[This is one of seven pieces in Jadaliyya's electronic roundtable on the Western Sahara. Moderated by Samia Errazzouki and Allison L. McManus, it features contributions from John P. Entelis, Stephen Zunes, Aboubakr Jamaï, Ali Anouzla, Allison L. McManus, Samia Errazzouki, and Andrew McConnell.]
The Moroccan regime's reaction and that of its supporters’ to the United States' attempt to extend the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to monitor human rights was predictable and logical—predictable because, as usual, hooliganism was adorned with the mask of patriotism, both in the media and in Parliament.
The Moroccan regime's reaction was also logical. It felt betrayed—betrayed by an ally, for whom the Moroccan intelligence services willingly carried out torture during the so-called "war against terrorism." Morocco offered "blacks sites"—secret prisons—where Moroccan labor was responsible for doing the dirty work of the United States. For its US ally, Morocco was humiliated before the world when it refused to ratify the treaty of the International Criminal Court (after signing it), because the Bush administration did not want it to.
Moreover, it is a logical reaction for a regime that wants to take advantage of the spotlight that goes with the status of being perceived as a democracy without having to pay the price. The draft resolution would, in a way, have further exposed this lie.
In reaction to this development, Morocco is trying to achieve two goals: to be an international law abiding member of the Concert of Nations while asserting its sovereignty over what the international community calls the Western Sahara. Morocco could have pursued just one of these two objectives: imposing its sovereignty over the the disputed territories to the world. It would have refused the United Nations's involvement and, if necessary, responded to any challenge to its claim with force. It would have chosen isolation and autarky. It is useful to state the implications of such approach as the jingoistic tone of the national debate suggests that we, Moroccans, are willing to pay any price in our struggle to preserve the territorial integrity of our country. It is time we start having an idea of what these costs entail. It is precisely because the Moroccan authorities are aware of the consequences of a rejection of international mediation that they are trying to achieve two goals simultaneously: sovereignty over the Sahara and integration into the international community.
How are these goals being pursued? Incompetently. The recent history of the conflict is littered with tactical failures. But graver still is Morocco’s strategic incoherence.
The hypocrisy of the expulsion of Aminatou Haidar, the Gdeim Izik fiasco where the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) and Istiqlal took turns fanning the fire, and more recently, the panicked calls for the dismissal of United Nations envoy to the Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, belong to the first category. Politely stated, these are tactical failures. Speaking more bluntly, these moves reflect an unfathomable stupidity. What they have in common is that the palace or its allies initiated these decisions. This is why the PAM secretary general’s, Mustapha Bakkoury, latest proposal to create a national commission chaired by the king to address issues and policies relating to the Sahara, under the pretext that the government has failed, is grotesque hypocrisy. After all, Abdelilah Benkirane and his government had nothing to do with these failures. Yet, Benkirane and his government are complicit at a deeper level. In endorsing an authoritarian institutional system that places the monarchy above any accountability, Benkirane condones the misguided strategies of the royal clan.
Following the passage of the resolution to extend the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) without adding to its prerogatives human rights monitoring as the United States initially requested, the royal cabinet was quick to issue a press release claiming victory. The obvious goal was to emphasize that it was the palace, not the government, that had thwarted the American initiative. The less obvious goal was to deflect attention from a serious failure: how did we get to this point? Why did the United States, a traditional ally, attempt to introduce this resolution in the first place. A rather serious failure because it signifies a strategic defeat.
Numerous international human rights organizations reports, as well as Juan Mendez’s recent report, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, confirm the ongoing impunity of serious human rights violations and exposed the myth that the Moroccan regime has reformed--the myth being that the regime has definitively turned the page with respect to its serious human rights violations. The regime (makhzen) believed it could avoid a real process of democratization through targeting those on the left and in civil society and tempting them with the makhzen’s gold, as well as placing them at the head of various commissions. Thus, the makhzen thought it could display its progress in respecting human rights in order to convince the international community. It believed that if it carried out torture for the Americans, opened the Moroccan economy to French enterprises so they could binge on huge profits to fatten up several of the Sahrawi grandes familles to buy their peace, it would have the authority to do whatever it liked in Western Sahara…and in the rest of Morocco, for that matter. If this was the only way for Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara to be accepted—by throwing away all consideration for ethics out the window—then perhaps. But this was not the only way, even though it was certainly the worst.
Who still remembers that during the sizable demonstrations in Laayoune on September 1999, neither the flag of Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic flag was visible, nor were demands for independence? Just over five years later, in May 2005, demonstrations of the same magnitude were held at Laayoune. This time, the demands were clearly for independence. The question is: what happened in the meantime? Or, what did not happen?
After the events of 1999, the king dismissed then interior minister, Driss Basri, under the pretext that the security forces used unjustified force towards the demonstrators. In stride, he announced in his speech commemorating the Green March that he would create a council, the Conseil Royal Consultatif des Affaires Sahariennes (CORCAS), and it would be responsible for the Sahrawis' demands. Additionally, it was announced that the Sahrawi population would elect the council members.
What did the monarchy do afterwards? Nothing. At least not after six years and until the major Sahrawi towns erupted in demonstrations in May 2005. Then under pressure, the king created the CORCA, but with a twist. Its members were not elected, rather, he designated them. What happened from 1999 to 2005 is that promises of a young king, who many believed was willing to democratize the country, were replaced by the renewed authoritarian ethos of a monarchy drunk on power.
The Temara secret detention and torture center, brutal police repression, justice that follows orders, press censorship, and the king’s businessmen gluttonous behavior have turned off a generation of Sahrawis—the generation of Aminatou Haidar, Mohammed Moutawakil, and Ali Salem Tamek. This is the generation that could have subscribed to the “democratic Morocco” project. That was a moment of opportunity for Morocco: convincing young Sahrawis that their aspirations for liberty and dignity would have better chances to be fulfilled in a democratic Morocco.
The project for autonomy would have made sense. Morocco could have made its case as being the choice between a democratic Morocco—that this generation would have been invited to contribute to. The other choice could have been an independence process that would have pit this young democratically minded Sahrawi generation against the Polisario elites, of whom at least some are still engrossed in a Cold War mentality and under the influence of the Algerian regime.
To make things worse, Morocco’s policy of offering the Sahrawi population exclusive economic support proved to be self-defeating. The majority of Sahrawis benefit from social services, priority access to public sector employment, public investments, and other tax exemptions that have exasperated the less fortunate “northerners.” After Gdeim Izik, when Moroccans saw the horrendous images of an injured police officer being slaughtered by alleged Sahrawi rioter, this resentment was in full display. A sort of uninhibited anti-Sahrawi racism was unleashed in the public debate, further alienating the Sahrawi populations who were depicted as spoiled and ungrateful.
The responsibility of Abdelilah Benkirane and of the political elites, who have also chosen to accept the perpetuation of authoritarianism, is historic. The withdrawal of MINURSO’s expanded mandate to monitor compliance with human rights has not helped the situation. In their attempt, one could add Juan Mendez’s reports and the international community’s countless appeals. In its attempt to expand the mandate to include human rights monitoring, the United States signaled that Morocco’s repression could have a cost. In other words, the separatist militancy is, relatively speaking, less expensive. The result is something we saw after the United Nations Security Council’s vote: lessened fear among the separatists through widespread protests. They are willing to brave batons, which will be increasingly costly for the Moroccan regime.
The inclusion of a generation of young Sahrawis—born after the Green March and who attended Moroccan public schools—in the construction of a democratic Morocco should have been Morocco’s greatest boon in settling the issue of the Sahara. Instead, in the absence of credible democratization, this factor has become the most serious hindrance.
Concretely, these individuals must be allowed to speak freely even when demanding independence. Credible civil society actors must be allowed to increase contacts and build relationships with their peers in the Sahara. We must eradicate the cancer of economic predation. Potentate farms that pump groundwater in Dakhla and elsewhere are an ecological crime and go against the territorial integrity of the country. It is also time to end the exploitative agreements that supply the quarrying sand to henchmen of the regime. Ending these practices would send a powerful signal and would lend credibility to the transitioning policies of governance. But this is not possible and would only be credible if followed by a real democratization of the country’s institutions. We missed the turning points of 1999 and 2011. Only the democratization of the country’s institutions will give Morocco a chance to make its sovereignty over the Sahara recognized, and safeguard its territorial integrity.
Morocco has, since the beginning of this affair, relied on the time factor to weaken its opponents. Today, this factor has turned into a war of attrition due to the accumulation of errors. Time, instead of erasing the mistakes or helping people forget them, only increases their cost.
[This article was originally published in French on Lakome.]