one, and for others Moussa came off as far less promising than had been expected.

Being Nasserist, pursuing a socialist agenda with social justice at its heart, committed to personal freedoms and promising a national agenda against all foreign intervention makes Sabbahi appealing to many revolutionaries. Sabbahi's presidential program could be summarised in the slogan of the revolution; "bread, freedom, dignity and social justice."

"I was standing shoulder to shoulder on 28 January in Galaa street with Hamdeen, he represents me , the revolution and people," Laila El-Refai,  twenty-five, told Ahram Online, describing her experiences of what is described as the 'Day of Rage' during the eighteen days of mass protests that led to the fall of former president Hosni Mubarak.

Less than two weeks before the polls, more than 500 public figures, revolutionaries and intellectuals announced their support for Sabbahi. Among those were the Revolution Youth Coalition, Peaceful Change Youth Movement, the mother of a symbol of the Egyptian Revolution – the mother of Khaled Said – Alaa El-Aswani, columnist and novelist, Abdel-Halim Kandil, columnist. Sabbahi's chances seemed to be increasingly looking up in the days approaching the polls.

Youth also make up a good chunk of Sabbahi's voters. He was able to capture the imagination of many young Muslims and Copts, particularly those who identify the revolution. At fifty-seven, Sabbahi was also one of the youngest presidential candidates.

For some people, Sabbahi's Nasserism set off alarm bells. Sabbahi sought to offset this by distancing himself from aspects of the Nasser era and promising he would not be another Nasser. For others, Nasserism also evokes a period of national pride and greater social justice than the period that has elapsed since then.

Whether Sabbahi makes it to the second round or not, the high turnout for the Nasserist candidate is a source of hope to the poor, the revolutionaries, intellectuals and to all those who believe in social justice for Egypt.

"These results are an expression of the Egyptians' capacity for change and for creating a better Egypt," Fahmy told Ahram Online.

[Developed in partnership with Ahram Online.]

It has been fifteen months since the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. Since then there has been a continued sense of leaderlessness and overall instability throughout Egypt. Over the last two days¹, Egyptians have taken to the ballot box in what has become an historic presidential election. Hours since the voting polls have closed and the ballots are still being counted as Egyptians wait with bated breath. This race has been hard to predict up to the very last hours—as though the elections for Egypt’s next president have been held up by the lack of polling.

This essay examines social media content leading up to the presidential elections in May 2012. It provides ten interactive graphs to illustrate public opinion expressed on Twitter. These graphs represent sentiment and semantic analyses of over two million tweets from seventeen hashtag feeds posted 10 April 2012 through 24 May 2012. The following hashtags are in the study: #egyelections, #egypresiden, #egypt as well as the Arabic hashtags شفيق# حمدين# ,انتخابات_الرئاسة# ,العباسيه#  ,ابوالفتوح# ,خالد_على# , موسى# ,مرسي# ,#مصر.

The results of this case study were generated using swarm computing algorithms developed at R-Shief, Inc.—a lab that is harvesting “one of the largest repositories of Arabic-language tweets” since 2008.² This technique of data exploration works from the bottom up, filtering through the noise and letting the data and tell us what is there. Leveraging its massive database, R-Shief was able to develop language, sentiment, and semantic analytic tools in Arabic and English beginning 2008 (adding Persian, French, German, Spanish in 2011, and soon to include Urdhu) and applied in real-time analyses on political mobilization across the Middle East and North Africa region.

The data visualizations generated seek to illustrate and improve our understanding of the sensibilities and cultural logic(s)³ that are being expressed by the people on Twitter. It is not to say philosophical underpinnings to the nature of a virtual world are new and revelatory; nor does this argument purport that the what is being expressed online in the digital world is necessarily representative of what happens on the ground. In places like Egypt where literacy rates only reach 66%⁴, analyses of Internet penetration hold less weight⁵.

However, elements of the virtual become actualized under unique, local, temporal conditions that cannot be predicted. They only happen in the “now.” Approaching this logic from a visual arts lens, as Laura Marks does in her book, Enfoldment and Infinity: An Islamic Genealogy of New Media Art, she traces new media art along a unique historiography of Islamic thought from the birth of the algorithm in nineth century Iraq through fifteenth century Islamic mysticism and neoplatonism, or “beginnings of virtual reality.” One of the critical points Marks builds upon is a notion of events in time as unique and foldable, similar to Kant’s nineteenth century notion of the “sublime” event. For an event to be transformative, it relies on unpredictable conditions. In other words, the act of Bouazizi lighting himself on fire in Tunisia was as sublime as it was horrible.

For the purpose of this essay, the event under examination is the first round of Egypt’s historic presidential election to replace former President Hosni Mubarak.

Graphing and Reading the Presidential Elections 

Despite the fact that the majority of tweets are in Arabic, the English hashtag #Egypt is used in over twice as many tweets as its native Arabic equivalent, #مصر, according to the table in Figure 1. From the first day sampled for this study, 10 April, the ex-prime minister Ahmed Shafiq has had the most daily mentions of all the candidates. Shafiq has steadily been mentioned double and triple the volume as his opponents.

Fig. 1. These are the 17 Twitter hashtag feeds examined in this digital case study.

In order to determine whether volumes of tweets about a candidate indicate support or criticism, the sentiment analysis in Figure 2 indicates degree of positive sentiment expressed. However without careful semantic consideration, conducting sentiment analysis can result in inaccurate results and in the past has proven to fail to detect sarcasm in tweets⁶. In the interactive bubble chart below, a new method of sentiment analysis was conducted on the Arabic-language tweets⁷. What was calculated, but is not represented in the chart below, are percentages of neutral and negative tweets.

Readers of this article are highly encouraged to roll the cursor over the all of the figures in this article to interact with the various analyzed data charts. When you roll over the charts with your mouse, detailed information will appear. Each bubble represents tweets collected on hashtags with the candidates’ name in Arabic. The size of the bubble represents the average volume of tweets in comparison to the others, and its position along the x-axis represents percentage of positive sentiment. The further to the right the bubble falls, the more positive sentiment detected in those tweets. When you roll over each bubble, a window of statistics will appear including a short description about the candidate.

From the sentiment analysis below, one would say that Ahmed Shafiq and Mohamed Morsy will move on to the next round of elections—Shafiq because of the sheer volume of public interest (whether positive, negative, or neutral), and Morsy because he came out with 99.83% positive sentiment. According to this bubble chart, the only contender is Hamdeen Sabbahi.

 [Run your mouse over the graph to display comparative values]

Fig. 2. Created by VJ Um Amel, 2012. Research tools by R-Shief, Inc. 

The interactive bar graph below, Figure 3, gives you a weekly comparison of the candidates. If you roll your cursor over the columns, windows with more detailed information appear. This graph compares the average volume of tweets on the top candidates to be the next President of Egypt over the last week of campaigning. One thing clearly stands out: Shafiq, Sabbahi, and Morsy all gained more Twitter “talk” over the two last weeks. Mohamed Morsy seems to have increased the most from week to week.

[Run your mouse over the graph to display comparative values]

Fig. 3. Created by VJ Um Amel, 2012. Research tools by R-Shief, Inc. 

Figures 4, 5, and 6 are interactive line charts that graph tweets over time. If you roll your cursor over the columns, windows with more detailed information appear. Figure 4 is a comparison among the Arabic hashtags for each candidate candidates zoomed into the 48 hours of Election Day one and two.

In Figure 4, there are two peaks evident. The first one occurred on 23 May around 5:00 pm Cairo time when Shafiq was hit shoes thrown at him as he cast his ballot. The second peak of activity occurred in the final hours when Shafiq appeared as a clear winner. Alongside Morsy, Sabbahi and Moussa continued to gain Twitter talk as the results started trickling in Thursday night.

[Run your mouse over the graph to display comparative values] 

Fig. 4. Created by VJ Um Amel, 2012. Research tools by R-Shief, Inc. 

Figures 4 and 5 graph the number of times each candidate is mentioned in #Egypt tweets from 1 May 2012 through 24 May 2012. I chose to use the #Egypt tag because it receives the largest number of tweets in comparison to the other hashtags in the study (as an important rule of thumb, larger data samples allow the analyses to be more precise).

In previous studies, R-Shief has recorded that over 75% of tweets with #Egypt tags are written in Arabic. That understanding led me to graph the candidates name as it is written in English separately from graphing their names in Arabic. Though these two graphs seem similar, please note the numbers on the y-axis of the graph indicate different scales.

As we look at candidates Twitter popularity of a timeline, one day that stands out is 10 May, when Amr Moussa and Abdel Moneim Abou El-Fotouh clashed in national television debates broadcast live. The debates seemed to have hurt the former two leading candidates, because soon after Sabbahi began to trend on Twitter while Moussa's numbers dropped. Among English speakers, Sabbahi gained the most interest. The question thus follows: did he win over Moussa supporters after the debate?

Another striking observation is that Shafiq and Morsy were rarely mentioned by name in English throughout the month of May; however, at present, they are in the lead.

[Run your mouse over the graph to display comparative values]

Fig. 5. Created by VJ Um Amel, 2012. Research tools by R-Shief, Inc. 

[Run your mouse over the graph to display comparative values]

Fig. 6. Created by VJ Um Amel, 2012. Research tools by R-Shief, Inc. 

Figure 7 offers a cumulative display of the data in Figures 5 and 6. In this view, it is clear that Hamdeen Sabbahi is most discussed among English speakers and Amr Moussa follows his lead. Looking at the history of Twitter talk, one could argue that Moussa lost ground to Hamdeen as they seemed to have appealed to similar voters.

[Run your mouse over the graph to display comparative values]

Fig. 7. Created by VJ Um Amel, 2012. Research tools by R-Shief, Inc. 

The timeline below is designed to help readers spot the highest points in the graphs (nodes). Like the cumulative bar graph above, Figure 8 offers a total number of mentions the candidates received throughout the month of May irrespective of language. According to this more comprehensive account, the following are the main highlights:

• Following the violence in Abbassiya late in early May, Twitter talk on Shafiq increased.

• The live ONTV television debate between Moussa and Abou Fotouh on 10 May generated Twitter talk on both candidates. However without further sentiment analysis, it is difficult to determine whether more talk about a candidate indicates support or ridicule. Gauging by the Twitter talk activity following the event, one could argue that the debates impacted both Moussa and Abou Fotouh negatively.

• At the close of the ballot boxes on Thursday 24 May, Shafiq’s blue dot soared while Morsy and Sabbahi both came from behind.

[Run your mouse over the graph to display comparative values]

Fig. 8. Created by VJ Um Amel, 2012. Research tools by R-Shief, Inc. 

This interactive table below allows you to read through over 2,000 tweets posted that included the hastag #egypreselex while Egyptians went to the ballot boxes 23 and 24 May. The purpose is to allow you, the reader of this essay, to sift through a small sample of the tweets yourself.

[Run your mouse over the figure to display comparative values]

Fig. 9. This is an interactive table that allows you to read through tweets posted on #egypreselex
May 23-24 2012.  Created by VJ Um Amel, 2012. Research tools by R-Shief, Inc. 

In the interactive pie chart (Figure 10), the most frequently used words in the data chart appear. This chart is intended to offer a birds eye view into the semantic signals found within the corpus of data sampled for this study. Unsurprisingly, the most used word in the data set is “Allah,” the Arabic word for God, the second is the Arabic word for “today,” the third is the Arabic name for “Egypt,” the fourth is the Arabic word for “the people,” and the fifth most word in the data set is “before,” the sixth is a transliteration of the word, “retweet,” and the seventh is the Arabic word for “organization,” the eighth is the Arabic word for “day,” the ninth is the word for “revolution,” and the tenth most frequent word in the data sample is the Arabic name, “Mohamed.”

While Allah, retweet, and Egypt are obvious signifiers, the more mundane words like now, day, and organization. They may signify urgency, action, and mobilization expressed in Arabic on Twitter in 2 million tweets over 40 days.

[Run your mouse over the graph to display comparative values]

Fig. 10. Created by VJ Um Amel, 2012. Research tools by R-Shief, Inc. .

Conclusion

• Despite negative sentiments and protests against military rule, Ahmed Shafiq has consistently been the subject of social media engagement in volume twices and three times more than his opponents. However, Morsy’s high percentage of positive sentiment also indicates a strong base of supporters.

• The television debate on 10 May 2012 seemed to be a turning point for the liberal versus conservative camps. On the liberal camp we saw the sudden rise of Hamdeen Sabbahi from the Nasserite party. The conservatives stayed conservative and out of the limelight during controversial debate. Twitter talk on Morsy, in particular, became quiet after the debates.

• There is a fleeting aspect to this type of ambient journalism. It has a great impact on mobilizing and alerting around real-time events. However, the trends can change at a dizzying rate.

• Arabic language dominates Twitter posts on hashtags related to Egypt. In the case of hashtag #Egypt, the candidates trend differently when their names are posted in Arabic than when they are posted in English.

• The candidates that will advance to the next round, Ahmed Shafiq and Mohamed Morsy, both had very little Twitter discussion about them in English. The candidates that appeared most in the Arabic tweets are the two that won this first round.

• From this social media data, it was clear that Shafiq was “leading the Twitter talk polls,” so to speak, for weeks now. He consistently stayed ahead of his opponents throughout the race.

• Despite the minimal social media penetration among Egyptians, in this case study, Twitter did function as an echo-chamber to events on the ground—from the violent clashes in Abassiya in early May, to the television debates on 10 May, to the shoe throwing attack on Shafiq on 23 May, all the way until the closing of the voting polls.

_______________________

[1] Egyptian embassies and consulates worldwide administered elections a week prior to official voting in Egypt for Egyptian expatriats.
[2] Miller, Greg. (30 September 2011). Social Scientists Wade in Twitter Stream. Science: Vol. 333 no. 6051 pp. 1814-1815. 
[3] Introduced by Frederic Jameson in his book, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late-Capitalism, the idea of a cultural logic signifies a process of people collectively using effectively identical assumptions in interpreting each other's actions. In this instance, culture exists in a spatial system of interests.
[4] According to UNICEF’s statistics by country, the total adult literacy rate (%), 2005-2010 in Egypt is 66%.
[5] According to Social Bakers, among Internet users in Egypt, the total number of FB users is reaching 10.7 million, which translates into a Facebook penetration rate of 13.26%.
[6] González-Ibáñez, R., Muresan, S., & Wacholder, N. (2011). Identifying Sarcasm in Twitter: A Closer Look. In Proceedings of the 49th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies.

 هذا الشريط ضمن سلسة من الأفلام تنشرها ”جدلية“ بالإتفاق مع موقع ”العربي الحر“ ومن انتاجه. توثق هذه الأفلام الوثائقية القصيرة التي تتراوح مدتها بين دقيقتين إلى ثلاث دقائق لجوانب في الحياة اليومية لهؤلاء الذين تتحدث عنهم، وتبعات الثورات العربية سلباً وايجاباً على حياتهم. تتبع الكاميرات حيوات أفراد من أجيال وطبقات مختلفة، سواء كانوا من المدينة أو الريف، أغنياء أو فقراء. كما تحاول تتبع نشاطاتهم في مختلف المناطق العربية والتي يصعب عبور حدودها لأسباب معروفة. 

الفيلم بعنوان "مسرح الشارع". في أحد شوارع العاصمة الأردنية عمّان، يؤدي أحمد سرور وأمجد حجازين وسليمان ظواهرة مسرحية تدعو المواطنين الأردنيين إلى محاسبة حكومتهم على الفساد. المؤدون الثلاثة شباب قرروا عبور الخط الأحمر في نقدهم السياسي. فأسسوا "مسرح الشارع" وهو عبارة عن عرض مسرحي في الأماكن العامة في شوارع عمّان وبقية المدن الأردنية. ولا يحتاج مسرح الشارع إلى جمهور محدد أو إلى شراء بطاقات دخول. يركز النقد في مسرح الشارع على فقدان الحرية والحقوق الأساسية. ويتم امجاز المهمة عبر توظيف الكوميديا ورسم شخصيات افتراضية تمثل الطبقات الكادحة. ويمكن للجمهور أن يتفاعل مع العرض ويطلب منه أن يعلق ويطرح الأسئلة ويقدم الاقتراحات.

This video is part of an ongoing series presented in cooperation with Al-Arabi Al-Hor. The films, which are produced by Al-Arabi Al-Hor, portray the daily lives of its featured individuals, following the positive and negative effects of the Arab uprisings on them. The camera follows individuals of different generations and classes, whether from urban centers or rural areas, in rich neighborhoods or poor slums. The films also portray their activities across different Arab regions, the borders of which are difficult to cross for reasons that are well known.

The below video is entiteld Masrah al-Share' (Theater of the Street): Performing in Downtown Amman. In one of Amman's downtown streets, a popular area in the Jordanian capital, Ahmed Sror, Amjad Hijazin, and Suliman Zawahreh perform a play that urges Jordanian citizens to hold their government accountable for corruption. The three performers are young Jordanians who decided to cross the red lines of public political criticism. So they started the Street Theater, a form of theatrical performance that takes place in public spaces in the streets of Amman and the rest of Jordan without a specific audience paying to watch. The street theater's criticism focuses on the lack of freedoms and basic rights of Jordanian citizens. This is accomplished through the genre of comedy with hypothetical characters addressing ideas that represent the laboring class of society. The street theater aims to put the street audience in a state of total surprise as they are forced to analyze the ideas put forward by the performance, which requires high-speed agility and the ability to maintain a rhythm and stick to the limits of representation in the vicinity of the street character. In turn, the audience in the street is asked to interact with the actors through commenting, asking questions, or suggesting ideas.

Hamdeen Sabbahi will file a lawsuit calling for the suspension of Egypt's presidential election because of alleged voting irregularities and a pending case over the right of former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq to stand, Sabbahi's lawyer said Saturday.

Sabbahi is a leftist presidential candidate who did not make it into the run-offs by a very small margin.

"We will present an appeal on behalf of candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi ... to the Presidential Elections Commission, citing a series of irregularities ... that have affected the outcome of the first round," lawyer Essam El-Islamboly told Reuters.

Islamboly said the appeal, to be lodged on Sunday or Monday at the latest, will ask the commission to suspend the election until the public prosecutor checks a claim by a police officer that the Interior Ministry had illegally assigned 900,000 votes to Shafiq.

Parliament had passed a political exclusion law disqualifying Hosni Mubarak's prime ministers from running for high office, but the elections commission declined to enforce the rule, instead sending it to the Supreme Constitutional Court.

Essam al-Erian, deputy head of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, told reporters Friday that Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsy won the first round of the election with twenty-five percent of the vote, followed by Shafiq with twenty-four percent. The first round was held Wednesday and Thursday.

Sabbahi came third with twenty-two percent of the vote, according to figures collated by Brotherhood observers at polling stations across the country. 

[This article originally appeared in Egypt Independent.]

Ahram Online presents a detailed visual breakdown of the results from Egypt's first free presidential elections.

[Developed in partnership with Ahram Online. Ahmed Feteha, Bassem Abo Alabass, Mohamed Nada, Michael Gunn, Mahmoud Elassal contributed to this project.] 

Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, editors. Foreword by Faisal Devji. Poetry of the Taliban. London: Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2012.

Since there is already a substantial discussion surrounding this compilation of poetry "of" the Taliban, it seems important to review the work within a series of broader contexts.

Writing on Afghanistan has recently enjoyed an upsurge, but this is not the first such spike of western interest in Afghanistan. Amid a major catalog that has emerged over the past decade, there is a slowly growing subset of work that examines representations of Afghanistan from colonial to contemporary times as part of its project. We might cite recent edited volumes, alongside work by Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, Jamil Hanifi, Magnus Marsden and Ben Hopkins, and others. A picture that repeatedly surfaces is a historical feedback loop of policy interests, Orientalist scholarship, and popular market expectations that have produced remarkably durable and static conventions, as several have pointed out.

Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn are independent Kandahar-based researchers and analysts, and highly-respected members of the Afghan NGO sector. Along with other primary-source work, their compilation Poetry of the Taliban fits into a contrary tradition alongside such largely ignored works as H. G. Raverty’s Selections from the Poetry of the Afghans (1862), and especially James Darmesteter’s Chants populaires des Afghans (1888). The latter is perhaps the sole repository of self-expressed non-elite perspectives on anticolonial activity in nineteenth-century eastern Afghanistan. It contextualizes those sources in a universe of contemporary discourse: love lyrics, satire, and folktales. The result is so removed from conventional wisdom that I have never seen it cited in histories of the events its poets comment on.

Recently, Taliban literature has received attention at the US Naval Postgraduate School among other places, sometimes embedded in wider studies. Unlike works seeking policy lessons in poems, though, Strick and Kuehn's book arises from the same multidimensional curiosity regarding sociocultural history that Darmesteter harbored, shorn of stereotype and rooted in primary sources. Poetry of the Taliban translates a survey of poetry from published collections and recordings of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as from contemporary media, especially the Taliban’s official website. Presented with minimal commentary, the poems are categorized by theme: "Love and Pastoral"; "Religious"; "Discontent"; "The Trench"; and "The Human Cost." The result is both an anthology and a larger phenomenon. What can we learn from it?

The editors’ introduction and Faisal Devji’s preface situate these texts in their media universe. To a greater extent than in the work of Pashto’s classical philologists, Strick's and Kuehn's social science training benefits both the reader and the exercise. Few researchers can speak with as much authority regarding the social domains of insurgent cultural circulation. It is importnat to note, then, that they are satisfyingly agnostic here, stopping short of concrete claims about the production, or the producers, of most of the poems. We learn that their composers come from a wide cross-section of society; and that many identifiable authors have no affiliation with the Taliban movement. Instead of documenting "The Taliban," it seems, many of these words simply resonated with individuals who interact with a piecemeal Taliban media infrastructure, and who decided to submit poems, whether their own or other people’s, to a Taliban website, just as they might share something with a Facebook group. This revelation of a decentered, mostly anonymous authorship is a valuable insight, one that the editors explicitly call attention to but also underplay.

Underplaying it is problematic for individuals, as some have pointed out: what if careless readers imagine that any poet who protests NATO’s presence, in a volume titled Poetry of the Taliban, also supports any number of Taliban ideas or actions? Might such slippages have potential real-world consequences, if such imagined "support" is viewed as "material"? But also, if reviews are any indication, underplaying this decentered provenance distracts even thoughtful readers from the book’s larger, very substantial value. Like Darmesteter’s compilation, it is a cross-sectional archive, however selective. If we read these poems with sensitivity to that reality, then the book offers a view of permeable social domains, and complex, layered worlds of aesthetics and opinion from multiple Pashto publics, not just Taliban ones.

Numerous jingoistic anthems throughout the book celebrate militaristic domination. Some from other genres probably voice approval of the Taliban cadre’s ideas in some respects, if vocabulary like "crusaders" is any indication, but also incorporate a deep skepticism regarding violence. In such cases, poetry is hardly a "fram[ing of] violence in higher ethics"; rather, it is a ceding of key terms of discussion, by the Taliban’s archival gatekeeper, to a public that disapproves of their actions. Finally, some poems express only devastated bewilderment, a sense that all the forms of violence (including the Taliban’s) surrounding the poems’ speakers have caused such irreconcilable rupture that history itself is on hold.

If history is suspended, do we gain any sense of delinked pasts in this collection? Certainly, if we know where to look. Occasionally we recognize allusions, or even poets, like Gul Pacha Ulfat, a leader of the underground pro-democracy "Awakened Youth" movement of the late 1940s. Ulfat, an elite religious scholar, died in 1977 and was one of twentieth-century Afghanistan’s most socially progressive thinkers. His fiction spoke of social justice and the sufferings of the rural poor, especially women, and many of his didactic ghazals cryptically yet (to Pashtuns) unmistakeably interrogated hegemony: mutually-implicated structures of autocracy, lineage patriarchy, and corruption. The mere presence of Ulfat’s name reactivates his "counter-Taliban" memory for those who recognize it—and who are many and varied, at least within Afghanistan. As an opinion trend, his movement spread through concerted, hybrid literate and oral-poetic campaigns that bridged gaps between urban and rural, between society’s most formally educated and its least educated, rendering meaningless any facile pronouncement on Pashto "folk" poetry’s rustic or vernacular nature. In these respects, the movement presents a strong parallel to the Taliban in their war of ideological position, even while its core leadership was characterized by radically opposing sensibilities.

Such texts return us to the present via multiple bridges from the past. Rather than a coherent picture of self-contained ideological beliefs held by a definable activist group (or an undifferentiated horde of low-tech land-drones), this collection, carefully read, looks more like the deeply conflicted ecology of an archive, one much deeper than advertised. It is an archive of insurgent and other Afghan expressions of experience, opinion, and occasionally critique, an archive that is interconnected by the curatorial practices of a fissiparous social movement (and of the volume’s editors) as much as by external reality.

Even despite the selection process, the lines between insurgent, ambivalent Taliban sympathizer, skeptic, and Ulfat sometimes become so blurry here as to be invisible even to the specialist. In fact, most of the poems in the final section, "The Human Cost," to me resemble neither the militarized anthems nor martyrdom songs ubiquitous on YouTube, but rather a rising trans-regional print genre of anti-war poetry, equally damning of all parties to ongoing violence, that has been discussed approvingly in the western media. Lacking specific contexts for specific works, why wouldn’t a reader focus only on the collages of individual ideas and images in particular poems, and privilege disjuncture on the level of the corpus over any unity? Might any attempt to read unified characteristics from isolated selections betray one’s own preoccupations, as much as any external reality?

As one might imagine, this has not been the prevailing approach to the book. Some have scolded the book: is it nothing more than "self-justifying propaganda" that "gives oxygen to the enemy?" Others have agreed, while derisively sniffing that it is "bad poetry" too. But what is accomplished by dismissing a book that replicates the speech not only of a militia, but of a cross-section of other parts of society too? Given these poems’ scattered provenance, dismissing the book means rejecting the everyday traumatic experience of millions of people, just because their experience first sits alongside that of a faction that contributes to that trauma and selectively edits it, and is then edited further by the label on the cover. And, in addition to rejecting the Taliban’s manifold, and manifest, violence, a blanket dismissal involves willfully ignoring the trauma that has resulted from foreign intervention too; as well as the fact that for many Afghans, ongoing events fit into a much longer collective memory of intervention. Just because western readers feel distant from, or reject their inheritance of, this shared history, it does not follow that recalling it always involves a triumphalist celebration of violence and domination in the occasional historical Afghan victory; nor need it imply that a critical poet identifies with the Taliban.

Indeed, dismissing the volume wholesale would mean disregarding the complex imaginations that inform everyday people’s very ambivalent relationships with this social movement surrounding them. And it would mean pushing from attention one thing that this volume suggests: such ambivalence exists, and the Taliban’s cultural gatekeepers themselves have had no choice but to acknowledge it, even at the cost of ceding parts of their own message. The more censorious among the volume’s western detractors might take this point to heart.

On the other hand, dismissing the volume’s scope—including reading it only for "Taliban"—would just be business as usual: further marginalizing the richer, more humane, yet increasingly-forgotten sociocultural histories that are clandestinely archived in ghostly traces throughout. They are histories that many across the region, of any and all backgrounds, yearn to revisit, but that recede further into obscurity and impossibility with each act of negligence or ignorance. In dismissing this, as earlier generations dismissed Raverty’s and Darmesteter’s work, one dismisses the varied experience of millions, under the label "enemy of my tribe"—or even, with flippant charges of illiterate, weak poetry, dismisses their ability to properly voice their experience at all.

يا فاتناً لولاهُ ما هزّني      وجدٌ ولا طعمُ الهوى طابَ لي

هذا فؤادي فامتلك أمره     واظلمه إن أحببتَ أو فاعــــدل

ماذا يعني أن تعشق السيدة، أم كلثوم، بعد الأربعين من عمرك، تنصت من كلِّ قلبك، تهيم بآهاتها، وتلينُ أحجارُ روحك في البحّة الفادحة؟

الترنيمة، وحدها، تلمسُ شيئاً في قاع نفسك هوى واستقر، ونبرة الألم، تقدح حزناً لم تكن قد تصورته ممكناً ذات يوم. 

ها أنت ذا مأخوذ بها، وَلِهٌ، وحزين، تشفّ، مع الأربعين، وتعرف أن كل عاطفة تؤول إلى شجن.

تفكّر، أحياناً، أن علاقتك المستجدة بها، ولما تكمل العقد بعد، عتبة لفراق ما، غربة موعودة، غياب، بذرة موت سقطت في دواخلك، نبتت في الأرض المهجورة على مهل وضربت جذورها عاماً بعد عام، بغير أن تُحسَّ، وها هي فتّقت تربة الجسد، وقد جفّ قليلاً، راحت غضارته، حتى استقامت شجرة، أغصانها الخضراء العفيّة تشقُّ الجلد، تمتد، أوراقها تتمايل مع الصوت الساحر العجيب كلما اشتدّ، وارتفع، وصاح، كلما طاب، وذاب، وتبغدد.

أحياناً تقول: هي كلُّ ما تبقى من ذكرى زمن لم أعش من فتنته الكثير. 

حنينٌ، أن تعشق أم كلثوم، بعد كلِّ هذا العمر، اشتياقٌ، وحشةٌ، وعد مكسور، رسالة، نفحة عطر ذاب وتبخّر، لذةٌ مهدورةٌ ليس لاستعادتها من سبيل.

أن تنتبه، بعد عقود، لعاطفة تنبض تحت جلدك، وترى أنك مأخوذ بما لم تعشه معها من أعوام، ذلك يعني أنك تتذكر، تحيا صوتاً موهوباً لزمن ليس هو الماضي بالضرورة، ليس هو الراهن العصي، إنما هو زمن الحكاية حينما تُصبح الحكاية ذكرى، وتصبح الذكرى عزاءً، أو ما يشبه العزاء، زمن يستعاد عبر الصوت، وبالصوت يكتب حكايته مثلما حكيت من قبل، بما في طياتها من مواجع وأحزان. 

لا أكتب، بذلك، سيرة عمر مع أم كلثوم، لا أفتح باباً لأعود لفصل أول بعيد، إنما أمنح الصوت، بقماشته الساحرة، حق أن يترنم في ما تبدد من أيامنا، ما تسرّب وتبخّر وذاب، أيام لم تكن أم كلثوم سوى لغز في كل ذكرى له برعم وغصن، هكذا هو صوت السيدة، وهكذا هي حكاية عشقنا، حقيقية كانت أم متخيلة، وقد تفتحت مثل زهرة.

تنتظرنا السيدة هناك، في عطفة خفيفة الضوء، بعد الأربعين، تقف دونما كلال مثلما وقفت على مسرحها طويلاً، بالفستان نفسه، بالخاتم، بالنظرة، بهزة اليد عندما يعلو النغم، وبارتعاشة المنديل، واثقة من قدومنا وقد رقق الزمن أرواحنا، وأخذنا نشفُّ مع التقدم في السن، نلتفت ونتذكر. لقاؤنا مع السيدة في عطفة العمر لقاء أطياف هي أقرب إلى الحياة ولوعتها، هي، على نحو ما، خلاصتها، مثلما كانت ترنيمة السيدة خلاصة عاطفة عاشت طويلاً، عبرت، مثل فرس مجنحة، من عصر لعصر لتستقر بين يديها، وها هي تعود لتحليقها من جديد.

مثل صيحة قطار، أليفة، عميقة، مترقّبة، وهي، إلى ذلك، موحشة، أخّاذة، مفاجئة، هكذا تبدو علاقتي بها اليوم، وليس غريباً أن يأخذنا تولّهنا بالسيدة إلى القطار، ولو على سبيل التشبيه، فالقطار، قطار المعقل بالذات، جنّة من جنان العمر النادرة، حلم يبدأ بمحطة وينتهي بأخرى، حياة بهيجة حافلة، أناس وأصوات وروائح ورغبات وأوقات، لكل وقت طعمٌ وشكلٌ ولون، حكاية الفتى وقد قاسمك غرفة الكوشيت في إحدى سفراتك الليلية لبغداد، زادت من حيرتك أمام عشق الناس لأم كلثوم، تولّههم بها، ووسعّت مالا تفهمه من أمر العلاقة، كان الفتى طالباً في الإعدادية، في مرحلتها الأخيرة أو ما قبلها، على غير أوصاف أهل البصرة، حلو الملامح، طويل الشعر، برونزيه، رياضي القوام، أخذتنا حكاياتنا لعبد الحليم، فاتننا العليل، وأخذته روحه لأم كلثوم، حدّثنا عن تسابقه في عشقها مع مدرّس الرياضيات، حتى صارت هي امتحانه بدلاً من الأرقام والقوانين والمعادلات، يسأله المدرّس عن أغنية بعينها، وعلى الطالب أن يجيب ذاكراً كاتب كلماتها وملحنها، أحياناً يقلب المدرّس اللعبة، يذكر اسمي الشاعر والملحن ويترك لتلميذه أن يصطاد الأغنية، هكذا، وفي الحالين، دخل رامي، وناجي، والقصبجي، وزكريا أحمد، والشيخ أبو العلا، والسنباطي، وعبد الوهاب، والموجي، وبليغ، وبيرم، وقباني، ومرسي جميل عزيز، وشوقي وسواهم درس الرياضيات، يا الهي إنهم يدخلون درساً بعد آخر، بهيآتهم الغريبة، يملأون الصف، وقد طردوا فيثاغورس وأغلقوا من خلفه الباب..الأرقام الوحيدة التي تلعلع بين الطالب ومدرّسه هي  4 مايو 1904، تاريخ ميلاد السيدة، كانا معاً يقفزان برشاقة فوق تاريخ وفاتها، يُغمضان أعينهما وهُبْ يقفزان، كأنهما يردمان هوة ميتتها، يرميان لها، في كل درس، حبل الحياة.

 كان الفتى أحد أصغر المفتونين سناً الذين صادفتهم في حياتي، وكان القطار يخبُّ، مع حديثه، في الظلام، منفصلاً عن رمال العراق، صاعداً لدقهلية مصر، لمركز السنبلاوين ـ يا لغرابة الأسماء ـ مع الفجر يُبطئ قليلاً، تخفُّ اندفاعته، وتنقطع أصوات ركّابه، ربما نكون قد أسلمنا أنفسنا لملائكة النوم، لكننا نعرف أننا وصلنا قرية اسمها طماي الزهايرة، وفي نومنا ننتظر أن يتوقف القطار وتنقطع حركته أمام بيت متواضع فيها. هنا إبراهيم البلتاجي، إمام مسجد القرية ومؤذنه، وهنا زوجته فاطمة، فاطمة المليجي، التي ستهب العالم بذرة حشاشتها: أم كلثوم.

حتى ما قبل دخولك الأربعين، بسنوات قليلة ربما، كانت أم كلثوم لغزاً، محض لغز يحوم من حولك، مثل طائر غريب يحطّ فجأة، وفجأة يطير، ضبابه موسيقى غير مفهومة تهوّم، حتى لتبدو أقصى من قدرتك ـ وأنت الفتى الذي عرف الحزن ـ على قبول الصوت، قبولاً خالصاً، والذوبان فيه، وأعلى من إرادتك على رفضه، رفضاً تاماً، ونشّ الطائر الغريب، والخلاص منه.

لم تكن قد استجبت تماماً لمواقيت النغم التي سنّتها إذاعة بغداد، فغدت عُرفاً وطنياً قائماً حتى اليوم: فيروز لساعات الصباح الأولى، وأم كلثوم للواحدة بعد الظهر وأقصى السهرة، سيدتان تتقاسمان أيامنا، لكنك، وبدافع من انكسارات عاطفة صبيانية وجدت نفسك على جرف عبد الحليم، صحبة مجموعة مولهة من الأصدقاء، تأخذكم لوعة أصابعه وهي تموج مع النغم، كنت تتقلّب من حال لحال، مشدوداً للوعة صوته، يغطيك رمل أحزانه، وتغسلك أمواج سعاداته الخاطفة. 

كان سحر أم كلثوم حاضراً يناوشنا من بعيد، أغاني الطقوس والمناسبات جعلت منها، لا من أغنياتها فحسب، أيقونة البهجة وبوابتها، ولم يكن الأمر موقوفاً على ارتباطنا بها أو بسواها، كان للطقس والمناسبة حكمهما الذي يلمُّنا جميعاً، على اختلاف من نهوى: عبد الحليم أو فيروز أو فريد الأطرش، أو عبد الوهاب بالنسبة لآبائنا، فلا يحلُّ العيد ولا يكتمل بما يُعلنه جامع (الأبلّة)، شئ ما يظل ناقصاً، غير رائحة الكليجة، والملابس الجديدة، والألعاب التي تُنصب في السوق. أم كلثوم، وحدها، توقد نجمة العيد وتؤكد هلاله بندائها (يا ليلة العيد)، طقطوقة رامي والسنباطي، ببساطة كلماتها وسلاسة لحنها ورشاقته، السنباطي سيكون حاضراً كذلك في فواتح عيد الأضحى، صحبة أحمد شوقي هذه المرّة، لحظة تغني أم كلثوم (إلى عرفات الله).

لم يكن الصباح موهوباً كله لفيروز، كانت لأم كلثوم حصة فيه، ذلك ما سنّته إذاعة بغداد وهي تحيي مستمعيها عبر ترنيم السيدة (يا صباح الخير يا اللي معانا)، الأغنية التي انسابت منذ عام 1948 من فلم (فاطمة)، لتسبح طويلاً في نهر أيامنا، ممهورة بكلمات بيرم التونسي وألحان القصبجي، سأسمعها بواكير الصباح، مع النصف الأول من الثمانينيات، عقد القسوة التي نحتتها حرب طويلة قاهرة، تبثها اذاعات التوجيه السياسي في معسكرات التدريب، وفي الوحدات العسكرية أنى انتقلت، جرياً على عادة اذاعة بغداد، بعد أناشيد سيد النقشبندي ومدائحه، بصوته الفخم الذي يجلجل بين المنام والصحو، يأخذني دفق نوره لوراء ما يُنشد، حيث سماء اللوعة بلا حدود، وستعني لي أغنية السيدة وقتها أكثر مما تعنيه أغنية لفتى، سيتكسر زجاج في صدر الفتى الجندي كل صباح، مع سذاجة الدعوة التي تعلنها الأغنية، وهو يعرف أن لا كروان ينتظرهُ في قسوة أيام العسكر، ولا نسيم.

كانت أم كلثوم، حتى قبل أن تغفو في الثالث من فبراير عام خمسة وسبعين، اثنين رحيلها، ظلاً يطوّف حول حياتنا المنزلية، يدخلها من دون دعوة ويكون فيها، يدور صوتها معنا حيث ندور في المعقل، في المنزل والشارع والسوق، يأتينا من راديو الجيران في كل وقت، وهم يعبرون بمؤشره من إذاعة لأخرى، من صورتها الفوتوغرافية الكبيرة العالية في غرفة الضيوف، من تفجّعهم بموتها، المرّة الأولى التي أكتشفت فيها أن لربطة العنق صلة بالموت كانت مع رحيل أم كلثوم، فقد كان لنا جار يميزه عن جيران المعقل تعلّقه بأم كلثوم و أناقته المفرطة، بنطلوناته الشارلستون المكويّة باتقان، قمصانه السادة أو المزهرة بقماشها الخفيف، وسِتَرَه المقلّمة بياقاتها العريضة وأزرارها الكبيرة اللامعة، وأربطة العنق التي لا عدّ لها، مع رحيل أم كلثوم لم يعد يرتدي منها، لسنوات طويلة، سوى الربطة السوداء، ربطة تعرض مرّة وتستدق أخرى، تحنو في عقدة فرنسية طيعة أو تشتد، لكنها تظل سوداء في كل وقت، عندما أستعيد الرجل اليوم، محتفياً بحضوره بين عشاق السيدة، أتذكر أشياء كثيرة ذابت أو تغيرت، لكنني لا أتذكره بربطة عنق ملوّنة. 

مع أم كلثوم يلتقي التاريخان العام والخاص، يتضافران ويتواشجان، يعيدان بلقائهما سرد وقائعنا، الشخصية منها والعامة، يكتبانها على نحو جديد بعد أن يدور الزمان دورته، وتغرق في نهره أحلام وتفسيرات ودعاوى وأفكار، يظل الصوت وحده مئذنة من ذهب.

إن أكثر ما رسّخ أغنيات جيل العمالقة في حياتنا، وأغاني أم كلثوم في القلب منها، هو قدرتها على تدوين لحظاتنا، تثبيتها على نحو ما في الروح والذاكرة. تعيش الأغنيات، بذلك، ترجمتها الفردية في الوقت الذي تتلبس عواطفنا، لتصبح، وهي الأغنيات التي تعيش في الشعور العام، تضئ وتنبض، مفاتيح تواريخ شخصية وعلامات، لن تكون أغنية (الأطلال)، بهذا التصوّر، إلا إيقونة حبي الأول، حب الصبا الأقرب إلى التولّه والقداسة والجنون، وقد أهدتني إحدى صديقات المعقل شريط الأغنية، فوجدت نفسي أعيش ألماً ثلاثي العوالم: أُرفع عالياً بدفق أنغام السنباطي التي أتصوّرها تنبثق من أعلى جبل، تلفُّ وتدور قبل أن تصل إليّ، تهب من حولي وتأخذني فأتنفسها وأعيش دقائق أنغامها، وتسليم قصيدة ابراهيم ناجي بقدريتها الجارحة، وجبروت صوت أم كلثوم، تأخذني، أنا الصبي غضّ العود، وتلقي بي على ضفة إلى صلابة الصخر أقرب، إلى عتق لونه وهول ما يكتم من أسرار، تغيّبني موجة وتعيدني أخرى، ووجه فاتنتي، صاحبة الشريط، يتجلى مع كل موجة وكل نغم.

إنها واحدة من ثمار ستينيات أم كلثوم، وقد دخلت عصرها الذهبي بكامل قدرتها وجلال هيبتها، العقد الذي عاشت الأغنية العربية خلاله واحداً من أكثر عقودها عبقرية ودلالاً.

في لقاء التاريخين، العام والخاص، وتواشجهما، يحدث أن تنقلب المعاني وتتغيّر الدلالات، مثلما غدت (أنت عمري) ـ قصيدة أحمد شفيق كامل التي دسّها محمد عبد الوهاب في درج مكتبه خمس سنوات تقريباً، ولم تخرج إلا برغبة من جمال عبد الناصرنفسه ـ بالنسبة لي، اغنية حرب بامتياز، لا بما تعنيه أغنية الحرب من ذهاب إلى الحماسة والبطولة والفداء، إلى فداحة العمى وهو يسبق الموت وقسوته، بل بما عشته معها من ليال في سواتر شرق البصرة، وقد قاسمني الملجأ أحد عشاق أم كلثوم وهم كثر ـ في كل حضيرة وفصيل وسرية وفوج يصادفك جيش من عشاق السيدة، يجعل سواتر الحرب أخفَّ قسوة ولياليها أقلَّ وحشة وظلاماً ـ كان في الملجأ أكثر من راديو ترانزستور تتنقل مؤشراتها من البي بي سي إلى مونتي كارلو، بحثاً عن أمل بارق عسير، لكنها تصمت، بعد وقت ليس بالبعيد، ويظل صوت أم كلثوم يضئ الملجأ بحثاً عن عينين تعيداننا، نحن فتيان الحرب، لأحلامنا، تعلماننا الندم على ماض لم نعشه.

هل كنا نصالح، مع أم كلثوم، أيامنا، نسامح زماننا، وننسى الشجن؟

إنني أستعيد بذار أم كلثوم في حياتي، أرصد ملامح فتنتها، أُدخل التاريخ الشخصي بالتاريخ العام، أجمعهما في لحظة، وأعرف أننا حينما نكتب عن عشق السيدة، فإننا نناور لكتابة حياتنا، نحتال لتدوين بعض من أوجاعنا، والتقاط تأريخ أرواحنا الذي تصعب استعادته بغير طاقة الفن وقدرته على ملاعبة الزمان..

مع أم كلثوم اكتشفت أن الأمر لا يقف عند حدود أن أحب أو لا أحب..

 إنه فصل من فصول حياتنا خارج مسار العاطفة، ومواقيت القبول والرفض، وأبعد منهما..

للعاطفة مع أم كلثوم معنى يتشكل في المنطقة الشفيفة بين السعادة والحزن، بين الفرح المورق بلقاء الحبيب ولوعة غيابه، يسحب وجهاً ملتبساً للعلاقة بين التسليم لعبودية المحبوب ورفضه والاحتجاج عليه، عاطفة تهبّ عاتية من كتاب الصحراء، من أقصى فصوله لوعة وعذاباً.

 ربما يكون من الأجدى السؤال عن الكيفية التي عشت بها صوتها، تنفسته، وحييت فيه، لتكون الكتابة عن حياتنا الشخصية بتفاصيلها الخفيّة، عن حبيباتنا وأهلنا وأصدقائنا، عن قسوة سنواتنا، في نص واحد مناسبة تماماً، فنحن، عبر صوت أم كلثوم، ننادي الزمان، نفتح له باباً ونرسم حلماً لم نعش لذاذاته، نُنصت لها، من جديد، وفي دواخلنا ينبض سؤال عن العمر الذي تغنيه، تهتف من أجله، تملؤه كأساً بعد كأس، تهديه لمحبوب، أيُّ عمر، ذاك الذي يبرق في صوتها، وقد التفّت على رحيلها عقود طويلة وعقود؟.. 

لكن علاقتي بها تظل، على الرغم من كل ذلك، نوعاً من لغز، لغز مضبب يحوم من حولي.. 

ربما كان مزاج أبي، لا صبابته، هو ما أورثني، بعد عقود، عشق السيدة.

لم يكن أبي يعشق أم كلثوم، ذلك ما ينبغي أن أتأمله، عامل الميناء كان مثل عمّال الكون، لا يختلف عنهم كثيراً، لا بسحنته، ولا ببدلته الزرقاء، ولا برائحته عندما يعود من العمل، ولا بخوفه الموصول، خوف غريب وغير مفهوم بالنسبة لي، رغم التعب الذي يهدُّ بدنه يوماً بعد يوم، يسكر أحياناً، يصلّي ويصوم أحياناً، لكنه لم يكن يعشق أم كلثوم، لم يكن هواه، على كل حال، مع الأغنية. 

المرّة الأولى التي دخل جهاز التسجيل فيها بيتنا كانت جرّاء حادثة اصطدام، كان أبي، في أواسط عمره تقريباً، يسوق الدرّاجة النارية وله معها شأن، من الـ MZ، الخنزيرة وأختها، إلى الـ Scooter، الفزبه منفوخة البطن، إلى الـ Traidnt، درّاجة شرطة المرور المخيفة العالية باسمها الرنّان مثل أسماء الطائرات، جميعها بالطبع مُلك شركة الموانئ العراقية، ولم يكن قد ركبها إلا بعدما أصبح ملاحظاً في قسم الماء والكهرباء أوائل السبعينيات، مترقياً، بعد عقود من الجهد والخوف، من عامل تأسيسات مائية، عمل الملاحظ يتسع، وزمنه يبدو أكثر سرعة وآلية من زمن درّاجة العمّال الهوائية. الترايدنت هي التي أدخلت جهاز التسجيل إلى بيتنا، فقد حدث أن صدمتها سيارة مرسيدس، سوداء أو رصاصية، برقم كويتي، وطرحت أبي على الإسفلت، كسرت ساقه اليسرى، وزلزلت عموده الفقري، زارنا صاحب السيارة في عصر صيف، بعد خروج أبي من المستشفى، وكان إيرانيا أبيض الوجه، هكذا أتذكره أو أتصوّره، أغمض عينيّ فأستعيده وأراه، شعره أسود، سرح، كأنه أحد أعضاء فرقة الإنشاد الوطنية. حمل معه، على سبيل الترضية، هدايا عديدة، لم يعلق منها في فمي غير طعم شرائح القمر الدين، وقد رطبتها حرارة صيف البصرة، ولم يتبق منها في ذاكرتي غير جهاز تسجيل بسماعتين كبيرتين، كانت عزيزة جلال، وليس أم كلثوم أوعبد الحليم، تغني داخله ليالي الأنس لأسمهان، كأنها تناديها. 

كان مزاج أبي حاداً، مزاج رجل أكثر ميلاً إلى التوحد والعنف، شكّاك، يحدّث نفسه بصوت مسموع، كلماته غير مفهومة، في كل وقت، سواء كان وحده أو وسط جيش من الناس، تلك علامته الفارقة، غير النظارة ذات الإطار البلاستك الأسود الثخين وشاربه المحدّد مثل خيط صوف، وكان يطقطق بأسنانه حينما ينام، أسمعه كأننا مازلنا ننام على سطح بيتنا بترابه المرشوش، كما لو كان يقرض حبلاً طويلاً لا ينتهي. حينما تضيق بوجهه الدنيا، وهي غالباً ما تضيق، يسجن نفسه في الظلمة، كأنه يحاسبها ليلاً على ما جرى في النهار، وحيداً يجلس في ظلمة قاهرة، قبل أن يغيب عن عينيه النور شيئاً فشيئاً وقد فتك به مرض السكري، ويعيش ظلمة ممتدة ليل نهار، ولا يعود يراني، في زياراتي المتباعدة لبيتنا القديم، إلا براحة يده التي رقّ جلدها والتمع ولان، ولا يعرف ولديّ، وقد كبرا قليلاً، إلا من صوتيهما.

أنا الآن في مثل العمر الذي كان أبي يسجن نفسه فيه، لم أركب درّاجة نارية من أي نوع، ولم أجلس في الظلمة وحدي، لكن الصوت المجلجل أخذني في عذاباته سنة بعد أخرى، حتى وجدتني غارقاً فيه. أفكّر في مسألة أم كلثوم التي أعشق، وأراها عراقية الطابع، بصريّة الروح والهوى، زمانها زمان الحلم في البصرة، في شارع الكورنيش، في شارع الوطن، في البرجسية، في حديقة الأمة أو حديقة الأندلس، في ساعات اللوعة والمرارة والعذاب، كم جمّعت من أناس وكم فرّقت، في أوقات السُكر المتباعدة وانتشاءتها الخفيفة العابرة، في لمّة الصداقات التي بددتها الحروب.      

[.نشر هذا المقال لأول مرة في "أخبار الأدب" وتعيد جدلية نشره بإذن من الكاتب]

The aesthetic and political significance of the murals and the graffiti of Mohammed Mahmud Street continue to draw much attention through to their mesmerizing beauty and their crucial significance for the visual and artistic narration of the revolution. It is not only the murals’ aesthetic appeal that has captured the imagination of many observers, but also how they exemplify a fascinating fusion between a variety of cultural artistic traditions that portray Egypt’s rich history, namely Pharaonic, popular Islamic, and contemporary traditions. They all reinvent, adapt to and adopt universal schools of painting, adding a fascinating “Egyptian twist” to express—sometimes humorously—the spirit of rebellion and resistance.

It remains debatable whether the Mohammed Mahmud murals represent a post-January 25 Revolution innovation, or whether the very idea of murals had already existed in the façade paintings of rural dwellings as inscribed in Islamic traditions and ancient Egyptian temples. Yet, the fusion between popular Islamic, Pharaonic and contemporary artistic traditions remains one of the most striking features of these murals.

This short photo essay is the beginning of a broader research effort to highlight the influence of symbols of popular Islam in visualizing the January 25 Revolution through the theme of the “Buraq,” which appeared in the murals by artists Alaa Awad and Ammar Abu-Bakr. Specifically, the essay examines two distinctively different visions of the Buraq; namely the Buraq of Alaa Awad in the mural facing Tahrir Square at its intersection with Mohammed Mahmud Street. Before it was erased on the week of 21 May 2012 the mural was located on the last Mohammed Mahmud wall to be painted after the rest of the Street’s walls were completely filled with graffiti. The second Buraq, which was painted earlier by Ammar Abu Bakr, is located on the walls of Mohammed Mahmud Street.

The Buraq is a mythological creature that is half-animal half-human with wings. The body has often been described as representing a half-mule, half-donkey. In some Islamic traditions the Buraq is figured with the head of a woman, while in some paintings it appears with a male head. Earlier Islamic references do not seem to define the human element of the head. The Buraq is famously known as the creature that is said to have transported the Prophet Muhammed from Mecca to Jerusalem and back on the night of the “Israa and Meraj” (the night journey). Associated with flying and defiance of gravitation, the Buraq is often viewed as a symbol of freedom and liberation.

Buraq also means lightening, and in some contexts the term denotes a vision or a dream. In the Persian and Indian traditions, the Buraq is represented as a beautiful looking half-woman, half-animal with long black hair and a peacock tail. In some Indian paintings the body takes the shape of a cow.

The Buraq, we are told, also transported Abraham who shared his time between one wife in Syria and another in Mecca. This evokes one interpretation of the Buraq as the state of being in an intermediate realm, somewhere between two worlds, such that one would be experience being in two places at the same time. One could further draw the analogy between the Buraq and the realities in Egypt, by underscoring the uncertain, seemingly intermediate state in which post-Revolution Egypt appears to be experiencing today.

Alaa Awad’s murals tended to heavily borrow from Pharaonic art. His first painting in Mohammed Mahmud Street depicted the scene of an ancient Egyptian funeral, in which women mourners are praying behind a sarcophagus that is being carried away while the soul of the deceased is ascending to heaven. The mourned were the Ahly Ultras fans who were massacred in Port Said on 2 February 2012.

              
                                                             [Alaa Awad Buraq mural. Photo by Mona Abaza.]

Alaa’s most recent paintings on the wall facing Tahrir Square differ from his previous work. Here he seems to combine  several traditions, fusing Islamic icons with contemporary art. According to Awad, this mural depicts the internal conflict the revolution faced when it had to retreat from the battle after confronting violent attacks by counter-revolutionary forces. However, what the mural conveys clearly is the ordeal of a violent battle and death. The retreat of the revolutionary forces is portrayed in the mural by ancient worriers and horse-riders turned upside down. This seems to be happening at the same time as preparations for another attack are underway. Here a figure, resembling an infant dressed in white (possibly with white wings) is standing on the back on the Buraq, but without riding on it. Awad’s Buraq is accompanied by a few young black panthers, which, according to him, symbolize the protectors of the Revolution. Near the Buraq, a chariot’s weel, perhaps as a prison, is incarcerating the face of an officer that symbolizes one of the officers who had been imprisoned by the army after participating in an anti-SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) Tahrir protest on 8 April 2011. Awad’s message is that the SCAF does not represent the entire army, which also encompasses the honest officers who sided with the revolution and were condemned by the SCAF for doing so.

              
                              [Alaa Awad Buraq mural with focus on the chariot’s wheel. Photo by Mona Abaza.]

Alaa Awad’s mural shows a Buraq featuring a  female head with wild, curly hair. The Buraq is green (which is often interpreted as the color of Islam) and displays the body of a mule or a horse, with three front legs, perhaps to convey speed. Staring faces, some of which are upside down, appear on the Buraq´s body. Black panthers are protecting the Buraq, which appears to be standing in the middle of a battlefield. Looking backwards in the direction of its protector, the Buraq seems to be betwixt between defeat, retreat and possible resurgence. The Buraq’s depiction could possibly also symbolize the struggle of the women who have encountered humiliation, virginity tests, and beatings in Tahrir Square. The Buraq is conflicted about what to do: run away, escape, or advance toward freedom? The mythical figure of the Buraq, for Alaa Awad, appears to epitomize freedom, the symbol of the revolution.

              
                                                       [Ammar Abu-Bakr’s Buraq Mural. Photo by Mona Abaza.]

Ammar Abu-Bakr’s Buraq on the other hand, evokes the image of the facades of the rural dwellings in Egypt. In contrast to Alaa Awad, the body of the Buraq  in Abu-Bakr’s mural is sky-blue. The head of the woman is staring at passers-by. Her black braids and her ornamented headscarf are clear references to the traditional fellahin garment. The Buraq speaks to the Egyptian fellahin culture and in this case it would be mostly often associated with the hajj (Muslim pilgrimage) journey. The Buraq is often painted on the facades of houses in the countryside when celebrating one’s return from hajj, and as a way of narrating the sojourn. It is perhaps another way of reminding us of the significance of the fellahin popular tradition in the revolution.

Alaa' s mural vanished away this week thanks to the “professional whiteners” whom Egyptian authorities usually commission to erase graffiti art from streets. The mural and the buraq, mentioned in this article turned this week into an archive that could be resurrected through the efforts of photographers.

            
                                 [Alaa Awad Buraq erased on Mohammed Mahmud Street. Photo by Mona Abaza.]

The obsession with whitening walls persists all over the city. On 21 May as I passed in front of the murals of Mohammed Mahmud Street, I found out that some local officials had started to paint over the mural on the American University in Cairo (AUC) wall facing Tahrir. By the time AUC security personnel noticed it, the entire mural facing Tahrir and one bit of the Mohammed Mahmud mural which was painted only last week had vanished away under a thick white paint. AUC security personnel managed to stop the workers from erasing the rest of the wonderful mural.

              
                                              [Silhouette painting before it was erased. Photo by Mona Abaza]

              
                                                 [Silhouette painting after it was erased. Photo by Mona Abaza.]

The government-commissioned workers justified their actions by stating that they were only interested in erasing insults against SCAF. What they targeted though, apart from Awad’s wonderful mural, which included no words or insults, was the infamous half-Mubarak half-Tantawi portrait and the most recent drawing of a faceless military uniformed silhouette with a joker’s mouth, holding with threads headless marionettes wearing suits and ties. Perhaps too, these professional whiteners thought of starting erasing graffiti from the Tahrir side so that they would be unnoticed by AUC security. Last month, AUC administration had decided to preserve the murals and graffiti by painting the walls with a protective layer, though it seems that their efforts to protect the art were partly unsuccessful.

Shortly after the incident was announced on Facebook, the Square was filled with numerous photographers and graffiti hunters who were already filming the next round of politically subversive graffiti art. The artistic struggle to preserve the revolution remains strong.

              
         [Photographers document making of next round of graffiti on Mohammed Mahmud Street. Photo by Mona Abaza.]

[The following article was translated into English by Christine Cuk.]

The Kurdish issue in Syria has a history and trajectory that are different from sectarian problems in the region. It is not a sectarian problem, as the Kurds are not a sect of Arabs or a special Islamic group. They belong to a people that are forty million strong and are distributed over a number of countries, and they are the largest national group in both the region and the world that is deprived of a political counterpart to its existence: an independent state. The aspects of the region's Kurdish question differ from the revival of sectarian problems in Arab-Islamic society.

A problem often mentioned is that it is impossible and impermissible to talk about a Kurdish people and a Syrian people in one state, and the assumption is that there are a Syrian people, or one Arab Syrian people, and that's all; thus, there may not be two peoples in one state.

This theoretical argument assumes that there is a deep national state in Syria, that it has attempted integrated social engineering in its sphere, and that the state has arisen on this basis. But if one were to invoke the current or historical tangible reality (and not the previous argument), one would notice that in the Kurdish situation one faces a different reality, since Kurdish national identity has not been subjected to extermination or incorporation into the national identity; rather, it has retained a deep-rooted particularity. The occasional integration of Kurds into Damascene or Hama society, for example, do not come close to the truth of the problem, since the essence of the Syrian Kurdish issue assumes a concrete form only in those areas where the inhabitants speak only Kurdish and understand themselves only as Kurds, in terms of a national-civic identity.

The Kurdish issue has not crystallized in Syria as a general problem of the state and Syrian society, as it has in neighboring countries, because the Kurdish regions exist on the periphery, distant from the larger cities, centers of politics, and power struggles. The Kurds who are integrated into Syrian society (in Damascus, Hama, and Aleppo) have participated extensively in politics and have held high positions in the army and government, but only as Syrians, and only before the Ba’ath's seizure of power and the exclusion of Kurds from all top positions, especially in the army and the diplomatic and political corps. On the other hand, the Kurdish nationalist sentiments that have sprung up in the period of nationalist enthusiasm have found other channels for expressing themselves: namely, the symbolic and political interaction with the political movement and struggle of the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey. Syrian Kurdish society was confused with respect to identity and affiliation, and was pulled to its national centers and historical cities outside the borders of the new Syria.

A general problem did not arise, but the issue of their identity was very much present in the Kurdish mind, and thus inflamed nationalist sentiments, as they remained confined within their respective borders. The problem became more acute with the nationalist and authoritarian policies undertaken at the time of Syrian-Egyptian unification in 1958, despite the well-known and open personal position of the late Gamal Abdel Nasser—inspiration of the pan-Arabists at that time—on the Kurdish question, especially in Iraq (some of them attribute this position to his conflict with Iraq's leaders and the conflict between Cairo and Baghdad for regional influence).

As authoritarian oppression and societal deprivation of politics and freedoms increased, the Kurds' share of them doubled, within the limits of the regimes' underhanded policies. In addition, other factors played a part in keeping the Kurds relatively apart from the general political movements of the time. The most important of these was the relationship of the strong Hafez al-Assad regime with the two main Kurdish parties in Iraq and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (in Turkey). These relationships represented a real paradox: depriving the Syrian Kurds of the most basic of their rights (such as denationalization and the prohibition of their language and culture), while supporting the Kurdish movements outside Syria. In addition, there was the Syrian political forces' marginalization of Kurdish issues, Kurdish particularity, and Kurdish demands, and the absence of Kurds from the political sphere, along with the removal of democratic freedoms in the country.

An organized Kurdish political movement was established in the summer of 1957 as an accumulation of nationalist, cultural, social, and political activities. These activities extended from the beginning of the century, around the revolutions that broke out in Kurdistan during the struggle for independence from the Ottomans and later against Ataturkist fascism, to the modern day, with the struggle of the Kurds of Iraq and Iran for self-rule.

However, this movement limited its goals from the beginning to securing Kurdish rights in Syria within the framework of a democratic Syria, and within its territorial integrity. To present, no call for Kurdish independence from Syria has been issued. This silence, coupled with an absence of bloody clashes (with very few exceptions) with the central authority, and the generally good social relations with the rest of the components of Syrian society gives the Syrian Kurdish movement a peaceful character, and has made it possible to solve outstanding Kurdish problems. The absence of a tumultuous and bloody history during the Kurdish conflict with successive authorities has two contradictory effects: The first is the non-emergence of a substantial Kurdish problem in Syria, and the second is the potential to build on this peace in order to find solutions to this problem and related issues.

Syria is indebted to its Kurds, as they have never harmed their country, or its citizens, despite long years of marginalization and exclusion. The Kurds contributed (with well-known effectiveness) to Syrian independence from French occupation, building the national state (before the eras of exclusion), and they did not adopt sectarian or national-chauvinist positions. They did not throw a single rose on a policeman, an intelligence element, or a single Arab citizen, including those whom the authorities settled in Kurdish regions after good agricultural land was expropriated from its farmers and original Kurdish owners and granted to Arab citizens who were brought from outside the governorate (from al-Raqqah and Aleppo).

The Kurdish question has been fair and just, both before and after the breakout of the popular uprising. It must be treated, on a number of levels, as a basic issue of social justice on the Syrian level. In the political sphere, it will be a present and strongly pressing issue with two dimensions: adherence to the unity of the state and its public nature, and the aim of strengthening it in exchange for the powerful Kurdish request for constitutional and legal provisions to ensure collective (and not only individual) equality. This is a theoretical and practical problem faced by Syrian social and political thought. The task within the cultural and epistemological fields is to provide all political sides (forces, parties, youth activists…) with concepts that spring from reality first and foremost, and putting these realities in an epistemological framework. 

The basic issue is the creation of a new concept of citizenship and equality, one that opens these concepts up to new horizons that have emerged from the history of forming the modern Syrian state over the last century, and from a reality of truly existent pluralism, which is neither imaginary nor incidental.  

[This article was orginally published in al-Hayat.] 

This is a selection of what you might have missed on Jadaliyya last week.  It also includes the most read articles. Progressively, we will be featuring more content on our "Last Week on Jadaliyya" series. 

• About Last Night
• Egyptian Elections: Preliminary Results [UPDATED]
• Egypt's Working Class and the Question of Organization
• "We Didn't Know It Was Impossible, So We Did It": The Quebec Student Strike Celebrates Its 100th Day
• War Against Activists: Turning Saudi Arabia Into A Big Prison
• Al-Jazeera's (R)Evolution?
• UN Committee 2012 Session Concludes Israeli System Tantamount to Apartheid
• Analyzing Egyptian Presidential Election Vote
• Why Did Sabbahi - 'One of Us' - Do So Well?
• Egypt's Presidential Election: Meet the Contenders

• حوار شامل مع المفكر المغربي عبد الله العروي
• The Kurdish Question in Syria: A General Approach
• The Buraqs of "Tahrir"
• عشق السيدة
• Poetry of the Taliban
• Missing in Bahrain: On Ali Abdulemam (Video)
• Analyzing Egyptian Presidential Election Vote
• Sabbahi To Seek Election Suspension, Cites Voting Irregularities
• Masrah al-Share' (Theater of the Street): Performing in Downtown Amman (In both Arabic and English)
• Egypt's Presidential Elections and Twitter Talk
• Why Did Sabbahi - 'One of Us' - Do So Well?
• Why Did Abul-Fotouh Fail In The Presidential Elections?
• How Did Mubarak's Last PM Make It To Egypt's Second Round of Presidential Elections?
• ثورة ...ضمن "القواعد المرعية الإجراء"؟
• The Elevation of Jeffrey Feltman
• Unofficial Egyptian Election Results: Morsy First, Shafiq Second
• Symbols of Nakba, Visions of Return: Al Majdal Special Issue on the Nakba and Resistance
• UN Committee 2012 Session Concludes Israeli System Tantamount to Apartheid
• Mursi First, Shafiq Second in Egypt President Race With Two Governorates to Tally Up
• الرجل والمرأة صنوان لهما كرامة واحدة
• War Against Activists: Turning Saudi Arabia Into A Big Prison
• Egypt Elects its President While in Crisis
• Nazlet Al-Semman District: 'Not Everybody Loves the Revolution'
• Suez, Which Stoked Flames of Uprising, Lukewarm on Election
• Vote Counting Begins in Historic Egypt Election
• Summer 2012 Internships at Jadaliyya/Arab Studies Institute
• القضاء على الفساد، مصر تحتاج إلى قانون حرية تناقل المعلومات
• In Labor Stronghold of Mahalla, Vote Split Between Morsy and Sabbahi
• Class Divisions Emerge in Alexandria Vote
• Egyptian Presidential Elections, Day One: Turnout and Trends
• Syria Media Roundup (May 24)
• Maghreb Media Roundup (May 24)
• Reading The Tea-Leaves: Early Indications of Egypt Presidential Poll Results
• New Texts Out Now: Hilal Elver, The Headscarf Controversy: Secularism and Freedom of Religion
• The Presidential Race: A Game of Egyptian Roulette
• Election Day Violations Widespread But Relatively Minor
• For Egypt's Voters, Revolution Feels Light Years Away
• Can Egypt Have a President Without a Constitution?
• "We Didn't Know It Was Impossible, So We Did It": The Quebec Student Strike Celebrates Its 100th Day
• Post-January 25 Iranian-Egyptian Relations: A New Dawn?
• Egypt's Working Class and the Question of Organization
• لماذا سأقاطع الانتخابات الرئاسية؟
• Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (May 22)
• سنان أنطون: العراق تعمق فيه تشويه التاريخ
• Ali from Bahrain: How I Became a Refugee (In both Arabic and English)
• Interview with Egyptian Presidential Candidate Abdel Moneim Abul Fettouh
• About Last Night
• To Fight Corruption, Egypt Needs a Freedom of Information Law

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Egypt and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Egypt Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to egypt@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.]

“Winners and losers of the presidential race”
Moustafa Khalil says the biggest loser in the presidential elections is the Muslim Brotherhood; the biggest winner – Hamdeen Sabahy.

“Elections commission sets Sunday as deadline for accepting appeals”
The Supreme Electoral Commission receives appeals from four candidates, including Ahmed Shafiq, Hamdeen Sabahy, Amr Moussa and Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh.

“Abul-Fotouh campaign files complaint over claimed polling breaches”
Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh files an appeal with the electoral commission, citing voting violations.

“Mubarak's NDP versus the Brotherhood: Déjà vu?”
Dina Ezzat says the results of the presidential elections have disappointed many revolutionaries.

“Parliament committee approves standards of Constituent Assembly formation”
According to the new standards, the Constituent Assembly has to write the constitution within a month.

“Egypt’s new president must hit the ground running or face Tahrir”
Carina Kamel outlines the challenges that the new Egyptian president will have to face in taking office at a difficult time for the country.

“Egyptians as they really are, for once”
Rami Khouri reflects on the results of a recent opinion poll about public attitudes in Egypt.

“Alaa al-Aswany: 'Egypt, strong but paralysed'”
Alaa El-Aswany on the present socio-political situation in Egypt.

“Egypt's elections do not simply mark a return to the status quo”
Jack Shenker looks at the complicated political situation that a run-off between Ahmed Shafiq and Mohamed Morsi created.

“Muslim Brotherhood, Freedom and Justice Party: We Seek National Unity to Save Revolution”
After announcement of election results, the Muslim Brotherhood seeks national unity against “Mubarak-era leftovers.”

“Mubarak's right-hand man sentenced to 7 years in jail”
Zakaria Azmy, former chief of staff, gets a jail sentence for illicit profiteering.

“Sabbahi, Abul-Fotouh campaigns deny claims they will back Mursi”
Claims on the Muslim Brotherhood official website that Hamdeen Sabbahi and Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh are discounted.

“Jimmy Carter visits polling centres to check voting process”
Former US president visits polling stations during the first round of presidential elections.

“Egypt's Presidential Elections: Don't Hold Breath”
Sara Khorshid challenges the validity of presidential elections in the absence of a constitution.

“Shafiq breaks electoral law, referred to prosecutor-general”
Presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq breaks electoral law by calling a press conference during the voting process.

“Are Police Voting for Shafik?”
Wael Eskandar recaps circulating evidence that members of the security apparatus have been illegally voting for Ahmed Shafiq in the presidential elections.

“Egypt’s Presidential Elections: No One Stands Out”
Sarah El Sirgany says Egyptian voters are too concerned with keeping candidates out of the race rather than supporting them.

“We Actually Won The Elections! Time to Act!”
Omar Kamel says the armed forces are the overall losers from the first round of the presidential elections.

In Arabic:

“موسى يطالب بالتحقيق الفوري في تصويت أكثر من 900 ألف مجند أمن مركزي بالجيزة”
Amr Moussa’s campaign announces it is seeking the investigation of 900,000 votes cast by soldiers of Central Security.

“اجمالي النتائج المعلنة حاليا”
Results of the first round of elections, updated May 26.

“دعوى قضائية تطالب بخوض مرسى وصباحي جولة الإعادة واستبعاد شفيق”
A lawsuit submitted to the Administrative Court demands the elimination of Ahmed Shafiq from the presidential race.

“نصر شلش يكتب: ولماذا لانختار أحمد شفيق؟؟؟”
Nasser Shalash reflects on the motivations of the Egyptians who voted for Ahmed Shafiq in the first round of the presidential elections.

“مصدر قضائى: شفيق والطيب خالفا قانون العزل”
A judicial source says that the law banning remnants of the old regime from running for president is still in force.

“مرة أخرى: قبل أن تنقرضوا”
Wael Qandil sees the potential for unity against the former regime and SCAF as a positive sign.

“الإسلامبولي يكشف تفاصيل طعون صباحي على نتائج الرئاسة: السماح لـ 117 ألف مجند بالتصويت وإلقاء بطاقات حمدين في الزراعات”
Essam Islambouli, a lawyer at the Cassation Court, files an appeal with the Supreme Electoral Commission.

“حملة شفيق: من صوتوا للفريق شاركوا فى جمعة الغضب وكانوا دائما ضد مبارك والتوريث.. ومؤيدون: إحنا ضد الثورة حد له عندنا حاجة؟”
A press release by Ahmed Shafiq’s campaign claims that people who participated in the revolution voted for him.

“زوجة «الجيزاوي»: السلطات السعودية «لم تسمح بحضور محامٍ» معه في التحقيقات”
The wife of Ahmed El-Gizawy says that the Saudi authorities continue to prevent lawyers from attending the investigation procedures against him.

“هبه السويدي «أم المصابين»: الحكومة لم تفعل شيئاً لضحايا الثورة (حوار)”
An interview with Heba El-Sewedy, “Mother of the Injured,” who started a campaign to help with the treatment of the injured during the revolution. 

Recent Jadaliyya articles on Egypt:

The Buraqs of “Tahrir”

The Presidential Race: A Game of Egyptian Roulette

Analyzing Egyptian Presidential Election Vote

Sabbahi To Seek Election Suspension, Cites Voting Irregularities

Why Did Sabbahi - 'One of Us' - Do So Well?

Why Did Abul-Fotouh Fail In The Presidential Elections?

How Did Mubarak's Last PM Make It To Egypt's Second Round of Presidential Elections?

Unofficial Egyptian Election Results: Morsy First, Shafiq Second

Mursi First, Shafiq Second in Egypt President Race With Two Governorates to Tally Up

Egypt Elects its President While in Crisis

Nazlet Al-Semman District: 'Not Everybody Loves the Revolution'

Suez, Which Stoked Flames of Uprising, Lukewarm on Election

Vote Counting Begins in Historic Egypt Election

In Labor Stronghold of Mahalla, Vote Split Between Morsy and Sabbahi

Class Divisions Emerge in Alexandria Vote

Egyptian Presidential Elections, Day One: Turnout and Trends

Reading The Tea-Leaves: Early Indications of Egypt Presidential Poll Results

The Presidential Race: A Game of Egyptian Roulette

Election Day Violations Widespread But Relatively Minor

For Egypt's Voters, Revolution Feels Light Years Away

Can Egypt Have a President Without a Constitution?

Post-January 25 Iranian-Egyptian Relations: A New Dawn?

Egypt's Working Class and the Question of Organization

Interview with Egyptian Presidential Candidate Abdel Moneim Abul Fettouh

To Fight Corruption, Egypt Needs a Freedom of Information Law

لماذا سأقاطع الانتخابات الرئاسية؟

ثورة ...ضمن "القواعد المرعية الإجراء"؟

القضاء على الفساد، مصر تحتاج إلى قانون حرية تناقل المعلومات

لماذا سأقاطع الانتخابات الرئاسية؟ 

في هذا الحوار الذي أجراه الأساتذة مصطفى بوعزيز، المعطي منجب، وسليمان بنشيخ، لمجلة «زمان»، يتحدث المفكر والمؤرخ عبد الله العروي عن قضايا راهنةٍ: عن الملكية والإسلام السياسي وحركة 20 فبراير والمغرب الكبير.

كتابك «L’Histoire du Maghreb»، هل كان رد فعلٍ على تسمية شمال إفريقيا، التي أطلقها المؤرخ الفرنسي شارل أندري جوليان؟ من ناحية أخرى هل كانت رؤيتك للمغرب هي تلك الرؤية الفدرالية التي كان يحملها الطلبة المغاربيون في فرنسا، أم كانت رؤيةً اندماجيةً من قبيل تلك التي كانت سائدةً في القاهرة؟

لإزالة كل التباس، أؤكد بأنه لو طلب مني اليوم كتابة تاريخ المغرب الكبير سأرفض، بل سأتحدث عن المغرب وحده، تاركاً للآخرين أن يتحدثوا عن بلدانهم.

 لماذا مثل هذا الاختيار اليوم؟ 

لأن فكرة إقامة مغرب عربي متحد، والرغبة في ذلك، والدعوة إلى إقامة الوحدة، كل هذا لا يثبت وجود مغرب عربي في الوقائع، ولا يجعل المغربي يتحدث عن الجزائر وتونس كما يمكن أن يتحدث عنهما جزائري أو تونسي. غالباً ما نخلط بين تجانس نخبة معينة وبين تجانس الشعوب. هذا صحيح بالنسبة إلى مناطق أخرى وليس بالنسبة إلى المغرب الكبير. انظروا إلى ما يحدث في أوروبا اليوم. الخطاب الأوروبي للنخب السياسية أصبح مطعوناً فيه في كل مكان، لأسباب معقولة أو غير معقولة، من قبل الشعوب. أنا مثلاً يمكنني أن أحس بأنني أقرب إلى مثقف تونسي، لأننا قمنا بدراسات مقارنةً، لكن هذا لا يعني بالضرورة أن يحس شخص من مدينة آسفي بنفسه قريباً من مدينة سوسة التونسية. لطالما تأسفت لعدم توفرنا على سوسيولوجيا حقيقية تعنى بالنخب المغاربية. إذ كان من الممكن أن تقوم بتنوير رجال السياسة عندنا.

 لكن الفضاء المغاربي الذي تتحدث عنه لم يكن مغلقاً. إذ كان بالإمكان التنقل داخله بكل حرية.

 هذه هي الصورة التي يحلو لنا أن نعطيها لأنفسنا. في الواقع، في الوقت الذي كان ليوطي، لم تكن الحدود بين المغرب والجزائر سهلة العبور. ليوطي الذي سبق أن اشتغل في الجزائر، وكان عارفاً بشهية المستوطنين في وهران، قام بكل شيء ليبقي المغرب معزولاً. وعندما تم استبدال ليوطي بحاكم عام سابق للجزائر، تيودور ستيك، الذي أراد تسوية الوضعية المغربية، بمعنى جعل المغرب جزائرياً، وجد الكثير من عدم الرغبة عند فرنسيي المغرب.

نحن شاهدون على أن الحدود مع الجزائر لم تكن أبدا حدوداً، بل كانت هناك علاقات ومصالح  مشتركة من الجانبين. لنكن أكثر تحديداً، فلم تكن التنقلات مراقبة.

نعم، لكن هذا لا يعني شيئاً. حتى يومنا هذا فالتنقلات غير مراقبة.

لكن في تلك الفترة لم يكن عبور الحدود يعتبر تسللاً؟

 هذا لا علاقة له بالواقع السياسي. يمكننا أن نتخذ قراراً سياسياً دون أن نكون قادرين، ميدانياً، على مراقبة ما يحدث. الوضعية نفسها توجد على الحدود مع موريتانيا. حتى نختم هذه المقدمة الصغيرة، أؤكد أن الإطار الذي كتبت فيه كتابي عن المغرب العربي، سنة 1969، كان مختلفاً تماماً عما هو عليه اليوم. الدول الوطنية لم تكن مهيكلة بشكل قوي.
 هل تظن أن وطنية الدولة تساهم في تطوير الرؤى حول الهوية المغاربية؟

 فكروا في هذا الواقع البسيط: هل يمكن أن تكون لنا نفس الرؤية عن أنفسنا وعن الآخرين في نفس البلد حينما ينخفض معدل الأمية من 70 في المائة إلى 30 في المائة؟ البلد كان يبدو أكثر استقراراً وتجانساً في الحالة الأولى. كما كانت فكرة الوحدة مع شعوب أخرى أكثر انتشاراً. هذا هو السبب، حسب رأيي المتواضع، في ضعف المثال النموذجي العربي. الأمر نفسه عند الفلامانيين. إذ حينما كانوا أقل تعلماً كانوا يقولون عن أنفسهم بكل عفوية إنهم بلجيكيون. بالتعليم يدرك الناس الفروق بينهم وبين الآخرين. يقولون إذن إنهم يعيدون اكتشاف هويتهم. في وضعية الأمية، تكون الأسطورة ملِكاً. هذه حجة للاعتراض على ما قاله المؤرخ الفرنسي جاك لوغوف. في القرون الوسطى لم يكن الأوروبيون يحسون بأنفسهم أوروبيين، بل كانوا يحسون بأنفسهم مسيحيين، لأن المعتقد المسيحي كان ثقافتهم الوحيدة. عندما يقال إن فكرة المغرب الكبير نابعة من الشعب، أتساءل: في أي وسط يوجد هذا؟ الإبقاء على علاقات متواصلة في شعاع ممتد على 30 كيلومتراً على جانبي الحدود لا يعني وجود رؤية موحدة للمستقبل.

هذه ظاهرة تتسم بها كل الحدود؟
بالفعل. مخافة أن نقع في التكرار أؤكد مرة أخرى بأنني إذا كنت كتبت كتابي حول المغرب الكبير في سياق معين، فإن هذا السياق تغير تماماً اليوم...

 هذا مفهوم. المغرب الكبير كان في تلك الفترة ممكناً في التاريخ. ما الذي كان يمثله بالنسبة إليك في تلك الفترة؟ عندما نقرأ عن مواقفك المتعلقة بالتعريب، نفهم أنها كانت تندرج ضمن إطار رؤية عالم عربي متحد، حيث لغة التواصل هي العربية الكلاسيكية. ما هي الرؤية السياسية التي تقف خلف هذا التصور؟ وهل رؤيتك اندماجية أم فدرالية؟

 لم تكن لدي أبدا رؤية اندماجية للمغرب الكبير. في تلك الفترة كانت مثاليتي الوحدوية، عربية أو مغاربية، أقلوية، (minoritaire) كانت رغبة، وتوجها شخصياً. تمنيت تلك الوحدة، لكنني لم أناضل من أجل تحقيقها. ككل جيلي، كنت واعياً بالسياسة التي ينبغي اتباعها حتى نتمكن من تحقيق رغباتنا، وفي نفس الوقت كنا نعلم بأن الواقع كان ضدنا، وكان اختيار المحافظة مريحاً أكثر. كان الأمر يستدعي إذن إرادة. كان يجب تعنيف الواقع. ومن هنا كان انتظارنا لقائد. أما فيما يخص التعريب، فقد كنت أدافع عنه لأنني كنت أفكر بأنه الطريق الأقصر لمحاربة الأمية وسط الساكنة؛ ولهذا كنت أطلب كذلك تبسيطاً، على جميع المستويات، لهذه اللغة المشتركة السيارة  غير أنه، حتى في هذا المستوى، كنت أتوقع أنه في مرحلة  معينة ستؤدي محاربة الأمية تلقائياً إلى خلق تنوع ما، وأن اللغة العربية المغربية ستصبح مختلفة عن مثيلاتها العربية. بعد ذلك تم اتخاذ اختيارات أخرى خلال أربعين سنة. اختيارات كانت لها عواقب ينبغي الحكم عليها بناء على ما تستحقه، وليس بناء على النتائج الافتراضية التي كانت ستنتج اختياراتنا المفضلة. الاختيارات التي تم اتخاذها كانت تحت ضغط عوامل داخلية وأخرى خارجية بالأساس. أنا أتحفظ على إعطاء حكم لأنني واع تمام الوعي بهذه العوامل الخارجية. ولكن  الأمور أخذت مجراها...

هل الحركات الإسلامية، التي صعد نجمها في بلدنا المغرب الكبير، تؤكد أن مجتمعاتنا المغاربية متقاربة وتتطور في نفس الاتجاه؟

 لكن، ماهي مميزات هذه الحركات الإسلامية، كل واحدة في إطارها الوطني؟ إلى حدود الآن لا أرى أي شيء إسلامي في أداء الحكومة المغربية، التي يجب التذكير بأنها نتاج تحالف. لقد ارتكبنا نفس الخطأ الذي ارتكبناه تجاه حكومة اليوسفي، حينما نسينا بأنها هي الأخرى مشكلة من تحالف. يجب الحكم على هذه الحكومة بناء على أدائها وليس بناء على ما تقوله أو ما قالته في الماضي. ينبغي الاحتراس من الخطابات المهيمنة. لنأخذ كمثال: خلال حكم بورقيبة، عندما كنت أزور تونس، كان لدي انطباع بأن المغربيات، من الناحية النفسية، أكثر تحرراً من التونسيات. مع أن الكل كانوا يقولون إن التونسيات كن الأكثر تحرراً ضمن النساء العربيات. أنا أقتصر على مراقبة الوقائع والأفعال. هذا ليس تواضعاً زائفاً، لكنني أعترف بأنه  في كل حدث يقع في المغرب أكون متفاجئاً. فخلال كل هذه السنوات التي كنت أحاول فيها فهم النظام (le  système) لازلت في كل مرة أجدني مندهشا. هذا هو ما يصنع التاريخ. التاريخ موجود لأن لا شيء متوقع.

هل تقول كذلك إنك متفاجئ بقرارات الدولة؟

نعم، في كل مرة أجدني مندهشا بسرعة اتخاذ القرارات. مثلاً، تتبعت خطوة بخطوة، على الأقل، النصف الثاني من حكم الحسن الثاني، الذي كان يتصرف بناء على حدسه. وليس هناك واحد من أفعال الحسن الثاني لم يثر اندهاشي، بسبب أنه لم يكن متوقعاً.

هل تشكل ملكية الدولة عائقا أمام بناء مغرب كبير موحد، بالمعنى الذي يتم فيه النظر إلى الملكية كوريث لنوع من السيطرة؟
 إذا كان جيراننا يفكرون هكذا، لا يمكننا أن نغير رأيهم. الآن المغرب الكبير يتقدم حسب السرعة التي تسير بها الدول التي تشكله. كل بلد عليه أن يلتزم بجدليته الخاصة. فيما يتعلق بالمغرب، في وضعيته الحالية، أنا متأكد أن السلطة الملكية لها دور ضامن للاستقرار، خصوصا أنها تسمح بتفريق الديني عن السياسي.
هل تنادي بملكية برلمانية؟

 رؤيتي هي رؤية لملكية دستورية بالفعل، دورها هو حماية الحداثة ضد القوى التقليدية والمحافظة. على الملك أن يهتم بالأسئلة الدينية، لتفادي استئثار شخص آخر بها، ثم تحريف اللعبة السياسية. في النظام المثالي كما أراه،  الملك هو المؤهل الوحيد لحل المسائل الدينية، وتلك التي يمكن  أن تنشأ من الهيكلة الجهوية الجديدة. لقد أتيحت لي الفرصة لاقتراح أن تكون الغرفة الثانية غرفة  مستشاري الملك لتحل محل مختلف المجالس الاستشارية. لكن يبدو أن هذا الاقتراح لم يسترع أي اهتمام. مع أن الاقتراح كان سيساهم في تقوية سلطة مجلس النواب حتى تكون له الصلاحية لمناقشة كل المسائل باستثناء المسائل الدينية والبين جهوية (interregionale)

 لكن هل تظن أن الملك سيقبل الاكتفاء بحصر سلطته في هذين المجالين؟ لقد كان محمد الخامس يقول إنه لا يريد أن يحصر نفسه في دور مدشّن المساجد.

هذا ليس بالدور الصغير بتاتاً. لا يجب أن ننسى أن المظاهر الجهوية أساسية. إذ سيتعلق الأمر، مثلا، بتسوية بعض المسائل التي تمس بالهوية الوطنية. كذلك، فإن الجيش والديبلوماسية سيبقيان بيد الملك. يجب التأكيد هنا بأنني أتحدث عن إمكانية بعيدة جداً. بالنسبة إلي، بكل صدق، المغرب الكبير هو إمكانية بعيدة. لا أريد أن أٌعاد إلى حلول لا أعتبرها فحسب متجاوزة، بل كذلك غير قابلة للتطبيق. ينبغي أن يقبل المغرب الكبير، في مجمله، بالتوجه نحو فصل السلط السياسية عن الدينية، كما تحدثت، وإذا لم يرد الآخرون ملكاً، فليتخذوا على الأقل سلطة دينية لا يكون حولها نزاع.

لماذا لم يبدأ مشروع الوحدة المغرب الكبير من الاقتصاد؟

هذا هو ما أتحدث عنه بالضبط. يجب البدء بتسوية المشاكل التجارية والاقتصادية، والعمل على تنقل فعلي للأموال. أنا لا أتحدث عن تحرير تنقل الأشخاص، الذين من شأنهم أن يخلقوا مشاكل حقيقية، بل عن تنقل مجموعات محددة. يمكن أن نفكر أيضا في خلق منظمات دولتية مشتركة مثل غرف التجارة والفلاحة والصناعة، أو حتى نقابات، عبر خلق مكتب مغاربي للعمل. وأيضا خلق المؤسسات التقنية المحضة، التي ينبغي أن تكون بالأساس محايدة، من قبيل مكتب للإحصاء، أو مجلس اقتصادي واجتماعي، يمكن أن تكون مشتركة. لنقل في كلمة واحدة إنه بإمكاننا مغربة كل ما يتعلق بإدارة الأمور، ولنترك، مرحلياً، ما يتعلق بسياسة الأشخاص، أو «السياسة» بمعناها في اللغة العربية الكلاسيكية. للأسف هذا لا يقنع أبداً مناشدي الوحدة؛ فهؤلاء عندما يبدؤون الحديث عن المغرب الكبير، يفكرون مباشرة في برلمان جامع، وفي انتخابات عامة، مع أن هذا صعب المنال في الوقت الحالي.

من الذي يعرقل هذا التطور الذي تدافع عنه؟

حسب علمي، ليس النظام الملكي المغربي، ولكنها ثقافة النخب السياسية، التي تختلف كثيراً من بلد لآخر.
 
أحياناً تبدو كمن يعطي تصوراً عن التاريخ آت من فوق. وأحيانا كثيرة لام عليك البعض كونك لم تجعل القبيلة تتكلم. أليس للقبيلة دور في تاريخ المغرب؟

 هل هو خطئي إن كانت القبيلة خرساء. من السهل أن نجعلها تقول كل ما نريده. أنا لم أرد أبدا أن أخوض في هذه اللعبة. نفس المشكل يطرح بخصوص مفهوم الطبقة. ولهذا كان الراحل المأسوف عليه أبراهام السرفاتي يخون نفسه مرتين، عن حسن نية بدون شك، بحديثه عن القبيلة-الطبقة. ليست القبيلة من يصنع، إيجابياً، التاريخ، لكن يمكن للقبيلة أن تصنع التاريخ سلبياً. يعلم الجميع جيدا بأن الاكتشاف الكبير في العلوم الفيزيائة هو أن «القصور» ليس بدون  تأثير. الأمر نفسه متعلق بالتاريخ. لقد رأينا ذلك للتو مع شباب 20 فبراير. ليسوا هم من كتب الدستور الجديد، الذي سيكون الوثيقة الوحيدة التي سيدرسها المؤرخون القادمون. مؤرخو الثورة الفرنسية يؤكدون على دور الحشد (la foule)، ودور تجمعات الأحياء... لكنهم يتوقفون أكثر عند أثر الدستور، لأنه ترك العديد من الوثائق، بينما تكلم الحشد وكلامه ذهب في مهب ريح التاريخ.

كيف تنظر إلى مسألة الصحراء من خلال المغرب العربي الذي تأمله؟

إلى حدود الآن، لم تكف الجزائر عن استعمال الصحراء كوسيلة ضغط سياسي. ولم تكن الوحيدة في ذلك. لقد كانت الجزائر ولازالت تتكئ على قواعد دولية، وعلى وضعية جيو سياسية جد صعبة بالنسبة إلى المغرب. موقف المغرب غير مفهوم بالنسبة إلى البلدان الأخرى، لأن القليل من هذه البلدان لها نفس البنية ونفس التجربة التاريخية. لكن السياسة الجديدة القائمة على الجهوية، وخصوصا الطريقة التي تفسر بها من طرف الهيئات الدولية تغير المعطى. يتعلق الأمر الآن بالدولة المغربية والمجموعات السكانية المحلية، وهذا الآن مكتسب. لنفترض أن الجزائر تبنت جهوية تقترح نفس المنطق التاريخي الذي اختاره المغرب، فإننا سنتمكن حينها من رؤية ظهور تدريجي لمنطقة صحراوية عابرة للحدود، ولِمَ لا مغربا كبيرا مكونا من جهات تقتسم نفس المصالح التنموية. بفضل الجهة، يمكن للدولة القومية (l’état –nation) أن تتفوق وتعيش في انسجام مع تنظيم أكثر أو أقل فيدرالية.

[عن”مجلة زمان“.]

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on the Arabian Peninsula and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Arabian Peninsula Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week's roundup to ap@jadaliyya.com by Monday night of every week.]

Repression in Bahrain

Bahrain bails human rights activist Nabeel Raja A news report on the release of Nabeel Rajab in BBC News.

Bahraini opposition figure ends hunger strike A news report on the end of Abdulhadi al-Khawaja hunger strike in Al-Akhbar English.

Bahraini activists convicted over 'Iran plot' A news report on the sentencing of six Bahraini activists to 15 years in prison in Al-Jazeera English.

Bahrain jails daughter of hunger striker A news report on Zainab al-Khawaja in Al-Jazeera English.

Secret Clinics Tend to Bahrain's Wounded Kareem Fahim writes in the New York Times about the secret treatment given by doctors and first-aid medics to Bahraini protesters.

Policy and Reports

UAE continues crackdown on activists A news report on the detention of 15 activists in the UAE calling for political reforms in Al-Jazeera English.

BAE Systems Wins £1.9bn Contract To Supply Saudi Training Jets A news report on the latest arms deal between BAE Systems and Saudi Arabia in The Huffington Post.

Stateless Blogger Facing Deportation After Being Tricked by Immigration Authorities A news report on Ahmed Abdul Khaleq, a pro-democracy activist, who is in jail before his deportation.

Manal al-Sharif: 'They just messed with the wrong woman' An interview with the Saudi woman who was filmed driving by Guy Adams in The Independent.

Crisis in Yemen

Yemen Suffering 'Catastrophic' Food Crisis As US Escalates Its Drone War A report on an imminent hunger crisis in Yemen in Common Dreams.

Yemen Shia gathering hit by suicide attack A news report on the suicide bombing in the Yemeni province of al-Jawf on Al-Jazeera English.

Yemeni army kills 35 fighters in the south A news report on the Yemeni army's offensive against an al-Qaeda stronghold in Wadi Banaa Arab on Al-Jazeera English.

Saudis Pledge $3.25 Billion in Aid to Yemen A news report on $4bn pledge to Yemen to avoid a 'catastrophic food crisis' in The New York Times.

Yemen's Other Crises An article by Letta Tayler on political instability, insecurity and humanitarian crisis in Yemen, published originally in The Huffington Post and reposted on Human Rights Watch.

Qaeda Ally Says Yemen Bomb Was Payback for Attacks An article by Robert Worth and Eric Schmitt on the suicide bombing on the eve of Yemen's National Day in The New York Times.

In Yemen, a ruthlessly symbolic attack Jane Ferguson analyzes the significance of the suicide attack in Yemen in Al-Jazeera English.

The Olympic Games

Doha and Baku lose out on Olympics bid A news report on Qatar's elimination from the 2020 Olympics bid in Al-Jazeera English.

Qatari women prepare for Olympic debut A news report on the first three Qatari women to compete at the London Olympic Games in Al-Jazeera English.

IOC: Olympic Hurdles for Saudi Women Persist A report on the decision by Saudi Arabia to ban their female athletes from participating in the London Olympic Games in Human Rights Watch.